Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: ICR00003648
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
TF093011, TF099946, TF099943, TF012069, TF015934, TF015935, H‐9920, TF0A1813
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 29.43 MILLION EQUIVALENT
TO THE
Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning
FOR A/THE
SOUTHERN SUDAN EMERGENCY FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE PROJECT ( P113586 )
February 22, 2019
Agriculture Global Practice
Africa Region
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective {Feb 12, 2018})
Currency Unit = South Sudanese Pound
130.26 = US$1
US$ 1.452010 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 ‐ June 30
Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Carolyn Turk
Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele
Practice Manager: Mark E. Cackler
Task Team Leader(s): Melissa Williams
ICR Main Contributor: Melissa Williams, Behnaz Bonyadian Dehkordi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
2008 PP The original Project Paper creating the Emergency Food Crisis Response Project 2011 PP The first Additional Finance Project Paper dated June 20, 2011 2012 PP The second Additional Finance Project Paper dated June 15, 2012 2013 PP The third Additional Finance Project Paper dated October 1, 2013 2014 PP The fourth Additional Finance Project Paper dated February 28, 2014 2016 PP The fifth Additional Finance Project Paper dated April 11, 2016 AAH Africa Action Help ACTED Agence d'Aide a la Cooperation Technique et au Developpement CMU Country Management Unit CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSO Civil Society Organization EFCRP Emergency Food Crisis Response Project EFNSP Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project EA Environment Assessment ESA Environment and Social Assessment ESIA Environment and Social Impact Assessment ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP Environmental and Social Mitigation and Monitoring Plan ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FCV Fragile, Conflict and Violence FPCR Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GOSS Government of Southern Sudan/Government of South Sudan IBRD The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICRR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IPDP Indigenous Peoples Development Plan IPPF Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework IRI Intermediate Results Indicator ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report JAM Joint Aid Management International LICUS Low‐income Countries Under Stress Grant M&E Monitor and Evaluation
MAFS Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, which previously known as Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NGO Non‐governmental Organization NPA Norwegian People’s Aid OP Operations Manual Policy and Procedures PCF Post‐Conflict Funds PDO Project Development Objective PHRD Policy and Human Resources Development Fund PIU Project Implementation Unit POC Project Operational Coordinator
PMP Pest Management Plan PP Project Paper RAP Resettlement Action Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SSTC Southern Sudan Technical Committee—a technical secretariat within the SSPSC responsible
for overall coordination and oversight of the project SSTSC Southern Sudan Technical Steering Committee—an inter‐ministerial, high level Committee
chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and responsible for implementation of the project
SAFDP Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project TOC Theory of Change UN United Nations WFP World Food Programme WVI World Vision International
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ........................................................ 7
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ........................................................................................................... 7
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................... 10
II. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 12
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs .............................................................................................................. 12
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ........................................................................................ 13
C. EFFICIENCY ............................................................................................................................. 21
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ..................................................................... 22
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................. 23
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 24
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION..................................................................................... 24
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................. 25
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 28
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................. 28
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 29
C. BANK PERFORMANCE ............................................................................................................. 31
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ........................................................................................ 34
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................. 35
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ............................................................ 38
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 49
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT............................................................................. 51
ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 52
ANNEX 5. OVERVIEW OF CHANGES TO THE RESULTS INDICATORS ......................................... 55
ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ...................................................................... 57
ANNEX 7. MAP OF PROJECT COUNTIES .................................................................................. 59
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 1 of 60
DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information
Project ID Project Name
P113586 Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response
Project
Country Financing Instrument
South Sudan Emergency Recovery Loan
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)
Related Projects
Relationship Project Approval Product Line
Additional Financing P125381‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project
29‐Jun‐2011 Special Financing
Supplement P130396‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (AF)
15‐Jun‐2012 Recipient Executed Activities
Supplement P145339‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project‐ AF III
13‐Mar‐2014 Recipient Executed Activities
Supplement P149698‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project Additional Financing IV
Recipient Executed Activities
Supplement P149700‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project AF IV
13‐Mar‐2014 IBRD/IDA
Supplement P151031‐Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project
12‐Apr‐2016 Recipient Executed Activities
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 2 of 60
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO
Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households or groups living in six of the most distressed counties ofSouthern Sudan.
Revised PDO
To support adoption of improved technologies for food production and storage, and provide cash or food to eligible beneficiariesinSouth Sudan.
PDO as stated in the legal agreement
See ICR text for elaboration
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 3 of 60
FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)
World Bank Financing
P113586 TF‐93011 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
P113586 TF‐99943 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000
P113586 TF‐99946 700,000 700,000 700,000
P113586 TF‐12069 3,000,000 2,999,718 2,999,718
P113586 TF‐15935 3,800,000 3,799,982 3,799,982
P113586 TF‐15934 3,730,000 3,730,000 3,730,000
P113586 IDA‐H9220 9,000,000 8,929,337 8,641,597
P113586 TF‐A1813 2,700,000 2,672,083 2,672,083
Total 29,430,000 29,331,120 29,043,380
Non‐World Bank Financing 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
Total Project Cost 29,430,000 29,331,121 29,043,381
KEY DATES
Project Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing
P113586 03‐Oct‐2008 27‐Oct‐2008 16‐Feb‐2011 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2017
P130396 15‐Jun‐2012 31‐Dec‐2017
P145339 13‐Mar‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017
P149698 31‐Dec‐2017
P149700 13‐Mar‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017
P151031 12‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 4 of 60
RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions
29‐Jun‐2011 4.95 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
15‐Jun‐2012 7.20 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
01‐Oct‐2013 10.20 Additional Financing Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
28‐Feb‐2014 11.70 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
11‐Apr‐2016 17.73 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual
Disbursements (US$M)
01 24‐Dec‐2008 0
02 29‐Jun‐2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory .81
03 22‐Dec‐2009 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.05
04 04‐Jun‐2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.08
05 04‐Apr‐2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.70
06 11‐Mar‐2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.62
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 5 of 60
07 16‐May‐2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.64
08 09‐Dec‐2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.20
09 26‐Jul‐2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 14.22
10 02‐Jan‐2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 21.66
11 09‐Mar‐2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.28
12 05‐Jul‐2016 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.34
13 18‐Jan‐2017 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 26.44
14 04‐Nov‐2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.04
SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors
Major Sector/Sector (%)
Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 70
Crops 60
Public Administration ‐ Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 10
Social Protection 30
Social Protection 30
Themes
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 100
Jobs 100
Human Development and Gender 100
Nutrition and Food Security 100
Food Security 100
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 6 of 60
ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Carolyn Turk
Senior Global Practice Director: Juergen Voegele Juergen Voegele
Practice Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Mark E. Cackler
Task Team Leader(s): John Jaramogi Oloya Melissa Williams
ICR Contributing Author: Behnaz Bonyadian Dehkordi
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 7 of 60
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context
1. The Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (EFCRP) was a series of small grants financed through
the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund (FPCR), Global Food Crisis Response Program Trust Fund (GFRP),
IDA, and the Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) trust fund. It was implemented over 9.5
years between September 2008 and December 2017. The final project cost totaled to $29.43 million. The
components and activities remained largely consistent throughout implementation, with funds shifting to
reflect the increasing food insecurity in the country. At the time of appraisal, Southern Sudan was just
emerging from 25 years of protracted violent conflict with the Government of the Sudan, and the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement had established the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as an
autonomous entity.1 GOSS’ capacity was still very weak, with few staff in public ministries.
2. Southern Sudan faced continuing residual violence from the previous conflict, returning refugees
following the 2005 Peace Agreement, and structural food insecurity stemming from a combination of: (a)
low agricultural productivity; (b) poor state of infrastructure; (c) the lost productivity ensuing from
incessant violent conflict; (d) inadequate provision of agricultural services; (e) weak institutions and lack
of policies and regulations; (f) inadequately skilled human resources; (g) irrational use of natural
resources; and (h) absence of an appropriate land tenure system and land law. Southern Sudan already
relied heavily on food imports,2 which were already expensive due to fuel and transport costs. When
global commodity prices increased, food prices in local markets jumped by as much as 30 percent over a
three‐month period, and local production could not offset expensive imports due to persistent insecurity
in Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria and in Abyei.
3. The 2008 Project Paper (2008 PP) explained that the EFCRP also demonstrated to donors and the
UN that the Bank was willing to make financial commitments to Sudan. Since re‐engaging in the country
in 2000, Sudan’s arrears prevented the Bank from re‐establishing a normal program. Instead, the Bank
had provided $10 million in IBRD surplus to the two multi‐donor trust funds and funded projects using
Post‐Conflict Funds (PCF) and Low‐income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) grants. The EFCRP, drawing on
Global Food Crisis Response Program, addressed the criticisms about the Bank’s commitment to the
country.
Theory of Change (Results Chain)
4. Neither the 2008 PP nor the additional financings were required to explicitly outline a theory of
change. Based on the results framework and descriptions in the project paper, a final overarching theory
of change can be discerned and is presented in table 1. This TOC supported items 2 and 3 of the
1 On 9 July 2011, the Government of Southern Sudan became the Government of South Sudan following a referendum on independence. GOSS refers to both Government of Southern Sudan and Government of South Sudan depending on the time. 2 A 2008 FAO/WFP estimate put the cereal gap at 93 thousand tonnes.2 With approximately 372,000 returnees anticipated in 2008, the gap was expected to increase.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 8 of 60
Government of Southern Sudan’s 2008 strategy, which called for, inter alia, targeted safety net programs
and enhancing quick impact agricultural interventions to resource poor farmers to address the price crisis.
Table 1 EFCRP Final Theory of Change
Issues/Challenge Activities Inputs Outputs Outcomes
Low food production leads to high prices
Investment support to crop and livestock production
Improved cereal, vegetable, and pulse seeds
Increased production and higher yields
Increased availability of food for local markets and producer households
Increase agriculture labor opportunities
Cultivation techniques training
Mechanization for land preparation
More land prepared and faster
Animal restocking/health
Increased meat, milk, and eggs
Fishing equipment provision/training
Increased availability of fish
Investment support to post harvest management
Post‐harvest management training
Decreased food loss Increased food availability into lean season Fish processing training
Availability of protein for longer period
Mechanization for processing
Value addition to agriculture products
Increased trade in processed flour
Increased income potential
Poor infrastructure for agriculture
Cash for Work/Food
Grain storage construction
Increased storage capacity
Increased food availability over time
Road repair Improved access to markets More food arriving
in local markets
Households cannot afford food
Market repair Better facilities for sellers
Payment for work Increased household income
More food for households
5. EFCRP sought to address both the supply and demand challenges in local markets. It promoted
local production of key staple foods, vegetables, and animal products, which fed the producer households
and supplied local markets. It did this by providing technology for production, storage, and processing in
addition to training on good farming and harvest practices. The cash for work program invested in
infrastructure important to farmers (e.g., market access roads, grain storage facilities) and put cash in the
hands of food insecure households so they could purchase food locally. As the project added additional
financings, the TOC clarified as did the indicators measuring it—changing from general goals (such as,
increased food reserves) to more concrete inputs (such as, fallow land brought under cultivation, storage
capacity added). As the security and hunger situation deteriorated, the project added unconditional cash
transfers and ultimately food aid through WFP for those too ill or old to work or who could not work due
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 9 of 60
to conflict in the area. Two underlying assumptions to the TOC were that the security situation would
improve as would the macro‐economic situation. Section IIIB “Factors Affecting Implementation”
discusses at length how these assumptions did not hold during implementation, and how the scope of the
security, economic, and food security crisis ultimately far exceeded the ability of EFCRP to have a
significant and sustainable impact.
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
6. The 2008 Project Paper (2008 PP) PDO in the data sheet was “to increase access to food for
consumption by the food insecure households living in six of the most distressed counties of the Southern
Sudan”. There were variations in how the PDO was presented between the data sheet, PP text, and the
Grant Agreement (GA), but the differences were minor and still adhered to the theory of change. In
keeping with World Bank practice, the ICR uses the text in the GA, which reflects text agreed during
negotiations: “The objective of the project is to assist the Recipient increase access to food for
consumption by food‐insecure households and groups in six counties of Southern Sudan.”
7. The 2008 PP defined food insecure households as those lacking assets and technical support,
mostly constituted by smallholder farmers. Implementing NGOs worked with local authorities to identify
those households in the project area. The project approach invested in: (a) supporting an accelerated
supply response of productivity enhancing technologies to increase “own production of staple foods for
own consumption and internal distribution;” and (b) safety net measures that will target food insecure
households in the same locations through public works. Some of the technologies to be introduced
included improved seeds, animal traction, mechanized land preparation and crop management, post‐
harvest mechanization, and storage facilities.
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
8. The project proposed measuring progress toward the PDO through two indicators: (a) the percent
of targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas,
corresponding to the goal of accelerated production for consumption; and (b) percent of target
population receiving cash transfers, corresponding to the safety net measures. While the indicators
aligned to the goals of the PDO, they stopped at measuring inputs rather than whether the amount of
food accessible to households for consumption increased. Measuring production increases of different
crops, changes in local market prices, and the actual purchase of food by the safety net beneficiaries would
have provided better measures of PDO achievement.
Components
9. The project had two technical components and one management component through the fourth
additional finance, which remained largely unchanged in terms of the activities they supported (see
Section I(B) for additional details). The most frequent change was the addition of funds and the outcome
targets. The fifth additional finance added a new component, which is discussed in Section I(B). The
original project included the following three components:
Component 1: Support to Agricultural Productivity (appraisal: $3.0 million, project close:
US$11.43 million) sought to increase farmers’ own production and improve postharvest handling
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 10 of 60
and management of food crops. It supported provision of inputs (seeds and tools), technical
advice on production and postharvest management, and construction of low‐cost food storage
facilities and granaries at household and community levels.
Component 2: Strengthening Community Safety Nets (appraisal $1.5 million, project close:
US$13.2 million) created temporary job opportunities and income for the food insecure people
to increase their access to food. It supports cash for work activities where target beneficiaries get
cash transfers in exchange for labor. Typical activities included opening access roads to
agriculturally productive areas and construction of grain storage facilities and markets, among
others.
Component 3: Support to Project Implementation (appraisal: $0.50 million, project close:
US$2.1 million) designed to finance administrative costs of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU)
including financial management, procurement, environment and social safeguards management,
monitoring, reporting and evaluation of activities under the project.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION
Revised PDOs
10. The original PDO—to assist the Recipient increase access to food for consumption by food‐
insecure households and groups in six counties of Southern Sudan—was revised three times. In the first
additional finance in June 2011 (2011 PP), the PDO was revised to “support adoption of improved
technologies for food production by eligible beneficiaries, increase storage capacity for staples, and
provide cash or food to eligible people participating in public works programs in six counties in Southern
Sudan.” This aligned the PDO more closely to the PDO indicators being used by the team and reflected
the changes in geographic targeting agreed in the original negotiations, although it focused the PDO on
activities as opposed to more strategic outcomes. The restated and amended GA used the same text for
the new PDO. The second additional finance in June 2012 (2012 PP) revised the PDO to align to the
proposed change in geographical reach of the project and recognize the change in name of the country
after independence. The fourth additional finance in 2014 (2014 PP) streamlined the description of
Component 1 and reflected the introduction of direct food support to vulnerable people who could not
participate in cash for work programs due to conflict, age, or infirmity.
Revised PDO Indicators and Outcome Targets
11. The project adjusted its targets with each additional finance made changes to the project
indicators. Ultimately, none of the indicators from the 2008 PP remained at the end of the project.
Changes and additions brought clarity to the indicators and how they were measured.
12. Based on instructions from the GFRP, which funded the project, the team changed the PDO
indicators to farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and
percentage) and targeted population receiving cash transfers (number instead of percent). These were
agreed with MAFS and the implementing NGOs at a workshop in December 2009, which introduced
indicators specified by the GFRP Secretariat after the 2008 PP had been approved. Annex 5 gives a full
review of the indicators
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 11 of 60
Revised Components
13. The fifth additional financing project paper in April 2016 (2016‐PP) added a new component,
Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes, that sought to increase the production and consumption of
foods of high nutritional value and build institutional capacity to support nutrition‐sensitive agriculture.
The project PDO did not change with the addition of this component, which had three subcomponents:
Strengthening of farmer groups for increased diversification of locally produced foods would
build the capacity of the smallholder farmers already supported under the EFCRP project in
Nagero, Tali, Morobo, Jur River, Juba, and Aweil South counties to diversify their local food
production to include legumes, fruits, vegetables, and small animal products.
Improved Food and Nutrition Practices would improve households’ knowledge and practices of
food and nutrition to improve food consumption patterns—focusing on both farmers and mother
support groups. It also promoted new technologies and incentives to reduce post‐harvest losses,
test labor, and energy saving technologies especially for women as well as address health issues
such as aflatoxins in foods.
Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Improve Integration of Nutrition in Agriculture would
build the capacity of national institutions for better nutrition outcomes through integration of
nutrition in agriculture and promotion of a multi‐sectoral approach to addressing malnutrition
and exploring the possibility of bio‐fortification to enhance nutrition.
14. Ultimately, implementation of this component was delayed by one year due to another outbreak
of fighting in July 2016, which caused the Bank and most other donors and NGOs to evacuate the country
for several months. The grant was implemented between July 1 and December 31, 2017 but only in Jur
River, Juba, and Aweil South counties due to time constraints and remaining security restrictions in
Nagero, Tali, Morobo.
15. From the beginning of the EFCRP to the project closure on 31 December 2017, Component 1 on
agricultural production shifted from being 60 percent of total project cost to 47 percent. The component
on safety nets shifted from 30 percent of project cost to 50 percent. This shift in investment in the
components was consistent with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. By the end of
the project, the final four components were:
Table 1. Project costs by component
Component
Original Project 2008
Additional Finance (US$ million)
Total 1
2011 2
2012 3
2013 4
2014 5
2016
Support to Agricultural Productivity 3.00 1.30 1.40 2.73 3.00 ‐ 11.43
Strengthening Community Safety Nets 1.50 0.70 1.50 4.00 5.50 ‐ 13.20
Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.30 2.30
Support to Project Implementation 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.50 0.40 2.50
Total 5.00 2.20 3.00 7.53 9.00 2.70 29.43
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 12 of 60
Other Changes
16. The third Additional Financing (2013), added upgrading of the Palotaka Basic Seed Center to
component 1 “Support to Agricultural Productivity”. The fourth Additional Financing (2014), a $5 million
activity for general food distribution through World Food Programme (WFP) was added to Component 2
in response to the worsening food security situation.
Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
17. All the changes made to the PDO statement, funding amount, and key performance indicators
were aligned with the original theory of change which had the PDO outcome of increasing the ability of
food insecure households to access food. The addition of the investment for the Palotaka Basic Seed
Center supported the PDO and the goal of increasing production by facilitating the bulking and
multiplication of higher yielding seeds thus making them available for farmers because quality seeds are
a major constraint to farmers throughout the country.
II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating
18. Relevance the PDO is rated substantial. While the PDO wording changed three times, the theory
of change remained constant, and it was very relevant to the food security issues facing Southern/South
Sudan. The significant change in wording came in the 2011 PP, which changed the language to focus more
explicitly on the inputs and activities the project supported. In 2016, new PDO and intermediate outcome
indicators were added to track activities to improve nutrition in addition to food security. EFCRP’s
objectives aligned to the World Bank Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of 2008 for Sudan, which, in Southern
Sudan, focused on improved governance and decentralized service delivery to the states, counties, and
communities, drawing on the experiences of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement period (2005‐2011).
Subsequent additional financings were similarly informed by the World Bank's 2011 strategy for Africa,
Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It, the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict,
Security and Development, and the South Sudan Interim Strategy Note (2013‐2014). The goals remained,
perhaps, even more relevant after closing in December 2017 given the conflict/post‐conflict conditions
prevailing in the country and the high level of food insecurity. Activities like those under EFCRP are being
implemented under the current Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project (EFNSP) with a greater
emphasis on humanitarian aid.
19. The relevance of the project design is conservatively rated as substantial. When the original
project was designed, Southern Sudan was affected by low production and a dependence on food imports
that resulted in high food prices that were exacerbated by the global food price crisis. EFCRP provided a
rapid intervention that brought assets (seeds and tools) to farmers and created work opportunities for
food insecure households to earn cash for food. The combination of agricultural productivity and cash for
public works should be considered a good practice approach for such conditions because it addressed
both the supply side and demand side constraints within a given area. More food was produced, and
people had more money to buy the food, which increased income for the producers to invest in additional
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 13 of 60
production. The simple and modular design—which remained throughout the life of the project—allowed
it to respond to the different needs of project communities as implementation progressed. Once the
security situation deteriorated, this also allowed the implementing NGOs to determine what activities to
focus on given the fluid conditions was also a good decision. In interviews with some NGO staff they
indicated they are often limited by other programs to delivering humanitarian aid, even when the targeted
communities ask for farming assistance over food.
20. There were some weaknesses in the design decisions that lead to the conservative rating. It may
have been better for the grants to be linked directly to the Support to Agriculture and Forestry
Development Project (SAFDP) under the MDTF‐S as additional financing, especially since the initial
geographic targeting aligned in part to that project. SAFDP was already under implementation when
EFCRP was designed, and MAFS was the implementing agency for both projects, and the 2008 PP
discussed the complementarities between the two projects. The clear connection in terms of activities is
evident in that the EFCRP activities in Leer and Panyikang counties were ultimately shifted for a time to
the SAFDP project with the 2011 PP using the same implementing partner—Norwegian Peoples’ Aid.
Attaching the grant to SAFDP could have facilitated better synergies between the two projects, simplified
monitoring for the stretched resources in MAFS, and allowed the Bank and MAFS to reassess the
continuation of EFCRP when SAFDP closed in 2012. One reason for keeping EFCRP separate was raised in
the 2008 PP, and that was the need to show development partners that the Bank was willing to invest its
own resources, as opposed to MDTF‐S resources, into Southern/South Sudan. At the time, the FPCR trust
fund was perceived as Bank funds.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome
21. Efficacy is rated substantial. Considering the FCV environment, it is extraordinary that over the
life of the project, EFCRP reached 339,433 people, of which 47 percent were women. This fell just short
of the target of 384,500 people, (of which 50 percent women).3 This achievement was made even though
implementation was hampered by increasing insecurity. The assessment looks at project delivery on the
major goals in three phases:
Phase 1: September 2008‐June 2011, which implemented in Yambio, Morobo, Leer, Panyikang,
Raga, and Tonj North counties;
Phase 2: July 2011‐June 2016 which covers the first through the fourth additional finance and
implemented in Yambio, Morobo, Leer,4 Jur River, Panyikang, Raga, Tonj North, Terekeka, Maban,
Nagero, and Pochalla; and
Phase 3: July 2016‐December 2017, which added the focus on nutrition and implemented in Jur
River, Juba, and Aweil South counties.5
3 The final progress report from MAFS gives a figure of 442,921, of which 51 percent were women, but the ICRR team used World Bank ISR reporting throughout the report to be consistent. The more conservative number reported reflects 4 Leer and Yirol ultimately had to be dropped due to insecurity. 5 Nagero, Tali, and Morobo had to be dropped due to insecurity.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 14 of 60
Component 1 Goal: Increasing the Supply of Food
22. Farmers adopting new production technology. Phase one measured the number of farmers that
adopted at least one improved technology for food production, setting a target of 130,000. According to
project reports, the IPs surpassed that target, helping 189,000 farmers adopt an improved technology by
July 2011. In phase 2 the project continued to measure the number of farmers adopting improved
technologies for food production, surpassing the final target of 266,000 by achieving 272,620. Phase 2
also clarified the PDO and indicators, and the technical interventions—seeds and planting materials, small
processing equipment and tools, advisory services, and the goal of expanding current household’s areas
under cultivation to a minimum of five feddans.
23. The technological inputs included mainly seeds,
malodas, toria, some ox ploughs, and in a few instances
power tillers or tractors. According to the 2011 project
paper, the impact of this technology on yields was positive—
yields of sorghum on EFCRP farmer field increased 100
percent in Panyikang, 71 percent in Morobo, and 43 percent
in Yambio. Given that cultivation had decreased or ceased
during the war with Sudan, the significant increase is
understandable. Farmers supported by the project toward
the end of Phase 1 cultivated an average of 0.43‐1.3 hectares
of land.6 The distribution of seeds was more equitable than
market‐oriented than originally intended. MAFS wanted to
include farmers with larger farms who could produce more
food for local markets. The support for households working
the smaller plots was a trade‐off—more households
engaged in the project, with just enough for food security
and a little surplus for local markets (at least those
cultivating 1.3 hectares).7
24. In Tonj North, WVI also supported crop production
through distribution of seeds, malodas, hoes, and some ox
ploughs. It worked beyond staple crops and trained five women’s groups in improved vegetable
production techniques and installed vegetable gardens. Another group of 25 women received sheep and
goats, and 50 households received training on fish drying/handling. WVI reported an 80 percent increase
in households with diversified income sources and a 40 percent increase in target households with
vegetable gardens and producing green leafy vegetables.8
25. Expansion of land under cultivation. Given the cultural practices in the allocation of land—in
6 2011 PP 7 MAFS. 2014. Private Sector‐Driven Agricultural Modernization Working Paper 3 for the Agricultural Development and Food Security Project. 8 World Vision. Project completion report Tonj North County, September 2010 ‐ July 2011. Received by ICRR team July 2018.
Farmer in Ngingo boma, Yambio, with her casava mosaic virus free crop (credit AAH‐I).
Tonj North Farmer Field Day training (credit WVI) where farmers learn, inter alia, the benefits of planting in rows instead of broadcasting seed for cultivation.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 15 of 60
some areas, the village head allows people to cultivate land, but ownership does not change hands, so
the land remains communal. The plot size per household was not tracked; however, new land brought
under cultivation was. By introducing labor saving equipment for land preparation—e.g., ox ploughs,
power tillers, tractors—the project surpassed the target of 38,800 hectares of previously fallow land by
roughly 170 percent to achieve 104,741 hectares.
26. Introducing post‐harvest technology. Post‐harvest
technology was supported in phase 1, reaching approximately
82,000 farmers, but it was explicitly tracked in the results
framework in phase 2. In terms of the number of farmers
adopting practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and
management, the project surpassed the final target of 100,700
with the final figure of 125,211. By the project end, 125,211
farmers adopted new practices and initiatives for postharvest
handling and management after being trained by the project,
surpassing the target of 100,700. The project also provided new
machinery to facilitate new introduction of technology, which
the beneficiaries adopted as reported in the anecdotal reports
accessed (see photos).
27. Increasing storage capacity. The project was not able to
measure the number of food insecure households in the project
area that had food reserves during phase 1 due to the difficulty
in establishing a baseline and difficulty in measurement given
that there were investments in household and community
storage—depending on the community demand. The indicator
was revised for Phase 2 to track the additional grain storage
capacity created overall. According to project ISRs, the project
exceeded the final target of 8700 metric tons of storage capacity
by building 11,092 metric tons of storage capacity at the
community and household levels. In most areas, the project
supported more rudimentary technology for storage, which was
within the ability of communities to build and maintain and for
which materials were readily available.
28. The overall project impact on food production was as
follows:
a. Under the 2008 PP (2008‐2011), about 190,000
beneficiaries cultivated on average about 1.0 feddans (or 0.425 hectare) equaling 80,750
hectares. Based additional data provided on beneficiary cultivation patterns in Yambio and
Morobo during phase 1, about 83 percent of cropping was used for cereals. Taking a more
conservative estimate of 70 percent of EFCRP cropping area going to cereals, that would mean
Training in fish drying/smoking in Tonj North (credit WVI)
Food Preparation and Preservation of Vegetable in Tonj North (credit WVI)
Improved granary in Morobo
Rice mill in Morobo
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 16 of 60
56,227 hectares were planted with cereals in the project areas. Data from FAO/WFP in the CLIMIS
database for 2011 show that in the six counties where EFCRP operated, the total area under cereal
production was 66,268 hectares. Therefore, upwards of 85 percent of cereal production in the
EFCRP counties in 2011 is attributable to the project. See tables 2 and 3.
b. During the remaining years of the project (from 2011‐2016), an additional 83,620 farmers
adopted improved technology with the goal of cultivating 5 feddans per farmer. Assuming an
average of (1.275 hectares) per beneficiary, 106,616 hectares were added (tables 2 and 3).
c. Up to 2014 when the bulk of project lending for productivity had already occurred, cropped area
and total production maintained a healthy increase over the early years of the project (tables 2
and 3). Due to the conflict, however, area under cereals harvested reduced, resulting in reduced
production (see graph FAOSTAT).
d. The project supported the adoption of post‐harvest technologies for 125,000 farmers and an
additional 11,000 tons of storage capacity to ensure temporal availability of foods, all contributing
to reduced losses and longer availability of processed foods for consumption. According to field
reports from IPs, several farmers indicated that they would construct their own household
granaries after they saw how effective
Table 2 Total cereal production area (hectares) in EFCRP counties during the life of the project
State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Equatoria
Morobo 10,351 10,060 12,550 13,079 25,099 37,603 9,783
Terekeka 26,858 18,409 18,961 18,224
Western Equatoria
Nagero 2,311 1,731 1,914
Yambio 25,080 29,251 34,970 36,414 37,770 33,156 22,302
Lakes Yirol 28,583 25,594 36,505
Warrap Tonj North 22,143 15,065 30,333 25,543 18,736 20,505 22,809
Western BeG
Raga 6,406 6,946 7,221 9,553 11,056 11,388 6,260
Jonglei Pochalla 6,003 5,007 5,894 6,625
Unity Leer 3,536 3,007 2,814 4,105 639
Upper Nile
Maban 4,362 4,546 3,461 4,990 5,370
Panyikang 2,090 1,939 2,016 2,522 ‐ 162 680
69,606 66,268 94,266 128,623 150,432 159,984 131,111 Source: FAO/WFP data in CLIMIS database. http://www.climis‐southsudan.org/crop/data
Table 3 Net cereal production (tonnes) in EFCRP counties during the life of the project
State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Equatoria
Morobo 7,453 7,243 9,036 11,510 32,126 51,140 12,522
Terekeka 21,486 16,200 10,618 13,122
Western Equatoria
Nagero 1,849 1,524 1,684
Yambio 27,086 30,422 36,369 40,784 45,324 34,483 23,194
Lakes Yirol 25,750 24,570 32,125
Warrap Tonj North 15,057 7,834 15,773 16,348 14,989 16,404 18,247
Western BeG
Raga 6,406 6,946 4,910 7,643 12,383 10,932 6,010
Jonglei Pochalla 5,763 5,207 4,715 5,300
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 17 of 60
State County 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Unity Leer 1,980 505 900 1,971 1,117 224 358
Upper Nile
Maban 2,094 2,182 1,661 3,194 3,437
Panyikang 1,254 489 968 1,614 N/A 104 435
101,843 94,829 119,003 133,510 156,606 157,908 116,434 Source: FAO/WFP data in CLIMIS database. http://www.climis‐southsudan.org/crop/data
Increasing Income Through Safety Nets
29. Cash for Work. Project reports cite initial difficulties implementing the safety nets because the
IPs were not familiar with the approach promoted by the project. However, the World Bank team, MAFS,
and the NGOs worked to overcome the confusion, and by the end of phase 1 in June 2011, the project
reached 24,462 people with cash for work, exceeding the PDO target of 20,000.
30. The original project also had some learning
by doing regarding what could be measured under
the circumstances and how. The practice of paying
by task instead of daily rates is one example of
difficulty in tracking data as originally planned in
project design. Similarly, the initial criterion for
targeting food insecure households was not
effective due to the local culture. Box 1 describes
how Africa Action Help—the IP in Morobo and
Yambio counties—entered communities and
identified beneficiaries for the safety nets
component (see box 1).
31. By the end of phase 2, EFCRP supported
110,000 beneficiaries with cash for public works,
averaging 22,000 beneficiaries per year. It had also
informed the technical design of the Skills Development and Safety Nets Project, which was approved in
2013.
32. As agreed with GOSS, the cash for work activities enhanced agricultural productivity in the project
area—e.g., feeder roads, market cleaning/upgrading, grain storage, and the like. For example, in two road
rehabilitation projects, there were 690 individuals (510 men and 180 women) employed to repair 6.5 kms
of the Morobo‐Iraga road and 7 kms of Aboroto‐Yugufe road. Activities included clearance and stumping,
road formation (earth works), drainage, murram digging, and spot murraming.9 In Morobo, 300 people
(198 men and 102 women) were employed to rehabilitate 23.6 km of feeder road by bush clearing,
excavating, and spreading murram to selected sections, and another 76 people renovated the Karua and
Wuli bridges. In Tali, 225 people (180 M/45 F) were involved in the opening, swamp raising, and gravelling
sections of 11 km feeder road linking Tali center to Pagara Boma.
9 Murram is a gravelly lateritic (clayey) material, often used to surface minor roads in parts of Africa.
Box 1 Safety nets entry activities by AAH
To introduce project public works activities, the NGO held
three Boma meetings in Lujulo, Panyume and Gulumbi
Payams, which were attended by 54 participants including
farmers, chiefs, and local authorities. The three contractors
selected to manage the work were introduced to the
construction sites through meetings with local authorities
and the community, where 37 participants attended the
meeting. Eligible households for public works were selected
based on the following criteria: level of food insecurity, idle
youth not involved in productive work, those involved in
charcoal burning and forestry destruction, and individuals
capable of working. Feeder road formation training was
given to 69 beneficiaries (62 male, 7 female) that formed the
core group for road repair. The training covered road
alignment, measurement for feeder road dimension
formation and compaction.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 18 of 60
Rehabilitation of Karua bridge in Morobo county Installing culverts as part of road rehabilitation in Nagero
33. Unconditional food transfers. The 2014 PP started after the civil war began and added
unconditional food or cash transfers to the project deliverables given the severe food insecurity in the
country. This was the first time that IDA funds were used in EFCRP. The unconditional food aid—
amounting to $5 million—was managed by WFP. A target of 138,000 beneficiaries provisioned with two
months of food was set in the project paper. In the contract with MAFS, however, WFP committed to
reach about 58,000 with four months of provisions. Ultimately, it reached 58,680 beneficiaries with four
months of food supplies, substantially achieving the overall target (138,000 x 2 months=276,000
compared to 58,680 x 4 months = 234,720). WFP reported efficiencies in food procurement due to
exchange rate gains and sourcing commodities from various sources. Given the dispersed locations of
those in need, the “land, transportation, storage, and handling” comprised 63 percent of the contract cost
compared to 17 percent to procure the food. This provides a stark picture of the transport challenges in
the country.
Table 4 General food distribution and BSP by state
States Cereals Pulses Oil Salt Supercereal Total MT Beneficiaries Aug‐Dec 2014
Jonglei 697.70 151.50 20.76 71.88 941.84 25,250
Upper Nile 334.95 12.00 46.81 65.12 458.87 10,401
Central Equatoria 245.95 14.41 20.05 280.41 16,708
Eastern Equatoria 0.75 0.75 207
Unity 350.75 11.70 4.38 366.83 5,846
Lakes 16.05 16.05 268
Total 1,645.40 175.20 87.11 20.05 137 2,064.75 58,680
34. Given the difficulty in getting on the ground in country for supervision once the war broke out,
the team only caught the disconnect by the time of the May/June 2016 ISR, just before the close of the
project. If the indicator tracking the WFP work had not been at the PDO level, the mismatch could have
been corrected relatively easily.
Improved Nutritional Outcomes
35. Activities related to improving nutrition were the focus of phase 3, which was supposed to begin
in July 2016. The outbreak of violence in July 2016 delayed the start of implementation until July 2017, at
which point the World Bank and MAFS agreed to contract the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) to manage implementation. FAO subcontracted World Concern Development
Organisation (WCDO), Joint Aid Management (JAM), and World Vision International as implementing
partners. The phase was originally supposed to build the capacity of the smallholder farmers already
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 19 of 60
supported under the EFCRP in Nagero, Tali, Morobo, Jur River, Juba, and Aweil South counties with the
codicil that locations could change based on the security situation. When operations resumed in July 2017,
Nagero, Tali, and Morobo were dropped due to insecurity.
36. In contrast to the other grant activities under EFCRP, phase 3 had the affirmative goal to impact
nutrition through dietary diversity,10 and it introduced two new PDO indicators. Against a target of 1800
households increasing the number of foods they produce, the project achieved 4600 households. To do
this, the project collaborated with State Ministries of Agriculture and Health, the Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission, UNICEF, WFP, International Rescue Committee, Action for Development, and Die Johanniter,
a German humanitarian organization operating in the area, to sensitize communities to the project
activities and to nutrition through meetings in collaboration with county/payam administrators, local
chiefs, and sultans. Following that, 4600 targeted households were organized into 163 groups (20 in Aweil
South, 40 in Juba, and 103 in Jur River). FAO procured and distributed about 4.8 tonnes of vegetable
and legume seeds, including amaranth, collard, cowpea, eggplant, okra, onion, tomato, and
watermelon. Hand tools—including, hoes, rakes, spades, watering cans and plastic buckets—were
distributed to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries in Jur River also received fishing kits comprising gill nets,
fishing hooks, and twine. To increase availability of animal protein, the project provided 5000 vulnerable
households with investment vouchers to acquire 20,000 chickens and 18,000 sheep or goats from the
local market, which generated income for local livestock sellers. Demonstration plots covering 12.6 ha
provided training on agronomic practices and animal husbandry.
37. The project increased the dietary diversity of 6000 households (against a target of 1900).
Interventions to achieve this goal included providing vouchers to 6000 mothers of children under‐five
years of age and vulnerable households to access nutritious foods in the local market. The NGOs also
formed and trained 18 mother‐to‐mother support groups with 450 mothers (100 mothers in Juba and 350
in Jur River) on income generation, business skills and market linkages. It also established small kitchen
gardens for 2300 beneficiaries (79% women) and trained 2500 beneficiaries (82% women) on food
processing and storage and 400 beneficiaries (38% women) on fish net braiding, processing, and
10 Other NGOs did provide support to vegetable production—e.g., AAH, WVI, and Mercy Corps.—however, nutrition impacts were not an explicit goal of the other investments.
Beneficiaries redeeming their vouchers for poultry pose with the poultry trader
A beneficiary shows off her tomato crop
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 20 of 60
preservation.
38. Beyond assets, the project trained households on the types of basic foods they could grow
throughout the year for dietary diversity and how they could prepare and process/preserve the food.
Beneficiaries were trained on food processing, preparation and infant feeding practices, and mother
support groups were formed and trained in business skills. Awareness‐raising sessions were conducted
on nutrition sensitive technologies and on energy‐saving technologies—such as, cooking baskets and solar
drying for vegetable preservation. Beneficiaries for nutrition education were selected following a
participatory process with the involvement of, and consultation with, relevant stakeholders in the
nutrition sector. They included households with young children on the verge of falling into the
malnutrition trap and children who have graduated from UNICEF treatment. While these households
benefited from nutrition vouchers to buy healthy food, they also received nutrition education and
demonstrations on cooking, food preparation, and preservation; and they were trained on setting up
kitchen gardens and using energy and labor‐saving technologies. Radio programs were designed with
beneficiaries to improve knowledge of the importance of a diversified diet. Ultimately, 2781 households
reported adopting healthier eating habits and 2500 households were using improved food processing and
storage methods and facilities.
39. The project also conducted a national capacity assessment to review the institutional
environment for nutrition and coordination. State level consultations with relevant stakeholders from the
State Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and the Universities of Juba and Bahr el‐Ghazal were
held, followed by a workshop to raise awareness among six states of the Greater Bahr el‐Ghazal region
and draft action plans to mainstream nutrition in agriculture. Given the short timeline of the project
(essentially 5 months for implementation), the planned national stakeholder workshops could not be
organized to build stakeholder capacity for nutrition mainstreaming. By project close, 40 agriculture
professionals reported increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition, which falls short of
the target, but is an impressive achievement given the context and the short implementation timeline.
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating
40. Overall efficacy is rated substantial because the objectives of increasing food production and
A hay solar cooking basket (fireless cooker) is one of the labor saving technologies introduced by the project
Children from Marial Ajiith recording a role play at Voice of Hope Radio Station in Wau
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 21 of 60
providing access to cash for work were surpassed, despite the difficulties presented by increasing
insecurity and poor accessibility. EFCRP was able to substantially achieve or surpass its targets despite the
challenges of implementing in an area where the government was just being established, the population
had been traumatized by years of civil war, accessibility due to poor roads was an issue between April and
November, and where active conflict ultimately engulfed the new country for four years of the
implementation.
41. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, much of the evidence of the project’s achievements came
from indirect sources and not the M&E office of the PIU. This is why the project is rated substantial instead
of high. Progress monitoring in FCV settings cannot be expected to reach the levels of rigor that are
achieved in non‐FCV countries, particularly in times of active conflict. EFCRP experienced consistent
difficulties in monitoring; however, implementing through reputable international NGOs that were able
to collect data at the local level and were willing to meet with the ICRR team even 6 years after the close
of their activity increased the confidence in the effectiveness of the project. In the early years of the
project the World Bank and MAFS officials made regular visits to the field to validate reporting from IPs,
which increased the confidence in the reporting that was submitted from the field during the rest of the
project when field monitoring was limited for MAFS and extremely limited for the World Bank. The ICRR
team accessed original completion reports from World Vision, Africa Action Help, ACTED, Mercy Corps,
and FAO and held a workshop with IPs in July 2018 to review their implementation experience and
achievements. This supplemental data verification, in addition to secondary sources and World Bank
implementation supervision reports and project papers, helps tell a more plausible story of the project’s
achievements.
C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
42. Overall, the project efficiently managed seven grants over the life of the project with no delays in
expensing the grants. Early inefficiencies in the procurement process were resolved, and the PIU brought
the project in while fully accounting for all funds and receiving clean audit reports. Nevertheless, efficiency
is conservatively rated as modest largely because of deficiencies in direct project monitoring by carried
out by the PIU. In addition, the urgency of the crisis response during preparation and the general lack of
basic data in South Sudan meant that no financial or economic analysis was carried out prior to project
implementation in 2008, 2011, 2012, or 2013 (original project and the first three additional financings).
The 2013 PP committed to collecting data for ex‐post computation of financial and economic returns on
farm income towards the end of project implementation; however, the civil war erupted shortly after
approval of that additional financing, which delayed implementation for several months and limited field
data collection necessary for analysis until the end of the project.
43. Based on a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the
preparation of 2014 PP to estimate financial gross margins in the project area. For EFCRP, average prices
for maize and sorghum in December 2015, six months before the end of the project were used to
determine the gross margin. Sorghum prices ranged from SSP 12/kg in Rumbek to SSP 15/kg in Wau. Maize
prices ranged from SSP 10.3/kg in Wau and to SSP 11.7 in Rumbek. Drawing on the EFNSP analysis, the
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 22 of 60
analysis assumes an average of 1 ha/beneficiary. Based on these numbers, the average gross margin six
months before project close was US$257 for sorghum and US$150 for maize.
44. While sorghum and maize are the major crops in South Sudan and a priority for food security
production, those two crops represent just a part of the cropped area under the project. Seeds and
cuttings were provided for groundnut, cassava, pulses, vegetables, and sim sim, but data was not available
to do an adequate analysis of these crops. Prices were volatile throughout the project, so financial returns
were similarly volatile. Informal analysis done by one of the implementing NGOs during Phase 1 of the
project (around 2010) showed a higher cost of production that negatively affected gross margins for
maize. There was insufficient data to analyze the returns to mechanization—both for land preparation
and post‐harvest processing, but this was a small element of the project assets introduced.
45. The analysis of the cash for work program looked to analysis from similar projects for indications
of the potential returns. For this, the World Bank’s SNSDP project, which drew on EFCRP for its technical
design, did provide an analysis that showed it would cost US$2.07 to transfer US$1.00 in wage benefits to
the intended recipients, which compared well to similar programs. The EFNSP cash for works component
ultimately reached 47,595 people with an investment of $8.2 million—about $172 invested per
beneficiary. This is averaged over the life of the project, and it includes the cost of materials. Detailed data
on the number of people reached each year in each county was not systematically collected, but AAH
provided full financial data in their 2014‐15 completion report. In Yambio, Nagero, and Tali counties, the
public works component provided an average of 56 days employment at about $7/day. This was manual
repair of several kilometers of road and installation of culverts for each community. Due to the prevalence
of bartering in South Sudan, the project noted that introducing cash wages would increase purchasing
power and stimulate demand in local markets. That EFCRP also supported the supply response in local
market offset the risk of inflation that could have happened in the absence of functioning markets.
46. The amount allocated for operations under the nutrition component in phase 3 was US$2.3
million. The funds supported 6000 HH, averaging roughly $54 per person to increase production and
dietary diversity, and the households were continuing to produce and even sell surplus in the market six
months after the close of the project. By comparison, the general food distribution under phase 2, cost
$5 million to reach 58,680, and average of $85 per person—this is largely due to the expense of delivering
food support in high conflict areas. The cash for work generated about US$4.6 million in wages under the
public works schemes. With 110,000 benefiting from public works, the project paid out US$42 per person
annually.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
47. Based on the strong results on the ground in an increasingly dangerous FCV context, there was a
good argument to rate the overall outcome as satisfactory; however, the team decided on a the more
conservative rating of moderately satisfactory due to the lack of traditional evidence and analysis. The
overall relevance of the PDO was substantial and the design of the project was an excellent response to
the challenge being addressed—investing in both the demand and supply‐side constraints in a project
area to increase food security. Based on the robust data available (albeit from indirect sources), EFCRP
achieved or surpassed its targets for increasing food security:
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 23 of 60
272,620 farmers adopting improved technologies for production (102% of the target)
104,741 hectares of idle land brought under production (270% of target)
11,092 metric tons of storage capacity built, which increased the time that food was available in
communities (127% of the target)
47,595 participants in the cash for work public works program (128% of target)
4500 households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced (250% of target)
6000 households reporting increased household dietary diversity (316% of target)
2500 households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities (161% of
target).
48. Having the safety net component focus on improving farm to market roads, increasing storage
capacity and preparing farm land created a virtuous synergy with the food production component. The
simple, modular design also allowed relatively easy expansion of the project as the situation on the ground
deteriorated. Despite this, the difficulties in project implementation caused by steadily increasing conflict
and violence, economic crises, weather‐related site accessibility, and capacity gaps that were not
addressed meant that the project simply did not have the data to prove efficacy and efficiency to meet
the moderately satisfactory threshold.
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)
Gender
49. None of the grants had specific goals along the lines of increasing women’s agency—e.g., power
to make decisions about how household resources are allocated, etc. —or reducing gender‐based
violence. The focus on women’s inclusion varied across implementing partners, but all made sure to
include women in project activities—some explicitly targeted female headed households (e.g., World
Vision, Mercy Corps) while others reported the number of women reached. In line with the emerging
requirements for the World Bank core indicators, the team started tracking the number of beneficiaries
disaggregated by gender, and it achieved 47 percent women’s inclusion against a target of 50 percent
according to World Bank ISRs. The fifth additional finance, with its focus on nutrition, reached a higher
proportion of women—e.g., 79 percent of the beneficiaries of kitchen garden training, and 82 percent of
trainees on food processing and storage.
Institutional Strengthening
50. Regardless of the definition of institutional strengthening used, EFCRP was not primarily designed
to contribute to this goal. That said, the primary project paper did say that EFCRP would contribute to the
increased capacity of MAFS and local authorities to manage and monitor projects. Despite a rocky start,
the project did build a new working relationship between MAFS and the NGOs (see the next section for
elaboration). NGOs report close collaboration with local authorities, including county agriculture
department and payam extension workers, who supported implementation and were provided transport
facilities to facilitate their work. Local officials participated in trainings to be able to provide support after
the end of the project. In addition, EFCRP did provide funding to upgrade the Palotaka Seed Center for
the purposes of producing quality seeds for farmers.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 24 of 60
Mobilizing Private Sector Financing
51. The project was not designed to mobilize private sector financing given the emergency nature of
the operation and the fragile context of the country.
Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity
52. As an emergency project designed to meet immediate food security needs, the project did not
focus on poverty reduction or growth, per se. Given the focus on food security through production and
income support, it certainly increased incomes of producers and mitigated the impacts of poverty during
implementation. However, given the continuing conflict, it has been challenging to measure the impact
on either of the twin goals.
Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts
53. Early in the project—by June 2010—the team noted that there was impact on youth jobs with
public works providing livelihood opportunities. Anecdotes from the NGOs indicate that the youth were
especially involved in farm mechanization efforts and took the lead in land preparation in some areas and
the rehabilitation of public roads and the construction of storage facilities. With the first additional
financing, the project started measuring youth participation in the safety nets activities and it was
reported that they surpassed their target of 50 percent.
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
54. At the time EFCRP was designed, the Government of Southern Sudan was just forming and had
low human resource capacity to manage development projects. Several ministries had few or no staff on
the ground. EFCRP was designed shortly after the Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development
Project (SAFDP) which was financed by the Multi‐Donor Trust Fund‐South Sudan (MDTF‐SS) and was
managed by the same ministry. These two projects were not the only agriculture/food security projects
under the MDTF‐SS, so the management burden was not small.
55. The management structure followed SAFDP in that the project was integrated into the normal
operations of the MAF Technical Directorate for Research and Extension with the Director General (DG)
as Project Operational Coordinator (POC) for day‐to‐day coordination. This meant that a government
official was essentially managing the project in addition to the rest of his or her portfolio, which was sub‐
optimal given the fiduciary, safeguards, and technical issues that needed intense attention.
56. The decision to use technical assistance and implementing partners (NGOs) for EFCRP ran against
the preference of GOSS, but it was a necessity given limited capacity on the ground and the need to act
quickly. Given the government’s aversion to technical assistance, this decision created further challenges
during implementation that, perhaps the inclusion of capacity building activities for MAFS staff (e.g.,
training seminars with visiting staff from the Bank) could have mitigated.
57. The decision to have project sites spread across six states (and later expanded) was a trade‐off in
terms of management efficiency. The reason for this is that South Sudan has very weak transport
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 25 of 60
infrastructure, with most roads impassable during the rainy seasons, and sporadic insecurity that existed
even at the time of project design. This made management and monitoring especially difficult for an
already stretched Ministry and Bank team.
58. As with SAFDP, the design team lacked information on weather, physical conditions, the social
dynamics of the proposed project areas, and the nature of local markets in the target areas as well. The
project overcame the lack of capacity and information by hiring strong, reputable NGOs for
implementation—Action Africa Help, Norwegian People's Aid, World Vision, Mercy Corps, HARD‐SSS, and
ACTED—to implement the project. This prevented the project from adding more detail to the design of
implementation arrangements and from designing a robust monitoring and evaluation strategy.
59. The emergency nature of the project combined with delays in contracting the NGOs, fed into the
failure to sufficiently orient MAFS and NGO staff to the design principles of the project where early on,
there was confusion over how to implement the safety nets component and how to divide the agriculture
production activities between subsistence and more market‐oriented farmers (cultivating 5+ feddans).
This created confusion early on in implementation, which was ultimately overcome, but not without lost
opportunities.
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
60. EFCRP spanned almost 10 years during which its operating environment changed drastically. It is
impressive that the project achieved what it did given the circumstances unfolding in the country. This
section describes the factors that impacted the implementation progress.
61. Conflict and civil war. The deteriorating security situation ultimately became the defining factor.
While December 2013 marks the start of a civil war period, intermittent insecurity affected the project as
early as December 2009, and delayed or prevented implementation in some area (e.g., Pochalla and Yirol
West).
62. In December 2013, one month after approval
of the 2013 PP, civil war broke out, forcing the Bank to
evacuate the country between 20 December 2013 and
30 April 2014. During this time, implementation was
minimal in most locations, but given the increasing
need, the Bank pushed through a fourth additional
financing in February 2014, which included direct food
aid through WFP. By the fourth additional financing in
2014, the project was providing food security support
in nine counties across seven states (table 4).
63. The project’s flexible implementation model,
giving authority to the implementing partners to
determine where and what to implement based on the
local conditions allowed implementation to continue. The Bank returned to Juba in April 2014, but field
visits were minimal for the Bank and MAFS due to continued insecurity. A peace agreement was reached
A landmine uncovered in Maban county during excavation of a farm pond in 2013 under the grant implementated by Mercy Corps
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 26 of 60
in September 2015, after which the Bank, MAFS, and the NGOs made efforts to return to normalcy. The
2014 PP was set to close in June 2016. Preparations for a fifth additional financing through the PHRD trust
fund—this time focused on nutrition—commenced and the grant was approved in June 2016. However,
the peace agreement fell apart in July 2016, prompting the evacuation of staff from July 2016 to April
2017.
64. Economic turbulence and decline. Economic crises at different points of implementation
(2008/2009, 2012, and 2016) constrained public sector investment and limited the government’s ability
to import food. Very early in the project (2008‐2009), oil prices dropped by around 70 percent, at a time
when 90 percent of Southern Sudan’s revenue came from oil. Oil prices rebounded somewhat, but a 2012
dispute over oil with Sudan again restricted the amount of food imported from Sudan and curtailed access
to fuel by large‐scale mechanized farmers in South Sudan. The situation was exacerbated by an influx of
refugees and returnees that increased overall food demand. The conflict in December 2013, shut down
five oil fields, which severely constrained government revenue. Ultimately, GDP per capita dropped from
$1,111 in 2014 to less than $200 in 2017. Growing insecurity, low government revenues, and the move to
monetize the debt led to extraordinarily high inflation—including for food—later in project
implementation.
Figure 1 South Sudan Consumer Price Index 2011‐2017 with dates of each additional financing
65. Project design elements. The project design had both positive and negative elements. EFCRP was
simple, with two technical components that could be easily replicated, and adjusted, to work in different
geographies. The activities were familiar to most NGOs and so could be deployed quickly at various points
across the country. The synergy between the two components multiplied the positive impact of the
project. On the downside, the small, short‐duration grants prevented the NGOs from establishing the
long‐term trust relationship necessary to affect change. They could not plan out on a sufficient time
horizon the engagement they think was needed. The many restructurings to add financing to the project
also created an administrative burden for the project team (dual track approval and reporting), which was
as different times during implementation, also implementing the SAFDP, preparing a follow‐on agriculture
project, and preparing and implementing the EFNSP. At the same time, the dispersed nature of the project
made monitoring difficult, particularly during the rainy season when rain made roads inaccessible.
Jun‐11100
Jun‐12174
Apr‐13153
Mar‐14153
Jun‐16720
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Jun‐11
Sep‐11
Dec‐11
Mar‐12
Jun‐12
Sep‐12
Dec‐12
Mar‐13
Jun‐13
Sep‐13
Dec‐13
Mar‐14
Jun‐14
Sep‐14
Dec‐14
Mar‐15
Jun‐15
Sep‐15
Dec‐15
Mar‐16
Jun‐16
Sep‐16
Dec‐16
Mar‐17
Jun‐17
Sep‐17
Dec‐17
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 27 of 60
66. Accessibility. Aside from security issues, South Sudan is one of the most difficult countries to
travel due to the lack of paved roads. In fact, between April to May and October to November, most roads
in South Sudan are inaccessible. As insecurity grew during implementation, the costs of monitoring and
delivering goods increased substantially. At times, logistical issues led to the delayed delivery or loss of
inputs due to road accidents.
67. Weather. Weather shocks—including drought, rain, and flood—repeatedly affected accessibility
to project areas and success of cropping. Early in the implementation, the project learned that drought
had affected beneficiaries in Upper Nile State, destroying all early planted crops.11 In 2011/2012, delayed
and erratic rainfall in most parts of South Sudan affected the harvest while drought in the neighboring
countries limited the availability of food for import. These events coincided with a conflict between Sudan
and South Sudan over oil that triggered macroeconomic decline that exacerbated the rapidly increasing
food insecurity in the country.
68. Implementation through NGOs. EFCRP started when Southern Sudan was an autonomous region
that had only existed for about three years. Government agencies were severely short of staff. The
decision to implement through reputable NGOs, some of which were able to provide their own pre‐
financing in anticipation of the funds being reimbursed by MAF, was critical to successful implementation.
Building trust between the local authorities and the NGOs also took time, which delayed progress at first.
Trust was eventually established, and a positive working relationship characterized the rest of
implementation. GFRP ultimately highlighted the partnership between the NGOs and the government
(see box 2).
Box 2 Establishing a New Partnership between NGOs and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS)
Four international NGOs were contracted to support the implementation of the GFRP South Sudan Program: Norwegian People’s Aid, World Vision, Africa Action for Hunger International and the Agency for Cooperation in Technical Development. The contractual relationship was defined by an agreement based on Bank procedures that clearly identified NGOs as consultants delivering services required by the GoSS. The selected NGOs had working experience in the agricultural sector in South Sudan, extensive knowledge of the local communities, and appropriate operational structures ready to be quickly scaled up. However, after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the subsequent independence in 2011, new working procedures were established. While previously NGOs were only accountable to their donors, they began to be supervised by the new government in place.
It took some time for the NGOs to adjust to the new reporting requirements; however, they successfully engaged with the local authorities. They played a crucial role in promoting awareness on important topics, especially related to gender issues. Although governmental institutions remained structurally weak, they played an important role by providing counterparts to supervise the project; facilitating the exemption of taxes on equipment, materials, and inputs for the project; and disclosing policy documents related to agriculture and forestry development in South Sudan. Therefore, the relation between NGOs and the GoSS positively evolved during the implementation of the GFRP program. In terms of management, the Internal Coordination Committee, a forum in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, brought together the different actors monthly to discuss implementation of the project and helped in the identification and resolution of key implementation challenges also related to accessibility, logistics, and insecurity.
Source: World Bank 2012 “Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP): Progress and Lessons Learned”
11 World Bank. 2009. Implementation Status and Results Report. Sequence 2.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 28 of 60
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
69. Monitoring and evaluation was modest. The original project paper outlined more of a supervision
plan than a monitoring strategy beyond defining the indicators and describing the sources for the data.
Given the dearth of information about M&E in the 2008 PP (and subsequent additional financings) and
that EFCRP used the implementation structure and fiduciary systems as defined under the MDTF‐S and
used for implementation of the SAFDP, it is likely that the project design team planned to build on the
M&E system defined in the final project paper for SAFDP. Like SAFDP, EFCRP suffered from the paucity of
data available to establish baseline values.
70. Taking a lesson from SAFDP, where “in the absence of a clear plan, a piecemeal approach became
the actual modus operandi of the project as far as M&E was concerned”,12 EFCRP developed a set of
indicators directly linked to the project and held at least two workshops to reach agreement on the
indicators and their measurement. There were, however, changes to the initial indicators once monitoring
requirements from the FCRP trust fund were communicated after the project was approved. This led to
a disconnect between the 2008 project paper results framework and the one that was used during
implementation support. Despite the additional preparation, there was some initial confusion over some
indicators—e.g., what constituted an improved technology—and difficulty measuring other indicators—
e.g., calculating person‐days of labor was not possible due to the nature of assigning and jobs and making
payment. The original results indicators were completely different by the second additional finance in
2012.
M&E Implementation
71. M&E remained weak throughout implementation. By the close of the project, there was no M&E
specialist on staff, and the PIU did not have staff or budget to prepare a borrower completion report. No
consolidated management information system database to track physical progress and supplementary
data was created according to interviews with the Project Director. In the absence of capacity, the PIU
assembled the progress reports from the NGO implementers for the World Bank team. Technical
assistance was supposed to be used throughout implementation, which could have bolstered M&E
activities; however, the Government was not enthusiastic about outside technical assistance, so coverage
was patchy.
72. There was a missed opportunity to gather supplementary data on, for example, the types of
technology used, the amount and types of seeds distributed, the production levels of crops, the prices
earned by producers, the difference in prices in local markets once the farmers began selling, the
kilometers of roads rehabilitated, etc. Enriching data like this was done or not depending on the NGO, and
12 World Bank. 2013. Implementation Completion and Results Report for the Support To Agriculture And Forestry Development Project. World Bank: Washington, DC.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 29 of 60
there was no defined methodology to guide the gathering of the information. Therefore, good efficiency
and impact analysis was not possible.
73. In the early years of the project, regular field missions by the Bank and MAFS could verify the data
provided by the NGOs, and local authorities were also working with the NGOs to do site monitoring. Due
to the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, field missions reduced significantly. While implementation
resumed by March 2014, access to field areas for data validation was constrained. The World Bank team
noted that for most of 2015, MAFS officials were unable to make field visits due to insecurity and could
only resume monitoring visits in early 2016.
M&E Utilization
74. The indicators finally adopted by the project as of 2012, were enough to gauge progress on project
implementation; however, the World Bank team consistently reported problems with data verification.
Nonetheless, field verification missions that included World Bank staff were possible through 2013, which
adds a measure of confidence to the data that the NGO partners were reporting. Based on project
completion reports submitted by the project implementers—available from every implementing NGO
except for one—there was a wealth of data being collected that could have been consolidated and use to
enrich the project knowledge base. For example, there are doubts about the acceptability of animal
traction and other mechanization among communities. EFCRP supported such mechanization and could
have collected data on adoption rates and qualitative information on issues limiting adoption. Some
implementing NGOs reported on farmers engaging in contracts with private sector buyers in larger cities.
It would have been good to collect data on what farmers and/or cooperatives were able to engage in such
contracts and to gather qualitative data on how these contractual arrangements were formed.
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E
75. Quality of M&E is rated negligible because by the end of the project, the paucity of verifiable data
and reports meant that the ICRR team could not validate any outcomes. The introduction of capacity
building for PIU staff could have helped increase the acceptance of the technical assistance that was
needed but not readily accepted by the implementing agency, and it could have improved the overall
confidence in the data.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
76. Environmental and Social. EFCRP was a Category B project for environmental safeguards
throughout the life of the project. The 2008 PP triggered OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP
4.09 (Pest Management). The 2011 PP added OP 4.10 (Indigenous Peoples) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary
Resettlement, then the 2012 PP added OP 4.04 on Natural Habitats and OP 4.36 on Forests. Relevant
safeguards documents were prepared and disclosed as specific to OPs as follows: Environmental and
Social Management Framework (ESMF), including a Pest Management Plan (PMP) for OPs 4.01 and 4.04;
an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF) for OP 4.10; and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF)
for OP 4.12. During these updated PPs, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment
Framework (ESSAF) was prepared for the whole of the South Sudan portfolio in 2012.
77. Despite capacity weaknesses in safeguards management in the implementing agency, EFCRP
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 30 of 60
started and ended implementation in safeguards compliance with respect to documentation. Compliance
lags occurred in preparation of subsequent management plans – Environmental and Social Management
Plans (ESMPs) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs). At the time of the 2013 PP, a South Sudan Social
Assessment concluded that most of the people in South Sudan met the criteria for OP 4.10, so an IPP was
deemed no longer necessary. In May 2013, an environmental and social audit conducted by the Bank
found that safeguards continued to be implemented satisfactorily at the NGO level. By October 2013
(when 2013 PP was approved), a consulting firm had been hired by the PIU to manage all safeguard issues.
That firm, which continued through the end of EFCRP and assured safeguards compliance on the ground.
According to project reporting, project interventions remained small in scale and resulted in minimal
safeguard risks that were easily mitigated by the NGO implementers. The collaboration between the NGOs
and the local authorities was particularly helpful in managing localized conflict between groups.
78. Financial Management and Audits. The implementing entity maintained effective financial
management arrangements throughout the life of the project in compliance with the Bank’s policies and
procedures. A consultant financial management specialist supported the project for the entire duration.
The overall financial management performance was rated Moderately Satisfactory for most of the
implementation period, except for the period between July 2016 and January 2017 when it was rated
moderately unsatisfactory due to disruptions occasioned by the July 2016 conflict. To mitigate the
heightened fiduciary risk following the conflict, implementation of key project components under the
2016 PP was contracted out to FAO, which had adequate capacity. The project submitted all the interim
financial reports to the Bank within the timelines stipulated in the legal agreement. It also submitted all
the audit reports to the Bank on time except the audit report for the financial year ended June 30, 2017
which was delayed. All the audit reports expressed unqualified opinions with no major financial
management issues except the audit report for the financial year ended June 30, 2018 when the auditor
expressed a disclaimer of opinion based on inability to obtain documentary evidence relating to
expenditure of USD 2.5 million incurred through FAO. Withdrawal applications were submitted to the
Bank on a regular basis with no major delays in funds flow.
79. Procurement risk rating remained high throughout project implementation. Challenges included
the institutional weakness to independently implement project procurement activities and the general
geographical and political factors during implementation period. The 2008 PP was prepared when the
establishment of government systems were at initial stages with challenges related to overall oversight
and accountability of procurement decisions. The Ministry of Finance and Planning issued in 2006 the
Interim Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations (IPPDR) that were not generally adhered to by
institutions. Regulations have no legal framework and to date no Procurement Act has been passed by
the government. The other factor is the long lead time in procurement process due to both the
infrastructural and capacity challenges in the country. At a rate of not less than six months to hire a firm,
project procurement did at times negatively affected the project’s ability to adhere to the cropping
calendar. Conflict in some project areas especially during the period 2014‐2017 affected the procurement
and contract management. Project supervision was limited to Juba town as corporate security restricted
movement of Bank staff beyond Juba town. Procurement and contract management was supported by
experienced procurement consultants. Post Procurement Reviews conducted showed moderately
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 31 of 60
satisfactory ratings and though with some challenges, procurement objective(s) were largely met with no
mis‐procurement activities recorded. Procurement performance is rated as moderately satisfactory.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
80. Quality at entry was satisfactory. The design of EFCRP was particularly strong in that it addressed
both the supply side and demand side constraints affecting food security. When it was being designed,
several other programs—financed through the MDTF‐SS were under implementation, many working on
complementary issues of food production and safety nets. This included the SAFDP, which had been under
implementation for a couple of years, was trying to address issues of capacity at the center and local
levels, which would have benefitted EFCRP operations.
81. Implementation arrangements were complex at first, following SAFDP, which mainstreamed
project activities into the operations of MAF Technical Directorates. The Southern Sudan Technical
Steering Committee (SSTSC) was an inter‐ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry was responsible for implementation of the project. The Southern Sudan Technical Committee
(SSTC) was a technical secretariat at the Undersecretary level within the SSPSC and was responsible for
overall coordination and oversight of the project. A Director General, who was a member of the SSTC, was
appointed to provide a link between the national level and the NGO implementers at the decentralized
level and was to be supported by a short‐term project management and administrative specialist and a
road engineer as the core personnel for the PIU for the project. The PIU for EFCRP was embedded within
the Project Coordination Unit of MAF so it could be fully supported by their expertise in the said unit.
82. EFCRP supplemented the capacity of the government with well‐established international NGOs
with extensive experience working with the local communities on agriculture and safety nets. This was a
good decision that impacted the ability of the project to start activities despite delays in establishing the
contracts for the NGOs, and it paid off in term of safeguards management and implementation in conflict
areas when the security situation worsened. The project also brought in technical assistance in the PIU to
complement the government staff working on the project.
83. EFCRP reflected the lessons that had already been learned through SAFDP. It had a comparatively
simple results framework with a few indicators that were directly related to the project activities instead
of broad sector monitoring indicators. The team held workshops on M&E with the implementing agency
and the NGOs to overcome difficulties experienced in developing the M&E system under SAFDP. Based
on the quality of EFCRP’s data, more was needed to get a workable system established, such as capacity
building on database creation and management, data verification, using project data for decision support,
etc.
84. The World Bank team planned for rigorous supervision of the project, but the selection of far flung
implementation sites should have been avoided given the poor transport infrastructure in the country.
Most of the team was based in the Juba Office and provided direct support and supervision as frequently
as required. In keeping with the practice of other emergency projects, a minimum of four intensive
support missions per year were planned in addition to bimonthly review meetings with the implementing
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 32 of 60
agencies. A project review was planned for the end of the first year of implementation to focus on: (a) the
fiduciary issues; (b) the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms; and (c) achievements of results.
Implementing agencies were required to produce technical audit reports every six months and the
government was tasked with making regular spot visits to project sites.
Quality of Supervision
85. The quality of supervision is conservatively rated moderately satisfactory, especially given the FCV
context. The World Bank team is to be commended for adhering to a critical pillar of the World Bank’s
approach in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, which is to stay engaged. The team
worked with MAFS to apply for additional funds to keep the EFCRP operation going, preparing additional
financing proposals while the staff were evacuated due to insecurity. Ultimately, the experience of EFCRP
into the design of the Safety Nets and Skills Development Project and the Emergency Food and Nutrition
Security Project. For the latter, it is highly likely that the relationship established between the World Bank
and the GOSS through EFCRP facilitated the rapid preparation of that project.
86. During Phase 1 and the early parts of Phase 2, the World Bank team was in the Juba office and
worked closely with MAFS and the NGOs to monitoring implementation progress. It also hired an
additional consultant to provide close implementation support to MAFS. The team held workshops with
MAFS and the NGOs to agree on monitoring indicators and measurement—although more capacity
building was required to get the M&E system functioning—and it provided training on safeguards
implementation. The World Bank team undertook regular field visits and joined project coordination
meetings with MAFS. Given the lack of capacity on the part of such a new government and the lack of
experience on the part of the NGOs and the Government in working together, it sometimes fell to the
World Bank team to drive implementation, which they did, by and large.
87. Once civil war erupted in December 2013, supervision became almost impossible (table 5). The
Bank offices were twice evacuated to Nairobi: (a) 20 December 2013–30 April 2014; and (b) July 2016‐
April 2017, but the Bank team still arranged for the 2014 PP during the first and the follow‐on EFNSP
during the second.
88. Insecurity ultimately precluded field visits in some areas—especially by the World Bank team—
and it impeded project implementation in several areas. Given the rapidly changing circumstances in the
country (both from a security and food insecurity perspective), the World Bank team and MAFS adopted
a flexible approach to implementation, where the combinations of activities (agricultural production,
public works, and direct food support) implemented in a project area were dictated by local circumstances
and relied on the judgement of the implementing agency.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 33 of 60
Table 5 EFCRP implementation calendar with security issues
89. Nevertheless, despite persevering under extremely challenging conditions, there were oversights
and missed opportunities that might have been avoided. For example, providing capacity building to
government staff at the national level could have built more long‐term impact than hiring in technical
assistance. Even training workshops during supervision, VCs with Bank experts for additional training and
guidance, and mentoring of staff by Bank team members could have be workable. The reporting and
record keeping on the part of the Bank team was less than optimal. The team’s candor about the
implementation issues, including scale of the conflict was weak throughout implementation. There were
14 ISRs for a 9.3‐year project (less than the twice per year guideline), and they sometimes lacked detail
on the nature of the issues being incurred. Finally, the Bank’s handling of two of the additional financings
in 2014 and 2016 created errors that dragged down the ratings of efficacy and relevance. In the 2014 PP,
it’s not clear that the PDO needed to be changed to add unconditional cash transfers to the project,
although this may have been required under the circumstances. The indicator to track that activity did not
need to be at the PDO level, since there was already a beneficiary indicator, and the other safety net
activities were tracked at the intermediate outcome level. An intermediate outcome indicator could have
been correctly quickly and painlessly revised once the confusion between the Bank’s targets and the
MAFS‐WFP contract was identified, preventing the shortfall on the target. In the 2016 PP, the failure to
revise the PDO to fit the changed nature of the grant led to a break in the relevance of the design in the
project, even though the activities by themselves were relevant to the context.
Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
90. Based on the above, while consideration was given to rating overall performance as satisfactory,
the conservative rating of moderately satisfactory was chosen for the reasons cited above. Project
preparation reflected lessons from ongoing project, but the lack of contextual information on the ground
and lack of capacity for World Bank project management in the implementation agency led to weaknesses
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
2008 PP
2011 PP
2012 PP
2013 PP
2014 PP
2016 PP
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
2008 PP
2011 PP
2012 PP
2013 PP
2014 PP
2016 PP
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
2008 PP Active implementation
2011 PP
2012 PP Bank evacuated from Juba
2013 PP
2014 PP Implementation under security restrictions
2016 PP
2016 2017
2014 2015
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 34 of 60
in baselines and monitoring systems that were not overcome. During implementation, the growing
insecurity ultimately made field level close supervision impossible. The chaos resulting from the unfolding
situation in South Sudan during this time, certainly explain the shortcomings; however, the World Bank’s
failure to catch these issues during preparation and supervision reviews and to bring in the extra resources
to adequately address them led to important data and lessons being lost.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
91. The risk to development outcome is high. The continued conflict and macroeconomic collapse in
the country have resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Table 6 provides an
overview of how key humanitarian indicators have degraded over time. The scale of the conflict and
economic collapse where beyond the ability of the project to overcome.
Table 6 Humanitarian situation in South Sudan at various points of time
Dec‐12 Apr‐14 Jun‐16 Jun‐17 Jul‐18
IDPs 183,000 817,700 1,600,000 1,940,000 1,840,000
POCs N/A N/A 170,000 216,956 198,444
Severely food insecure 2,400,000 3,200,000 6,100,000 7,500,000 7,100,000
Refugees N/A 287,600 727,610 1,940,000 2,480,000
92. Given the insecurity in the country and the ensuing internal displacements, the sustainability of
project investments cannot be confirmed, and it is likely that much of the progress registered by the
project has been lost due to displacement and damage or destruction of infrastructure in the conflict
affected areas. For example, Mercy Corps implemented in Maban County in the payams of Korakimar,
Bunj and Banachuwa between November 2012 to May 2013. By 2014, sources reported escalating conflict
in Upper Nile, including in Maban County (Bunj payam) and in Panyikang County. It is unknown how many
beneficiaries were displaced and how much of the cropping and public works activities survived.13 The
July 2018 workshop with MAFS and implementing NGOs confirmed that some infrastructure in Yambio
has survived the conflict, but that many of the farmers had fled the area. Nagero and Morobo counties
remained inaccessible. The investments in Phase 3 were still operating in June 2018, six months after
project close. Follow up surveys or monitoring have been next to impossible for MAFS and especially for
Bank staff.
93. Donor activities in South Sudan now focus almost exclusively on humanitarian aid, including the
World Bank’s EFNSP, which has supported general food distribution through World Food Programme;
nutrition, health, WASH, and psycho‐social support services through UNICEF; and continued support to
production for food security through FAO. Despite the loss to conflict, EFCRP did influence the design of
two follow‐on projects—SNSDP and EFNSP. It also created lessons that will inform the design of future
recovery and resilience projects in terms of the type of inputs, technology, and other support that should
be provided.
13 Radio Tamazuj. 2014. “MAP: Who controls Upper Nile state?” https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/map‐who‐controls‐upper‐nile‐state
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 35 of 60
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
94. The following lessons learned and recommendations from the project are intended to inform
future World Bank finances operations being implemented in the FCV context.
What worked well
Working with NGOs. In a context of fragility and conflict, strong, reputable NGOs that are familiar
with the project area and cultural issues can help overcome lack of information on the part of the
World Bank and the implementing agency. This is especially true in areas that were isolated for a
long time due to war. Difficult human relations that arose due to the war are better understood and
addressed by people who have worked and/or have thorough knowledge about the local setting.
This can accelerate progress at the beginning of the project as they can hit the ground running. This
approach also has trade‐offs. The World Bank and implementing agency must ensure a shared
understanding of project goals, methodologies, and monitoring priorities up front to avoid confusion.
Working with Local Authorities. Working with local authorities—including sector officers, local
administrative officers, and traditional leaders—is critical to managing risk and delivering results on
the ground. EFCRP benefitted from County level coordinating meetings with officials that helped
minimize overlap among donor programs. In addition, local authorities played a key role in resolving
localized conflicts between groups when they occurred.
Youth in Agriculture. Youth do exhibit interest in agriculture, and they are especially attracted to
machinery for land preparation and crop processing, in addition to road rehabilitation and storage
construction. These types of activities can attract more youth in future project and create sustainable
enterprise opportunities for them.
Pushing technical boundaries. NGO partners, working with government scientists to identify best
varieties for different locations were able to introduce good quality seeds with traits beneficial to the
South Sudan context, such as: Red Beauty groundnut, which is tolerant to rosette and leaf spots;
NERICA rice, which is more resistant to environmental stresses and contains more protein than
traditional varieties; TME 14 variety of cassava for high yields and disease and pest resistance; Longe
5 maize, for drought‐tolerance and protein content. In addition, seed multiplication in areas of relative
security was possible and beneficial to continued production.
Mechanization is possible and essential. Even with small grant sizes and a short implementation
period, EFCRP was able to introduce animal traction, push tillers, some tractors, and machinery for
post‐harvest processing. Land preparation mechanization is critical to bringing sufficient amounts of
fallow land under cultivation, so a community can start to tackle food security, and the post‐harvest
machinery is important to extending storage life of crops.
Adaptive changes during implementation
Technical assistance vs. capacity building. There is a trade‐off, particularly when working in FCV
countries, between achieving project goals in a timely manner through technical assistance and
building lasting skills on the ground through capacity building. While technical assistance is needed
up front in low capacity contexts, a strong program of mentoring and capacity building is needed for
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 36 of 60
longer‐term change. Close supervision is also needed to more effectively track progress,
communicate and establish teamwork among PIU and donors.
Maintaining momentum. It is important to counter the impacts of high staff turnover, including by
staying in active communication with changing country context and PIU staff, and by working to
foster capacity of and ownership by incoming stakeholders through dialogue and periodic training
sessions.
Proactivity and Flexibility in Project Design and Implementation. Projects in FCV face fluid
situations—in terms of natural disasters and conflict—requiring adaptive risk management at all
levels—e.g., Bank team, CMU and Senior Management. Projects should be flexible enough to
continue operating as circumstances on the ground change. For example, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal,
when plans for donkey‐powered traction clearly did not work due to tse‐tse fly infestation, the
government and the NGO partner quickly identified alternative activities that would benefit farmers.
When the insecurity made it next to impossible to go to the field, the World Bank and MAFS agreed
with the NGO partners on the priorities and to decentralize decision‐making on what interventions
would work in each setting. This allowed the project to keep moving forward on at least one
component until security improved.
Recommendations for Future Projects in FCV
Learning from experience. This project could serve as an example that despite challenging country
context, results can be achieved, especially in dire situations such as a food crisis. There is also merit
in assessing the counterfactual risk of not engaging in countries needing basic services. For these
circumstances, a feasible and measurable M&E framework is needed and should be given credence
when assessing final outcomes.
Value of better targeting that trades off need and accessibility. Having analysis that would effectively
measure the accessibility dimension would provide evidence to better support the technical design of
projects in the future. The demands of this project were especially clear given the grants responded
quickly to the food crisis, however may have missed the potential of conjoining the accessibility
dimension for greater impact.
Pre‐planning and clear fund flows help maintain implementation momentum. A project operating
in and FCV context should map out as much as possible, its initial procurements and locations for
prepositioning so that supplies—seeds, construction materials, equipment—can be purchased,
imported, and pre‐positioned close to the implementation sites. This will help the project keep
moving if weather or conflict block transport. It can also ensure that the seeds and tools for cultivation
are in place before cropping needs to begin and not delay implementation for a season.
Longer implementation timelines are needed to achieve impact. All of the NGOs reported that having
small grants over a short period prevents planning for a longer engagement and trust with the
communities, which need more intensive engagement to move from humanitarian to resilience
building. The NGOs could not plan out on a sufficient time horizon the engagement they think was
needed. The many restructurings to add financing to the project also created an administrative
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 37 of 60
burden for the project team (dual track approval and reporting), which was as different times during
implementation
Third‐party monitoring. Having one or more independent agencies monitoring project processes as
well as implementation progress is important in fragile contexts. These monitors can not only verify
results, but also identify areas where confusion over approaches or measurement techniques are
evident so that additional capacity building or other adjustments can be made quickly. They can also
facilitate knowledge sharing across project areas.
Use technology to enhance M&E. Where interventions are highly dispersed and difficult to access,
technology such as those offered by GOST, can boost the value of data collected. First, it provides
time and GPS tagged data that can be used to ensure project staff are working where they claim to
be working. Second, data can be uploaded directly to the PIU and the Bank at any time, allowing for
closer tracking of project progress. Third, it makes M&E interesting—something even youth in the
project areas might enthusiastically embrace. Fourth, it can facilitate satellite monitoring of project
areas. Finally, photos of the implementation locations can be attached to records to increase
understanding of the situation of the ground and to provide before and after comparisons of project
interventions. .
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 38 of 60
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators
Objective/Outcome: Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers
Number 0.00 138000.00 138000.00 58680.00
03‐Feb‐2014 03‐Feb‐2014 03‐Feb‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Added in the 2014 PP to capture beneficiaries of direct food distribution from WFP (43% of target achieved). Due to apparent miscommunication between the World Bank team and MAFS, the 2014 PP gave the 138,000 target, but the contract between MAFS and WFP was for the amount achieved. The May/June 2016 ISR noted that “the number of vulnerable households benefiting from unconditional food support (food aid) stands at 58,680 and these accrue primarily from the contract that was issued by the Government to the World Food Program.” The project was not restructured at the time to align the targets.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries Number 213462.00 215500.00 384500.00 339433.00
20‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 11‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Female beneficiaries Percentage 42.00 45.00 50.00 47.00
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 39 of 60
20‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 11‐Apr‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target (88% achieved). Indicator introduced in 2011 PP as a mandatory core indicator. It replaced "targeted population receiving cash transfers" as a PDO indicator, and participants in public works was tracked for the rest of the project through an intermediate outcome indicator. This indicator will capture beneficiaries under components one and two only (component two beneficiaries disaggregated as an intermediate indicator).
Objective/Outcome: Increased production and availability of food in targeted areas
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for food production.
Number 0.00 189000.00 229800.00 272620.00
23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 16‐May‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (102% achieved). The indicator was introduced in 2011 and replaced the indicators "Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and percent). It is proxy for reporting on number of farmers targeted for own food production. Original target from 2008 PP was targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas. This was replaced with 2 GFRP indicators in 2009: Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number and percent). This current indicator was the final version used from the 2011 PP onwards. The target was revised upward with each additional finance until 2016.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Metric tons of storage capacity built
Metric ton 1636.00 2600.00 8700.00 11092.00
01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 03‐Feb‐2014 31‐Dec‐2017
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 40 of 60
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (427% achieved). New PDO indicator in 2011 will report on investments made in response to the demanded post‐harvest storage capacity identified at household and community level. It is a proxy to capture strategies taken by the project to promote increase practices that would reduce household vulnerability to seasonal availability of food for consumption.
Objective/Outcome: Increased production and consumption of highly nutritious foods by selected farmers and vulnerable households
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced due to the project
Number 0.00 1800.00 4600.00
11‐Apr‐2016 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (250% achieved). This indicator was added under the final grant (PHRD) accessed by the project. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Numbe rof households that report an increased household dietary diversity
Number 0.00 1900.00 6000.00
11‐Apr‐2016 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (316% achieved). This indicator was added under the final grant (PHRD) accessed by the project. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 41 of 60
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Component 1 Support to Agricultural Productivity
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management.
Number 0.00 83000.00 100700.00 125211.00
23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (151% achieved) New indicator in 2011. Introduced to report innovations promoted by the project to improve household consumption through better food management and handling. It will report effects of investments in training, construction of food stores or granaries, processing and other post‐harvest management. It is a subset of the indicator above.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production
Hectare(Ha) 0.00 4000.00 38800.00 104741.00
23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (262% achieved) New indicator in 2011. Introduced to track increased production through expansion of beneficiaries planted area through clearing of idle land.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Percent of targeted food Text 12% 65% 0 74%
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 42 of 60
insecure households in project areas with food reserves
23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Dec‐2011
Comments (achievements against targets): Original indicator from 2008 PP was "Numbers of food insecure households in the project area with food reserves" with a target of 1000. This was revised to the current target in 2011 and dropped in 2012 due to difficulty in terms of time and cost in obtaining accurate and reliable data on the indicator, potential problems with attribution of impact to project interventions, and lack of a reliable baseline.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of househjolds using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities
Number 0.00 0.00 1550.00 2500.00
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (161% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
Component: Component 2: Strengthening Community Safety Nets
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of participants in public works program
Text 0 25462.00 37300.00 47595.00
01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Percent of which are youth Text N/A 50% 70% 62%
23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2011 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 43 of 60
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (187% achieved) Added in 2011 as requested by the GFRP Secretariat, to report the number of individuals that participated and possibly benefited from cash and/or food from public works. It was simplified to record participation rather than benefits as the latter would require survey, and the original target was set based on elaborate criteria targeting households. Based on the nature of activities selected and the required time for completion, self targeting predominated the selection in 50% of the areas selected.
Component: Component 3: Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of housholds adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices
Number 0.00 0.00 1650.00 2781.00
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target surpassed (169% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understaning of their role in improving nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work
Number 0.00 0.00 120.00 40.00
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 44 of 60
Comments (achievements against targets): Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of jopint activities and meetings invloving nutrition and agricutlure/food security coordination mechanisms
Number 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 01‐Jun‐2016 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved (160% achieved) Added in 2016 as part of AF #5 (2.7M PHRD), this is a new indicator associated with the projects new components. Implementation was delayed due to the outbreak of violence that caused the Bank to evacuate from South Sudan for almost one year.
Component: Component 4: Support to Project Implementation
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues.
Yes/No N Y Y Y
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 31‐Dec‐2017 31‐Dec‐2017
Comments (achievements against targets):
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 45 of 60
Indicator Name Unit of Measure
Baseline Original Target Formally Revised
Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Feebacks and follow‐up recorded on fiduciary issues (number)
Text 4 0 0 0
23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008 23‐Sep‐2008
Comments (achievements against targets): Dropped in 2012 in favor of Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues. However, the ISR template was not updated until the following year.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 46 of 60
B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Increased access to food for consumption by food insecure households
Outcome Indicators 1. Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers
2. Direct project beneficiaries
Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Number of participants in public works program
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)
1. 58,680 people benefitted from unconditional food distribution through WFP (43% of stated target)
2. 339,433 direct project beneficiaries, of which 47% were women (88% of target)
3. 47,595 people participated in public works programs (128% of target) of which 62% were youth (89%
of target)
Increased production and availability of food in targeted areas
Outcome Indicators 1. Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for food production
2. Metric tons of storage capacity built
Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management
2. Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)
1. 272,620 farmers adopted improved technologies for food production (102% of target)
2. 11,092 metric tons of storage capacity built (127% of target)
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 47 of 60
3. 125,211 farmers adopting new practices for post‐harvest management (124% of target)
4. 104,741 hectares of idle land brought under cultivation (270% of target)
Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes14
Outcome Indicators 1. Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced due to the project
2. Number of households that report an increased household dietary diversity
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Number of households adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices
2. Number of households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities
3. Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understanding of their role in improving
nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work
4. Number of joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination
mechanisms
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)
1. 4,500 report increased number of foods produced (250% of target)
2. 6,000 households reporting increased dietary diversity (316% of target)
3. 2781 households report adopting healthy eating practices (169% of target)
4. 2,500 households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities (161% of target)
5. 40 agriculture professionals reporting increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition
(33% of target)
14 This was not part of the PDO, but was the objective of the phase 3 grant. See Sections IIA and IIB for explanation.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 48 of 60
6. 8 joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination
mechanisms (160% of target)
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 49 of 60
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS
Name Role
Preparation
Supervision/ICR
Melissa Williams Task Team Leader(s)
Ocheng Kenneth Kaunda Odek, Pascal Tegwa Procurement Specialist(s)
Stephen Diero Amayo Financial Management Specialist
Christine E. Cornelius Team Member
Jeeva A. Perumalpillai‐Essex Team Member
Tracy Hart Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Juvenal Nzambimana Team Member
Varalakshmi Vemuru Social Safeguards Specialist
Evarist F. Baimu Counsel
Srilatha Shankar Team Member
Abel Lufafa Team Member
Museme Munira Issa Team Member
Eric Brintet Team Member
John Barakia Team Member
Grace Tabu Felix Team Member
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost
No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 50 of 60
FY09 5.573 33,822.36
FY10 0 0.00
Total 5.57 33,822.36 Supervision/ICR
FY09 8.358 32,206.60
FY10 23.351 111,520.88
FY11 39.461 117,881.87
FY12 19.661 47,720.84
FY13 16.470 123,350.67
FY14 0 1,737.27
FY15 1.800 7,914.26
FY16 0 273.77
FY18 6.088 39,112.82
FY19 3.878 23,034.92
Total 119.07 504,753.90
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 51 of 60
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Component
Original Project
2008 (US$, millions)
Additional Finance (US$ million)
Total 1
2011 2
2012 3
2013 4
2014 5
2016
Support to Agricultural Productivity 3.00 1.30 1.40 2.73 3.00 ‐ 11.43
Strengthening Community Safety Nets 1.50 0.70 1.50 4.00 5.50 ‐ 13.2
Support to Improved Nutritional Outcomes
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.30
2.3
Support to Project Implementation 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.50 0.40 2.5
Total 5.00 2.20 3.00 7.53 9.00 2.70 29.43
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 52 of 60
ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
95. Because of the urgency of the crisis response during preparation and the general lack of basic data
in South Sudan, no financial or economic analysis was carried out for the project in 2008, 2011, 2012, or
2013 (original project and the first three additional financings). The 2013 PP committed to collecting data
for ex‐post computation of financial and economic returns on farm income towards the end of project
implementation. Within two months of approving the 2013 PP, however, the civil war broke out in South
Sudan forcing the Bank to evacuate Juba in late December 2013 until April 2014. The 2014 PP was
prepared while the Bank office was evacuated, so the World Bank team used available data (including
targets set in the 2014 PP) to provide some preliminary financial and economic analysis while highlighting
the uncertainties associated with the following estimates:
Cash wages paid to 37,300 participants in public works projects in the project area were valued
at US$1.6 million or US$42 per person per year constituting 11 percent of the South Sudan poverty
line per person per year.
In EFCRP, ultimately 47,595 people participated in the public works program; however, payment in some areas followed a daily wage rate while other used a task‐based rate, which incentivized rapid completion of works. According to analysis in the 2011 PP using 2009 data, the payments were equivalent to daily rates ranging from SDG 13‐15 SSP per day in Yambio and Morobo to SDG 20‐25 per day in Raja.
Direct food support to 138,000 people for 2 months was valued at US$7.6 million at a rate of
US$27.5 per person per month equivalent to 86 percent of the poverty line.
As pointed out in section IIB, due to miscommunication between the World Bank team and the PIU, the assumption of 138,000 beneficiaries served for two months was inaccurate. The PIU contracted with WFP to provide GFD for 58,680 beneficiaries over a period of four months. GFD represented 17 percent of the project cost, so the analysis below looks at the financial returns for the support to agriculture production, which was 39 percent of the project.
The economic benefit cost ratio of increased community grain storage was estimated at 1.3 with
an economic NPV of US$1 million and an ERR of 20 percent.
The data and assumptions used to arrive at these figures were not available to the ICRR team, so a follow up analysis was not done.
96. While the NGOs were able to restart with implementation after March 2014 and the Bank
returned to Juba one month later, insecurity throughout the country preventing the collection of solid
data for analysis. This ICRR provides some financial analysis of the support to agriculture production
(component 1) using a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the
preparation of the 2014 PP. It also draws on project documents and evaluations of similar projects inside
and outside of the Bank to get a sense of the returns to investments to public works programs (component
2) like those under EFCRP.
97. EFNSP used a representative crop model for sorghum and maize that was developed for the
preparation of 2014 PP to estimate financial gross margins in the project area. For EFCRP, average prices
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 53 of 60
for maize and sorghum in December 2015, six months before the end of the project were used to
determine the gross margin. Sorghum prices ranged from SSP 12/kg in Rumbek to SSP 15/kg in Wau. Maize
prices ranged from SSP 10.3/kg in Wau and to SSP 11.7 in Rumbek. Drawing on the EFNSP analysis, the
analysis assumes an average of 1 ha/beneficiary. Based on these numbers, the average gross margin six
months before project close was US$257 for sorghum and US$150 for maize.
Table 7 Financial analysis of sorghum and maize production under EFCRP
Unit Sorghum Maize
Yield kg/ha 900 800
Crop price US$/kg 0.73 0.5
Operating costs by Project US$/ha 200 125
Operating costs by farmer US$/ha 200 125
Gross Margin US$/ha 257 150
98. There are a few caveats to the analysis. The final reported number of farmers adopting improved
technologies for production under EFCRP is 272,620, and while sorghum and maize are the major crops in
South Sudan and a priority for food security production, those two crops do not represent 100 percent of
the cropped area. Seeds and cuttings were provided for groundnut, cassava, pulses, vegetables, and sim
sim, but the project did not track the number of hectares dedicated to each crop across seasons. It should
also be noted that prices were volatile throughout the project, so financial returns were similarly volatile.
Financial analysis of production for maize and groundnut done by one of the implementing NGOs during
Phase 1 of the project (around 2010) showed a higher cost of production, particularly for maize in Yambio
county. However, this data had not been validated, and some details were missing, so the analysis could
not be included.
99. There was insufficient data to analyze the returns to mechanization—both for land preparation
and post‐harvest processing, but this was a relatively small element of the project assets introduced.
100. The analysis of the cash for work program looked to analysis from similar projects for indications
of the potential returns. For this, the World Bank’s SNSDP project, which drew on EFCRP for its technical
design, did provide an analysis that showed it would cost US$2.07 to transfer US$1.00 in wage benefits to
the intended recipients, which compared well to similar programs. The EFNSP cash for works component
ultimately reached 47,595 people with an investment of $8.2 million—about $172 invested per
beneficiary. This is averaged over the life of the project, and it includes the cost of materials. Detailed data
on the number of people reached each year in each county was not systematically collected, but AAH
provided full financial data in their 2014‐15 completion report. In Yambio, Nagero, and Tali counties, the
public works component provided an average of 56 days employment at about $7/day for average annual
wage of $414. This was manual repair of several kilometers of road and installation of culverts for each
community.
Component 1
Agriculture
Component 2
Safety Nets
Component 3
Management
Number of people
employed Mandays
Average days/ person
Total Wage Bill
Average daily wage
Yambio 37.2% 24.9% 37.9% 276 14,691 53.23 112,059.07 7.63
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 54 of 60
Component 1
Agriculture
Component 2
Safety Nets
Component 3
Management
Number of people
employed Mandays
Average days/ person
Total Wage Bill
Average daily wage
Tali 40.6% 17.2% 42.2% 225 13,667 60.74 99,638.96 7.29
Nagero 42.6% 25.2% 32.2% 568 31,150 54.84 224,081.00 7.19
101. Noting the prevalence of bartering in South Sudan, the project noted that introducing cash wages
would increase purchasing power and stimulate demand in local markets. That EFCRP also supported the
supply response in local market offset the risk of inflation that could happen in the absence of functioning
markets. The public works supported by EFCRP had multiplier effects as well. For example, the focus on
farm to market road rehabilitation would have contributed to lowering the cost for transport to market
by farmers, which would have increased access to relatively affordable food in local markets. The
monitoring system for the project did not systematically record the kilometers of road that were
rehabilitated, and no baseline data on the cost of transport to market was collected. A review of a World
Food Programme feeder road project (an activity supported by EFCRP as well) did not perform an
economic or financial analysis.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 55 of 60
ANNEX 5. OVERVIEW OF CHANGES TO THE RESULTS INDICATORS
Line Item Type Indicator Introduced
Dropped or
Replaced Comments
1 PDO % of targeted farmers adopting improved technologies for food production in the targeted areas
Sep‐08 Dec‐09 Replaced by GFRP indicators (#2 and #3)
2 PDO Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (number of farmers)
Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by simplified #4 in June 2011
3 PDO Farmers adopting at least one improved technology for food production (% of farmers targeted)3
Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by #4
4 PDO Number of farmers adopting improved technologies for production
Jun‐11 N/A
5 PDO % of target population receiving cash transfers
Sep‐08 Dec‐09 Replaced by #6
6 PDO Targeted population receiving cash transfers (number)3
Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by #9
7 PDO Number of vulnerable persons benefiting from unconditional food or cash transfers
Feb‐14 N/A Added in 2014 to capture beneficiaries of direct food distribution from WFP
8 PDO Metric tons of storage capacity built Jun‐11 N/A
9 PDO # of project beneficiaries (% of which are female)
Jun‐11 N/A Captured all beneficiaries under components one and two.
10 PDO Number of households reporting an increase in the number of foods produced
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
11 PDO Number of households that report an increased household dietary diversity
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
12 IOI Food insecure households in the project area with food reserves
Sep‐08 Jun‐11 Replaced by #17
13 IOI Number of food insecure households in the project area that participate in public works
Sep‐08 Jun‐11 Reformulated in 2011 and merged with number of participants of public works program
14 IOI Beneficiaries of public work programs (number of individuals)
Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Replaced by #18
15 IOI Person‐days provided in labor intensive public works (number)
Dec‐09 Jun‐11 Difficulties in measurement as some areas of South Sudan paid by task rather than by day.
16 IOI Feedbacks and follow‐up recorded on fiduciary issues (number)
Sep‐08 Jun‐12 Replaced by #21
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 56 of 60
Line Item Type Indicator Introduced
Dropped or
Replaced Comments
17 IOI Percent of targeted food insecure households in project areas with food reserves
Jun‐11 Jun‐12 Dropped due to difficulty in gathering data
18 IOI Number of participants in public works program (% of which are youth)
Jun‐11 N/A
19 IOI Number of farmers adopting new practices and initiatives for postharvest handling and management.
Jun‐11 N/A Introduced to track additional focus on post‐harvest management.
20 IOI Number of hectares of idle land brought back into production
Jun‐11 N/A
21 IOI Planned implementation progress based on annual work plans is achieved and timely actions taken on implementation problems including fiduciary issues.
Jun‐12 N/A
22 IOI Number of households adopting healthy eating practices and using essential nutrition practices
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
23 IOI Number of households using improved food processing and storage methods and facilities
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
24 IOI Number of agriculture professionals reporting an increased understanding of their role in improving nutrition and integrated nutrition activities in their work
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
25 IOI Number of joint activities and meetings involving nutrition and agriculture/food security coordination mechanisms
Jun‐16 N/A Exclusive to the PHRD grant
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 57 of 60
ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)
World Bank. 2008. Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project (ISDS). Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=9817324
World Bank. 2011. Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 05 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=14004193
World Bank. 2012. Main report Vol. 1 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17736742
Lufafa, Abel. 2012. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 06 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=16898647
Lufafa, Abel. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 07 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17721318
World Bank. 2013. Environmental and social management framework Vol. 3 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17747304
World Bank. 2013. Environmental and social assessment report Vol. 2 of South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : environmental assessment. South Sudan ; s.n.. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=17747175
Lufafa, Abel. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 08 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=18622981
Lufafa, Abel. 2014. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 09 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=19892291
World Bank. 2011. Sudan ‐ Additional Financing for the Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project . Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=14450486
0000A8056. 2015. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 10 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=23141880
World Bank. 2013. South Sudan ‐ Additional Financing for the Emergency Food Crisis Response Project. Washington DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=18367768
Lufafa,Abel. 2016. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project : P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 11 . Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 58 of 60
https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=26047282
Lufafa, Abel. 2016. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 12 . Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=26550495
World Bank. 2016. Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: Implementation support mission ‐ May 16 to 20, 2016. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=26534091
World Bank. 2014. Official Documents‐ Recommendation of Statutory Committee for Grant H922‐SS, TF015934 and TF015935 (Closing Package) . Washington, DC: World Bank. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=19427303
World Bank. 2014. South Sudan ‐ Additional Financing for the Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: restructuring. Washington DC; World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=19221266
Lufafa, Abel. 2017. South Sudan ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: P113586 ‐ Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 13. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=27109736
World Bank. 2017. South Sudan/AFRICA‐ P113586‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ‐ Procurement Plan. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=27895515
National Audit Chamber. 2016. South Sudan ‐ Emergency Food Crisis Response Project: audited financial statement ‐ year ending June 30, 2015. South Sudan. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=27041391
Lufafa,Abel. 2017. Disclosable Version of the ISR ‐ Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ‐ P113586 ‐ Sequence No: 14. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/ImageBank/Pages/DocProfile.aspx?nodeid=28133885
The World Bank Southern Sudan Emergency Food Crisis Response Project ( P113586 )
Page 59 of 60
ANNEX 7. MAP OF PROJECT COUNTIES The project implemented in select payams within each operational county.