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Benjamin, Eoger; And ethersManual for the Political Development Iaboxatory.Minnesota Univ., Minneapolis. Dept. of PoliticalScience.Vational Science Foundation, Washington, E.C.; Officeof Education WHEW), Washington, D.C.69GY-3772; OEG-3-7-061513-0058152p.; For related documents, see EL 026 628, ED OLIO890, and SO 012 0E5-067

MF01/PC07 Plus Postage.*College Curriculum; *Data Analysis; *Development;Economic Factors; Higher Education; InstructionalMaterials; *International Relations; PoliticalInfluences; *Political Science; Politics; ResearchMethodology; Eesearch Skills; Social Factors;Supplementary Textbooks

This manual introduces undergraduate students toempiricel aspects of the political development process. It contains12 exercises, some of which are based on outside readings or excerptsiucluded in appendices. Exercises cne through three exalkinetheoretical, conceptual, an0 definitional issues.'Exercise fourfocuses on social and econeimic correlates of political development.Exercises five and six relate communism and democracy to thedevelopment process. Longitudinal data from the Minnesota PoliticalData Archive are introduced in exercises seven and eight toillustrate effects of viewing political development from thestandpoint of historical patterns and sequences of socialmobilization. Concluding exercises examine specific politicalleadership patterns as they relate to political development. Themanual includes a code and computer printout. Students do not needprevious training in statistics or methodology, and no specialequipment is needed to complete the exercises. (Author/AV)

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MANUALfor the

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY

by

Roger Benjamin

with the assistance ofFay G. Cohen

and EuRane R. !tersest'

Political Laboratory Curriculum ProjectDepartment of Political Science

University of Minnesota

-

U.S. DEPARTMENT OP HEALTH,EDUCATION& WELFARENATIONAL INSTITUTE OP

EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS SEEN REPRO-DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROmTHE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN-ATING IT PCHNTS OP VIEW OR OPINIONSSTATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRE-SENT Op p IcIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OpEDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSI9I TO REPRODUCE THISMATERI HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCESINFORMATION CENTER (EMI."

This manual was prepared under grant OEG-3-7-061513-0058

;from the Office of Education and grant GY 3772 from the

National Science Foundation. All or parts of this manual

may be used without restriction, provided credit is given.

Fall 1969

r-,

Preface

rhe purpose of this manual is to introduce intermediate levelstudents to the field of political development centering on tbe empirical

work now emerging. To accomplish this purpose, we examine a series oftopics designed to expose the student to selected problems in the fieldof political development.

The first three exercises examine theoretical, conceptual, anddefinitional issues. Exercise 4 focuses on social and economic corralates

of political development. Assignments 5 and 6 relate communism and

democracy to the development process. Longitudinal data from the MinnesotaPolitical Data Archive is introdufed in exercises 7 and 8 in an attemptto illustrate the pitfalls and usefulness of looking at political develop-

ment from the standpoint of historical patterns and sequences of socialmobilization. The last 4 assignmesIts examine specific political leadershippatterns as they relate to political development. The manual includes a

code and computer printout for the analysis deck used in the exercises.

Also included in appendix B are excerpts reprinted from William Flanigan

and Edwin Fogelmam, "Patterns of Political Development and DemocratizationsA Quantitative Analysis," a paper presented stAbee'American Political

Scipace Association Meeting, September, 1967.

The emphaais of the manual is on empirical aspects of the political

development process, however the insturctor will have considerableflexibility to elaborate on methodological considerations. We have not

assumed any previous training in statist/is or methodology though aay suchknowledge on the student's part increases his analysis options. Also, no

equipment of any kind is required to complete the exercises since we haveincluded a printout of the analysis data in the appendix. If available,

counter-sorters, calculators, and computers with standard non-parametricstatistical routines will be helpful.

The exercises provided ia no way exhaust the potential uses ofthe data provided thus we 'scald expect students, after completing themanual exercises, to formulate their own exercises or secondary dataanalysis projects. Of course, these exercises can be supplemented withadditional material on political development.

ln formulating the data analyais deck, we were aided by Fay Cohen,research associate of the Societal Research Archives System project,Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota. We, of course, are

totally responsible for the use of the data in these exercises. Grateful

acknowledgement of several colleagues in the Department of PoliticalScience in preparing the exercises is made. We especially thank the editors

of the series William Flanigan and Samuel Krislov. John Eautsky madevaluable criticiams at an early juncture in the development of this project.

Editor's Preface

This manual is the fourth of a series aimed at bringing to under-graduate teaching the sophistication and the excitement of dealing withgenuine research problems, the discovery and examination of data, ratherthan passive acceptance of conclusions. Members of the Department ofPolitical Science at the Unive...-sity of Minnesota have been involved inthe development of such a program for nearly six years. The first of

the series -- on political behavior, written by William Flanigan andDavid RePass -- was issued in 1967. A revised edition of that effortis available from Little, Brown and Company. The second -- on compara-tive politics by Uwin Fogelman -- will be available from them inSpring 1970. We expect over the course of the next year to issuesimilar, but individualized, efforts as follows: community power,

Thomas Scott; legislative behavior, Eugene Eidenberg; internationalrelations, Ellen Pirro; and quantitativo methods 'by Roger Benjaminand William Flanigan. As these are revised for final publication, theywill also be published by Little, Brown and Ctimpany.

The project itself is supported by the Office of Education and theNational Science Foundation. In accordance with the principles of publicsupport, and our own purposes, we are making all materials availablewithout restriction, asking only that credit be given for any use ofthe materials.

Samuel KrislovMinneapolisNovember 1969

5

Assignment I

Empirical Theory and Pnlitical Development

Assigned ReadingsA. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler

Publishing Co., 10647 Chapters IV, VIII.

Suggested iteadingsrhomas Kuhn, The structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago;

University of Chicago Press7710).

Bmpirical Theory

In every subject matter there develops to some degree shared

agreement over the kindl of questions considered important to ask, the

types of explanations considered admissible, and the approaches used tostudy the basic datum of the subject matter. For us the subject matterin question is political development and since this manual approachespolitical development from aasumptions and methods not shared by everystudent in the field, it may be useful to outline the basic componentsof what we identify as the empirical theory approach to politicaldevelopment.

Political development aa a field of special importance has emergedin the wake of World War II and the creation of over 60 newly independentnations. Fast paced methodological changes have left a good deal ofconfusion and indecision over what the field consists of and what methodsof analysis are most appropriate. Thus far compelling practical needshave dictated the field's central concern with basic descriptive data ofnational political units. However, recently political development hascome within the scope of the behavioral movenTnt in political science.Generally, this movement may be said to contain two basic features of

4 interest to students of political development: (a) a renewed emphasison political aspects of human behavior as the central problem of concern;

and (b) the adoption of the value system of science as a guide to thestudy of political behavior. Before begiuning to grapple with the specificdefinitional, conceptual, and analytical problems in the political development field, it may be useful to survey the meaning and use of the notionsof empirical theory, concept formation, and measurement, three problemswhich, as we shall see, have application in political development.

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We have indicated our acceptance of empirical theory. Let us specify

the basic components of this term, first distinguishing empirical theoryas a special type of theory. First, a minimum definition of theory mightbe the systematic formulation of underlying principles of observed phenomena.However, recourse to the "real" world through hypothesis verification in

such a way as to allow intersubjective evaluation is the major feature that

distinguishes empirical theory and this is what is meant by adherence tothe value system of scienct. This may be the only useful method ofdistinguishing empirical theory mince other features such as systematicand empirical observation, description, explanation, aad prediction arenot uniqUe to empirical theory. Any one or a combination of these featurescharacterizes any theory. A crucial aspect to the minimum definitionabove is the view that if theory is to,be defined more tightly, thequestion theory for what, in terms of what "body of knowledge must beadded. This addition is especially important because of the many disparatedefinitions of theory offered. For example, theory has been variouslydefined as a set of empirical generalizations, an ideal type, a classificationscheme, or a formal deductive axiomatic explanation schema. The point is

that if theory is discussed in terms of the physical sciences, formaltheory comes to mind; conversely, theory as a set of empirical generalizationsidentifies much of what is generated in small group research or demography.For political development the mininum conditions for acceptance as empiricaltheory are frequently ignored and probably nowhere met to any substantialdegree. Yet, the thrust of this manual on political development is towardempirical theory construction even if the complexity of the phenomenainhibits fulfillment of that thrust.

11

Concept Formation

Concept formation in political science and particularly in politicaldevelopment shoulders the difficult burden of specifying the range of ouroperational inquiry. Concepts themselves, in the broadest sense, are merelysets of rules which organize some aspect of reality. Concepts are, ofcourse, not unique to science; indeed, they provide the sensory filtersfor every individual which inform him which and how much of, the outsidestimuli to admit. However, the especially difficult task of science is toderive nomologically, or inductively,concepts which progressively allowmore of each particular science's data to be subsumed under new conceptswhich are more elegant, powerful, relevant, etc. For the most partconcepts allow propositions to indicate simple inclusion or exclusion inthe classification itself. In turn, the concept may fit into other latentor manifest concept sets or theories. We usually distinguish conceptsfrom theories by etating that the relationship to observations it, definitionalfor concepts (for theoretical constructs as well) while the same relationship

7

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is a question of empirical fact for theories. However, even this

distinction may not be accepted absolutely since every observation

extends beyond the purely empirical.

The problem of how good political development concepts are actually

formed is related to what Hempel has termed the paradox of conceptualization.

Briefly, this is that in order to develop an admissible theory about aportion or all of political development useful concepts are needed,Lut

we require good theory to develop the useful concepts. Thus, concept

formation like theory building never ends. Political development offersexamples, e.g., democracy, nation, national integration, etc., of the

continual movement back and forth between concepts and theories developedout of the concepts and then revised concepts developed out of the theory.

Difficulties in developing shared conceptual agreement are explored belowin Assignment VI on Democracy and Political Development.

inMeasurement

Many of the problems we shall deal with in this manual may besubsumed under a set of delimitations usually placed under the rubricmeasurement in philosophy of science discussions. This is so, for in

the broadest sense all empirical political aaalysis represents continuing

efforts to devise finer measurement distinctions to categorize thephenomena uader investigation. Thus there is a constant effort not onlyto capture phenomena through broad classifications which demarcate the

inclusion and exclusion of phenomena, e.g., "he is a student" which

distinguishes him from the non-student set, but to develop much moreprecise partial or total orderings of the classes, e.g., 1st through the12th grade student. The first example, student, is a nominal measure,

a type of measure which is surprisingly useful and certainly very common

in political analysis. ihe second example, the sub-categories of gradesfor thP student, is an interval measure, a type of measure not often used61 Folitical analysis, hut held up as a kind we ought to move toward inpolitical development.Nominal concepts such as democracy-autocracy, stable-unstable :ire commonly used while occasionally related to interval levelconcepts from social and economic development such as per capita incomebirths and depths per 1,000 population,etc.

There are major measurement difficulties in political developmentwhich relate particularly to the choice of statistical measures. Nominal

classifications such as communist-non-communist are broad, very inclusiveand flit, investi,,ator can be reasonably sure his aspect of political realityunder invc.stirAtion is encompassed by his measure. He may not, however,utilize very powerful measurement systems, for instance, interval basedstatistical tecnniques or forma/ mathematical characterizations. In short,

1-4

the possibility of developing an explanation of much power from conceptscapable of nominal measurement is small. The reverse difficulty characterizesthe effort of the investigator who develops ordinal or even interval measure-ment categories for the data, for instance the level of politicalparticipation measured by electoral data. More powerful statisticaltechniques can be used on his categories, his explanation is mare likelyto discriminate items within his classification more finely, but has helost important qualities of his data? Are the cutoff points for the sub-categories made arbitrarily or are they based on logical or naturalcriteria? Perhaps there are no final answers to these questions sincethe success of one's measurement operations lies in the quality of.thefinal explanation product. However, any student who engages in empiricalwork in the field of political development necessarily must be aware ofthese difficulties and problems.

For our purposes we shall further delimit the characteristics oftfie ueminal,ordinal, and interval measurement distinctions mentioned abovesince you will be using them in the exercises. To review briefly thecharacteristics of each level of measurement it is necessary to recallthat each level provides us with increased amounts of information aboutthe units measured. Nominal measurement simply records whether or notunits of observation fall into a category: each unit either has theidentifying characteristic or it does not. Obviously this is not a highdegree of discrimination but it is adequate for many analytic purposes.Nominal measures may include many categories but no order among them isestablished; it is only possible to say for each of the many categorieswhether or not a unit belongs in the category. For example, being a highschool graduate or not being one would represent nominal (and dichotomous)categories.

iJrdinal measurement locates each unit of observation in a categerxalong a dimension such that we ma order the categories on some basis.ale ordering of the categories means that each unit is either the same asor more tban or less than every other unit. This ordinal relationshipmAy he quantified in tAis ways with respect to every unit (or categoryit is pousibie I. compare another unit (or category) and to assign a score.f "1" for more than, "U" for the same as, and "-l" for less than thefirst wiit. rhis simple quantitative comparison is not confined to threecategories but may be extended to many more merely as long ail it is possibleto maintain the ordered relationship. 10 continue with examples fromeducation it 14 common to find ordinal measurement in social analysis likegrade sch1, high school and college educated.

latervol meaaurement locates units of observation with respect toone anothe. id..red so precisely that the intervals between observationsmay be added, subtracted, multiplied and divided. For most statisticalcomputaions this is the maximum amount of information we are able to use.For at least some purposes years of schooling would represent an intervalmeasure.

9

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it is easy to see that we can convert an interval measure intoan ordinal measure or either type into a nominal measure. For example,if we had recorded the age of each individual in a study, the measure-onit of actual age would be an interval measure. Given the actual agesit would be simple to create a few categories like "under 25," "25 to 46,"Hover 65," etc., or to reduce the entire range of observations to nominalcategories like "under 50," and "50 and over." For examples of nominal,ordinal, and interval measurement you may turn to appendix A.

Assignment il

Political Development; Some Definitional Aspects

Assigned, ReadingsReinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and CitizenshiR (New Yorks John

Willey) I 964), pp. 1-29.John H. Kautsky (ed.), Political Chane in Underdeveloped Countries

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 3-29.Everett E. Hagen, "How Economic Growth Tegins: A Theory of Social

Change," in J. Finkle and U. W. Gable (eds.), Political Develop-

ment and Social Change (New York: John wiley:71577-5.. 129-139.

6liggvsted heading:David Apter, rhe Politics of Modernization (Chicago; University of

Chicago Press, 19661', pp. 1-42.Gideon Sjoberg? "Folk and Feudal Societies" in J. Finkle & R. W.

Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social ,Change (New York:

John Wiley, 1977777-45-63.

in every important subject matter there is recurring discussion over

hasir theoretical assumptions, key concepts, and methoda and techniqued to

be usea to study the phenomena. fhe field of political development is no

exception. Here, we shall confine ourselves to considering some basic

definitional considerations.

There are two aspucts to the argument we are going to review in this

exercii0. Ai4toricv1 attention to problems of developint, countries gained

!Ilomiofntiim after Lhu second World Mir. Then and now political development

was fe1 t. larmely to ie identified with the non-industrial world--the countries

outside of ti'le Worth American-European axis and the islaad nations of

AtisLralia, New Lealand, and Japan. ibis has meant that social scientistscuncerne4 with development, from their various field perspectives, have

eraduolly separated out a pet of problems toe worked on in the context

of the countries listed above by inference. Many feel, therefore, that

developea societies should be carefully distinguished from developing

Societies. Whether the distinction has much importance couceptunlly

questionable, yet At is clear the distinction has affected greatly thekinds of studitd thought to be acceptable. For example, until very recently

development scholars did not study patterns of economic, social, and

political evolution in the deVeloped world. It would appear that important

genralizations may be generated from analysis of the political development

patterns of 18th and 19th century =gland and Germany. All this has meant

that social scientists specializing in the development process have formed

some agreement about their subject matter. They are generally concerned

with problems associated with the non-industrialized world, more specifically

the rapid changes occurring there.

If there is tacit recognition concerninc a eet of problems under

the rubric development, little conceptual agreement on the basic componen

of politica' development follows. A basic issue ie whether politicaldevelopment is considered as an independent or dependent dimension.

Scholars who focus on cultural, social, or economic problems often view

political development as a function of one or a combination of these other

problem areas. Alternatively, political development students typicallyview social, economic, or cultural features um interacting with or being e

determined by political dimensions. Therefore, the student of political

development is confronted by diverse and often conflicting views of the

theoretical basis of political development. Consider for instance the term

developing countries. Depending on the scholar, the term developingcountry is rejected for "underdeveloped,""less-developed," "moderoizinp-,,"

"industrializing," "non-industrial," etc. Others reject these terms asculture-bound or teleological and wish to epeak simply of political chunge.

Ne shall treat these various terms aa attempts to characterize the changesoccurring in societies which enter the initial phases of industrialization.

There are two aspects we are going to review here--tke distinctionbetween "developed" and "developing" societies and the primacy of thepolitical development concept, i.e., whether the phenomena of political

development are to be viewed as independent or dependent dimensions.

First, as discussed above, it is necessary to recognize that scholarshave defined the concepts of development and modernization in different

ways. In each case, a definition will refer to social phenomena--or sets of

phenomena--that may or may not be included in another definition. In order

to become familiar with the variety of concepts and definitions found in

the literature it will be helpful to identify some specific authors'

definitions and then observe how they differ from or resemble one another.

'Mat are the principal concepts used by the authors you have read inclassifying political systems ("modern," "traditional," "developing," etc.and hov does each author define the concepts he uses?

11-3

What elements are common to these definitions and how do the

definitions differ? Do the authors use the same term-to describe differ-

ent phenomena, or do they use different terms to describe the same phenomena?

Ih characteristics that are mentioned in describing different types of

systems fall into at least two categories: social characteristics and

attitudinal characteristics. Social characteristics refer to institutions

or patteims of activity; attitudinal characteristics refer to cognitive

and effective diopositions (i.e., how people think and feel about the

system).

Are the authors' concepts defined in terns of the same units of

analysis (e.g., roles, institutions, attitudes, etc.)? If not, what

imaplicatious does this have in terms of our ability to define a "developing

political system"? a "developed political system"? an "undevel sed

political system"? (Note: you may wish to answer the next ques n before

you attempt to answer this one.)

11-4

On the chart below, liat those characteristics which are assoeiated

with each type of political system.

Pre-modern or Developing orTraditional Transitional

Modern orDeveloped

a

eor each of the characteristics listed in the chart, in icate with a

symbol (a) which are attitudinal.

Another distinction that may be evident in the chart is between characteristics

that are directly political and those that refer to demographic, economic, orother non-political features of the system.

ior each of the characteristics listed in the chart, indicate with asymbol (p) which are directly political.

Students of political development attempt not only to destribe differenttypes of systems but also to explain how and why modernization occurs. Up

to this point you have identified several different concepts of developmentas well as the underlying dimensions or sets of variables included in each

concept. In order to describe the process of development it is necessary torelate these variables with each other in a way that clearly explains thenature of their interdependence.

1 4

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Select two "theories" of political development or modernization from

your readings and state, in the form of several hypotheses, the relationship

between these variables. Be sure that you can identify and distinguish

between the dependent and the independent variables.

1141.!...1.17,.

Assuming that you were asked to validate each of these hypotheses,which variables seerd to you to be the most ambiguous and mast difficult

to operationalize?

I c

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Given tIv? same hypotheses what problems might you encounter in

attempting to specify precisely he direction and extent of association

between these varlables?

Assignment III

Lmages of Political Development

Assigned Reading:Urganski, The StaRes of Political Development (New York:

hnopf, 1960, Introduction.Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay,"

World Politics, Vol. XVII, No. a (April 1960, pp. 336-430.

Underlying the problem of definitional considerations is the issueof central theoretical assumptionsheld about political development.fheoretical assumptions may be conceived of as the images, more or less

explicitly formulated, which guide and structure inquiry at its most

basic level. These images determine not only those aspects of realitywhich are conceptualized, but also delineate the parameters of admissible

explanations and methodological tools. Therefore, we are interested in

consequences the minimum consensual images have for political development..

All writers on political development speak o. growth. This may be

in the form of increased governmental capacity, complexity of the organizational

structures of central political iastitutions, increased autonomy of the

governmental institutions, or other variants. For students of political

development as in the case of scholars of economic and social development,the proposition that growth or development is a positive "good" is central.

iksociated in the minds of most political development students is the view

that the scope of political chte,ge occurring after the onset of industrial-ization is much greater than in other historical periods. Thus political

development is often seen cia a function of modernization aad the politicsof non- or pre-industrial societies, past or present, are not seen aa beinrrelevant since the political linkage with industrialization is absent..hoN;li fewer writers today emphasize the temporal evolution of politicalimtitutions from a point selected by the investigator toward an increasinglycomplex and stable met of political institutions, even the most sensitiveobservers react positively to the idea that the apparent evolution whichoccurred iu tilt presently modernized societies is or will take placeeventually in the transitional societies. The stress is on concepts suchas political mobilization, development, social and political integration,

nation-building, etc. Benchmarks such as democracy, political stability,governmental bureaucratization are used to evaluate the level of politicaldevelopment achieved in any society. Finally, the highest percentage ofpolitical development specialists do not see the process operatingindependently; rather it is characterized as a function of social oreconomic dimensions or the interaction of these dimensions in particularhistorical sequences.

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The questi. a we raise regarding the sketch is whether in fact itis relevant. I. it productive of useful descriptions and explanationsof political development phenomena? AA least in part we would suggestthe answer is no. Optimistic projections about the achievement ofpolitical development,"either in the present or the futtre, have beenmade with declining regularity for the societies variously called under-developed, transitional, developing, etc., since the end of World War II.Howver, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America it clearly is becoming moreaccurate to speak of the politics of instability. Everywhere the break-down of existing political institutions is evident and the pattern ofpolitical instability through the disintegration of central governmentinstitutions via ;military takeover, revolts by labor-intellectual alliances,and other means, is becoming routinized. It is more accurate to speak ofa circle of political instability in present transitional societies thanto continue to vlew these societies as moving through stages or thecontinuum of a political development process. Yet even the most sensitiveobservers refer to this growing pattern as pathologies or breakdowns.

If the above is a more accurate image of the political developmentprocess, what accounts for the present mare optimistic image of politicaldevelopment? First the countries from whose perspective most politicalscientists write have attained a modicum of success in generating long termeconomic and social growth and apparently political development as well.Bound up with this is a set of symbols and assumptions which characterizethe milieu within which western political scientists work. Though most ofthese synools are on what has linen called the tacit dimension, one assumptionhas beeL, williantly explicated by J. B. Bury, the idea of progress. Thisconcept with its speciil implications for all science has gained unquestionedacceptance by most, if not all, social and specifically political scientists.To add to the probability of the continued acceptance of the bias towarddevelopment and integrative versus disintegrative meosures, intellectualsfrom transitional societies themselves share these biases. They areeducated either ia the modernized societies or in an indigenous educationalsystem which mirrors the style and contept of the modernized world'seducational structures. Therefore, one finds little difference concerningbasic assumptions toward the development process between writers in thedeveloped and transitional worlds,

Where, then, do we go from here? How should assumptions or basicimages about political development be recast? You will be asked to formyour opinions on these matters, but first consider the following points.

Political development, in its broadest terms, should be viewed as abranch of political history, nothing less nothing more. It involves the studyof the politics of transitional societies, societies undergoing the processof iudustrialization. Positive or negative denotations associated with theusual set of assumptions, such as democracy, the evolutionary direction ofpolitical or for that matter all development should be avoided. Bather weshould confine our initial assumptions to a concern for making descriptiveand explanatory statements about the politics of transitional societies.

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ileyond this we must be prepared to at least give equal time to the viewwhich suggests that nondevelopmental concepts such as political instability,or the circular nature of political change in terms of the capacity, scopeor autonomy of central political institutions versus the developmentalconteptualization of such political change are central. Such a view wouldmean we would be prepared to examine problem areas within, say, theconfines of the dimensions of tbe community formation level, politicalparticipation, and political institutionalization that have heretofore goneunexamined. In other words, why not focus on the requisite of politicalinstability? For example, the statements on Nigeria before the recentcoups and final break by Biafra emphesimed,even lauded,the supposed orderlyprogress toward national integration and the development 0 a strongautonomous central political structure. In retrospect all this seemslike so much nonsense. If it were possible, it would be exceedingly usefulto study the process of disintegration which has been underway there.

hhat assumptions or images do you infer are present in Organski?

What problems are there in this view?

Am!ilr

What assumptions or images do you infer are present in Huntington?

III-4

What problems are there in this view?

Based on your analysis of the reading and written work for assignmenttwo and this assignment, present your own "image" or set of theoreticalassumptions about political development.

..,

Let us now use these assumptions. What are transitional societieswhich are, in terms of your image, currently undergoing political develop-ment? JustiAy your choices.

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Are there transitional societies currently undergoing "decay,"disintegration, etc.? Again, be sure to justify your choices.

Assignment IV

Social and Lconomic Correlates of Political Development

Assigned Aleading:Kenneth Janda, ata Processing: Applications to Political Research

(gVsnstons fforthwestern University Press, 1965)71graluction,Chapter 39 passim.

Arthar flanks and *belt Textor, A Crass-Politiy Survey, (Cambridge:M.1.1. Prees, 1963), Introduction.

From the first three exercises we have seen evidence of widespreaddisal;reement over key definitions and assumptions. It also became clearthat there is disagreement over the relative importance of the social andeconomic factors thought to be associated with political development.However, many students of political development do feel that social andeconomic aspects are the most important variables and that politicaldevelopment may be considered broadly as a function of the level of socialand economic development in a society. Therefore, it may be worthwhileto examine some of the relationships thought to hold betireen socia],economic and political development. To fulfill this task socia-eleamoniut-data is provided. The reader should be warned that clear one to onerelationships are conspicuous by their absence in this type of socialresearch. However, the goal of this assignment is to realistically involvethe reader in sucioeconomic aggregate data analysis.

First, we should review attempts to state these relationships.Classical political theorists such as Aristotle and Plato presentedcompeting paradigms of the Polity, yet both conceived of the politicaletracture as the highest organized level of complexity coterminous withthe nation-state. The family, the economy, the society itself wereconceivett of as being subsumed under the Polity. Penultimate questionsfor classical philosophers were related to the nature of the existingpolity and the organization or character of the "best" polity, i.e., thetype of political structure which would come closest to allowing man toachieve the-good life. Interestingly, by the 19th century some politicalphilosophy had reached the polar conclusion, vividly illustrated in thewritings of Karl Marx, that the economic structure of society is the mustimportant independent dimension and determines or ccnditions the politicalstructure. MOre recently economists and sociologists have generateddevelopmental theories which attempt to establish sophisticated variantsof the Marxian, Spancerian, etc., view by attempting to specify empiricalindicator of economic and social change. We shall see now what kinds ofrelationships do exist between the social, conomic and political dimensions.

IV-2

To look at these relationships we shall utilize data from ArthurBanks and Robert rextor, A Cross-Politv Survey. These data take the formof coded iaformation punched on standard computer cards. The code issimply a guide for understanding the numerical notations punched into the-computer card. rhe code accompanies this exercise. The social, political,and economic information is recorded for each country and each card isidentified by an alphanumeric country name. Therefore, you will be ableto recognize each card by a simple visual inspection. Other than thecomputer cards a counter-sorter will be useful for completion of thislablratory exercise. An explanation of the use of the counter-sorter isprovided by the reading in the Janda assignment. In addition, a print-out of the cards is provided in the appendix thus making it possible tocomplete the exercise without using the equipment.

Prefatory to our exercise we may review some essential featuresassociated with aggregate data in the study of political development (thesocial-economic variables coded below are examples of aggregate data) andcomputer storage and data analysis. First, the advantages. For the firsttime basic social-economic statistics, albeit in an incomplete form, bavebeen collected, coded, and stored by the Yale Political data program (seeBruce Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators)mximore recently by the Minnesota Historical Political Data Archivepioneered by William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman. The availability ofthese data allows us to subject theories and hypotheses about variousaspects of political development to empirical validation. The revolutionarypotential this provides students of political development may hardly beoveremphasized. In addition, data which are collected, coded, and storedaccording to an explicitly defined set of conceptual and operationalprocedures often may be analyzed with the aid of statistical measures ofassociation and tests of significance. Parallel in importance is theopportunity of secondary analysis or replication of the original analysis.The building of cumulative knowledge can develop only when concepts,operational indicators of these concepts, and hypotheses are presentedLa such a way as to allow intersubjective evaluation. Only in this way canscholarly critical communication develop. There are liabilities as well.Data stored on computer cards are only as good as the sum series of stepsof initial concept formation, construction of operational measures ofthese concepts, and final coding decisions have made them. This meansthe investigator who develops the data and codes it to be punched on thecomputer cards mist be especially cautious. Incorrect coding decisionsreturn to haunt the analyst. In this connection it is useful to reviewsome of the coding decisions made by Banks and Textor. Look closely attheir distinctions between highly bureaucratized countries and those deemedlow on this scale. You mAy or may not agree with their distinction butyou should note that the coded categories are the results of decisionsmade by Banks and Textor regarding any simple entry.

We shall work with the social-economic and political variablesprovided in the code. For our purposes political development will be equated

Iv -a

with Banks' and Textor's delimitation of that term. "See Variable 83:Political Development; 1940-1960 in the Code Sheet."

First, draw a random sample of thirty couaries from yourprintout. Men, separate your countries in terms of the politicaldevelopment measure and list them in the appropriate categories belows

Political Development Measure

Next, take your random sample of thirty countries and rank themaccording to one of the social and economic measures provided in the Code

Sheet. Specify below which measures you have selected:

Sec i al Dev opine n t L!easure Economic Level opment I4ea3ure

_Med i tuu Low +Ugh Medium Low

2 s

1V-4

what differences do you notice between the.relative position ofcountries in terms of your social-economic development measures?

!MEM.

What differences are there between the relative positions of thecountries on the social-economic variables and the political developmentnieasures? What is your interpretation of the degree of difference orcongruity?

Ito

How do the following countries rank on your social-economic measures:India Argentina, Dominican 1tepublic, Greece, Italy, Great Britain?

IV-8

Are any of the country rankings different in terms of the social

and economic meaoures?

1110.111.M.0.

Rank the same countries on your political development measure,

PoliticalDevelopinent

High

edium

LoW

CoMptine the rankings from questions 5 and 6. *wt is your interpre-

tation or the similarities and differeneee?

IV-6

From viewing the results of your social-economic and political

development measures what conclusions have you reached regarding their

level of correspondence? Are there any other strategies you would like

to employ to develop a higher or lower level of measurement correspondence?

Assignment V

Communism and Economic Development

Assigned Reading:S. U. Lipset, Political His (New York: Doubleday w2d Co., 1960),

4pp. 45-58.

Robert Marsh and William Purish, "Modernization and Communism: At

Se-Test of Lipset's Hypotheses," American Sociological Review,Vol. 10M, No. 0 (December, 1965), pp. 034-942.

Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Rwatsky, "Communiam and EconomicDevelopment," American l'allUsuglaktactlieview,-Vol.No. 1 (March, TW)T-ip. 110-123.

Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the UnderdevelopedPeoples," in Jnhn Kautsky (ed.), Political Cam. in Under-developed Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 3767,pp. 316-334.

Many scholars have viewed Communism as a unique kind of political

ideoloa which creates a distinct type of political regime wherever,itbecomes dominant. Yollowing from this Communism, Communist parties andgovernments are viewed as monolithic entities. Depending on whom thestudent reads, this means that Communism is regarded as an alien ideology,formed in the Soviet Union, exported by iaternational Communist movements,etc. Simply put, Communists are often regarded as people who transcendnational boundaries, people that are largely Communists before they areLnglishman, Japanese, or American. One approach to the study of Communismthat has been gaining in importance has to do with looking at the relation-ship between Communism and the level of economic, soeial, and political

development. Of course, Marx, himself, watAuite explicit about positingthe direction of the relationship between economic development and Communism.

Marx saw Communism growing in strength as economic development continued.Per example, he saw the opportunities for Communism as being much greater,in mdd and late 19th century when he wrote, in industrialized countriessuch as England, Germany, or the United States rather than in the countries

in the transitional society group.

Our concern is one of establishing some method of relating thestrength of communist parties to levels of economic development. In order

to do this we must first examine the significance of communist parties asmodernizing movements in transitional societies. One reeponse to politicaland ecenomic change takes the form of the modernizing movement, oftenmmaifest in such organizations as the communist party, militant labor unions,political party organizations, etc. These movements emerge out of a critical

response to certain aspects of modernization. Th0,social composition of

"s

2 8

V-2

these movements is an important defining characteristic since particular

elements of the population are, at different stages of economic develop-

ment, more or less inclined to join these maements depending on their

evaluation of the personal costs and benefits resulting from membership.

Before analyzing the social composition of OAS type of modernizing

movementthe communist partywe should first establish some basic measures

of modernization. Beret we shall deal exclusively with measures of one aspect

of modernizationeconomic development. We shall use two indicators of

economic development in this exercises 1) agricultural population as per

cent of population and 2) per capita gross national product. first, we shall see

how our sample of countries is distributed along different levels of develop-

ment. Then, we shall analyze theme groupings of countries in terms,of the

relative significance and composition of the communist party as viewed by

political analysts.

Classify your sample* of countries in terms of agricultural population

as per cent of total population (See Appendix B):

Country_

Table I

Agricultural population (% of population)

*for this exexciee our sample will consist of the non-Communist countries

coded in Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, A Croso-Polity Amma. Communist

Countries are excluded because the function of Communist parties differs

qualitatively in Communist and non-Communist countries. As in the other data

analysis exercises we have appended the actual printout which lists the coded

information necessary to do this exercise.

2 9

V.3

Classify your sample of countries in terms of per capita gross

national products

Table II

Per capita gross national product,

Coucntry /Ea, Low Low Medium uth f yery gra

i:xamine both of your tables and state the relationship between the two

indicators. That is, could you predict the location of a country on onescale knowing its position on the other?

V-4

We shall now attempt to establish a typology of societal types based

on both the two econoMic development measures (above) and on another measurewhich differentiates societies ac:rding to the degree of industrializationand Western Impact found in these ocieties. While this is our own classi-fication scheme, other authors stiggest that societies can be meaningfully

distinguished along roughly the esme Oimensions. These societies are

grouped within the following cateirriess

Type I Traditional, No modernizing movementType 11 Traditional with modernizing movementType III Advanced Modernizing MovementType IV Non-Colonial, some industryType V Advanced induetrial

See your code for the distribution of countries in each societal type.

How closely do these societal-types correspond with their respective counter-parts listed in Table 11, i.e., per capita gross national product?.

11.01MENPrk .The authors suggest that within each of these societal types, moderniz-

ing movementsand in particular the communist party--tend to attract andrecruit different groups of individuals. In other words, they argue thatcommunist party membership and composition is a function of societal conditionssuch as industrialization, economic conditions, social and ethnic composition,literacy and education, social norms, personal adjustment. etc. These authors

attempt, with varying success, to explain the relationships between what isoften referred to as "susceptibility to communiam" and particular social andeconomic characteristics such as those we have mentioned. Each author hasselected a particular group of countries which corresponds to one or severalof our societal types. We shall begin by identifying these types accordingto author.

In the chart below, list which authors describe each societal type andthe countries or regions included in his essays

Type I

Table III

Author Country or Region

Table III (con't.)

Author

Type II

Tyne III

Type IV

Tyr V

V-5

CoUntry or &Aim

Now that you have seen some empirical examples of each of these societaltypes, i.e., particular regions and countries, it is possible to proceed toexamine the functions and compositions of communist parties in each of thesetypes of societies. It is important to realize that our selection of countriesis somewhat arbitrary and is not considered a representative or "typical"sampling. They have been selected because the communist parties may be groupedin the same framework, i.e., class and occupational groupings, as a responseto industrialization and political change, etc. These studies only suggestwhat we might find in the large number of countries not examined here.

On the next page, you are asked to identify the kinds of groups whichyour authors explain comprise the major elements of communist parties ineach societal type.

Table IV

mmuniiParty Membership in F3ve Societal

Major Classes Major Occupations Ethnic EducationSocietal Type Agpresented Hepresented Backerounds Levels

II

IV

V

*Based on ranking between societal types (1,20,4,5)

rimes

Mbiabe ship's View Size of*ofnParty Atinction PartyEsoteric. Exoteric. etc. (Bank)

34

V-7

Summarize the information on your completed chat with special reference tothe differences between the kinds of groups aggregated by the communistparty in each societal-type.

/

Draw the direction of the relationship between communist party strength andsocietal-type in terms of Upset's, Marsh & Parish's, Benjamin & hautsky'sidea of the direction.*

Communist highPartyStrenGth

Low

Figure I

Societal Type

*Distinguish the three curves.

V-8

Do the curves suggest a.revision in Upset, Marsh, or Benjamin? How? Why?

.11M11.11111111,

What are the implications of the hypotheses generated in the studies abovefor the analysis of Communism? Is communism monolithic? How should communist

movements be compared?, etc.

AppendixA

Alphabetical List of Countries and Their Communist Party Uombership

Country Ca. Membership*

C.P. membership asper cent of working

ME-2222lation

Afghanistan no known members .000

Australia 5,000 .078

Austria 35,000 .760

Belgium 11,000 .186

Bolivia 6,500 N.A. *

Brazil 31,000 N.A.

Burma 5,000

-Burundi Nil .000

Cambodia 100 .004

Cameroun Nil .000

Canada 3,500 .033

Central Aft. Rep. Nil .000

Ceylon 1,900 .040

Chad Nil .000

Chile 27,500 .650

Colombia 13,000 N.A.

Congo ,Brazzaville) Nil .000

Congo Leopoldvill.) Very Small N.A.

Costa aica 300 .051

Cyprus 10,000 3.243

Dahomey Nil .000

Denmark 5,000 .170

Ecuador 2,500 N.A.

El Salvatior 200 .023

Ethiopia Nil .000

Finland 40,000 1.441

France 2000000 .905

Gabon Nil .000

Germany, Zed. itep. 50,000 .138

Ghana Nil .000

Greece 20,000 .366

Guatemala 1,300 N.A.

Guinea Nil .000

Honduras 2,400 .261

Iceland 1,000 .999

India 135,000 .055

Indonesia 2,000,000 3.800

Iran 1,500 .015

Iraq 15,000 .474

Ireland 100 .006

Israel 2,000 .156

Italy 1,350,000 4.190

Ivory Coast Nil .000

Jamaica Nil .000

Japan 120,000 .200

Jordan 500 N.A.

*Source, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Vorld StrenAtk of the Communist yarW Organizations (January, 1965).

3 7

Country

LaosLebanonLiberiaLibyaLuxemburgMalaysiaMaliMauritaniaMexicobcco$epalfietherlandsNew ZealandNicaraguaWigerVigeriaNorwayPakistanPanamaParaguayPeruPhilippinesPortugalRwandaSaudi ArabiaSenegalaigrra LeoneSomaliaSpainSudanSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTanganyikaTogoTrinidadTurkeyUgandaUnited Arab Rep.United KingdomUnited StatesUpper VoltaUruguayVenezuelaYvmen

C.P. Membership

1003,000NilNil

5002,000NilNil50,0001,2503,50012,000

500250

NilLesa than 1004,500\&100

4005,0008,5001,8002,000NilNegligibleNil

NilNil5,0002,500

20,000less than 6,0004,000NilNilVery Small1,000Nil1,000

34,372 claimel12,000 claimedNil10,00030,000Negligible

38

Ca. membership asper cent of workingmm.population

N.A..000

000.221

.060

. 000

.000

.275

. 017

.169

.039

.031

.000.

.199

.007

.070

.600

.180

.013

.035

.000

.000

. 000

.000

.025

.382

.402

.167

.190

.000

.000

.007

.000

.114

.007

. 000

.600

. 760

Appendix

Code

The foils:wino measures and categories were used in our research.

(1) Membership of Communist parties:

1. 5,000 and below

2. 5,001 - 10,0003. 10,001 r 20,0004. 20,001 - 35,0005. 35,001 - 50,0006. 50,001 - 75,0007. 75,001 - 100,0008. 100,001 - logoom0. 1,000,001 and above

10. N.A.

(2) Wembership of Communist party as per cent of working age population:

0. .25 and below1. .26 - .502. .51 - 1.03. 1.1 - 3

N.A..

(3) Level of urganizations

1. Hiab (20f or more of population in cities of 20,000 or moreand 12.3$ or more of population in cities of 100,000 or more).

2, Low (less than 20% of populatiori in cities of 20,000 or more andless than 12.5) of population,in cities of 100,000 or more).

3. Ambiguous4. Unascertained

(4) Agricultural population as per cent of total population:

1. Rich (over 612. Medium (34-60%3. Low (16-33%)4. Very low (under 16p)

Unascertained

39

(3)

(7)

(ross national product:

Very highHigh

3. Wdium4. Low5. Very Low

Ver capita gro

1. Very Bigh2. High3. Medium4. Low5. Very Low

1

1425 billion and above)$25-124.9 billion)$5-24.0 billion)$1-4.9 billion)under $1 billion)

as national product:

1

$1200 and above)$600-1199)4300-599)41(0-299)under 6150)

Stutus of economic development;

1, Developed (self-sustaining economic growth; GNP per capita

over 4600)2. intermediate (sustained and near self-sustaining economic growth)

3. Underdeveloped (reasonable prospect of attaining sustained

economic growth by the mid-19701s)

4. Very underdeveloped (little or no larospect of attaining

sustained economic growth within the foreseeable ftture)

8. Ambiguous

(8) International Financial Status:

1. Yery high (UN assessment of 100for above)2. High (UN assessment of 1.50-9.99)3. Medium (UN assessment of 9.25-1.49%)

4. Low (UN assessment of 0.05-0.20)5. Very Low (minimum UN assessment of 0.00)9. Unaseertained

,10

21E.J.

AfghanAstanInamndiCambodiaCentral Air, liep.ChadDahomeyEthiopiaGabonIvory CoastLaosLiberiaLibyaMaliMauritaniaNicaraguaNigerSaudi ArabiaSierra LeoaeTogoUpper Volta

Type II

CamerounCongo Brazzaville)Congo Leopoldville)El SalvadorHondurasIranJordanMalaysiaNepalNigeriaPanamaParaguayRwandaSenegalSomaliaSyriaTanganyikaUgandaYemen

Appendix C

Countries by Societal

Tyne III

Wiwi*BrazilBurmaCeylonChileColombiaCosta RicaCyprusLcuadorGhanaGuatemalaGuineaIndiaIndonesiaIraqIrelandIsraelJamaicaLebanonMexicoMoroccoPakistanPeruPhilippineaPortugalSudanTrinidadTurkeyUnited Arab RepublicUruguayVenezuela

ea

,Trne

FinlandFranceGreeceItalySpain

Dmiti

AustraliaAustriaelgiunCanadaDenmarkGerman Federal RepublicIcelandJapanLuxemburgNetherland*Mew ZealandNorwaySwedenSwitzerlandUnite4 KingdomUnited States

S. A

Assignment VI

Democraci and Political Divelopment*

Assigned ReadingsS. H. Upset, "Some Sdcial Requisites of Demo racy* Economic Develop

mint and Political Legitimacy," in Nelson Polsby, Dantler and Smith,

11, yowl*. gelLSocisl Ws (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963),pp. 541.468.

Philips Cutright, °National Political Developments Social and Economic

' Correlate's," Ibid., pp. 569482.D. E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political

Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 1961)71771002-6.

We learned from the previous exercise that Communism is related to socialand economic factors in very interesting ways. It may be that democracy is

also related to social and economic development.

Since the beginning of political philosophy, scholars have been interestediu tile questions relating to the social, conomic, psychological, and historicalconditions under which democratic systems flourishf but only in recent yearshas the question becoam a focus for systematic quantitative analysis. In this

exercise we shall examine some recent studies concerned with thin question.

A first requirement in examining the conditions "nr effective democracyis to agree on a definition'of democracy. Since we are interested inquantitative analysis we need a definition that is not only conceptuallysatisfying but that refers to measurable phenomena. That is, we need anoperational definition of democracy. A good operational definition ofdemocracy will identify the basic characteristics' that we consider distinctiveabout democratic systems and will also tell us how these characteristics canbe measured. It should be stressed that no natter how conceptually satisfyinga particular definition may seem, unless it refers to measurable phenomena,unless it is operational --the definition im inadequate for purposes ofquantitative analysis.

No one definition of democracy is universally accepted. On the contrary,many definitions are available, and the particular definition we adopt will

*This assignment is adopted from "Definitions and Indicators of Democracy,"Assignment I in 44win Fogelman, Manual for the Comparative PoliticsLaboratory (Minneapolis, Minnesotas Political Lahoratory Curriculum Project,Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1968).

F..

VI.N2

have important effects on our findings. In this exercise we will consideralternative definitions of democracy' that have been used in thvee recentstullies, and we will notice some implications of adopting one definition oranother.

Three etudies that classify countrien according to measures ofdemocracy are Upset's "Some Social acquisitor of Democracy," Cutright'd"National Political Development," ant Neubadsrls "Some Conditions of1)emers-6y.* KOW4Ver, the measures of democracy ars liferent in each study.These differences will be summarized in Figure 6,1.

How does Lipset define demooracyt,

In Column 1 of Figure 6.1 list the measures that Upset uses ascriteria of democracy.

Figure 6.1. Measures of Democracy in Thrde Recent Studies

Lipset

AMMIIIMINIMINNISOPMlr

Cutright Neubauer

Are Lipset's criteria in classifying countries good operationalmeasures? Are the grounds of assigning countries into ono category oranother clear and explicit? Could you replicate Lipset's classification

4

,

on the basis of the measures and data he provides?

/11100PIIIMIRMIMI,

Upset's criteria are intended as measures of democracy. Cutright's

Political Develupment Index, on the other hand, is intended as a measure not

of democracy but of development. Yet the items included in the Index refer

to similar political characteristics.

What does Cutright's Political Development Index actually measure?

In Column 2 of Figure 6.1 list the items included in Cutright's Index.

Cutright not only lists a number of items but cambines them into am

Index en the basis of which countries can be scored and ranked. Notice that

Lipeet's criteria are used only for classifying countries in dichotomouscategoriesthat is, stable democracies or unstable democracies, and unstable

dictatorships or stable dictatorshipswhile Cutright's Index is used toorder countries in terms of their score on a continuous scale. Such an

ordering permits additional kinds of mualysis that would not be possible with

the more simple dichotomous classification.

Do you agree with the weights Cutright assign& in constructing his

Index? If not, why not?

Is the Political Development Index a good measure of political develop-

ment, as Cutright defines it? Is it a good measure of democracy?

4 4

=ma-mmlEmpnopm.

VI-4

Neubauer critizes Cutright's Index of Political Development as a

measure of both development and democracy. In Column 3 of Figure 6.1

list the indicators that Neubauer includes in his Index of Democratic

Performance.

How do Neubauer's indicators differ from the items in Cutright's

Index?

The importance of the differences in measures summarized in Figure 6.1becomes apparent when we go on to classify and order.countries according toone or another of the suggested sets of"measnres. The basic question isc towhat extent will countries be classified and ordered in the same way if we

use different measures of democracy? If the classification and ordering ofcountries turns out the same in all instances it maim. little differencewhich measures we adopt; but if the classification or ordering of countriesdiffers substantially then the choice of particular measures becomessignificant.

rhe consequences of adopting one set of measures or another can beseen by completing Figures 6.2 and 6.3. Column 1 of Figure 6.2 lists 23countries as ranked by Neubauer on his Index of Democratic Performance. In

Column 2 rank the same 23 countries according to their scores on Cutright'sIndex of Political Development. Where more than one country has the samescore on Cutright's Index consider all those countries as the same ranking

and then skip that number to determine the next,ranking. (For example,

since 8 countries have the highest score, 66, on Cutright's Index, considerall 8 countries as ranked first and then skip to ninth plate for the nextcountry.

Figure 8.2. Ordering of 23 Countries an Indices of Democracyin Two Recent Studios

Neubauer Outright

VI-5

a9

1011

121314151617181920212223

Great BritainFrance 0

FinlandSwedenNetherlandaBelgiumJapanLuxembourgNorwayNew ZealandDenmarkIsraelWest GermanyItalyCanadaUnited StatesVenezuelaAustriaChileIrelandIndiaSwitzerlandMexico

Now in Figure 6.3 plot the location of each of the 23 countries by

its position on Cutright's ordering as the vertical axis and Neubauer's

ordering as the horizontal axis.

4 d

VI-0

FigNse 6.3. Belationship of Cutright's Ordering of Democratic

Countries to Neubauer's

C m-

u

23

201.

Ii

15

0 10

5I.

1

10 15

Neubauer's Ordering

20 23

23

20

15

10

5

1

If Cutright's and Neubauer's ordering of countries were identical,

how would the cases be distributed on Figure 6.3?

In fact, how are the cases distributed?

How serious is the deviation of the actual distribution from the

distribution that would appear if the orderings were identical?

4 7

Oar.

What implications follow from the deviation between the actual

dietributIon of cases and the expected distribution if the orderings were

identical?

Gm the basis of Figure 6.3 what conclusions can you draw about the

significance of alternative measures in ordering countries by extant of

democracy/

Assignment VII

Historical Patterns of Political Development

Assigned HeadingsS. M. Upset, Political Man (New Yorks Doubleday &Co., Anchor

Books, 11204:15iiiiit7r 2; or S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites

of Democracy Economdc Development and Political Legitimacy,"in Polsby, Dentler and Smith, Witics 20. Social Life, 1963.

H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, from Max Webers Essays la sociology,

ogeo Yorks Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 195837 pp. 224-244.

William Flanigan ;sod Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Develop-ment and Democratizations A Quantitative Analysis" (excerpts

included in Appendix B)

An extremely important but often neglected approach among studies of

political development is the analysis of historical patterns of change.

Historical or longitudinal, analysis differs from cross-sectional analysis

in the sense that the latter is confined to the study of variation in one

or more variables at a single point in time. Longitudinal analysis, on the

other hand, extends the comparison of changes in variables over some desigeated

period of time, allowing one to abserve changes in one or more characteristics

of a sampling unit (e.g., a nation-state, organization, etc.) over time. The

importance of the time dimension can hardly be overemphasized. Prom research

completed to date we hay* learned that the pattern or sequence_ of historical

changes which occurred in the currently modernized societies was a crucial

determinant in the development of the political institutions now in being.

Here we will trace the relationships between several indicators ofmodernization in an attempt to elucidate, by means of empirical analysis,the projected patterns of change outlined by Max Weber and Seymour M. Lipset.

You will observe that although both readings are addressed to the question

of democracy and development, each looks at the problem from a differentperspective. Lipset's analysis points out some interesting consequences ofvarious social and economic conditions for the prospects of democraticdevelopment. Weber, on the other hand, describes how the growth ofbureaucratic institutions leads to changes in the distribution of wealth

and tilt. chances for democracy. The readings lead us to cInclude that anyaualysis of democratic development along historical lines should at someearly point evaluate the impact of concurrent changes in a system'sbureaucratic capacity and its pattern of economic development.

Max Weber's essay, "Bureaucracy," represents only a small part ofhis classic work Wirtschaft und Gessellschaft written early in this century.

Iv

The portion you have been assigned to read illustrates one aspect of Weber'sconcern with the impact of modern bureaucratic structures on capitalisticeconomies and democratic institutions. For our purposes, let us try toreconstruct one of his major themes.

1) What, according to Weber, is the relationship between the develop-ment of bureaucratic institutions and desseratimation? (FOr example, whatare the consequences of changes in one for changes in the other? Is therelationship a linear one, that is, does 'change in one produce an "equivalent"change in the other? oi what?)

'V!

2) What factors does Weber suggest act as intervening variables therebyweakening the relationship between tht historical development of bureaucraciesand democratization? How do they modify the relationship?

As you w411 have no doubt observed, Weber's effort to trace therelationships between bureaucratic structures and democratic developmentreveals au extremely complex configuration of institutional development andhistorical change and one that leads to no simple empirical "solution."

VII -3

1Aside from the problems of defining such coneepta as "bureaucracy,""democracy," etc., of dealing with 'changes occurring eimultausously atseveral levels of society, tc., the very notion of historical cintroduces au important variabl that we have up to this pointconsideredtime. The variable tip. is of course an underlying d sion

in any historical or longitudinal analysis. If, for xample, we areinterested in -delcribing-thertateporat-iieqnsnce Cf. certain events, we mustgive explicit recognition to the units of time comprising our observationalperiod.

One variant of time-series analysis is the study of t of

change. The paper by Flanigan and Fogelman describes a procedure y whichseveral patterns of change, e.g., ia terms of the increase or decline ofgovernmental publications, may be constructed using historical data. Sincethe paper also provides quantitative time series data for several othervariables that Weber and Upset deem important for demooratic development,there is some value in our assessing the usefulness of these measuresbefore attempting to describe these patterns. (see Appendices B and C)

3) What are the measures of political development and democratizationused by Flanigan and Fogelman?

valle

4) lisw are scores determined for the 29 countries on the measures ofpolitical development and democratization? Can the scoring procedures bechecked?

VII -4ii

G) Un the basis of the scores in Figures 1 and 6 in Appendixand Fogelman identify four patterns of political developamnt andpatterns of democratisation. Hew arc these patterns determined?agree with this classification of countries into four patterns?alternative classifications would you suggest?..,

Co FlaaiganfourDo you

What

API/

(;) Complete Table 1 below using the same classification of patterns asdescribed by Flanigan and Fogelman.

Table 1

Governmental Publications

Continuouslow

Democratization development

Consistentlydemocratic

4oderatelydemocratic

Predominantlyundemocratic

Consistentlyundemocratic

Prolongedmoderate

development

Uederate tohigh

developmentLaxly highdevelopMent

7) summarize your findings from Table 1.

VII 5

8) Refer back V4 your responses to questions 1) and 2) in this exercise.Does Weber suggest any variables that might account for your findings inquestion 7)? What additional variables would you um4?

ae have seen that the growth of democratic political systems is notnecessarily fostered by the increasing capacity of national bureaucracies.Furthermore, according to Weber, bureaucratic growth msy in some ways act asa powerful counterforce to democratic development. If the consequences ofbureaucratization are always to some extent indeterminate, what problemsdoes this.pose for transitional eocietlee, for, industrial societies? Somescholars, for example, have argued"that the evolution of a "managerialclops," or "meritocracy," in industrializing societies is already presentinga severe threat to existing democratic institutions. However just as athoughtful scholar is never completely satisfied with any single explanationof complex phenomena, students of political development are challenged tolook to other worthy explanations of the developmental process. -An importantcontribution to this body of literature is Upset's article "Some Social,.;-quisites of Denocracy." 4

Lipset's article draws our attention to a number of social conditionsthat, he argues, "support" democracy. Let 1114 select one such condition,that of economic development.

9) According to Lipset, in what ways does economic develowent "support"demucracy?

Based on his analysis of 50 countries, Lipset concludes that thelevel of national wealth, as defined by several operational indices, is, onthe average, higher in democratic countries. Note, however, that by apply-ing single time-point data, Lipset is thereby precluded from drawing

5 a 'at

ti VII -6

conclusion' about relationships between historical patterns of democratimition'and rates of eponomic development. Sor example, does it mak* a differencefor a country's political development whether its industrialization begauearly or late, ot proceeded-at a slow or rapid peg!? What arelthe chancesfor demacracy in societies Just beginniag to industrialize? To begin toanswer these questions we must turn to historical evidence.

iirst, we need an indicator of economic development. Flanigan andFogelman selected a measure of apiculturial employment for their indicator

. of economic development.

10) What are the advantages--and disadvantagesof this indicator?

amIMPI.MIMMO.MEm

Refer to Appendix C. Figurell. Index of Agricultural EMployment.Note that data has been collected for%many but not all countries listed. Forour purposes, we will examine only those countries where data is recordedfur the decades 1910 and 1950 for a total of 10 countries as listed below.

Indicate on the chart below the numeral corresponding to each country'spattern of democratization as determined by Flanigan and Fogelman. (See

Appendix 8, pp. 9-10)

Pattern ofDemocratization(I,II,III,IV)

1. Argentina2. Aurma3. Canada4. egyp15. Franceb. Germany7. Hungary8. India9. Italy10. JapanII. Mexico12. Portugal13. Spain14. U.S.S.A.n. United hingdom16. United States

Proportion oflabor forceleaving agriculturalemployment (in %)

Our next strp is to create an index for the rate of economic develop:-went. Simply subtract each country's score for the decade 1980 from itsscor tpr the decade 1910. The difference expressed as a percentage

411.

VII -7

indicates the proportion of the labor force which ha/ moved out ofwicultural employment over the for*y year span and will serve as ourindex of the rate of economic development. List the scores for eachcountry in the chart above.,

Based on the information in your chart, complete Table 2 below.

Proportion oflabor forceleaving agriculturalemployment

Table 2

ilp orless

10 ormere

Patterns of Democratization

I and II III and rv

11) Vhat does Table 2 indicate concerning patterns of democratizationin relation to the rate of economic development (i.e., change in agriculturalemployment)?

110117.1M.101111,1.1!

In an attempt to clarify the observed pattern in Table 2, let usextend our analysis by controlling for a third variable--the size ofagriculturaa labor force in the decade 1910. Here, we will distinguishbetween countries whose labor force in the decade 1910 was relativelylarge from those countries whose labor force was small.

V11.8

Complete Table 3 but include only those countries whose score forthe decade41910 isstgaing. Complote Toblo 4 and include only thosecountries those score for the same decade iallkajam

:Table 3

Large Agricultural Labor Force - 1910

Proportion ofLabor forceleaving agriculturalemployment

11$ orless

12A ormore

Table 4


I and II IlIandIV

Small Agricultural Labor Force - 11110


I and II IllandlY

11% orless

Proportion oflabor forceleaving agriculturalemployment 12% or

more

12) What additional information doespntrolling for size ofagricultural labor force give you regarding he relationship between patternsof democratization and change in agriculturl employment?

13).... What /imitations in the data and the analysis might affect

the validity of these findings?

14) What additional hinds of analysis can you suggest applyinghistorical data to problems of democracy and politica development?

1"4.1t

Assignment VIII

Social Mobilization and Political Development

Assigned Reading:Marl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in

Finkle and Gable, eds., Political Development and SoFial Change,1966, pp. 225-226.

William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Develop-ment and Dmocratisations A Quantitative Analysis" (excerptsincluded in Appendix s).

In the last exercise we observed that historical patterns of democraticdevelopment are related in interesting ways to patterns of bureaucratizationand economic growth. Do other aspects of historical development contributeto the likelihood that democratic regimes will enmrge and flourish duringindnstrialization? What effect, for example, does rapid--or slow--urbanizationhave on societies attempting to introduce modern participatory politicalinstitutions? Did countries which became democratic by the end of the 19thcentury stand a better chance of suataining peaceful change than didcountries just beginning to install democratic regimes? If so, why?questions such as these have long concerned students of political develop-ment. Aimost invariably, however, attempted solutions have been met witha lack of adequate historical data, of appropriate indicators for usefultheoretical concepts, and of sufficiently powerful models and theories ofthe development process. More recently, a number of scholars have encouragedfurther use, and refinement of the concept social mobilization. The versionof this comcept, as introduced to studenta of political development by EarlDeutsch purports to meet, at lzast in part, some of the objections raisedagainst earlier solutions to the kinds of questions and research strategieswe have just outlined. Are these assertions justified?

1) £0 what aspect of-modernization does the term social moLilizationrefer? What assumptions about the modernization process does Deutsch make?

VI I

2) *hat concepts and methods of analysis underlie Deutsch's model?What kinds of data are required?

k

3) What are the advantages of vlewing modernization im this way?

One consequence of social mobilization, notes Deuts,rfh, is that it"brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant trate of the

population." Another important consequence, he adds, if the creation ofnew demands on the political system, bailed upon the ne ds of these newlypoliticized groups. Social mobilization, then, implies some increase inparticipation and in demands and some subsequent impact on governmentswhich are more or less capable of sustaining those demands. This raisesthe queetions under what conditions jam novernments capable.of neetiskgnew demands? For example, does it male a difference whether mobilizationadvances rapidly or slowly? What, for example, are the effects of rapidurbanization on countries attempting to modernize? Can governments sustaindemocratic reforms in societies undergoing major population shifts fromvillage to city, from farm to factory? How can we proceed to research theoequestions?

A first step in this investigation must be to arrive at a usefuldefinition of the term "government capability." Here, we suggest that oneimportant measure of governmental capability, and one particularly relevantto modernizing societies, is the probability that attempts to meet demandsfor greater political participation will be successful. Such attemptsmight consist of the extension of suffrage, the exposure of more, andespecially the more important, political offices to democratic procedures,and other similar political reforms.

Then, let us ash, what "conditions" associated with a nation under-going modernization are presumed to have some effect on governmental

59

TS,;

3t

VIII-3

performance? What kinda.of social changes would seem to imply added, or..fewer, burdens on the political procesi? We have selected an indicator ofsocial mobilization from the list in Deutsch (table 1, Group II, p. 218),

"Change from rural to urban residence" or, mdl, of b a for reasons

of convenience and utility. First, rates of change urban tion is qua

indicator included in the class of variables which, according-to Deutsch,is "related to the capabilities of the government for coping With themeburdens." Second, urbanisation data tends to be more reliable and completethan that for other relevant indicator*.

4) Based on evidence and assumptions implicit in Deutschle model,how is the rate of urbanisation related to the capabilities of a government?Or, more precisely, what ie the expected rilationehip between a government's ability to,meet increasing demands for participation and that country's

rate of increase in urbanization? What kinds of evidence does Deutsch state,

or imply, are relevant to this question?_.,

) Trace the expected relationship in Figure belows

Figure 1

liate of increasein

urbanization

Hig

LowLow High

Government Capability tomeet demands

Let ue see whether this expected relationship is supported by furtheranalysis. By applying the data in Appendix CI we will create an operationalmeasure for each of the two variables --rate of urbanization and governmental

capability to meet demands. From the information in Figure 8, Index of

Urbanization we will construct an indicator of the rate of urbanization,'operationally defined as the arithmetic difference between the urbanization

60

VIIT-4

score of the decade prior to, and the score of the decade following, anattempt to establish democratic procedures. (See Appendix DI pp. 10-11for definition of urbanisation.)

Our indicator for governmental capability is derived from data inFigure 2. Index of Democratic Succession. (See Appendix 8, pp. 54)Government capability will be defined aa the extent to which a governmentis "successful" in its attempts to establish a more democratic procedurefor selecting its chief executive official. Mere specifically, by thephrase "attewpt to establiah a more democratic procedure in.selectiag itschief executive official" iS,meant a situation in which the chief executiveis selected at least once by a "democratic" procedure whore previouslysuccession had been either "send-democratic" or "nan-dsmocratic"; or inselected at least once by a "semi-democratic" procedure where previouslysuccession had been nnon-democratic." By the phrase "eitent to which agovernment is 'successful" is meant the Cumber of uninterrupted decadeswhich pass, following the original attempt, within which time no attemptsare wade to establish a less democratic procedure. (Or, stated differently,before which time an attempt is made to establish a less democratic procedure.)

Since our data for urbanization (Figure 8) ars considerably lesscomplete than the data for democratic succession (Figure 2), we must limitour analysis to those countries .and decades for which urbanization data isavailable. Initially, then, we will consider only those countries listedin Table 1 (below). In addition, since our criteria for distinguishingmore successful" from "less successful" countries rests on iaformationabout the decades which follow attempts to establish democratic procedures,it is necessary to forgo consideration of attempts made just prior to 1950.In order to lose as little iaformation as possible, but at the same timeto give adequate time for attempts to be judged as successful or unsuccessful,we will not include attempts made after the decade 1930. To be considereda successful attempt, the newly established democratic procedure must besustained over a period of at least three continuous decades. Unsuccessfulattempts are those which are sustained for no longer than, and possiblyless than, two continuous decades. Finally, since we wish to apply ourcoding procedure consistently for each case, we will include only thoseattempts for which urbanization data is available for the decade immviiatelyprior to and the decade immediately following the attempt.

0). Complete Table 1.

I,* t ,°` ;

Table 1

;01F.

7.4

Count

Period ofobservationof attemptsmade inc naive

Decadeattempt

Number ofContinuous'successful

cades

Success ofattempt863 or-more decadesU61 o 2 d ads

Rateofurban1-atio

1.

2.

3.

4.

6.

0.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

lb.

16.

17.

18.

1.a.

20.

21.

22,

Argentina

Brasil

Burma

Canada

Chile

Colombia

EWPt

France

Germany

ihutary

India

Indonesia

Italy

Japan

kexico

Philippines

Spain

Switzerland

Turkey

U.S.S.R.

United Kingdom

United States

1880 . 1930

1900 - 1930

1890 - 1930

1870 - 1930

1870 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1890 - 1930

1810 - 1930

1820 - 1930

1860 - 1930

1890 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1810 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1990 - 1030

1900 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1810 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1900 - 1930

1810 - 1930

1820 - 1930

1910 2 +5

7) taxed on information in Table 1, complete Figure 2 below:

Figure 2

Success of Attempts to Establiah Democratic Proceduresand fiats of Urbanisation

Rate ofUrbanization

SO ormore

4A

VINORM*Ij

0 - 2 decadesunsuccessful

3 or more decadessuccessful

Number of ContinuousSuccessful Decades

8) What does Figure 2 indicate concerning the zw!eces of attempts toestablish democratic procedures and the rate of urbanization?

9) How well do your findings in Figure 2 correspond with your expectedrelationship in Figure 1?

ematIMIMMIlfmle

10 How might our choice of indicators for governmental capability andrate of urbanization affect the correspondence between the expected relationship and the observed relationship

11) What other limitations in the data and the method of analysis

might affect the validity of these findings2z..._...._.

00001.00

101101000001100010

12) What additional kinds of problems relating to sooial mobilizationmight be interesting to investigate?

:

Assignment Lg

Political Leadership in the Development Process

Assigned Heading;David Apter, The Politics of Wodernisation (Chicago; University of

Chicago Press,INI), -Chapter 6. .

Wendell Dell, "Social Change and Elites in an aseggent Nation," inH. 114 Barringer, bisistaastalia: tam

(Cambridge, Mass.; Schankman Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 156-205.Daniel Lerner, The ptesing of 14aditional Society (Glenooe,

Free Press 1958), Chaptele 11.

Lester Seligm:nn, "Elite Hecruitment and Political Development," inFinkle and Gable (eds.), Political peve1o4usent and Social Change(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 324-338.

Edward Shiley "The Intellectuals in Political Development of Newstutes," in Finkle and Gable (eds.), Political evelopmnt andSocial Change (Nrw Yorks John Wiley & Sons, inc., 196OJ pp. 339-305.

Though, as we have already seen, some scholars emphasize the 1..ortanceof social and/or economic forces on the modernization and political develop-ment process, others view leaders, military, intellectual, economic, orliureaucralic, Lie fundamental to thq political development process. Some,

for example, interpret the successful Japanese response to the challengesof induAtrialization and Western expansionist foreign policy as largely aresult of the strong development of the Japanese elite after the MeijiRestoration in 1867

The concept of political leadership has been interpreted and definedin many different ways. Some refer to leadership as the quality of inter-personal relationships between leaders and their followers--or simply as aninfluence relationship between A and B. Some are concerned with the relation-ship of leadership to particular political situations, groups, or institutions.Still others are interested in the psychological qualities of leaders andclassify them along certain dimensions--e.g., democratic-authoritarian. Very

probably the usefulness ofany schema or definition of political leadershipwill depend oh the nature of the research problem itself. For this exerciseit is necessary only that you be aware of the variety of interpretations anddefinitions available to you and that you apply whichever working definitionswhich seem to be most appropriate, given your task.

Hera, we are interested in two aspects of political leadership. First,

we shall identify these elites in terms of their importance at different

stagee uf political development. Second, we shall examine the relationshipsbetween the particular composition of elite groups and the nature of politicn)development observed in their respective countries.

A%T-48

Do the assigned reading.

a) La the chart beim, list the elites one might expect to find incountries at each of the three levels of political development. You maydistinguish between elites accordinuto occupation-or profession, educationalattainments, social background, etc. It may be helpful to identify leaderswith respect to the particular sector in which they are most,prominent--e.g., political, economic, social (statts and prestige) sectors.

Po l itical

ixonomic

Traditional

ELITES AND STAGlig OF DEVELOPMENT

Transitional Modern

; F.

IX-3

Do yoa observe any overlapping of the same elite groups in more thenone of the columns, 1.e., stages of develocent? Bow would you explain this?

De you find any patternsior trends in the amergence of elite groups thatare cloSely related to the stages of development?.

1ich groups'of elites become increasingly important with increasing

,modcrnization? What do they have in common?

1111

Which elites become decreasingly important with increasing modernization?

Une interesting aspect of elite-type analysis in the developing countriesis the phenomenon of transition, i.e., periods of time in which certain elitesemerge into positions of power and prestige while others experience a decline.You have already observed some general over-all patterns of transition, if youhave answered the second question on this page. Now, we shall attempt to explainthe "rise and fall" of elites by first, focusing on particular transition periods;and, then, examining the social and economic characteristics of societies ateach of these periods.

G 7

IX-4

Assuming we could identify, in the real world, that period of transitionbetween traptional and developing, utet social and economic forces.would youexpect to find most closely associated with the emergence of new elite groups?

4111

would you expec0 to find the same social and economdc forces associatedwith the ascendance of new elites in the period between developiNg and modern?

Why? or why not?

.11.=niam..1.1womnammmerra..a...

Do you feel that your explanations are sufficient to account for thepresent composition of political elites in a given country in, say LatinAmerica, South-east Asia, or Africa today? If so, why? If not, why not?

0.110.10,

G

IX-5

In order to familiarize yourself with the methods and data used in

elite.unalysis, you are asked to select 3 political leaders representing

countries from each of the three stages of developmenttraditional, tran-sitional, and madernfor a total of 9 political leaders. You are to

describe, in some dethp, the social background-characteristics of the

let:Jars. (You may select Presidents, Prime Linisters, Congressmen, ordiplomatsor representatives of some other important national political

botly.) For each leader, find the following informations

gameb Birth date and geographical originc Social -econcimic class background

d Education (where, what level completed, professional degrees, etc.)

e Career pattern (major occupations, offices held, year, etc.)

gor biographical iaformation consult Who's Who, Statesman'sYearbook, autobiographies, biographies.

Fill in the following chart.

Characteristics of Palitical Leaders

6imilar Different

Traditional

Vransitional

Uodern

69

What are the interesting similarities and differences of thecharacteristics of the political leaders in and across the three stagesof developaent?

What conclusions emerge based on your answer to the previ.ous question?

"AV

Assignment A

Political Parties and Political Development

..ssigned deading:Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chanaing, Societies (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 19607 Chapter 7: "Parties andPolitical Stability."

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, political parties havesignified, perhaps more than any other political institution, the modern agein politics. The historical development of political parties --as we knowthem today --has been closely associated with the increased mobilization offormerly disenfranchised political and social groupings, the rise of mass -based political ideologies, the emergence of modern, well-financed partyorganizations, and the ascendance of elected politicians into foremostpositions of power.

Political scientists have recently begun to examine historicaland contemporary evidence in such a way as to lend more credibility andsophistication to our knowledge about political parties and their significancein modernizing societies. Some scholars, for example, have prommted system-atic investigations of party functions and party organizational structures.uthers have made extensive analyses of voting behavior among various groupsin the electorate. Still others have focused on the relationships betweenattributes and party systems, such as the extent of competitiveness, stability,the number of parties, etc. and economic development, modernization, orhistorical experience. In this exercise, we will look at several analyticaldimensions of political party systems and examine them within the contextof modernization.

An impQrtant distinguishing characteristic of party systems is theextent to which individual political parties must compete in order to winpolitical offimes. in democratic societies, for example, political partiesmust vie for Lhe support of the electorate while in totalitarian or one-party systems electoral competition plays a minimal role. Initially, itwill be useful to see how competitiveness in party systems is distributed inour sample of countries. ior this purpose, the following table requiresthat you first classify the 116 nations according to-eeographic area orregion and then indicate the extent of competitiveness in the electoralsystem. 6ee Variable 1 ("Ueographic Location") and Variable 29 ("Competitive-li('es uf 2;lectoral Sys4vo") in the Codesheet. Then see the Appendix for eachcountry's ranking. (slotes Do not include countries ranked as "ambiguous"or "unascertained.")

\ Table 1

X-2

itegion Country Competitive Partials competitive Non-competitive

..

-

c

1-3

lea 1 (conit.)

4:eaion, Country RegelakEt ?artially competitive Nop-colpetitive

k

Summarise as succinctly as possible your finAings iu Table

4-4

What, if any characteristics, other than geographic regien, do thosecountries share which are most competitive? leam4 competitite?

Promdnent among some students' classifications orparty systems is'th$number, of parties competing for political office. Huntington, for example,after tracing the historical phases of party development in tabular fashion,illustrates the relationships between the number of parties in a system andother charactc,ristics (party strength, party stability, military coups, andlevel of literacy).

Complete Table 2 using the data from Table 1 and, for the same couritries,data from the Appendix (Variable 411 Quanatative Party System).

One-party

dominantparty

quantitativeParty one-and-a

System half party

two party

multi-party

Table 2

Number of Countries

Non-cOmpetitive Partially competitive Competitive

Competitiveness of Llectoral System

X-5

Based on your findings in Table 2, summarize the relationship(*)

between competitiveness and the number of parties in the system.

liow do you explain the absence cif a simple irect relation botweln the

two indicators?

ihintington offers the hypothesis that party: strenethis closely related

to the number of parties in a system, but only after "controlling" for the

level of modernization.

tffiut does it mean to "control" for a third variab e (in thic case, the

level of modernization)?

Mutt indicators would you use to distinguish countries with respect to

a) levels of modernization? b) party strength?

De9cribe the rocAure you would follow in order to test Huntington's

hypothesis.

Aas i ;meat XI

The Military and Political Development

Assigned Reading:S. E. Finer, The Man on Horsebacks The Role of the Military in

Politics (iii;; York: Praeger, 1963 Chapters 1 and 7.

Morris Janawitz, The MilitarY in the Palitical Devolpment of New

Nations (Chicago: University of Chicage Press, 1964)7Chapter::

1 and 2.David Hapoport, "A Co ,4arative Theory of Military and Political Types,"

in Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military

Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free PressTIVN):Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States

(London: Pall Mall Press, 1964) Chapters 1, 8 and 10.

Suggested Reading:John J. Johnson, fhe Role of the Militark in Underdeveloped Countries

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

Edwin Lieuwen, Arum and Politics in Latin America, Revised gdition

(New Yorks Praeger, 1961---TArthur S. Banks and Robert D. Textor, A Cross-Polity Surver (Cambridge,

Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1063), Introductory Chupter.

une of the most interesting and perhaps most significant subjects in

Lle sLudy of political development is the relationship between the military

ort,unization and civilian political institutions. Two general questions are

o;ten asked with respect to the role of the military in political change.

First, what political and economic characteristics of a developing nation

facilitate the military's involvement in domestic politics? Second, what

are the capacities of the military to supply effective leadership for a new

nation's rapid economic development and social modernization?

In this exercise we shall address ourselves to these questions, but

only after hlving first broken them down into several more manageable

questions. uur objective is to formulate hypotheses explaining the relation-

ship between the military and certain measures of modernization that are

susceptible to quantitative or statistical techniqueu. Since you will be

asked not only to create several hypotheses but also test them and interpret

your results, you will need to become familiar with two lands of method-

ological problems involved in such au analysis. First, we shall be making

comparisons between a large number of countries. Ln order to make valid

comparisons, one must be sure to select categories or units of analysis

that are comparable or equivalent in each of the countries selected. If

we were -t4 compare the political iafluence of the militfigy in several countries,we must first define the term "military" in such a way that it identifies anorganization performing the same function in each country. What may appearto be similar institutions, at first glance, may often be quite different immere than one respect: military officers may perform "civilian" functionsin some societies; police and parai-milinary units may be engaged in "military"activities, etc. Although youwill not be expected to become an "expert"iu the task of differentiatiwnilitary structure. and functions frompiviliaa,ones, you should be aware of the kinds of difficulties faced by scholars intheir attempts to male these important, but often subtle distinctions.

rafhis first methodological problem in crosscultural studies is often

referred to as the problem of comparability. It is essentially the problemof defining variables in such a way that they have the same generic meaningLa each culture. The next step, then, is to determine the extent or degreebp which that variable is "found" in each cultural setting. By measuring orscaling a variable we can co are several cultures in terms of the relative(or sometimes absolute) amourt of that variable's presence iu each culture(e.g., high, medium, low, absent, etc.). In attempting to compare the degreeto which the military may influence other political bodies, you first haveto establish a scale or measurement of influence that clearly distinguishesbetween different levels or degreeR of influence. Once we have ordered orranked each country with respect to military influence, for example, we mightthen wish to determine the extent to which military influence is associatedwith another variable, say, level of economic development. By scalingvariables in this manner--and our scales may often be quite simple--we areable to mulc t,. fairly precise statements about the nature of relationshipbetween two or more variables, simply because we can apply techniques ofahalysis that otherwise could not be used.

IttRI

im order to bocowe familiar with the models or typologies of themilitary used in crosscultural studies, look at the suggested readingsunder the beading "military."

For euch author, list and briefly describe his typology of the military.

67

X1-3

Aloes 'Mal dimensions does each author distinguish between hie militarysocieties; i.e., what criteria does ho use to differentiate between one"type" and another "type"? Ams these criteria, or standards of comparison,

made explicit?

11..

Since most of these models of military-civilian societies attempt, inons way or another, to compare the nature or degree of influence the militaryexercises in political decision-making, it might be helpful to distinguishbetween each author's definition of "influence" or, perhaps, "participationin politics."

How capes each author define or seem to define, the term "influence"?"Political participation"?

11111

What observable forms do these authors suggest "influenc" may take?

Since our objective is to examine some relationships between militaryparticipation in politics ,,nd certain indicators of modernization, ;.ou shouldreview the readings that deal specifically with questions of this nature. Youmight askyoarselfs How is the level of political development associated withmilitary participaiion in domestic politics? *ro what extent might the wilitarbehave differently in an nnderdeveloped country? What measures of politicalor economic development appear to be most appropriate in such an analysis?

X1-4

What hypotheses would you suggest to explain the relationship betweenthe degres,of militarijerticipation in domestic politica andt

the level of economic development? Amminimmar

the level of political culture? (See Finer)

the strength of civilian political institutions; e.g., politicalparties, the legislative branch, executive branch, interest groups, etc.?

1. Check the coclebook which explains the manner in which politicaland economic variables are scaled and coded,

2. Heexamine your hypotheses and determine which variables--fromthe list of these available in the codebook--you wish to use indefining your terms.

You are now asked to test these hypotheses using data from 70 countries.In order to do this you should follow either of the two following procedures(selected by your instruf7tor):

Option One

.Percentagtpomparison

Percentage-comparison and analysis of data provided, i.e., theprintout which you received fur the assignment on social-economiccorrelates of political development.

1. Check the cudebook which explaino the manner in which the varia4leshave been scaled and coded.

2. Re-examine your Iwpotheses and determine which variablesfrom thelist of these available in the codebookyou wish to use in defining

Ur terms

3. lie-examine your 4ypotheses and state them in bivariate form, i.e.,compare only two variables or seta of variables. For example, therelationship between military participation and economic developmentmight be examined.

4. Re-examine your hypotheses and state them in such a fashion that thedirvotion of association (positive or negative) is clear. For example,"the level of economic development is negatively associated with j,ile

degree of military participation." Also specify the degree ofallaciotion expected, "strong," "weak," etc.

5. wrking with your selected variables and your country based data frouihE computer printout construct two tables which present the frequencydistributions and percentages.

X1-6

Table 1

Table 2

P2

`40,

How well did your hypothesea "meet the test?'

XI-8

How would you restate your hypotheses on the basis of these findingsand, perhaps, some second thoughts?

.1111111tem..... Opowanarboro

What difficulties did you face in formulating your hypothesvs withrespect to the nature of the variables, i.e., their precision, clarity, orgeneral utility and significance?

X1-9

Option Two

Statistical Analysis

1. Check the codebook which explains the manner in which the variableshave been scaled and coded.

2. Be-examine your hypotheses and determine which variablesfrom thelist of these available in the codebookyou wish to use in definingyour terms.

3. Re-examine your hypotheses and state them in bivariate form, i.e.,compare only two variables, or sets of variables. For example, therelationship between military participation and economic developmentmight be examined.

4. Re-examine your hypotheses and state them in such a fashion that thedirection of association (positive or negative) is clear. For example,"the level of economic development is negatively associated with thedegree of military participation." Also specify the dep:ree, of associationexpected, "stronL," "weak," etc.

5. Read carefully the accompanying leading on rank correlation methods,and especially Kendall's Tau4leta.

6. Pick up a set of data punch cards and the particular statisticalprogram that has been suggested. This is referred to as an analysisdeck.

7. Locate the variables you wish to use on the appropriate columns ofthe punch cards. Make a list of these columns. You will need thialist when the programmer consultant helps you set up your particularprogram. (Ordinarily, you will simply select the standard computerlibrary routine which includes non-parametric statistics like hendall'sTau-Beta.) Typically, you are asked ta submit control cards for theroutine you select.

ith the assistance of the programmer consultant, make up your "state-men'," telling the computer exactly what operations to perform.

9. Submit your completed analysis deck to the computer center. Pickup the analysis deck and printout when ready.

10. Lxamine the printout sheet carefully to see whether it performedcorrectly the operations you specified. The programmer assistyou in interpreting the printout if you have trouble.

Statistical Analysis

Kendall's taw-beta is a measure of the degree of association or.correlation between two rank ordered variables. Let us start with a simpleexample., Suppose we wanted to measure the degree of association betweencoureergrades in political science and course grades in mathematics. Weknoir.that five students received the following gradess (For the purposesof this illustration, we will use an unusually small number of cases.)

Grade Rank Grade Bank

in in in in

Student Political Science Political Science MathemsOics Mathematics

Al B+ C

Ben C C4.

Don C+ B

Ed Ag- B.

Sam B A

Complete the example by determining each student's rank in the courses.

Arranged in a different way, we Wiwi

Al Ben Do;n Ed Sam

Aank in Political Science 2 5 4 1 3

Rank in Mathematics 5 4 3 2 1

-

Now, let ill compare the ranks of each student with every other student.If the ranks are in the natural order (1,2,3,...10 we will score this +11 ifnot we 'WI score this -1. Comparing,A1 with Ben, for example, we see thatHen (rank 5) ranks lower than AI (rank 2) in political science, but Ben (rank 4)

ranks higher than Al (rank 5) in math. Thus we score the Aa - Ben pair +1 inpolitical science (2 and 5 are in a natural order) and -1 in math (5 and 4 arein descending order). Comparing Al with Don we see that their ranks inpolitical science are in the correct order (2 and 4) and their ranks in mathare in the descending order (5 and 3). Continuing for all possible pairs,we have the following indications of the relative ranks of the students ineach course when each student is compared with the others.

Pair

Al Ben

Al - Don

Al - Ed

Ben - Ed

Ben - Sam

Don - Ed

Don - Sam

Ed - Sam

Table 3

Political Science

212011011X-21E41-

+1

-1

+1

- 1

-1

- 1

- 1

+1

Net Soore (S)s

Amik OrderScore

OverallScore,

.1 -1

-1 -1

-1 +1

-1 -1

1 +1

-1 +1

-1 +1

-1 +1

-1 +1

-1 -1

We are interested in measuring the degree of correlation betweenability in political science and math. Thum, we will need an overallmeasure of the extent to which rank scores in political science and rankscores in math vary together. That is, if two students ars ranked in thesame order in both subjects (either +1 in both or, -1 in both) their positionsin the two subjects are related. If the rank scores move in opposite directions,this would indicate lack of co-variation or correlation. By simply multiplyingthe political science and math rank order scores in Table 3 we get a +1 ifthey vary together (+1) x (+1) +1 or (-1) x (-1) +1; and 4 if the pair-is not related (rank isores moving in opposite direction* Perform thismultiplication in T4104,11 to get the overall score. You should have 6 (+1)'sand 4 (-1)'s in the4overall score column for a net score (6) of +2.

Eendall's rank correlation (tau) is simplys

actual net score

Maximum Possible Scsre_,

The Maximum Possible Score (denominator) is the score we would haveif the rank orders in both rows (viz courses) were exactly the sane (perfect)

X142

correlatioa If this were the cbsi, each pair would get an (Arial scoreof +1.- (There could be no scores moving in opposite directions if allatudents were ranked the same in each course.) How many +1 overall scores

would there be im this case? We can find out by simply counting the numberof pairs. In aqy set of n people there are in (n-1) pairs. (If one personin a set of n persons paired with every other person in the set, therewould be n.1 pairs. If all a people were se paired, thereFould be a times(u-1) pairs or n (n-1). Since we do net compare each pair_trice--for essegae,we do not compare Al with Ben and then Ban with Al--the n W-1) combinationsare divided im half. Verify by counting the number of pairs in Table 3.)

Therefore:

In this case

Kindall's tau

S +2; n 5

thus tau 2

10

.2

In the case of perfect rank ordering oniboth variables, S would equa/in (n-1). If in (n-1) were substituted for S in the above formula for tau,we can 300 that tau would equal +1. (Any amount divided by the same amountin equal to 1., Thus tau takes the velum +1,, if there is perfect positivecorrelation (and -1 in the case of perfect negative correlation.)*

In the case of completely random rank ordering; i.e., if the two rowsof ranks had no relationship with each other there would be about as manynegative (opposite pairs) contributions to the net score (S) as there wouldbe positive contributions (covariant pairs). In this situation, the netscore (S) would be zero or close to it and thniNAu would be close to zero.Thus, valuss of tau close to zero wizen indicate little correlation.

In the social sciences, correlations are seldom close to perfect sovalueo of tau near +1 or -1 are rarely found. A tau of .5 or .8 (abouthalfway between zero and +1) is considered quite high for social sciencedata.

*Exawple of perfect negative correlations ABCDErank in X 1 2 3 4 5

rankinY 5 4 3 2 1

Each pair wouldcontribute a -1to the OverallScore.

X1.-13

rho abov formula is reall Randall's tau-alpha. landall's tau...beta

is basically the same but takes into consideration ties in rankings. Supposewe were correlatimg two variables I and Y which were coded se follows:

VeriablIbY

1. Very interested I Agree

3. Somewhat interested 2 Depends

5. Not interested 3. Disagree

Note that both variables (and their codes) are in a natural order (fromstrong to weak interest: fron_agre. to diaagree). Tau-beta cannot be usedwith variables that do not have an order un4erlying the classifications orcodes. For xample, the variable "religion" with classifications Protestant,Catholic, Jai has no one dimensional underlying continnue or ordering. I

Suppose we took a few curds (cases) from the lab deck and we foundthat individual A, was coded 1. on variable I and alec 1. on variable Y:individual B was coded 1. on variable I and 2. on variable Y and so forthas follows:

Table 4

ABCDEFGHX 1. 1. 1. 3. 3. 3. 5. 5.

Y 1. 2. 2. 2. 3. 3. 2. 3.

The code categories are, in 'swingy, ranks. Let us compare pairs andscore them as we did in the example above. We see that A and B ar tied onvariable I. There is no difference in rank and therefore we sbore this pairas zero. Continuing we have3

Pair

AC

AD

AL

AF

AG

Ali

SC

LiD

BE

oF

all

CD

CE

C

C G

Cki

DE

DF

DG

Ffl

El'

EG

Table 5

VariableX

VariableYorder order overall

Scare s core Scare

0 +1 0

+ 1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+1 +1

1+ +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

0

+1 0

+1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+ 1 0

+1 +1 +1

+ 1

+ 1 +1 +1

+1 +1 +1

+ 1

+ 1 +1 + 1

0 +1

0 +1

+ 1 0

+ 1 +1 + 1

0 0

+ 1 -1 - 1

+ 1 0

+ 1 -1 -1+ 1 0

+1

S-.

XI-15

Compute the wenn score in Table 5. (S should be 12 - 2 is 10).

Nete that sero times asky number is nem' Thus inv." war, gem there are13.41m either Ekes variables sausgisattstisialimt. Thisfact must be taken into considration in computing the denominator of tau.If ties cannot contribute to the 8 score, we must subtract the total numberof tie in each variable.froa the Maxima Possible Score so tau can achievea value of +1 if we have perfect ordering.

Thnss Taw.bete

where T number of pairs tied on vAriable

U . number of weirs tied en variable Y

If you are wondering where the square root came fram, note that if thereno ties we would have

Tan

n (n-1) - n

n (n-1)

were

V77:17:7511

Conputation of Tan-beta for Cross Tabuiations

Let us arrange the data in Table 4 into a crosm-tabulation table. Inside

the table we will designate the individuals occupying the cells so that you cansee exactly haw the rearrangement took place.

Table 6

Variable Y

2.

1. A BIC

3. E,F

5.

We can compute the S score with the data in this way, For example,looking at the upper left hand cell, (in which we find A), we note that Band C are in the same row (ran0 and thus should contribute nothing to theS score when compared with A. Jew ver, D, E and F, G, H, which are belowA and to the right, all have higher ranle than A on both variables. A,

paired with each of these, would add +1 to the S score. Thus, A times the

xl-15

Compute the overall score in Table 5. (8 should be 18 - 2 10).Note that sere times any number is sm. Thus in all Walthere there am,ties on eithern, both variables nothing istadjaaLSAgerv Thisfact must be taken into consideration in computing the denaminator of tau.If ties cannot contribute to the S score, w must subtract the total numberof ties in each variable from the Maximum asible Score so tan can achievea value of +1 if we have perfect order

Thuss Tau-beta m

a n (n-1) - 5 a n-1)

where T number of pairs tied en variable I

. number of valve tied on variable Y

If you are wondering vhere the square root came from, note that if there wereno ties we would have

5 la

_

97 5 n (n-1) 27 V j .0711

Computation of Tan-beta for Cross Tabulations

Let us arrange the data in Table 4 into a cross-tabulation table. Insidethe table we will designate the individuals occupying the cells so that you cansee exactly how the rearrangement took place.

Table 8

Variable Y

2. 3.

-4 1, A B,C

'A 3. EF. 5.

We can compute the S score with the data in this way, For example,looking at the upper left hand cell, (in which we find A), we note that Band C are in the same row (rank) sod thus should contribute nothing to theS score when compared with A. However, D, E and F, G, Hp which are belowA and to the right, all have higher ranks than A on both variables. A,

paired with each of these, would add +1 to the $ score. Thus, A times the

number of cases below, it and to the right gives a positive contribution tothe S score. To continue, B and C are tied on the Y variable, with thosedirectly below (D and G). Howevr, both B and C have higher rank, on-bathvariables thaa E, F and H. Thus B tines E, F and B: plus C times E4.F, and

H adds to the $ score. (You may want to check these combinations with theoriginal computations of the S scare for these data in Table 5.) In general

we can say that if we look at any given cell, all cases below it and to theright contribute positively to Si we would imaltiply the amber of cases inthe given cell hy the total number of cases in the given cell by the totalnumber of cases below and to the right to compute positive contributioae tothe S score. We can also show that all cases below oak the left of agiven cell are in the incorrect or descending order and thus would contributenegpitiveky to the S score. Thus, if we look at the cell in which we find Eand F, we note that G (below and to the left) has a lower rank OM bothvariables. These two pairs (EG aad FG) would contribite two (4)10 to theS score. (Again, you may want to check these pairs and their scores withthe original computations in Table 5.)

We have already noted that B and C are tied with D aad G on the Yvariable. This means that there are 6 pairs of ties in this instance (BC,BD, BG, CD, CG, and DG). You may wish to refer back to this example whenwe compute the denominator of tau-beta.

Table 6a

(Table 6 with number of cases in cells)

Variable Y

3

2

4 3 8

0 indicates nocases

We will now compute S by looking at each cell across each row and scoreaccording to the rules outlined above:

Positive contributions to S (each cell times those cases below and to the right):

1 (1 + 2 + 1 + 1) + 2 (2+1) + LC + 0 (1+1) + 1 (i) + LC

(Last row is not ueed since no cases can be below it.)

Negative contributions to S (each cell times those cases below and to the left):

FC + 2 (0 + 0) + 0 (0 + 1 + 0 + 1) + FC + 1 (0) +2 (0 + L1)

XI-17

"LC" indicates that cell, in the last column axe not used to computepositive contributions to S since there can be no cases to the right.

"FC" indicates that cells in the first column are not used to computenegative contributions to S since there can be no cases to the left.

P . Positive contributions to 8 . 1 (8) + 2 (3) + 0 + 1 12

. Negative contributions to S 0 + 0 + 0 + 2 2

S A P Q m 12 - 2 10

The denominator of tau-beta is:

where T number of pairs of ties on variable X

We have already noted that the number of pairs in a set of n persons is Li n(s-1). Thus,

T = t (t - 1) where t number in each set of peopletied on a category of X.

In the above example (Table 6s) there is s set of 3 tied on category 1.of variable X; a set of 3 people tied on ,category 3.; and a set of 2 tied oncategory 5. thus there are,

1 3 (3-1) + 3 (3-1) + 2 (2-1) pairs of ties on variable X.

Similarly, U u (u -1) where Ix number in each met of people tiedon a category of Y.

In this case u 1 1 (1-1) + 4 (4-1) + a (3-1)

T . 3 + 3 + 1 . 7

U 0 + 8 + 3 . 9

You may wish to verify this by counting the zeros in the variable X andvariable Y rank order scores in Table 5.

Finally,

tau-beta

n (n-1) - j7 n n-1)

10

45 8 (8-1) - 27 fiB (8-1) -

1 0all=11=111.01illIMM2111i====

(21) (19)

. .51

'If two cross-tabulated variables are perfectly correlated, all caseswould have the same ranks in each variable and thug all cases would fallalong the diagonal of the table. For example,

1. 2

1. 3

2.3.

3

3

3

3 3 3 9

In the event of perfect correlation we would have perfect predictability;knowing someone was coded 1. on variable 1: would MIMI that we would know he

c-was coded 1. on variable Y and so forth.

It should be noted that given the number of cases in each categorY;that is, given the marginal distributions of variable X and Y in Table 6a,we cannot possibly achieve a +1 taa-beta since :Ili Cases cannot be put onthe diagonal and still add correctly to give the marginal totals. in otherwords, we are constrained by the distribution of caaes in the categories ofthe variables we are correlating. For example, the closest we could come toa perfect correlation given the marginal totals in Table 6a is as follows:

co 5.

Variable Y

1. 2.1 2

2

3.

1

2

3

3

2

1 4

(Table 6a with caaes arranged as close to principle diagonal as possiblegiven the marginal totals.)

This arrangement would gives

F 1 (2 + 1 + 2) + 2 (i + 2) + 2 (2)

5 + 6 + 4 m 15

There would be no negative contribution to S with this arrangement.The denominator of tau-beta would be the sane as that just computed. Thus,tau-beta for this arrungement which is as close to perfect as we can get iss

15

19 .9

.75

Haw well did your hypotheses "most ths time?

mmiwallawamm

How would you restate your hypotheses on the basis of the findings aud,..,!'

perhaps, some second thoughts?

aw...111...."

What difficulties did you face in formulating your hypotheses withrespect tos

the nature uf the variables, i.e., their precision, clarity, orgeneral utility and significance?

the statistical technique applied?

XI-20

93

Assignment XII

The Military and Political Development

PART 2

in Part 1 of this exercise, we were interested, primarily, in therelationships between certain political and economic characteristics andmilitary participation in politics. We discovered the fact that militaryparticipation in politics is a phenomenon both difficult to amationalizeand difficult to explain in terms of our simple political and economiccorrelates. Perhaps, as further research is carried out--and the tools ofanalysis refined--we shall be able to explain with greater precision theextent to which military participation is related to different levels ofdevelopment.

La this exercise, we shall look at the consequences, rather than thecauses, of military intervention in domestic politics. W. are interestedin such questions as: What role does the military Flay in the political andeconomic development of countries in which it is a politically powerful, ifnot ruling, institution? Demi* what circumstances may the military becomea ;, ,itive developmental for e in modernization? What characteristics ofmilitary organization seem to affect its attitudes and behavior towardsmodernization?

First, we might attempt to classify iaternal characteristics ofmilitary organizations that appear to be related to the political behaviorand attitudes of military elites. We may begin by drawing a simpletrichotomous scheme which distinguishes these characteristics to the extentthey have different implications for development.

La the chart below, indicate which internal characteristics of themilitary may be associated with a positive orientation towards economic andpolitical development; then indicate those associated with a negativeorientation; finally, indicate which characteristics are clearly relatedto neither. You may either use the characteristics listed below or thosesuggested by your authors. In aay case, be sure to briefly, but clearly,explain each one.

Organizational

Characteristics

of the

Military*

X11-2

Positively Related Negatively Related Relationshipto Modernization to Modernization Not Clear

*For example, organizational goals; command of certain resources, skills andtraining; recruitment policies; ideology (professional and political); organ-izational cohesion.

Although the military may also be the ruling elite as, for example, inEgypt, Pakistan, ete., or may dominate domestic politics as, for example, inBurma, Indonesia, etc., the policies they support with respect to modernizationare often quite dissimilar. For each of these four countries, evaluate thedegree to which it has supported, or suppressed, social, political, andeconomic change. (Since we have no readily quantifiable indicators of "support"or 'suppression" with regard to public policies for thess,c_ountries, youranswers will be somewhat impressionistic.)

Social ChangesSupported or Suppressed

Xgypt

gik4104,

XII -3

Political Changes Economic ChangesSupported or Suppressed Supported or SuRpressed

Pakistan

Burma

Indonesia

From the information you have gathered for the fOUr countriesyou rant:a2 of thzp :ts::leg:rom :neht:e:rour-:

::pr:the least.

Social Chanke

1.

2.

3.

4.

Political Change Economic Change

(above), howwith "one"and "four"

XII -4

Assuming someone else were to rank the countries on the basis ofinformation provided in your table, do you think he would arrive at exactlythe same rankings? Why, or why not?

If you were to extend this analysis so that it included a very largenumber of countries, say, N, which you imtended to rank from one to N alon:the same dimensions as you did above, what measures of change, in all threesectors, would you use? Could you use these measures in a/I the countries?Are they quantifiable?

What kinds of theoretical and methodological problems might you encounterattempting to determine the actual nature of public policy preferences ofpolitical elites? That is, haw would you define "public policy?" How wouldyou evaluate "preferences?"

Appendix 0

Part I

The Code Sheet

Variable 1: Geographic Location (scaled Variable 4: Population Density (per sq.

O.

in terms of distance from US)

North America O.

kilometer)

Over 5001. Caribbean & Central America 1. 250 - 1500

2. South America 2. 150 - 2493. West Europe & Scandinavia 3. 10e - 1494. East Europe 4. 70 - 99Jo Middle East &North Africa 5. 50 - 096. Central & South Africa 6. 30 - 497. East Ania 7. 15 - 298. South Asia 8. 10 - 149. Southeast Asia & Australia 9. Under 10

Variable 2: Size (in squareSource: Bassett et al. Table 41

Variable 51 Population Growth Rate (1958-kilometers)

1. over 20 million 1961)

2. 7.5 - 20 million O. Over 10%3. 2 - 7.4 million 1. 4 - 10%4. .75 - 1.9 million 2. 3.5 - 3.9%5. 250 - 749 thousand 3. 3.0 - 3.4%6. 75 - 249 thousand 4. 2.5 - 2.9%7. 30 - 74 thousand 5. 2.0 - 2.4%8. 10 - 29 thouseuld 6. 1.5 - 1.9%

9. Under 10 thousand 7. 1.0 - 1.4%

Source: Russett et al. Table 408.

9.

.5 -.9%Under .5%

Variable 3: Total Population, 1961Source:

Variable 61

Russett et al. Table 8

Urbanization (% population incities over 20 thousand)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Over 300 million70 - 300 million30 - 69 million20 - 29 million10 - 19 million6 - 9 million3.5 - 5.9 million2.0 - 3.4 millionUnder 2 million

Source: Bassett et al. Table 1

0.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7,

8.

9.

Over 75%60 - 74%45 - 59%35 - 44%32 - 35%25 - 31%15 - 24%10 - 14%5 - 9.9%Under 5%

Sources Hussett et al. Table 9

*The data deck listed in Appendix A was adapted from data organized by the SocietalArchives System Project, Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota.

Based on the information in the first two tables, as well as on yourreading,,list several hypotheses that relate the degree of military influenceon domestic politics with public policy consequences.

Variable 7: Agricultural Populationlabor force employed inagriculture)

O. Over 90A1. 80 - 89%2. 70 - 79A3. 60 - 69%4. 150 - 59A5. 40 - 49%6. 30 - 39*7. 20 - 29*8. 10 - 19%9. Under 10*

Source: Russett et al. Table 50

Variable 8: Gross National Product, 1957

O. Over 250 billion1. 50 - 250 billion2. 25 - 49 billion3. 10 - 24 billion4. 5 - 9.9 billion5. 2.5 - 4.9 billionb. 1 - 2.4 billion7. 500 - 909 millionS. 250 - 499 million9. Under 250 million

Source; Huasett et al. Table 43

Variable 9; Grose National Product percapita, 1957

O. Over $2,0001. 61000 - 20002. $500 - 9993. 6400 - 4994. 0300 - 3995. 6200 - 2996. 6100 - 1997. 475 - 99S. 650 - 749. Under 450

Sources Hussett et al. Table 44

Variable 10: United Nations FinancialStatus

1. Very High (10% or above of total)3. High (1.5 - 9.9%)5. Medium (.25 - 1.5%)7. Low (.05 -.2499. Very Low (.04%

Variable 11: Economic Development

2. Developed3. Ambiguous5. Intermediate7. Underdeveloped9. Very Underdeveloped

Variable 12; Literacy Rate

O. Over 90%1. 80 - 89%2. 70 - 79%3. 60 - 69%4. 50 - 59%5. 40 - 49%6. 30 - 30%7. 20 - 29%8. 10 - 19%9. Under 10%

Source: Ruasett et al. Table 64

Variable 138 Freedom of the Press

1. Complete4. Intermittent5. Unancertained6. Unascertainable7. Internally absent9. Internally and externally absent

Variable 141 Newspaper Circulation (per1000 population)

O. Over 4001. 300 - 3992. 200 - 2993. 100 - 1994. 75 - 995. 50 - 746. 25 - 407. 10 - 248. 1 - 9

9. Under 1

Source: Huasett et al. Table 31

Variable 15: Religion (% populationChristian)

Bassett et al. Table 74Worldmark Encyclopedia

Religious Homogeneity (%in predominant religion)

Variable 191 Date of Independence

O. Over 99%1. 90 - 99%2. 80 - 89%3. 65 - 79%4. 50 - 84%5. 35 - 49%6. 20 - 34%7. 10 - 19%8. 1 - 9%9. Under 1%

Sources

Variable 16:

1. Before 19th Century3. 1800 - 19137. 1914 - 19459. Agter 1945

Arisble 20; Westernisation

1. Historically Western nation3. Significantly Westernized (no colony)4. Significantly Westernized (colony)6. Partially Westernised (no colony)7. Partially Westernized (colony)9. Non-Westernised

Variable 21: Former Colonial Ruler

O. Non -EUropean1. Belgium, Italy, United States, Portugal,

Netherlands2. Spain3. France4. England9. None

Variable 22: Political Modernization:

1.

2.3.

4.5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Over 99495 . 99%90 - 94%80 - 89%65 - 79%50 - 64%40 - 49%25 - 39%Under 25% Historical Type

Sources: Ruasett et al. Tables 73,74, 751964 Information PleaseAlmanacWorldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 17: Racial Homogeneity0,(% ofpredominant racial back-

1. Early European or early European derived3. Later European or later Enropean derived4. Non-Ekropean autochthonous7. Developed tutelary9. Underdeveloped tutelary

Variable 23: Political Modernization:Periodization

3. Homogeneous4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained7. Heterogeneous

Variable 18:

ground)

(over 90%)

(under 90%)

Linguistic Homogeneity (%of population speakingpredominant language)

1. Advanced3. Mid-transitional7. Early Transitional9. Pre-transitional

Variable 24: Ideological Orientation of

1.

3.

the Government

DoctrinalDevelopmental

1. Over 99% 4. Ambiguous (but tending towards 1 or 3)2. 90 - 99% 5. Situational3. 80 - 89* 6. Ambiguous (but tending towards 7 or 9)4. 70 - 79% 7. Conventional5. 60 - 69* 9. Traditional6. 50 - 59%7. 40 - 49%8. 30 - 39%9. Under 30*

Source: Russ t et al. Tabl 39

Variable 25: System Style or (Mobili-zation of Resources)

1. Mobilized3. Partially Mobilized4. Ambiguous6. Unascertainable9. Non-mobilized

Variable 26: Constitutional Status ofPresent Regime

1. Constitutional4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained6. Unascertainable7. Authoritarian9. Totalitarian

Variable 27: Government Stability

1. Generally stable since 19203. Generally stable since 19455. Ambiguous5. Unascertainable7. Moderately stable since 19459. Unstable since 1945

Variable 28: Representative Characterof Current Regime

1. Polyarchic (broadly representativt)3. Limited polyarchic4. Ambiguous6. Unascertainable7. Pseudo-polyarchic (ineffective

representation)9. Non-polyarchic (totally non-

representative)

Variable 301 Freedom of Group Opposition

1. Can oppose government4. Can organize politically but not oppose5. Unaacertained6. Tolerated only informally and outside

politics7. Ambiguous9. None tolerated

Variable 318 Political Homogeneity

1. High5. Medium6. Unascertained9. Low

Variable 32: Sectionalism

1, Extreme3. Ambiguous4. Moderate5. Unascertained9. Negligible

Variable 33: Interest Articulation byAssociational Groups (tradeunions, pressure groups)

2. Significant3. Ambiguous5. Moderate7. Limited9. Negligible

Variable 34: Interest Articulation byInstitutional Groups (e.g.,legislative blocs, militaryofficers, bureaucraticdepartments)

Variable 29: Competitiveness of Electoral1. Very significant

System3. SignificanV15. Moderate6. Unascertained7. Limited

1. Competitive4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained6. Partially competitive9. Non-competitive

Variable 35: Interest Articulation byNon-Associational (Ascriptive)Groups (e.g., kinship, ethnic,religious groups)

2. Significant5. Moderate7. Limited9. Negligible

Variable 36: Interest Articulation byAtomic Groups (viz in formof riots and demonstlations)

1. Frequent2. Ambiguous3. Occasional5. Unascertainable7. Infrequent8. Unascertained9. Very infrequent

Sources Tauter Table 22 for somecountries with missing data

Variable 37: Interest Articulation byPolitical Parties

1. Significant4. Moderate5. Ambiguous6. Unascertained7. Limited8. Negligible9. None

Variable 38: Laterest Aggregation byPolitical Parties

1. Significant3. Moderate4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained6. Unascertainable7. Limited8. Negligible9, None

Variable 39: Lnterest Aggregation byFaecutive

1. Significant3, Moderate5. Unascertainable6. Unaacertained47. Limited8. Ambiguous9. Negligible

Variable 40: Laterest Aggregation byLegislature

1. Significant3. Moderate4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained6. Limited7. Negligible9. None

Variable 41: quantitative Party System

1., No parties2. Only one party3. One party dominant4. Ambiguous5. Unascertained6. One party somewhat dominant7. Two-party9. Multi-party

Variable 42: Qualitative Party System

O. Communist1. Mass-based territorial & African

transitional2. Regional or regional-ethnic

; 3. Communal and Ambiguous4. Corporative & Irrelevant5. Broadly Aggregative6. Class-oriented & Latin Liberal-

Conservative7. Personalistic8. Unascertained9. Latin Social Revolutionary

Variable 431 Stability of Party System

1. All significant parties stable2. No parties3. Ambiguous4. Moderately stable5. Unascertained9. All parties unstable or situational

Variable 44: Personalism* (tendency ofpolitical parties to clusteraround personality factors)

1. Pronounced3, Irrelevant Omitted4. Moderate5. Unascertainable6. Unascertained9. Negligible

Variable 45: Political Leadership(Eliteness)

1. Elitist4. Moderate elitist5. AmbiguousO. Unascertained9. Non-elitist

Variable 46: Leadership Charisma

1. Pronounced3. Moderate4. Ambiguous5. Unascertaiaed6. UnascertainableV. Negligible

Variable 47: Vertical Power Distribution(Federalism or Ladependenceof Government Agencies)

1. Effective federalism3. Limited federalism5. Formal federalism9. Formal and effective unitarism

Variable 48: Horizontal Power Distri-bution

1. Significant (Three branches ofgovernment effectively autonomous)

2. Unascertained6. Limited9. Negligible (Complete dominance of one

branch)

Uriable 502 Curr,nt Status ofLegislature

1. Rally Effective4. Partially Effective5. Unaacertained7. Largely Ineffective9. Wholly Ineffective

Variable 51; Type of Legislature

1. Unicameral5. Unaacertained9. Bicameral

Variable 62o Current Status of ftecutive

1. Dominant3, Unascertainable4. Unascertained5. Strong6. Ambiguous9. Weak

Variable 53: Character of Bureaucracy

1. Modern (or functional, rational)3. Semi-modern5. Ambiguous6. Post-colon4a1 transitional7. Unascertaed9. Traditional

Variable 54: Political Participation ofthe Military

Variable 49: Legislative-Executive

1. laterventive4. Ambiguous5. Supportive9. Neutral

4V:triable 55: Political Hole of the Police

0.

1.

2.

Structure

ParliamentaryParliamentary-HepublicanCommunist

3. Parliamentary-Hoyalist 1. Significant4. Presidential-Parliamentary 3. Unascertained5. Monarchical-Parliamentary 5.

6. Unascertained 9.

,Unascertainable

Not significant7. Presidential-Premieral (Communist)8. Presidential9. Monarchical

Variabi;\56: Type of Legal System Variable 60: Youthfulness of population

O. Civil Law(% of population 5-14, 1955)

1. Scandinavian O. Under 10%2. Mixed Civil-indigenous 1. 10 - 14%

3. Mixtures of civil, common & indigenous 2. 15 - 19%

4. Common law 3. 20 - 24%

5. Commanist 4. 25 - 29%6. Mixed civil-Wtslin-indigenous 5. 30 - 34%

7. Mixed Ciiil-Muslim 6. Over 35%8.

9.

Uixtures of MUslim, common, indigenousOther

Source: Ginsburg, Table 7 andaccompanying figure

Variable 57: Communist Bloc (A vote forCommunist party)

1. Over 90%6. 20 - 29% or some ties with Communist

governments7. 10 - 19% or slight ties with Communist

governments9. Lees than 10%

VariubleMs Food Consumption, 1956

O. Over 3500 calories / day / capita1. 3200 - 35002. 2900 - 31993. 2600 - 28994. 2300 - 25995. 2000 - 22996. 1700 - 19997. 1400 - 1699

Variable 58: Military Expenditure (sum ofSource:

Variable 62:

Ginsburg Table 9 &accompanying figure

Primacy in Urban Population(% of that population in thefour largest cities whichlives in the largest city)

O.

1.

2.

3.

4.

3.

following two variablf!)--

Military Personnel Expenditure onas % of Population Defense as %15-64 of GNP

O.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Under 30%30 - 39%40 - 49%50 - 59%60 - 69%70 - 79%80 - 89%90 - 99%

Over 5% O. Over 10%3.5% 1. 5 - 10%

2.3% 2 . 3 - 5 %

1.2% 3. 1 - 3 %

0.5 - .99h 4. Under 1%Under

Sources; Hussett et alr Tables 22& 23Worldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 59; Technological Development(Factor based on severalindices of technical &economic development)

45

Berry (in dinsburg)Table V111-1 Figure 1

Sources: Ginsburg Table 12 &accompanying figureWorldmark EncyclopediaEncyclopedia Britamnica

Variable 63; Energy Potential per CapitalO.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

b.

7.

8.

9.

Less than45 - 5960 - 6970 - 7980 - 8990 - 99100 - 109110 - 119120 - 129Over 120

Sources

1955

O. Over 60 million kilowatt - hours percapita

1. 40 - 592. 20 - 393. 10 - 194. 5 - 95. 2 - 46. 1 - 1.97. 0.5 - .99 Source: Ginsburg Table

8. 0.1 - .49 23 & accompanying figure9. Under .1

Variable 64: Intensity of Railroad Use, Variable 67s Trade Dependency on Raw1954

Over 3.0 million freight ton-kilo-meters per railroad kilometer O. Over 99%

1. 2.0 - 2.9 1. 95 - 99%2. 1.50 - 1.99 2. 90 - 94%3. 1.00 - 1.49 3. 85 - 89%4. .75 - .99 4. 80 - 84%5. .50 - .74 5. 70 - 79%O. .25 - .49 6. 50 - 69%7. .10 - .24 7. 30 - 49%8. .01 - .09 8. 15 - 29%9. 0.0 9. Less than

Source: Ginsburg Table 27 &accompanying figure

Variable 65: Energy Consumption/Capita,

Materials (wiz as A ofexports) 1955

15%

Sources Ginsburg TOle 47 &acco awing figure

Variable

O.

1.

2.3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Over 75005000 - 74992500 - 49991250 - 2499750 - 1249500 - 749300 - 499200 - 299100 - 199Under 100

Source:

1962

UN Statistical Yearbook

O.

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Over 99%90 - 99%80 - 89%70 - 79%60 - 69%50 - 59%40 - 49%30 - 39%16 - 29%Under 15%

Variable 66: International Trade TurnoverSource:

(Exports + Imports) / Capita,1955 Variable 69:

O. Over 4991. 480 - 99 O. Over 67%2. $60 - 79 1. 65 - 66%3. 040 - 511 2. 63 - 64%4. 830 - 39 3. 61 - 62%5. $20 - 29 4. 59 - 69%6. $10 - 19 5. 57 -

7. 5 - 9 9 6. 55 - 56%8. 82 - 4 7. 53 - 54%9. Under $2 8. 51 - 52%

Source: Ginsburg Table 46 &9. 49 - 50%

accompanying figure Source:

Trade with North AtlanticCountries-North America &West &rope, 1955-6 (es %of Total Trade)

Ginsburg Table 48

Working Age Population (as% of total population)

Russett et al. Table

Variable 70: Votes in National Elections(as % of voting age popu-lation) various years since1955

0.-

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

6.

7.

8.9.

Over 99%PO - 99%80 -149%70 - 79%60 - 69%50 - 59%40 - 49%30 - 39A20 - 29%Under 20%

Sources Russett et al. Table 24Worldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 71: Annual Growth Hate ofEnergy Consumption perCapita, 1959-62

O. Over 8%1. 7.0 - 7.9%2. 6.0 - 6.9A3. 5.0 - 5.9%4. 4.0 - 4.9%5. 3.0 - 3.9%6. 2.0 - 2.95k7. 1.0 - 1.9%8. 0.0 - 0.9%9. Negative

Source: UN Statistical Yearbook

Variable 72: Deaths from Domestic GroupViolence, 1950-61 (per one-million population)

0.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Over 1000500 - 599100 - 49950 - 9910 -5 - 91 - 40.5 - .99.01 - .49None

Sources: Russett et al. Table 29Tanter Table 22Worldmark EncyclopediaYearbook of EncyclopediaBritamnica

Variable 73: Population per (1000 Hectaresof) Agricultural Land

O. Over 15,0001. 7500 - 15,0002.. 5000 - 74993. 2000 - 49994. 1000 - 19995. 750 - 9996. 500 - 7497. 250 - 499S. 100 - 2499. Under 100

Source: RUssett et al. Table 42

Variable 741 Students Enrolled in HigherEducation (per 100,000population)

O. Over 16001. 1000 - 14092. 750 - 9993. 500 - 7494. 300 - 4995. 100 - 2996. 75 - 997. 50 - 748. 15 - 499. Under 25

Sources: Russett et al. Table 62Worldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 751 Catholics (as A ofpopulation)

O. Over 99%1. 95 - 99%2. 90 - 94%3. 80 - 89%4. 60 - 79%5. 40 - 59%6. 20 - 29%7. 10 - 19%8. 5 - 9%9. Under 5%

Sources: hussett et al. Table 73Worldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 761 Moslems (as % of population)

O. Over 99%1. 00 - 99%2. 80 - 89%3. 60 - 79%4. 40 - 59A5. 20 - 39%6. 10 - 19%7. 5 - 9 %

8. 1 - 4 %

9. Under 1%

Sources lnesatt et al. Table 75

Variable 79: Foreign Trade (am % of GNPLaporte + &ports)

v.1.2.

a.

4.a.

6.

7.

a.9.

Over 100%80 -0 99%70 - 79%60 - 69%50 - b9%40 - 49%30 - 39%20 - 29%10 - 19%Under 10%

Variable 77: Annual Growth Bate of GNPCapita, circa 1948-63

Russett et al. Table 45Worldmark EncyclopediaYearbook of EncyclopediaBritannic&

Ratio of Exports to Lmports,

Source.:

Vaiiable 801

Bassett et al. Table 46Worldmark Encyclopedia

Executive Stability, 1945-81(Number of Years Independent/Number of Chief Ekeoutives)

Bassett et al. Table 30Worldmark EncyclopediaYearbook of Encyclopedia

s Britmmnica a.

per

1. Over 7%2. 6 - 6.9%3. 5 - 5.9%4. 4 - 4.9%5. 3 - 3.9%6. 2 - 2.9%7. 1 - 1.9%8. 0.0 - 0.9%9. Negative

Sources:

Variable 78:

1. 17

2. 10 - 163. 8 - 94. 5 - 7

5. 4 - 4.96. 3 -.3.97. 2 - 2.98. 1 - 1.99. Under 1

Sources:

O.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

1961

Under .70.70 - .79.80 - .89.90 - .94.95 - .991.00 - 1.051.06 - 1.101.11 - 1.191.20 - 1.29Over 1.30

Sources: UN Statistical YearbookWorldmark Encyclopedia

Variable 811 Climate (Temperate vv.

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

6,

7.

8.9.

Tropical. Compiled as anoverall weighted iadex frauLife Pictorial Atlas of theWorld with the following codeused.)

Humid ContinentalMarineMountainousSubtropical Dry SummerHumid SubtropicalSemi-aridTropical Wet and DryDesertTropical Wet

Sources Life Pictorial Atlas, p. 26-7

Variable 821 Government Costs (as $ ofGNP) - average of revenuesand expenditures

0. Over 50%1. 40 - 49%2. 30 - 39%3. 25 - 29A4. 20 -24%5. 15 - 19%6. 10 - 14%7. 5 -8. 0 - 4%

Sources: Worldmark EncyclopediaRussett et al. Tables 17& 18

Variable 83: Political Development, 1940-60*

2. Very Low3. Low4. Low Medium5. kWdium (low)6. Medium (high)7. High medium8. High9. Very high

Source: Cutrigbt, Figure 1

*Reflects years for which country wasruled by an elected executive & alegislature composed of heterogeneousmembers. For exact definitions, seethe-Cutright article. The code repre-.sents the T-score of political develop-ment. Scores of 2 & 3 were given toex-colonial African countries.

Variable 84: Communications Development(T-score bused on newspaper?mail & telephone operations)

2. Very low3. Low4. Low medium5. Medium6. High medium7. High8. Very high

Sources Cutright, Figure 1

.yariable812: Mated Nations Voting Bloc

O. Communist Bloc1. Communist Bloc (non-member)2. Strong Neutralist Bloc3. Weal:Neutralist Bloc4. Non-aligned (non-mmmber)5. Weak Nem African Bloc6. -Strong Nor African Bloc7. Western Bloc (non-member)8. Weak. Western Bloc9. Strong Western Bloc

Source: Wrigley Table 6

Part II of Appendixlist rated in terma of eachThe countries are listed inI to 85 beginning in column

Appendix A

Part 11

The Coded Printout

A consists simply of the recorded values for a countryvariable listed in tbe Code Sheet, part I, of Appendix A.alphabetical order and the variables are ordered from5.

1 2 3_ 4

Afghanistan 0 0 1

Albania 0 0 2

Algeria 0 0 3

Argentina 0 0 4

Australia 0 0 5

Austria 0 0 6

Belgium 0 0 7

Bolivia 0 0 8

Brazil 0 0 9

Bulgaria 1 0

Burma 0 1 1

Burundi 0 1 2

Cambodia 0 1 3

-Cameroun 0 1 4

Canada 0 1 5

Central Afr. Rep. 0 1 6

Ceylon 0 1 7

Chad 0 1 8

Chile 0 1 9

China 0 2 0

Colombia 0 2 1

Congo (Bra) 0 2 2

Congo (Leo) 0 2 3

Costa Rica 0 2 4

Cuba 0 2 5

Cyprus 0 2 6

Czechoslovakia 0 2 7

Dahomey 0 2 8

Denmark 0 2 9

Dominican Rep. 0 3 0

Ecuador 0 3 1

El Salvador 0 3 2

Ethiopia 0 3 3

Finland 3 4

France 0 3 5

Gabon 0 3 6

Germany, E 0 3 7

German Fr 0 3 8

Ghana 0 3 9

Greece 0 4 0

Guatemala 0 4 1

Guinea 0 4 2

Haiti 0 4 3

Hondoras 0 4 4

Hungary 0 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Card 16 7 8 9 10 11

5 3 5 7 3 8 1

4 9 9 5 3 8 2

5 2 5 9 6 7 22 2 4 9 6 2 7

9 1 5 9 5 2 8

3 8 6 4 9 3 6

3 9 6 I 8 4 82 3 7 9 7 6 2

2 1 2 9 2 5 3

4 8 5 4 8 6 3

9 3 4 6 5 7 2

6 9 8 4 7 8 1

9 6 7 6 2 6 1

6 4 7 9 7 9 1

0 1 5 9 5 3 8

6 4 9 9 6 9 1

8 9 5 2 4 7 4

6 2 8 9 7 1

2 3 6 8 5 2 6

7 1 1 4 5 7 3

2 3 5 8 5 6 46 5 9 9 3 6 1

6 2 5 9 5 8 1

1 9 9 7 1 6 4

1 8 5 5 5 3 6

5 9 9 5 7 7 4

4 7 5 3 8 5 6

6 7 8 7 7 8 1

3 9 7 3 8 2 7

1 9 8 5 2 7 42 5 7 7 3 6 4

1 9 8 3 2 7 3

6 3 4 7 5 9 1

0 3 5 7 8 8 5 5

3 4 3 4 7 5 7

6 5 9 9 7 8 1

4 8 5 3 9 3 8

3 6 3 2 7 2 8

6 6 6 7 1 8 2

3 7 6 5 8 3 5

1 8 7 6 3 7 3

6 6 8 8 3 8 1

1 9 7 2 5 8 1

1 8 9 7 3 7 3

4 8 5

31 I 5 3

6

Variable8 9

Row10

14

11

15

12

16

13

17

14

18

15

19

lt

2C12 13

7 8 7 9 9 9 8 98 6 9 9 3 9 6 5 a

6 6 6 9 8 7 7 84 3 5 5 1 4 3 1

3 1 3 2 0 1 1 35 2 5 5 0 1 2 1

3 1 5 2 0 1 2 1

8 7 9 9 6 4 6 1

3 5 5 5 5 4 5 1

5 4 7 5 1 9 2 36 8 7 7 5 4 7 88 9 9 9 8 5 8 48 6 9 9 8 7 8 98 9 9 9 9 1 8 6

2 0 3 1 0 1 2 2

8 6 9 9 8 5 9 6

6 6 7 9 3 6 6 88 6 9 9 8 1 9 85 4 5 7 1 1 3 1

2 8 4 7 5 9 7 9

5 5 5 5 3 1 5 1

8 8 9 9 8 5 8 56 7 7 9 6 4 8 5

8 4 9 4 2 1 4 1

5 3 7 7 2 9 3 2

8 3 9 5 3 1 3 2

4 2 5 2 0 9 2 2

8 6 9 9 8 5 8 85 1 5 2 0 1 1 1

7 5 7 9 4 1 6 07 6 7 7 4 1 5 1

7 5 9 9 6 5 6 1

88,7 9 9 7 8 5

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8 6 9 9 5 5 6 0

5 3 5 5 0 9 3 1

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Spain 9 3 3 4 3 5 7 3 4 4 5 5 7 1 7 5 1

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Syria 9 7 5 6 7 7 1 3 2 7 6 7 9 7 4 7 7Tanganyika 9 8 6 3 6 8 6 9 1 7 8 9 9 v 1 8 6Thailand 9 9 9 4 4 5 3 8 1 6 7 7 9 , 3 7 7 9Togo 0 0 6 9 9 7 5 9 1 9 8 9 9 9 6 8 7

Trinidad 0 1 1 9 9 2 4 0 7 8 3 8 7 2 1 4 3Tunisia 0 2 5 7 7 6 6 6 3 7 6 7 9 8 7 7 8

Turkey 1 0 3 5 3 4 6 4 6 2 4 5 5 7 6 4 6 8

Uganda 1 0 4 6 6 6 7 4 9 1 8 8 9 9 7 1 8 5 1

USSR 1 0 5 4 0 2 8 6 3 5 1 2 1 2 0 7 3 5UAR 1 0 6 5 3 4 7 3 5 3 5 6 5 9 8 9 7 8

UK 1 0 7 3 6 3 2 8 1 9 1 1 3 2 0 1 0 1

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Vietnam hep 1 1 3 9 6 5 4 2 5 1 7 7 7 9 8 7 6 8

Yemen 1 1 4 5 6 7 7 7 9 1 9 8 9 9 9 6 8 9

Yugoslavia 1 1 5 4 5 5 4 7 6 3 5 5 5 5 2 7 5 3

China (Taiwan) 1 1 6 9 9 5 1 2 6 4 6 6 7 7 4 4 5 8

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Upper Volta 9 9 6 2

Uruguay 3 5 5 7Venezuela 9 5 3 7

Vietnam, N 9 9 1 2Vietnam Rep 9 9 1 2Yemen 1 6 6 2Yugoslavia 1 3 1 5

China (Taiwan) 6 5 3 7

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16

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

51 52 53 54 55 59 60 61 62 83 64 65

South Africa 9 1 1 1 9 1 1 5 1 3 9 9 2 3 3Spain 9 .9 9 9 1 I 3 5 1 0 9 5 2 2 3Sudan 9 9 8 5 1 3 6 1 1 8 9 8 8 4 5S w e d e n 9 1 3 1 9 4 1 9 9 1 8 5 1 2 28witserland 1 1 0 I 9 9 1 9 9 0 9 8 0 2 2Syria 9 7 6 5 5 3 3 1 1. 7 9 5 7 4 5Tanganyika 9 9 0 7 I 1 6 9 9 8 9 9 7 3 6T h a i l a n d 9 9 6 9 9 3 9 1 1 0 9 6 8 4 5Togo 9 9 6 5 1 3 3 1 I 2 9 8 9 3 3Trinidad 9 1 3 1 9 4 3 9 9 4 9 9 3 4, 5Tunisia 9 9 8 7 1 1 3 9 1 7 9 7 6 4 5Turkey 9 1 1 4 9 4 3 1 1 0 9 5 4 3 3Uganda 1 6 3 4 1 5 6 9 9 8 9 8 7 3 4USSR 5 9 2 9 9 1 3 5 1 5 1 1 2 3 2VAR 9 9 6 9 5 1 3 I 1 7 9 5 4 3 4UR 9 1 3 I 9 4 1 9 9 4 9 4 0 2 1US 1 1 8 I 9 4 1 9 9 4 9 3 0 2 2Upper Volta 9 9 8 7 I 1 0 9 5 6 9 8 9 4 5Uruguay 9 1 0 1 9 9 3 9 9 0 8 8. 3 3 2Venezuela 3 6 8 4 9 4 3 4 1 0 7 8 3 4 5Vietnam, N 9 9 7 9 1 1 3 5 1 & 1 3 9 4 0Vietnam Rep 9 9 8 9 1 1 5 5 1 2 9 3 9 4 6Yemen 9 7 6 5 5 3 7 1 1 8 9 8 8 3 6Yugoslavia 5 9 7 9 9 1 3 5 1 5 1 2 3 2 3China (Taiwan) 3 6 4 5 9 1 3 4 9 3 9 0 4 3 4

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Venezuela 4 5 8 2 3 0 5 6 2 3 2 7 4 2 9

Vietnam, N 2 9 3 7 8 2 8 8 3 0 2 3 6 9 8

Vietnam Rep 6 9 8 9 9 3 8 8 2 7 1 3 6 8 8

Yemen 1 9 9 9 5 0 3 6 9 3 5 8 7 9 0

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Appendix Bit

Lxcerpts from William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns ofPolitical Development and Democratisations A QuantitativeAnalysis."

In this paper we propose to examine through the use of varied quanti-tative measures a central problem in political analysist the relationshipsthrough time between socio-economic variables on one hand and two basicpolitical variables --political development and democratisation. Interest in

such rfilationships is hardly novel. In this paper, however, we introducemeasuies and indices based on quantatative data which haws not previouslybeen need and which permit forms of analysis that could not otherwise beapplied. The studies of Deutsch, Russet, Upset, Banks and Textor, and othershave made plain the possibilities of comparative quantitative analyses.Almost without.exception, however, these studies are cross-sectional iufocus rather than historical or longitudinal; that is, they employ data fromthe contemporary period to make comparisons among units at a particular point-in -time. But although many interesting problems can be investigated throughcross-sectional analysis there are other significant problems that can onlybe studied through longitudinal or time-series analysis. It in this neglectedarea of longitudinal quantitative analysis that we shall xplore in thepresent study.

rho dearth of quantitative longitudinal studies dealing with muchobviously dynamic problems as the patterns of political development anddemocratization has undoubtedly been due less to any question about thepossible interest of such studies than to the absence of useable relevantdata. The data we shall use have all been collected by the MinnesotaPolitical Data Archive.

Our main purpose is to examine relationships through time betweenthree socio-economic variables --urbanization, education, and economicdevelopment--and two basic political variables --political development anddemocratization. The first problem is to find appropriate measures foreach of the political variables.

Political Developments An Index of Governmental Publications

Although the concept of political development is commonplace amongstudents of comparative polities, there is notable disagreement concerningboth the meaning of the concept and the indices that are appropriate formeasuring levels of development. It seems, however, that one importantaspect of political development is the extent to which a government is ableto adopt the varied and complex policies that are demanded in every moderncommunity. This ability to adopt complex policies we may term "administrative

Appendices H and C are adapted from material developed by WilliamFlaLAgan and Edwin Fogelman, Department of Political Science, University ofMinnesota.

2

capacity." A basic premise in the analysis of political development is thatnot all political systems are equal in administrative capacity; not all govern-ments are equally able to.adopt the complex policies that are demanded byinfluential participants. The administrative capacity of apolitical syetemdepends on a number of conditions, including the iatroductien,of appropriateinstitutional structures, the presence of trained and-motivated-peratinnel,and the availability of relevant information on which policy-decisions CaSbe based. The first two of these conditions have been discussed often bystudents of political development. A number of typologies have beenconstructed based on the iustitutional characteristics of political systemsat different levels of development. Although the institutional characteristicsthat are usually stressed in such typologies do not refer merely to theadministrative capacity of a system, some of these characteristics have adirect connection with the relative ability of different systems to adoptcomplex policies. However, fram the standpoint of quantitative anelysis afundamental difficulty with such typologies in that the institutionalcharacteristics they emphasize are never measured quantitatively. It wouldbe unwarranted to say that institutional characteristics cannot be measuredquantitatively; but the fact remains that leading typologisti show littleinclination toward quantitative measurement.

The most widely-used quantitative measures that bear on the adminis-trative capacity of different political systems concern government employmentand government revenues and expenditures. Campilations of political dataregularly iaclude figures on the number of government employees as a percentageof population or as a percentage of work force, as well as figures on govern-ment revenues and expenditures es a percentage of GNP, or on the ratio ofdifferent types of government expenditures. We ourselves have collectedconsiderable data of this kind iu historical depth. The difficulty here,however, aside from very serious problems in finding such data over longperiods of time, is that the suitability of these measures as indications ofadministrative capacity is somewhat doubtful. Perhaps more elaborate measuresof patterns of government employment and expenditures would yield moresatisfactory results. But more elaborate meabares are not yet available, andour own attempts to find the data for such measures have not been encouraging.

In place of the familiar measures of government employment, revenue,and expenditures we suggest an alternative indicator of administrativecapacity related to the availability-within a political system of certaintypes of information. Specifically, we propose an Index of GovernmentalPublications based on the volume and kinds of policy-relevant informationthat is published, tx the egencies of gevernment. The underlying assumptionis that the ability of a government to adopt complex policies is indicatedby the volume and kinds of information that the government collects andpublishes. Three kinds of information were selected as a basis forconstructing the indexi census information; reports on trade and commerce;and government statistics. The volumed)f these types of information thata government publishes through the years is taken as an indication ofadministrative capacity and a measure of political development.

In constructing the index we counted the number of serial censusreports, trade and commercial reports, and statistical reports published

1 32.

it

3

by our 29 governments from 1800 to 1960; the number of such serial publi-cations in every decade was totaled as a score for each country in eachdecade. There are, however, certain limitations to the data. In the firstplace, the sources for these data should be the government publicationsthemselves* Score. for each country should be computed directly from thepublications issued by governmental agenoies. Unfortunotely, our limitedresources made this procedure impossible. Instead, for the period 1800-1920we counted the volume of serial governmental publicatious held in all UnitedStates libraries aa reported in List of Serial. Publicsti ade Govern-jmeate and for the perio4 19204960 we counted the volume of serial morn-mental publications held in selected British libraries as reported in theLondon Biblisgraphy of Ag. Social Sciences. The use of these sources ratherthan the governmental pOlications themselves introduces certain biases intothe data, although the elitent of these biases is uncertain. Probably thepublications of non-Western governments are underestimated, but more generallywe cannot be sure that the volume of publications for any country is completelyaccurate. For this reason, the index presented here is less reliable than wewould like. W. emphasize, however, that the sources of data.for a morereliable index are accessible. 'With more time and funds the relevant govern-ment publications can be Ixamined directly, and a highly reliable index cancertainly be constructed.

Ie the second place, the fact that data for the index were obtainedfrom two separate source' posed the problem of combining the data into asingle measure despite discrepancies in the figures reported in the twosources. To solve thiS difficulty we obtained raw scores for two over-lapping decades (19106-1029) and on the basis of this overlap we fitted themere recent data from the London Bibliography to the trend established fromour main source, Serial Publications* A conversion ratio for each countrywas obtained by comparing the two scores for the overlapping decades, andthis ratio was used to extrapolate scores from 1930 to 1950.

In the third place, we limited ourselves only wU serial governmentalpublications rather than total governmental publications, and we allowed amaximum score of 10 for each serial publication in each decade even when thenumber of publications in the series was higher. Bereover, we took no accountof differences in the size of publications in particular series; a series ofpamphlets was counted equally with a series of voluminous tomes. One resultof these decisions is to depress the score for the more developed countries.Again, direct perusal of the relevant publications would enable us to constructa more sensitive and reliable index than has in fact been possible.

1Scores for the United States were obtained by going directly to the

Department of Commerce Index of Publications and counting exhaustively thenumber of relevaat publications. None of our sources contained enoughlistings for Lebanon to compute an index. From 1900-1929 the Philippineswas scored from the Catalogue of the Library of Congress, since publicationsfor the Philippines wve not listed in Serial PUblications.

4

No extensive validation of this index was undertaken, but we do havegovernmental non-military employment data for the Mite(' Manama and theUnited States over nmst of the one hundred and sixty years. To the samedegree the proportion of the population in civilian government employmentindicates the extent of development, and we would expect a high correlationwith the Index of Governmental Publications as another indicator of politicaldevelopment. In this instance we find simple correlation coefficient of.95 im each country, which gives as much support for the index as we couldhope for at the present time. Adequate validation depends on betterindependent indicators than government'employment--indicators we lack atthis tims.

For present purposes all our countries have been grouped into fourcategories on the basis of their scores on the Index of Governmental Publi-cations. Summary scores from 0 to 3 were assigned on the following basil's

Score Range on the Index of Governmental Publications3 1-502 51-150

151-2500 251 and over

Changes in political development based on these summary scores are presentedin Table 1. (All Tables are included at the end of the paper.)

rhe distributions shown in Table 1 reveal four distinct patterns ofchange in political development.

Pattern As One set of countries achieves an early high level of politicaldevelopment. These countries include Canada, US4 US, France, Italy, USSR,and Spain. All maintain the highest level of development for at least fourdecades. With two exceptions they show an early and gradual increase inpolitical development. In the case of Italy the pattern of developnmnt issomewhat uneven; the pattern for the USSR is both more abrupt as well asobviously uneven in the decades of the revolutions and World War II.

Pattern Bs A second set of countries attains a high level of development inthe mid-20th century. These countries include India, Japan, and Switzerland.All have moderately high levels of development throughout the 20th century,but they reach the highest level only after World War II.

Pattern Cs A third set of countries maintains a moderate level of develop-ment for a prolonged period, but they do not sustain the highest level ofdevelopment. These countries include Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile,Colombia, CzechoslovAkia, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico,Portugal and South Africa. With three exceptions, the trend of developmentis smooth. Austria, Germany, and Hungary reveal uneven fluctuations indevelopment associated with major political disruptions.

Pattern Ds A fourth set of countries remains at a low level of politicaldevelopment with at most moderate increase in the mid-20th century. Thesecountries include Burma, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, and rurkey.

5

Although there axe important problems in generalising tbe Index ofGovernmental Publications as * measure of political development, the Indexseems to us to have sufficient face validity to warrant its use in examiningrelationships between political development, democratisation, and socio-economic variables.

An Index of Democratization

Like politicp1 development, the concept of democratization has beendefined in different ways by different scholars. But despite the variety ofdefinitions students of democracy tend to emphasize four basic characteristicsas distinctive features of democratic political systems. _These distinguish-ing characteristics are electoral or parliamentary succession, politicalcompetition, popular electoral participation, and absence of suppression.If measures could be devised for each of these characteristics an Index ofDemocratization could be constructed based an combinations of the four basicmeasures. lu this section we shall introduce such an index and appki it toour 29 countries.

Democratic Succession

fhe practices through which political leaders succeed to the principalexecutive offices are a major aspect of every political system. To describethese practices, however, is not always easy, if only because there may besignificant divergence between the formal practices and the actual practicesof succession. In describing the processes of SUAcession that are charac-teristic of democratic systems we found it useful to identify a number ofdifferent combiaations of formal and actual practices of succession that canprevail in any political system. This variety of formal and actual practicescan be described as follows:

formal practices

electoral or parliamentary: selectionof chief executive official througha general election or through investi-ture by a legislature

parliamentary monarchy: selectionthrough appointment by a monarchwith legislative approval

institutional support: selection ofthe chief executive official by aspecific group or organization, suchas a party, military, or religiousorganization

monarchy:colonial:no formal

interimbeen asprocess

selection through inheritanceselection by a colonial power

practice established:period in which there hasyet no formalization of theof succession

4. 3 -i

actual practices

electoral or parliamentary

managed electoral or parliamentary:manipulation of electoral or,parliamentary proceduree throughvaried types of pressure, bribery, etcparliamentary monarchy

institutional support: including,in addition to selection by aparty, military, or religiousorgmzization, succession as aresult of popular uprising andother forma of usurpation

monarchycolonialforeign imposition

On the basis of this general typology of practices of succession weconstructed a summary measure for democratic succession to the chiefexecutive offices in terms of the following codes

Index of Democratic Succession

0 democratic, formal succession through electiens or parliamentaryinvestiture and actual succession through electionsor parliamentary investiture

I semidemocratics formal succession through elections or parliamentaryinvestiture and actual succession through manipulatiom,institutional support, or other nonelectoral practices

2 non.democratics formal succession through nonelectoral practicesand actual succession through nonelectoral-practices

The use of this measure involves certain difficulties and has a number ofimplications in assessing a system as democratic. To begin with, identificatienof the chief executive official is itself sommtimes a matter of judgment. Whenalternative choices were possible we selected the official or officials whoseemed to us to occupy the most critical role in the making of policy.Secondly, decisions as to which practices are actually prevalent in a systemcan also be controversial. Especially in instances of institutional supportor managed elections it is not always easy to identify the actual msan4 ofsuccession. Thirdly, the measure discriminates against systois that areformally democratic but in which actual success:ion occurs through controlledelections or manipulated parliamentary procedures. La this respect the,measure is biased against democratic scores. Moreover, this biaa is re.Loforced by our decision to count the worst score for the decade. In otherwords, our scoring reflects the failure of democratic succession in a countryrather than the typical patterns of succession in that country.

Scores on democratic succession for the 29 countries are shown inTable 2. When a decade passes with no instance of succession, the practiceof the previous decade is continued.

Competition

The second measure comprised within our overall Index of Democratizationis a measure of political.competition. There are many different ways in whichpolitical competition can be defined, described, and measured, but in a broadcomparative and historical perspective only some rather 'simple measures seemfeasible--at least for the time being. Our measure of political competitionis based on two characteristics of the systems the'presence in the system oflegal opposition parties, and the presence of opposition in a regular importantelected legislature. Countries are scored in terms of the 'combination ofthese characteristics that are present in any decade, as follows:

Lndex of Political Competition

O. presence of legal opposition parties and opposition in a regularimportant elected legislature

7

1. presence of either legal opposition parties or opposition in aregular important elected legislature

2. presence of neither feature

Like the measure of democratic succession, the use of this measure of politicalcompetition ban certain implications thst should be noticed. In the firstplace, the presence of appolitift parties is treated rather formally. A"party" im regarded as any group that identifies'itself as such, and thepresence of 413 opposition party is considered as a matter of legal statuswitnout regard to how effective the opposition party may be as a politicalorganization. Secondly, identification of a regular important electedlegiulature involves some controversial matters of judgment. By "regular"we mekn that the legislature has not been convened only for a single orlimited number of sessions and Chat it has net been disrupted during thedecade; by "important" we mean that the legislature either selects the chiefexecutive or plays a major role in policy-making; by "elected" we mean thatmembers of the legislature are selected by soma broad electorate. Theexistence of these conditions is obviously in many cases a matter of judgment,especsally in regard to whether or not a legislature should be regarded as"important". Thirdly, at least in part the measure of political competitionWAS intended to discriminate between modern democratic and modern totalitariansystems, and it does serve this purpose well enough. However, it appearsratter indiscriminate for developing systems in both the 19th and 20thcenturies. The measure seems too generous'in scoring eystems which quiteearly in their development contain both forms of oppositionparty oppositionand legislative opposition. It appears that highly undeveloped traditional:evemes aud bighly developed totalitarian regimes are most likely to suppressifipp,,,,;Jiou; all other regimes are likely to permit at least token opposition.

ui political cempotition for the 29 countries are presented in

tlectural Participation

A third characteristic of democratic systems is widespread popularparticipation in the electoral process. Actually, mass electoral partici-paCIW: 1.0 als0 characteristic of developed systema, as contraated withdemocratic systems, so that in itself popular participation is no indicatorof democracy. To construct au Lndex of Democratization a measure of electoralparticipation must be combined with the other measures we have been describing.

lu measure electoral participation we have recorded the type of suffrageprevaleut in each decade in national elections for the legislature or thepresidency, whichever elections were most important in the selection of thechief executive official. These types of suffrage were scored as follows:

0. national election. with universal suffrage (including universalmale suffrage as welI as minor suffrage requirements such asresidence)

1. national electiona with moderate restrictions on suffrage2. national elections with severe restrictions on suffrage3. no elections

8

Obviously, the dialinction between "moderate" and "severe" restrictionsau sn:Zrage is in part a natter of Judgment. Moreover, the measure as awhole refers to the effects of formal suffrage requirements rather thanactual electoral participation. No doubt there would have been advantagesin using turnout as the indicator of electoral participation. But turnoutdata are extremely difficult to obtain for many countries. Some of thevariation in scores foreindividual countries probably exaggerates fluctu-ation ia actual participation, since the scozps reflect an easing andtightening of suffrage requirements which may have bad relatively slightimpact on turnout in the short run.

Scores on popular participation for the 29 countries axe presentedin Table 4.

Absence of Suppression

'The fourth characteristic of democratic systems is the absence ofsuppression directed against individuals, groups, or organisations thatparticipate in the political process. To indicate the extent of suppressionin a system we have scored instances of suppressive acts in terms of boththe degree of coercion and the selectivity of the acts. We assigned scoreson the following basis:

Index of Political Suppression

0 no significant political suppression (may include the outlawingof a minor extremist party or media censorship)

1. selective coercive suppression (including individual and grouparrests or executions as well as coercive measures againstparties or other organizations)

2. widespread electoral suppression (applied to widespread coercionpracticed during an election period against opposition individuals,groups, and organizations)

3. general repression (including colonial regimes, generally auto-cratic regimes, and foreign occupation)

4. civil war conditions5. severe suppression (applied to police-state and totalitarian

regimes)

Since all regimes attempt to maintain order we have not considered govern-mental responses to riots or uprisings as instances of suppression; rather,we have tried to reccrd more general suppressive practices. We have codedthe most suppressive acts for each decade, so the measure is biased towardsuppressive scores. Again, therefore, our measure reflects the failures ofdemocratic systems rather than their typical patterns. Several types ofsuppression are omitted in our measure. We have not recorded acts ofsuppression by local governmental units when such acts were obviously distinctfrom the national unit; nor have we recorded acts of suppression carried outby non-governmental organizations, although suppressive acts of this kindcould be extremely significant uader certain circumstances.

Scores on political suppression for the 29 countries are presentedin fable 5.

3 s

To construct a general Index of Democratisation we combined the fourmeasures of democratic succession, political competition, popular partici-pation, and political suppression into a single comprehmsive measure.Scores were assigned to each country for every decade in terns of the follow-ing eight-point rankings;

Index sd Democratisation

0. Succession .

Competition

Participation-Suppression

1. Succession .

CompetitionParticipation.Suppression .

2. Succession .Competition .Participation.Suppression .

3. Succession .Competition .Participation.Suppression .

4. Succession .Competition .Participation.,

Suppression5. Succession .

Competition

Participation.Suppression .

6. Successionor

Participation. Same as for "1"or

Competitiou Same as for "5"7. All other combinations

formal jail actual succession through electionsor parliamentary investiturepresence of legal opposition parties Ellopposition in a regular important electedlegislaturenational elections with universal suffrageno significant political suppressionformally electoral, parliamentary or parliamentarymonarchy - actual succession managed or institutionalsupportSame as for "0"Any national electionno widespread electoral suppropsion or worseSame as for "1"

:-Same as for "0"Same as for "1"no general repression or worseSame as for "1"Opposition in regular elected legislatureSame as for "1"Same as for "2"Same as for "1"Opposition in any elected legislatureSame as for "1"Same as for "2"Legitimate succession including colonial andmonarchicalOpposition in any elected legislature ar legalopposition partySame as for "1"Same as for "2"Same as for "1"

fhe combination of four measures - -competition, participation, suppression,and democratic succession --yields the scores on democratization shown inTable 6.

Inspection of Table 6 reveals four patterns of democratization.

10

Pattern Is One set of countries maim consistently democratic virtuallywithout interruption through the entire period. These countries are Caned*,Switzerland, United Kingdon, and United States. The major departure froma consistently democratic pattern occurs in the United Steles during thedecade of the Civil War. This results from U. high suppression score forcivil war conditions under our coding. The fact that ady four countriesare consistently democratic reflecto the severity of our Index of Demo-cratisation. The requirements for political competition, including legalopposition parties and opposition in aregular important elected legislatureare sufficiently demanding to exclude most countries even during' otherwisedenocratic decades.

Pattern lb A second set of countries remains moderately democratic for anumber of decades but never sustains a consistent4 democratic regime.These countries include Argentina, Chile, France, Germany, Hungary, andItaly. Jal reveal some unevenness in patterns of democratisation. Withthe exception of Chile all have undergone one or nore decades of highlyundemocratic disruptions during their development.

Pattern Ills A third set of countries is predomdnantly non-democratic butwith some interindes of at least moderate democrazy. These countriesinclude Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Portugal, andSpain. Despite considerable variation in specific patterns of democratizationamong theme countries, all revert to highly undemocratic regimes followingtheir most democratic interludes.

Pattern rvs Pyurth set of countries :vagina cluisistently undemocraticthroughout the entire period. These countries are Burma, Egypt, India,Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Nigeria, !Philippines, South Africa, Thailand,Turkey, and USSR. The major departure from the consistently undemocraticpattern occurs following World War II, when India, Japnn, Lebanon, thePhilippines, aud Turkey achieve relativelyAimocratic regimes. Within thegenerally undemocratic pattern three types of regimes can be distiuguishodscolonial regimes (Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lobes:Lon, Nigeria, Philippisses--for varying perioda of time); traditional authoritarian regimes (Egypt,Japan, Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, Russia, and South Africa.agaic for vir)ringperiods); and a modern totalitarian regime (USS11).

No doubt exception can be taken to the specific scores for demo-cratization assigned to particular countries in various decades. In partsuch disagreements may reflect differences in judgment and interpretation.Beyond diffarenaes of judgment, however, our code does contain some implicitlimitations. Storing under the code ignores abortive attempts to establishdenocratic regimes (sa in Russia in 1917 er during the &worsen revolution.of 1848) as well as short-lived democratic rsgimes during a decade of severesuppression or undemocratic suppression (as in Japan in the 1920's). Atthe same time, other scores nay exaggerate the extent of democratisationthrough our effort to record periois of experience with sone denocrilicinstitutions and practices under otherwise undemocratic eonditions-(as inBrasil and Mexico during the early decades). These ieplicit biases certainly

140

affect our patterns of democratisation to some degree, but whatever theeffects mmy be the general acceptability of the findings depends at thisstage on face validity.

Social and Economic Variables

Since our main purpose is to examine relationships between politicalvariables and socio-economic variables we must now describe briefly thesocial and economic measurts'we propose to use in\the analysiss urbanisation,education, and agricultural employment.

Urbanization

The simplest of the three measures is urbaoisation, which is definedas the proportion of the population in cities over 100,000. Populationestimates are generally available for all 29 countries throughout the entireperiod of our study. During earlier periods, when the accuracy of populationestimates is most questionable, considerable variation in urbanisationfigures is quite tolerable, since the proportion of population in citiesover 100,000 is so *mall that large changes in proportions would notinfluence the overall trend.

The selection of 100,000 as a basis for estimating the population inurban areas was arbitrary, dictated by the greater availability of worldwidedata on cities over 100,000 in several almanacs and yearbooks. For mostcountries our data extend back in time to 1800 or to a point where the unithas no cities over 100,000. However, per* are several characteristics ofthe measure that should he noted. la countries wiih a small population, thegrowth of any city over the 100,000 mark causes the mmasure to jump markedly--the trend appears more jaggmi than the actual overall growth of the urbanareas warrants. In countries with large populations this is nm problem.There is also a difficulty in establiahing comparability among units becauseof uncertainty in some data as to whether population figures for citiesinclude the entire urban area or merely the central city.

kricultural bloloyment

Agricultural employment is measured lyy the proportion of the laborforce engaged in agriculture. Unfortunately, this measure appears to besubject to some error, particularly iu the early period.. During pre-industrial and precommercial periods estimates of the proportion of a country'slabor force employed in various weys may be quite inaccurate. Mare accurateestimates generally %re available only when industrialisation is underwey.Not only are estimates of the labor force in agriculture subject to errorbut estimates of the total labor force are also open to question. Moreover,the reported estimates are not always strictly comparable either within acountry or between countries, since practices change in estimating the laborforce, particularly with respect to including women, counting rural popu.lations; or counting all males as opposed only to employed males. Never-theless, this amasure remains the best single indicator we have_of economicdevelopment for all our units over the whole time period.

12

Eaucation

Our measure of education consists of the number of children in primaryedutation as a proportion of total population. This rather onrious way ofmeasuring the level of education in a country is used because of itssensitivity during earkv periods of development. However, it is not asappropriate forams* developed countries. -In-tatirpariods-the measureaccurately reflects the low level of investment in education as well asthe gradual increase in this investment. But later, as the age distributionof the population shifts, it also responds to theopropertional decline ofprimary school students in tha entire populstion.' The accuracy of estimateson primary education is probably fairly good once a government begins report..Jag such information. However, there are problems with comparability fromone unit to the next, especially since nongovernmental schools ow be includedor excluded in various patterns.

Political Development and. Patterns of Democratiipation

Having introdnoed our principal measures and indices we can nowconsider some relationships between the political variables themselves andalso between political variables on, one hand and socio-economic variableson the other...

Figure 9 shows the average of each social and economic characteristicfor all countries grouped according to pattern of democratisation.

If we turn now to democratisation we find that countries with differentpatterns of democratization over the last 160 years have quite distinct socialbud economic characteristics for thz some period. A. Figure 9 shows, consistentlydemocratic countries have smaller proportions of their labor forces in agri-culture, are more urbanized, and have higher proportions of the population ioelementary schools. The consistently undemocratic countries show the oppositetendency, with high levels of employment in agriculture throughout, relativelylittle urbanization until quite recently, and low levels of education untilthe last two decades. On all three variables the moderately democraticpatterns (Group II) fall clearly between the consistently democratic countriesand the predominantly undemocratic.

2We are working on the possibility of converting a country's score

from the primary education index to an index iiiterporating higher educationdata as the country reaches an advanced stage of development.

Proportionof

Labor Forcein

Agriculture

30

20

10

trirma.

1800

30

Proportionof

Population 20in

Urban Areasover 100,000

Proportionor

Populationin

MomentaryBducation

10

Wm f Dowooratination mdSocial and Romanis Variables.

1850 1900 1950

143

Canada8oltaorlan4tbitod linguaUnited natio

Group 4

ArgentinaChilePromGermanyHungaryItaly

Group II/

AustriaBrasilColombiaCsechoelovakiaPortugalMexicoSpain

Group IT

BurmaIndiaIndonesia

JaPanLebanonNigeriaPhilippinosSouth AfricaThailandTurkeyU.S.S.R.

APP34DIX C*

Tables of Coded Scores for Figures 1.8

*Preparation of this manuscript wits sided by the Curriculum DevelopmentProject on Laboratories in Political Science, University of Minnesota.

Figure 1. Index of Governmental Peigicatians.

1800Coutrx.........90 10 20

Argentina

Austria 3 3 3

Brazil 3 3 3

B u r m a

Canada

Chile 3 3 3

Colombia

Czechoslovakia

Egypt 3 3 3

trance 3 3 3

Germany

Hungary a 3 a

India 4, 3 3 3

Indonesia 3 3 3

Italy

Japan 3 3 3

Lebanon 3 3 3

Mexico 3 3 3

Nigeria

Philippines 3 3

Portugal 3 3 3

South Africa

Spain 3 3 3

Switzerland

Thailand 3 3 3

Turkey 3 3 3

U.S.S.R. 3 3 3

United Kingdom 3 3 3

United States 3 3 3

30 40 50 60 70 80 90190000 10 20 30 40 50

3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0

3 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 2 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 0

3 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1

2 2 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1

3 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 2 2 2 , 2 2 0 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 0

4P 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 1

3 3 3 2 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2

3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0

2 2 2 1 1

3 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 1

3 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0

3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was uot in existence or was otherwise

inappropriate.

Country

Figure 2.

180000 10 20

Indx of Democratic Succssion.

190030 40 SO 60 7, SO 90 00 10

Argentina 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0

Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

Brasil 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1

B u r m a 2 2 2 2

Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0

Chile 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Colombia . 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Czechoslovakia

Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

France 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0

Germany 1 1 1 1 1

Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2

India 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Indonesia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Italy 0 1 1 1 1 1

Japan 2 2 2 2 2 * 2 2 2 2 2 2

Lebanon 2222 2 2 2 2 2 2

Mexico 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1

Nigeria 2

Philippines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Portugal 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

South Africa 0

Spain 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Thailand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Turksy 2 co 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, 1

U.S.S.R. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

20

0

0

0

2

0

1

1

0

2

0

0

1

2

2

1

0

2

1

2

2

1

0

2

0

2

1

2

ir

0

30_ 40 60

1 1 1

2 2 0

1 0 0

2 2 2

0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 1

0 2 2

1 1 1

0 2 1

2 2

1 1 2

2 2 0

2 2 2

1 2 0

2 2 0

2 2 0

1 0 0

2 2 2

2 2 0

1 1 1

0 0 0

2 2 2

0 0 0

1 1 1

0 0 0

2 2 2

0 0 0

0 0 0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwiseinappropriate.

14!

Figure 3 Indx of Political Competition.

1800a_.1..9.22W0Count0 80 70 SO 00 00 10 20 30 40 80

2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1

2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0,

2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0

2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

1900

V

Argentina

Austria

Brazil

Burma

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Czechoslovakia 0022Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2

France

Germany

Hungary 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

India 2 2 2

Indonesia 2 2 2 2 9 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

Japan 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

Lebanon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0

Mexico 2 2 f 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Nigeria 2 1 1 1 0

Philippines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 0

Portugal 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1

South Africa 0 0 0 0 0

Spain 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

Switzerland 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Thailand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1

Turkey 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0

U.S.S.R. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2

United Kingdom 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 2

2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6


-47

Figure 4. Index of Popular Eaactoral Participation.

gamist901000

10 20

Argentina 3

Austria 3 3 3

Brazil 3 3 2

S u r m a

Canada

Chile 3 3 1

Colombia

Czechoslovakia

Egypt 3 3 3

Prance 3 1 2

Germany

H u n g a r y 3 3 3

India 3 3 3

Ludonesia 3 3 3

Italy

Japan 3 3 3

Lebanon 3 3 3

Mexico 3 3 1

Nigeria

Philippines 3 3 3

Portugal 3 3 2

South Africa

Spain 3 0 3

Switzerland

Thailand 3 3 3

Turkey 3 3 3

U.S.S.R. 3 3 3

United Kingdom 2 2

United States 2 2 2

100030 40 50 80 700o_$JLE.ja,:o5o3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1

3 3 3 3 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 '0

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0

0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0

2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2

3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0

1 1 4 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 3

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 0

2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 3 0 3

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 0 0 0

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,0

2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


4 S

o

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

Figur. 5 Index of Political Suppression.

1800 19A0Coun 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 TO 60 90 00 10 20 30 40

Argentina 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1

Austria 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 3 0 5 5

Brazil 3 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 5 5

B u r m a 3 3 3 3 3 1 5

Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Chile 3 4 2 2 2 4 1 0 2 4 0 0 2 1 1

Colombia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 0 4

Czechoslovakia 1 0 5

Egypt 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3

France 3 3 3 3 4 3 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 3

Germany 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 5

Hisingary 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 0 0 1 0 5 1 1 5

India 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1

Indonesia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5

Italy 4 2 2 2 1 1 5 5 5

Japan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 5

Lebanon 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0

Mexico 3 4 4 2 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 0

Nigeria 3 3 3 3

Philippines 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5

Portugal 3 3 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 5 5

South Africa 3 3 3 3

Spain 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 1 1, 1 i 2 5

Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Thailand 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5

Turkey 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5. 1 5 5 5

U.S.S.R. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5

United Kingdom' 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0


-49

50

1

0

b

0

0

0

4

5

5

0

5

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

5

5

0

5

1

5

0

0

Country

Figura 6. Index461 Damaoratisation.

1800 .

00 10 20 ,30.0 50 60 470 80 90190000' 10 20 30 40 50

Argentina, 7

'7

7 7 8 2 2 2 2' 2 0 1 2 6 6

Austria 7 7 7 8 7 8 6 e 6 0 6 6 10

Brasil 7 7 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 6 3 3 3 8 6 1

Burma 7 7 7 7 8 5 6 0

Canada 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Chile 7 7 4 3 3 6 3 3 3 6 1 1 2 1 1 0

Colombia 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 0 6 8

Czechoskovakia 1 0 '6 8

Egypt 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 4 6 6

Prance 6 6 6 6 6 8 5 6 0 1 1 1 0 1 i 7

Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 7

Hungary 6 7 0 6 6 6 8 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 6 8

Lmdia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 8 6 5 0

Indones ia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6

Italy 6 2 2 2 1 1 6 6 6 0

Japan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1

Lebaan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 1

Mexico 7 7 6 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 6 6 3 3 3

Nigeria 7 6 6 6 5

Philippines 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 1

Portugal 7 7 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 6 1 6 6 6 8

South Africa 6 8 6 6 6

Spain 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 6 6 7 7

Switzerland 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

Thailand 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 8

rarkey 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 4 6 6

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 6

United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Blank *paces ind cate that the unit was not in existence or wae otherwiseinappripriate.

5

Figure 7 Index of Agricultural EMploymaat.

Co t

180000 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 SO 90

190000 10 20 30 40 50

Argentina

Austria

Brazil

Burma

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Czechoslovakia

Egypt

France

Germany

Hungary

India

Indonesia

Italy

Japan

Lebanon

Mexico

Nigeria

Philippines

Portugal

South Africa

Spain

Switzerland

Thailand

Turkey

U.S.S.R.

Unitet! kingdow

United States

75 70

35

66

33

72

63

28

71

62

22

69

62

22

64

54

62

19

59

67

48

50

50

65

62

15

53

63

50

51

48

42

62

60

57

82

13

49

59

43

48

45

38

60

61

58

76

65

69

38

10

43

53

39

67

43

44

35

59

59

70

70

62

60

31

9

38

45

41

71

37

71

42

33

56

63

55

63

68

58

56

27

75

9

31

38

23

69

35

37

40

65

41

31

58

64

56

55

71

57

26

8

27

32

25

31

35

39

67

37

30

54

64

51

50

70

56

50

21

80

t

21

26

65

28

36

40

71

34

27

50

47

45

66

49

52

21

56

6

18

25

65

21

31

38

64

30

23

51

72

42

46

58

48

49

43

6

13

Count

Argentina

Austria

Brazil

Burma

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Czechoslovakia

Egypt

France

Germany

Hungary

India

Indonesia

Italy

Japan

Lebanon

Mexico

Nigeria

Figure 8. Index of Urbanisation.

1800

00 10 20 ao

3 3 3 3

1 1 1 1

4 4 5 5

Philippines

Portugal

South Airica

Spain

Switzerland

Thailand

Turkey

U.S.S.R.

United Kingdom 9 11 14 17

United States 1 3 4

50 60 70 80 90

10 14 16

6

3 5

1 2 3 8

2 5 8 12

3

9 9

4 5 7 9 10 12

1 2 4 6 8 12

2 2 2 3 3

2 3

1

6 6 6 6 7

6

3

2

7

7

3

20 22 21 25 29 32

5 6 8 11 11 16

1900

00

20

10

4

8

9

13

16

5

3

1

9

9

3

'3

9

11

8

4

34

19

10 20 30 40 50

23 25 29 22 38

9 9 10 11 13

4 4 4 4 5

15 19 22 23 23

16 19 21 23 28

3 3 8 9 18

9 10 12 13 19

14 15 16 16 17

21 26 29 30 27

6 14 48 19 21

3 3 3 4 7

1 1 3 7

11 15- _17 19 20

11 12 18 29 26

5 7 8 10 24

3 3 3 6 9

10 12 15 20 24

12 12 16 18 21

8 6 6 8

4 8 15 19

37 38 39 44 50

22 26 30 29 29

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