Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000382 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-36830 IDA-36831) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 23.0 MILLION (US$30 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA FOR A ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT December 17, 2007 Sustainable Development Department South East Europe Country Unit Europe and Central Asia Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of The World Bank
Report No: ICR0000382
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-36830 IDA-36831)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 23.0 MILLION (US$30 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
FOR A
ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT
December 17, 2007
Sustainable Development Department South East Europe Country Unit Europe and Central Asia Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2007)
Currency Unit = Albanian Lek (ALL) ALL 1.00 = US$ 0.011
US$ 1.00 = ALL 92.490
FISCAL YEAR
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BMS Bridge Management System CAS Country Assistance Strategy DRS Directorate of Road Safety GDP Gross Domestic Product GRD General Roads Directorate EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IEG Independent Evaluation Group MLGD Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization MOF Ministry of Finance MOI Ministry of Interior MOTT Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications NGOs Non Governmental Organizations PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PIT Project Implementation Team PMS Pavement Management System RMC Resource Mobilization and Co-financing RMP Road Maintenance Project
Vice President: Shigeo Katsu, ECAVP Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos, ECCU4 Country Manager: Camille Lampart Nuamah, ECCAL
Sector Manager: Motoo Konishi, ECSSD Project Team Leader: Richard Martin Humphreys, ECSSD
ICR Team Leader: Elena Chesheva, ECSSD
ALBANIA ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT
CONTENTS
Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 43. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 84. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 135. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 146. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 157. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 17Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................... 18Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 19Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................. 22Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 23Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 24Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 25Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 26Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................... 46Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 47
MAP
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A. Basic Information Country: Albania Project Name:
Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 11 9 Roads and highways 89 91
Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Infrastructure services for private sector development Primary Injuries and non-communicable diseases Secondary Other social protection and risk management Primary Secondary Rural services and infrastructure Primary Secondary E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Shigeo Katsu Johannes F. Linn Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Christiaan J. Poortman Sector Manager: Motoo Konishi Eva Molnar Project Team Leader: Elena Y. Chesheva Cesar Augusto Queiroz ICR Team Leader: Elena Y. Chesheva ICR Primary Author: Hernan Levy F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to reduce both transport costs on priority sections of the main road network, and accident rates more widely, and provide better accessibility to rural areas and to essential social services. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Project Development Objectives were not revised.
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(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target Values (from
approval documents)
Formally Revised Target Values
Actual Value Achieved at
Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 : Percent of population in the pilot areas with improved access to essential social services (Vlora and Shkodra hospitals)
Value quantitative or Qualitative)
0%
70% - an average reading across centers and isochrones. The pecentage of the population living within a 10 minute isochrone of these sites has doubled in each case.
Date achieved 06/05/2002 05/12/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 2 : Traffic Surveys demonstrate achievement of expected reductions in travel time of cars on priority national road sections
Value quantitative or Qualitative)
0%
Target by project end - 20% Actual at Project End: 22% in national roads 39% in rural roads
Date achieved 06/05/2002 05/12/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 3 : National accident records indicate significant reductions in traffic fatality rates
Value quantitative or Qualitative)
0% (15.12 fatalities/10000 vehicles in 2000)
Target 10% Actual 43% (8.65 fatalities/10000 vehicles in 2006)
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Date achieved 06/05/2002 05/12/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target Values (from
approval documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value Achieved at
Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 : Priority road sections maintained
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
Roughness 10.02 for national roads 19.28 for rural roads
Roughness 5 for national roads 8 for rural roads
Date achieved 05/06/2002 06/30/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 2 : Efficiency of the management and maintenance of the national and rural road networks improved
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
GRD not restructured PBMS being designed PMS being designed rural and municipal road administration strenghtened
GRD restructuring has commenced.
Date achieved 06/05/2002 06/30/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 3 : Traffic Safety: blackspots upgraded and multi-agency road safety program implemented
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
a.number of designated blackposts improved (0) b. no program nor safety audit c. targeted enforcement practices limited (0% baseline for accidents) d. no reports prepared
a. 30 blackspots improved b. annual programs implemented c. 10% reduction of accidents d. DRS reports are disseminated to public
Date achieved 06/05/2002 06/30/2007 Comments (incl. % achievement)
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal Structural changes in the economy since 1991 have led to radical changes in the level and composition of transport demand, especially road transport. The road fleet has grown from almost zero to over 180,000 vehicles in 2000. On the other hand, rail freight and passenger traffic has fallen to about 10 percent of its pre-1991 peak. Infrastructure bottlenecks, including the poor condition of the road system was, and continues to be, a major deterrent to economic growth. Such bottlenecks also hinder efforts to alleviate poverty because they constrain access by the poor to market opportunities and social services.
Road investments, mostly donor-financed, initially concentrated on the main transport corridors. Most sections on East-West and North-South corridors were complete or about complete in 2002. Other donor-financed investments were oriented mainly to help rehabilitate other sections of the primary and secondary road networks. Pre-1991 roads were not designed for heavy traffic and had to be rehabilitated before they could be efficiently maintained. In addition to the World Bank, the following donors were active in the sector at the time of project preparation (in alphabetical order): European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, European Union, Italy and Kuwait.
Despite these efforts to rehabilitate the road network, by the time of appraisal of the Road Maintenance Project (RMP), only one third of the network was in good or fair condition. In order to ensure that the rehabilitated roads were properly preserved, the government allocated a high priority to maintenance. A government road maintenance strategy, sent to the Bank in December 1999 in connection with the earlier emergency road repair project, highlighted the responsibility of the national highway agency (General Roads Directorate, GRD) for the maintenance of some 3,200 kilometers of the primary road network. It also noted that all road maintenance work (periodic and routine) would be done by contract in future. The strategy also gave increased attention to road safety, because the traffic fatality rate was the highest in central/eastern Europe and about ten times the average rate in the countries of the European Union.
The World Bank has been an active participant in the transport sector in Albania. Since 1991, it has approved 6 projects, covering national and local roads, trade facilitation and ports, for a total amount of USD 118.9 million. The Bank supported improving the roads sector both in its 1998 CAS and in a CAS Progress Report in 2000. Both documents stated as a key strategic priority, the promotion of sustainable private sector growth, including the improvement of infrastructure, with an emphasis on private sector participation. During Bank assistance to the government for the preparation of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework in 2000, the Bank recommended that the government increase its level of transport expenditure from 2 to 3 percent of GDP. Despite the ongoing needs, the recent Public Expenditure and Institutional Review1
1 World Bank (2006) Restructuring Public Expenditure to Sustain Growth, PREM, Washington DC.
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revealed that public expenditures in the sector remain below this level, averaging 2.4 percent of GDP over the period 2000-2005.
The RMP was the first donor-assisted operation that supported road maintenance and demonstrated efficient and practical ways to carry it out. The Bank was well placed to support this project in view of its broad, world-wide experience assisting in the institutional strengthening of road administrations to better manage and maintain national and rural road networks, support implementation of traffic safety policies, and coordinate with a large number of donors.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The project’s development objective was to reduce both transport costs on priority sections of the main road network, and accident rates more widely, and to provide better accessibility to rural areas and to essential social services. Outcome Indicators
1. Percent of population in the pilot areas with improved access to essential social services.
2. Traffic surveys demonstrate the achievement of expected reductions in travel time on priority road sections.
3. National accident records indicate significant reductions in traffic fatality rates.
Output Indicators
1. Compliance with agreed road standards and approved designs in segments designated for maintenance, with significant reductions in road roughness.
2. Improved efficiency of the management and maintenance of the national and rural road network by: (i) restructuring the national road administration (General Roads Directorate –
GRD); (ii) introducing a pavement management system; and (iii) strengthening the rural and municipal road administration unit (Ministry of
Local Government and Decentralisation – MLGD). 3. Designated accident ‘black spot’ areas improved in compliance with agreed designs. 4. Improved road safety by:
(i) developing the institutional capacity in the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications – MOTT/GRD and MLGD to identify hazardous locations and to design and implement physical measures to reduce road accidents at these locations; and
(ii) providing technical assistance and equipment to improve co-operation between agencies and the Directorate for Road Safety (DRS).
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification
The PDO and key indicators were not modified.
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1.4 Main Beneficiaries
The target population of the improvements sought under the project included all road users, including transport operators, agricultural and industrial producers, and the general population using the road network. Although the project was not specifically targeted to alleviate poverty, the poor, especially the rural poor (and almost 90 percent of Albania’s poor were rural at that time) were expected to benefit from improved access to job opportunities, social amenities (such as health and education services), and local markets, whilst also benefiting from improved road safety, thus reducing accident risks to pedestrians and non-motorized vehicles, in most cases operated by the poor.
Although not specifically identified as a project beneficiary, the institutional components aimed to make General Roads Directorate a more effective and efficient agency. The improvement encompassed better organization and using more modern methods of managing the highway network, especially of highway maintenance. The project also helped develop and train local contractors.
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
The Credit in the amount of SDR 13.5million (US$17 million equivalent) was approved on June 27, 2002, and became effective on October 11, 2002. The project included the following components:
(i) Maintenance of National and Rural Roads (US$18.65 million, out of which IDA financing was US$15.11 million). Works: About 500 kilometers of roads and bridges of the national road network and about 500 kilometers of roads and bridges of the rural road network. Goods: Equipment for road surveys, office equipment, vehicles and supplies for project implementation, equipment for road database development and implementation. Training and Technical Assistance: Restructuring of the national and rural road management; assessing rural and health facility accessibility; recommending appropriate user charges based on funding needs; providing services to prepare engineering design and carry out supervision of the road works; training for the private road construction industry; consultant services for PIU operation; consultant services for environmental management, training and public information campaigns; project audits.
(ii) Traffic safety (US$2.20 million, out of which IDA financing was US$1.89 million). Works: physical measures to improve safety in selected priority areas and accident black spot locations. Goods: Equipment (traffic control devices, safety enforcement), systems for data storage, retrieval and analysis for the Traffic Police and the MOTT Directorate of Road Safety. Training and Technical Assistance: road safety awareness seminar for senior government and other officials; consultant services for MOTT to support implementation of the DRS and its working procedures; consultant services and training for GRD; consultant services and training for MLGD; consultant services and training for the Traffic Police.
1.6 Revised Components
An amendment to the Development Credit Agreement (dated July 24, 2003) increased the IDA contribution to the project by an additional SDR 9.5 million (US$ 13 million equivalent), bringing the total amount to US$ 30 million equivalent. In parallel with the increased contribution, physical outputs were amended as follows:
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Table1. Original and Revised Targets for Physical Outputs Item Original
Target Revised Target
Comment
National Roads-Length to be maintained (kilometers)
500 1,000
Rural Roads – Length to be maintained (kilometers)
500 1,000 See Section 6.7
Blackspots areas improved 30 60 This change not described in the Amendment, but specified in the Supplemental Credit Agreement.
1.7 Other significant changes
a) Outcomes
There was no change in the expected outcomes.
b) Intermediate Outputs
During the Mid-Term Review the target for the maintenance of rural roads has been revised, and an Amendment to the Credit Agreement issued to reduce the target of 1000 km to 500km, as it was found out that during project preparation an error was made in calculation of the length of the roads to be maintained under the project. The consultant had summed the length of the treatment, rather than the length of the road sections, overlooking the fact that some routine and periodic maintenance would be undertaken on the same sections during the life of the project.
A study on road user charges included under the technical assistance component was also taken out of the project as a similar study was carried out with financing from the EBRD. Technical assistance to help prepare restructuring of the GRD was made dependent on the completion and recommendations on the results of an EU-funded technical assistance to the MOTT that included a Restructuring Plan for the GRD. The EU study in turn made use of a consultant study carried out during preparation of the RMP, which examined in detail the GRD organization.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Lessons taken into account.. The project built on the experience with two previous roads projects. Of particular relevance was the National Roads project. Experience from this and previous projects, as well as Bank global experience in the sector, were taken into account in project design and preparation, most notably in respect of the following:
(a) contract maintenance is more cost-effective than force account, and while periodic maintenance already is mostly outsourced in Albania, efforts should be made to initiate a similar approach for routine maintenance (which is more difficult to do because tasks are
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more difficult to define precisely, and their low unit cost make it less attractive to contractors);
(b) performance-based contracts, rather than conventional admeasure contracts further increase cost-effectiveness;
(c) funding for road maintenance through the budget requires a strong government commitment, or an autonomous Road Fund needs to be created;
(d) frequent changes in Albanian civil service in the past require a competent and independent Project Implementation Unit (PIU) during project implementation, constituted by local consultants paid according to market rates; and
(e) road safety is a major concern for the country and the Bank globally, and addressing it requires strong government support and involving a multiplicity of agencies.
Risks. The PAD rated the RMP risks as substantial, and identified three specific risks as being the most crucial: (a) inadequate allocation by government of resources for road maintenance, (b) insufficient or delayed government counterpart funding for the project, and (c) inadequate staffing and resources available to the involved agencies. Mitigation for the first two of these risks was based on the commitment made by the government under the Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks 2001-2003 and 2002-2004 published by the MOF in December 2000 and June 2001. In addition, a loan condition committed the government to increase GRD's budget for maintenance by not less than 5 percent in real terms during the life of the project. The third risk was mitigated by the provision of technical assistance in key areas. A number of other risks were considered modest, and the PAD clearly specified the corresponding mitigation measures.
Participation. The participatory process was appropriate for the design and identification of components of the project. Since the rural roads are 'owned' by the local rather than the central governments, identification of priorities for the rural roads sub-projects was done in consultation with Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization (MLGD) staff in both the national and regional offices. During implementation all contracts for execution of the rural roads subprojects required signature by an authorized representative of the government ministry responsible for the local government, the MLGD first, and its successor the Ministry of Interior (MOI), later, when the MLGD was dismantled. Despite the participatory process, it appears that changes in authorities in these ministries resulted in the new authorities having the perception that selection of the rural roads subprojects was not done in full consultation with the local authorities or the MLGD/MOI. This issue is discussed as a lesson in section 6.
Consultation on road safety issues and concerns was carried out with the public in different parts of the country during project preparation. The project preparation team also consulted with NGOs and relevant Albanian agencies involved with other IDA projects to identify suitable approaches to increasing public participation in the project.
2.2 Implementation Changes in Key Government Personnel. During the project period, several changes took place in key authorities leading the project on the borrower side. Changes included five different Ministers in the ministries directly responsible for the project (initially the Ministry of Public Works, and then its successors the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications), and a similar number of directors of the GRD. The PIU director was changed once. The civil works and road safety components of the project suffered little from these changes, since the new authorities respected the objective and design as had been originally agreed. However, the changes in ministers and at the head of GRD negatively
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affected the implementation of some institutional subcomponents. This is discussed in section 3.5b. Political changes also had effects on the rural roads components, as discussed below.
Changes in Physical Targets - Length of Road Works. The target of 1,000 kilometers of rural roads maintenance, agreed during the preparation of the supplementary credit, has been revised in 2005, and an Amendment to the Development Credit Agreement was issued on May 2, 2005, which reduced the target to 500 kilometers of rural roads to be maintained and repaired under the project. The target was revised because it was found that the calculation of the length of the road network to be maintained under the project was done erroneously during the preparation of the project, and the consultant had summed the length of the treatment, rather than the length of the road section, overlooking the fact that some routine and periodic maintenance would be undertaken on the same sections during the life of the project.
Changes in Physical Targets - Blackspots The target included in the project amendment consisted of the improvement of 60 blackspots (road sections with high risk of traffic accidents). Treatment of blackspots included a menu of several possible interventions, including guardrails (roadside barriers) in mountainous terrain. Following a series of bad traffic accidents where vehicles, including a bus of schoolchildren coming from Kosovo, left the road and fell for a considerable distance, causing deaths, the government requested that the project concentrate the blackspots' work on the installation of barriers along the most hazardous mountainous road sections. This was within the scope of the project and the Bank agreed. In total, over 100 sections of roads were protected with guardrails, covering a total extension of over 17 kilometers. In addition, the project carried out three innovative pilot Road Safety Communities (Bushat in the North, Libonik in the Center and Orikum in the South). These are described in sections 3.5(c) and section 6.
Impact of Changes in Physical Targets. The increased physical targets resulting from the project amendment and supplemental financing did not have any major impact on project implementation. In fact, the project initially had been prepared for a level of IDA funding that was the same as was achieved when the supplemental funding was approved. (Shortfalls in overall IDA funds required to reduce the initial scope to the project that was approved). Therefore the GRD and the PIU team were sufficiently prepared to carry out the extended project.
Responsibility for Winter Maintenance. One factor affecting implementation, although of limited impact, had to do with winter maintenance. The issue affected only those regions that get snow, and happened only during the first year of implementation. The issue stemmed from the GRD authorities belief that the maintenance contracts made under the project included winter maintenance (essentially snow removal). On this assumption, budget funds normally reserved for winter maintenance were reallocated for other uses. When it was discovered that the maintenance contracts did not cover winter maintenance, additional, separate contracts had to be concluded, covering snow clearing and ice removal, as well as clearing of landslides. In turn, these contracts originated a conflict with the contractor carrying out periodic and routine maintenance, since clearing landslides was a responsibility of the contractor. It took some time to sort out the division of responsibilities.
Weather Conditions. Harsh winter conditions in the early years of the project accelerated deterioration of some of the roads maintained under the project, and this required additional work by the contractors to repair the damages.
Risk Status. The project at no point during implementation was considered to be at risk.
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2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
The project included a simple but well targeted list of Performance Monitoring Indicators. The three outcome indicators are described below. The first two measure results that could be attributed solely to the activities of the project. The third indicator measures results that could be caused, in part, by exogenous factors. The indicators had a good mix of local and national level, the first one being purely local, the second one a mix of local and national, and the third was national. All three indicators were actually monitored and measured as planned:
(a) Improvement in the access by the population to social amenities, specifically health services. Two hospitals, in Vlora and Shkodra, which had been recently rehabilitated under a Bank Health project, were selected as reference points to measure the project’s impact on accessibility. The indicator measures the percentage of population living within a band of 10 kilometers on each side of any national or rural road where maintenance was carried out under the project relative to the total population living in the area where the hospitals are located. A detailed procedure was defined in order to collect the relevant data and allow measurement of the indicator. (b) Reduction in travel time on priority road sections. The indicator is the reduction in travel time for cars, measured in vehicle-hours, on selected road sections where periodic and routine maintenance has been carried out under the project. (c) Reduction in traffic fatality rates. The indicator measures the decrease in traffic fatalities nationwide per 10,000 vehicles in the country’s vehicle fleet. The indicator is computed from the official government traffic and vehicle registration statistics. Two qualifications need to be made. First, government registration statistics include vehicles which are registered but are known not to be circulating. Thus, the estimate of this indicator has a systematic error, both at baseline level and at project completion. Second, traffic fatality rates are also influenced by improvements in the safety features of new vehicles. However, when assessing improvement in the fatality rates, it is not possible to separate the effects of improved road safety and improved vehicle safety.
As an expansion of outcome indicator (a), though not explicitly listed as one of the project indicators, an assessment of improved accessibility country-wide to social services was included under a project-financed study.
Two output indicators are measured numerically:
• Road roughness as measured by the international roughness index (IRI). Road roughness for five national roads and eight rural roads was to be calculated on a weighted average basis (traffic-wise). Measurement of the IRI was done, (i) for the national roads, using a road surface profiler, and (ii) for rural roads, through a visual assessment conducted by the supervision consultant , and
• Number of blackspots improved. Regarding the blackspots, as noted in section 2.2, there was a shift in the focus that resulted in a somewhat different definition of the blackspots, resulting in a bigger number of blackspots treated.
There were also six output indicators that referred to institutional aspects of the project and required a descriptive comment. The descriptive output indicators were used during supervision to follow up progress with the institutional aspects and outcomes expected under the project.
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Analysis of progress with outcome and output indicators was included in the quarterly reports prepared by the PIU. Assessments were made at the time of each work's completion, and a reassessment - at the Mid-Term and at project completion.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Safeguards. The project was category B and no safeguards issues were encountered during implementation. The Environmental Management Plan was followed as expected. Compliance with the EMP was included in the supervision consultant's Quarterly Report.
Fiduciary compliance. Since the PIU had implemented two previous Bank operations, the National Roads and the Emergency Rehabilitation projects, it was experienced in dealing with fiduciary matters. The accounting, reporting, disbursement, budgeting and auditing arrangements had been established prior to the financial management assessment. There were no significant issues during the project. A total of 113 civil works contracts were executed, of which 42 for national roads, 62 for rural roads, and 9 for the traffic safety component. Due to non compliance with bid requirements, during the first two years of implementation, out of a total of 62 contracts, about one third (22) were awarded to the second lowest bidder rather than the lowest bidder. The situation improved in the last two years, as only 7 out of 51 contracts (14 percent) were not awarded to the lowest bidder. The improvement was achieved mainly thanks to a pre-bid meeting that was introduced by the PIU in order to explain the requirements of the tender documents.
In accordance with requirements of the credit, the project was audited yearly by an external auditor appointed by the Ministry of Finance. RMP funds allocated for this purpose were not used as the audits were funded by the MOF. No significant issues were raised by the audits.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
The management of the national roads remains with the GRD, and the local roads are managed by the Ministry of Interior and the local governments. A follow-on Bank operation, the Transport project, effective in 2007, continues to support GRD and the activities carried out under the RMP. A condition under the ongoing operation requires the government to increase funding for maintenance by not less than 10 percent per year over the life of the project.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
The project's objective is coherent with the current (2006) Country Assistance Strategy, which notes that the poor quality and high cost of infrastructure and utilities combine to inflate the cost of doing business. The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 ranked Albania 100th out of 117 countries surveyed, inadequate infrastructure being one of the major issues raised. At the same time, the recent (2007) review by IEG of the Bank-wide activities in transport recommends that increased emphasis be placed on road safety. Further, transport demand in Albania is growing rapidly (the latest estimate shows growth of 7 percent in 2006), with most of the increase in demand occurring in road transport. The number of registered vehicles has grown at an average annual rate of 13 percent since 1999. The intended restructuring of the GRD is essential, despite staff reductions over the past years, as it remains an overstaffed, inefficient organization.
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The project components were well conceived to support the project objectives. By including national and rural roads, the project covered roads under the responsibility of the central government as well as under the local governments. The introduction of outsourcing of routine maintenance to private contractors served to emphasize the practicality and efficiency of contracted routine maintenance, while giving private contractors and the GRD a first exposure to managing routine maintenance by contract.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
The targets for all three outcome indicators of the project’s development objective were achieved and surpassed.
(i) Percentage of the population in the pilot areas with improved access to essential social services. The target at project completion was that 30 percent of the population in the pilot areas, around the hospitals in Vlora and Shkodra would have improved access to these hospitals. At completion, 70 percent of the population had improved access thanks to the national and rural roads improved under the project. In addition to this specific indicator, access to a broader range of social services was also improved, as reported by a survey on accessibility carried out under the project. Notably, there was a large reduction in the time required by children to reach their schools. This is described in section 3.5.
(ii) Reduction in travel time on priority road sections. The target at project completion was a reduction of 20 percent in travel time in the selected road sections. The improvement in the condition of the national roads, especially the quality of their surface, led to a reduction of travel time of 22 percent. While travel time was used as outcome indicator of the improvement in road condition, a more direct assessment of the quality of the road surface was the measure of a surface’s roughness, which was monitored by a specific output indicator. This indicator showed that the quality of the surface of both the national and the rural roads maintained under the project improved significantly (by 26 percent for national roads and by 48 for rural roads).
(iii) Reduction in traffic fatality rates. The target was a reduction in traffic fatality rates (traffic accident deaths per 10,000 registered vehicles) of 10 percent over the baseline in 2000. The fatality ratio that year was 15.12. The fatality ratio by project completion (measured at end 2006) was 8.64. Thus, there was a 43 percent reduction of the fatality ratio. Although, to put this improvement into perspective, this is still one of the highest fatality rates in the region, and approximately eight times the best European performers. Factors inside and outside the project contributed to the reduction in fatality rates, but it is not possible to quantify the specific contribution of each. The key factor outside the project was the continuous improvement in the safety of vehicles, due to the rapid modernization of the vehicle fleet. Yet, the project contribution to reduced fatality rates was probably substantial, reflecting the installation of roadside barriers in dangerous sections of mountainous roads, the safety awareness campaigns involving all key stakeholders (road users, schools, police, the press), the provision and utilization by the police of radars to control speeds and of breathanalyzers to test alcohol levels in drivers, and the commune projects. The project's support for road safety was also measured through two output indicators, both of which were fully achieved: a substantial reduction in the number of blackspots and developing the institutional capacity to address road safety, through project-financed studies, training and equipment.
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Chart 1. Fatality Rates (number of fatalities per 10,000 vehicles): 2000-2006
Other important outcomes are described in sections in 3.5a, and 3.5c. The only area which showed only partial achievements has to do with the efficiency of the management and maintenance of the national and rural road network. Progress achieved in this area is described in Section 3.5b.
3.3 Efficiency
(a) Economic Rate of Returns
Economic analyses reveal that the investments were economically viable. An ex post cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was conducted for the rehabilitation works of all road sections included in the project. The evaluation was done using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which simulates life cycle conditions and costs and provides economic decision criteria for road construction and maintenance activities. The results of this CBA show the road sections perform well with regard to the standard criteria for measuring the performance of an investment: All road sections lie well above the 12% rate of return threshold, with positive NPV values confirming the suitability of the project. Details of the economic analysis are included in Annex 3.
(b) Other Indicators of Efficiency
• The introduction of principles of economic analysis to prioritize maintenance interventions and the use of HDM4 tool helped increase GRD efficiency.
• The GRD became more efficient in carrying out road maintenance as it reduced its staffing, and as it introduced performance-based maintenance contracts.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory The rating is based on: (i) the high relevance of the project’s objectives and design, (ii) a satisfactory achievement of the project’s development objectives, with all the outcome indicators as well as most of the quantifiable output indicators exceeding the targets, but only partial achievement of the institutional output indicators, and (iii) a high economic return of the project-financed investments.
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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Beyond the specific target on accessibility analyzed in 8.2, the project helped reduce the regional disparities through inclusive development thanks to the project’s impact on improving access to welfare services in the poorest areas of the country. A survey was carried out under the project at the national level as part of a study to assess the impact of the improved accessibility resulting from the improved condition of national and rural roads. A significant impact was found in respect of education services and health services (beyond the improved accessibility to the hospitals in Vlora and Shkodra) Education. The survey confirmed the fact that the project has benefited the rural children as the improved roads provided them with opportunities to access schools. The number of functional schools is higher in beneficiary areas, both in rural and urban ones, than in non-beneficiary areas. There is an impressive and significant decline in the time required to reach schools, especially for those living at a distance from the school of more than 30 minutes. The improvement of the road infrastructure is considered as the key factor to increase the access to school. The survey found out that 88 percent of people in urban areas and 78 percent of people in rural areas thought that the time to reach the schools has decreased. Health. The impact analysis regarding health facilities suggested that in beneficiary areas, the road rehabilitation brought a greater improvement than in non beneficiary areas. 65.2 percent of service users in rural beneficiary areas can access the health center approximately in 10 minutes, versus 29.9 percent of users in non beneficiary areas. The average time to reach health facilities has declined significantly as well, respectively by 16 percent in rural areas and 24 percent in urban areas. Measuring the impact that the RMP project had on reducing social exclusion was beyond the scope of the study. However, based on survey results, the study noted that the impressive differences between non beneficiary and beneficiary areas suggest the project has contributed to reduction of social disparities among regions. The project has also positively affected the community participation and interaction. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
Although the expected restructuring of the GRD did not materialize, some important measures were undertaken. Most notably, a major reduction in GRD's staff from 1,500 in 2002 to 830 at the end of 2006. Another important achievement was the establishment of a Project Implementation Team (PIT) consisting of full time staff of the implementing agency, which is responsible now for undertaking all foreign financed projects in the road sector. The objective of this approach was to overcome the negative impact of self-standing PIUs and to strengthen ownership and sustainability of the project, as well as building the capacity of the implementing agency. The PIT has replaced PIUs working for several donors, including the Bank, and even though it happened towards the end of the RMP, it is noteworthy to mention. PIT is well integrated into GRD’s line management, and the director of the PIT is also a vice-director of the GRD, a new position created in parallel with the merging of the PIUs.
The introduction under the project of routine maintenance by contract is also of great significance. As noted in the PAD, the project intended to launch routine maintenance by contract. Although not monitored by any specific indicator, the introduction of this new way of
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carrying out routine maintenance represented a radical departure from the traditional system of using in-house personnel (a method known as force account). International experience has shown that moving from force account to contract maintenance is a difficult process when applied to routine maintenance. Yet, as described in Annex 2 of this ICR, much progress was achieved under the project: (i) in the national roads, over 1,200 kilometers received routine maintenance by contract (with the number of years maintained varying between 1-4 years depending on the road section), and (ii) in the rural roads, close to 500 kilometers were maintained (also with the number of years maintained varying depending on the section). The introduction of routine maintenance by contract, together with the sharp reduction in the staff of road agency, are two important project achievements that will greatly facilitate the task of the GRD once it is restructured.
A number of activities envisaged in the project aimed at GRD strengthening were not carried out. A road user charges study included in the project was carried out under financing from an EBRD project, and was therefore removed from the RMP. The project’s intention to develop a pavement management system (PMS) and a bridge management system (BMS) failed due to a lack of client commitment at the time. The GRD did not request the purchase of the software and hardware necessary for the development of the pavement and bridge management systems. This is now being established with support from the European Union. A similar situation happened with the equipment for road surveys, which was, therefore, not procured.
The project substantially strengthened the capacity of the local construction industry. The different types of contracts, large ones for periodic maintenance (with or without inclusion of routine maintenance), and small ones for routine maintenance only, involved a large and varied number of contractors, some big and some small, some national and some local. The introduction of stylized hybrid performance-based contracts was an additional beneficial aspect. Training of the contracting industry was carried out by the supervision consultant. Training included general aspects of road maintenance and the maintenance contracts. In addition, the road safety consultant held seminars and workshops on carrying out road safety audits for some of the local contractors.
The project emphasized the importance of increased funding for road maintenance. A condition in the credit agreement requiring the government to increase the annual budget of the GRD for maintenance by no less than five percent per year has been met by the end of project implementation, and the subsequent Transport project has a covenant to achieve a ten percent increase in funding for road maintenance annually. However, still, by end-2006, according to the Bank’s Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Albania spends approximately 40 percent less on the maintenance of the national road network than is required.
With some delay, the government adjusted the taxes on leaded and unleaded gasoline in order to encourage the use of unleaded gasoline. This was a covenant in the credit agreement, and it required that as a result of the tax adjustments, the retail price of leaded gasoline is at least five percent higher than the average retail price of unleaded gasoline. This condition was finally met in mid-2006, and by-mid 2007 the sales of leaded gasoline have virtually disappeared.
There were two other outcomes, which are of an institutional nature and which are worth highlighting: (i) the introduction of hybrid performance-based methods to carry out road maintenance (details in section (c) below), and (ii) the introduction of economic analysis as a standard practice for prioritizing road maintenance activities.
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(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
There were two important positive unintended outcomes, introduction of stylized hybrid performance-based maintenance contracts and successful pilots on Road Safety Communities.
Introduction of stylized hybrid performance-based maintenance contracts on a pilot basis was very much a demand driven initiative, and was not originally included in the project. These pilots successfully demonstrated the feasibility and advantages of this approach. It has also paved the way for expansion in the future of this maintenance management method. The pilots served to provide both the PIU/GRD and the involved contractors with fresh experience, and to suggest where the contracts could be fined-tuned to better adapt to the conditions in Albania.
The pilots on Road Safety Communities demonstrated how low-cost interventions can improve safety. They consisted of a combination of simple interventions (wider sidewalks, street marking, and street islands) areas in front of primary schools in order to improve the safety of children. These pilots attracted the interest of the communities and villages, due to the visibility and practical nature of the improvements, and the importance that parents and teachers give to the children’s safety.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops This is a Core ICR, and therefore a Beneficiary Survey and a Stakeholder workshop are not required. Yet the study carried out under the project to assess the impact on accessibility of the road improvements included a survey, which interviewed a substantial number of stakeholders. The findings were very positive. The results of the survey have been reported earlier in this ICR.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High
No assurances exist at present that funding for maintenance of the roads, national and rural, improved and maintained under the project will be provided in adequate levels. In fact, in the case of the national roads, due to lack of maintenance, some of the roads maintained under the project are already experiencing a degree of deterioration. The funding situation has improved recently, and in 2006 the funding for routine maintenance was increased almost twenty percent, and for periodic maintenance – almost doubled. Under the recently approved transport project (L4850-AL) the government is committed to increase its funding for maintenance, but it is too early to assess the level of compliance. In addition, the Government has committed to contract out all maintenance operations, routine and periodic from 2007, as part of the reform of GRD.
The risks in the rural roads are even greater. Local governments that are responsible for the maintenance of the rural roads receive annually a block grant from the central government, which may be used for any purpose. Past experience indicates that the funding from the grant allocated to road maintenance generally is little, reflecting unduly high administrative costs, and the remainder is used mainly to tackle crisis situations rather than to carry out preventive maintenance. A Secondary and Local Roads project (Provisionally expected to be approved in FY08) in the early stages of preparation and will focus on rural roads. This is expected to identify with counterparts an appropriate administrative vehicle to ensure that funding for rural roads receives a higher priority than at present.
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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory
The Bank designed a project which had a relevant and well focused development objective. It was the first project by any donor to tackle road maintenance. It was similarly the first donor-supported assistance to the country’s traffic police. The outcome performance indicators were a good mix of national, local, and national-local outcomes, and were simple to interpret by a non-technical audience. The overall set of performance indicators constituted an effective system of monitoring and evaluation, with clearly identified baseline values, targets, and ways to measure the indicators.
During project preparation, the Bank made a good effort at mapping the interventions of the various donors in the road sector, essentially new construction or road rehabilitation, assessing who was doing what, and what the dates of start and completion of the works. Such mapping, which was included in the PAD, helped the Bank identify together with the government the road to be assisted under the project, and also helped during implementation to facilitate coordination with other donors.
(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory
During implementation, the Bank fielded solid supervision missions, most of them comprising several Bank experts. Supervision missions visited Albania two and sometimes three times per year. The missions followed closely the contracts, especially the civil works contracts, and focused their attention in the institutional area on the expected reform of the GRD. This was doubtless a key priority, and the missions did well in focusing on this.
The supervision missions also followed closely the progress with the road safety components, which was well reported in their aide-memoirs.
Supervision missions could have been more focused on the project’s legal conditions, especially regarding the issue of funding for road maintenance and the question of the retail prices of leaded and unleaded gasoline. While some of the aide-memoire covered these topics, some did not, even when the covenants were not being complied with. However, seeing the government indecision on the topic of leaded fuel taxation, the project team prepared a Policy Note, which highlighted the negative impacts of the lead and the benefits of conversion to unleaded fuel, as well as provided good practice examples and recommendations for Albanian Government. Few months later, the Government adjusted the taxes, and by mid- 2007 leaded gasoline was no longer on sale.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory
5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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The Borrower performed less than satisfactory in the areas where actions depended on it rather than on the implementing agency, that is, progress with institutional development and meeting important legal covenants. Although progress was made in making GRD more efficient through the reduction of GRD’s staffing, the expected restructuring of GRD did not take place, reflecting a lack of commitment from the previous administration.
The Borrower also was slow in complying with two important covenants, and compliance was only achieved towards the end of the project. Such covenants were, (i) to carry out annual increases of five percent per year in the funding of road maintenance, and (ii) to adjust taxes in order to achieve a five percent higher retail price of leaded than unleaded gasoline. Regarding the latter, until close to project completion, the previous administration had asserted that an increase in the import duty and circulation tax of second hand vehicles which had been introduced should achieve the same results as the tax differential required by a project condition.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory
The General Roads Directorate, through the project’s PIU, implemented the project well, completed it in time, and with a satisfactory outcome. All project development indicators were exceeded, as were some of the output indicators. The PIU implemented the project efficiently, and ensured that procurement moved swiftly, especially the processing of the large number of civil works contracts. The PIU also took appropriate measures to assist inexperienced local contractors bidding for road maintenance contracts. The project’s mid-term report was comprehensive.
The PIU should also be complimented on its decision to try pilots with performance-based maintenance contracts. Implementing such contracts, was an additional chore for the PIU not originally included in its terms of reference. Such contracts require, first, designing them, which is not simple, and second, assisting contractors to operate under the special requirements of the contracts.
The road safety activities were well implemented. The Inter-Ministerial Committee, with a secretariat based in the Road Safety Department of the MOTT, was active, and carried out activities at two levels, at the political with participation of senior ministerial authorities, and at the technical, with participation of experts.
On the negative side, the GRD, despite being prodded by the PIU failed to take action on the purchase of equipment and software for the development of the road’s database, an essential input for the development of the pavement and bridge management systems. As a result, no progress was achieved in these activities.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
6. Lessons Learned Several lessons emerge from the road maintenance project.
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Rural Roads: Ownership and responsibility of local authorities. The selection of the project's rural roads was done by a consultant study, which started by collecting a list of priorities from the Circles and the Communes. At implementation, while the procurement process was centralized by GRD, every individual contract was signed by a senior authority in the Ministry of Local Governments or its successor the Ministry of Interior. Yet, during project implementation and even at project closing there are indications of unhappiness in the MI that selection was not always the highest priority. There is also unhappiness with the design standard, where an asphalt surface was desired. This situation points to the need for a stronger participation of the local communities and the MI in all stages of the project cycle. It also points to the need for an even stronger participation or consultation with the MI or local authorities when such authorities change during the course of the project. In fact, part of the perception of the current MI authorities may stem from the fact that many decisions were taken by the preceding authorities. Lack of ownership, if real, may have serious consequences when the road improvement or maintenance work is completed, and it is up to the local authorities to assume responsibility for the maintenance of the roads. Road safety: Mix of national and local level interventions. The road safety component of the project included a number of activities at the national level, such as the creation of an inter-ministerial committee on road safety, safety awareness workshops, support to the police, and local-level activities such as improvement of blackspots and pilots interventions aimed at improving the safety of schoolchildren. The national level and the local level mix of safety intervention proved successful. The national activities - because of their impact on helping reduce the road fatality ratio nationwide, and the local activities - because of their impact at the community level. The three pilot Road Safety Communities, demonstrated that such interventions not only are effective ways to protect the local population, notably children in the case of the RSC, but they are also visible actions that generate trust and support from the local population. The pilots also showed that, because they are low-cost and simple, they can be replicated by other communities with their own funding Feasibility of Performance-Based Contracts for Highway Maintenance. The project originally intended to finance conventional contracts for periodic maintenance, and also to launch routine maintenance by contract. The latter, whether in contracts together with periodic maintenance or in routine maintenance-only contracts, represented a major advance in the modernization and improved efficiency in the management of road maintenance. The move towards performance-based maintenance contracts, including both periodic and routine maintenance, was a further step in modernizing and improving the efficiency or road maintenance. The move was prompted by the poor performance of the contractor in the hybrid contracts regarding the routine maintenance part of the contract. Routine maintenance are of little interest to contractors since it is a low-cost activity with a small profit margin, especially in the case of the larger contractors that also do the periodic maintenance part of the contract. The RMP demonstrated that performance-based contracts that include a mix of periodic and routine maintenance are feasible in Albania. The bidding process and inexperienced local contractors. The fast growth of the local construction industry, in part encouraged by the RMP, had as a consequence the entrance in the market of small contractors inexperienced in international bidding. The result was a significant number of the lowest bidders during the first two years of the project being disqualified due to lack of compliance with bid requirements. The introduction of pre-bid seminars was highly successful in helping inexperienced local contractors prepare bid meeting bid requirements. As a result of these seminars, there was a drastic fall in the percentage of bids where the lowest bidder is disqualified, leading to a lower cost of contracts. Thus, patience with infant-industry problems
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and putting in place appropriate remedies (the pre-bid seminars) were instrumental in helping the local industry adapt to the new modalities of highway maintenance contracts. Institutional reform: path and opportunity. The experience with the RMP suggests that institutional reforms do not follow a predictable path but that progress is piecemeal and opportunistic. Furthermore, the scope and timing of the reforms are largely dictated by the political economy of winners and losers. Three dimensions of reforms that took place during the RMP illustrate this finding. (a) Staff reduction. While little was achieved by way of reforming GRD’s structure that would have made it more adapted to the direction it is moving as a planning and contract-management agency, much was achieved in terms of reducing the size of its staff. By the end of the project, GRD staff was close 50 percent smaller than at the beginning. The political economy of winners and losers is asymmetric, with instant losers (the job losers) and more diffuse and longer-term winners (the efficiency of the public sector). Thanks to Albania’s strong economic growth during the 5-year period of the project, the damage to the losers was significantly reduced. The solid economic growth during the period, and a growing market for private civil works contractors opened attractive job opportunities for GRD staff made redundant and seeking alternative employment (part of the staff reduction was achieved through attrition and not replacing retiring staff). (b) Unification of the PIUs into a single unit and integrated into GRD structure. This was an important reform that made the management of project implementation more efficient, while retaining institutional capacity inside GRD rather than under dispersed, temporary implementation units. This reform was made possible by a coincidence of views among several donors, including the Bank, and the strong Government and Bank support for this initiative. Without these circumstances, it would have been difficult to think that such reform could have taken place. (c) Introduction of performance-based maintenance contracts. The disinterest of the large contractors in the execution of the routine maintenance component of conventional, admeasure periodic plus routine maintenance contracts, opened an opportunity for GRD to try a few pilot performance-based maintenance contracts. Success with these pilots opens the way for expanding the use of this maintenance management approach in the future.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Cofinanciers (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)
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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate (USD million)a/
Actual/Latest Estimate (USD
million)
Percentage of Appraisal
MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL AND RURAL ROADS
30.56 37.41 122.42
TRAFFIC SAFETY 3.05 3.51 115.08
Total Baseline Cost 33.61 40.92
Physical Contingencies 2.61
Price Contingencies 0.85
Total Project Costs 37.07 Project Preparation Fund 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00
Total Financing Required 37.07 40.92 a/ This column includes the supplemental financing. Original PAD cost was USD 20.85 million
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing
Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest Estimate
(USD millions)
Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower 7.07 7.17 101.41 International Development Association (IDA) 30.00 33.75 112.50
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Annex 2. Outputs by Component 1. The outputs achieved under the project are described below. Only substantial outputs are described. Procurement of goods is described to the extent that goods produced, or helped produce, a substantive output. Thus, goods such as office equipment, vehicles and the like are not listed below. The same applies to technical assistance and training. A. Civil Works 2. Road Maintenance. In the case of road maintenance, not only the physical outputs are important, but also the contracts, since the project launched routine maintenance by contract, and the project also launched as pilots performance-based contracts comprising both periodic and routine maintenance. 2.1 National Roads. The following was achieved:
• 1,168 kilometers were maintained, of which 192 kilometers received four years maintenance, 137 kilometers three years maintenance, 640 kilometers two years maintenance and 199 kilometers one year maintenance
• over a four-year period, 1,492 kilometers received maintenance, including several sections within the 1,168 kilometers that received maintenance more than once
• the maintenance work was done under 42 contracts, including 17 with combined periodic and routine, which maintained 744 kilometers of roads, of which 241 kilometers were overlaid with asphalt
• the total contract value of the work was $23.2 million, comprising $18.3 million for periodic plus routine maintenance, $2.3 million for routine maintenance only, $0.07 million for winter maintenance, and $1.9 million for the maintenance of urban roads in Tirana
2.2. Rural Roads. The following was achieved:
• 497 kilometers were maintained, of which 106 kilometers received four years maintenance, 67 kilometers received three years maintenance, 194 kilometers received two years maintenance and 130 kilometers received one year maintenance
• over a four-year period, 669 kilometers received maintenance, including several sections that received maintenance more than once
• the maintenance work was done under 62 contracts, including 35 contracts with combined periodic and routine maintenance covering 418 kilometers, of which 230 kilometers were overlaid with gravel and 25 kilometers with asphalt
• the total contract value of the work was $10.1 million, comprising $8.0 million for periodic plus routine maintenance, $1.5 million for routine only, and $0.5 million for winter maintenance.
3. Traffic Safety
• Blackspots: 17 kilometers of road safety barriers at various locations in selected national roads were installed. This substituted for the original number of 60 blackspots. The change stemmed from a series of major road accidents in the autumn of 2004 involving vehicles leaving the road in mountainous areas. The substitution was agreed to by the Bank.
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• Road Safety Communes: These were pilot activities, located in Bushat in the North, Libonik in the central region and Orikum in the South. The focus of the pilots was: child safety, safer roads and first aid training. The focus was determined after a series of meetings with local authorities. These pilots were located in the immediate vicinity of schools, and included one or more specific blackspots (three in Bushat, two in Libunik and on in Orikum).
B. Goods 4. Practically all of the substantive goods procured were related to the traffic safety component. They were the following:
• Specialist Equipment for Road Traffic Police. This included laser speed measurement equipment; alcohol-meters for screening and evidence tests; digital video cameras for mounting in police vehicles; portable wheel-load weigh-scales; portable accident-warning road signs and amber flashing lights; defensive driving training equipment. All the equipment was procured and distributed to end users.
• Specialist Medical Equipment for the Police. Equipment included first-aid bags, CPR
training manikin, external defibrillator, cervical adjustable collars, stretchers, ventilation (Reubens) bag, manual cutting tool for rescue operation, infusion equipment kit. All the equipment was procured and distributed to the end-users.
• Hardware and Equipment for Traffic Police. This included computers for the Accident
Investigation System and related computer equipment, digital cameras, GPS. C. Technical Assistance and Training 5. Substantive technical assistance and training covered roads, support for project implementation and traffic safety.
• Evaluation of Project Impact on Access to Social Amenities. A study carried out by a consultant evaluated project impact on social amenities, particularly health facilities, schools, markets and of impact on improvement on safety and on access to local employment and market opportunities. This study provided very useful information on the impact of the improved road condition, and its key findings have been incorporated in the body of this ICR.
• Engineering Design and Works Supervision. This technical assistance was instrumental
especially with the supervision of project-financed road works. The original scope of this assistance had to be expanded when the project was amended, and there was a substantial increase in the number of works contracts.
• Training of the Local Construction Industry. The Supervision Consultant carried out
training for the local construction industry that included general aspects of road maintenance activities and types of contract, and winter maintenance for the contractors involved with this activity. In view of the training provided by the Supervision Consultant, the GRD did not agree to proceed with the original intention to recruit a consultant specifically for the purpose of providing training to the local construction industry.
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• Support to the PIU for Project Implementation. The project financed the recruitment of key consultants for the PIU in the areas of accounting, procurement and civil engineering.
• Traffic Safety. A consulting team provided specialists in various areas, and the main outputs were:
o establishment of three Road Safety Communes o training in Road Safety Audits and Black Spot identification o discussion on introduction of road safety in school curriculum o extensive training program for the police o implementation and data collection for the accident database, and by project end
accident information had been input for the whole of 2005.
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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Economic analyses reveal that the investments were economically viable. An ex post cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was conducted for the rehabilitation works of all road sections included in the project. The evaluation was done using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which simulates life cycle conditions and costs and provides economic decision criteria for road construction and maintenance activities. The input data used in the model refer to the Final Report of the Supervision Consultant, DIWI, and built upon the engineering-based field surveys and supervision consultants engineering judgment. The traffic surveys indicate a current daily traffic between less then 100 vpd to more than 4,000 vpd. Traffic was assumed to grow at 7% per annum for cars and buses and 5% per annum for trucks The results of this CBA show the road sections perform well with regard to the standard criteria for measuring the performance of an investment: All road sections lie well above the 12% rate of return threshold, with positive NPV values confirming the suitability of the project. See Table 1 for details. Road Section Name Length
Cesar Augusto Queiroz Consultant IEGSG Co-Team Leader (FY2003-FY2005)
Jesus Renzoli Sr Procurement Spec. ECSPS Procurement Radhika Srinivasan Sr Social Scientist ECSSD Social Elona Gjika Financial Management Analyst ECSPS Financial Management
Olav Rex Christensen Sr. Financial Management Spec. ECSPS Financial Management
(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) Not applicable
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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) Not applicable
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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The objective of the Project has been satisfactorily met (see components below). Road Maintenance Component National Roads Component includes the Municipality of Tirana works contracts. At the commencement of the project, due to the urgent requirement to repair some of the roads within the Tirana City Municipality, the “Tirana Roads”, which were originally scheduled for second year maintenance were moved forward into the first year maintenance programme. Three roads were included within one Works Contract: rehabilitation of “Don Bosco” Road; improvement of “Muhamet Gjollesha” Road; and improvement of “Bajram Curri” Road. Due to the cost savings through the use of competitive bidding procedures, an additional Works Contract was able to be procured within the budget available for the repair of the “Tirana Roads”. The second contract provided for the rehabilitation of “Mine Peza” Road. Both of these works contracts have been completed providing a vast improvement to those selected roads, both in terms of riding quality and also from a positive drainage viewpoint. The total cost of this completed “urban” component is US$ 1.852 million. For the National Roads, the four year programme (2003-2007) has been successfully completed as below:
During the First Year, nine contracts were procured. Four of these contracts provided periodic and routine maintenance intervention (two-year contracts) and the other five were routine maintenance only. Generally, the periodic maintenance was completed in the first year and then continued with routine activities only. The total length of national roads covered by periodic and routine maintenance contracts was 254 km. Similarly the total length of national roads covered by routine maintenance contracts was 183 km. This provided a first year total length for national roads of 437 km.
During the Second Year, twenty four contracts were procured, out of which 13 were Periodic and Routine Maintenance Contracts (two-year contracts), together with 8 Routine Maintenance Works Contracts and 3 Winter Maintenance Contracts (two-year contracts). The total length of national roads covered by periodic and routine maintenance contracts procured in the second year was 490 km. Similarly the total length of national roads covered by routine maintenance contracts in the second year was 241 km. This provided a second year total length for national roads of 731 km.
Hence the list for the national roads maintenance intervention took full account of the increase in the IDA Credit and maintenance of approximately 1,168 km of the national network was achieved by the end of the project, of which 744 km benefited from periodic and routine maintenance and 424 km from routine maintenance. A survey of these national roads has been undertaken to determine the change in the road roughness. Similarly surveys have been carried out to determine the change in travel time over the roads maintained within the project, which reflects in vehicle operating costs savings. The results of these surveys are provided in Tables 1a and 2a in Annex 2.
During the Third Year, three contracts were procured. These were three national roads, that had received periodic and routine maintenance since the first year, and now received a further period of routine maintenance until the end of the project (two-year contracts). These three roads were maintained utilising performance-based contracts. The total of roads maintained by these contracts was 187 km.
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During the Fourth Year, four contracts were procured. The previous performance-based contract documentation was reviewed by the PIU, together with the Supervision Consultant “DIWI” to remove problematic issues that had been raised during the ongoing performance-based contracts of the third year. The World Bank approved the revised contract documents. Four national roads, that had received periodic and routine maintenance since the second year, were selected to receive a further period of routine maintenance and were completed by the end of March 2007. This has permitted one further month for the Defects Liability Period, followed by final payments prior to closing of the Credit on 30th June 2007. The total of roads maintained by these contracts was 137 km. At the end of the Project, the status for completion of maintenance for National Roads is as follows:
• total contracted value of the works contracts is US$ 23.183 million, comprised of US$ 18.348 million for periodic plus routine; US$ 2.304 million for routine only; US$ 0.679 million for winter maintenance and US$ 1.852 million for urban roads in Tirana;
• total length of the national roads maintained was 1,168 km; • total contract length of national roads maintained (over the four years) was 1,492 km; • total number of the contracts was 42 (including 2 urban road contracts and 3 winter
maintenance); • total number of the contracts with Periodic & Routine maintenance was 17, maintaining 744
km of national roads, out of which 241 km of roads have been overlaid with asphalt surfacing; and
• by the end of the Project a total of 192 km of national roads had received four years maintenance, 137 km had received three years maintenance, 640 km had received two years maintenance and a further 199 km had received one year of maintenance.
For the Rural Roads, the four year programme (2003-2007) has also been successfully completed as below:
During the First Year, nine contracts were procured. Four of these contracts provided periodic and routine maintenance intervention (two-year contracts) and the other five were routine maintenance only. Generally, the periodic maintenance was completed in the first year and then continued with routine maintenance activities only. The total length of rural roads covered by periodic and routine maintenance contracts was 106 km. Similarly the total length of rural roads covered by routine maintenance contracts was 30 km. This provided a first year total length for rural roads of 136 km.
During the Second Year, eighteen contracts were procured, out of which 9 were Periodic and Routine Maintenance Contracts (two-year contracts), together with 5 Routine Maintenance Works Contracts and 4 Winter Maintenance Contracts (two-year contracts). The total length of rural roads covered by periodic and routine maintenance contracts procured in the second year was 140 km. Similarly the total length of rural roads covered by routine maintenance contracts in the second year was 28 km. Hence the second year length for maintenance of rural roads was 168 km and the total length for both first and second years was 304 km (246 km periodic plus routine maintenance and 58 km routine maintenance only).
During the second year programme, the PIU held discussions with the MLGD during Autumn 2003 to determine their requirements for the rural roads to be maintained within their road network during the next two years. An agreed list was produced for the network, which conformed to the previous survey work undertaken by Louis Berger during the preparation stage of the RMP. This list was incorporated into an updated Procurement Plan in December 2003. However, a problem occurred due to the estimated costs provided by Louis Berger Consultants.
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This issue was raised with the World Bank, and in summary the available budget of $9.91m for Rural Roads was insufficient to maintain 1,000 km of the rural road network using the survey data prepared by Louis Berger with average maintenance costs of $19,000/km. During the first year of procurement for the rural road network, 136 km of rural roads had been contracted for maintenance for a total cost of $1.88m, which provided an average cost of $13,500/km. Hence for the rural roads, the only way that 1,000 km could be maintained with the available budget of $9.91m would be by reducing the actual scope of the maintenance proposed by Louis Berger. After discussion with the Bank, an interim measure was adopted. The MLGD approved the original list proposed by Louis Berger for the second year’s procurement. With this list of schemes a total of 304 km of the rural roads were scheduled for maintenance (First Year 136 km, Second Year 168 km).
Following the second year of procurement, approximately $3.3m remained to be allocated for rural roads maintenance contracts from the total budget of $9.91m. MLGD indicated to the World Bank that they would prefer to utilise the $3.3m to achieve maintenance of approximately 500 km of rural roads, rather than a greater number of kilometres but with a lower standard of maintenance. MLGD provided the PIU with a list of additional maintenance schemes to be procured by the end of 2004 which would provide for maintenance intervention on a further 193 km of rural roads.
Subsequently the list for the rural roads maintenance intervention has taken full account of the increase in the IDA Credit. However, due to the extremely poor condition of the rural roads in general, maintenance of only 497 km of the rural road network was achieved by the end of the project. From this total 411 km have benefited from periodic and routine maintenance and 86 km from routine maintenance, thus reflecting the initial poor condition of the rural roads. A visual survey of these rural roads has been undertaken to determine the change in the road roughness. Similarly surveys have been carried out to determine the change in travel time over the roads maintained within the project, which reflects in vehicle operating costs savings. The results of these surveys are provided in Tables 1b and 2b in Annex 2.
During the Third Year, twenty five contracts were procured, out of which 22 Periodic and Routine Maintenance Contracts (two-year contracts) and 3 Routine Maintenance Contracts were included in this programme, to cover another 193 km of the rural roads. So with the third year programme, a total of 497 km of rural roads have been included for maintenance within the RMP. In addition the Rural Roads in four Circles that received periodic and routine maintenance in the first year also received a period of further routine maintenance. The total length of these rural roads contracted for further routine maintenance is 106 km.
During the Fourth Year, five contracts were procured. The MoI (formerly MLGD) agreed with the PIU regarding which Circles should receive further periodic and routine maintenance. This was due to the short period of time remaining before the end of the Project, taking into account that the period also included the winter months. Five roads schemes (in Berat, Gjirokaster, Lezha, Shkoder and Durres Circles) were procured. These five rural roads had received periodic and routine maintenance since the second year and then received a further period of routine maintenance for the contracts in Gjirokaster and Lezha Circles and periodic and routine maintenance for the other contracts in Shkoder, Berat and Durres Circles. The maintenance works for these contracts were completed by the end of March 2007. This permitted one further month for the Defects Liability Period, followed by final payments prior to closing of the Credit on 30th June 2007. The total length of these rural roads contracted for further maintenance is 67 km.
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At the end of the Project, the status for completion of maintenance for Rural Roads is as follows:
• total contracted value of the works contracts is US$10.119 million, comprised of US$8.039 million for periodic plus routine, US$1.508 million for routine only and US$0.572 million for winter maintenance;
• total length of the rural roads maintained was 497 km; • total contract length of rural roads maintained (over the four years) was 669 km; • total number of the contracts was 62 (including 4 separate winter maintenance contracts); • total number of the contracts with Periodic and Routine maintenance was 35, covering 418
km of rural roads, out of which 230 km of roads have been overlaid with gravel and 25 km with asphalt surfacing; and
• by the end of the Project a total of 106 km of rural roads had received four years maintenance, 67 km had received three years maintenance, 194 km had received two years maintenance and a further 130 km had received one year of maintenance.
For more details of the contracts see the final Procurement Plan in Annex 1. Procurement of Goods:
(a) The sub-component for “Equipment for road survey for GRD and MLGD” (US$0.12 million) (including pavement strength and roughness measurement devices, automatic traffic counters, axles load scales) was only partly completed.
No road survey equipment has been procured, because the GRD requested from the Bank, and received their approval, to use some of the funds for these goods to carry out repairs and service to two pieces of road survey equipment already within the GRD’s assets. Hence service and repairs were carried out on a ‘Falling Weight Deflectometer’ and a ‘Road Surface Profiler’ (US$0.021million). In addition the GRD received approval from the Bank for purchase of a suite of traffic analysis computer programs (US$0.008 million). Referring to the purchase of new road survey equipment, both the GRD and MLGD deemed that the equipment wasn’t necessary. Most of the inventory of rural roads is composed of gravel roads and the GRD can use the existing equipment which they had repaired. The balance of funds was transferred and used for other goods or technical assistance.
(b) The sub-component for “Vehicles” (US$0.1 million) was only partly completed. Only 50% of the four vehicles (US$0.054 million) were purchased. The reason was that the PIU/GRD determined that it was unnecessary to purchase the remaining two vehicles. The balance of funds was used to recruit an additional civil engineer to the PIU team to assist with the increased number of maintenance works contracts. The Bank provided their approval to this and the necessary reallocation of funding was done.
(c) The sub-component for “Office equipment and supplies” (US$0.09 million) required for effective project implementation was completed. It has been utilised to procure computers, printers, fax machine and photocopier,etc for the MLGD and some additional computers and printers for the GRD and PIT . In total the expenditure for this sub-component were US$0.105million.
(d) The sub-component for “Computer hardware and software (including GIS and plotter) for the road and bridges database development and for implementation of a road asset management system” (US$0.09 million) was cancelled. The reason was that the basis for pavement and bridge management systems was established by the Consultant responsible for the preparation of RMP during the earlier ERRP. The Consultant prepared a road inventory for considerable portions of the national road network and some for the rural roads. The GRD now
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performs an update of the bridge conditions every four months. The balance of funds was transferred to be used for other goods or technical assistance. Training and Technical Assistance: (a) TA for Restructuring of National, District and Local Roads Management – this sub-component was for the procurement of training and consultant services for MOTT/GRD/MLGD to assist in the restructuring of the main national and rural roads management organisation and systems, including reorganisation of GRD and development of a Rural Road Department within MLGD (US$0.15 million). This particular component was discussed with the Bank’s representatives during their mission to Albania in July 2004. Other donor-funded projects had also studied the necessity for restructuring of the road management organisations. Consequently a recently commissioned EU-financed TA to the MOTT included a ‘Restructuring Plan’ to be produced for the GRD. This GRD restructuring plan would take full advantage of the study carried out by Louis Berger consultants during the RMP preparation work, which examined in detail the GRD organisation and its inputs and identified where the weaknesses were. It was envisaged that the EU-financed TA would assist the MOTT in producing a directive for required improvements in outputs and deliverables from the GRD. Based on this MOTT directive a new structure for the GRD would then be defined by the EU-financed TA and included in the Albanian National Transport Plan (ANTP). The new structure should ensure that the required deliverables would be achieved with very tangible and measurable results.
Consequently the TA for GRD reform was reassigned to help put the required and requested systems on the ground and produce the required results within a specified timeframe. The timetable depended on a timely completion of the GRD Restructuring Plan by the EU-financed TA for MOTT.
However due to various reasons, including a change in Government, the restructuring of the GRD was put on hold. After discussions with the World Bank, it was agreed that the TA to assist the GRD with the implementation of the restructuring should be included in forthcoming Transport Project.
The newly commenced Transport Project confirms that the Government is committed to strengthen the institutions, practices and the financing of road maintenance in the sector. The Government considers that the reform of the General Roads Directorate (GRD) is a key priority for it, consistent with the contracting out of all maintenance. This reform has commenced, and a new draft structure has been prepared. The new Transport Project includes a small technical assistance component to assist in refining this structure and identifying necessary capacity building. The European Union is providing, within a second phase of TA, support to implement the reform and to establish a functioning asset management system for the primary and secondary road networks with the reformed GRD.
The Government has recently formally adopted the Albanian National Transport Plan (ANTP) as the Sector Policy and Strategy. The ANTP, prepared with support from the European Union CARDS programme, provides the basis for an overarching framework for the development of the transport sector for the first time. The Government has formally approved this plan as the Strategy and Policy for the development of the Sector. This study has also been endorsed by a number of development partners.
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Based on the above context, it is expected that the reforming of GRD will start during 2007 with the reforming plan that the Consultant within the Transport Project will prepare (October 2007). After being approved from the Government, the GRD will need one year more to complete its reformation.
(b) TA for Designing Road User Charges Legislation and Collection Mechanisms – this sub-component was for procurement of training and consultant services to assist MOTT/GRD/MLGD in designing and recommending an appropriate road user charge system (US$0.15 million). This TA component was deemed not to be required because the Government was not committed to implementing a road user charge system. Additionally other components took priority over this one, in particular the civil maintenance works contracts. (c) TA for Evaluation of Project Impact on Access to Social Amenities – this sub-component was for procurement of training and consultant services to assist MOTT/GRD/MLGD in evaluating project impact on access to social amenities, particularly health facilities, schools, markets and of impact on improvement on safety and on access to local employment and market opportunities. This sub-component was satisfactorily completed by a local consultant, who completed the Study according to the TOR. The actual cost of the service was US$0.065 million. (d) TA for Engineering Design and Supervision of the Works – this sub-component was for procurement of Consultant services to prepare the engineering design, the contract documents and carry out supervision of all the road periodic and routine maintenance works (US$1.49 million increased to US$1.85 million with the supplementary credit). The Bank approved the Terms of Reference and Bidding Documents for the Supervision Consultant during November 2002. The Contract was signed on 20th May 2003 and the Consultant had to immediately commence with supervision of the Maintenance Works Contracts which had been procured during the winter and spring period and were waiting to commence. After the Supplementary Credit was provided, the funding available for Civil Works increased from US$16.71 million to US$32.41 million. In view of this increase, the Consultant requested an addendum to their contract in order to provide more local engineers to assist with the supervision of the increased number of works contracts. The original supervision contract price was US$2.35 million and this was increased to US$2.838 million with the addendum. (e) TA for Training the Road Construction Industry – this sub-component was for procurement of technical assistance for support and training for the development of the private road construction industry, including organization of new firms, preparation of business and financing plans, preparation of tenders, organization for implementation of maintenance projects, contract management and invoicing methods, employment of unskilled labor, and possibly utilization of labor intensive methods (US$0.2 million). Terms of Reference were prepared by the PIU in 2003 for this technical assistance and received the Bank’s approval. However, the then GRD Director General informed the Bank that the GRD had not reviewed the TOR and prepared their comments. In view of this the Bank asked the PIU to resubmit the TOR to the GRD for their review. Shortly after submission to the GRD, the DG was replaced and the incoming Director General decided that the TA for training the road construction industry was not required for the reasons given in the following paragraph. As a result, this sub-component was not procured. The Supervision Consultant had carried out some training of the road construction industry. This training for the road contractors included general aspects of road maintenance and more
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specifically the maintenance activities and types of Contract. The Consultant also held a workshop on winter maintenance for those contractors involved with this activity. Additionally the Road Safety Consultant held seminars and workshops on carrying out Road Safety Audits for some of the local consultants. Furthermore a Training Program was prepared by the PIU which identified, through consultation with the beneficiaries, the training needs of the local staff (MOTT, GRD, MLGD and PIU). Relevant staff members were selected and their training requirements identified. The World Bank reviewed the training program and accepted it in principle. Following this acceptance any courses, which were later identified to be in accordance with the requirements of the training program of an individual, were submitted to the Bank for approval for the individual to receive the training. The final expenditure used for training was US$0.131 million. (f) Procurement of Consultant services for PIU operation The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was already established as the IDA-Financed Roads PIU within the GRD and was responsible for implementing ongoing road projects in the GRD. In May 2003 the PIU staff signed new contracts and from that date the existing PIU transferred over to being funded through the Road Maintenance Project. The PIU consisted of an Accountant, a Procurement Officer who also doubled-up as a Civil Engineer, two other Civil Engineers, an Assistant Accountant who also doubled-up as a Secretary and a Driver. The PIU was managed by the PIU Director, who was also a Civil Engineer. An additional civil engineer was recruit to the PIU team to assist with the increased number of maintenance works contracts. The Bank provided their approval to this and the necessary reallocation of funding was done. The final cost for this sub-component was US$0.512 million. (g) Technical Assistance to the PIU Additionally the PIU received technical assistance and procurement advise from a foreign individual consultant. The Consultant was already established as Technical Assistant to the earlier, on-going IDA funded road projects. The PIU Director, supported by the GRD Director General, made a request to the Bank to make funding available within this Project to allow the Consultant to continue to provide the PIU with technical assistance and advice regarding procurement issues when the existing contract expired. Hence the TA signed a contract with the PIU Director on 11th December 2003, and which was completed on 28th February 2005 (after a one month extension). The final value of the contract was US$0.14 m. As this previous contract was drawing to a close, the PIU Director, again supported by the GRD Director General, asked the Bank to permit the TA to continue after the end of 2004. The reason given was that the Road Maintenance Project would continue until June 2007. Furthermore a new Transport Project was proposed to commence before the end of 2005. The Bank agreed that the TA to the PIU would be funded through the new Transport Project. However the proposed Project ran into delays and subsequently was not expected to commence until late 2006. Consequently the PIU /GRD requested the Bank to agree to an additional contract being signed with the existing TA for a further six months and again funded by the RMP. The Bank agreed to this latter proposal and the contract value was US$0.12m and which ended on 17th December 2005. A further contract for the TA was requested and approved by the Bank. This contract ran from 18th December 2005 until 27th January2007 and the contract value was US$0.15m. The final cost for this sub-component was US$0.374 million.
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(h) Project Audits The Ministry of Finance engaged external private auditors to ensure that the project audits were completed in a timely manner. No costs were attributed to this Project for these audits. The conclusions of the June 2007 Audit for the Project are satisfactory. Traffic Safety Components The requirement was for the remedial work on 60 traffic accident "Black spots" on the road network (national or rural roads) from a list of 96, which the Traffic Police had identified as especially dangerous to the various categories of road users. (Funding increased from US$0.75 million to US$1.5 million with the supplementary credit). The procurement of Civil Works contracts for elimination of traffic accident “black spots” was delayed for two reasons. Initially the delay was caused by the provision of the supplementary credit, which meant that forty-two (42) Maintenance Works Contracts had to be procured during the Winter and Spring period (2003/04). The second reason for delay was that although the “black spots” had been identified, designs needed to be undertaken to provide drawings and bills of quantities for inclusion in Bidding Documents. The design work had not been included in any of the Consultants’ Terms of Reference. The PIU requested approval from the World Bank to issue an addendum to the Road Safety Consultant’s Contract to provide assistance with the necessary design work and technical document preparation. At the same time this was also used as training for the local consultants. The addendum was granted and designs for a group of ‘black spots’ were completed by a Highway Specialist from the Consultant working closely with local staff. In view of the problem of design and document preparation, the Road Safety Leading Group and the World Bank were asked by the Road Safety Consultant to permit them to explore the possibility of finding local companies who could manufacture semi-circular plastic ‘Roadside Delineators’ from round plastic pipes. It was considered that installation of these ‘Roadside Delineators’ would be a quick way of providing low-cost solutions to many sections of both the national and rural road networks. The intention was to place the delineators at ‘black spots’ and ‘black sections’ along 140km of national roads and 120km of rural roads. After some initial problems concerning the manufacturing of the delineators, the purchase of 10,000 semi-circular roadside delineators with white reflective marking on the front and red reflective marking on the back was concluded. The delineators have been used by both the GRD and the Local Government Authority for their respective road networks. Thus this component was satisfactorily completed with a cost of US$0.059 million. Following a series of serious road accidents in autumn 2004 involving vehicles leaving the road in mountainous areas, the World Bank agreed to the utilisation of approximately US$1 million for installation of roadside safety barriers at the request of the GRD Director General, on behalf of the MOTT. The GRD, with the assistance of the PIU, prepared the Bidding Documents for five works contracts. The five ‘Accident Black Spot Elimination’ Works Contracts provided for the installation of approximately 17 km of roadside safety barriers at various locations on selected national roads. The installation of the safety barriers was successfully completed with a total cost of US$1.028 million.
The Road Safety Consultant, together with the MLGD, established three “Road Safety Communes” situated in Bushat in the north, Libonik in the central region and Orikum in the south of Albania. During the initial series of meetings, it was decided to work on three main themes:
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Child Safety, Safer Roads and First Aid Training. Therefore the list of equipment to be purchased for the safety component of the project was increased to include some first-aid equipment for use by the three Road Safety Communes.
The Road Safety Consultant identified accident blackspots in each “Road Safety Commune”. In Bushat, the works provided for the removal of three accident blackspots. In Libonik, the works provided for the removal of two accident blackspots and in Orikum, the works provided for the removal of one accident blackspot. All of these Works Contracts were completed satisfactorily with a total cost of US$0.172 million.
Procurement of Goods: The sub-components for (a) Data storage/retrieval and analysis system for the Traffic Police Accident Unit and for the MOTT General Directorate of Road Safety to facilitate establishment of a GOA transport and road safety statistics web-site (US$0.1 million); and (b) traffic control devices, safety enforcement equipment and first aid kits for emergency response activities (US$0.25 million), were completed as below. At the beginning it was agreed with the Bank that the road safety equipment should not be procured until the Road Safety Consultant was in place and able to establish the actual requirements of the beneficiaries. So after the procurement, the Safety Consultant held meetings with the Road Safety Leading Group and Road Safety Communes, that had been established as pilot studies, to agree the equipment required. As a result of these discussions, the following goods were considered: Software Equipment for Traffic Police (Accident Investigation System) (Cost estimate US$0.06 million): Equipment included: Computer software to establish a database for storage, retrieval and analysis of road traffic collision data and training of the local police force in its use by the provider. One of the requirements of the Road Safety Consultant’s Terms of Reference was to implement a reliable and functional road accident reporting system. Initially the Road Safety Consultant proposed a system which would only be installed into three Circles. Unfortunately only two quotations were received from interested Suppliers of the Accident Investigation System (AIS), due to the specifications, which contravened the procurement guidelines within the World Bank. This prompted a rethink of the approach on the part of the PIU, Road Safety Consultant and the World Bank. The outcome of the discussions was that a simpler accident reporting database system was adopted for the whole of Albania and not just within three Circles. A database was developed using MS Access. Although this type of access system has no GIS-functionality, it can be added by using the ‘Arcview’ GIS software. A SweRoad Specialist developed the system and produced an accident form from which the database was organised into twelve tables covering the following topics: general accident information; vehicles involved; vehicle defects; vehicle documentation; vehicle age; driving licence; driving experience; nationality of driver; driver behaviour; alcohol test; pedestrian behaviour; and persons involved.
The tables covered 32 different accident variables which may be cross-tabulated against each other. A process of “Train the Trainers” was carried out by SweRoad at the Tirana Police Academy. In addition 20 software CDs were handed over as well as 20 Data entry manuals and 15 Analysis manuals in the Albanian language.
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Therefore the Software Equipment for Traffic Police (Accident Investigation System) was not directly procured and this resulted in the World Bank agreeing to the procurement of supplementary hardware and equipment for the Traffic Police. Specialist Equipment for the Road Traffic Police (Actual Cost with supplementary equipment was US$0.219 million): Equipment included: Laser speed measurement instruments; alcohol-meters for screening and evidence tests; digital video cameras for mounting in police vehicles; portable wheel-load weigh-scales; portable accident-warning road signs and amber flashing light units; defensive driving training equipment. All the equipment was procured and distributed to the end-users. Specialist Medical Equipment for Police (Actual Cost US$0.041 million): Equipment included: First-Aid Bags; CPR Training Manikin; Heart-starter (External Defibrillator); Cervical adjustable collars; Stretchers; Ventilation (Reubens) bag; Manual Cutting Tool for rescue operation; Infusion equipment kit. All the equipment was procured and distributed to the end-users. Hardware and equipment for Traffic Police (Actual Cost US$0.11 million): Equipment included: Computers (for the Accident Investigation System); Central Server; Printers; Digital cameras; GPS receivers. Also includes some computers, printers and digital cameras for GRD, MLGD and PIU (Cost US$0.025 million included in total above). All the equipment was procured and distributed to the end-users. Supplementary hardware and equipment for Traffic Police (Actual Cost US$0.044 million): Equipment includes: Computers (for the Accident Investigation System); Printers; GPS receivers. Also includes some additional computers for MLGD (Cost US$0.005 million included in total above). All the equipment was procured and distributed to the end-users. Training and Technical Assistance: a) TA to Conduct a Road Safety Awareness Seminar – procurement of consultant services to conduct a road safety awareness seminar for senior GOA and other officials (US$0.l million);
This TA was not procured because it wasn’t actually required as an independent procedure. Initially at the start of the Project the Consultant who was preparing the RMP, under financing through the Emergency Road Repair Project, arranged and held the first Road Safety Awareness Seminar on 17th February 2003. The seminar was considered to be a “High Profile” Seminar. The President of Albania opened the seminar in order to raise the public awareness of the problems currently facing Albania in terms of the large number of road traffic accidents. The seminar brought to the public’s attention the aims of the Road Maintenance Project’s Traffic Safety component towards reducing this unacceptable level of traffic accidents and improving road safety in Albania. The costs associated with implementing this seminar have been allocated to this TA component (US$0.013 million).
A further localised seminar on road safety issues was held on 3rd December 2004 in Shkoder. This was then followed by a final “High Profile” Seminar, held for Senior GOA staff and other officials in Tirana in June 2005. In both cases the costs of organising the two seminars was covered from the Road Safety Consultant’s Contract. However the costs associated with implementing the seminars, such as hire of venues, refreshments for guests etc. was covered by this TA component.
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b) TA to Support Implementation of Directorate for Road Safety (DRS) and Training for Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (MOTT) – procurement of consultant services and training (US$1.0 million) for MOTT, GRD, DRS, MLGD, Traffic Police and other agencies. The Bank approved the Terms of Reference and Bidding Documents for the Road Safety Consultant at the end of April 2003. The Contract was signed on 29th October 2003 and, as reported in the Civil Works section, the Consultant was provided with a contract addendum to permit them to assist with the designs for the elimination of accident ‘black spots’. The final Consultant’s contract price, including the addendum was US$1.876 million (without withholding tax). The Consultant provided Specialists who visited Albania to gather the necessary information regarding their particular component. In brief, the Consultant has established three Road Safety Communes; undertook training in Road Safety Audits and Black Spot identification; discussed with the Education Authority the introduction of road safety into the school curriculum; and instigated a ‘Wearing of Seat Belts’ campaign and corresponding enforcement by the traffic police. The Consultant also organized a ‘Study Tour’ to Sweden for the Key members of the Road Safety Leading Group. The tour highlighted the need for all the key groups to work together to improve road safety.
The Road Safety Consultant’s Contract was due for completion in October 2005, but the Consultant submitted a proposal to the PIU to extend the Contract until the end of December 2005 utilizing some savings which had been accrued during the contract. The World Bank accepted this proposal and an addendum to the contract signed. During this period of extension, the Road Safety Consultant, with the cooperation and assistance of the Police Assistance Mission of the European Community in Albania (PAMECA), undertook an extensive training program for the police. Initially SweRoad carried out a “Management and Train-the-Trainer” course of six days duration, and which was delivered to thirty five (35) ‘First Commanders’ and Specialists from the Police Headquarters and all twelve Qarks (Circles). This was then followed by two “Train-the-Trainer” courses, each of three days duration, delivered to seventy (70) Road Police field commanders. Finally two further training courses, each of three days duration, were delivered to one hundred (100) police assistants.
Additionally during this last period of the safety component, SweRoad’s accident information system specialist visited Albania to assist the traffic police in its efforts to collect road accident data and to guide them with utilization of the new database. The specialist visited the majority of the regions in Albania and acknowledged that the local traffic police have made good progress in adopting the new system. The PIU also paid a visit to the traffic police headquarters and met the personnel responsible for implementing the accident information system. The regional police were completing the accident data forms at the site of the accident and then inputting the data into their local computers. At that time, the information was then delivered to the police headquarters using CD. But PAMECA offered to assist with introduction of dedicated links between police headquarters and each of the regional offices and so it was anticipated that when these links would be fully established the regions would be able to send the data electronically at regular intervals. By the end of the project, the status of the accident database was that accident information had been input for the whole of 2005, although some of the earlier accident information was sparse.
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However with the collection of better accident data, the database should become more useful for comparison between previous periods and then annually in the future. Excellent progress has been made in this respect. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome Factors outside the control of Government or Implementing Agency One factor affecting the implementation and outcome of the project was the continuously unfavourable exchange rate between the local currency and US Dollar. This led to a requirement for continuous control from the PIU. The problem was that the works’ contracts were paid to the Contractors in Albanian LEK, which was strengthening against the US Dollar and this tended to offset the gains made against the SDR. However the implementation of the project is not considered to have been noticeably affected by the exchange rate since all the proposed components have been completed. Another factor was the fact that the Albanian construction enterprises were faced with tendering requirements for routine maintenance works, which was a new experience in the country and for which it was not sufficiently prepared. During the implementation of the Project, a substantial amount of training measures was required by the Supervisor Consultant in order to overcome this difficulty. The supervision component dealt with maintenance works for more than 2,000 km of national and rural roads for which a total of 111 works contracts were involved, including 8 “black spot” improvements. For each contract, the Consultant had initial talks with the contractor being entrusted with the Works. This was then followed by an immediate introduction to the site. As a result, the contractors were fully aware of the essential contents of their contracts and the current condition of the road to be maintained before commencement of the works. By the end of the Project the results were positive. This has provided a sound basis for the sustainability of the Project to be continued with local capacities and funds. Factors generally subject to Government control One factor under Government control, which could have affected the implementation of the project, was the problem of power cuts. The Contractors solved the power cut problems by purchasing sufficient power generators for their site offices as well as for the necessary site activities. This increased the costs sustained by the Contractors, but ensured that the Works were completed on time. Therefore the Contractors’ actions mean that the implementation of the project is considered to have been only slightly affected by the reduced power supplies. Factors generally subject to Implementing Agency control The main factor, subject to Implementing Agency Control, which sometimes created temporary delays to the project implementation, was that during the execution of the works, the contractors had to deal continuously with objections by local people. These related to a number of measures prescribed in the contracts such as gravel pavements, installation of culverts, grading shoulders, removing vegetation etc. The local residents and road users expected the Road Maintenance Project to provide at least an asphalt concrete pavement and a road drainage system that does not negatively affect the farming
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land located adjacent to the road. But they also expected the maintenance to cover the removing of illegal dumping of any kind of waste beside the roads. Additional points of a similar nature were some occasional comments and interventions by the local authorities (Prefects, Mayors and Heads of Commune) who - amongst other things - criticised the performance of contractors and the type of road pavements, since maintenance of the gravel paving was, in their opinion, a wastage of funds. They were continuously seeking for the roads to be reconstructed, including an asphalt concrete pavement, even though this was outside the scope of the Project. However the implementation of the project is not considered to have been noticeably affected by this difficulty, since all the proposed road maintenance contracts have been completed. Sustainability Sustainability of the project is likely. This is because of the GoA’s ongoing commitment to improving and maintaining the Country’s national road network and the continuous pressure by the financiers upon the Government to maintain the road network, including the new roads which have been financed by foreign donors. This is demonstrated by the recent provision of IDA/IBRD funding of the Transport Project. One component of which provides for the continuation of routine road maintenance through the introduction, on a trial basis, of Output and Performance Based Maintenance Contracts for the national road network in two pilot regions. These proposed routine maintenance works contracts should provide business and employment opportunities for the Albanian construction companies. In summary, continued co-operation between the Bank, other development organizations, the Albanian government and private sector organizations is necessary for continued sustainability. Transition Arrangements to Regular Operation It will take several more years yet before transition to regular operation is complete. In part, this is because of the new organization’s weak managerial skills and lack of experience in a market economy, and also because Albania lacks a permanent civil service. Conversion to new technologies and learning new procedures of work, co-operation and competition, especially towards routine road maintenance, will be essential during the transition period. Lessons Learned
1. More than 2,000 km of national and rural roads were involved in this Project, out of a total of 16,000 km of the Albanian road network. When looking at the map one is able to notice that the Project’s road network is not very coherent. The individual award of each works contract was not done by locating the next road section of a contract as close as possible to the previous contract. The outcome was that the road sections were scattered over the entire territory of Albania and may have been better if continuity over adjacent sections had been maintained. The other aspect was the condition of the selected roads before start of the works. Some of them, or sections thereof, were in a very poor state and essentially these required major re-construction measures in order to achieve an adequately maintainable standard. This should have been a prerequisite to this Project.
2. In general the local contractors being entrusted with periodic works, such as asphalt
concrete overlay pavements, were quite experienced in the execution of such works. This technology of road improvement is the most common one in Albania, and most profitable too, since the experienced ones amongst the Albanian contractors are well equipped with road paving machinery. Therefore it was not surprising that preference was given to the
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execution of such periodic works, which were more attractive than the BoQ-items for routine maintenance works. Both periodic and routine maintenance were based on fixed quantities with unit rates attributed to them. However, the latter is the major shortcoming of this type of maintenance contract, in that the routine maintenance works are contractually treated like periodic measures, or similar to construction works for a new road. Routine works need continuous subsequent works, which is not ensured once the contractor has completed the volume shown in the contract. Therefore for any subsequent works he wants to get them paid for carrying them out. This shortcoming has been eliminated by assigning the contractor with the repetition of the works without extra pay. However for the later contracts, the entire scope of routine works was switched to a performance based approach, for which monthly unit rates were introduced. This proved to be more successful in ensuring that the maintenance works were carried out throughout the whole period of the contract.
3. Contract Language – Clause 17 of the Conditions of Contract stated that the contractual
language was Albanian, even though the supervision was provided by an international supervision consultant. This made the communication between the Resident Engineer and the Contractor, especially with the Contractor’s workforce on site, quite difficult. All correspondence between the RE and the Contractor, and any documents, had to be translated from English to Albanian and vice versa by the Supervising Consultant’s local staff. The interpreting and translation process was time consuming and created some difficulties in following the correct procedures. Frequently misunderstandings and misinterpretations were noticed on site. The lesson has been learned in that the Contract language for the Civil Works Contracts, which were undertaken in the latter stages of the IDA-Financed Road Maintenance Project, is English. Although an Albanian version of the Bidding Documents was prepared to assist the local Contractors during the preparation of their Bids.
Borrower and Bank Performance The Borrower and the Beneficiaries have performed satisfactorily throughout the Project. The Borrower has ensured that counterpart financing has been made available on time and that payments to the Works Contractor’s has been made in a timely manner. The Beneficiaries of the various components have cooperated fully during the implementation of the project. The personnel from GRD and MLGD have assisted the Works Contractors to ensure that contracts have been successfully completed, whenever required to do so. Personnel from the Ministry’s Safety Department and from the Police Department have worked closely with the Road Safety Consultant and provided sound ideas and advice towards improving road safety in Albania. The Borrower considers that the Bank performed well throughout the period of the Project. The MPWTT, GRD and MOI are very appreciative of the help, work and advice given to them by the Bank’s staff during the implementation of the Project. The contribution and work of the previous Task Manager, Mr. Cesar Queiroz, the current Task Manager, Mr. Martin Humphreys and his assistant Mr. Artan Guxho, together with their supervision missions, have contributed greatly to the final success and achievements of the Project.
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Borrower’s Comments on the Draft Implementation Completion and Results Report. Comments from the General Roads Directorate:
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Comments from the Ministry of Interior:
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Translation: REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
THE MINISTER Prot. No. 7163/1 Tirana, Nov 20, 2007 Subject: The road Maintenance Project (Credit 3683-Alb) To: The World Bank Office TIRANA Attention to: Mr. Sokol Olldashi
MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Dear Sirs, On November 7, 2007, The Ministry of Interior has received, for comments, the final draft of the ICR of the Road maintenance Project, prepared with the contribution of the Project Implementation Unit, within GRD. In the road maintenance component, which is the major component of the project, in addition to the national roads, were included sections of the rural roads network, under the administration of the regional (qark) councils, and for which the Ministry of Interior, previous ministry of Local Government and Decentralization, has a direct contribution to support the PIU. With appreciation on the content of the report, the Ministry of Interior takes the opportunity to suggest that in paragraph 2.2 “The Implementation”, which presents the reduction of number of kilometers included in the project from 1,000 to 500, should be considered the justifications provided by the previous Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization in its letter no. 1128, date March 9, 2005, and reflected in the letter the Ministry of Finance sent, at that time, to the World Bank (copes attached). Thanking you for the cooperation THE MINISTER Bujar Nishani
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Comments from the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication:
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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not applicable.
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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Appraisal Document, the World Bank, June 5, 2002 Development Credit Agreement 3683-ALB, July 15, 2002 Agreement Amending Development Credit Agreement 3683-1 ALB, July 24, 2003 Project Status Reports Implementation Status and Results Reports Aide-Memoires Quarterly Reports, PIT, General Road Directorate, Albania
