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Doxa and a critical rhetoric:Accounting for the rhetorical agentthrough prudenceJim A. Kuypers aa Visiting Assistant Professor and Director of Speech ,Dartmouth College , Hanover, NH, 03755Published online: 21 May 2009.

To cite this article: Jim A. Kuypers (1996) Doxa and a critical rhetoric: Accounting forthe rhetorical agent through prudence, Communication Quarterly, 44:4, 452-462, DOI:10.1080/01463379609370031

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Doxa and a Critical Rhetoric:Accounting for the Rhetorical AgentThrough Prudence

Jim A. Kuypers

This paper explores the tension between critical rhetoric's doxa and a modernistic episteme.Critical rhetoric's professed move away from an agent-centered rhetoric in favor ofrhetorical textuality recasts and de-emphasizes the ethical dimensions associated withaction. Ironically, however, this same move precipitates the re-emergence of the agent inthe form of the critic who acts as interpreter-constructor of texts for society. As a remedy,I develop a revised conception of doxa positioned within a critical rhetoric, which iscontrasted to episteme, and then advance a conception of prudence (practical wisdom) thatuses doxa as its underpinnings. Finally, I argue that the actions of the agent may beaccounted for through a prudential critique, thereby outlining ethical considerations withina critical rhetoric.

KEY CONCEPTS: Critical rhetoric, doxa, episteme, prudence

JIM A. KUYPERS (PhD., Louisiana State University, 1995) is Visiting Assistant Professorand Director of Speech, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03 755. An early version of thedoxa section of this manuscript was presented as a Top Five Paper in Rhetorical Theoryand Criticism at the annual meeting of the Central States Communication Association in1992, Cleveland; an early version of the prudence section was presented at the annualmeeting of the Florida Communication Association in 1992, Ft. Lauderdale. I would liketo thank Michael Bowman, Andrew King, Raymie McKerrow, and all of the anonymousreviewers for their helpful suggestions.

McKerrow (1989) has provided a necessary catalyst to begin exploring a conception ofrhetoric from within a postmodern philosophical perspective. His project seeks not torehabilitate rhetoric, but to emancipate it from Platonic universalizations. This

emancipation is announced in a pragmatic vein: as critics we are now asked to shift from askingquestions of truth or falsity and instead to view rhetoric as doxastic. This "allows the focus to shift tohow symbols come to possess power—what they 'do' in society as contrasted to what they 'are'"(McKerrow, 1989, p. 104). For McKerrow, rhetoric's purview is not the traditional concerns withtruth, but the critique of power. In using critical rhetoric, then, it is paramount that we assume thatdualism is no longer extant (Murphy, 1989), that Platonic universalizations are relics of a modernmind-set, and that we live in a relativized world (Sarup, 1989)—all these are assumed by McKerrowfrom the start of his essay.

This paper explores the tension that exists between a critical rhetoric's doxa and a modernisticepisteme, and examines the concepts of doxa and prudence (practical wisdom; phronesis) positionedwithin a critical rhetoric perspective.1 My general argument is that in displacing the agent as theprinciple focus of a rhetorical critique in favor of rhetorical textuality (McGee, 1990), McKerrowchanges the nature of the moral and ethical dimensions traditionally associated with agent-centeredaction. The agent is positioned outside the modernist standards of ethics and morality by which

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traditional rhetorical agents have been judged. In this essay I argue that the aforementioned difficultyis exacerbated with the re-emergence of the rhetorical agent in the form of the critic who acts as textinterpreter-constructor within a critical rhetoric perspective. Since power primarily resides in themoral and ethical standards—and a critical rhetoric's agent is supposed to be the critic of power—tojudge him or her by traditional standards defeats the entire enterprise.

McKerrow (1989) does not address how to judge the actions of the critic using a critical rhetoric,however, and with this in mind I advocate a conception of prudence that is linked with doxa, for whatis needed in a critical rhetoric perspective is an ethic of performance that responds to the postmodernperspective in which it is exercised.2 I argue in this essay that prudence is a way of evaluating thecritic's performance. By using prudence in this fashion we can acknowledge rhetorical textuality andat the same time judge the critic's actions. This allows for a reclamation of the rhetorical agent thatplaces greater emphasis on the moral and ethical nature of a doxastic rhetoric as opposed to anepistemic one. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two sections: the first developing a conceptionof doxa positioned within a critical rhetoric and contrasted to episteme, and the second advancing aconception of prudence that uses doxa as its underpinnings to account for both the re-emergence of therhetorical agent and a recasting of the ethical landscape.

Doxa, Episteme, and the Re-emergence of the Rhetorical AgentA critical rhetoric questions the universalizing standards of judgment operating within modernism

by replacing rhetoric as epistemic with the idea of rhetoric as doxastic. McKerrow (1989) agrees withHariman (1986) that doxa encompasses the characteristics of "opinion," "reputation," "regard," and theinteraction of concealment and revelation in discourse, but further removes doxa from an orientationtoward episteme by focusing upon how discourse manifests power within a contingent universe, ratherthan how discourse mirrors truth. Thus, in a critical rhetoric, doxastic knowledge is viewed as separateor distinct from an epistemic knowledge. Doxa is another type of knowledge that the critic focusesupon when analyzing a particular discourse; in this case, upon the power structures operating betweenvarious social institutions and individuals.3

This positioning of doxa is problematic for some theorists, however. Hariman (1991b),responding to McKerrow's (1989) reconceptualization of his original notion, attempts to illustrate thatMcKerrow's conception of doxa is not fully detached from modernism due to the characterization ofdoxa and episteme as being different forms of knowledge. Instead of supporting differentepistemologies, Hariman argues for "different alignments" of truth and knowledge in texts. Thisposition suggests a linear relationship among differing epistemologies, not an oppositional one. InHariman's sense doxa is an amorphous and societal based knowledge in which a fluid process ofregard, ranking, and (un)concealing of discourse occurs. It can be taken as the grounds for rhetoricalpractice and implies a preferable public behavior. Since it is created through acts of concealment (whatwe do not know shapes what we do know), "a complete conceptualization of doxa must also includethe idea that regard is in part achieved by the concealment of rank (rank of ourselves, others, ideas,concepts, etc.). This interpretation repositions doxa: it is no longer contrasted with episteme, but ratherwith aletheia, truth (literally 'unhiddeness')" (Hariman, 1986, p. 50).4

While generally agreeing with the foregoing, McKerrow does not adhere completely to Hariman'sinterpretation of doxa. A conception of rhetoric/critical praxis grounded in doxa is not the same as onegrounded in a strict sense oí episteme. A critical rhetoric seeks to avoid "principles of universalism";certitude is not sought after. There are different alignments of "truth," and rather than a weakenedepisteme, doxa is offered and functions as a substitute term (McKerrow, 1991). Having a viableconception of doxa, in contradistinction to a "weak" episteme, allows for Hariman's alignments of socialknowledge as well as a conceptual distinction between doxa and episteme.5

Critical rhetoric further removes a conception of doxa from episteme by shifting the focus ofrhetoric away from agent-centered communication in favor of textual fragments. Critical rhetoric is

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interested in "transformational activities." It is a mode of critique that seeks to concentrate "attentionan that symbolism which addresses publics" (McKerrow, 1989, p. 101). Although the focus is uponsymbol, not agent-centered action, it is the critic who brings together the textual fragments in order toeffect a text suitable for criticism. And this very action involves an act of interpretation. As Cox(1990) reminds us, the construction of suitable texts within a postmodern philosophical perspectiveis an act of interpretation: it involves "the locating of discursive fragments within a discordant andmulti-layered culture of'meanings"1 (p. 327). This raises the question of the possibility of a critic-centered agency in lieu of a traditional public subject/agent.

McKerrow (1993) has outlined the possibility of the subject/agent positioned within a criticalrhetoric by differentiating between a modernistic "1" (a transcendental and physical presence consciousof its own presence, and the originator of its own action) and a postmodern, "decentered" subject (notthe originator of meaning, but a constructed entity). McKerrow follows neither conceptualization intoto, and instead prefers to recast a conception of the subject positioned in a critical rhetoric. To dothis he grants "more 'will' to the subject as actor-as an agent who has some say in the conditions thatwill provide for... the care of the self" (p. 58). The assignation of more "will" to rhetorical subjectsgrants these same subjects "independent existence apart from other subjects and from those socialforces that constitute it" (p. 59). In this configuration these subjects are still subjected to, andinfluenced by, the constituting social formations. Thus, the subject has been disinterred from both themodernistic and exclusively postmodern concept. In a critical rhetoric, the subject is "constituted asone facet of the possibilities of change within social relationships" (p. 60).6

As the above suggests, the subject is a special construction, one who possesses the possibilitiesof agent and autonomy, especially when the subject is the critic. As McKerrow (1989) states, "Thefocus [in a critical rhetoric] is upon the critic's activity as a statement; the critic as inventor [of texts]becomes arguer or advocate for an interpretation of the collected fragments" (p. 108, italics added).This parallels McGee's (1990) positioning of the critic: "the fragmentation of our American culture hasresulted in a role reversal, making interpretation the primary tasks of speakers and writers, and textconstruction the primary tasks of... critics" (p. 274). In short, the job of the critical rhetorician is toinvent a text suitable for criticism. The invented text is to be utilized by those for whom it was invented"to alter the conditions of their lived experience" (McKerrow, 1993, p.62). Clearly this involvesinterpretation on the part of the public; it also involves interpretation from the critic, casting him or herin the role of agent for social change. A critic seeks to pull together disparate scraps of discourse,construct them into an argument, and then present them to the public to raise awareness about taken-for-granted social practices. This construction clearly articulates the role of the critic as possible agentas opposed to critic as subject only.

Thus we see two lines of thought developed here. One, in terms of society at large, is doxa,interpellated within a critical rhetoric to help assess how symbols addressed to publics come to possesspower—what symbols "do" as opposed to what they "are" in a society. So the focus is clearly uponsymbol-rhetorical textuality-and not agent. Concurrently, though, by advocating the position that acritic/interpreter constructs texts suitable for criticism, we see the re-emergence of the agent in theguise of the critic. These two lines of development are addressed in the remainder of this section.

Critical rhetoric's announced shift from agent in favor of symbolism and mediated discoursepresents us with an important dilemma: "the diminution of agent/subject also diminishes the moral andethical dimensions of choice itself: if choice is not constitutive, it is not moralizing and it is not ethical"(Williams, 1990, p. 10). Critical rhetoric, unlike traditional rhetoric, does not privilege a moral orethical stance in its critique. Its end is the transformation of society, but no provision is made forrendering judgments about such transformations other than that of continual critique. In a highlyrelative world, without privileging any answer as right, how can we judge a rhetorical performance?Are there to be no constraints on ethical judgment? Thus we encounter the necessity of asking whatagency a critical rhetoric creates. The answer I prefer is that we may retain a concern for the agent byasking how critics (and rhetors) construct rhetorical audiences and how they construct themselves.

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Ethical judgments may then be based upon these constructions. The sense of agent I endorse flowsfrom these constructions, and, in turn, from the ethical judgments made. Rather than announce theagent in advance, the task in this essay is to explore the possible constructions.

The importance of defining agency to provide for ethical judgments is further highlighted whenwe consider the linear relationship between doxa and episteme. Episteme's original and distinctcharacteristics involve knowledge gained from axioms and first principles; it uses demonstrativereasoning. Further, as Warnick (1989) notes, the "purpose oí episteme is to discover knowledge ofgeneral rules that can apply invariably to all instances within the rubric for which the rule is intended.Emotive elements, probable proof, and considerations of moral choice are inappropriate in episteme"(p. 304). If epistemic rhetoric, strictly defined, operates within the realm of the universal, then doxasticrhetoric operates within the realm of a relativized world where universals no longer exist.

Not all uses of episteme are so constrained, however. For example, consider the rhetoricalepisteme that Scott (1967,1976) speaks of (see also Leff, 1978, and Cherwitz, 1990). Scott does notview epistemological rhetoric as universal. He quite clearly states:

[TJhere is no possibility in matters relevant to human interaction to determine truth in any apriori way... truth can arise only from cooperative critical inquiry. Men may have recourseto some universal ideas in which they are willing to affirm their faith, but these must enter intothe contingencies of time and place and will not give rise to products which are certain.(1967, p. 14)

Scott's concept of episteme is not the a priori knowledge of which Warnick speaks. It is instead agenerative knowledge, produced through action, through doing. Thus Scott's conception falls short ofthe requirement of a universal knowledge; since there is no universal knowledge, one may never becertain. "If one cannot be certain, however, then one must either withdraw from the conflicts of life orfind some way to act in the face of these conflicts" (Scott, 1967, p. 16). The answer for Scott is to actanyway, "what is true . . . does not exist prior to but in the working out of its own expression" (p. 16).

A critical rhetoric rejects outright an a priori truth while embracing the very type of knowledgethat Scott is speaking of. Yet the locus of inquiry in McKerrow's critical rhetoric is the power relationsinherent within discourses-with what symbols "do." As McGee (1990) suggests, relations of powerare the taken for granted "matrix of rules, rituals, and conventions" of a society (p. 280). Criticalrhetoric's two critiques, of domination and of freedom, take as their central task the continual challengeof these established conventions. "In this context," McKerrow notes, "a 'critique of domination' impliesfreedom from powers of oppression; a 'critique of freedom' impliesfreedom to pursue other powerrelations" (1991, p. 75). The nature of McKerrow's doxa is further removed from the above mentionedconcepts of episteme in that it is linked to what McKerrow (1989) calls "influence." When dealing withthe established conventions of society, "the notion of'influence' rejects the twin claims that nothing isconnected to anything else (culturalism) and that everything is determined by something(structuralism)" (p. 106; see too, Condit, 1990).7

Thus a bipartite predicament. First, critical rhetoric's move away from agent to rhetoricaltextuality/symbolism does not privilege an ethical stance in its critique, thereby diminishing the concernwith the traditional ethical domain of rhetoric. Further, with doxa viewed as conceptually distinct fromepisteme, the amoral dimensions of critical rhetoric are further exacerbated; there needs to be somemethod of judging an agent's actions that does not rely solely upon universal or relativistic conceptionsof episteme. Second, although McKerrow (1993) believes the rhetorical subject can be both agent ofaction and critic of society, a critical rhetoric generally ignores the agent in favor of a rhetoricaltextuality. Yet the very act of fashioning a text imbricates the critic as both interpreter and agent ofsocial change.

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Reclamation of the Agent and Ethics through PrudenceClarification of the above contradiction may be achieved by referring to the concept oîphronesis,

also called prudence. The role of prudence is understood through its relationship with the doxaoperating within a given society: Doxa must be viewed as the societally transferred and manifested,diachronic concept of the knowledge of "truth," whereas prudence is the instantaneous or abruptindividual praxis oí doxa. Positioned within a critical rhetoric, the notion of prudence encourages usto examine the ethical dimensions of how an agent acts to establish, maintain, and transform society.

This is the crux of the matter: McKerrow's focus on rhetoric as mediated discourse diminishes thetraditional conception of rhetor as agent. With this shift in emphasis it seems that we move away fromconcerns with the moral and ethical dimensions of agent-centered action in favor of a non-privilegingstance toward relations of power. Prudence allows us to retain the moral and ethical nature of an agent-centered rhetoric necessary for a doxastic rhetoric differentiated from episteme. Prudence also providesus with the means to correct for critical rhetoric's non-privileging stance concerning the ethical natureof societal transformations. Value and moral choice are no longer bound with modernism'suniversalizations, however; they are instead constructs that have their instantiation with the "now" ofthe doxa of a given society. Recall that Wamick sees episteme as universal; Scott sees episteme as aform of cooperative critical inquiry; and that McKerrow views doxa as a societally based knowledgethat acknowledges the established conventions of society. Prudence, addressing ethical concerns withina doxa based rhetoric, allows for the evaluation of rhetoric's performative nature, whether as atraditional agent-centered action, or as a pluralized subject. Such a conception moves beyond Warnick,Scott, and McKerrow in that it allows for the examination of how the individual works upon theestablished conventions of truth within situational constraints to form new meaning. Prudence involvesreflective judgment as a constitutive aspect of right action. Prudential action may be "read and viewedas social text" (Warnick, 1989, p. 309).

A conception of prudence necessitates that we respect qualities that the academy and criticaltheorists usually eschew: virtue, morality, and "right" or "good" action.8 Prudence is not concerned withbodies of knowledge, nor is it contained in bodies of propositions; instead it is concerned with action.It can be said to be a product of experience and the possession of reason. It is concerned withconsequences, uncertain judgments, and ethical considerations. Prudence may be contrasted withsophia in that it operates in the realm of moral and political action, whereas sophia represents wisdomgenerated in the speculative sciences and philosophy.

Prudence as Meth od of A ctionGarver (1987) argues that prudence is one of three methods of determining action: prudence,

algorithmics, and heuristics. He further defines prudence as lying midway between algorithmic rules(an ethics of principles, calculative in nature) and heuristic rules (an ethics of consequences,performative in nature). Both could lead to a loss of potential creativity and reflexivity. It should benoted that there exists a distinction between Garver's positioning of prudence during his study ofMachiavelli and Aristotle's positioning of prudence. For Aristotle (1963), prudence is not contrastedwith algorithmics and heuristics, but instead with science, or episteme, and art, or techne (6.5-6). Thusthe contrast is between a science expressed in propositions and demonstrations, and an art that reliesupon propositions on how to produce objects that possess value and existence in and of themselves.Prudence is not subject to demonstration, nor does it have an end outside itself. The importance hereis that while prudence is commonly viewed as a mediation between an ethics of principles and an ethicsof consequences (Charland, 1990; Hariman, 1991a), Aristotle's relationship forces the developmentof the personal nature of prudence; it involves looking within the individual embodying prudentialtraits: "the value of the deed flows in part from the doer" (Garver, 1987, p. 21 ; Aristotle, 1963,6.5-6).This links prudence with character and provides for the consideration of virtue, morality, ethics, andthe "good." Concern with character virtue (Johannesen, 1991) acts to humanize the critical act and

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highlights the concern for the individual—persons become real, not illusions in a rhetoricallyconstructed universe of discourse. If we are to hold individual members of societyaccountable/responsible for their actions/utterances, then we must look to prudence as a form of "rightaction."

To paraphrase Aristotle (1963): A prudent person is one characterized not only by his or herability "to reach sound conclusions" in personal deliberations about what is good and advantageous forself, but also about what is conducive "to the good life as a whole." A prudent person also "calculateswell for the attainment of a particular end" (6.5). The focus here is upon the importance of theparticular end as it relates to a general "good." What is good, according to Aristotle, is that desired byall; thus the general good is linked not with an enástate, but with the continual betterment of societyat large (as based upon doxa); what is good is viewed in terms of human commitment and is timebound. Prudence is thus associated with particulars; it is the ability to "deliberate or calculate wellabout things to be done" (6.5).

Virtue is necessary to enact this conception of prudence. Johannesen (1991) believes human good"consists (in part) both in virtuous action and in being a person of a certain character" (p. 72). A focusupon virtue highlights the portion of prudence that does not concentrate wholly upon the intellect. Thisrelationship of knowledge to virtue depends in part upon our conception of wisdom. If we allow forthe division of speculative (scientific) versus practical wisdom, then we must also admit that theindividual wise in science may not be of the same moral character as a prudent individual. Indeed,Aristotle finds that prudence and moral virtue are reciprocal, for prudence makes us use the rightmeans. Simon (1991) illustrates this reciprocity, highlighting the relationship between a prudentialjudgment and its inextricable union with human use: prudence "is not a mere skill, expertness, art ortechnique, but a virtue in the full sense of the term. Of all the intellectual habitus, prudence alone isa virtue properly so called-which indeed implies that it is not purely intellectual" (pp. 10-11). Indeed,prudence combines standard definitions of virtue and character; and ethical character does influenceour actions and the choices we make (Johannesen, 1991).

Thus far we have covered several of the basic aspects of prudence. Prudence is judgment appliedto right action; it is the abrupt individual praxis of doxa. Rooted in doxa, it allows for maintenance ofthe moral and ethical nature of an agent-centered rhetoric, for action may be judged as social text.Prudent actors engage the particular with the general good in mind. The particular necessitatesconsiderations of character; thus, given Aristotle's original (and pre-modem) placement of prudence,we see the re-emergence of the personal aspects of prudence: virtue, morality, ethicality, and rightaction. The discussion thus far has focused upon how the particular actor interacts with a particularsituation; I now turn to the relation between actor and society. This relationship necessitates thedevelopment of two other aspects of prudence: prudence as constitutive and prudence as performance.

Prudence as ConstitutivePrudence may be viewed as constitutive in the sense that it allows for the calling into being of

audiences. In this sense, prudence enables us to view rhetoric as a process that involves both theconstruction of a "people," an audience capable of enacting change, and their subsequent fragmentation(McGee, 1975, 1990). This is commensurate with my earlier assertion that critical rhetoric's focusupon the transformative aspects of rhetoric necessitates a reconceptualization of how we judge theethical and moral implications ofthat which is constructed. A critical rhetoric does not eliminate ethics,it instead assumes a non-privileging stance; it views transformation, or the possibilities oftransformation, as the ultimate goal. These transformative activities are the constitutive elements foundwithin a collectivity of textual fragments. Although critical rhetoric concentrates upon the critic's roleas agent of change, the idea of transformational activities is not new. Indeed, by acting we create anethical identity for ourselves, for those we talk about, and for our audience. We propose a relationshipamong these elements. Prudence, through its association with character, here necessitates the

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examination of who we are and who we are becoming. This stresses the responsibility we have oneto another. It considers how we constitute our selves and others (Johannesen, 1991 ; White, 1985). Asinitially presented, critical rhetoric does not address ethical values (although they might be implied byMcKerrow (1993) when he discusses the "possibility of the subject"). Critical rhetoric seeks insteadto concentrate upon symbolism addressing publics; thus as critics we must not fail to look at the agentbringing together the collectivity of fragments that are being analyzed to effect a transformative praxis.It is the prudential agent who must deliberate and take counsel before action; thought is turned to actionand decisions are reached and executed. To do otherwise is to be imprudent-the irresolute skeptic.The prudential performance becomes a text of sorts that draws upon and reconstitutes its societal andcultural contexts. As White demonstrates (1985): "It employs the expectations established by otherworks, and modifies them; it incorporates by allusion or imitation, and in doing so it modifies what itrefers to" (p. 129). It is this constitutive sense, then, that allows for the development of a second aspectof prudence within a postmodern rhetoric~a performative prudence; for what is constituted ascontingent is thus what is performed.

Prudence as PerformanceIn order for an agent to act prudentially he or she must be able to draw successfully upon the doxa

operating in a given society in order to ascertain the ethical dimensions of the discourse at hand. Thatis, the appropriate ethos must be ascertained for a successful prudential performance (Hariman, 1989).In this sense, prudence acquires a normative dimension-it involves the apprehension of what involves"good" communicating.9

At this point the question of value judgments must be considered-these values are based upon thesociety's doxastic rationality, as differentiated from an epistemic rationality (e.g., see McKerrow, 1990).Thus, as Hariman (1990) suggests, "'prudence' orients us towards maintaining the rationality of publicdecisions through their alternation during performance, and from a prudential perspective rationalityrequires recognizing the range of variations allowed any performer for a particular script" (p. 2). Thisconception highlights the constitutive and performative nature of doxa. It further demands that weconsider the ethical dimensions associated in prudent action: "choice itself has to be ethical, has to bemoralizing, has to be constitutive oí being itself' (Williams, 1990, p. 10). This implies that in actingwe recognize the contingent nature of doxa's established "truths." Thus we must take full responsibilityfor our actions, and the ethical nature of action is maintained. Furthermore, this stresses the nature ofvalues being successfully performed, not disregarded or seen as an elusive goal. Concepts such asfreedom and equality, often used as end states or non-acknowledged underpinnings and goals by criticaltheorists (Charland, 1991; Ellis, 1991; Sarup, 1989), are not ignored, but regarded in terms of theirperformance.

Contingency has been a defining feature of rhetoric since Aristotle; indeed, Donald Bryant (1953)suggests that "rhetoric is concerned... only with those questions about which men dispute, that is, withthe contingent—that which is dependent in part upon factors which cannot be known for certain, thatwhich can be otherwise" (p. 409). Although the use of contingent by Bryant is different than thatespoused above, the "unknowness" associated with that which is contingent remains. Self (1979) hasdemonstrated that prudence functions "in the domain of the 'variable,' in the realm where humandeliberation or calculation results in probable truth about contingent matters" (pp. 131-132). Aprudence linked with the contingent involves at least three aspects: it involves the intelligentcomprehension of the contingent; it involves interpretation of the contingent-the evaluation ofoutcomes to various responses; and it presupposes virtue realized through right action. There is,however, a difference between individuals in society acting upon contingent affairs and the criticemploying critical rhetoric acting upon contingent truths. Recall that in society at large we act withknowledge of doxa, our sense of established conventions. However, the critic realizes the contingentnature of these conventions; thus prudence now concerns contingent affairs and contingent truths, and

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may be used to critique either the critic or another social actor as agent. Because in a critical rhetoricit is the critic who brings together the fragmented texts into a whole, in effect creating the text uponwhich the truth is contingent (McKerrow, 1989), I suggest we uphold the critic's performance to aprudential critique: what constructions are effected? What agency has been constructed for those otherthan the critic? In short, what "constitutions" are being made?

Prudence, in its constitutive aspects, now calls for both the creation of audiences andtransformative activities. (A critique of freedom implies the establishment, the constitution, of newrelations of power.) Thus, two constitutive aspects are achieved: new relations of power and thecreation of an audience capable of enacting the change. Furthermore, the performative aspect holdsprudence as a norm for action in which value judgments are made based upon a community's needs,doxa, and with awareness of the contingent. Thus, it involves the ethical dimension associated withaction; choice itself, in order to be ethical, must be constitutive of being itself.

Conclusion: Toward the Cultivation of a Responsibleand Ethical Transformative Praxis

McKerrow's move in opposing doxa to episteme as the definition of a society's "truth" does work—if one sees the opposition as experiential, that is, setting up a tension to be resolved in an ethical,constitutive act. Furthermore, prudence, underpinned by doxa, transcends the totalizations ofmodernity, and at the same time allows for societal-based conceptions of value, morality, andrationality. Doxa is manifested through prudence because society in general does not engage incooperative critical inquiry. Instead society possesses the "truth"~this is its doxa-and prudence allowsfor ethical and agent-oriented critique of the manner in which the "truth" is transmitted and transmuted.Here "truth" is created by rhetors who interact with and re-constitute their selves and society; thepossession of "truth" is then time-bound and societally contingent. This "truth" changes over timethrough a collective reinterpretation that is a result of both a contingent prudential praxis and thecollision of cultural fragments.

It is apparent that doxa provides the underpinning of society's rationality and conception of ethicalvalues. Values and rationality are no longer linked with modernism's epistemic constructs ofrationality, but rather to a conception of doxa allowing for considerations of agent and contingency; andit is in this sense that we can state that McKerrow's conception of ¿foxa-differentiated from episteme—is especially valid. Moreover, we can agree when Charland (1990) states:

[T]he exercise of prudence requires interpretation in order to fully grasp the contingent andweigh possible responses to it. It also requires reflective judgment, that is to say judgmentin the absence of... [a universal] concept but only with the presumption of an idea, of a te losof which the judgment would be a realization, (p. 4)

The interpretations and judgments are products of prudential reasoning made possible through doxa,not products of a universalized truth. Telos is that which concurrently draws upon and evolves withina society's doxa, and not a universalized construct. With this in mind, we may do away with traditionalnotions cítelos altogether in using prudence and doxa, substituting instead the concept of a time-boundprudential act.

In critical rhetoric prudence may emerge as action that calls forth "publics" to engage intransformational activities; moreover, it is an action that operates within doxa, and strives for thesuccessful apprehension of doxastic change. The "right" or general "good" end as envisioned byAristotle is now contrasted with the implementation of the transformational aspects of a critical rhetoric(of both the critic and the critiqued), within the purview of a society's doxa. Action is no longer tiedto an ultimate, or a fixed idea of what should be, but rather it is an action that recognizes humancommitment and the doxastic nature of "truth. " Thus, prudent action is time-bound and fully human.

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In highlighting the notion of time-bound action, prudence allows for emphasizing those aspectsof action that transcend the limiting potential of pure reaction to power relations by some criticaltheorists. Moreover, prudence allows for the cultivation of responsible and ethical transformativepraxis. Because of its strong implications of cognition, ethics, morality, and willful action, prudenceallows us to focus upon individual actors as they interact with various communities. Through aprudential perspective, then, we begin the process of answering the question of whether or not thereis an ethics of transformation in a critical rhetoric; and, we must also ask what types of socialtransformations are being effected and what are the ends to which these transformations are motivated.

I have argued in this essay that a conception of prudence is necessary for understanding the ethicalconsiderations endemic to critical rhetoric. Critical rhetoric's shift from an agent-centered rhetoric toa rhetorical textuality/symbolism recasts the ethical dimension of rhetoric by not privileging an ethicalstance in its critique: societal transformation is viewed as its own raison d'etre. Although as positionedin a critical rhetoric the rhetorical subject can be both agent of action and critic of society, criticalrhetoric clearly favors rhetorical textuality. Nevertheless, the very act of fashioning a text allows thecritic to be both interpreter and agent for social change.

Prudence allows for the reclamation of the rhetorical agent and ethics, without anchoring universalprinciples. The conception of prudence advanced in this essay is designed to work in a critical rhetoricthat has as its theoretical underpinnings postmodern philosophical principles. Prudence, viewed as amethod of action temporally located, allows critics and others involved in rhetorical transactions toretain agency and ethics through doxa. Further, it necessitates that the agent assume accountability forhis or her actions. From a prudential perspective we have a potential critical tool to engage in anexamination of an ethics of transformation. Prudence asks us to examine our constitution as a society,with no end outside of its own enactment of an ethical constitution. Since ethics are involved with"what relationship we ought to have with ourselves and others" (Cooper, 1991, p. 24), whenconstituting these new relationships we are involved with ethical considerations. With prudence, then,we have the capability to critique those agents of transformation positioned within a critical rhetoric.Critical rhetoricians are about creating new relations of power-new constitutions of self, newconstitutions of society. These constructions are ethical and rooted in an appreciation of social doxa.

NOTES1Ancient Greek ideas, such as doxa, as they have been applied in communication studies, usually overlook

the fact that they are of Greek, aristocratic, and pre-modern origins. Some modification of these ancient principlesis necessary if we are to use them within our own time and society, without marginalizing or privileging any oneparticular societal in-group. It is with this in mind that I undertake this project.

2 Both Charland (1991) and Ono and Sloop (1992) have made similar calls, but stopped short of fleshing outprecisely where or how such an ethics would function. Charland offered phronesis as a guide only, and does notlink it with a particular society's doxa. Instead, Charland envisioned critical rhetoricians as being "engaged in anongoing struggle against oppressive formations of power specific to their own contexts" (p. 71, italics mine).Furthermore, Charland's critic would eschew community standards in favor of self-amusement: "the CriticalRhetorician might best be considered as a bricoleur, a kind of cultural tinkerer whose art consists of dissembling(deconstructing?) certain formations in order to try out new constructions" (p. 74). Ono and Sloop also placed anemphasis upon forwarding the critic's own critical beliefs instead of grounding action in doxa (p. 48). Theirconception of telos as guiding light emphasizes the creation of "an end which could guide us in attempting to effectsocial change" (p. 52). This end is contingently Utopian and created by the critic in order to forward the critic'sown critical and political beliefs (p. 51). The commitment to these beliefs is not based upon a society's doxa, butrather upon the momentary convictions of a particular critic. Commitment, moreover, lasts from "the moment ofplacing pen to paper" to that moment when pen is lifted (p. 53). In contrast, the current project offers a doxa basedprudence as a guide and a critique for those practicing critical rhetoric and for those wishing to critique the productof critical rhetoricians. Thus this project suggests where and how an ethics of transformation functions within acritical rhetoric perspective.

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3 Doxa has its roots in Greek philosophy. Some of the earliest references are found in Parmenides. It is herethat the distinction between episteme as true knowledge and doxa as "seeming" or opinion begins. As Mechoulan(1990, p. 135) states: "The way of truth is never one way, a divine way that is articulated only by the divine voice.The other way is that of appearance, non-truth, that the mortals share, that named 'opinion,' (doxa)." Thus withParmenides we see the opposition of truth (what is) and appearance (what Mechoulan called "an abusive beliefin the power of naming," p. 136). Plato initially sets up true knowledge (eide) against ignorance. In between thesetwo states lies a type of quasi-knowledge called doxa. For Plato, doxa is concerned with sensible things (i.e., thatwhich may be sensed) and those opinions held in common by humanity. Thus Plato's doxa is founded upon theseparation of eide from the realm of sensible things (aistheta). (See The Republic. 476-480 and 509-511.)Aristotle has a different conceptualization of doxa. Knowledge for Aristotle is immediate (nous) or discursive(dianoia). We may divide the discursive into episteme (that knowledge ascertained from necessary premises) anddoxa (knowledge ascertained from contingent premises). A convenient way for viewing doxa is provided byAristotle in Metaphysics (1039): doxa may be viewed as that which could be otherwise. (See Posterior Analytics.88-89 and Topica. I, 100.)

4 Hariman (1995, esp. pp. 177-192) continues this line of thought, although the emphasis is upon decorum,not prudence; however, the development of the art of rhetoric as the study of doxa and practical reasoning ismaintained.

5 Hariman (1991b) states: "I see epistemic theory in the following manner: Scott defined rhetoric as a formof knowing; Tom Farrell argued that rhetorical knowing is social; I argued that social knowledge is structured byattributions of status. The relationship is linear, not oppositional" (p.69). The distinction between doxa andepisteme rests then on a conceptual focus: an epistemic focus brings to mind what symbols "are," whereas adoxastic focus brings to mind what symbols "do."

6 In more recent, unpublished work, McKerrow (1994, 1995) appears to be advancing a plural conception ofthe subject that follows Mouffe (1993). Mouffe states: "[W]e are . . . always multiple and contradictory subjects,inhabitants of a diversity of communities (as many, really, as the social relations in which we participate and thesubject positions they define), constructed by a variety of discourses, and precariously and temporarily sutured atthe intersection of the subject positions" (p. 20). Exactly how this new subject construction will affect a criticalrhetoric has yet to be decided.

7 Warnick (1989) and Scott (1967) represent two very different notions of knowledge. Doxa parallels Scott'sperspective as the more accurate classical term for the kind/status of knowledge produced. By introducing"influence," McKerrow (1989) has introduced new considerations which have yet to be fully explored.

8 This view is consistent with Simon (1991): "[W]hen a question involves contingent occurrences, it absolutelycannot be answered by the ways of cognition, but only by those of inclination. In other words, the correct answeris obtained not by any logical connection with axiomatic premises but by the attractions and aversions of a soul inconnaturality with the good" (p. 35). Thus, prudence is not something to be taught only, but rather it isexperienced and cultivated from those ineffable aspects of humanness that defy full explanation.

9 Hariman (1995) continues this line of reasoning in his study of political style which he defined as, "acoherent repertoire of rhetorical conventions depending on aesthetic reactions for political effect" (p. 4, italicsdeleted). In short, Hariman explores how certain political styles draw upon societal expectations of the "role ofsensibility, taste, manners, charisma, charm, or similarly compositional or performative qualities in a particularpolitical culture" (p. 4).

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