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Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59

Diverse property rights, institutions and decentralisation: Forest

management by village forest councils in Uttarakhand§

Satyajit Singh

University of Delhi, Delhi, India

Abstract

This study of decentralised institutions for forest management brings out the varied dimensions of local institutions and politics

as they interface with property rights and decentralisation. Unlike the economic literature on decentralisation that is dominated by

normative and prescriptive arguments on how a shift towards decentralisation should take place, this paper makes a case for re-

centering of the political in the decentralisation literature. This political study of decentralisation does not prescribe decentralisation

rules, but weighs the different social, economic and ecological outcomes under varied local conditions. It takes note of the diversity

of local institutions and politics in the interpretation of formal rules, power relations, legal rights, moral claims, social custom, and

the establishment of informal institutional arrangements. This is done in the context of questioning the typologies of neat property

regimes that are broadly categorised as – open-access, state, private and common property - in the economic literature. These widely

accepted typologies are tested at the local level and it is found that ownership does not necessarily refer to control and use of

resources. The paper highlights the heterogeneity of property regimes under which the village communities manage the forests, and

points out that specific state-society relations in particular villages determine the entitlements of the villagers. Importantly, the

nature of collective action on decentralisation and negotiation of institutional design has an impact on the consequences at the local

level. As the local reality is based on varied local resources, institutions, political processes and social capital, uniform national or

state policies have very different local outcomes. This paper asks if it is possible to evolve policies that incorporate diverse

institutional arrangements with a combination of different kinds of property rights under decentralised local governance

management.

# 2013 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The literature on decentralisation has largely been dominated by economic arguments in its favour. These are

normative arguments, prescribing how a shift towards decentralisation should take place (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956).

Of late attention is being paid, not just to the fiscal arguments and related principles of decentralisation, but also to the

political economy of decentralisation (Bardhan, 2005; Manor, 1999). It is important to understand the background in

which the parameters of decentralisation is defined; how and why policies towards decentralisation are framed; and the

§ This is part of a larger work that I undertook as a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex and as the Leverhulme Fellow in

Environment and Development at the Centre for the Comparative Studies in Culture, Development & Environment, University of Sussex. The

support of the two institutions is gratefully acknowledged, as is the assistance of the Ford Foundation, New Delhi. I am grateful to Chetan Agarwal,

Cyril Raphael, Prema Bein, David Hopkins, Nawal Kishore and Chandra Pant for providing critical assistance in conducting this field study and to

Jean Dreze, Robin Mearns, Mahesh Rangarajan, Arun Agarwal, M. Ramesh, Jonathan London, Blane Lewis and Caroline Brassard for providing

constructive comments. Finally, I am very grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of Policy and Society for suggesting concrete ways to

reorganise this paper and to Aditi Kodesia for doing a wonderful job with the illustrations.

E-mail address: ssinghdu@gmail.com.

1449-4035/$ – see front matter # 2013 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.01.003

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5944

choices made of agencies, instruments and institutions selected to implement decentralisation programmes. All these

have a significant bearing on the outcomes of decentralisation – content or discontent. Unlike neat choices of good or

bad that are available to us in the fiscal literature on decentralisation, a political study would find it difficult to conclude

on acceptable or poor outcomes (Singh and Sharma, 2007).

This political study of decentralisation questions the typologies of neat property regimes that are broadly

categorised as – open-access, state, private and common property (Bromley & Cernea, 1989) in the economic

literature. These typologies are tested at the local level and ownership does not necessarily refer to control and use of

resources (Rangan, 1997). By referreing to the heterogeneity of property regimes under which the village communities

manage the forests, the paper questions the appropriateness of arguing in favour of the superiority of one or the other

property regimes for the efficient management of forests. As clear-cut property regimes signifying exclusive

ownership and control do not exist, specific state-society relations in particular villages determine the entitlements of

the villagers. The paper goes further to state that the nature of collective action on decentralisation, its institutional

design and manner of implementation has an impact on the consequences at the local level. As the local reality is based

on varied local resources, institutions, political processes and social capital, uniform national or state policies have

very different local outcomes. Hence, different combinations and configurations of institutions and state-society

relations lead to varied outcomes in the management of village forests. This study of decentralised institutions for

forest management brings out the varied dimensions of local institutions and politics as they interface with property

rights and decentralisation.

A study of the political, importantly of local institutions, and micro politics, has an important role to play in the

understanding of decentralisation, its design, implementation and appraisal. Significantly, local politics ensures

challenging ways in which property rights and formal institutions are negotiated by local communities in varied

situations and contexts. A judicious use of informal arrangements can also make the formal institutions more useful

and relevant. The paper asks if it is possible to evolve policies that incorporate diverse institutional arrangements with

a combination of different kinds of property rights under decentralised local governance management. After making a

case for re-centring the political in the decentralisation literature, the paper concludes with some lessons that can assist

in the way critical political choices of decentralisation paths could be negotiated in the future.

1. Property rights and decentralisation

The issue of property and tenurial rights has been central to the concern for decentralised and sustainable

forestry. These rights broadly but not wholly determine the basis for access to and the distribution of forest

resources. The security or insecurity of forest resources to the various stakeholders has a direct bearing on their

everyday interaction and relation to the forest. Forest tenure regimes have been broadly categorised by Bromley and

Cernea into four types that are popularly accepted – open-access, state, private and common property. The open-

access regime has been widely condemned as it signifies the complete absence of authority and institutions to

manage it, exemplifying a situation of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ as articulated by Hardin (1968). While Hardin

was actually criticising the commons and arguing for greater state control over natural resources in this very

influential essay, his critics have subsequently pointed out that there is rarely a common that is governed without

authority and rules in the manner claimed by him. Most common property resources have elaborate local

institutions for its management and distribution of the resources. It is widely agreed that ‘the tragedy’ scenario is

more accurate for the open-access regimes that need to be differentiated from common property (Berkes, 1986;

Ostrom, 1990).

Forests under state control account for most of the forests in India, amounting to about twenty three per cent of the

total land area. The state, from the colonial times, has pursued a centralised revenue generating strategy targeted at

commercial exploitation of the forest resources. This has alienated the forest communities from critical resources

necessary for the sustenance of their livelihoods (Gadgil & Guha, 1995; Guha, 1989; Rangarajan, 1996). In addition,

the state forests have not been properly managed leading to widespread deforestation and ecological damage (CSE,

1982, 1985). Various state sponsored programmes have been discredited and the state has often been accused of

adopting corrupt and ill-conceived policies that have not in any way adequately addressed the issue of ecological

damage. In spite of the powerful appeal of the ‘tragedy’ model of Hardin which called for greater state control over

natural resources, the state today finds itself unable to properly manage the forests even though it has enormous control

over these resources.

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 45

Administrators have often argued that the local resource users are the cause of ecological destruction, pointing out

that the local communities are destroying the forest to meet their demands of fuel and fodder. However, this abuse of

the forest by the local communities has been analysed by critics to be a result of the absence of rights and tenure to

them. The absolute monopoly of the state ‘denies the local people certainty about future benefits from the forests . . .(which) has destroyed the incentive to use forests sustainably’ by the local communities (Somanathan, 1991). The

centralised, corrupt and revenue driven state has been discredited to such an extent that even its recent participatory

policies, are viewed with scepticism. There are analysts who argue that the state is merely pursuing these policies as it

is forced to due to the fiscal crisis (Kolavalli, 1995).The failure of the state to adequately manage the natural resources

has led many to argue in favour of its privatisation (Alchian & Demetz, 1973; Cheung, 1970; Demsetz, 1967; Repetto

& Gillis, 1988). Critics of privatisation, point to the limitations of the market in dealing with ecological issues which

are faced with unmeasurable outcomes and uncertainities (Norgaard, 1985). It is also believed that private property

leads to disparities in income and therefore entrenches inequalities (Netting, 1997). Privatisation and the market

encourage the production of high market value goods, which can often be to the detriment of the environment. It may

also neglect the interest of non-owners who may lose out from the curtailment of the production of non-tradable goods

that are otherwise important (Agarwal, 1988). In India, private forests do not cover a large area despite a demand for

privatisation by the timber and paper lobby. Public opinion is strongly against the privatisation of common property, as

also state owned forests. The eminent economist, Jodha (1986) provides recent empirical evidence to drive home the

point that privatisation of the commons in India has not improved their management, instead has led to a loss of control

by the poor who are otherwise dependent on them. There are other similar accounts that privatisation of common

property does not improve the management, instead leads to inequalities like those from rural Karnataka (Karanth,

1992). Such work as Jodha’s and Karanth’s on common property management has shown that it is the state which

encourages privatisation. This collusion of the state with market forces deprives the poor rural population of access to

critical resources important for their livelihood. Similarly, critics like Netting attack both the state and market when

they say, ‘. . . enclosure and similar breaches of common property institutions contribute to growing inequality, not

because they represent privatisation alone, but because they are conducted under the dominance of a national state and

its sovereign legal apparatus’ (Netting, 1997, p. 31).

With the condemnation of the open-access regimes, the disgruntlement with the government forests, and the

rejection of exclusionist privatisation, the emerging discourse calls for decentralisation and community management

of the natural resources (preferably outside the domain of the state, often a revival of ‘traditional’ autonomous

community institutions). Often the deplorable condition of the state-owned forests is contrasted with some well-

managed commons where people have a secure tenure and the resources are distributed equitably. Today it is widely

recognised that local communities can play an important role in natural resource management, and the state can even

learn from many of their practices (Arnold, 1992; Cernea, 1992; Ghai, 1994; Poffenberger & McGean, 1996; Rowe

et al., 1992; Thomson, 1992; Uphoff, 1986).

In India this literature is complimented with the adoption of a policy for community participation in forestry, under

the joint forest management (JFM) programme and more recently with the adoption of a complementary and broader

programme of decentralisation and creation of local government bodies in rural areas called the panchayati raj

institutions (PRIs). These policies are a result of long struggles by the forest dwellers and are also partly influenced by

global level initiatives at community participation and decentralisation of natural resource management. The JFM

policy envisages that proprietary rights to land will continue to rest with the state, however, the local people will be

made responsible for the protection and regeneration of the forest. JFM is limited to Protected Forests, and does not

extend to the Reserved Forests, which constitute most of the 75 million hectares of the forest land. In return the people

will be provided with rights to fuel and fodder in the forest as well as a share in the revenue generated through the

harvest of minor and major forest produce. This is clearly a first step in acknowledging the rights of the forest

communities. While these efforts are laudable, the process of institutionalising and bureaucratising the policy of

community participation is creating an orthodoxy that is promoting uniform community level institutions and property

regimes. This is being done without assessing the local ecology and society, and their interplay with existing

institutions and property regimes that may provide a different answer to strengthen the principle of community

participation. The emerging euphoria on the potential of participatory and community forestry takes on board in toto

the above analysis of the various property regimes. This paper questions such assumptions that can be misleading. In

fact, the new orthodoxy may actually undermine its own purpose of ensuring greater community participation in

natural resource management.

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5946

In order to strengthen the concept of decentralised community forestry, it is imperative to broaden the discussions

on institutions and property rights. By showing the existence of a number of property regimes under which the village

communities manage the forests, the paper questions the appropriateness of arguing in favour of the superiority of one

or the other property regimes for the efficient management of forests. This paper broadens the scope of discussion by

drawing attention to the diverse property regimes that exist at the village level. The heterogenity of these arrangements

indicates there is much more to the tale than ownership title, whether of centralised ‘state’ or decentralised

‘community’. Clear-cut property regimes signifying exclusive ownership and control do not exist, and the specific

state-society relations in particular villages determine the specific entitlements of the villagers.1 It is also seen that

proper management of the village forests can be undertaken under a wide combination of property arrangements. It is

thus erroneous to look at the forestry debate as a choice between centralised state or decentralised community, rather as

one in which state institutions support and complement the critical role that decentralised institutions play in the

management of natural resources.

The field data highlights the diversity of decentralised institutional arrangements that successfully manage village

forests. Every village has a distinctive polity, is endowed with different resources, and has various institutions that are

brought into play depending on the local requirements and capabilities. The empirical evidence presented here,

emphasises the variety of situations and problems faced by decentralised community-based natural resource

management strategies, and argues for a building of institutions based on local needs and resources under a wide

variety of property arrangements which not only empower the forest communities, but also provide institutional

safeguards for the marginalised within them.

In the next section, the paper looks at the property arrangements in forest resources across Uttarakhand.

This is followed by an empirically informed discussion on a sample of what is loosely called ‘open-access’, ‘state’,

‘community’ and ‘private’ ownership of forests. The empirical data will focus on the institutional arrangements, the

absence of a neat arrangement of property rights and will emphasise that everyday local politics and state-

society relations affect the management of the concerned forest resources. The data presented here is based here is

culled out from an in-depth study of 18 villages across Uttarakhand (see also Singh, 1999). The villages were

selected in consultation with key informants of the region to be representative of the diverse local institutions and

the problems faced by them. Starting with a literature review and discussion with key informants from the

government and civil society, extensive village level studies were carried out. These had three elements – household

surveys, focus group discussions with different socio-economic groups, and key informants interview of

representatives from formal and informal institutions, local leaders, representatives of non-governmental

organisations, government officials and representatives of neighbouring villages. Taking a leaf from Berreman’s

classic of the region, the focus was on using ethnographical tools to the study of local institutions, politics and

natural resources (Berreman, 1963).

2. Property rights in forests in Uttarakhand

State forests in Uttarakhand, as elsewhere in India, are categorised as Reserved Forests, civil soyam forests and van

panchayats. The reserved forests are under the exclusive control of the Forest Department, while the civil forests are

the responsibility of the Revenue Department. The colonial demarcation along reserved and civil forests was done in

accordance with the commercial value of these forests. The rich sal (Shorea robusta) forests were reserved, while the

forests, which primarily provided fodder and grass to the villagers, were categorised as civil and put under the

management of the Revenue Department. As per the 1931 Van Panchayat Act, the civil forests could be put under the

direct management of the village communities if the villagers moved a proposal to that effect. About a quarter of the

total area under the Revenue Department is currently under van panchayats. The total forest area Uttarakhand is about

34,042 sq. km, of which 23,755 sq. km are under reserved forests, 7607 sq. km are civil soyam forests and about

2448 sq. km are under van panchayats.

1 In an article Rangan (1997) differentiates between property and control in articulating an argument against the belief that state ownership results

in poor forest management and ecological degradation. She rightly points out that, ‘it is assumed that ownership status determined the ways in which

resources are used and managed’.

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 47

2.1. Reserved forests

Nearly seventy per cent of the total forest area in Uttarakhand is reserved. In these forests the rights of the forest

communities are restricted only to access dry wood and grass. These rights can, however, be limited in the regeneration

areas. The villagers are also given haq haquq, or rights to timber for repair of houses. The timber rights do not provide

direct access to the timber trees, but the villagers have to apply to the Forest Department for these rights through their

Gram Sabha. The reserved forests are primarily geared towards sustained yield production of timber.

2.2. Civil forests

The non-commercial forests on which the local communities depend a great deal for fuel, fodder and watershed

preservation was transferred from the Forest Department to the Revenue Department in 1921.2 This reversion was on

the recommendation of the Kumaon Forest Grievances Committee (KFGC), which was set-up to look into the

grievances of the hill people following a series of peasant protests in the hills against the colonial state’s encroachment

on the forests and the restrictions imposed on the rights of villagers (Guha, 1989). The Revenue Department did not

set-up agencies or institutions for the forests’ management either by itself or through the village community. This

created what can be called an ‘open-access’ regime, which led to the widespread abuse of such forests. Presently, in

these forests the tree cover is only ten per cent of its potential.

2.3. Van panchayats

As the civil forests were being denuded indiscriminately, the Van Panchayat Act of 1931 enabled villagers to

regulate the use of forests within the village boundaries in accordance with specified rules and under the supervision of

the Revenue Department. In the mid-nineties, about a quarter of the civil forests were under the van panchayats. The

limited appeal of the van panchayats had a lot to do with the distrust of the forest communities towards the colonial

government. The independent State Government of Uttar Pradesh (from which the state of Uttarakhand was carved

out) did little to win this trust back. In fact, it had sought to limit the powers of the van panchayats through the 1971 Van

Panchayat Act and other policy changes (Saxena, 1995).

3. Negotiating property rights and understanding decentralisation

This paper is based on four case studies. Three cases are of community forest management on civil land. Some van

panchayats have been established on civil soyam land owned by the Revenue Department. Others are ‘open access’

forests, without any formal institutional control. In some instances the local population is regulating these ‘open’ areas

under a set of informal arrangements. Under the van panchayats, the revenue department does not have any formal

control over the informal village institutions that protect and manage the forests in the civil soyam lands. In one

instance in villages Krass and Kafalna the local villagers had carved out de facto rights for themselves in the Reserved

Forest, a case that will also be taken up here.

There are several themes critical to the study of decentralised management of village forests. The themes that will

be taken up in the case studies in these orders are: (i) There is fluidity in property rights as defined by ownership in

favour of the state, for conservation requires participation. Property regimes are also open to political contestation

among local community groups, institutions and the state. The outcomes of political conflicts over forests are often not

as per the property rights laid out in law but the manner in which community institutions are able to establish moral

rights to forests through a judicious use state institutions and everyday politics. (ii) While the common property

literature has condemned the privatisation of the commons, it is by no means self-evident whether all privatisation

leads to unsustainable and inequitable outcomes. Community oversight of private management and clearly spelling

out the ambit of privatisation of village commons could in certain cases also lead to sustainable development. (iii) Is it

helpful to examine village level forestry institutions as a choice between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions? While

2 Earlier, these village forests were under the purview of the Revenue Department were transferred to the Forest Department to restrict the rights of

the villagers.

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5948

traditional institutions like the lath panchayat may not be all inclusive or have clearly defined property rights, modern

institutions like the van panchayat with clearly allocated property rights may not be able to protect those rights due to

the lack of functional linkages at various tiers of government for conflict resolution. Ear-marking of clear property

regime without administrative or fiscal capacity at the lowest tier is not very conducive for sustainable development.

Yet some traditional institutions like chaumasa with clearly demarcated functional responsibilities have ensured the

sustainability of natural resources in Uttarakhand. (iv) Finally, though not in any way the least important, ‘formal’ and

‘informal’ institutions and the complex issue of gender and forest management. Formal institutions giving legality to

property rights may not be gender inclusive, hence allocate functional responsibilities along traditional roles that are

detrimental to women. However, it is seen that even informal institutions such as Mahila Mangal Dals that are created

to give more voice to women may not be able to create a fair institution for all women due to patriarchal management

by mother-in-laws.

4. Village protecting part of reserved forest

Let us begin by examining the property rights of the forest which the villagers of Krass and Kafalna jointly consider

as their own (see Illustration 1). The forest is green and dense. If one looks around the landscape, one cannot find a

thicker and greener forest. The forest stretches for about two and a half to three kilometres around the village, and

Krass and Kafalna are among the few villages in the hills that do not have a water problem. The Gram Pradhan claims

that there are about 200 streams flowing to their fields from the forest.

The forest, however, is not a van panchayat or a civil forest. It is in fact a Reserved Forest being looked after by the

Forest Department. The villagers claim that they have been nurturing and protecting (the word they use is palna

roughly translated as parenting) the forest since 1945–1946. This region comes under the formerly princely state of

Tehri Garhwal, which unlike British Garhwal and Kumaon, did not have the institution of van panchayats during the

colonial period. In Tehri Garhwal and Uttarkashi districts formal van panchayats began to be set up only in 1976.

However, in this region one finds the existence of a number of cases where there are no formal institutions,

organisations or even clear distribution of accepted rights for the maintenance of forests in the vicinity of the villages.

These informal institutions have often been called a lath (literally translated as staff) panchayat. Discussions on lath

panchayat have often idealised this institutional arrangement for it has helped in conservation (Ballabh & Singh, 1988;

Guha, 1989). However, as the term denotes, the rights to the forest are not determined on the basis of legal rights, but

on the contesting strength of protecting villages or communities. The claim to forests under the lath panchayat is

maintained by resort to what may be considered to be unlawful and undemocratic methods, by the powerful, in

Illustration 1. Chandrabadni Watershed (Villages Krass and Kafalna).

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 49

restricting the bona fide claims of the residents of the neighbouring villages. Yet the claim by force has to be presented

as morally justifiable rights. While the ingenious manner of collective action for forest management by isolated

villages needs to be appreciated, one has to be cautious in lauding the manner in which the legal rights of others are

restricted by lath panchayats.

The villagers of Krass and Kafalna, who are mostly Rajputs have not only used the lath to restrict ‘outsiders’ from

the forest, but their sincere work in conservation since 1945 has created the most enviable forest in the region and has

given them a de facto right to this forest that has become more or less informally acceptable by state institutions,

panchayats and everybody concerned. The villagers have used a wide-range of mechanisms to maintain exclusive

control over this forest. Along the lines of the van panchayat, the villagers hire a guard for the forest. For this purpose a

contribution is collected from every household. The guard has the powers to confiscate the implements used to cut

grass or cut wood along with the rope that the ‘encroacher’ uses to carry the load home. This is deposited with the

office bearers of what they call van samiti (all the adult members of the two villages are members of the van samiti and

its office bearers are usually the elected representatives from these villages to the Gram Sabha) who decide on the

amount of fine to be imposed.

These villagers have adopted the rhetoric that movements like Chipko have projected in their dismissal of the

exclusionist and corrupt practices adopted by the Forest Department. They argue that the vast degraded reserved forest

is there for everyone to see and contrast it with their effective conservation management strategy. While taking over the

forest land they have challenged the state, yet the sharp state-society conflict which movements like Chipko have

portrayed, and which the villagers themselves assert in articulating their thoughts on the matter, does not translate into

their own strategies of managing what they regard as ‘their’ resource. In fact, as in this village, it is seen that state

institutions are often used by some of these ‘autonomous’ village bodies to enable them to effectively manage ‘their’

resources. In Krass and Kafalna, over the years an innovative arrangement has emerged whereby state institutions are

abused as well as used in the contest over natural resources and in its conservation and management at the village level.

The villagers of Krass and Kafalna have tried to institutionalise their claim over the forest by claiming that it is

Gram Sabha forest, when it is convenient. However, this Gram Sabha is not only composed of villages Krass and

Kafalna, but also villages Palkhand and Andhrethi. While Krass has a population of about 81, Kafalna has a population

of 183, Palkhand 47 and Andhrethi 36. The residents of Palkhand and Andhrethi are denied access to the forest and as

they are in an absolute minority they have not been able to win important positions in the Gram Sabha. Confident of

their exclusive control the villagers of Krass and Kafalna (jointly with 80 households compared to 27 households in

Palkhand and Andhrethi) suggest that the forest is just that when they deal with government officials in matters

concerning the forest.

At times, when the issue of legality comes to the fore, and is invoked by the Forest Department, the villagers make

use of innovative strategies to deal with it. In one instance, the villagers of Krass and Kafalna on hearing that the local

District Magistrate (DM) would be passing by on the road to their village, erected a gate to welcome him. When the

DM stopped they told him about their forest and their hard work towards its conservation over the years. The DM not

being aware of the contesting claims did what he was expected to do and congratulated the villagers on their efforts and

even promised to award them by recognising their village forest as the best maintained is the district (that was done

subsequently). This ‘visit’ of the DM and maybe the exaggerated announcement of his ‘praise’ for the villagers have

been used by the residents of Krass and Kafalna to underline the official recognition to their claim over the forest by the

highest district official. It is also used against forest guards and officials to maintain the status quo. The persons making

these claims are also ‘officials’, and close to the state bureaucracy as they are the elected representatives to the Gram

Sabha. Such tactics have been used by the villagers to give their forest a quasi-official recognition.

The villagers of Krass and Kafalna also actively seek the intervention of the forest guard to protect ‘their’ forest. Given

that legal rights over this forest are not actually theirs, very often the outside ‘encroachers’ refuse to pay fines. In case of

repeated offenders, the village officials complain to the forest guard and deposit the implement used to cut grass – sickle

(darati) or axe wood (kulhari) and rope (rassi) with him. The forest guards are aware of the villagers’ watch in this area

and usually without any hesitation issue official challans (legal notice for fines – these have a state sanction and in case

they are not paid, the state commences legal proceedings against the culprit) on the ‘encroacher’. The offender has no

rational option but to pay the fine to the state (which is actually higher than that imposed by the villagers), for failure to do

so will amount to a number of trips to the courts at the district headquarters that will prove to be a very expensive option.

Similarly, a few families from Krass have encroached upon the forest land for agriculture. Successive village level

meetings have pressed upon the encroaching parties to respect the will of the village. When this did not have any effect

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5950

on the offending parties, the Pradhan of the Gram Sabha led a delegation to petition before the District Forest Officer

(DFO) to stop this encroachment on the Reserved Forest land. A subsequent visit by the forest officials to the disputed

site was enough for the encroaching families to fall in line.

This case study brings us back to the issue of legal rights of the state and its enforcement. The failure of state regulation

and the scarcity of forest resources have led the residents of these two villages to stake their claim over a portion of the

reserved forest. Their dedicated protection and regeneration of the forest for over half a century has given them certain

accepted moral rights to the forest. Though this case is known to the Forest Department, the forest guard is happy with the

arrangement as he can showcase this green belt to his higher authorities. The district forest officials have also not taken

any action to enforce the rights of the neighbouring villagers in this part of the Reserved Forest. Residents of Krass and

Kafalna have successfully argued that though the land belongs to the state, the trees belong to them.

Though the residents of Krass and Kafalna actively oppose the exclusionist policies of the Forest Department in

conservation, they acknowledge the existence and power of the state and use it to legitimise their stake to the produce

in the Reserved Forest. These villagers also find it difficult to manage and regulate the distribution of the forest produce

without the help of the state. They very often seek the intervention of state officials like the forest guard, DFO, Sub-

Divisional Magistrate (SDM) or the elected politicians at the level of gram sabha, state or national legislature in the

affairs of ‘their’ forest. The residents of Krass and Kafalna also take recourse to the state funds for programmes for

afforestation, directly through the gram sabha or through non-governmental organisations. Similarly, the villagers

acknowledge that if their efforts at curbing encroachment are not successful, then they will seek arbitration from the

state judicial system. Keeping in mind the complex manner in which the villagers of Krass and Kafalna have managed

to establish their rights in this forest, it can be said that there may not be such a thing as ‘autonomous’ peoples’ or

community institutions. The village level institutions have to invariably interact with state institutions for the

maintenance of village resources. Contrary to the sharp state and society divide that some of the popular literature on

forestry in Uttarakhand has portrayed, the people do not have a monolithic view of the state and actually differentiate

between the various agencies of the state and use or abuse them for specific purposes. This fascinating example of local

politics, state and society interaction for the management of state forest points to the need for transcending a simplistic

understanding of the state and to differentiate between the various agencies of the state and the policies that each

implement at particular times.

5. Village privatising civil forest

In Basoli Malli village, in the Chandrabadni watershed itself, an interesting division of the commons has taken

place (see Illustration 2 for a sketch of village). This village has 28 families and a total population of 154. The total

village area is about 59 ha, of which about 26 ha is agricultural land and about 31 ha is civil soyam forest land

(categorised as waste land in the revenue records). The civil soyam forests do not have commercial species, but is made

up almost entirely of oak tree, which provide valuable fodder and help in the retention of moisture in the soil. The

forest land technically belongs to the revenue department. In the absence of the institution of van panchayat that came

to Tehri Garhwal in the seventies, the villagers used the common land for regeneration in order to ensure a sustainable

supply of fuel and fodder for themselves under a lath panchayat.

However in the 1940s, this forest land was divided equally among the existing households. This division took place as

the village as a whole had problems convincing the people to take up rotational guarding of the forest under the existing

lath panchayat. The idea of monetary contribution for a village guard also did not appeal to the villagers. In the absence of

an effective collective pursuit, the villagers thought that it would be best to divide the forest equally among individual

households who would be responsible for its maintenance, for they would be forced to meet their requirement of fuel and

fodder from their respective patches. In this way they will be forced to pay attention to the management of their ‘private

commons’. In order to minimise village level conflicts on the issue of territorial rights, it was agreed that cattle had to be

stall-fed. Free grazing was not allowed in this forest. Apart from this restriction, the village as a whole has no say in the

way in which different households manage their plots. Villagers have been able to minimise the costs related to the

functioning of the common institutions and the problem of regular guarding. The village forest has now become lush

green and there is abundant fuel and fodder to meet the requirements of the entire village.

While this can be called privatisation of the commons, it is perhaps more appropriate to call it ‘private commons’.

The title to the land is with the state though it does not exercise any direct and visible control over it. In addition,

against the popularly held notion that considers a direct link between privatisation and the production of goods for the

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 51

Illustration 2. Village Basoli Malli.

market, here the market does not dictate production. Theoretically, the villagers may be able to sell their surplus fuel

and fodder in the market, or in the face of economic hardship deplete their future stocks. Surprisingly, not a single

family of the village does that. While there are no formal institutional checks to stop this from happening, there is an

underlying code that the entire village adheres to. Forest produce does not enter the market directly, though its by-

products like milk, ghee and goats are sold in the market. While the village forest is being cared for individually, there

is collective mechanism that continues to curb outside encroachment. The village elders get together and first use

persuasion with the encroachers, failing which they seek the intervention of the local Patwari (local revenue official).

Given the topography of the village, any trespass by outsiders can be easily detected by the villagers, especially on

their way in or out of the village. They alert others and jointly warn and fine the culprit even in the absence of the

family whose forest had been the target. This is not a formal arrangement but dependent upon the goodwill of the

person who sees the trespassers and alerts others.

After the initial allotment, there has been subsequent division of the plots within a family similar to the distribution

of agricultural land and other assets among the heirs. As such, not every family has the same area of forest any more. In

spite of the unequal per capita forest area, all the plots were equally well looked after and only the villagers could tell

the boundaries of one plot from the other. Conflicts on the issue of boundary of the plots are unheard of. Even though

there is no institutionalised guarding by families individually, or jointly by the entire village, there has been no conflict

in the village arising from accusations of stealing from each other’s plots. This ‘privatisation’ has also not led to any

shift in land use, for instance, conversion of forests to agricultural land. A reason for this may be that any encroachment

on this land would be easily visible both to the villagers and outside agencies, as in this village the agricultural fields

are situated on the other side of the village.3

3 The most common example of encroachment of forest land in the UP hills is by the extension of agricultural fields to the adjoining forest land.

This form of encroachment can only be detected by the villagers themselves or by the revenue officials if they come to measure the land. The latter is

done only when a dispute ensues involving some of the villagers.

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5952

Though the villagers did not have any authority to divide up the commons and do not have official titles to their

private commons, families have made land transactions among themselves. Till date there has been no transaction

outside the families or involving cash. However the idea of this land being as good as private property is strong. For

instance, one family without a male child was thinking of bringing in a ghar jamai (resident son-in-law) for their

youngest daughter. And in case this would not be possible, then they would sell off their assets in the village and set-up

an independent dwelling in a town where two of their daughters are already married. This family had no doubt

whatsoever that they could procure a monetary compensation to renounce their claim over their private common in

favour of a villager wishing to buy their rights. Unlike the price of agricultural land, they were of the opinion that the

price for their private common would be considerably less and would to a large extent be determined by the

competition for it from families with declining ratios of per capita forest.

This is indeed a unique village where its peculiar privatisation has brought about a significant transformation of the

village resources that is sustainable, broadly equitable and meets most of the requirements of fuel and fodder of the

village. Though the villagers do not have title to the land that has been ‘privatised’, there are socially recognised

alienable rights. However, this village study does raise questions that contradict analysts like Netting (1997). Netting

summarise in the following manner, ‘Privatising or enclosing the commons, either by agreement of the commoners or

by external force, tends to widen existing economic and political inequalities among smallholders and to impede the

solution of collective action problems.’ The land use pattern has not shifted, perhaps because of the location of the

forest away from agricultural fields. While petty trade in forest products like fuelwood and fodder is possible, the

villagers have instead preferred to maintain their stock of cattle to continue to reap benefits from their parallel livestock

economy. This is something which villagers across Uttarakhand are increasingly finding difficult to.

An invisible actor in the regulation of this forest is the Revenue Department, the actual owner of the forest land. To a

large extent, the villagers have worked towards the functioning of this controversy free private common due to the fear

of the uncertain action that the state may adopt if the arrangement gets controversial. The villagers fear that state

initiated institutional changes could seriously affect their secure supply of fuel and fodder that the villagers have built

up over the years. While this case study points to the mechanism in which community privatisation can regulate the

sustainable and equitable distribution of resources, there are other lessons for institutional development. The villagers

of Basolli Malli have reduced the costs of the functioning of the village collective institution. Apart from the direct cost

of paying for the village guard, indirect cost related to the time taken to forge collective interaction is also removed.

The earlier discussion on fissures within the ‘community’ that hampered collective action points to an unequal

distribution of resources and benefits from the forests. Similar discussion on the problems associated with the

‘democratic’ functioning of village bodies hinted at the dictatorship of the majority or the powerful, which again has a

bearing on the distribution of resources. All these institutional hurdles seem to have been overcome by the villagers of

Basolli Malli. The villagers have also found it easy to resist depleting their forest for trade in the market, instead opted

for sustaining their livelihoods and also making economic returns at the same time. In all this they have been helped by

the particular location of the village, the forest within the village, remittances from outside, as also the distribution of

labour in the different households which does not make any drastic change in the livelihood attractive.

6. Customary practice, van panchayats and regulation of natural resources

Apart from the institution of the formal van panchayat, informal institutions like the lath panchayat, and

privatisation of commons, there continue to exist customary practices for the regulation of natural resources. It is seen

that the van panchayats and all the diverse forms of institutions work best when implementing the customary practice

for the regulation of grass. Keeping in mind the sustenance of the agro-pastoral economy, villagers across Uttarakhand

have historically evolved customary practices for the regulation of grass. These vary from region to region and can

range from closing part of the forest for a few months as in the middle Himalayas, to the practice of chaumasa or

migration for four months (usually July–October) as in the high altitude of Chamoli district, where the villagers have to

depend more on cattle than agriculture. Let us look at the different manner in which customary practice and the formal

institution of the van panchayat assist in the regulation of natural resources.

In Sungh and Luwani, two villages in Chamoli district, the villagers leave fallow their agricultural and grazing land

in the lower altitude and harvest a monsoon crop in another part of the village on a higher altitude. Every family has

land and chans (an additional dwelling hut usually of a temporary nature) in the higher region where they migrate

during the monsoons. For these four months, the entire village depends on the resources of the higher altitude. When

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 53

the winter sets in, they move back to the lower reaches. The lower region would by now not only have a good stock of

grass that had grown during the four months, but even the agricultural land would have some of its nutrients

replenished. This provides them with some security for the harsh winter. The seasonal migration eases the pressure on

the village resources and helps to sustain the livelihood of the people.

In this region, it was not uncommon to find families with nearly a hundred or more cattle. During the chaumasa,

many families send their cattle to the higher reaches of the Himalayas many miles away. The melting of the snow

during the rains, lays bare the high meadows, and the cattle can feed on the grass during the four months before the

snow comes again during the winters and covers up the meadows. All the residents of Uttarakhand have rights to the

grass in these meadows during the chaumasa. The state recognises these rights and issues the villagers with a pass

notifying them of the area in which they can graze their cattle every year. The villagers of Luwani, inspite of their vast

van panchayat forest, send their cattle away on chaumasa. According to custom, a few villagers take almost the entire

village goats. These people taking the goats are paid for their services and they assume no responsibility in case a few

of the goats do not make the journey back due to illness, theft or death on the way.

While some of these customary regulations continue to work very effectively in the villages across the UP hills, new

practices and institutions like the van panchayat created by the state have many problems. It is not my intention to

suggest that tradition invariably works while state-supported institutions do not. It is to highlight that state support has

been unenthusiastic and that it limits the power of communities and often acts as a hindrance to their collective

pursuits. There is no reason to suggest that even if the state took on the role of a facilitator of collective pursuits for

forest management it will not be able to evolve successful institutions for these purposes. In fact the traditional

practices very often incorporate power and exploitation that exists within the community and the oppressed, such as

the economically insecure, the lower castes, and women are marginalised from the decision making mechanism in the

village.

Sungh and Luwani both have predominantly oak forests (see Illustration 3). As the administrative structure of the

Revenue Department is geared towards support for commercial activities like the extraction of resin, it is often years

before the van panchayat inspector (who usually has a jurisdiction of over a hundred panchayats) visits these villages.

Some other pressing matters of the village are also not processed. For instance, these two villages have been involved

in a dispute over the border of their respective van panchayats. Even though government officials visited the site once,

after much coaxing by the villagers, they have not followed it up with any action to resolve this conflict, which has

resulted in a day to day escalation of tension and divided these two villages, which otherwise were very close, and used

to practice inter-marriage.

Sungh has 48 households, all of them Rajput belonging to the same Bisht sub-caste. The van panchayat was formed

in 1956 and initially the villagers kept watch by rotation. The van panchayat has two parts. The total van panchayat

area is 25 acres, of which as much as 14 acres is disputed with village Luwani. A portion of the civil soyam land was

not registered as van panchayat and adds up to 15–16 acres. However, since the residents of adjoining village Matkot

started encroaching on the civil land, the villagers of Sungh decided to also register this land as van panchayat land in

1979. They hoped this would prevent the residents of Matkot from making inroads into their land for fear of state

action. Their application is however gathering dust in the revenue office for the last seventeen years. The villagers

allege that they even bribed the van panchayat inspector to speed up the process; however, the state is yet to recognise

this land as van panchayat land.

Luwani is the bigger village with 127 households. Of these 27 households are Harijans, while the rest are Rajputs.

This village has a van panchayat area of 28.445 ha (71.11 acres), of this as much as 14 acres is disputed with Sungh.

The conflict began in 1978, when the residents of Sungh filed a court case in the SDM’s court. The judgement on the

conflict was to divide up the area equally. However, the residents of Sungh protested that the judgement was not

according to the revenue map. There could have been some mistake in recording the ground details in the map, which

was detected by the residents of Sungh. The map is now being used to establish their rights on the ground. The ensuing

conflict has resulted in the destruction of the resources on the disputed site where all the branches from the oak trees

have been cut.

While this is a territorial conflict, it raises other issues related to access and distribution of forest resources among

the hill communities. While social movements like Chipko are quick to point to the unfair extraction of forest

resources by the state, there is little effort to reconcile forest related disputes among the hill villages. Conflicts between

Krass, Kafalna and Palkhand and Andhrethi are not demands for an equal distribution of forest resources rather for the

right to unequal access to resources. Krass and Kafalna has monopolised a large part of the state forests and even

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5954

Illustration 3. Villages Sungh and Luwani.

though they have done commendable work for its preservation, this has been at the cost of the neighbouring villagers

whose rights have been curtailed. In the case of Sungh and Luwani as well as a number of villages across Uttarakhand,

the dispute takes a territorial form. The creation of village boundaries with land settlement has led to villages having

unequal access to resources and as these boundaries have become the sole basis of resolving disputes among villages,

these conflicts are only going to get more acute. Not only will villages look for irregularities in the land records, but

also explore ways to extend their territorial claims by recourse to active intervention and manipulation of the

judgement of the revenue officials.

Issues such as the resolution of the territorial dispute and proper supervision of the van panchayat forest be they oak

or chir, requires an active state participation. The state however finds itself in an uncomfortable situation, for it had

created the van panchayats to reduce its administrative and financial burden in the regulation of the civil forests.

However, the state did not give the village bodies enough power and later took away whatever little it had given. In

such a situation the villagers have no option but to call for state intervention on every small matter. The unwillingness

of the government to create a well-resourced administrative structure to look after the institution of the van panchayat

or empower the village institutions has led to the inefficiencies in the institution that are not contributing to the

regeneration of the village civil forests.

7. Formal and informal institutions

We have seen the interplay between state systems and community institutions for the management of forest

resources. Let us now look at the manner in which two ‘modern’ institutions interact for the management of village

forests. In village Gharkharak in district Pauri a fascinating arrangement has emerged between the van panchayat and

the Mahila Mangal Dal (Women’s Welfare Group) (see Illustration 4). The van panchayat, controlled by the men, has

official jurisdiction over the civil forest. However, it is seen that the Mahila Mangal Dal undertakes the actual

management of the van panchayat.

The village has 27 families, out of which 12 are Brahmin and 15 are Rajput. It has a population of 200, of which

nearly half reside in towns where they have employment. The van panchayat in this village was set up as late as 1973 in

10 ha of the civil forest. Prior to this the people looked after the forest in an ad hoc manner. The villagers preferred the

institution of the van panchayat as they were fed up with the interference of the local Patwari. The van panchayat act

provides the villagers with certain rights like one tree per family every year for fuelwood. As this forest was not a van

panchayat forest, the Patwari used to fine the villagers if they were found to be lopping off green branches. In return,

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–59 55

Illustration 4. Village Gharkharak.

there was no management of the forest by the Revenue Department. In order to undermine the authority of the Patwari,

the villagers decided to set-up a van panchayat where they would have greater powers and would be answerable to the

distant van panchayat inspector. In the last twenty-five years, the initiative of the village has resulted in some

plantations and their guarding the forest has led to regeneration. The forest is not only green again, but has recharged

the groundwater and meets the demand of fuel and fodder of the village.

The van panchayat in this village, like in most villages across Uttarakhand, is a strictly male organisation. This

particular van panchayat does little more than interact with the state. The sarpanch of the van panchayat says that they

do not fine the encroachers, as they do not consider that to be an effective deterrent; instead, they prefer to reason with

the offender. This way, they think that they are able to embarrass the culprits who instead go to other forests to

encroach the next time. In any case, the male sarpanch reasons that ‘a loss of a 32-year-old tree cannot be compensated

by five rupees.’ As the van panchayat also does not organise any extraction of resin, in effect it does not have any

source of income and therefore no account book.

The institutionalisation of the van panchayat has given the villagers greater control over their resources,

but it has also led to the dilution of village level initiative in managing their forests. For instance, prior to

the creation of the van panchayat, the villagers used to take active part in afforestation, like their major effort in

1965–1966 when the entire work was done by shramdan (voluntary unpaid labour). Now the villagers expect

afforestation to take place through government programmes and want to be hired as wage labourers to plant and

tend the trees. Similarly, as in other villages, they expect that the services of the village forest guard should be paid

for by the state.

In the early eighties, the village Mahila Mangal Dal was set up under the guidance of the Chipko leaders from

Gopeshwar. Mangal Dals became popular all over Uttarakhand following the Chipko agitation and the prominent role

that women played in this movement. Since then various writers have labelled ecological movements in Uttarakhand

as womens’ movements (Shiva, 1988). As a result, peoples’ groups and non-governmental organisations started

mobilising village level women under Mangal Dals. The Mangal Dal does not only concern itself with ecological

issues, but also all issues concerning women. The Mangal Dal in Gharkharak is particularly active and enthusiastic.

Spurred on by the legacy of Chipko as well as to meet their requirements of fuel and fodder, the women of this village

guard the forest on a voluntary rotational basis. Two women from two families are in charge of keeping a watch on the

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5956

forest every day. The Mangal Dal, unlike the van panchayat, imposes a fine on the offenders and puts this money in the

Mangal Dal accounts. This money along with their own monthly contribution is used for community work.

In my numerous visits to Uttarakhand’s villages, I found that whenever a village guard is hired for cash, the guard is

a male. And whenever there is a watch by voluntary rotation, it is women who undertake this task. It is for this reason,

that Mahila Mangal Dal’s have gained recognition even from men, and they go to lengths to talk about women’s role in

the protection of the forest. It can thus be argued that it is in the interest of the men that women get some recognition for

their work from outside the village to keep their enthusiasm for the forest alive. In this village, women are not

represented in the van panchayat, nor are they paid for their valuable labour which men do not perform. As the already

burdened women of Uttarakhand have become the champions of ecological protection, they are under increasing

pressure from NGOs and peoples’ organisations to emulate the role models of Chipko icons like Gaura Devi. This

village also presents a classic example, where women are not represented in the van panchayat, but their efforts at the

protection of the forest is rewarded as they are allowed to collect the fines. However, these fines do not help pay their

wages, but to a collective fund. Even though, the emerging ecologically conscious Garhwali women may retain

effective control over their funds and channel it for projects in their favour, these are in effect used for the communal

purposes meant for the entire village. It can be argued that this new ‘feminist’ ideology, along with the existing

patriarchy is continuing to define and dictate womens’ labour, time and role. In spite of the existence of the Mangal Dal

in this village for over a decade, and the fact that they have effective control over the van panchayat, they still have not

been able to get even one woman elected as a panch. They have also not been able to get empowered through access to

education as apart from the children, only five women can read and write. I was told that somehow the literacy mission

did not reach this village.

The popularity of the Mangal Dal and the voluntary protection of the forest can also be seen as the only way women

can effectively manage the village’s requirements of fuel and fodder. Unlike the village reported by Britt-Kapoor

(1994, n.d.) where the mothers-in-law had effective control over the Mangal Dals and set up rules that the daughters-

in-law, the actual users of the forest, found obstructive and difficult to obey, the Mangal Dal in Gharkharak was

primarily a group of daughters-in-law. There was only one mother-in-law who was a member of the Mangal Dal

(which had representation from all the families). The members of the Mangal Dal mentioned that the men and mother-

in-laws used to actively dissuade them from going to other forests for fuel and fodder, for it they were caught, they

would have to pay fines. Many daughters-in-law said that their families had refused to pay fines on several occasions

and they were subjected to humiliation by men of other villages. More than one woman said that as a result they were

forced to take up wage labour in order to pay the fines and take possession of the confiscated rope and sickle.4 Thus,

very often, it is in the daughter-in-law’s interest to participate in the activities of the Mangal Dal for the preservation of

their own forest can ensure that they can procure their stock of fuel and fodder from it.

An arrangement has evolved in this village where the state run institution exists on paper but provides critical

function like the establishment of rights and the devolution of the powers of the Patwari. It also obtains critical support

such as state funds under various afforestation programmes. However, the protection of the forest has largely been

because of the Mangal Dal. The formation of Mangal Dals is ultimately a strategy for survival for many women. It is

unfortunate that instead of understanding the system of exploitation (and trying to change it) that is forcing women to

come out to ensure the protection of the environment, which in itself needs urgent attention, their actions have become

a cause for celebration by the eco-feminists as well as most environmentalists (Shiva, 1988). This misreading and

celebration of women’s role in forestry in Uttarakhand has created policies and programmes that have begun to bind

the women to particular roles that are in no way emancipatory. While the popularity of the Mangal Dal may be due to

the unfavourable balance of power that the daughters-in-law face in this village, they have nevertheless managed to

create a secure supply of fuel and fodder for themselves. The daughter-in-laws have also demonstrated a high level of

co-ordination and their capacity to successful manage village institutions and resources in spite of their marginal social

position. It is another question whether they will be able to use these valuable assets of theirs to challenge the forces

that marginalise them. This is a complex political issue as the provision of institutional safeguards has so far been

provided under categories of caste or gender. It is seen here that these safeguards need to be further segregated to sub-

groups under them such as daughter-in-laws.

4 Usually if a fine cannot be paid on the spot, then the rope and sickle or axe, which is carried to bring back the grass or wood, is confiscated. Its

loss for a few days can mean a lot of hardship for women who have to take recourse to borrowing other’s implements to get grass and wood.

S.

Sin

gh

/ P

olicy

an

d S

ociety

32

(20

13

) 4

3–5

9

57

Table 1

Property rights, institutional arrangements and linkages.

Village and demography Property regime

and demography

Legal rights Nature of institution

and linkages

Local politics Gender dimensions Contribution to conservation

Krass & Kafalna Tehri

District Garhwal (Krass

& Kafalna have a total

of 80 households, mostly

Rajputs & Andhrethi &

Palkhad have 27

households, mostly

Brahmins)

Reserved forest No legal rights for

community management;

moral rights asserted.

Community management

has restricted rights of

neighbouring villagers

Informal, traditional

lath panchayat (van

samiti). Judicious use

of the institution of

gram sabha, forest

guard, forest

department and revenue

officials

Judicious use of powe

political and

institutional spaces at

the local level

Rotational guarding

decided by men, who

control the informal

van samiti (forest

council)

Excellent – protected

degrading reserved forest for

over 50 years. Best forest

cover in the region

Basoli Malli Tehri District

Garhwal (28 Brahmin

households)

Civil forest Legal rights as common

property. However,

common property is

demarcated divided as

individual landholdings

with quasi alienable rights

– a form of privatisation

Informal private

commons maintained

by individual families

Revenue department

and legal structure as

silent regulators

Women do not have to

go out of their village

for fodder. However,

stall feeding means

more work for women

Excellent – no significant

inroads by markets

Sungh and Luwani Chamoli

District Kumaon (Sungh

48 Rajput households,

Luwani 127 households –

100 Rajputs and 27 Harijans)

Van panchayat

and civil forest

Legal rights as community

forest for both van

panchayat and civil forest.

Recourse to convert civil

forest into van panchayat

in order to stall

encroachment by

neighbouring villagers.

Van panchayat in one

part of the village and

civil forest in another

While customary

practices like chauma

work, the modern

institutions like van

panchayats have led t

endless litigation

Men control the forest

institutions. Recourse

to litigation has ensured

that women remain in

the margins of the van

panchayat and other

institutions

Institutions like van

panchayats, with all its

problems, used effectively by

locals for conservation.

Litigation has ensured that

inter-village harmony is

affected. No conflict

resolution by revenue officials

or assistance in litigation

Gharkharak Pauri District

Garhwal (27 households –

12 Brahmins and

15 Rajputs)

Van panchayat Legal rights for

community management

Formal van panchayat,

but defacto Mahila

Mangal Dal

Van panchayat was

formed to restrict the

intervention of a loca

patwari (revenue

official)

Daughter-in-laws are

the main collectors of

wood and grass and

they work for the

Mahila Mangal Dals

Excellent, largely due to the

contribution of the exploited

daughter-in-laws, who get a

secure source of wood and

grass in the village; and do not

have to face the humiliation of

being caught collecting the

same by men of the

neighbouring forests

r,

sa

o

l

S. Singh / Policy and Society 32 (2013) 43–5958

8. Managing transition towards decentralisation

Table 1 provides a brief summary of the case studies presented here clearly points to the diversity of property

regimes and decentralised management structures, all with their limited flaws as well as a history of a long record of

collective action for conservation and mechanisms for conflict resolution. It is seen that the parameters in this political

study of decentralisation is very different from the normative ones in the economic literature. These studies weigh the

social, economic and ecological benefits as well as register the limitations in terms of gender and social equality. It also

acknowledges the diversity of political activity in the interpretation of formal rules, informal power relations, legal

rights, moral claims and social custom. Unlike prescriptive economic models, it is seen here that it is very difficult to

argue for the ‘right’ form of institutional arrangement given the diversity of resources, local needs, institutions and

importantly local politics. This paper brings out the diverse local experience that calls for greater attention to the key

role that local politics plays in effecting local decentralised institutions effective or ineffective.

It is seen that content or discontent with decentralisation is ultimately dependent on the institutional design of

community management of natural resources. The debate on the ideal property rights regime for sustainable forestry

and that of decentralisation has been opened up. The existing wisdom that calls for property rights to be reversed to the

communities and idealises the role of the community in continuing to successfully manage the forest resources is in the

right direction. However, the underlying assumptions for making this argument are simplistic and devoid of an

appreciation of the political reality in which local institutions work. As different institutions lead to different outcomes

(and similar institutions can also lead to different outcomes as they are dependent on local resources and politics),

there is a need to appreciate a wide variety of property and institutional arrangements instead of a single decentralised

model for an entire state. Hence, an approach that empowers local communities to define decentralisation and gives

them the flexibility of institutional design with the facilitation, oversight and regulation of both the state and civil

society is likely to produce more effective decentralised institutions and sustainable management of natural resources.

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