DM B4 Intelligence Fdr- Memos- Correspondence- Discussion Papers Re Intelligence Reform 327

8/14/2019 DM B4 Intelligence Fdr- Memos- Correspondence- Discussion Papers Re Intelligence Reform 327

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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGYDEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

ROOM 6-208CAMBRIDGE, M A S S A C H U S E T T S 02139

JOHN M. D E U T C H

INSTITUTE P R O F E S S O R

TE L (617)253-1479FA X (617)258-5700

E-Mail: [email protected]

Senator John Warner, ChairmanCommitteeon Armed Services

Senate Susan C ollins, ChairmanCommitteeon GovernmentalAffairs

Senator Pat Roberts, ChairmanSenate Select C omm itteeon Intelligence

Senator Carl Levin,Committeeon Armed Service

Senator Joseph LiebermanCommitteeon GovernmentalAffairs

Senator JohnD. Rockefeller,IVSenate Select Committee on Intelligence

Senators: August 14,2004

The Senate Select Committee'sReport on the U.S. Intelligence Com munity PrewarIntelligence Assessments on Iraqand the 9-11 Commission Report present a convincingrecord of Intelligence Community(1C) deficienciesand provide a compelling casethatmajor change is required. How ever, successful intelligence depends aboveall ondedicatedand capable individualswho are trained an d motivated to work cooperatively.These individualsin the 1C must be enabled by a sound organizational structure withclearly aligned respon sibilitiesan d authorities.

Currently, the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI) does not have the authoritynecessary to perform critical intelligence functions that supportefforts to combatterrorism,combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction,an d military operations.Inconsidering changes to the structure of the 1C, the central question that Congressmustdecide is how much executive authorityto give to the newNation al Intelligence D irector(NID).

M y experience as DCI andDeputy Secretaryof Def ense leadsme to suggest thatthe bestbalance is toincrease the authority of the NID forplanningan d budgetingbut to leaveauthority forexecution of the NID approved programs with executive departmentandagency heads. In this regard, someof the recommendationsof the 9-11 Commissiongotoo far andothers not far enough. I propose five modificationsof the 9-11 Commissionrecommendations that I believe will better serve the security interest of the UnitedStates.

1. The NID should be directly responsibleto the President an d confirmedby the Senate.The individua l should serve at the President's pleasure and should not have a fixed term.The NID should not be located in the ExecutiveOffice of the President becausethe 1C is

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only one actor in the interagency process. The President should rely on the Nationa lSecurity C ouncil and N ationa l Security A dvisor as the single m echanism in theExecutiveOffice of the Presidentfo r managingthe interagencyprocess.

2. The N ID must have responsibilityfo r planning, programming,an d budgeting an 1C

comm unity-wide, multi year program. This means giving the NID budgetary andplanning responsibilityfor all of theNational Foreign Intelligence Program(NFIP) andJoint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)and some of the activities in the TacticalIntelligenceand Related Activities (TIARA ) program. The Secretary of D efense shouldrely on the NID for theintelligence planningan d budgeting requiredfor intelligencesupport to military operations. O nlyif the NID isgiven this expanded budgetaryauthorityshould the position of NID be separatedfrom the Director of CIA. If the NIDis no t given budgetary authority,the position willbe irrelevant.

3. The NID should have shared, notsole authority, with the head of the executivedepartment to recommend to the president appointment of individuals to head1Cagencies. I believe it a mistake to require that positions o f deputy NID for foreignintelligence,defense intelligence,and homeland intelligencebe created or be 'doublehatted.' These positions should bestaff functionsfor the NID and cannot have lineauthority over the component agencies. Because of the requirements for battlefieldintelligence,th e Secretaryof Defensemust have day-to-day responsibility overthe NSA(for example, to provide communications security) and the NGA (forexample,geospatialimagery to support tactical targeting). Intoday's world, afuture Secretary ofDefense mightwell decide not to have an Undersecretaryfor Intelligencebut rather anUndersecretary forComm and, Control, Communicationsan d Intelligence thatis moreoriented tosupport of military operations.The National ReconnaissanceOffice (NRO)should be managed by the Secretary of Defense as part of the DOD space acquisitionsystem, executing a program plan put together by theNDI.

4. The proposed N ational Counterterrorism Center (NC TC) with joint intelligence andoperations makes sense. But the extension of the 'center' concept to other activitiescannot be made with confidence. The analogy of joint comm and in the Department ofDefense is imperfec t, becauseal l defense activitiesare under the executive authorityofthe Secretaryof Defense. The proliferationof centers perform ing collectionan d analysisbegs th e question aboutth e functions performed under suchan arrangement in thecomponent1C agencies, especiallyNSA and DIA.

5. The 9-11 Com mission report does not adequately define the relationship of the NID toth e FBI. I believe the NID should have planningand budgeting authority overallintelligenceactivities of the FBI. This is the only way to have an integrated intelligenc ecollectionan d analysis effort against the terrorist threat. Dissem inationof informationwith nation al security implication s should underthe direction of theNID.

I regret that the 9-11 Commissiondid not give favorable considerationto separatingdomestic intelligencefrom the FBI andplacing domestic intelligencein a new entityreporting to the NID insimilar alignmentto the CIA andforeign intelligence. Thiswould have permitted the Attorney General to focus on assuring that the rights ofU.S.

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citizens are respectedan d that the 1C obeys U.S. laws.The Attorney Generalnow is inth e undesirable positionof having a conflict between collecting domestic intelligencean d defending civilrights.

There are many complex issues involved in implem enting the recomm endations of the

9-11 Com mission. M oreover, organizingthe governmentto meet the terrorist threat isonly one of the serious security challenges weface. There are also the problemsposedby North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Iran, and combating the spread of weapons of massdestruction. Allrequire intelligence analysisto support policyand action. It is unwiseto decide on amajor reorganization of the national security structure in the monthsimmediately before a presidential election, based on the recommendations of a groupchartered for the particular purpose of examining thecauses of the 9-11 tragedy. The1947 National Security Act, its 1949 and 1958 amendments and the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act were not adopted during a presidential election yearand I suggest th eCongress, as well as the Bush administrationor a Kerry administration, deserve to giveintelligencecommunity organizationfurther deliberate thought.

Sincerely yours,

John Deutch

C c: Senator Ted K ennedySenatorArlen SpecterChairman Porter GossCongresswoman JaneHarman

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"National Intelligence Reforms"A Critique

The discussion paper proposes, in my view, a structure for the intelligencecommunity far more complicated and stovepiped than is the present system. Itwill be fiercely opposed by almost every element of the community and will havealmost no chance of acceptance. In addition, it is difficult to understand why itwill not make inter-departmental communications more complicated andstovepiped than they are today.

Perhaps unconsciously, the diagram itself shows fourteen stovepipes witha mixture of operational and staff responsibilities.

Now to specifics.The CIA is totally eviscerated.1) The CIA director, who now reports to the president, would now report to

the executive officer, who reports to the DNI, who reports to the president.

2) The CIA's operational functions are to be divided among seven or eightdirectors general who are not responsible to him, as he retains only analyticalfunctions.

3) The CIA director loses substantial control over the personnel he doesretain to the NIA Chief of Intelligence Personnel and to the NIA executive

officer.

4) The CIA loses control over his own budget.

The FBI is cut in half.1) Its present law enforcement functions are, of course, outside of the

diagram.

2) While the plan calls the domestic intelligence function the "FBI NationalSecurity Intelligence Service", it is in fact an MI5. Its head is appointed by theDNI (with the concurrence of the AG or the FBI, depending on which page youread) and reports to the DNI. That office also controls budget and personnel. Nomatter what it's called, it's not part of the FBI.

The Defense Department loses effective operational control over NSA,NGA and NRO. In addition, it loses budget authority and perhaps evenassignment and promotion authority over the uniformed personnel in thoseagencies.

Even the president is restricted in his appointing authority.


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This is not a system with any chance of acceptance; it is not a system thatshould be accepted, as it would be highly disruptive in the short term and morebureaucratically complex in the long term.

Several of its supporting suggestions, however, have real merit.

A single point of oversight over all IT systems and the creation of standardIT protocols would be a major achievement.

An organized method of collection of openly available information is agood idea, though why it requires a separate organization I don't fullyunderstand.

And a far more transparent budget is a good idea.

A Modest Proposal

We do know that in the almost three years since 9/11, a number ofchanges and reforms in the intelligence community have been implemented,some modest, some dramatic. They focus the actual, historic system we inherit,not a blank slate. To the extent possible and appropriate, we should try to buildon what we already have.

We should encourage the already dramatic reforms in the FBI, insuringthat intelligence career tracks are at least as inviting as those in law enforcement,and perhaps asking Congress to ensure an adequate intelligence budget.

As the administration has alredy encouraged intelligence sharing by thecreation of TTIC, apparently with some success, let's build on that success.

Now TTSC is a co-operative, relatively low-level bureaucracy, dependenton co-operation.

Perhaps it should be a statutory agency, with a director nominated by thepresident and confirmed by the Senate. Perhaps it can be granted authority tomandate sharing and co-operation. Perhaps it can be authorized to directcollection in certain areas it deems appropriate across all present elements of theintelligence community. Perhaps it can have certain other authorities.

We need to get this right and get it accepted.

Slade


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEMay 28, 2004

National Intelligence Reforms

An Imperative for Change

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, exposed severe shortcomings in ourintelligence capabilities. W e did not haveeffective access in countries where we have noofficialpresence and we were unable to penetrate hard targets like terrorist organizations operatingabroad or cells established in the United States.

Our investigations haveconfirmed grave dysfunctions in our national security intelligenceestablishment.They are of twokinds, structuraland cultural.

The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies straightforward. Thegovernment agencies charged withforeign and domestic intelligenceare the creatures of adifferent age with laws, regulations,and organization fashionedfor external warsand internalthreats of the last century w here strict sepa ration offoreign and domestic activities was desired.

That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated wa llsand compartmentalized information cannotdeal with transnational threats thatoperate seamlessly at home and abroad with speed and agility.Our m ost senior intelligenceofficials do not have authorities, access and accountability to dowhat is expected o f them. Nor do they have the power to make the great organizational changesnecessary to correct these problems.

The Comm ission therefore recommends specific sweeping organizational changes.

Focusing on the Mission

1. Organize the national intelligence agencies- CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and the FBI'scounterterrorism/counterintelligence elements (hereinafter the Na tional SecurityIntelligence Service)- into a new structure w here responsibility, authorityandaccountability for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence a re alignedunder a D irector of Na tional Intelligence(DNI).

The DNI would lead the national intelligence agencies and be the President'ssenior intelligence advisor. NS A, NG A, and NRO w ould rema in within theDepartment of Defense foradministrativeand logistical purposes.

The Secretary of Defense would have responsibility for the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), the intelligence entities of the military services, the Joint M ilitaryIntelligence P rogram,and all tactical intelligence. DIA would continuetocoordinate on national estimates on behalf of the Secretary.

The intelligence entities withinthe Departmentsof State, Treasury, Energy,andHom eland Security would rema in within theirrespective departments and beresponsible to their respective cabinet secretaries; they wo uld continue tocoordinate on national estimates and receivefull access to intelligence collectiondata.

Establish withinthe Federal Bureauof Investigation a National SecurityIntelligence Service(NSIS) responsible for the intelligence m issions of theBureau, in particular counterterrorism andcounterintelligence. The Departmentof Justice and the FBIwould be responsible for NSIS, which wouldbe fundedthrough a nationa l intelligence appropriation and its D irector would be selected bythe DN I with the concurrence of the Director of the FB I.

COMM ISSION SENSITIVE


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COMMISSIONSENSITIVEMay 28 , 2004

2. The President would appoint,and the Senate confirm, a Directorof National Intelligence,separate from the head of the CIA, to lead thisnew structure witha small executivestaff.The DNI would recommendto the President nominees to be appointed as the directors ofthe national agencies, with the concurrence of the relevant cabinet Secretaries, and thedirectorsof the national m ission areas. He/She shallbe held accountablefor integratingthe national intelligence agencies intoa fully integrated, global intelligence network.The

DNI would also: Establish intelligence priorities, form ulatecollection and analytic strategies and

establish intelligence policies;formulate a consolidated budgetand execute anappropriation fornational intelligence; overseethe managementof the nationalintelligence agencies and approve national intelligence estimates.

Build workforce cohesion and expertise by appointing oneofficial responsible forrationalizingthe multiple personnel systems ac ross the national intelligenceagencies and to create incentivesfor working across agencieson national securitym issions, such as transnational terrorism.

Fix information sharing am ong agencies by assigning authority to oneofficial to

set security standardsand establish informationtechnology protocols; and holdthat official responsible for changing the security culturefrom one of restrictinginformationbecause of a "need to know" to one that creates incentivesfor the"need to share."

Strengthen financial controls and accountabilityof the national intelligenceagencies - CIA,NSA,NGA, NRO and the FBI's counterterrorism/counter-intelligenceelements- by establishingone appropriationfor nationalintelligence and appointinga Chief FinancialOfficer fo r national intelligence.

3. The DNI should organizethe national intelligence agencies around missions,notcollection capabilities muchas the Goldwater-Nichols legislation organizedthe DefenseDepartmentaround missionsin 1986; a senior official analogous to a "combatantcom m ander" w ould direct,for the DNI, the work of these mission areas (e.g.,transnationalterrorism , w eapons of m ass destruction proliferation, C hina, Russia, etc.).These missions wouldbe expected to change over tim eas the national security interestsof the nation changeas determinedby the President.

4. Strengthen hum an source intelligence overseas be establishing a new clandestine serviceof agents that operate entirely undernon-official cover whichcan facilitate greater accessto terrorists and terrorist organizationsas well as penetrate the activities of othertransnationalactors moreeffectively than has been accomplished through traditionalofficial cover arrangements. This new service would be responsible to the DNI; the1,000 agent service shouldbe fully operational within36 months.

5. Strengthen competitive strategic analysisby ensuring: 1) the independenceofdepartmentalintelligence entities;and 2) giving full access to collectionby these entities(those withinthe Departmentsof State, Treasury, Defense, Energy and HomelandSecurity). Establish an independent ExecutiveResearch Service to support the NationalSecurity Counc il with analysisof openly availableinformationon national security topicsand by facilitatingthe use of outside expertsto advise the government.

More important than organizationalreform is dealing withthe second categoryof dysfunction


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COMMISSIONSENSITIVEMay 28, 2004

They can be changed only by appointing, confirming and supporting proven leaders oftalent andexperience to the top positions of the intelligence establishment.It is they who must sweep awaythe irrational security, classification and career path obstacles to create a new, agileinnovative^_career environmentin which excellencenot mediocrity will flourish. -"""

Immediate Action Required

To implement its recommendations, the Commission urges the President to imm ediatelyestablish, through Executive Order,an eighteen-month Intelligence Transition Task Forcetodevelop legislationand implement the reforms. The Task Force should includestaff selectedfrom the law enforcementand intelligence communities.The Task Force should reportto thePresident through an advisory board consistingof the White House Chiefof Staff, the NationalSecurity Advisor,and the Chairmanof the President's Foreign Intelligence A dvisory Board.

The Task Force wouldbe responsible for the following:

1) Drafting legislation and^r an Executive Orderto implement the reforms throughthe FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act;

2) Develop a detailed strategyand timeline for implementing the reforms within 12 monthsof passage of the legislation;and

3) Report regularlyto the President to resolve any conflicts.

COMMISSIONSENSITIVE


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Dan Marcus

From: Slade GortonSent: Friday, May 28, 2004 2:35 PMTo: Kevin Scheid; John Lehman; Jamie Gorelick; Richard Ben-Veniste

Cc: Front OfficeSubject: RE : Draft Intelligence Reforms-- Please Comm ent

With respect, I see no differences between this proposal and its predecessor. It is "sweeping", assweeping as was the creation of the Homeland Security Department and will be accompanied by as muchconfusion and disruption as is evident in HSD. It has the merit of clearer lines of authority and the obstacle that itwillbe uniformly opposed by almost all existing agencies.

It is disingenuous to say that the new NSIS remains within the FBI. The DNI controls its budget, itspersonnel and its mission. Its only connection with the FBI is its name and that the latter's director m ust concur inthe appointment of its director. It will lose all cross-fertilization with the FBI's law enforcement fun ctions and thusthe invaluable FBI contacts with thousands of local law enforcement agencies. It is an MIS, whatever you maycall it, reporting not to a Cabinet secretary, as in the U K, but to the DNI. Thismay be what we want, but if so, weshould be w illing tocall it by its proper name.

The heart of this proposal w ith respect to structure is found in paragraph 3. As I see it, this describes whatthe CIA does now. These "mission directors" will either report to the D NI or to a deputy who is for all practicalpurposes the CIA d irector. I see no separate CIA. In fact, you could simply em power the CIA director w ith all ofthe authority you give to the DNI; operations wouldbe supervised by the "mission directors" in paragraph 3.

The au thority and range of control you give to the D NI in paragraph 2, priorities, planning, oversight,personnel, technology and information sharing will not be accomplished with "a small executivestaff." It willrequire a large and compartmentalized staff.

I question that one personnel sys tem is needed or even desirable for such disparate kinds of operativesas those who now workfor the NSA, the NGA,the NRO and the CIA.

And even these recom mendations don't integrate the intelligence wo rk of State, Treasury, Defense(what's left of it), Energy and Homeland S ecurity. You'll still require aTTIC for that.

I continue to believe that we can get almost al, if not all, of the benefits you seek, without the oppositionand disruption, by making TTIC a statutory agency with a director appointed by the president and given thestatutory authority to require the production of all intelligence from all agencies and the duty to distribute itappropriately. The d irector should also have the right to direct the collection of intelligence and the duty to reportto the president any failure to comply.

If we feel the necessity for a more centralized budget process, let the final form of the intelligence budgetgo through, and be subm itted by, the NSC.

I fullyagree that culture is even more important than structure. Paragraph 4 is a vital recommendation,but where we will find these agents is left unstated. And one presumes that all presidents now seek leaders ofproven talent. The more profound question is how you find, promote and reward permanent staff with skills andimagination and keep them from becoming risk-averse over long careers.

And finally,no, no, no to a presidential task force. 18 months after we disband, its recommendations willbe just one m ore message to the C ongress to be chewed over by partisans. We are a unique commission. Weshould make our recommendations- whatever they are- directly to the President and the Congress with a sense ofurgency and a request for immediate action.

Slade

From: Kevin Scheid [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, May 28, 2004 10:04 AMTo: John Lehman; Jamie Gorelick; Gorton, Slade (SEA); Richard Ben-VenisteCc: Poysky, JoAnn (SEA);Jutta Freyer PriceSubject: Draft Intelligence Reforms - Please Comment

Commissioners:

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Attached is a revised set of proposed intelligence reforms that attempts to address concerns that several of youhad expressed with the previous proposal. It was developed from the briefing you received several months agoon the implications of the 9-11 attacks for US intelligence. It also takes into account many of the reforms currentlyunderway at the FBI and the CIA. At its core, this package of reforms tries to do the following:

Put.gne_eereonjn charge O f p U ||j ng our national intelligence capabilities together as an agile globalnetwork of human and technical collectors and all-source analysts. This reverses the trend of the past

decade of these capabilities being pulled apart making it more difficult to share information, planstrategies and work transnational threats across foreign and domestic lines. The DCI no longer has theinfluence his predecessors had over the large collection agencies (NSA, NGA, NRO) and is left to advisethe President largely with only human sources. Intelligence is most effective when HUMINT, SIGINT,IMINT, Open Sources and all-source analysts work together as one enterprise.

Preserve the intelligence capabilities of the Department of Defense to execute war plans, maintainsurveillance operations, and have access to intelligence data in support of the combatant commanders. Italso seeks to address Secretary Rumsfeld's primary concern with the DNl concept, what he characterizedas a resulting lack of competitive analysis if you put all the intelligence agencies under one person.These reforms would preserve and strengthen competitive analysis.

Build on the efforts of the DCI to strengthen the clandestine service, but to do so with more expediencyand with capabilities that can have greater success against non-state targets like terrorists - undeclared,non-official cover officers. And

Build on the work of the Director of the FBI to establish an effective intelligence capability with n theBureau that has clout, expertise, a career service and links to the foreign intelligence agencies.

Please provide me with your comments and I will try adjusting the draft accordingly by next Wednesday. Oncethe four of you are in agreement on the draft I will circulate it among the other commission members for reviewand comment.

Please advise.

Kevin Scheid

5/28/2004


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National Intelligence Reforms

Background: The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 exposed severeshortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access incountries where we have no official presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets

like terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States.

Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national securityintelligence establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.

The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remediesstraightforward.The government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligenceare the creatures of a different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned forexternal wars and internal threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign anddomestic activities was desired.

That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized informationcannot deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home andabroad with speed and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not haveauthorities, access and accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they havethe power to make the great organizational changes necessary to correct these problems.

The Commission therefore recommends specific sweeping organizational changes.

More important than organizational reform is dealing with the second category ofdysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucraticcareerism; groupthink; a law enforcement rather than preventive mindset; deep aversionto covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved by

organizational changes however bold. They can be changed only by appointing,confirming and supporting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions ofthe intelligence establishment. It is they who must sweep away the irrational security,classificationand career path obstacles to create a new, agile innovative careerenvironment in which excellence not mediocrity will flourish.

To accomplish such change these leaders must have new community wide authoritiesover personnel policies, certain budgets and appropriations, and security classificationsand clearances.

Some of these changes can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, and

to succeed all will require major changes in Congressional oversight. We are makingspecific recommendations for congressional oversight reform.

To implement its recommendations, the Commission believes the President shouldestablish, through Executive Order, a six-month Intelligence Transition Task Force to: 1)help develop legislation to implement the reforms; 2) develop a strategy forimplementing the reforms; and 3) report to the board on the status of the implementation.This Task Force would report to a board consisting of the White House Chief of Staff, the


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National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the President's Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board. The Task Force should include selected commissioners from the 9/11and Iraq commissions and a staff selected from the law enforcement and intelligencecommunities.

The Commission recommends the following:

1) Establish a National Intelligence Authority (NLA), which would be headed by aDirector of National Intelligence (DNI). Confirmed by the Senate, with Cabinet rank(Executive Level One), without a cabinet department. The United States IntelligenceCommunity as it is currently organized would be disbanded.

a) The National Intelligence Authority would include the existing and plannedcapabilities of: the CIA; the FBI National Security Intelligence Service, thenational imagery capabilities of the NGA; the national signals intelligencecapabilities of the NSA; the national imagery, signals, and communicationsacquisition programs and infrastructures of the NRO; the advanced science andtechnology capabilities of the CIA, NSA, and NRO; other specialized national

collection activities; and the all-source analytic capabilities of the CIA and theFBI.

b) The mission of the DNI is to oversee and direct the global network of human andtechnical systems and organizations to collect, analyze and disseminate nationalintelligence to the President and the members of the National Security Council,whether the information originates within the United States or abroad. He/she isto have the powers and authorities necessary to bring about such changes as maybe required to accomplish that mission.

c) The DNI would have the authority to nominate to the President the Director ofCIA, the Directors of NSA, NGA and NRO with concurrence of the SECDEF,and Director of FBI's National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) withconcurrence of the Attorney General.

d) An executive office for executing his/her responsibilities would support the DNIwith such functions as: personnel management, security policy, informationtechnology policy, budget and financial control, an inspector general,institutionalized lessons learned reviews, and support to customers, particularlythe Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

e) Establish the position of Chief of National Intelligence which would be the seniorcareer intelligence professional (Executive Level Two) who would support theDNI in his role as the President's senior intelligence executive and who would beresponsible for conveying intelligence to the President, the NSC and the DSC.

i) The National Intelligence Authority would be organized by national securitymissions established by the President. Each mission area (e.g., globalterrorism, WMD proliferation, counterintelligence, China, Russia, emergingthreats, etc.) would be led by a Director General of National Intelligence. TheDirector Generals would report to the Chief of National Intelligence. TheDirector Generals would be the government's highest-ranking intelligence


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official (Executive Level Three) responsible for their mission area andresponsible for both analysis and operations.

ii) The national intelligence agencies - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, NSIS, and othernational capabilities - would be responsible for training, equipping, andmanning the national intelligence mission areas and supporting the Director

Generals of National Intelligence. The heads of these agencies would reportto the Director of National Intelligence (Figure One).

2) Integrate Domestic Intelligence while ensuring civil liberties by creating within FBIan independent National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) with complete access toall investigative intelligence and without law enforcement culture. Director of NSISto be selected by DNI, with concurrence of FBI.

3) Establish an NIA Chief of Intelligence Personnel to establish NIA-wide standards ofrecruitment, training, certification and promotion to provide flexible assignments andcareer paths across intelligence agencies and areas; to ensure the regular infusionthroughout the ranks of agents, analysts, and managers of thinkers from diversedisciplines and professions with and without the government; to establish reserveprograms similar to the uniformed services, and generally to foster innovation andcreativity and stifle bureaucratic careerism.

4) Strengthening competitive analysis to ensure the President and senior nationalsecurity officials receive accurate, timely, complete and well-vetted intelligenceproducts; as well as the complete vetting of government views and improved analyticquality control measures. Strengthen all-source, strategic intelligence analysiscapabilities within the CIA/DI on transnational topics through: required overseastours by analysts, additional training in transnational issues, significant financialincentives for skills development, as well as financial incentives to recruit linguists,additional analysts with area or scientific expertise.

a) Strengthen and keep independent, departmental intelligence elements like theDefense Intelligence Agency, the military service intelligence units and the StateDepartment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Strengthen their capabilitythrough the setting of priorities, overseas tours, training in transnational issues,and language training.

b) Establish an Executive Research Service (300 positions) separate from theNational Intelligence Authority and the policy departments. It would direct thecollection, translation, analysis and production of national security-relatedresearch solely on the basis of openly available information. It would beresponsible to the National Security Council. It would contract out research andbuild research relationships with academia and research organizations.

5) Fixing the information sharing problems among the intelligence and law enforcementcommunities that have come to light from the investigation of the September 11attacks:

a) A new approach of managing and sharing "meta-data" should be established tocombine information about intelligence reporting, open sources and lawenforcement cases into one database. This meta-data would provide "pointers" to


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the content generated by, and protected within, the intelligence collectionagencies including the FBI. This meta-data file would be available to all analystsfor research. [This approach is similar what was recommended by the ScowcroftReview and the Markle Foundation Task Force on Creating a Trusted InformationNetwork for Homeland Security]

b) Establish the position of NIA Chief Information Officer, independent of anyintelligence agency, reporting to the DNI, for oversight of all major IT systemsand the establishment of standard IT protocols across intelligence and lawenforcement agencies to facilitate seamless, real time information integration.

c) The NIA/CIO would execute a strategy to phase out legacy systems, acquirecompatible replacement systems, make recommendations to the DNI oninformationsecurity and approve all major information technology acquisitions inthe NIA.

6) Establish an NIA Chief of Security responsible for developing a common set ofsecurity rules, guidelines and programs across the National Intelligence Authority toallow for improved information sharing, the breakdown of unnecessarycompartmentation, the increased protection of vital sources and methods and astreamlining of the background investigation process for new hires.

7) Strengthen human source intelligence both overseas and domestically through aphased national strategy to migrate case officers out of official cover status and out ofUS embassies abroad; and the expansion of the FBI's NSIS as a domestic collectionarm of the Bureau. This transformation of our HUMINT capabilities, bothdomestically and abroad, should be a national priority with a "fully operationalcapability" achieved within three years. CIA should accelerate its current efforts toreduce the nation's dependence on foreign liaison services, "walkins," and expandunilateral collection in all regions, whether the US has a presence there or not.

8) Strengthen DNI financial controls over the National Intelligence Authority byestablishing an appropriation for national intelligence and developing the associatedfinancial systems for managing that appropriation.

a) Declassify the aggregate budget amount for national intelligence. Details of theappropriations act would be classified and reported in a consolidated classifiedannex to the President's Budget prepared at the direction of the DNI.

b) Establish a "National Intelligence Appropriations Act" that would includefunding for: 1) the Intelligence Community Management Account, 2) the CentralIntelligence Agency, 3) the National Security Agency, 4) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 5) the National Reconnaissance Office, 6) the FBI's

National Security Intelligence Service, and 7) other national intelligencecapabilities not identified above.

c) The National Intelligence Appropriations Act would be made to the Director ofNational Intelligence, who would be held accountable for executing those fundsand their oversight. To meet this responsibility, the DNI would appoint a ChiefFinancial Officer (CFO) for the National Intelligence Authority.


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d) The CFO would allocate resources to the national intelligence agencies inaccordance with OMB apportionment guidelines, the DNI's direction, and theauthorization and appropriations acts.


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04/22/04 TH U 15:47 FA X-22-2004 14=14

002

April 13, 2004

The Honorable Susan M. CollinsUnited States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

T he Honorable Carl LevinUnited States .SenateWashington, D.C. 205 10

Dear Senator Collins and Senator Levin:

Thank you for your letter regarding the division of responsibilityamong certain counterterroiismelements of the United States Government(USG). We have provided you and your staff with

information describing the mission, responsibilities, and relationships of the Terrorist ThreatIntegration Center (TTIC), the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis andInfrastructure Protection Directorate (LAIP),and other government elements with terrorismanalysis responsibilities. Based on your questions, this letter focuses on counterterrorismanalysis within the Federal government

Primary Responsibility for Terrorism Information Analysis

TTIC has the primary responsibility in the USG for terrorism analysis (except informationrelating solely to purely domestic terrorism) and is responsible for the day-to-day terrorismanalysis provided to the President and other senior policymakers. We presume that all terrorisminformation has a link to international terrorism unless determined otherwise. Whereinformationhas been determined to have no such link to international terrorism, the FBI hasprimary responsibility with regard to the analysis of such information. This FBI responsibility,like TTTC's,is independent of where the information was collected.

IAIP has the primary responsibility for matching the assessment of the risk posed by identifiedthreats and terrorist capabilities to our Nation's vulnerabilities. IAIP is also responsible forprovidingthe full-range of intelligence support briefings, analytic products, includingcompetitive analysis, "red teaming," and tailored analysis responding to specific inquiries - tothe DHS Secretary, other DMS leadership, and the rest of DHS. DHS also has significantresponsibilities with regard to "purely domestic" terrorism threats, particularly in support of itscritical infrastructure protection, Customs, immigration,and other statutory responsibilities.

USG counterterrorism elements retain such terrorism analytic responsibility and capability asnecessary to support their own counterterrorism mission, and to carry out specific functionsassigned to them by statute or Presidential directive.


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Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

TTIC has no operational authority. However, TTIC ha s the authority to task collection andanalysis from Intelligence Community agencies, the FBI, and DHS through tasking mechanismswe will create. The analytic work conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each of

TTIC's partner elements, as we]] as other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.These products are produced collaboratively by all of these elements, principally through theirassignees physically located at the TTIC facility, but also working closely with theirheadquarters elements.

The DCI Counterterrorism Center (CTC)

The Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorism Center (CTC) conducts worldwideoperations and collection activities to detect, disrupt, and preempt actions of al-Qa'ida and otherterrorist groups. CTC continues to conduct analysis to support its mission. CTC may conductother analysis at the direction of the DCI or at the request of the Director of TTIC. The DCI, inconsultation with the other leaders of the Intelligence Community and no later than June 1,2004,

will determine what additional analytic resources will be transferred to TTIC.

DHS Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)

Whereas TTIC's terrorism analytic mission is global in nature, lAIF's mission is singularlyfocused on the protection of the American homeland against terrorist attack. This is uniqueamong all intelligence, law enforcement, and military entities whose missions both extendworldwide and to subject-matter areas and purposes well beyond counterterrorism. This focusallows IAIP to concentrate its energy on protecting against threats to homeland targets, whileworking closely with other USG components that have overseas-focused, or both oversees- anddomestic-focused, missions, to ensure unity of purpose and effort against terrorism worldwide.IAIP brings several unique capabilities to the US Government The Directorate maps terroristthreats to the homeland against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protectagainst terrorist attacks. Furthermore, through its combination of intelligence analysis andinfrastructureassessment, IAIP is able to independently analyze information from multipleIntelligence Community sources, as well as from its fellow DHS entities. Lastly, IAIP is able toprovide key information to the American citizenry, accompanied by suggested protectivemeasures.

lAIP's singular focus on th e homeland allows it to carry out ail missions assigned to it by theHomeland Security Act, including the following:

Facilitating the creation of requirements, on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Securityand DHS leadership, to other DHS components, and to the larger intelligence, law .enforcement, and homeland security communities, in order to integrate homeland securityinformation from all sources with vulnerability and risk assessments for critical infrastructureprepared by IAIP;

Providing the full-range of intelligence support -- briefings, analytic products, includingcompetitive analysis, "red teaming," and tailored analysis responding to specific inquiries,and other support - to the DHS leadership and the rest of DHS;


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T H U 15 :48 F A X5-22-2004 14:14

Working with the FBI and others to ensure that homelandsecurity-related intelligenceinformation is shared with others who need it, in the Federal, state, and local governments, aswell as in the private sector;

Serving as the manager for collection, processing, integration, analysis, and dissemination forDHS' information collection and operational components (Coast Guard, Secret Service,Transportation Security A dministration,Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customsand Border Protection), turning the voluminous potentially threat-related informationcollected every day at our borders, ports, and airports, into usable and. in many cases,actionable intelligence; and

Supporting the DHS Secretary's responsibilityto administer the Homeland SecurityAdvisory.System, including independently analyzinginformation supporting decisions toraise or lower the national warning level.

FBI

The FBI's Countarterrorism Division (CTD) has three core responsibilities: I) managingcounterterrorism operations on the territory of the United States to detect, disrupt, and preemptterrorist activities; 2) conducting analysis to support its own operations; and 3) producing anddisseminating to all Federal counterterrorism elements and, as appropriate, State and local lawenforcementofficials, intelligence reports resulting from these operations.

F BI analysis within CTD exploit all availableintelligence and information to drive FBI terrorismoperations (hat will lead to the identification and disruption of terrorist activities. FBI also hasthe responsibility for analyzing law enforcement and investigative information that has beendeterminedto have no connection to international terrorism-

It is important to identify the role of me new FBI's Office of Intelligence as it relates to thedivision of responsibility among certain USG counterterrorism elements. The FBI Office ofIntelligence, which provides CTD's imbedded analytic capability, also performs the analyticwork necessary to inform the FBI's collection tasking. This analytic product is designed purelyto guide the work of the FBI in responding to collection requirements. In addition, the Office ofIntelligence provides the full range of intelligence support to FBI components.

Finally, working with IAIP, TTIC, and other USG counterterrorism elements, CTD and the FBIOffice of Intelligence ensure that all terrorism information collected by FBI, both abroad andwithin the United States, is shared with, and integrated into the work of, other USGcounterterrorism elements in accordance with law, Presidential policy and direction, and writtenagreements such as those referenced herein.

Conclusion

Regardlessof the particular analytic roles of any USGcounterterrorism element under ourcontrol, we have committed all such elements, consistent with the President's policies, to shareterrorism information (as defined by the Memorandumof Understanding on InformationSharing,dated March 4,2003) with one another o ensure a seamless integration of such


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information. Nothing in this explanatory letter is intended to modify the definitions orobligations of this MOU or other relevant directives or agreements.

The President and Congress have not directed, and. as a matter of effective government and common sense, should not direct, that all USQ functions related to terrorism, including defense,intelligence, domestic law enforcement, diplomatic,economic, and a host of others be carried outby a single department or agency. In order both to ensure that no vital piece of intelligence ismissed and to ensure that all departments and agencies, as well as our national leadership,receive the best possible analytic support, it is necessary to treat the analysis of terrorism-relatedinformation as a shared responsibility.

W e look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as we strive to enhance our abilityto protect our Nation from terrorists seeking to harm us. If you have any questions about thismatter, then please have your staff contact Phil Lago with the Director of Central Intelligence at703-482-6590, or Eleni Kalisch with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at 202-324-5051, or Ken Hill with the Secretary of Homeland Security at 202-282-8222, or CymhiaBower with the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center at 703-482-3354.

Sincerely,

Thomas f. Ridge Robert S. MlSecretary, Director.Department of Homeland Security Federal Bureau of Investigation

rgeJ. Tenet S y/JohnO. BrDirector of Central Intelligence ( ^/ Director,

TerroristThreat Integration Center

TOTflL P.05

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