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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 148Box: 00002 Folder: 0001 Document: 10

Series: Dan Marcus Files

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Folder Title: [Ai] Gore

Document Date: 04-09-2004Document Type: Briefing Paper

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Subject: Outline: Interview of Vice President Albert Gore

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restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefor examination.

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QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "Thefederal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, andprovide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should betreated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,policies, priorities, procedures etc?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: The Gore Commission report referenced the changing threat from terrorism tothe U.S. homeland. How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation both domesticallyand internationally from the intelligence you received in the course of the Commission'swork and, in general, as Vice President?

H ij acking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threatand given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn'tthis more of a focus?

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on theimportance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice doyou have for this commission about how to set anaviation security R&D agenda, to fundit and to deploy the technology?

Passenger Profiling

Question: Will you share with us your recollection of the commission's deliberationsabout the followingkey issues:

Aircraft as weapons; The security consequences for passengers selected by the computer prescreening

system that the commission so strongly endorsed; For instance, was it thecommission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those who maypose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might posea hijacking threat as well?

The civil liberties aspects of CAPS and CAPS consequences; The use of government watch lists to stop suspected terrorists from flying.

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Reinventing Government

The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chairedfocused intently onraising barriers to the imposition of newfederal rules.

Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the FederalAviation Administration? Given that aviation security w as a regulatory process thatdepended on rulemaking to implement improved security measures, w as there concernthat the lessons from the Commission on Reinventing Government might unwittinglyfrustrate reforms contemplated in the report of the White House Com mission on A viationSafety and Security? , _ A*~ >, _ /

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Genera. Assessments

Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system inplace leadingup to and on 9/11/01? Why were the attacks able to succeed? How and why did thesystem fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believeeither theClinton or Bush Adm inistrations could have done which would have prevented thosedisasters?

Gore Commission: General

Question: CommissionerVict^ia CummockjBleda dissent to many of the ^Com mission's recommendations, argiiirigthat in some cases they lacked specificity,responsibility, substance,accountability^apglicability andtimelines and deadlines.Further, her dissent included whatsjae thought^wouldaddress thoseperceived gaps.Could you comment on that dissejit in terms of its validity and how the commission^dewith her views?

Recommendations

Question: What wouldyo u tell the Commission they should recommendto improveaviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general andwhat steps can we take to enhance the probability that our recommendations are dulyconsidered and implemented?

Question: Threats and vulnerabilities to the nation's transportation systemare many andvaried. They includeno t only aviationbu t maritime, rail, pipelinesand other surfacemodes. How would you advise that priorities be determined? H ow should cost beallocated among stakeholders?

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CAPS (computer assisted passenger screening)an d CONSEQUENCES

One of the Gore Com mission 's key recomm endations was for the FAA and air carriers toadminister a com puterizedprofiling system to identify passenge rs who should receiveadditional security screening .

The FA A's Baseline Working Group which helpedinform the Commission'srecom men dation stated thatthe system should "identify selectees, whosepersons andproperty (checked baggage and carry-on bags/items) will be subjected to securityscrutiny beyond that required for regularpassengers."

However, whenthe FAA implementedthe recommendationthe consequenceof selectionwas restrictedto the following: eitherthe selectee'schecked bags wouldbe screened fo rexplosivesor they wouldbe loaded ontothe plane onlyafter their ownerwas aboard.Being a selectee did notmean you underwentan y additional screeningof your personorcarry-on bags despite thefact that the FAA knew checkpoints were notoriously porous.In fact, yo u could onlybe a CAP S selecteeif you checked bags.

Q: Was it the Commission's intent for profiling to focus solely on stoppingexplosives in checked baggage? Did the FAA's rules on CAPS' consequencesadequately reflect the Gore Commission's recommendation?

(Follow-up: The CAP S recomm endation includedthe following provision: "FBI,CIAan d BATF should evaluatean d expand the research into know n terrorists, hijackersan dbombers neededto developthe best possibleprofiling system." Hijackers sneak thingsthrough on their person/carry-on not their checked bags, so why the focus of CAPSconsequences on checked bags only?

Q: It seems app arent that one of the reasons for focusing CAPS consequences solelyon checked baggage was that by doing so theFAA/air carriers didn't have to"hassle" people at the checkpoint which could have raised both civil libertycomp laints and caused "efficiency" problems in getting people through screeningan d to their flights. How would you respond to that premise?

Watchlisting

Among the Gore Com mission's recomm endationswas the following: "TheFBI and CIAshould developa system that would allow important intelligen ce informationon knownor suspected terrorists to be used in passenger pro filing without com prom ising theintegrityof the intelligenceor its sources."

Q: Was this intended to be the m eans of developing a "no fly" list? How expansivedid you intend this effort to be?

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Q: As you know there w ere fewer than 15 people on FAA's no fly list as of 9-11.This seems like anarea in wh ich the Comm ission's recomm endation never wentanywhere. Do you recall h earing w hy thiswasn't being done and did you take anysteps to push it?

Checkpoint Screener Certification

The Gore Comm issionrecommended that screening companiesbe certified by the federalgovernment tohelp enforce better performance. The FAA initiated rule-mak ingtoimplement the recommendationin 1997. As of September11, 2001 the rule still hadn 'tbeen finalized.

Q: Were you aware why it was taking so long to implement such a key rule? Did youtake any steps to eliminate the bureaucratic delay?

Q: The Gore Commission'sfirst recommendationwas to treat aviation security as aNational Security issue. Wouldyou agree that taking 5 years to implement a keyaviation security measurewas not consistent with that standard?

Lobbying

Q: We understand that the air carriers undertook a very aggressive lobbyingcampaign when the Commission was developing its recommendations and in theimplementation phase.What's your recollection of this campaign by the aircarriers?