Distributional Effects of Political Power–Sharing Arrangements and Their Negative

Consequences for Post-Agreement Stability

Kazuhiro Obayashi

Hitotsubashi University

Abstract

Most of the previous studies of post-agreement power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the

political PSA to be ineffective in stabilizing the post-agreement peace. These studies argue that

the political PSA is a signal that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry

among the signatories. Ignoring its distributional effects, however, these studies underestimate

the “negative” effect of political PSA on post-agreement stability. In fact, the inclusion of a

political PSA in a peace agreement increases the risk of civil war recurrence, although its

implementation reduces that risk to some extent. The risk becomes higher when a political PSA

is combined with a military PSA, which some of the previous studies find reduces the risk of civil

war recurrence substantially. I test the hypotheses by combining the survival analyses of post-

agreement peace duration, propensity score matching technique, and case studies of post-

agreement trajectories in Guatemala and Rwanda.

Paper prepared for presentation at the ISA Asia-Pacific Conference held at the City University of

Hong Kong in Hong Kong on June 25 – 27, 2016.

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Introduction

Power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) are often considered to be a useful means to end civil wars and

ensure post-agreement stability. However, previous studies are skeptical of their effectiveness in

reducing the risk of civil war recurrence. This is especially the case for the political power–sharing

arrangement (political PSA). While many studies find that military and territorial PSAs (military PSAs

and territorial PSAs) reduce the risk of a civil war recurring to some extent, these studies mostly deny

the influence of the political PSA (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). These studies

often attribute the ineffectiveness of the political PSA to its low cost, which renders the arrangement

ineffective as a device for signaling. These studies ignore the distributional effects of the political PSA,

however. If implemented, a political PSA has a longstanding and significant distributional consequence

for signatories to the peace agreement, and signatories are keenly aware of such effects. This awareness

creates an incentive for some of the signatories to renege on the peace agreement, which makes the

post-agreement peace fragile. In this article, I explore what implications the distributional effects of the

political PSA have for post-agreement stability.

The issue is important for scholars of civil war, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding to

improve the theories of post-agreement stability. Scholars often identify the presence of a spoiler as an

immediate cause of civil war recurrence (Stedman, 1997). There is no consensus, however, about the

relative importance of various factors that could be behind the emergence of a spoiler, such as

information asymmetry, the enforcement problem, and the distributional problem. It is not clear, either,

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whether the cause of civil war recurrence lies in the persistence of the original dispute among the parties

to a conflict, in a dysfunctional agreement, or in mistakes and failures in the post-agreement

peacebuilding process. By conceptualizing PSAs as signaling, previous studies presume that the major

factor behind the emergence of a spoiler is information asymmetry and that the political PSA is not

relevant to success or failure in peacebuilding. By not assessing the implications of the distributional

effect of the political PSA on post-agreement stability, these findings about the (non-)causes of civil

war recurrence remain dubious.

The issue is also important for policymakers. Policymakers and scholars value the political

PSA not only for its potential contribution to post-agreement stability but also for its impact on the

accountability and fairness of the post-agreement political institution. This is why some of the scholars

who are skeptical of the political PSA’s contribution to post-agreement stability encourage its

application and improvement rather than its abandonment (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). In order to

improve political PSAs properly, however, it is necessary to understand why these arrangements have

been ineffective. This need is even more urgent if, as I argue below, political PSAs have perverse

consequences on post-agreement stability. In fact, some scholars discussed negative impacts of the

PSAs on post-agreement society (Roeder & Rothschild, 2005; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). If the problem is

the political PSA’s imposition of only a low cost on signatories, it is necessary to raise such costs by

making the provisions in a political PSA stricter or by combining it with other sorts of arrangements,

such as a military PSA. If the problem lies with the political PSA’s distributional effects, however, such

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an arrangement may increase the risk of civil war recurrence. It may therefore be necessary to moderate

the cost of concluding the arrangement for a would-be defector or simply to drop the arrangement from

the peace agreement.

I argue that previous studies underestimate the “negative” impact of the political PSA on post-

agreement stability because these studies ignore its distributional implications. I will begin with a

classification of the different types of PSA and the stages of their implementation by focusing on their

distributional effects and the magnitudes of the enforcement problem. On the basis of this classification,

I will focus on the political PSA and argue that the insertion of a political PSA into a peace agreement

raises the risk of civil war recurrence thereafter, although its implementation moderates the risk. The

risk becomes even higher when a political PSA is combined with a military PSA, which many of the

previous studies find to be a major factor conducive to a long post-agreement peace.

In order to test the hypotheses, I will conduct survival analyses of the duration of peace after

peace agreements concluded between 1989 and 2004. In order to assess the robustness of the findings,

I will then conduct a survival analysis after the selection of cases using a propensity score matching

technique. I will then conduct case studies of peace agreements signed in Guatemala in 1996 and in

Rwanda in 1993 to examine the validity of the causal mechanism proposed in the hypotheses.

Previous Studies on the Political PSA and Post-Agreement Stability

Previous studies of the effects of the political PSA on post-agreement stability have been conducted as

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a part of studies on PSAs. Many of these studies conceptualize PSAs as a means of moderating the

information asymmetry between signatories to an agreement and remain skeptical that the political PSA

has any effect on post-agreement stability. These studies have a number of problems, both theoretical

and methodological.

The signaling approach conceptualizes PSAs as costly signals to moderate the information

asymmetry among the parties to a conflict (e.g., Hartzell & Hoddie, 2005b, 2007). This approach posits

that PSAs help the signatories to communicate to other parties their intent to abide by the peace

agreement by imposing a high cost on them, for example, by increasing its military vulnerability or by

recognizing a rebel group’s autonomy in a part of its territory. It is essential that these costs are high for

the party sending out the signal (cf. Fearon, 1997; Kydd, 2000).

Another set of studies conceptualizes PSAs as an instrument to reduce the commitment

problem (Walter, 1997; Walter & Snyder, 1999; Bekoe, 2005; Mattes and Savun, 2009). These studies

argue that PSAs moderates the belligerents’ fear for opportunism by the other side, while increasing the

cost of defection from a peace agreement.

The findings from the empirical analyses on the effects of PSAs on postwar stability are

somewhat contradictory. Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) identify four types of PSA—political, territorial,

military, and economic—and find that peace agreements with a wider variety of PSAs tend to be

associated with a lower risk of civil war recurrence. These studies do not differentiate between the

effects of different types of PSA, however.

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Those who examine the effects of different types of PSA separately mostly agree that

economic PSAs do not have a statistically significant effect on postwar stability (Hartzell and Hoddie,

2007; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Binningsbø & Rustad, 2012) except for Ottmann and Vullers (2015), who

finds mixed results.

Most studies find that military and territorial PSAs reduce the risk of civil war recurrence

(Walter, 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005a; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; DeRouen et al., 2009; DeRouen

et al. 2010; Toft, 2010; Licklider, 2014b), although Walter (2002) and Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008)

finds military PSAs to have no statistically significant effect on the psotwar stability.

Some studies find that political PSAs have positive effects on postwar stability (Walter 2002b;

Mattes & Savun, 2009; Cammett & Malesky, 2010), while others find them to be not consequential

(DeRouen et al., 2010; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Mukherjee (2006) finds the effects of the political

PSAs to be conditional on the military balance between the belligerents. Political PSAs have positive

effects on postwar stability where either side won a military victory, while political PSAs have negative

effects where military stalemate prevailed.

These studies of political PSAs, or of PSAs in general, have four problems. First, they ignore

the distributional implications of the political PSA. These studies assume that the higher the cost of

signaling is, the better the prospect for the post-agreement peace. In fact, however, an excessive cost of

signaling can substantially reduce the size of the pie to be divided among the signatories or heavily

advantage one party over another, undermining the post-agreement stability (cf. Werner, 1999). As I

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will discuss later, it is also unclear if a political PSA is in fact less costly than military and territorial

PSAs are. DeRouen et al. (2009) point out these problems in the existing literature, and argue that the

significant disadvantage of the political PSA generates an incentive for the militarily more powerful

side – oftentimes the government – to renege on the peace agreement, making the arrangement less

effective in maintaining the post-agreement peace. While their point on the high cost of the political

PSA is well taken, they find the political PSA to have no statically significant effect on the risk of civil

war recurrence in their empirical analyses.

The second problem with previous studies is methodological. The studies on political PSAs

do not pay sufficient attention to the potential problem of endogeneity and selection effects. Admittedly,

several studies take cautionary steps to moderate the problems such as an exploration of the conditions

that make PSAs more likely (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mattes & Savun, 2009) or two-

stage analyses (Cammett & Malesky, 2010). However, Stephen Gent (2011), for example, finds that the

political PSA is more likely to be signed when the military balance favors the rebel side. It is therefore

necessary to examine whether the selection problem biased the findings in the statistical analyses of the

PSAs.

The third problem with the previous studies is that these studies do not clearly distinguish

between the conclusion and implementation of PSAs. In fact, the implementation rates of PSAs are

fairly low. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and Ottomann and Vullers (2015) compiled original datasets on

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the implementation of the different types of PSA, respectively.1 The empirical findings of these studies

demonstrate the need to distinguish the two stages of the PSAs. Jarstad and Nilsson find that the

implementation of a PSA does reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, but the conclusion of a PSA does

not. Neither does the implementation of a political PSA. Ottomann and Vullers find that conclusion of

military, economic, and territorial PSAs have positive effects on postwar stability. They find conclusion

of political PSAs to have a negative effect on postwar stability, while its implementation has a positive

effect on it. Interestingly, the conclusion and implementation of economic PSAs have opposite effects

from those of the political PSAs.

These two studies made significant contributions to the studies of the PSAs by compiling

original datasets on implementation of the PSAs. However, their findings are contradictory with each

other. Also, their theories require further examination. Both studies rely on the costly-signaling

approach. For example, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) attribute their findings to the low cost of signing

PSAs and political PSA implementation. However, some of the studies on international treaties find that

signing a treaty can change the behavior of the signatory state because the act of signing in itself

generates costs, such as ex ante ratification costs, ex post consistency costs, and ex post audience costs

(e.g. Simmons, 2000; Simmons & Hopkins, 2005). It is therefore possible that conclusion of a PSA has

1 The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) also contains information about PSAs in peace

agreements and their implementations (Joshi & Darby, 2013). However, their data is

qualitative in nature.

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a similar effect, as Ottoman and Vullers (2015) shows. Still, Ottomann and Vullers do not provide a

theory that explains their findings divergent from most of the studies mentioned above.

Methodologically, they do not take cautionary measures against the selection bias and endogeneity

problem.

The fourth problem of the previous studies is that none of them addresses the issue of the

combination of the different types of PSAs and their effects on the postwar stability. A single peace

agreement often includes a few types of PSAs. If we take a costly-signaling approach and assume all

types of PSAs to have similar effects on postwar stability, it is reasonable to expect their effects to be

simply additive, and thus use the total number of PSAs in an agreement in a model to capture this effect

(e.g. Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Cammett & Malesky, 2012). A focus on the distributional effects of

PSAs, however, implies that the effects of the PSAs on postwar stability may vary in their qualities. A

certain combination of PSAs, therefore, may cacel out the effects of the individual PSAs, or even

generate an effect totally opposite from those of the individual PSAs applied separetely (cf. DeRouen

et al. 2009).

Theory: Distributional Effects of the Political PSA and the Incentive to Renege

Two obstacles exist in the process of signing, implementing, and complying with a peace agreement:

the enforcement problem and distributional conflict. PSAs vary in the magnitude of these problems

depending on their type and stage. The political PSA is associated with a relatively severe enforcement

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problem and distributional conflict. Its conclusion, therefore, increases the risk of civil war recurrence.

The implementation of a political PSA, however, reduces the risk to some extent.

The enforcement problem refers to the concern over one or more signatories’ defection from

an agreement. Distributional conflict refers to the bargaining among the parties over the distribution of

the interests arising from the conclusion and implementation of a peace agreement (cf. Krasner, 1991).

It is the power balance among the parties to the conflict that influences the outcome of the bargaining

process. The more powerful actor, that is, the actor with the better outside option, tends to gain more in

the distributional conflict.

The enforcement problem and distributional conflict affect each other (Fearon, 1998). For

example, the less severe the enforcement problem is, that is, the more difficult it is for the signatories

to defect, the more difficult it is for them to solve the distributional conflict. This is because the parties

expect a minor compromise at the bargaining table to cause a huge loss in a long run. Once an agreement

is reached, however, it is easy to secure compliance, and the post-agreement peace becomes stable. By

contrast, the more severe the enforcement problem is, that is, the easier it is for the parties to defect

from the agreement, the easier it is for the parties to solve the distributional conflict. This is because the

parties anticipate that they can easily renege on the agreement before a compromise at the bargaining

table leads to a huge loss over time. Even when an agreement is reached, therefore, it is difficult to

secure compliance among the signatories, and the post-agreement peace tends to be unstable. However,

when the enforcement problem is too severe, the parties do not even sit at the bargaining table or, even

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when they do, they are not very sincere.

The variation across the PSAs in the severity of the enforcement problem and distributional

conflict affect the level of post-agreement stability (cf. DeRouen et al. 2009). The risk of civil war

recurrence is particularly dependent on the incentives for the more powerful party. This is often the

government in the context of a civil war. I will therefore discuss the implications of PSAs for post-

agreement peace with a focus on the incentives for the government rather than for the rebels, although

the same logic would apply even when the rebels are stronger than the government. Following Jarstad

and Nilsson (2008), I will focus on the three types of PSAs, political, miliary, and territorial PSAs.

First, the military PSA is an agreement that integrates government soldiers and combatants

from a rebel group to form a national military force. The military PSA tends to have a distributional

effect in favor of the government because, in practice, it often means that the rebel combatants are

integrated into an existing national army, over which the government retains command. The

arrangement is also associated with a low enforcement problem because it is difficult for either side to

remobilize its soldiers and combatants for a new round of civil war against the other after its

implementation. These two characteristics of the military PSA make it difficult for parties to sign and

implement a military PSA. Once implemented, however, it is easy to secure compliance, and the post-

agreement peace tends be stable. This effect may be further reinforced by other pacifying effects of the

military PSA (Licklider, 2014).

The signing of an agreement with a military PSA also makes the post-agreement peace stable.

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However, its effect remains small, given the relative ease of defection before implementation of the

arrangement.

Second, the territorial PSA is a provision that authorizes the rebels to exercise autonomy

within part of the national territory. As the government needs to delegate the authority to govern a region

to the rebels for a long time, the distributional effect of the territorial PSA is less favorable for the

government. However, a territorial PSA often ensures that the government receives a part of the profits

from the region. The arrangement, therefore, tends to be more favorable to the government than does

the political PSA. The territorial PSA is also associated with a low enforcement problem, because

implementation of a territorial PSA makes it very difficult for the government to renounce the

arrangement and regain the authority to rule the area. Hence, it is difficult for the parties to sign and

implement a political PSA. Once implemented, however, it is easy to secure compliance, and the post-

agreement peace tends to be stable.

The signing of an agreement with a territorial PSA has a similar effect. As in the case of the

military PSA, however, its effect is limited because of the ease of defection before implementation of

the territorial PSA.

Third, the political PSA is an agreement that secures positions in the new government’s cabinet

or a similar government organization for leaders of both the government and the rebels. The political

PSA has a distributional effect that is highly unfavorable to the government because it requires the

government to delegate a significant part of its authority over the entire territory to rebel leaders. The

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arrangement also suffers from a relatively severe enforcement problem because both sides can maintain

their military capability even after implementation of a political PSA, although defection is easier before

its implementation rather than after it. These characteristics make it easy for the parties to sign and

implement a political PSA but difficult to ensure compliance even after its implementation, in

comparison to the military and territorial PSAs. Even so, implementation of a political PSA contributes

to post-agreement stability.

The signing of an agreement with a political PSA tends to have the perverse effect of

destabilizing post-agreement peace, however. A combination of the distributional effect unfavorable to

the government and a large enforcement problem (i.e., ease of defection) raises an incentive for the

government to renege on the agreement at a later date. Anticipating such a move, the rebels become

suspicious of the government’s willingness and capacity to implement and comply with the peace

agreement (cf. DeRouen et al. 2009). The signing of an agreement with a political PSA makes a post-

agreement peace unstable for one of the following three reasons: First, both the government and the

rebels may be insincere in their bargaining and plan to renege on it in the near future (selection effect);

second, while the rebels are willing to comply with the agreement, the government is unwilling to

comply with the agreement because the political PSA is too disadvantageous to the government

(selection and causal effect); third, leaders on both sides are willing to comply with the agreement, but

they lack the capacity—especially on the government side—to implement and comply with the

arrangement because of a high ratification cost or consistency cost (causal effect). For example, some

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of the subversive elements on the government side press the government leader to renege on the

agreement, replace the leader, or go it alone and attack the rebels. The two parties still sign an agreement

with a political PSA either because they would like to buy time to prepare for another round of fighting,

because they are forced by a third party, or because they see a chance of successful implementation of

the agreement, even though the chance may not be very high.

As mentioned above, however, implementation of a political PSA somewhat stabilizes the

post-agreement peace. This is partly because of its selection effect—parties that are willing and capable

of complying with the arrangement tend to implement it—and partly because of an increase in the

opportunity cost for both sides of returning to war, given the economic development associated with

the installation of a new government.

There are three routes through which a post-agreement peace may break down. First, the

government (leader) may renege on the agreement and initiate violence. Second, subversive elements

on the government side may defect and initiate violence. Third, the rebels may initiate a preventive or

a preemptive war in expectation of a defection by the government side (DeRouen et al. 2009). In this

case, either the rebel leaders or a subversive element on their side may take the initiative.

As to the timing of the resumption of violence, it is likely either when the power balance

between the government and the rebels shifts rapidly, or when the power balance on either side of the

conflict shifts internally (cf. Werner, 1999). This is because the bargaining outcome depends on the

power balance between the two sides and because a rapid shift in power makes it difficult for the parties

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to renew the agreement in peace.

[Table 1. Types of Power-Sharing Arrangement]

Survival Analyses without Matching

In this section, I will conduct survival analyses of post-agreement peace duration in order to assess the

effects of a political PSA on the risk of civil war recurrence. I rely on the Implementation of the Pacts

(IMPACT) Dataset vol. 2 to identify cases of peace agreement between 1989 and 2004 (Jarstad &

Sundberg, 2008; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Jarstad et al., 2012a; Jarstad et al., 2012b).2 The 83 peace

agreements in this dataset constitute the sample for the analyses in this section.

Dependent variable.

The dependent variable is the peace duration or the number of peace years after the signing of a peace

agreement between the government and the rebels (Peace Duration). I rely on the dyadic conflict data

in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) to identify the year of peace failure or civil war recurrence

(Harbom et al., 2008; Harbom et al., 2014). A peace failure is coded by the year when one or more of

the rebel groups that signed the agreement fights the government side and causes at least 25 battle deaths.

The observation for each agreement ends at the end of 2004, as the IMPACT dataset ends at this year.

2 I used Stata 12 to conduct the statistical analyses.

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The observation for each agreement was also terminated when the peace fails, when one or more of the

signatories signs a new peace agreement with the government, or when one or more of the signatories

achieves secession, without coding a peace failure in case of the latter two scenarios. I rely on the

System Membership Dataset to identify the years of secession (Gleditsch & Ward, 1999; Gleditsch &

Ward, 2008; Gleditsch & Ward, 2013).

A problem with the UCDP data is that it uses the number of battle deaths per year to code an

eruption of armed conflict. In order to avoid the problem of endogeneity, therefore, I code a peace

failure only from the year after the signing of a peace agreement. In the case of other reasons for

observation termination, such as a new peace agreement, it is easier to identify the precise dates and

check whether these events took place after the signing of the peace agreements under study. This

exercise left me with two peace agreements with peace durations of zero years. Stata’s survival analysis

function simply drops these cases from the analysis and cause a selection problem. For this reason, I

follow the Stata manual and set the observation for these agreements as starting slightly earlier than the

actual years of the agreements by 0.0001 year (StataCorp, 2013: 492).

Of the 83 peace agreements under study, 25 agreements ended with breakdown of peace in or

before 2004, 23 agreements ended with new peace agreements, and one agreement ended with secession.

Of the remaining 34 agreements, peace endured up to the end of the observation period, 2004. Hence,

the data is right-censored. The minimum peace duration is 0, and the maximum is 13 years.

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Independent variable.

The bargaining theory of PSAs predicts that political PSAs will increase the risk of civil war recurrence,

while its implementation reduces the risk. I will use the dummy variables on political PSAs and their

implementation in the IMPACT dataset. The variable for a political PSA (Political PSA) denotes

“whether a settlement offered the combatants guaranteed positions in the new government at the level

of cabinet or above, or a specific quota of political power in at least one of the main branches of

government” (Walter, 2002a: 9). The variable on implementation of a political PSA (Political

Implementation) takes 1 when the IMPACT dataset codes the arrangement as having been implemented

in “Full” within five years, that is, when “the pact [arrangement] in a given year has been implemented

according to all of these three criteria: 1) all named groups and individuals have claimed their seats in

government, 2) the assembly has been inaugurated, and 3) the institution of joint governance has begun

to function” (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008: 213).3 An implementation of a political PSA requires the

conclusion of an agreement with a political PSA in advance. Therefore, Political Implementation can

be interpreted as an interaction of Political PSA with another variable or a modifier that denotes a full

implementation of the provisions for the political PSA.4 Thirty-six peace agreements included political

3 I code the variable on implementation of a political PSA as 1 in all the years subsequent to the first

year of full implementation. The same applies to the variables on implementation of territorial and

military PSAs, which I will discuss below.

4 Buis (2010) explains the use and interpretation of the interaction effects in non-linear

models. Brambor et al. (2006, 64) notes that “scholars should include all constitutive terms

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PSAs, of which 27 were implemented.

H1: When a peace agreement includes provisions for a political PSA, the peace duration tends to be

shorter.

H2: When a political PSA is implemented, the peace duration tends to be longer.

The dummy variable for a territorial PSA (Territorial PSA) denotes whether “a provision for

some form of regional autonomy, … if one or both sides was allowed to continue to administer areas

under their control, … or if specific self-governing zones were established…” (Walter, 2002a: 10). The

dummy variable for a military PSA (Military PSA) is coded 1 if “there is a provision that offers the

combatants guaranteed integration into the national armed forces and/or command structures” (Jarstad

& Sundberg, 2008: 213). The dummy variables for implementation of the territorial and military PSAs

(Territorial Implementation, Military Implementation) takes 1 when the IMPACT dataset codes these

arrangements as having been implemented in “Full” within five years. Territorial implementation is

in their interaction model specifications” other than exceptional cases. However, I do not

include the modifier that denotes an implementation of the political PSA or that of the

military or territorial PSA. The value of the modifier remains 0 when provisions for political

or other sorts of PSAs are absent, and thus they have no effect on the risk of peace failure in

such situations.

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coded 1 “in a given year if decentralization laws were officially passed and made into law, and/or if

institutions of territorial decentralization, such as local or autonomous assemblies or executives, were

created within the timeframe, and is otherwise coded 0” (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008: 214). As in the case

of Political Implementation, Territorial Implementation and Military Implementation can be

interpreted as interactions of Territorial and Military PSAs with modifiers that denote their

implementations, respectively. Thirty-three peace agreements included a territorial PSA, of which

18 were implemented. Thirty-one peace agreements included a military PSA, and 12 of them were

implemented. Both the signing and implementation of the military and territorial PSAs are expected to

lengthen the peace duration.

H3: When a peace agreement includes provisions for a territorial PSA, the peace duration tends to be

longer.

H4: When a territorial PSA is implemented, the peace duration tends to be longer.

H5: When a peace agreement includes provisions for a military PSA, the peace duration tends to be

longer.

H6: When a military PSA is implemented, the peace duration tends to be longer.

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As discussed above, the prospect of a rapid shift in the balance of power between government

and rebels renders the post-agreement peace unstable. This is especially the case when the power shift

is expected to increase the ability of the disadvantaged side to renege on the agreement. This implies

that when a peace agreement includes provisions for both a political PSA and a military PSA, the risk

of war recurrence increases. While the political PSA has a distributional effect unfavorable to the

government, the implementation of a military PSA would shift the power from the rebels to the

government.

H7: When a peace agreement includes provisions for both a political PSA and a military PSA, the peace

duration tends to be shorter.

Control variables.

In addition to PSAs, previous studies of civil war recurrence identify several potentially important

variables.

A larger number of signatories to a peace agreement can increase the risk of civil war

recurrence because of the large diversity among the signatories, a more intensive problem of

information asymmetry, and a more intensive commitment problem. I therefore control for the number

of rebel signatories to an agreement (Signatory Number) from the IMPACT dataset.

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With regard to the characteristics of the conflict, I will enter variables for the intensity of the

conflict (Conflict Intensity) and type of incompatibility (Territorial Conflict). Conflict Intensity is a

dummy variable that denotes whether the cumulative number of deaths in the conflict reached 1,000

(Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Territorial Conflict takes 1 if the incompatibility of the conflict concerns

territory. The data for these variables comes from the UCDP Conflict Dataset (Themnér, 2013b;

Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013; Themnér, 2013a). I expect that the greater conflict

intensity and the territorial characteristics of the conflict to be associated with a shorter peace duration.

Rapid democratization after a civil war is expected to increase the risk of civil war recurrence

(Paris, 2004). Hence, I include Democratization, which is the difference in the Polity2 scores for the

state between the year of observation and the year in which the peace agreement was signed. The Polity2

score from the Polity IV project takes values between –10 and +10, larger values indicating the higher

levels of democracy (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011).

As for the level of international involvement in the peacebuilding efforts in the country, I use

dummy variables that indicate the presence of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)

and a non-UN Peacekeeping Operations (NUNPKO). PKOs are expected to moderate the levels of

information asymmetry and commitment problem among the parties to a conflict. Previous studies

suggest that the presence of PKOs also tends to reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, although there

still remain some debates on their effectiveness (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2002b; Fortna, 2004;

Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; King and Zeng, 2007; Sambanis and Doyle, 2007; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008).

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I rely on Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen (2007) to code the variables on PKO presence.

In addition, I enter several variables that may affect the risk of conflict recurrence.

The military power balance between the state and the rebel group may affect the stability of

post-agreement peace. Therefore, I enter the variable on the military strength of the most powerful

signatory rebel group relative to the government forces (Rebel Strength) retrieved from the Non-State

Actor (NSA) database (Cunningham et al., 2012).

I will also use variables for levels of GDP per capita (GDPPC) and economic growth

(Economic Growth) in the country to control for macro-economic conditions in the country. I expect

that higher levels of GDPPC and economic growth to lead to longer peace duration. The data is retrieved

from the Expanded Trade and GDP dataset (Gleditsch, 2002; Gleditsch, 2013).

In order to control for the cultural diversity of a country, I enter the ethnic fragmentation index

(Ethnic Fragmentation) compiled by James Fearon (2003a; 2003b). I expect a higher level of ethnic

fragmentation in a country to lead to shorter peace duration.

Some scholars argue that the primary determinant of the risk of civil war onset is the

availability of the opportunity to initiate a rebellion (Fearon & Laitin, 2003b; Snyder & Tilly, 1972).

Civil war recurrence may also be affected by the opportunity for rebellion. For this reason, I enter

variables for population size (Population), proportion of mountainous terrain in the state’s territory

(Mountain), and the number of personnel in the state’s military forces (Military Personnel), in addition

to the GDPPC mentioned above. These variables are all natural logs. I use the Expanded Trade and

22

GDP dataset for Population (Gleditsch, 2002; Gleditsch, 2013), James Fearon and David Laitin’s dataset

for Mountain (Fearon & Laitin, 2003a; Fearon & Laitin, 2003b), and the COW Project’s National

Material Capabilities Data for Military Personnel (Correlates of War, 2014; Singer, 1987). Because the

dataset for Mountain does not have figures for 2000 and later, I use the data for 1999 to impute the

missing values.

Fearon and Laitin (2011) argue that the Sons of the Soil (SoS) conflicts are extremely difficult

to terminate. I therefore expect these conflicts to be prone to recurrence and include a dummy variable

that denotes them (Soil). I rely on Fearon and Laitin’s list of SoS conflicts for coding.

In order to avoid the problem of endogeneity, I used one-year lags for all the control variables

except for Signatory Number, Territorial Conflict, and Rebel Strength. The descriptive statistics are

provided in Table 2.

［Table 2 Descriptive Statistics］

Method.

I will use the Cox proportional hazard model to conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement

peace duration. For the dependent variable in the analysis is non-negative, and the data is right-censored

because the observation can end before the termination of the post-agreement peace. The Cox

proportional hazard model is especially useful here because the model does not presume a specific

23

distribution of baseline hazards (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Blossfeld et al., 2007; Tsutsui et al.,

2011). I also use clusters of “conflict” in the UCDP dataset to control correlations among observations

from each conflict.

Results of the survival analyses without matching.

The results of the survival analyses, especially those on the effects of the signing and implementation

of political PSAs, are mostly consistent with the predictions of the bargaining theory of PSAs. The

results are presented in Table 3. Hazard ratios are presented rather than coefficients. An assumption of

the Cox proportional hazard model is that the relative risks of failure among the subjects do not vary

over time. Analyses of the time-dependence of the Shoenfeld residuals for each model indicate that the

assumption is not violated for each independent variable or for the model as a whole.

[Table 3. Survival Analyses of the Post-Agreement Peace Duration (years) without Matching 1989–

2004]

Political PSA turns out to increase the risk of civil war recurrence (Model 1). As the model

contains Political Implementation, a de facto interaction term, the hazard ratio of Political PSA shows

that the immediate effect of the conclusion of a political PSA (without its implementation) is to increase

the risk of civil war recurrence by more than three times. However, the hazard ratio for Political

24

Implication demonstrates that an implementation of the PSA reduces the effect of Political PSA by more

than 60%. These effects are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When I add an interaction term for

the conclusion of political and military PSAs, the effects of the signing and implementation of political

PSAs remain same, while the interaction variable increases the risk of civil war recurrence (Model 2).

Its hazard ratio indicates that the conclusion of military PSA increases the positive effect of conclusion

of a political PSA on the risk of civil war recurrence by more than four times. The effect is statistically

significant at the 0.05 level. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the bargaining theory

of PSAs.

Contrary to my prediction, neither the conclusion of the territorial PSA nor of the military

PSA has a statistically significant immediate effect on the risk of civil war recurrence in absence of its

implementation (Models 1 and 2). However, their implementation reduces the risk substantially, and

their effects are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These findings do not favor either the

bargaining theory or the signaling theory of PSAs.

These main findings in the survival analyses remain robust for alternative specifications of

the model. I added variables for the rebel strength (Model 3), the economic characteristics of the country

(Model 4), the variable for ethnic composition (Model 5), those for the opportunity for insurgency

(Model 6), and the variable for SoS (Model 7), and the primary findings for the PSA-related variables

remain the same.

25

Survival Analysis with Matching

One of the most important findings of the analyses in the previous section is that the signing of an

agreement with provisions for a political PSA, in itself, increases the risk of peace failure. In this section,

I test the robustness of this finding by employing a matching technique.

The survival analyses in the previous section assumed that the conditions conducive to the

conclusion and implementation of a political PSA are not skewed in comparison to those conducive to

the conclusion of peace agreements in general. If these conditions are skewed, it remains uncertain

whether the observed effects of political PSAs reflected their true effects or those of the conditions that

brought about the conclusion and implementation of the political PSA.

In order to avoid this potential bias, I will first use the propensity score matching technique to

identify pairs of peace agreement that are similar in various respects except for the values of their

Political PSA. In doing so, I will focus on the values of the control variables in the year of peace

agreement for each agreement. I will then conduct a survival analysis to assess the effect of the

conclusion of the political PSA on peace duration. By selecting the cases using a matching technique

before conducting a survival analysis, it becomes possible to control for the selection effects of the

observable variables and to conduct a “doubly robust estimation” (cf. Ho et al., 2007; Hoshino, 2009).

I start with the same sample as that used in the previous section. In computing the propensity

score for matching, it is necessary to identify the confounding variables. These are the variables that

influence the dependent variable (Peace Duration) conditional on the treatment (Political PSA), are

26

correlated with the Political PSA, and are causally prior to Political PSA (cf. Ho, et al. 2007). I therefore

conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test (K-S test) on all the control variables

employed in the survival analyses in the previous section as well as on other potential confounding

variables. I did not test the variables on the conclusion and implementation of the territorial and military

PSAs because the parties’ decisions to include these arrangements in the agreement are highly likely to

have been influenced by their decision regarding inclusion of a political PSA in the agreement, at least

in part. The results of the K-S tests indicate that the distribution of the following variables differed

substantially between the treated and the control groups: Territorial Conflict, UNPKO, Rebel Strength,

GDP per capita, Population, Mountain, Prewar Democracy, and Pre-agreement Democracy. Prewar and

Pre-agreement Democracy respectively represent the values of the Polity2 score in the pre-conflict

period and the year right before the agreement.

I use these variables to compute the propensity score for each case and then conduct a 1-to-1

matching with a caliper of 0.75, using psmatch2 command in Stata (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003). This

exercise leaves 64 cases, of which 32 are treated and the remaining 32 untreated. The sample has 219

observations, and 22 of the 64 post-agreement peaces ended with a recurrence of war by 2004. The

values of the control variables between the two sets of cases are reasonably balanced. The K-S tests on

the matched cases show that only UNPKO shows a statistically significant difference at the 0.10 level.

I conduct a survival analysis on the matched sample with all the confounding variables used for

matching, as well as those in Model 1 in the previous section to estimate the average treatment effect

27

on the treated (cf. Ho et al., 2007).

The result of the survival analysis shows that the signing of an agreement with provisions for

a political PSA increases the risk of peace failure. The hazard rate is 7.907. The robust standard error

with a cluster on Conflict is 5.161, and the effect of Political PSA is statistically significant at the 0.01

level. Because I controlled for the effects of the control variables by matching, the statistical results of

their effects on peace failure in the matched sample does not provide meaningful information. 5

Interpretation of the Survival Analyses

The results of the survival analyses in the preceding sections strongly support the main hypothesis of

this article that the conclusion of a political PSA increases the risk of civil war recurrence. I argue that

this is because a conclusion of a political PSA is associated with a distributional effect unfavorable to

the government and a high level of the enforcement problem. As previous studies suggested, the

conclusion of a political PSA does not have a statistically significant effect on the risk of civil war

recurrence if the focus is on its general effect. A conceptual differentiation between the conclusion and

implementation of a political PSA provides a new perspective on the issue, however. The immediate

5 A possible criticism here is that a peace agreement without a political PSA does not constitute an

appropriate counterfactual to a peace agreement with the parties to a conflict would not have signed a peace

agreement without a political PSA. However, this criticism does not hold in case of the matching analysis,

because the author compares a set of two cases where pre-agreement conditions looked very similar. Also, in

some cases, a third party imposes a political PSA.

28

effect of the conclusion of a political PSA is to increase the risk of civil war recurrence. Once a political

PSA is implemented, however, the risk of civil war recurrence declines.

The analyses also demonstrate that signing of a peace agreement with a combination of

political PSA and military PSA increases the risk of civil war recurrence. A cursory look at the

descriptive statistics provides an insight into how this happens. Out of 29 peace agreements that

contained provisions for a military PSA and for which the information on implementation is available,

13 agreements or 44.83 percent did not contain provisions for a political PSA. For these cases, the

military PSA’s implementation rate is 53.85 percent (7 out of 13 cases). If a military PSA is combined

with a political PSA, however, the implementation rate for the military PSA drops to 31.25 percent (5

out of 16 cases). Hence, the political PSA appears to impede the implementation of a military PSA,

which, if implemented, significantly increases the post-agreement peace duration.

The result of the matching analysis is important not only because it demonstrates the

robustness of the negative relationship between the signing of an agreement with provisions for a

political PSA and post-agreement stability but also because it testifies to the presence of a causal effect

between the two. In the theory section, I mentioned that the conclusion of a political PSA increases the

risk of civil war recurrence because of its selection effects and its causal effects. The result of the

matching analysis shows that the conclusion of a political PSA has the causal effect of increasing the

risk of civil war recurrence.

The signaling theory of PSAs cannot explain these complex effects of political PSAs and of

29

their combination with military PSAs on a post-agreement peace. The results of the analyses

demonstrate that the conclusion of a political PSA affects the risk of civil war recurrence, that PSAs can

have a negative effect on post-agreement stability, and that the effects of PSAs are not always positive

and additive. These observed effects of political PSAs can be explained only when we focus on the

distributional effects of the arrangements and the levels of enforcement problem associated with them.

Case Studies of Guatemala and Rwanda

The statistical analyses performed thus far have demonstrated the general validity of the argument.

However, it remains to be seen whether the causal mechanisms proposed in the theory explain individual

cases of post-agreement stability or the lack thereof. Given the limitation of the space, in this section, I

will conduct case studies of the peace agreements signed in Guatemala in 1996 and Rwanda in 1993 in

order to examine only the causal mechanisms through which conclusion of a political PSA increases

the risk of civil war recurrence. I selected these two cases among the pairs matched in the previous

section because this pair met two criteria. First, the values of the independent (conclusion of a political

PSA) and dependent variables (post-agreement peace duration) in each case follow the predictions of

the theory. Second, the case in the control group did not experience an implementation of a territorial

or military PSA, which would have been expected to reduce the risk of civil war recurrence substantially

and thus make it difficult for the researcher to observe the causal effects of the absence of a political

PSA in a peace agreement on post-agreement stability.

30

In December 1996, the Guatemalan government signed the peace accords with the

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). This 1996 Peace Accords did not have a provision

either for a political or military PSA (United Nations General Assembly & Security Council, 1997).

While the accords had a provision for a territorial PSA, it was not fully implemented. Nevertheless, the

government and the URNG did not engage in armed conflict with each other up to 2004, and armed

conflict has not occurred since. In Rwanda, President Juvénal Habyarimana’s government signed the

Arusha Accords with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in August 1993. The accords had provisions for

political and military PSAs (Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandanese Patriotic

Front, 1993). However, neither of the provisions was implemented, and the two parties were engaged

in renewed armed conflict within a year.

These two agreements were signed in similar settings. In both conflicts, the cumulative

number of battle deaths reached more than 1,000 by the signing of the agreements. The numbers of the

military personnel were 36,000 in Guatemala and 30,000 in Rwanda. The URNG and the RPF were

practically the only rebel groups in operation in their respective countries at the time of the agreements.

Both countries received international peacekeeping forces. Guatemala received the United Nations

Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) from January until May 1997, and Rwanda received

the Organisation of African Unity’s Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II) from August 1992

until November 1993, and then the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from

October 1993 until March 1996.

31

Admittedly, the two cases differed on two accounts. First, the political regime in Guatemala

was anocracy, while that of Rwanda was authoritarian. This was the case both prior to the conflicts and

at the times of the peace agreements. Second, the URNG was “weaker” than the state military forces,

while the RFP was “stronger” (Cunningham et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2012). However, previous

studies did not find either the Prewar Democracy or Pre-agreement Democracy to have a statistically

significant effect on the risk of civil war recurrence (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; DeRouen et al., 2009).

If anything, a stronger rebel group in Rwanda should have made the country more prone to a conflict

recurrence (Obayashi, 2013), but this is contrary to the actual trajectories of the two countries.

What explains the divergent trajectories of the two peace agreements then? The answer lies in

the presence or absence of political (and military) PSAs in these agreements.

The 1996 Peace Accords in Guatemala did not contain a provision for a political PSA. This

absence was important in ensuring post-agreement stability because of the fragile basis of the signatory

government. The center-right National Advancement Party (PAN) government had only a limited

political support at the time of the agreement (Stanley & Holiday, 2002). This was partly because the

PAN won only a marginal victory over the conservative Guatemala Republic Front (FRG) in the

November 1996 election. It was also because the military had a long history of engagement in politics,

and both the party system and the financial bases of the Guatemalan state were weak. In fact, the FRG

took over from the PAN government in January 2000 election. For these reasons, the implementation

of the agreement even without a political PSA was hampered by “[the government’s] unwillingness or

32

inability to incur domestic political costs” (Stanley & Holiday, 2002: 423). It is therefore reasonable to

infer that the addition of a political PSA in the 1996 Peace Accords would have provoked harsh domestic

opposition, forcing the government to renege on the agreement. Such a concern would have made the

URNG more cautious and resist the demobilization process. In fact, demobilization was completed in a

surprisingly smooth and swift manner by May 1997, in spite of all the slow-downs in the other aspects

of the peace implementation, given the URNG’s faith in the government’s commitment to the agreement

(Stanely & Holiday, 2002).

The failure of the post-agreement peace in Rwanda can be sourced to the provisions for

political and military PSAs in the Arusha Accords. The accords shifted a significant part of the political

power from the President to a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) (Government of the

Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 1993). Of 21 ministerial positions in the BBTG,

the moderate Hutu parties and the RPF together secured 14 positions plus positions of the prime minister

and the vice prime minister, leaving President Harbyarimana’s party only five positions, although the

party retained the position of the minister of defense. The accords also provided that the RPF and the

Government forces each have a 50 percent representation in the chain of Command, and contribute 40

and 60 percent of the soldiers respectively in the integrated military forces.

A successful implementation of these provisions, especially the provisions on the military

integration, would have reduced the risk of civil war recurrence substantially. However, Habyarimana

signed the accords only under a strong military pressure from the RFP and a financial pressure from

33

France and the World Bank. In the meantime, Hutu extremists such as the Coalition for the Defense of

the Republic (CDR) remained strongly opposed to the power sharing provisions. They stood to lose a

lot from the implementation of these provisions. In addition, they were afraid that the RPF would

threaten their physical security upon takeover of the state military forces. The assassination of

Burundian president Ndadaye in October 1993 by the Tutsi military only intensified this fear among the

Hutus (Khadiagala, 1999; Cunningham, 2011: 174-175). Being aware of such oppositions on the

government side, “the RPF was never convinced that the accords would be implemented (Doyle and

Sambanis, 2006: 289).

Upon conclusion of the Arusha Accords, the Hutu extremists mobilized their militias to

escalate violence. Habyarimana kept challenging the accords’ provisions on the political PSA by

insisting on an inclusion of the Hutu extremists in the transitional institutions, which pushed back the

implementation of the military integration (Khadiagala, 1999: 481-490; Burgess, 2014: 89-92). In the

meantime, the RPF continued recruitment and expanded its ranks (Des Forges 1999). In the early April

1994, Habyarimana finally promised to keep his words and install the transitional institutions in a

meeting held in Dar es Salaam. It was on his way back from this meeting to Kigali that his airplane was

shot down. Hutu extremists took this opportunity to initiate genocide, and the country was brought back

to a war.

34

Summary

Most earlier studies considered PSAs to be instances of costly signaling, and claimed that political PSAs

did not affect the risk of civil war recurrence. In this article, I developed a bargaining theory of PSAs

and demonstrated that the conclusion of a political PSA increases the risk of civil war recurrence,

although its implementation moderates this effect. The matching analysis and the case studies of

Guatemala and Rwanda further demonstrate that the conclusion of a political PSA has not only a

selection effect but also a causal effect.

The findings caution against an insertion of provisions for a political PSA into post-agreement

peace agreements, especially against a third party’s imposition of those provisions on the parties to a

conflict. Without a serious pre-assessment of its practicality, such provisions may erode post-agreement

stability, which constitutes the basis for all the other virtues that a political PSA is deemed to bring

about.

In order to carry out such assessments properly, policymakers require a good knowledge of

conditions conducive to the successful implementation of political PSAs. This study indicates that a

combination of a political PSA with a military PSA inhibits the implementation of the latter, which, if

carried out, would greatly reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Future studies of PSAs need to be

attentive to the distributional effects of those arrangements as well as to their combination effects in

order to identify conditions conducive to enduring stability.

35

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Appendices

Favorable to the

Rebels

Favorable to the

Government

SevereConclusoin of the

Political PSA

Conclusion of the

Territorial PSA

Conclusion of the

Military PSA

Impelementation

of the Political

PSA

ModerateImplementation of

the Territorial PSA

Implementation of

the Military PSA

Table 1 Types of the Power Sharing Arrangements (PSAs)

Distributional Effect

Enforcement

Problem

Mean Stan. Err. Min. Max. Number of Obs.

Peace Duration^ 7.143 3.85 0 13 294

Peace Failure^ 0.150 0.357 0 1 294

Political PSA^ 0.333 0.472 0 1 294

Territorial PSA^ 0.507 0.501 0 1 294

Military PSA^ 0.398 0.490 0 1 294

Political Implementation 0.265 0.442 0 1 294

Territorial Implementation 0.241 0.429 0 1 294

Military Impelemntation 0.208 0.407 0 1 288

Signatory Number#^ 1.190 0.507 1 3 294

Conflict Intensity#^ 0.643 0.480 0 1 294

Territorial Conflict^ 0.378 0.486 0 1 294

Democratization# 0.802 3.953 -14 11 273

UNPKO# 0.197 0.399 0 1 294

Non-UNPKO# 0.218 0.413 0 1 294

Rebel Strength -0.731 0.977 -2 2 294

GDPPC#+ 7.557 1.030 5.044 10.244 294

GDP Growth# 0.033 0.127 -0.444 0.800 294

Ethnic Diversity# 0.628 0.208 0.161 1 290

Population#+ 9.281 1.633 5.998 13.864 294

Mountaneous#+ 2.228 1.320 0 4.407 290

Military Personnel#+ 124.091 284.723 0 1325 276

Sons of the Soil 0.102 0.303 0 1 294

#1 year lag, +Natural log, ＾Time-independent variable

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics

46

Table 3 Survival Analyses of the Post-agreement Peace Duration (years) without Matching 1989-2004

Political PSA^ 3.637***(1.531) 6.463***(3.945) 6.730***(4.242) 7.375***(4.478) 7.652***(4.374) 10.499***(6.112) 7.232***(4.354)

Territorial PSA^ 0.464 (0.359) 0.500 (0.447) 0.471 (0.429) 0.626 (0.589) 0.586 (0.484) 1.014 (0.694) 0.554 (0.554)

Military PSA^ 1.045 (0.391) 1.860 (1.175) 1.857 (1.197) 1.580 (1.089) 2.215 (1.266) 2.092 (1.289) 2.004 (1.223)

Political PSA x Military PSA 4.383** (2.772) 4.583** (2.972) 4.481***(2.589) 6.725***(3.678) 8.190***(4.674) 4.729** (3.103)

Political Implementation 0.366** (0.153) 0.322***(0.131) 0.314***(0.129) 0.283***(0.109) 0.314***(0.130) 0.283***(0.136) 0.321***(0.135)

Territorial Implementation 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000)

Military Impelemntation 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000) 0.000***(0.000)

Signatory Number 1.049 (0.232) 1.030 (0.207) 1.006 (0.208) 1.019 (0.230) 0.959 (0.229) 0.910 (0.192) 1.034 (0.212)

Territorial Conflict^ 3.500 (2.946) 3.362 (3.134) 3.631 (3.536) 4.978* (4.810) 5.093* (4.757) 2.658 (2.357) 8.025* (9.857)

Conflict Intensity#^ 8.655*** (4.480) 8.533***(4.925) 9.520***(6.692) 13.068***(8.807) 13.340***(7.532) 26.757***(16.434) 12.242***(8.238)

Democratization# 1.145***(0.059) 1.175** (0.067) 1.180***(0.068) 1.176** (0.067) 1.184***(0.061) 1.179***(0.064) 1.189***(0.070)

UNPKO# 0.880 (0.484) 0.711 (0.406) 0.730 (0.407) 0.724 (0.413) 0.677 (0.347) 0.617 (0.287) 0.739 (0.396)

Non-UNPKO# 0.985 (0.611) 1.072 (0.637) 1.022 (0.583) 0.937 (0.503) 1.221 (0.651) 0.962 (0.484) 1.122 (0667)

Rebel Strength 1.114 (0.257)

GDPPC#+ 0.683 (0.177) 0.642* (0.165)

GDP Growth# 0.671 (0.915)

Ethnic Fragmentation# 6.974 (9.090)

Population#+ 0.918 (0.183)

Mountaneous#+ 0.753* (0.116)

Military Personnel#+ 1.003** (0.001)

Sons of the Soil 0.363 (0.358)

Obs

Subject

Event (Peace Failure)

Wald chi2

Log Likelihood -73.914 -73.08476 -70.548 -74.245

Note: I conducted survival analyses with the Cox proporational hazard model. The hazard ratios, not coefficients, are listed. The hazard ratios larger than 1 indicates that the

risk of peace failure increases with an increase in the value of the independent variable, and the hazard ratios smaller than 1 indicates that the risk of peace failure decreases.

The values in parentehses are robust standard errors clustered on conflicts. Observation refers to the number of peace agreement-year observations for the analysis. Subject

refers to the number of peace agreements. Event shows the number of peace agreements that failed during the periods under observation. *, **, and *** respectively show the

values statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels in two-sides test. # 1year lag, + natural log, ＾time independent variables.

-75.005 -74.454 -74.399

8631.02*** 9005.60*** 7591.00***

23 23 23 23

8691.51*** 9043.47***

23 23

8080 80

9257.43***7760.13***

80

23

77 75 80

267 263 250 267

Model 7Model 1 Model 2

267 267

Model 4 Model 5 Model 6Model 3

267