Dr. SES Distributed Resilient Secure EcmaScript

Dr. SESDistributed Resilient Secure EcmaScript

Mark S. Miller and the CajadoresGoogle

Overview

A Brief History of the Web

Distributed Resilient

Secure EcmaScript

Original Web

Server

Server

Frame

Frame

Browser

Link/Form GET/POST

New Page

Link/Form GET/POST

New Page

Ajax = Mobile code + async msgs

Server

Server

Frame

Frame

Browser

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response

Web services

Kludging Towards Distributed Objects

Server

Server

Frame

Frame

Browser

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response, Comet

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response, Comet

Web servicesJSONPFragment

tricks

A Web of Distributed Objects

ServerJS

ServerJS

Frame

Frame

Browser

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response, SSE

XHR GET/POST

XHR Response, SSE

Web servicesCross-Origin XHR(CORS, UMP)

postMessage

Distributed Resilient Secure EcmaScript

“Safe” mobile code as protocolLike x86

Massive adoption despite design mistakes


“Safe” mobile code as protocolLike x86

Massive adoption despite design mistakes

Beautiful Simple Core: Scheme, SelfObjects as records. Functions as lexical closures.Records of lexical closures => objects with

methods


Beautiful Simple Core: Scheme, SelfObjects as records. Functions as lexical closures.Records of lexical closures => objects with

methods

function makeCounter(count) { return { incr: function() { return ++count; } };}


EcmaScript 5 StrictTamper-proof (frozen) objects. Encapsulated

closures.Frozen records of protected closures => High

integrity

‘use strict’;const makeCounter = Object.freeze(function(count) { return Object.freeze({ incr: Object.freeze(function() { return ++count; }); });});


EcmaScript HarmonyMakes high integrity convenientFaithful virtualization by interpositionModular modules with lexical scoping

const makeCounter(count) { return Object.freeze({ incr: const() { return ++count; }; });};



When Alice asks: bob.foo(carol)Alice grants Bob access to Carol, as needed for foo

Memory-safe encapsulated objectsProtect objects from their outside world


When Alice asks: bob.foo(carol)Alice grants Bob access to Carol, as needed for foo

Memory-safe encapsulated objectsProtect objects from their outside world

OCaps: Causality only by referencesNo powerful references by defaultProtect world from objects

Reference graph === Access graphDeny authority by witholding connectivity


Java : Joe-E :: EcmaScript : SESDefensive Consistency & Natural POLA

SES ⊂ (ES5 Strict + a bit of ES-Harmony)Deny access to global variables, global objectDelete non-whitelisted propertiesFreeze accessible primordials (Object, Array,

Array.prototype,…)Restrict eval() and Function() to SES


Easy Secure JavaScript Mashups Impossible?


Easy Secure JavaScript Mashups Impossible?

The counter example:const bobEndowments = Object.freeze({counter: makeCounter(0)});const bobMakerCode = //... fetch potentially malicious code ...const bob = eval(bobMakerCode).make(bobEndowments);

Bob can only count.


const makeMint() { const decr = EphemeronTable(); const makePurse(balance :Nat) { const purse = Object.freeze({ getBalance: const() { return balance; }, makePurse: const() { return makePurse(0); }, deposit: const(amount :Nat, src) { const newBal :Nat = balance + amount; decr.get(src)(amount); balance = newBal; }}); decr.set(purse, const(amount) { balance = balance – amount; }); return purse; } return makePurse; }

// The “factorial” of secure programming


Shared State Message Passing

Blocking C++/pthreadsJava, C#, Mozart/OzJoCAML, Polyphonic C#

Blocking receiveCSP, Occam, CCSErlang, Scala, Go

Non-blocking

Soft Transactional MemArgus, FortressClojure, X10

Comm Event LoopsActors, AmbientTalkE, WaterkenAjax


p1 = farBob ! foo(carol); // queue request for BobNo conventional deadlocks or memory racesSupports Defensive Programming

Shared State Message Passing

Blocking C++/pthreadsJava, C#, Mozart/OzJoCAML, Polyphonic C#

Blocking receiveCSP, Occam, CCSErlang, Scala, Go

Non-blocking

Soft Transactional MemArgus, FortressClojure, X10

Comm Event LoopsActors, AmbientTalkE, WaterkenAjax, Dr. SES


Between machines…There is no do, there is only try.

--with apologies to Yoda

p1 = farBob ! foo(carol); // Bob throws, breaking p1

p3 = p1 ! bar(p2); // broken promise contagion


Between machines…There is no do, there is only try.

--with apologies to Yoda

p1 = farBob ! foo(carol); // Bob throws, breaking p1

p3 = p1 ! bar(p2); // broken promise contagion

p4 = try when (r3 = p3) { // delayed error handling => “ok: ” + r3 } catch (ex) { => “bad: ” + ex };


$100 $200


$100 $200

const payment = myPurse ! makePurse();


$100 $200


makePurse


$100 $0

$200



$100 $0

$200

const payment = myPurse ! makePurse();payment ! deposit(10, myPurse);


$100 $0

$200


deposit


$100 $0

$200


$90$10


$100 $0

$200

const payment = myPurse ! makePurse();payment ! deposit(10, myPurse);const good = bob ! buy(desc, payment);

$90$10


$100 $0

$200


buy

$90$10


$100 $0

$200


return try when (p = payment) {

$90$10


$100 $0

$200


return try when (p = payment) { => try when (ok = myPurse ! deposit(10, p)) {

$90$10


$100 $0

$200



$90$10

deposit


$100 $0

$200



$90 $210


$100 $0

$200


return try when (p = payment) { => try when (ok = myPurse ! deposit(10, p)) { => good } …

$90 $210


p1 = farBob ! foo(carol); // queue request for Bob

p3 = p1 ! bar(p2); // left dataflow chaining

p5 = try when (i = p3, j = p4) { => i + j }; // gather results

b5 = try whenever (i = b3, j = b4) { => i + j }; // perpetual

p6 = try (f = farF, x = farX) in (farEval) { => f(x) }; // mobile


Remaining Open Resilience ProblemsPersistence: How orthogonal?

Waterken, KeyKOS, E, WorkersDisconnected Operation: How to reconcile?

Dominant partition, Wave OT, Una, Ambient references

Upgrade: When instances outlive their classCo-existence: When versions collide

Each presents new security challenges

Questions?

Date post:	20-Feb-2016
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Dr. SES Distributed Resilient Secure EcmaScript

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