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Developing Young Engineers to be Design Engineers Gary Dittemore, NASA JSC Omar Torres, NASA LaRC Sam Miller, NASA LaRC Theo Muench, NASA GSFC Used with Permission
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Page 1: Dittemore.gary

Developing Young Engineers to be Design Engineers

Gary Dittemore, NASA JSC

Omar Torres, NASA LaRC

Sam Miller, NASA LaRC

Theo Muench, NASA GSFCUsed with Permission

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MLAS Task, Approach, and Success Criteria

• Task: – Develop an alternate LAS design as risk mitigation for the Orion

LAS. Demonstrate the alternate concept with a pad abort flight test.

• Approach: – Strive to identify the simplest design that will satisfy launch abort

requirements while maximizing nominal ascent performance– Implement flight test by using off-the-shelf parts wherever

possible to minimize cost and shorten schedule

• Success Criteria: – Obtain sufficient flight test data to assess performance, validate

models/tools, and support an MLAS Objective System design

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Coast Skirt

Boost Skirt

Modified Sears-Haack FairingMotor Simulators

Separation Joints

Internally-Mounted Motors

Turnaround Drogues

Drag Plates

MLAS Flight Test Vehicle Configuration

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MLAS Flight Test

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MLAS Resident Engineer Opportunity

• Unique opportunity for direct, on-going interactions between MLAS residents, NASA Technical Fellows, and Apollo-era veterans

• Limited scope and short duration of the MLAS project provided rare systems engineering experience

• “Off-line” nature of the project provided an opportunity to try-and-fail

• As a group, residents were responsible for all MLAS’ instrumentation – from specification to flight

• Each resident was an integral member of a subsystem

Resident engineers assisting in composite fin testing

Resident engineers performing camera vibration testing

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Residents and Mentors

Gary Dittemore (JSC) T.K. Mattingly

Geminesse Dorsey (JSC) Jerry McCullough

Joe Grady (GRC) Tom Modlin

Samantha Manning (KSC) Bob Ryan

Samuel Miller (LaRC) Dave Shemwell

Theodore Muench (GSFC) Milt Silveira

Terrian Nowden (GRC) Bob West

Sarah Quach (KSC)

Jerry Sterling (GSFC)

Omar Torres (LaRC)

Residents Mentors

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Skill Development

• Best training is hands on experience– Requirement development

– Hardware selection and procurement

– Procedure writing: test/launch/recycle

– Vehicle test/check out

– Launch

• Understanding the risk balance between engineering vs. schedule vs. budget

• Flight hardware inspires– Some peers at home centers left due to

dullness of their insight/oversight tasks

– MLAS afforded opportunity to make a tangible difference in the exploration vision!

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Resident engineers hardening Space Fibre camera for flight

Resident engineer performing camera vibration testing

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Experience That Can’t Be Taught

• Strain gauge amplifier issue– Hardware didn’t meet vendor spec

– Worked constant modifications and adjustments

– Eventually replaced amplifiers

• Retrospect illuminates the problem’s value... – “You earned your scars; wear them well”

– Required delivery date plays a large part in corrective action

– Small team prioritizes itself

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Improved Thought Process and Approach to Problems

• Unable to rely on well parameterized problems– Ex. Shuttle program has well defined specs and procedures

– “Needed a push at the beginning to take ownership…”

• Understanding the design process – Aware of the limitations and decisions involved

– “Models are only as good as the assumptions that went into them”

• Also learned how NOT to think – Need to have the goal in mind at all times

– The project is bigger than the subsystem!

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Effective Leadership

• Risk trades during progress of the project– Management of critical path: Manifolded Motors

• Decisions based on past experience – Connector issues

– Air data boom

• Methods of motivating group– Shared personal experiences

– Tailored approaches to different personalities

– Communicated openly with all levels of workforce

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Theo Muench - Background

• Mechanical engineer

• GSFC Cryogenics - Research & Development - 4 years

• Solar Dynamics Observatory – I&T of propulsion subsystem – 1 year

• Landsat Data Continuity Mission – TIRS cryogenic subsystem

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Personal Motivation

• MLAS/resident engineer program provided access to project managers in a quasi-peer/mentorship role– Big picture perspective provides inspiration for performing

seemingly simple or mundane tasks

– Observing effective project management teaches leadership skills/process

– In-depth exposure to role models allows for long-term career goal realism

– Short term efficiency loss through exposing residents to high level decision making process is traded for big picture inspiration and teaching opportunities

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Networking

• MLAS was a multi-center staffed program– Direct exposure to other NASA center’s facilities and

personnel

– Career building relationships garnered

– Provides global view of the NASA mission

– Experience of unity within the agency

– Understanding of why differences exist between centers

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Technical Story - Motor Pressure Transducers

• Expected to see 1200 psi +/- 100 psi for ~6 second duration

• Post-flight review found that sensor pin-outs on vendor specification sheet and calibration sheet differed– Signal ground recorded instead of signal (0V read during flight)

• Pre-flight testing– Individual sensors bench tested at multiple data points– System end-to-end testing only performed at atmospheric

pressure – No comparison of bench test and flight wiring harnesses– End to end testing of pressure sensors occurred day before

shipment to pad– Non-trivial to safely get high pressure source into proximity of

integrated pressure transducers

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Learning - Engineering Responsibility (Ownership)

• Personal Background– Minimal systems engineering responsibility– Highest level of experience (ownership) = repair/maint. of POV– My testing philosophy –based on personal experience

• I knew GSFC “testing philosophy” for robotic missions– Risk management through responsibility division, & extensive

documentation– Personally viewed as excessive and tedious– Performed tests as instructed

• Learned the difference between “knowing the path” and “walking the path”– Gained a personal rational for system testing vs. an institutional

explanation– Importance of communication/documentation

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Sam Miller - Background

• Electrical engineer

• LaRC earth science applications – 2 years

• Virtual reality research and development – 1 year

• Robotics R&D – 3 years

• Never worked on a flight project (!)

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Requirements and Complexity

• On requirements in early design…– “A requirement is a road not to travel down…”– Specify direction, preclude undesired paths, don’t impose

implementation– Accomplish by having good design engineer: listen, discuss, formulate– Ex. Bob Beil– Ex. “01.01.09: Determine Relative dynamics of CM-forward fairing to

show margin to recontact”

• On complexity…– Electronics: easy to add, but very hard to validate, test, and maintain

for launch– Structures: initially hard, but taper away before launch– Ex. Strain gauges, high-speed cameras, ground sensors– Our direct participation in design/assembly/test matured our capacity to

engineer complex systems

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structures

electronics

launch time

effo

rt

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Me

Three Generations…

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Images: http://www.clker.com/www.fallingpixel.com

Veterans

Experts

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Cross Discipline Decisions

• Cross-discipline view essential to good engineering…

• Know expertise limits, avoid engineering-judgment based decisions outside discipline

• Ex. “Waterproof” box leak rate judgment call was outside my expertise

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Gary Dittemore - Background

• Mechanical Engineer

• OMS/RCS Mission Operations/JSC – 5 years

• MLAS/NESC – 2 years

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Design Team Decisions

• Checks and Balances in an accelerated design project– Differing backgrounds working together

– Design Boards

– Peer Reviews

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Differing Background Experiences

• Operations Center

– Learning design process

• Research Center

– Learning operations processes

• Flight Test Center

– Learning to work with a larger program

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Systems Engineering

• System engineering’s criticality– We all became systems

engineers

– Analysis Skills

– Insight

– Imagination

– Humility

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Smart Buyers

• “Smart buyers”– Learned skills to become “smart buyers”

– Seeing, speaking, understanding

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Omar Torres - Background

• Electrical Engineer

• Navy aviation electronics technician

• Army Research Lab at White Sands Missile Range

• 2 NASA summer internships

• 1 Graduate Student Researcher Program (GSRP)

• NASA Langley Research Center – 5 years

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Omar’s Takeaways

• Participation with multidisciplinary team– Exposed to effects of one subsystem’s actions to another’s workload

• MLAS was a challenge in many aspects– Participated with avionics, aerodynamics, and GNC teams

– Had to adjust to a fast pace environment

– Seeing things from a systems perspective

– Took responsibilities on actions the team needed help with

• Opportunity to rise to a new level as an engineer

• One of a kind experience

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What We Learned

• We learned– The relationship of all components of large engineering

endeavor (from leadership to procedures)

– To embrace responsibility

– Agency-wide participation engenders mutual respect

– To understand and value design, testing, and ops cultures

– An excellent method for developing young engineers

• We and our peers are ready for more!!

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Project Management Suggestions and Benefits

• “Napkin to flight” made us better, more versatile engineers, cognizant of system-level issues, risks, and trades

• Fast pace gives system perspective: the decisional trajectory is held in the brains of all

• Real hardware responsibility forced us to “walk” paths we only “knew” (at best)

• Real responsibility, with the capacity for unchecked failure, transforms number crunchers to leaders

• Gathering top talent from multiple centers to work on a test project, allows skill transfer back to multiple centers/organizations

• Developing young engineers through prototype work provides a new generation of “smart buyers” for the Agency

• All engineers should have this type of experience…

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Questions?