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Caribbean integration – lessons for the
Pacific?
Bob Warner
Abstract
The 15 members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are digesting a critical
review of the structure and performance of its Secretariat, which describes the
overall CARICOM integration initiative as being in crisis. This paper describes
elements of the CARICOM integration project, and draws lessons for the Pacific
Island Countries. It suggests that the CARICOM experience puts into question
elements of the logic and overall approach to integration being pursued in both
regions (and being urged by external partners).
Discussion Paper 25
NOVEMBER 2012
Caribbean integration – lessons for the Pacific?
Bob Warner
Bob Warner is Director of Pacific Research Partnerships at the
Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU.
Warner, B 2012 “Caribbean integration – lessons for the Pacific?”
Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 25, Crawford School of
Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra.
The Development Policy Centre is a research centre at the
Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National
University. The discussion paper series is intended to facilitate
academic and policy discussion. Use and dissemination of this
discussion paper is encouraged; however, reproduced copies
may not be used for commercial purposes.
The views expressed in discussion papers are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to any organisation with
which the authors might be affiliated.
For more information on the Development Policy Centre, visit
http://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/
1
Caribbean integration – lessons for the Pacific?
1. Introduction
The Pacific Islands Forum is currently considering a critical review of the structure and
performance of its Secretariat (Dornan 2012). In considering institutional structures,
the Forum is not alone: ASEAN Member States are also grappling with challenges
concerning the performance of their Secretariat.1 These review processes are part of a
broader rethinking of the overall direction and approach to be taken to regional
integration, a rethinking which must be factoring in the current crisis in Europe. This
discussion paper looks at what is happening in the regional integration project being
pursued by the members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which for a variety
of reasons may be quite relevant to the Pacific Island States.
CARICOM comprises 12 island and three larger coastal states and territories that lie in
or border the Caribbean Sea. Although many CARICOM members share cultural and
historical similarities, there is considerable diversity among them, reflecting a range of
African, Asian, European, and native influences. There are also differences in population,
land area and levels of economic development. CARICOM includes high and middle
income countries with significant oil, gas and mineral resources or well developed
offshore banking sectors, as well as some of the poorest countries in the world, largely
dependent on subsistence farming. It also includes some continental countries with
relatively large land masses, as well as extremely small island states and territories.
(Table 1 gives a sense of the variation in size and wealth across CARICOM states and
territories. It also shows how important trade in goods and services is to the economies
of most CARICOM member states.)
The island members of CARICOM face some of the challenges usually associated with
smallness and physical separation from continental land masses. They are very open to
1 A recent draft report by the Asian Development Bank Institute argued that ‘in the absence of structural reforms that drastically bolster the Secretariat’s position, it is extremely difficult for ASEAN countries to conduct effective regional cooperation and integration (ADBI 2012).
2
international trade and financial flows, and this openness makes them more exposed to
external shocks than larger economies, and limits the instruments available to deal with
these shocks. Small populations also increase the challenges of building and maintaining
institutions, particularly those whose functionality is predicated on independence. This
is an issue both in terms of the smaller pool of qualified personnel to run the full range
of institutions of a modern state, but also due to the greater difficulties encountered in
separating political, personal and institutional interests.
Table 1: CARICOM members – key indicators
Population
(2011) Area
Population
density
GDP
(2011)a
Per capita
GDP (2011) b
Trade
share of
GDP c
‘000 Sq Km No/Sq Km US$ m US$ m %
Antigua and Barbuda 89.0 442.6 201 1 187 18 200 115.7
Bahamas 316.1 13 880 23 8 074 31 400 113.4
Barbados 287.7 430 669 4 478 23 700 125.2
Belize 327.7 22 966 14 1 474 8 400 132.1
Dominica 73.1 751 97 489 14 000 103.9
Grenada 109.0 344 317 822 14 100 83.5
Guyana 741.9 214 969 3 2 480 7 600 170.7
Haiti 9 801.7 27 750 353 7 388 1 300 58.1
Jamaica 2 889.2 10 991 263 14 810 9 100 88.0
Montserrat 5.2 102 51 Na 8 500 na
St Kitts and Nevis 50.7 261 194 715 15 800 103.9
St Lucia 162.2 616 263 1 239 12 800 118.3
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 103.5 389 266 695 11 600 105.5
Suriname 560.2 163 820 3 3 790 9 600 76.3
Trinidad and Tobago 1 226.3 5 128 239 22 710 20 300 107.8
a Using official exchange rates b In purchasing power parity terms c Imports and exports of goods and non-factor services as a share of GDP, for the latest available year Source: CIA 2012, World Development Indicators, 2012
While trade is very important to CARICOM members, intra-regional trade is typically
not. Intra-regional commodity trade accounts for a fairly small share of the region’s
total trade (just over 16 and 13 per cent of total regional exports and imports in 2008),
and this is dominated by petroleum exports from Trinidad and Tobago, which
accounted for over 68 per cent of total regional trade in 2008 (CARICOM 2010). North
America (United States of America and Canada) and the European Union are the most
important trading partner regions for CARICOM, with North America accounting for
over a third of CARICOM’s imports and a half of its exports. These regions are also the
3
main destinations for CARICOM members’ exports of tourism services, which are
significant sources of foreign exchange earnings for many: tourism exports account for
over 20 per cent of GDP for nine of the CARICOM members (Tsikata et al 2009).
As with other regions made up of relatively small national economies, external
migration has long been a feature of Caribbean demographic change, and there is a large
Caribbean diaspora. Remittances from this diaspora are significant sources of foreign
exchange for some Caribbean countries (estimated to account for 9 per cent of GDP for
Grenada, 14 per cent for Jamaica, 15 per cent for Haiti and 17 per cent for Guyana
(World Bank 2011).)
2. Regional integration
The pursuit of regional integration in the Caribbean predates independence. Initial
support for the short lived West Indies Federation promoted by the British authorities,
built on long standing ideas that the political and economic future of the territories
depended on forging a political union. These ideas could not withstand the pressure of
divergent interests and the absence of strong popular support, and the Federation was
dissolved not long after the Jamaican electorate voted to end participation (Caribbean
Education Online 2012).
Despite the failure of federation, an interest in economic integration persisted. Local
economists and political thinkers, including the Caribbean’s Nobel laureate in
Economics, Arthur Lewis, had long argued in favour of regional integration and
cooperation to address the constraints of small size on development, to share the costs
of common services and to pool bargaining power in international fora. In the early
1960s Caribbean states embarked on a series of integration initiatives of expanding
ambition and varying geographic coverage.
These initiatives started with the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) in 1965. This was followed by the decision to deepen economic integration
by creating a common market as an integral part of the Caribbean Community
4
(CARICOM), which was established in 19732. In 2002, CARICOM members formally
embarked on the creation of an economic union with a commitment to establish the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) under the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas, which came into force in 20063. The Revised Treaty envisaged the
creation of a common economic space, calling for a “fully market-oriented approach to
the regional economy, deeper macroeconomic policy coordination, increased
harmonisation of functional areas, the free movement of goods, services, investment
and labour, and eventually a currency union.” (Hornbeck 2008) Table 2 summarises the
main elements of these initiatives.
In parallel with, and in some case predating these formal integration initiatives,
Caribbean countries created a range of regional institutions, including: the University of
the West Indies; the Caribbean Court of Justice; the Caribbean Telecommunications
Union; and the Caribbean Regional organisation for Standards and Quality (Appendix
Table A.1 gives a larger but not exhaustive list of regional institutions).
Within the CARICOM grouping some countries have taken much deeper steps towards
integration. Eight of the nine members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
Montserrat and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) share a common currency managed by
the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, which also oversees financial and banking integrity
for the independent OECS states. Five of the OECS states have ratified a treaty to
establish an economic union, providing for free circulation of goods, services, capital
and labour, a regional Assembly of Parliamentarians and a common external tariff. The
OECS (established in 1981) is often identified as an exemplar of small island state
regional integration and cooperation. OECS members have been successful in
establishing a number of regional institutions, including the Eastern Caribbean Supreme
2 In practice, the Community and the common market were established as two separate legal and institutional entities: the Community which ‘comprises multiple functional relationships and institutions designed to integrate the region politically, economically and legally’ (Hornbeck 2008), and the common market focusing on trade and investment integration. 3 The original treaty of Chaguaramas, signed in 1973, established CARICOM.
5
Court, the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority, and the Eastern Caribbean
Telecommunications Authority.
Table 2: Caribbean regional economic integration initiatives
CARIFTA CARICOM CARICOM revised/CSME
Duration 1968-1973 1973-2006 Post-2006
Membership 12 Anglophone
Caribbean
countries a
13 Anglophone Caribbean
countries b
CARICOM 15 countries
CSME 12 countries c
Form Free Trade Area Customs Union/Common
Market
Economic Union
Scope Merchandise
trade
Merchandise trade
Minimal provision for services
and capital
Incentives policy harmonisation
Industrial allocation
Joint development of agriculture
and natural resources
Merchandise trade
Services
Capital
Skilled labour
Macroeconomic policy
harmonisation
Monetary union
Sectoral policy harmonisation
Complementary
Pillars
Common services Functional cooperation (mainly
social policy)
Foreign policy coordination
Functional cooperation (extended to
external trade)
Foreign policy coordination
a Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. b The Bahamas became a member of the Community in 1983 (but not the Common Market) c Suriname and Haiti joined the Community (in 1995 and 2002 respectively): The Bahamas, Montserrat and Haiti do not participate in the CSME.
Source: Girvan, 2010
The CARICOM regional integration project has received strong in principle support from
the member states of the Community, and broad acceptance within the private sector
and academia. However, there is growing disenchantment with progress actually being
made. This comes on top of long-standing doubts about whether models of regional
integration that are centred on trade liberalisation can deliver much in the way of
development outcomes.4
4 In a chapter of a report commissioned by the Caribbean Development Bank, University of West Indies Professor Norman Girvan observed that “… economic integration is still a work in progress, and what has been accomplished so far has not impacted significantly on regional economic development. This could be due to faulty implementation of agreed integration schemes, or to inappropriate design of the schemes
6
A World Bank/Organization of American States study published in 2009 argued that
implementation of the integration agenda had stalled, with the goal of establishing a
common market being far from met. In particular it pointed out that:
“Implementation of the common external tariff, a critical feature of the common
market has been marred by extensive derogations and the imposition of import
surcharges by some members. Average external tariffs range from 7.2 to 30.7 per
cent, and maximum tariffs range from 40 to 400 per cent, and a number of
members impose unauthorised non-tariff barriers to imports” (Tsikata et al
2009, p. ix)
CARICOM does not in effect have a common external trade policy, since the CARICOM
Treaty does not prohibit individual members from negotiating bilateral agreements
with third countries.
Significant impediments to the right of establishment and free movement of goods,
services, capital and labour remain to be addressed.5
Macroeconomic coordination and convergence are far from being achieved: there are no
rules for policy coordination and implementation, and the convergence criteria that had
been set for creation of the monetary union remain largely unmet.
Little has been achieved in the way of development of common or coordinated sectoral
policies.
The report also pointed to weaknesses in the institutional and governance structures
for CARICOM and the CSME. Decisions are taken by consensus and through inter-
themselves, or to inherent limits in the capacity of economic integration per se to drive development in these economies” (Girvan 2010). 5 CARICOM’s CSME Unit reports on a study indicating that across all five regimes CARICOM member states had implemented 64 per cent of the required measures. The highest level of compliance was for the movement of goods (80 per cent) and the lowest for the movement of services (37 per cent) (CSME Unit 2012).
7
governmental cooperation and, with the exception of the Caribbean Court of Justice,
none of the agencies or bodies created to support the integration process have been
given supranational decision-making power. Additionally, CARICOM has not yet created
instruments to enable Community decisions to become law.
A recently mandated study by CARICOM Heads of Government to offer proposals for
restructuring the CARICOM Secretariat observed that CARICOM was in crisis (Stoneman
et al 2012). While this was seen as partially due to continuing economic retrenchment
in the region caused to some extent by the 2008 global financial crisis and the fallout
from the problems in Europe6, it was also due to long-standing frustration with the slow
rate of progress and a serious weakening of the structure and operations of the
Community. In turn, it linked the frustration back to the excessive ambition of the
CARICOM agenda in the light of exogenous and endogenous constraints, which included:
binding exogenous constraints due to geography (too many islands), market size
and the inherent complexity (especially of the single market and economy
agenda) of the integration project;
endogenous problems such as the over-expansion of mandates, lack of coherence
in the expansion of CARICOM institutions, and lack of functionality of many of
these institutions, managerial and administrative weaknesses, including within
the Secretariat; and
the perennial problem facing all regional initiatives: progress depends on
member state level implementation and enforcement, and the political,
legislative and administrative challenges of translating Community level
decisions into practice—this in turn is linked to the absence of prioritisation and
tendency to adopt too many mandates.
6 Many Caribbean states were badly affected by the GFC, especially those heavily dependent on tourism. But the region includes some of the most highly indebted economies in the world, and many governments are struggling to achieve fiscal sustainability and deal with economic downturn.
8
3. Hemispheric integration
In parallel with the CSME agenda, CARICOM members have been pursuing integration
into the larger regional and hemispheric economy through agreements with other
partners. CARICOM has negotiated trade agreements with Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela: but the most significant agreements have been
with the United States and the European Union.
Historically, Caribbean integration into the global economy has been driven by trade
preferences, which have had the effect of shoring up increasingly uncompetitive
primary production activities. The United States continues to provide unilateral, non-
reciprocal preferential access through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and
the Caribbean Trade Partnership Act. However, the negotiation of an Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU, CARICOM and the Dominican Republic
that was concluded in 2007 signalled an eventual end to the provision of unilateral
preferential access to the EU market (especially significant for the region’s sugar and
banana industries). A range of new areas including customs and trade facilitation,
intellectual property rights, investment and competition policy were thus brought
under the discipline of a binding agreement. The EPA with the Caribbean grouping is the
only agreement to date that covers all target sectors to which all negotiating parties
have acceded (Rudloff & Weinhardt 2011).
The successful conclusion of the negotiations notwithstanding, some proponents of
Caribbean integration have argued that the negotiation of the EPA exposed the lack of a
regional governance settlement for the Caribbean, and the failure of leaders and
technocrats to seek buy in to the agreement (Bishop and Payne 2010). Others have
pointed out that the discussion within the Caribbean cast the agreement as a largely
technocratic issue, when in fact it went to the heart of the political economy of
integration for the region (Girvan 2009). In many areas the EPA has the capacity to
supercede the CSME as a driver of change for CARICOM members, and the institutional
arrangements set up to ensure progress and deal with disputes under the agreement
have been seen as supplanting the regional structures that the Caribbean has
endeavored to put in place. One commentator observed that
9
“As a consequence the just concluded EPA has included in it administrative and
organisational arrangements, which give EPA institutions a greater degree of
“sovereignty” over the domestic economic affairs of CARICOM, than the Treaty
of Chaguaramas, which established the Secretariat and organs of CARICOM does.
Since EPA bodies are jointly controlled by the EC and CARIFORUM Member
States this is clearly unacceptable” (Thomas 2008, p. 24).
4. Lessons for the Pacific?
Are there lessons for the Pacific from the CARICOM experience with regional
integration, and the factors that led to the conclusion that it is in crisis?
There are many differences between the members of the CARICOM Community and the
Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), even though the two regions are often grouped together
in thinking by other parts of the world and the development community. CARICOM
members are physically much closer to the large markets with which they have long
standing commercial ties, and none are as geographically fragmented as some PICs. (It
is instructive to note that the greatest distance between the nine members of the OECS
is half the distance of that which lies between the islands that are furthest apart of just
one PIC, Solomon Islands.) Most CARICOM members are much better endowed with
skills than PICs, and have a much stronger entrepreneurial base (Worrell and Fairbairn,
1995). However, many countries in both regions face the challenges of size and
dependence on air and sea transport for internal links and physical interactions with
the rest of the world.
Importantly for the regional integration agenda, for both groups of countries the
potential gains from regional trade liberalisation are not large: the prospects of a
significant, growth enhancing expansion of inter-regional trade are limited. In 2001,
Delisle Worrell noted:
“… Perhaps the weakest area of integration within the Caribbean has been
trade … There are few complementarities that would make for intra-regional
trade … Intra-regional trade is unlikely to assume major proportions …
10
Inevitably trade will be mainly with the rest of the world, its pattern of growth
determined by skills, investment and productivity and the rate at which the
Caribbean adopts new techniques, the critical factor in international
competitiveness” (Worrell 2001, quoted in Hosein 2010, p. 159).
Similar observations can be made about Pacific regional trade liberalisation (see, for
example, Warner 2008). For both regions a more logical approach is to liberalise trade
and investment with the rest of the world, or at the very least with the large markets
with which trade in goods and services are and will be important for member countries.
But as the Caribbean and Pacific experience with the EPA shows, how this integration is
approached is really critical. Unfortunately, the dynamic of trade agreements and how
they are negotiated often flies in the face of a sensible approach to reaping the gains
from liberalisation: they typically embody a mercantilist approach to trade and
prioritise institutional and policy changes that are not high order issues for both sides of
the table. While it is hard to see any case for Caribbean or Pacific economies to raise the
costs of international trade and investment through policy based impediments, most of
the benefits of reducing these impediments can be achieved through unilateral action.
For small states in the Caribbean and the Pacific, there ought to be larger gains from
regional institutional integration and development of shared institutions, especially
among the countries which share a common legal and institutional colonial legacy.
While this kind of integration has been part of the Caribbean regional agenda in the
past, and continues to be pursued in some areas, the reluctance of some governments to
cede sovereignty to regional institutions has constrained further progress. This
stumbling block also seems to impede the adoption of common sectoral policies and
regulatory systems that could lead towards the creation of a single economy. The clear
exception to this is the OECS, whose members are part of a monetary union and share a
number of institutions.
A key issue seems to be that where an institution directly or indirectly embodies or
influences a distribution of costs and benefits, the parties to the creation of that
institution have to be confident that its operation will lead to overall gains for the
11
community. This probably becomes harder to ensure the larger and more disparate the
members of that community are, or where culture and behavioural norms differ
widely7.
Put together, these observations suggest that there is value in recalibrating approaches
to regional integration. Many regional integration projects around the world have been
strongly influenced by the European model, where integration of the regional market
was the critical entry point in building confidence that would allow progressively
deeper integration, including monetary and political union, with a significant allocation
of power to central institutions. At the same time, Europe has used trade agreements
with other countries and regions to pursue broader commercial interests and ensure
market access.
It is not clear that the logic of this approach is very compelling for the Caribbean or the
Pacific. For these regions, the gains from regional trade and investment liberalisation
are small, and regional agreements do not deliver enough benefits to build confidence
and support for a broader integration agenda. Collectively negotiating agreements with
external partners is unlikely to be a good pathway to either strengthening regional
coherence or reaping the gains from freer flows of trade and investment
This suggests that the case for regional policy cooperation and creation of shared
institutions has to be sold on its own merits, and pathways must be developed to deal
with the sovereignty issues. One lesson from the Caribbean is that subregional
groupings with stronger cultural and historic ties can progress where larger pan-
regional groupings struggle.
Another important lesson from the Caribbean lies in the challenge of matching the scope
and ambition of the integration agenda to political and capacity realities. CARICOM has
been strongly criticised for adopting mandates unmatched by implementation capacity.
7 It may be significant that the OECS monetary union and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank that manages the union were created before independence, whereas the CSME objective of monetary union has to be agreed to by a collection of independent nations with clearer notions of separate national interests.
12
Leaders of CARICOM countries have also admitted that much of the agenda has been
driven in a top-down fashion: despite strong pan-Caribbean sentiment it has proved
hard to convince citizens of member states of the merit of more intensive regionalism.8
This has made it hard to translate decisions made regionally into national level practice.
8 See the lecture given to the Library of Congress by the former Prime Minister of Barbados (Arthur, 2007)
13
5. Annex: Caribbean regional institutions
Table 3 lists a selection of regional institutions operating in the Caribbean. Many have
been established under the aegis of CARICOM. There are also non-state regional
institutions, such as the Caribbean Labour Congress, the Caribbean Union of Teachers
and the Associated Chambers of Commerce.
Table 3: Selected Caribbean regional institutions
Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)
Caribbean Agriculture Research and Development
Institute (CARDI)
Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC)
Caribbean Centre for Development Administration
(CARICAD)
Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC)
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
(CDERA)
Caribbean Organisation of Tax Administrators (COTA)
Caribbean Environment Health Institute (CEHI) Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM
Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI) Caribbean Regional Information and Translation
Institute (CRITI)
Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO) Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and
Quality (CROSQ)
Caribbean Aviation Safety and Securing Oversight
System (CASSOS)
Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU)
CARICOM Implementing Agency for Crime and
Security (IMPACS)
CARICOM Competition Commission
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
(CCCCC)
Council of Legal Education (CLE)
Caribbean Development Bank Caribbean Law Institute (CLI)
Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council
(CCLEC)
Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO)
Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance (CCMF) University of West Indies (UWI)
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 2012
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6. References
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Arthur, O 2007 “The Caribbean Single Market and Economy – A Historic Necessity, lecture to the Library of Congress,” June 18 2007, Washington DC. <http://www.foreign.gov.bb/Userfiles/File/Library%20of%20Congress.pdf>
Bishop ML & Payne A 2012 “Caribbean Regional Governance and the Sovereignty Statehood Problem,” Caribbean Paper No. 8, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Canada.
Caribbean Education Online, 2012 <http://www.caribbeanedu.com/odyssey/Timeliner/nation01.asp>
CARICOM Secretariat 2010 Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010: Strategies for Recovery and Reform, executive summary, <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organs/ctir_2010_executive_summary.pdf>
CARICOM Secretariat, 2012 <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/institutions.jsp?menu=community>
CIA 2012 The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>
CSME Unit 2012 <http://www.csmeonline.org/en/news/item/137-csme-operating-at-about-64-level-of-compliance>
Dornan, M 2012 Swept under the pandanus mat: the Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat needs to be taken seriously, Development Policy Centre Blog, Canberra. <http://devpolicy.org/swept-under-the-pandanus-mat-the-review-of-the-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat-needs-to-be-taken-seriously/>
Girvan, N 2009 The Caribbean EPA Affair: Lessons for the Progressive Movement, paper presented at Conference on "Remembering the Future: The Legacies of Radical Politics in the Caribbean", University of Pittsburgh, Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, April 3-4, 2009.
Girvan, N 2010 “Caribbean Community: the Elusive Quest for Economic Integration,” Chapter 9 in Alleyne, Frank; Denny Lewis-Bynoe and Xiomara Archibald (Eds.) Growth and Development Strategies in the Caribbean, Barbados: Caribbean Development Bank, 2010, pp. 199-218.
Hornbeck, JF 2008 “CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic Integration,” Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL34308, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/102655.pdf accessed 19 June 2012>
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Hosein, R 2010 “Trade Policy in the Caribbean,” Alleyne, F, Lewis-Bynoe, D & Archibald, X (Eds.) Growth and Development Strategies in the Caribbean, Barbados: Caribbean Development Bank, 2010, pp. 151-183.
Rudloff, B & Weinhardt, C 2011 “Economic Partnerships between the EU and the African,” Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle -details/article/acp_states_economic_partnership_agreements.html>
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Thomas, C 2008 CARICOM Perspectives on the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement, <http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/clive-thomas-caricom-perspective-on-the-cf-ec-epa-may-2008.pdf>
Tsikata, Y, Moreira, PE, & Coke, HP 2009, Accelerating Trade and Integration in the Caribbean: Policy Options for Sustained Growth, Job Creation, and Poverty Reduction, World Bank and Organization of American States, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLACREGTOPECOPOL/Resources/CaribbeanTradeandIntegration.pdf accessed 19 June 2102>
Warner, B, 2008 “Pacific Island Economies, The role of international trade and investment,” in Bisley (ed) Pacific Interactions: Pasifika in New Zealand, New Zealand in Pasifika, 2008, pp. 135-190.
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Worrell, D 2001, “Economic Integration with Unequal Partners,” in The Caribbean Community, Beyond Survival, ed. Kenneth Hall, Kingston, Ian Randle Publishers.
Worrell, D & Fairbairn, TI 1995, South Pacific and Caribbean Island Economies, a Comparative Study, The Foundation for Economic Development, Brisbane.