GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
(Fifteenth Session - Geneva, 28 August – 6 September 2006)
DRAFT PROCEDURAL REPORT
Prepared by the Secretariat
1. The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) held at Geneva on 24 and 25 November 2005 decided, as
contained in paragraph 29 of its report (document CCW/MSP/2005/2), to commission follow-up
work under the oversight of the President-designate of the Third Review Conference of the States
Parties to the Convention.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 26 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, “to convene the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention from 7 to 17 November 2006 at Geneva in conjunction with the Eighth Annual
Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II.” The Meeting of the States Parties also
decided, as contained in paragraph 27 of CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “all necessary preparations for the
Third Review Conference be undertaken within the framework of the existing Group of
Governmental Experts.”
3. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 35 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, to recommend that “the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary
of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, and the President-designate, on behalf of the States
Parties, exercise their authority to achieve the goal of universality of the Convention and its annexed
Protocols.”
4. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 30 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, that the Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) would continue
its work in the year 2006 with the following mandate:
“To continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the
implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further
study, on an open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and
technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain
specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimising the
humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of
information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work. The Group will report
on the work done to the Third Review Conference in 2006.”
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5. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 31 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, that the Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM) would continue its work in the year 2006 with the following mandate:
“a) To continue to consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put
forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of
elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for
submission to the Third Review Conference in 2006.
b) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these
activities.”
6. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 32 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the
intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its
annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by
consensus, to the States Parties.”
7. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 33 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the
intersessional period on the possibility to establish a sponsorship programme under the Convention
and on the modalities of such a sponsorship programme, and shall report to the States Parties.”
8. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 38 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, to “designate Ambassador François Rivasseau of France as President of the
Third Review Conference of the States Parties to be held in 2006.” The States Parties also appointed
Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania as Coordinator on Explosive Remnants of War, and
Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil as Coordinator on Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines.
9. The Meeting of the States Parties decided, as contained in paragraph 28 of
CCW/MSP/2005/2, that “the intersessional work of the Group of Governmental Experts will be
undertaken in three sessions at Geneva during 2006.”
10. The Fifteenth Session of the Group of Governmental Experts was held at Geneva from 28
August to 6 September 2006.
11. The following States Parties to the Convention participated in the work of the Group:
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See,
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
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Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America and Venezuela.
12. The following Signatory States to the Convention also participated in the work of the Group:
Afghanistan and Egypt.
13. The following States not parties to the Convention participated as observers: Azerbaijan, Iran
(Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
14. The representatives of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) took part in the work of the Group.
15. The representatives of the following organisations also took part in the work of the Group:
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC).
16. The representatives of the following non-governmental organisations also took part in the
work of the Group: Actiongroup Landmine.de, Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, Cluster Munition
Coalition, Geneva Call, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Action (UK), Norwegian People’s Aid, Pax Christi International,
Pax Christi Netherlands, Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Tchad Agir pour l’Environnement,
University of Exeter.
17. On 28 August 2006, the session was opened by the President-designate of the Third Review
Conference, Ambassador François Rivasseau of France.
18. The meetings of the Working Groups of the Group of Governmental Experts were chaired by
the two Coordinators: Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania as Coordinator on Explosive
Remnants of War and Ambassador Carlos Antonio da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil as Coordinator on
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines. Mr. Peter Kolarov, Political Affairs Officer, Department
for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, served as Secretary of the Group, and was assisted by Mr.
Bantan Nugroho, Political Affairs Officer.
19. The Group held eight plenary meetings. At its first plenary meeting, on 28 August 2006, the
Group confirmed its Agenda (CCW/GGE/XIII/7, Annex I), and the Rules of Procedure as adopted
and used by the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1 with oral amendments) and
adopted its Programme of Work (CCW/GGE/XV/1/Rev.1).
20. At the same plenary meeting, the Group of Governmental Experts considered the question of
participation, including that of the United Nations agencies, specialized and other agencies and non-
governmental organizations in the work of the Group and agreed to exercise the utmost degree of
transparency in its activities.
Page 4
21. At the same plenary meeting, the following States participated in a general exchange of
views on the preparation for the Third Review Conference: Argentina, Canada, China, Finland (on
behalf of the European Union, the Acceding Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate
Countries Croatia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Countries of the
Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Serbia, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova aligning themselves), Japan,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and Russian Federation. GICHD, Human Rights Watch and
Cluster Munition Coalition also participated in the general exchange of views.
22. At the plenary meeting, on 28 August 2006, the Group of Governmental Experts devoted
time for the consideration of the status of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. The
meeting was chaired by Ambassador Edvardas Borisovas of Lithuania, Coordinator on Explosive
Remnants of War. The Group took note of the 23 States Parties which had notified the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of their consent to be bound by Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of
War: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Holy
See, India, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The Group also took note that in
accordance with article 5 (3) of the Convention, Protocol V will enter into force on 12 November
2006 during the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention.
23. In accordance with the decisions taken by the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2), the Group of Governmental Experts devoted time for the
consideration of the preparation for the 2006 Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention at the plenary meetings on 28 August, 4 and 6 September 2006. The meetings were
chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of France and considered papers presented by the
President-designate titled “Provisional Programme of Work of the Main Committee I of the Third
Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/4, dated 25 August
2006, “Provisional Programme of Work of the Main Committee II of the Third Review Conference
of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/5, dated 25 August 2006 and “Draft Final
Document of the Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/L.2,
dated 29 August 2006.
24. In accordance with the decisions taken by the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2), the Group of Governmental Experts devoted time for the
consideration of options to promote compliance with the Convention at the plenary meetings on 30
August, 4 and 6 September 2006. The meetings were chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of
France, who was assisted by Ambassador Gordan Markotić of Croatia, Friend of the President on
Compliance, and considered papers presented by the President-designate titled “Amendment to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
Page 5
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/2, dated 16 August 2006, “Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance” as contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1, dated 1 September 2006, and CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.2, dated 5 September
2006.
25. In accordance with the decisions taken by the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2), the Group of Governmental Experts devoted time for the
consideration of the possibility to establish a sponsorship programme under the Convention and on
the modalities of such a sponsorship programme at the plenary meetings on 30 August, 4 and 6
September 2006. The meetings were chaired by Ambassador François Rivasseau of France and
considered papers presented by the President-designate titled “Draft Decision on the Establishment
of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/3, dated 16 August 2006, and
“Revised Draft Decision on the Establishment of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)” as contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/3/Rev.1, dated 31 August 2006.
26. The Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War held three meetings and discussed the
implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and possible preventive
measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-
munitions, with a view to minimise the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive
remnants of war. It also considered a paper presented by the President-designate titled “Draft
Declaration on the Occasion of the Entry into Force of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of
War” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/L.1, dated 25 August 2006. It also held one meeting of
military and technical experts, chaired by Ms. Vera Bohle of GICHD, and discussed document
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1, dated 8 August 2006, presented by the Chairperson of the Meetings of
Military and Technical Experts on Explosive Remnants of War titled “Provisional Agenda for the
Meeting of the Military Experts on ERW” and its addenda as contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.1, dated 8 August 2006 titled “Annotated Provisional Agenda”, and
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.2, dated xxx September 2006 titled “Draft Table of Explosive
Ordnance Types and Systems”.
27. The Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines held three meetings and
discussed proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put forward since the establishment
of the Group of Governmental Experts. It considered papers presented by the Coordinator titled “Set
of Provisions on the Use of MOTAPM/AVM. A Compilation of Provisions that Could Command
Consensus in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)” as contained in CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1,
dated 14 August 2006, and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1/Rev.1, dated 4 September 2006. It also held one
meeting of military experts, chaired by Brigadier-General Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas of
Brazil.
28. During the course of the session, the Group of Governmental Experts considered documents
CCW/GGE/XV/1 to CCW/GGE/XV/5, CCW/GGE/XV/WP.1 to CCW/GGE/XV/WP.3, as well as
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CCW/GGE/XV/L.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/L.2, as listed in Annex IX. The Working Group on
Explosive Remnants of War considered documents CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1,
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.1, CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/1/Add.2, and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.1
to CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.3, as listed in Annex IX. The Working Group on Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines considered documents CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1,
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1/Rev.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/WP.1 and CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/WP.2,
as listed in Annex IX. These documents are available in all official languages through the Official
Document System of the United Nations at http://documents.un.org, and the official website of the
CCW as part of the website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at
http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/ .
29. The Group of Governmental Experts heard presentations by ICRC on “Battlefield lasers and
loss of vision: a question of dose”; by Gari Owen, an independent consultant, on “Lasers and
associated hazards”; by UN DDA to launch the new official website of the CCW as part of the
website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/. The Working
Group on Explosive Remnants of War heard presentations by France titled “ERW – Quality
Management Process”; UNMAS on “Cluster Munitions in Lebanon”; and Human Rights Watch on
“Cluster Munitions, ERW and Protocol V”.
30. The Group of Governmental Experts decided to recommend to the Third Review Conference
the “Provisional Programme of Work of Main Committee I of the Third Review Conference of the
High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex IV, and “Provisional Programme of Work of Main
Committee II of the Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex V. The Group
also decided to recommend to the Third Review Conference the “Draft Final Document of the Third
Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” as contained in Annex VII, the “Draft Declaration on
the Entry into force of CCW Protocol V on ERW”, as contained in Annex VI, as well as the “Draft
Decision on the Establishment of a Sponsorship Programme under the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”, as contained in Annex VIII.
31. At the final plenary meeting, on 6 September 2006, the Group of Governmental Experts
adopted the procedural report of the Fifteenth Session, as contained in document
CCW/GGE/XV/CRP.1, as orally amended, which is being issued as document CCW/GGE/XV/6.
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Annex I
REPORT
OF THE WORK ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Prepared by the Coordinator on ERW and
the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military and Technical Experts1
1. MANDATES OF THE GGE ON ERW
1.1. INITIAL MANDATE ADOPTED BY THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE IN 2001
At the Second Review Conference the States Parties to the CCW decided to establish an open-
ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with two separate Coordinators on Mines Other
Than Anti-Personal Mines (MOTAPM) and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The GGE on
ERW was mandated to:
“(a) discuss ways and means to address the issue of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). In this
context the Group shall consider all factors, appropriate measures and proposals, in particular:
1. factors and types of munitions that could cause humanitarian problems after a conflict;
2. technical improvements and other measures for relevant types of munitions, including sub-
munitions, which could reduce the risk of such munitions becoming ERW;
3. the adequacy of existing International Humanitarian Law in minimizing post-conflict risks of
ERW, both to civilians and to the military;
4. warning to the civilian population, in or close to, ERW-affected areas, clearance of ERW, the
rapid provision of information to facilitate early and safe clearance of ERW, and associated issues
and responsibilities;
5. assistance and co-operation. ”2
Under the same decision the Coordinator on ERW had to “undertake work in an efficient manner
so as to submit recommendations, adopted by consensus, at an early date for consideration by the
States Parties, including whether to proceed with negotiating a legally-binding instrument or
instruments on ERW and/or other approaches”.
The 2002 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW decided that “the Working Group on Explosive
Remnants of War would continue its work in the year 2003 with the following mandate:
(a) (i) To negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which
would reduce the risks of ERW. These measures would be based on a broad definition covering
most types of explosive munitions, with the exception of mines. Abandoned munitions would have to
be included. In these negotiations, questions need to be considered regarding, inter alia,
1 In cooperation with GICHD
2 CCW/CONF.II/2
Page 8
responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of information to facilitate clearance and
risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance & co-operation, and a framework for
regular consultations of High Contracting Parties. These negotiations would have to establish the
scope of this instrument consistent with Article I of the Convention as amended at its Second
Review Conference.
(a) (ii) To explore and determine whether these negotiations could successfully address preventive
generic measures for improving the reliability of munitions that fall within the agreed broad
definition, through voluntary best practices concerning the management of manufacturing, quality
control, handling and storage of munitions. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation
would be important elements of such best practices.
(b) Separate from the negotiations under (a): to continue to consider the implementation of existing
principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open ended basis,
possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions,
including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the humanitarian risk of these munitions
becoming ERW. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work.
(c) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to
provide advice in support of these activities.”3
1.2. MANDATE AFTER THE ADOPTION OF PROTOCOL V
Following recommendations of the GGE, the 2003 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW
decided4 that the GGE would continue its work on ERW in 2004 with the following mandate
5:
“To continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian
Law and to further study, on an open-ended basis, and initially with particular emphasis on
meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the
design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the
humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of
information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this work.”
Following recommendations of the GGE, the 2004 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW
decided6 that the GGE would continue its work on ERW in 2005 with the following mandate
7:
“To continue to consider, including through participation of legal experts, the implementation of
existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open-ended
basis, with particular emphasis on meetings of military and technical experts, possible preventive
3 CCW/MSP/2002/2
4 CCW/MSP/2003/3
5 CCW/GGE/VI/2
6 CCW/MSP/2004/2
7 CCW/GGE/IX/2
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measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-
munitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive
remnants of war. Exchange of information, assistance and co-operation would be part of this
work. The Group will report on the work done to the next Meeting of the States Parties.”
The mandate of 2005 was also adopted by the States Parties for the year 20068.
2. PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (PROTOCOL V) ADOPTION,
RATIFICATION, UNIVERSALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was negotiated by the GGE under the mandate
established by the 2002 Meeting of the States Parties as a result of the considerable advancement of
the work of the Group on ERW in 2001-2002.
The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was adopted as the Fifth CCW protocol by the
Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW in 2003:
“Following the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, the Meeting of the States
Parties decided to adopt the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, which is contained in
Appendix II attached to the Procedural Report of the Sixth Session of the Group of Governmental
Experts (CCW/GGE/VI/2), annexed to this Report as Annex V.”9
Protocol V was adopted by the States Parties on 28 November 2003. The Protocol was adopted on
the understanding that it was subject to checking of the official translation into United Nations
language versions by States whose working language was not English. Accordingly, proposed
corrections from different delegations on the Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts of the
Protocol had been received, considered and approved by the CCW States parties, and effected by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting as depositary of the Convention.
For their national ratification procedures, some States Parties needed the consolidated corrected
versions of the certified true copies of the original Protocol (in all 6 United Nations language
versions). The Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs has been approached accordingly
by the President-designate of the Third Review Conference, States Parties, the Presidency of the
European Union and others. In this regard, the following depository notifications in relation to the
authentic texts of Protocol V were issued:
• C.N.241.2006.TREATIES-1 “Issuance of the corrected French version of the Protocol”;
• C.N.379.2006.TREATIES-4 “Issuance of the corrected version (Spanish authentic text) of
the Protocol”;
• C.N.437.2006.TREATIES-9 “Issuance of the corrected version (Chinese authentic text) of
the Protocol”;
8 CCW/MSP/2005/2
9 CCW/MSP/2003/3
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• C.N.440.2006.TREATIES-9 “Issuance of the corrected version (Russian authentic text) of
the Protocol”.
In order to promote the early entry into force of the Protocol the President-designate of the Third
Review Conference, the Coordinator on ERW and the Presidency of the European Union on behalf
of its Member States carried out demarches in a number of the States Parties to the CCW that have
not yet ratified Protocol V.
On 12 May 2006 – the date by which 20 States Parties to the CCW notified their consent to be
bound by Protocol V, the conditions for the entry into force of the Protocol were met. In
accordance with Article 5 (3) of the CCW, Protocol V will enter into force on 12 November
200610
, six months after the submission of the 20th instrument of ratification, during the Third
Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW.
For the present, the following 23 States are party to Protocol V (as listed in alphabetical order):
Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Holy
See, India, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.
The Protocol provides for the Contracting Parties to undertake consultations and cooperate with
each other on all issues related to the operation of the Protocol. In accordance with Article 10,
paragraph 1: “For this purpose, a Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be held as agreed
to by a majority, but not less than eighteen High Contracting Parties”.
There is no decision yet concerning the timing of the First Conference of the High Contracting
Parties. The High Contracting Parties to the Protocol noted it might be possible to hold a meeting in
preparation for the First Conference in 2007 taking into consideration other CCW-related meetings
and, inter alia, address procedural matters, discuss substantive issues with the aim to make the
Protocol operational as soon as feasible. In preparations for the First Conference of High
Contracting Parties to Protocol V, issues related to the implementation of Protocol V could be also
considered in informal meetings within various existing venues.
In recognition of the importance that the Protocol should become operational after its entry into
force without delay, certain efforts have already been undertaken with this regard.
In 2006, a series of formal GGE meetings and consultations of different settings took place at the
initiative of, and in cooperation with, the President-designate of the Third Review Conference, the
Coordinator on ERW, the Netherlands, UNDDA, UNMAS, ICRC, GICHD and others.
At the request of the Coordinator on ERW, UNMAS, on behalf of the Inter Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA), prepared and submitted to the GGE a document titled “The
United Nations and the Implementation of Protocol V”11
. The GICHD presented some practical
10
C.N.382.2006.TREATIES-6 (Depositary Notification) 11
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.2
Page 11
ideas on the same issue and, in particular, on existing mine action tools that have the potential to
equally support the implementation of Protocol V as well as to establish synergies between
Protocol V and the implementation of the 1997 Convention on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention).
Consultations and practical steps taken at the national level have also been reported by some States
Parties that have ratified Protocol V.
The States Parties have agreed that the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW
should hold a Special (High Level) Segment to mark the entry into force of Protocol V on 13
November 2006. In this regard, the States Parties drafted and recommended for adoption to the
Third Review Conference a special Declaration on the Entry into Force of Protocol V.
3. DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
3.1. THE COORDINATOR’S THREE-STEP APPROACH
During the Sixth session of the GGE in March 2004 the Coordinator on ERW suggested a “three-
step” approach12
(hereinafter – the Coordinator’s Three Step Approach) in considering the
implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Step one would
seek to deliberate and agree upon which of the existing principles of IHL could be considered as
applicable to ERW, step two – to consider the status of implementation of these principles by the
States Parties, taking into account the obligations of the States Parties under the Conventions and/or
Protocols from which they are derived, and, step three would include consideration of the adequacy
of the mechanisms provided for in these Conventions and/or Protocols for promoting
implementation of these principles and whether any further measures are required in this regard.
3.2. IHL-8 INITIATIVE: IHL QUESTIONNAIRE. MCCORMACK REPORT, ITS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In pursuance of the goal outlined in the Coordinator’s Three-Step Approach in March 2005, eight
States Parties – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and United States of America (hereinafter – IHL-8) in consultation with the ICRC submitted a
proposal13
to facilitate the work of the GGE on step one and step two of the Coordinator’s Three
Step Approach. States Parties were invited to consider responding to the questionnaire (IHL
Questionnaire) introduced by IHL-8. The proposal enjoyed a broad support. This encouraged a
follow-up action, and during the GGE Twelfth session of in November 2005 Canada presented a
working paper titled “A Way Ahead for IHL Questionnaire Response Analysis”14
. It was suggested
by IHL-8 that written responses to the IHL Questionnaire and compiled oral intervention transcripts
12 CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1 13
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2 14
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.12
Page 12
will be analyzed on a “without prejudice” basis for the purpose of identifying general trends with the
overall aim of establishing a baseline or baselines from which further discussion can proceed in
accordance with step three of the Coordinator’s Three Step Approach.
Professor Tim McCormack of the Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, Australia, has offered
to undertake the required analysis. By 26 January 2006, 33 States Parties had submitted their
responses to the IHL Questionnaire. In accordance with the proposed course of action, the findings
and analysis by Prof. McCormack and his team were presented to the Coordinator in the form of a
report (McCormack Report15
) and later released to States Parties. The Coordinator also invited
ICRC and GICHD to provide their critical analysis of the McCormack Report, which they did
accordingly16
.
The McCormack Report concluded that “Protocol V to the CCW and the existing rules of IHL are
specific and comprehensive enough to deal adequately with the problem of ERW provided that those
rules are effectively implemented.”17
The following recommendations for practical steps that the GGE might consider in order to advance
their work on IHL and ERW were offered in McCormack Report:
“Recommendation 1: All States Parties to the CCW should be encouraged to ratify Protocol V on
ERW as expeditiously as possible. […]
Recommendation 2: The GGE should continue to stress to all CCW States Parties the significance
of legally binding rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable to all weapons types and to
the specific problem of ERW. […]
Recommendation 3: The GGE should consider the development of a set of non-legally binding
Guidelines on ‘best practice’ application of relevant rules of International Humanitarian Law to the
problem of ERW. […]
Recommendation 4: The GGE should encourage all States Parties to the CCW which do not
already do so to establish a process for legal review of all new and modified weapons systems. […]
Recommendation 5: The GGE should consider introducing a system of written confidence building
reports by States as to their unilateral destruction of old or outmoded weapons to reduce potential
sources of ERW.”18
During the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth sessions of the GGE, the discussion on the
implementation of existing principles of IHL that are applicable to ERW took place mainly on the
basis of the IHL Questionnaire, the McCormack Report, in particular its conclusions and
15
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.2,
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Corr.1, CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Corr.2 16
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.15 and CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.13 17
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 18
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12
Page 13
recommendations, “A Critical Analysis by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian
Demining”19
, the “Comments by the International Committee of Red Cross”20
, and the remarks21
prepared by the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne, which were meant to
form a constituent part of the analysis by Prof. McCormack and his team and be essential in
interpreting its findings.
In order to narrow down the persisting divergence of views, particularly on Recommendation 3, a
new document titled “Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible Approach to Recommendation 3”22
was
prepared by Prof. Tim McCormack, presented and discusased at the Fourteenth session of GGE and
debated.
After the presentation of McCormack Report for the consideration by the GGE and by the end of
the Fifteenth session of GGE, 9 (nine) more States Parties submitted their responses to the IHL
Questionnaire.
4. MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMANITARIAN THREAT AND ON TECHNICAL
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
After the adoption of Protocol V, subsequent meetings of the Military and Technical Expert Group
focussed on the following points:
1. Specific types of munitions and threat assessment from an ERW perspective
2. Technical preventive measures with a view to reducing humanitarian risk
3. Consideration of the relevance and feasibility of these measures
4. Possible assistance and cooperation with regard to implementing these measures.
These points were reflected in the agendas of the meetings (see Annex “List of Documents of the
GGE on the Issue of ERW”).
The following substantive proposals and achievements were made:
4.1. SPECIFIC TYPES OF MUNITIONS AND THREAT ASSESSMENT FROM AN ERW
PERSPECTIVE
A. Classification of munitions and common understanding
As a first step to come to a common understanding of “certain specific types of munitions, including
sub-munitions”, as per mandate, it was necessary to get a consistent overview of explosive ordnance.
19
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.13 20
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.15 21
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.1 22
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.4
Page 14
For this, a “Draft Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems”23
was produced, continuously
updated and improved. A workable version has been achieved, but finalisation will be required.
Germany has initiated a common understanding of the term “Cluster Munitions”24
, and has collected
on request of the Coordinator other delegation’s input. Common positions have been identified as
well as controversial points. Further work on a common understanding would be required. The
common understanding forms part of a German 8-Point-Position on Cluster Munitions, which has
been presented for discussion during the sessions, and which aims at replacing Cluster Munitions by
alternative munitions in the long term.
B. Assessment of humanitarian threat
The Coordinator on Explosive Remnants of War noted on 8 March 2004: “As the Group is
mandated to study preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific munitions,
the first task for the Group, therefore, is to specify which type of munitions, including sub-munitions,
need to be considered for improving the design through possible preventive measures,”25
. Generic
preventive measures are already dealt with in Article 9 and part 3 of the Technical Annex of
Protocol V.
The aim of the Military and Technical Expert’s sessions was to define ERW that present a specific
humanitarian risk, having in mind that all ERW in large quantities present a humanitarian problem,
but some munitions may by design have a greater potential to present a specific humanitarian threat
as ERW. The definition of ERW that present a specific humanitarian risk has been a difficult task,
because there is no existing methodology and there is a significant lack of detailed data for many
ammunition types. The approaches taken were the following:
The former Swiss chair of the Meeting of Military an Technical Experts had prepared a Matrix
which considered humanitarian risk of ERW (latest version: CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1, referred to as
“Swiss Matrix”), but this matrix was not meant to provide a methodology to define it. It was meant
to provide a structure for the collection of information on possible technical preventive measures. In
this regard, the Swiss Matrix is open for further development.
The United Kingdom had prepared a Humanitarian Threat Matrix26
, which was considered to be too
subjective. Consequently, the United Kingdom developed a methodology27
with the aim to assess
the relative risk of categories of explosive ordnance becoming Explosive Remnants of War more
objectively. However, in the given framework it has not been possible to achieve results through the
application of the methodology. Hence this approach has been discontinued and essential elements
are available for incorporation into the French Matrix (see below).
23
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/1/Add.2 24
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/WP.3 25
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1 26
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1 27
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.7
Page 15
UNMAS presented preliminary findings of a survey undertaken in 2005 together with UNDP28
.
UNMAS and UNDP had requested UN programme managers and technical experts from a number
of mine action programmes to give their assessment on the risks posed by specific ERW from a
clearance perspective. The main preliminary finding was that Cluster Munitions and their associated
sub-munitions present a specific humanitarian threat and a particular challenge to clearance
operations.
Several Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have published numerous studies and gave
presentations in side meetings indicating that from a humanitarian point of view Cluster Munitions
remain the key explosive remnants of war to be addressed.
General thoughts or presentations on how to define more precisely “certain specific types of
munitions, including sub-munitions” were encouraged and presented. Furthermore, the GICHD
conducted a review of publications, presentations and statements in the context of the CCW on the
issue.
The munitions mentioned so far presenting a specific humanitarian risk have been Cluster
Munitions. Some delegations argued that all munitions present a risk as ERW and no distinction
should be made.
4.2. TECHNICAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING THE
HUMANITARIAN RISK
There have been numerous presentations on this issue during the GGE sessions. Some of the
presentations focussed on generic preventive measures and national practices, some of them on
preventive measures for specific ammunition types, namely Cluster Munitions. Other delegations
presented detailed statements on these issues.
France addressed steps to prevent munitions from becoming ERW in their working paper
“Munitions – A Method to reduce the Risks associated with Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)”29
(called “French Matrix”). The Matrix has been continuously improved and is evolving into a
common document for the Group of Military and Technical Experts by including elements of the
explosive ordnance table, of the methodology of the United Kingdom, of the Swiss Matrix, of
national practices on how to prevent munitions from becoming ERW, and of experts, for example in
the fields of munitions design, production and training. The Matrix at this stage is meant to provide
a catalogue of questions and proposals, allowing countries to assess technical preventive measures
for all ERW, and thus facilitating the implementation of Protocol V. The development of the Matrix
has not been completed yet.
4.3. CONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANCE AND FEASIBILITY OF THE MEASURES
28
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11 29
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.14
Page 16
There have been only preliminary discussions on this issue so far, because no suitable technical
measures had been identified yet. Once these measures are identified, their relevance for the
reduction of the humanitarian threat of ERW and their feasibility would need to be discussed.
4.4. POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTING
THE MEASURES
There have been only preliminary discussions on this issue so far. Once concrete results have been
achieved on technical preventive measures, their relevance and feasibility, ideas on exchange of
information, assistance and co-operation should be addressed.
4.5. WAY AHEAD OPTIONS FOR THE WORK OF THE GROUP OF MILITARY AND
TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON ERW:
1. Continuation of the Threat Assessment process:
a. Completion of the ammunition table to form a technical base for further discussions
b. Further development of the common understanding of the term “Cluster Munitions”,
with Germany continuing to compile input from other delegations and reporting to
the Group
c. Agreement on munitions that present a specific humanitarian threat.
2. Continuation of the research for Technical Preventive Measures:
d. Further work on the French Matrix, which would then become a common document
of the group and incorporate other delegation’s working papers and presentations
e. Focus on munitions, including Cluster Munitions, deemed to present a specific
humanitarian threat
f. Extension of the mandate from design issues to the consideration of the whole life
cycle of munitions
g. Consideration of the relevance and feasibility of the identified measures
h. Consideration of technical cooperation and assistance.
3. Shifting of the non-technical aspects of Cluster Munitions to the meetings on ERW of the
GGE.
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE WORK OF THE GROUP ON EXPLOSIVE
REMNANTS OF WAR
There is an agreement that the major achievement of the Working Group on Explosive Remnants
of War since the 2001 Review Conference is the adoption and entry into force of Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V). Its universalization and effective implementation is the
most important goal in addressing the humanitarian problems related to ERW.
There is a common understanding that all States Parties to the CCW shall be encouraged to ratify
Protocol V as expeditiously as possible. Protocol V does impose basic obligations upon States that
Page 17
are parties to armed conflicts to minimize the risks and effects of ERW as well as encourages them
to take generic preventive measures aimed at minimizing the occurrence of ERW.30
In preparations for the First Conference of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, its
implementation issues have already been addressed, and could be also further considered in
informal meetings within various existing venues.
It was commonly recognized by the States Parties that the effective implementation of IHL
principles and rules pertinent to ERW should be pursued.
The Group agreed on the value that all States Parties recognize the significance of legally binding
rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable to all weapons types and in particular to the
specific problem of ERW. The State Parties should acknowledge the serious consequences of
violation of customary and/or treaty-based legal obligations applicable to the problem of ERW.31
The Group also concluded that the States Parties to the CCW which are the parties to the Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and which do not already do so should be encouraged to
establish a process for legal review of all new and modified weapons systems falling under the
scope of CCW as a way to increase the likelihood of compliance with international legal obligations
relating to the means and methods of warfare in military operations and thus preventing the
occurrence of ERW.32
Divergence of views remained concerning an introduction of a system of voluntary confidence
building reports by the States Parties as to their unilateral destruction of old or outmoded weapons to
reduce potential sources of ERW. 33
At the same time the common understanding on whether Protocol V and the existing rules of IHL
are specific and comprehensive enough to deal adequately with the problem of ERW was not
reached. Some States Parties agreed to the conclusions of the McCormack Report that the existing
rules of IHL are sufficient, provided that those rules are faithfully and effectively implemented.
Other States Parties felt that there was a need of specific regulations for certain types of munitions,
including cluster munitions. Some States Parties noted a need to concentrate particularly on cluster
munitions.
In this context, a number of States Parties have supported the idea proposed in Recommendation 3
of McCormack Report that one of the feasible means to reinforce the effective implementation of
IHL principles and rules pertinent to ERW could be the development of a set of non-legally binding
guidelines on the best practice of application of relevant rules of IHL to the problem of ERW. Prof.
McCormack has proposed preliminary thoughts on the possible structure of such guidelines34
.
30
As recommended in McCormack Report, Recommendation 1 31
As recommended in McCormack Report, Recommendation 2 32
As recommended in McCormack Report, Recommendation 4 33
As recommended in McCormack Report, Recommendation 5 34
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1/WP.4
Page 18
At the same time, during the discussions on this subject, some concerns were expressed that the
interpretation of legally binding obligations of IHL within the CCW might encounter certain
ambiguity or that legally binding regulations rather than non-legally binding guidelines should be
general practice of the CCW regime. A number of States Parties indicated that further clarification
of this idea or consideration of other means to reinforce the effective implementation and
application of IHL principles and rules pertinent to ERW would be possible. Some States Parties, in
particular those of the opinion that existing rules of IHL were sufficient, believed that those rules did
not need to be supplemented, but rather faithfully implemented.
According to the mandate to further study possible preventive measures aimed at improving the
design of certain specific type of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the
humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming ERW, the Group put its particular emphasis on
meetings of military and technical experts.
In the period 2004-2006, the Group of Military and Technical Experts identified types of
munitions, including sub-munitions, which needed to be considered for improving the design
through possible preventive measures. While considering such measures, the Group of Military and
Technical Experts needed to determine whether these preventive measures were essential, effective
in substantially enhancing reliability of munitions, including sub-munitions, technologically and
economically feasible. Given the disparity in military, technological and economic capabilities
among States Parties to the CCW, the Group has agreed to the necessity to take into account the
financial and technological implications for the States Parties, particularly for the developing
countries, of producing or stockpiling the new munitions with improved design and for
decommissioning/retro-fitting or destruction of the existing stockpiles35
.
Divergence of views remained on what type of munitions posed the greatest humanitarian threat
and thus should be further considered with the view to improving their technical characteristics and
design in accordance with the mandate of the Group.
In the opinion of some States Parties most of the problems caused by ERW could be attributed to
the use of cluster munitions. Other States Parties continue to consider cluster munitions as one in a
number of types of munitions, which could possibly contribute to the problems caused by ERW.
There is an understanding that the Group of Military and Technical Experts was able to deepen
discussion and should continue the work in progress until its completion, in particular on
classification of munitions and common understanding and technical preventive measures with a
view to reducing the humanitarian risk, as presented in chapter 4 of this report.
Cooperation and assistance, in particular of technical nature, forms an important aspect in
addressing the problems caused by ERW and therefore merits attention by the States Parties.
Having taken into account the broad scope of positions of the States Parties with regard to the work
accomplished by the Group of Governmental Experts on ERW since the last Review Conference,
few options could be considered as a follow-up on ERW.
35
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/WP.1
Page 19
A large number of States Parties recognize the value of the work accomplished by the Group at this
stage and favor continuation of the work in the CCW beyond the Third Review Conference on
munitions which may become ERW in order to fulfill the tasks outlined in the present mandate. As
proposed by some States Parties, without prejudice to the issues under the jurisdiction of Protocol
V, the work on ERW could be continued on the basis of the present mandate to further study, on an
open-ended basis, with particular emphasis on participation of military and technical experts,
possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions,
including sub-munitions, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian risk of these munitions
becoming explosive remnants of war and to consider, including through participation of legal
experts, the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law. Exchange of
information, assistance and co-operation should be part of this work.
A number of States Parties have indicated the need to establish preferably legally binding
regulations, within the CCW, aimed to reduce the risks of certain specific munitions, including
cluster munitions, or specifically cluster munitions. It was repeatedly mentioned by some States
Parties that, the work on ERW could focus without prejudice to the issues under the jurisdiction of
Protocol V on requirements for such specific munitions, including their reliability and accuracy,
training, transfers, use, management, destruction of stockpiles, etc.
Some States Parties expressed an opinion that upon the entry into force of Protocol V on 12
November 2006 the basic mandate of the GGE on ERW would be considered to be completed. One
state however recognized that the ongoing work of the Military and Technical Expert Group with
regard to possible preventive measures should be encouraged to continue until the completion of its
respective mandate.
In any case, the States Parties to the CCW should be called upon to make their every best effort to
promote universalization and implementation of Protocol V in its full scope, including voluntary
provisions of its Annexes. At the same time, the implementation of IHL principles and rules
applicable to ERW should stay under review of the States Parties to the CCW, as appropriate.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
It would be recommended:
1. To continue consideration and consultations on ERW-related issues, in preparation of the
Third Review Conference, within the scope of the mandate of the GGE on ERW for 2006,
including the work of the military and technical experts.
2. To endorse the draft declaration on the occasion of the entry into force of CCW Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) as contained in Annex VI of this Procedural
Report, and transmit it to the Third Review Conference for adoption.
Page 20
3. To consider continuation of the work on ERW beyond the Third Review Conference,
including the work of the military and technical experts, and in particular taking into account
the formal proposals submitted by the States Parties.
Page 21
VII. APPENDIX
LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
ON THE ISSUE OF EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Symbol Title Submitted by
CCW/GGE/I/WP.2 Discussion Paper on Clearance of Explosive
Remnants of War
Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/I/WP.3 Explosive Remnants of War – Assistance and
Cooperation
Brazil, Japan and Peru
CCW/GGE/I/WP.4 Technical improvements and other measures for
relevant types of munitions, including sub-
munitions, which could reduce the risk of such
munitions becoming ERW
Switzerland
CCW/GGE/I/WP.5 The types of munitions which become explosive
remnants of war – Factors which contribute to the
occurrence of explosive remnants of war
GICHD and ICRC
CCW/GGE/WP.5/Add.
1
Information on Explosive Remnants of War
Useful to Mine/UXO Action Organizations
GICHD and ICRC
CCW/GGE/I/WP.6 Discussion paper on “Warning to civilians” Norway and Landmine
Action (UK)
CCW/GGE/I/WP.7 European Union Position on the Issue of
Explosive Remnants of War
European Union
CCW/GGE/I/WP.8 Information Sharing as a Tool to Protect Civilians
from the Effects of UXO/ ERW
United States of America
CCW/GGE/I/WP.9 The adequacy of existing international law in
minimizing the post –conflict risks of Explosive
Remnants of War
Sweden
CCW/GGE/I/WP.9/Cor
r.1 (English only)
The adequacy of existing international law in
minimizing the post –conflict risks of Explosive
Remnants of War
Sweden
CCW/GGE/I/WP.10 Legal Issues Regarding Explosive Remnants of
War
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/I/WP.11 Discussion paper on the issue of explosive
remnants of war
Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/II/WP.1 Core questions on ERW by the Coordinator Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/II/WP.3 Elements for an EU paper on AVM European Union
CCW/GGE/II/WP.4 A Survey of Questions and Issues for the Group
of Governmental Experts on Explosive Remnants
of War
Canada
CCW/GGE/II/WP.6 Technical Improvements to Submunitions France
CCW/GGE/II/WP.8 Explosive remnants of war – An examination of
legal issues raised in the ERW discussions
ICRC
Page 22
CCW/GGE/II/WP.10 Group of Governmental Experts on Explosive
Remnants of War – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
from a field and donor perspective
Landmine Action (UK)
CCW/GGE/II/WP.11 Group of Governmental Experts on Explosive
Remnants of War – Information needs from a
field perspective
Landmine Action (UK)
CCW/GGE/II/WP.13 Explosive Remnants of War – Experience from
Field Operations
UNMAS
CCW/GGE/II/WP.15 Explosive Remnants of War Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/II/WP.19 ERW Information Requirements – Render Safe
Procedures (RSPs) during Humanitarian
Clearance Operations
GICHD
CCW/GGE/II/WP.20 Joint Discussion Paper on Technical
Improvements of Ammunitions to Prevent and
Reduce ERW
China and Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/II/WP.22 The relevance of the principle of precautions in
attack in the ERW context
Sweden
CCW/GGE/II/INF.2
Letter to military participants of the Group of
Governmental Experts of States Parties to the
CCW concerning the meetings of military experts
on ERW – Proposed Programme of Work and
provisional Agenda
Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/III/WP.1 Explosive Remnants of War: The way forward –
Note by the Coordinator on ERW – Draft
Proposal
Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/III/WP.3 Measures to Prevent ERW: Good Practice in
Munition Management
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/III/WP.6 International Humanitarian Law and Targeting:
An Australian Approach
Australia
CCW/GGE/III/WP.8 Report on the Meeting of Military Experts at the
Third Session of the Group of Governmental
Experts of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva,
4th December 2002
Switzerland
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/
WP.1
ERW Framework Paper: Possible Structure for an
ERW Instrument
Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/
WP.2
Explosive Remnants of War: Victim Assistance South Africa
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/
WP.3
Explosive Remnants of War: Assistance and
Cooperation
Pakistan
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/
WP.4
Amendments on the Protection of the Civilian
Population from the Effects of ERW (Article 6 of
the ERW Framework Paper)
ICRC
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/ ERW Framework Paper: Article 7 Australia
Page 23
WP.5
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.1/
WP.6
Definition of Explosive Remnants of War Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.1/Rev.1
Draft Proposal for an Instrument on Explosive
Remnants of War
Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.2
The United Nations and Explosive Remnants of
War
UNMAS
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.3
The Provision of Warnings and Risk Education
for Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.4
Information Requirements for Explosive
Remnants of War
GICHD
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.5
Ensuring the Reliability of Munitions Through
Their Proper Handling
Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/W
P.6
International Humanitarian Law and Explosive
Remnants of War
Norway
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/
WP.1
Draft Proposal for an Instrument on Explosive
Remnants of War
Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/
WP.2
Comments of the Inter-Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action on the draft proposed
Instrument on Explosive Remnants of War
UNMAS
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/
WP.3
National interpretation and implementation of
International Humanitarian Law with regard to
the risk of Explosive Remnants of War
Norway
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/
WP.1
Note by the Coordinator Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/
WP.2
Proposal for the Structuring of IHL/ERW
Discussions during CCW Experts’ Meetings in
2004
Sweden
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/
WP.3
Questions and Issues with regard to Preventive
Technical Measures for Certain Specific Types of
Explosive Ordnance
Switzerland
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/
WP.3/Corr.1
(English only)
Questions and Issues with regard to Preventive
Technical Measures for Certain Specific Types of
Explosive Ordnance – Corrigendum
Switzerland
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.1/
WP.4
Exchange of Information on a Voluntary Basis on
Protocol V
Netherlands
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.1/
1
Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the
Military Experts on Explosive Remnants of War
(ERW)
Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.1/
WP.1
Methodological approach to evaluation in the
context of improvement of the design of certain
specific types of munitions
France
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/1 Meetings of military and technical experts Chairperson of the
Page 24
Meetings of Military
Experts on MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/
WP.1
Dealing with the Impact of Cluster Munitions Cluster Munition Coalition
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/
WP.1/Corr.1
(English only)
Dealing with the Impact of Cluster Munitions Cluster Munition Coalition
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/
WP.2
Reliability, Safety, and Performance of
Conventional Munitions and Submunitions
Germany
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/1 Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of Military
Experts on ERW
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.1
Military Utility of Cluster Munitions United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.2
International Humanitarian Law and ERW Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United
Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and
United States of America
in consultation with the
ICRC
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.3
Proposed definitions for cluster munitions and
sub-munitions
UNMAS, UNDP and
UNICEF
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.4
Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions Germany
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.5
Review 2004 Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/W
P.6
Perspectives 2005 Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.1
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.1/Corr.1 (English
and Russian)
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005, Corrigendum
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.2
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
Canada
Page 25
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.3
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Poland
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.4
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
United States of America
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.5
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Norway
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.6
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Australia
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.7
Existing Principles and Rules of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable to Munitions that
May Become Explosive Remnants of War
ICRC
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.8
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Sweden
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.9
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Germany
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.10
Replies to Document CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2,
Entitled “International Humanitarian Law and
ERW”, Dated 8 March 2005
Argentina
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.11
Preventive Technical Measures in Munitions
Management
Argentina
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.12
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Japan
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.13
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Switzerland
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.14
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Austria
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.15
Discussions on Improving Munition Reliability Australia
Page 26
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.16
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
New Zealand
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.16/Corr.1
(Arabic, English and
French Only)
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005, Corrigendum
New Zealand
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.17
Explosive Remnants of War and International
Humanitarian Law
France
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.18
Responses to Document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Entitled IHL and
ERW Dated 8 March 2005
Denmark
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/
WP.19
International Humanitarian Law Principles and
Explosive Remnants of War (Working Paper
based on the Presentation by Prof. Tim
McCormack, University of Melbourne, Australia)
Prepared at the request of
the Coordinator on
Explosive Remnants of
War
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.1
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Brazil
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.1/Corr.1
(English, French,
Russian and Spanish
only)
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Corrigendum
Brazil
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.2
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Belarus
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.3
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.4
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Netherlands
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.5
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Estonia
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.6
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, of 8 March 2005,
entitled International Humanitarian Law and
Explosive Remnant of War
Belgium
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.7
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Croatia
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/ Responses to document Finland
Page 27
WP.8 CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.9
Working Paper on Submunitions France
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.10
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Lithuania
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.11
Survey on the Humanitarian Threat Posed by
Munitions and Sub-munitions that Have Become
ERW - Preliminary Assessment Based on
Responses and Findings
UNMAS and UNDP
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.12
A Way Ahead for IHL Questionnaire Response
Analysis
Presented by Canada.
Prepared by IHL
Questionnaire Co-
Authoring Delegations:
Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United
Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and
United States of America
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.13
Explosive Remnants of War -
A View from an Operational Theatre
Australia
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.14
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Republic of Korea
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.15
How Does Existing International Law Address
the Issue of Explosive Remnants of War?
Prepared at the request of
the Coordinator on ERW
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/
WP.16
General Requirements for Safety and Suitability
for Service of Cluster Munition
Germany
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.1
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Italy
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.2
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Czech Republic
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.3
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.4
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
South Africa
Page 28
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.5
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Mexico
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.6
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Portugal
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.7
Assessment of the relative risk of categories of
explosive ordnance becoming Explosive
Remnants of War: Methodology
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.8
Draft Table of Conventional Ammunition Types
and Systems
Chairperson of the
Meetings of Military and
Technical Experts
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.9
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
China
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.10
German Understanding of Cluster Munitions Germany
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.11
Cluster Weapons - a Real Humanitarian Threat,
or an Imaginary One?
Russian Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.12
Report on States Part ies’ Responses to
the Questionnaire on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants Of
War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, dated 8 March
2005. Introduction to the Report
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.12/Corr.1
(English only)
Report on States Part ies’ Responses to
the Questionnaire on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants Of
War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, dated 8 March
2005
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.12/Add.1
Report on States Part ies’ Responses to
the Questionnaire on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants Of
War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, dated 8 March
2005
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.12/Add.2
Report on States Part ies’ Responses to
the Questionnaire on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants Of
War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, dated 8 March
2005. Introduction to the Report
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.13
A Critical Analysis on the "Report On States
Parties' Responses to the Questionnaire" on
International Humanitarian Law and Explosive
Remnants of War
GICHD
Page 29
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.14
Munitions - A Method to Reduce the Risks
Associated with Explosive Remnants of War
France
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.15
Comments on the "Report On States Parties'
Responses to the Questionnaire" on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants of
War
ICRC
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/
WP.16
Responses to the Survey on the humanitarian
threat posed by munitions and sub-munitions that
have become ERW - preliminary assessment
based on responses and findings, document
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11,
Dated 12 December 2005
Belarus
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/1/Add.1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW-
Annotated Provisional Agenda
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/1/Add.2
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW-Draft
Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/1/Add.2/Corr.1
(English and Russian
only)
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW-Draft
Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/WP.1
Remarks on documents
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12,
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1 and
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add/2
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/WP.2
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Hungary
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/WP.3
Technical Comments on document
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.8,
Argentina
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG.1
/WP.4
Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible Approach to
Recommendation 3
Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University
of Melbourne
CCW/GGE/XV/WP.1 Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-
Binding Instrument that Addresses the
Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster
Munitions
Austria, Holy See, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand,
Sweden
CCW/GGE/XV/WP.3 Proposal for a Mandate on Explosive Remnants
of War (ERW)
European Union
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Page 30
1 Military and Technical Experts on ERW of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
1/Add.1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW-
Annotated Provisional Agenda
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
1/Add.2
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW- Draft
Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
Chairperson of the Meeting
of Military and Technical
Experts
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
WP.1
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Spain
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
WP.2
The United Nations and the Implementation of
Protocol V
UNMAS on behalf of
IACG-MA
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.1/
WP.3
Initiative on a Common Understanding of Cluster
Munitions within the Military Experts Group of
the CCW
Germany
Page 31
Annex II
REPORT
ON THE WORK IN 2006 ON MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
Prepared by the Coordinator on MOTAPM
and the Chairperson of the Meetings of Military Experts
The present report on the results of the work carried out by the Coordinator on Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) during the three Sessions of the CCW Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) of the CCW held throughout 2006, is presented to the President-designate of the
Third Review Conference of the States Parties to CCW
The 2005 Meeting of the States Parties appointed a Coordinator of the Working Group on Mines
Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines, and decided that the Group should continue its work in the year
2006 with the following mandate:
“a) To continue to consider all proposals on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines put
forward since the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts with the aim of
elaborating appropriate recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines for
submission to the Third Review Conference in 2006.
b) Meetings of military experts shall also be conducted to provide advice on these
activities.”36
In discharging his duties, the Coordinator on MOTAPM relied on the invaluable contributions of
Brig.-Gen. Gerson Menandro Garcia de Freitas, who acted as an advisor to the Coordinator and
chaired the Meetings of Military Experts on MOTAPM held during the 2006 GGE Sessions, and
whose report is enclose to this document.
In the Thirteenth Session, held between March 6th and 10
th, the Coordinator indicated to delegations
that, despite the strenuous efforts by the GGE on MOTAPM throughout the last four years, it was
yet not possible to eliminate a number of divergences, in particular as regards the most controversial
issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM. In light of this, the Coordinator asked
delegations to present a frank assessment of the current status of debates, and requested indications
of alternatives for future work of the GGE on the issue. The Coordinator also announced his
intention to conduct informal consultations with all interested delegations, with a view to identify
room for manoeuvre in the discussions throughout 2006.
Prior to the Fourteenth Session, the Coordinator has circulated a “Questionnaire on issues that might
enhance the level of understanding on the question of responsible use of Mines Other Than Anti-
Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)”. The Questionnaire was presented in the format of new language
that might be considered for addressing the topics identified as most contentious, as follows:
36
CCW/MSP/2005/2
Page 32
“perimeter marked areas” (PMA); “active life of MOTAPM”; “production and transfer of
MOTAPM”; and “detectability of MOTAPM”. It also provided for the submission of additional
comments on other issues that may be deemed relevant. Delegations were requested to comment the
proposed language (and ideas and/or concepts related to), on the basis of relevance, acceptance,
possibility of being incorporated to or of replacing the conceptual framework under discussion.
During the Fourteenth Session, held between June 19th and 23
rd, discussions were based on the
possibilities identified by the abovementioned questionnaire. A new round of informal consultations
in various settings also took place.
In the intersessional period prior to the Fifteenth Session of the GGE, the Coordinator has decided to
circulate a document entitled “Set Of Provisions On The Use of MOTAPM/AVM - A Compilation
of Provisions that could Command Consensus In The Group Of Governmental Expert (GGE)”37
,
which in his opinion encompasses all the areas that command consensus in the discussions held on
MOTAPM. The text builds upon all previous papers, including the Set of Recommendations
prepared by the previous Coordinator on MOTAPM, Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland
(CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2, dated 22 November 2005), and was presented as a basis for a
possible consensus during discussions that were to be held in the first days of the Fifteenth Session.
In addition to the most controversial issues of “detectability” and “active life”, some other questions
have also been identified as inspiring divergences among delegations, and were modified in relation
to the previous Coordinator´s text, in an attempt to identify consensus language: among the
modifications, the expression “Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines/Anti-Vehicle Mines”
(MOTAPM/AVM) was introduced as a means to address concerns raised by some delegations in
relation to what they perceive as “excessive breadth” and “subjective character” of the previous
definition of MOTAPM. A general reorganization of articles and paragraphs was also performed, in
order to bring together provisions on a single subject and to arrange them in a coherent, logical
manner.
As regards the most contentious issues of “detectability” and “active life” of MOTAPM, once no
possible consensus solution had yet been identified, they were not included in the first version of my
Set of Provisions. In its introduction, the Coordinator has outlined three possibilities as to the
inclusion of those two pending issues on a possible future protocol on MOTAPM, namely: a) the
insertion of legally binding language on the two issues in the main text; b) dealing with the issues of
“detectability” and “active life” in a way which would allow States-Parties the option to accept or
reject obligations on those two issues; c) place those two issues as non-binding best practices in a
technical annex.
In the Fifteenth and final Session of the GGE prior to the Third Review Conference, held between
August 28th and September 6
th, discussions on MOTAPM were based on the abovementioned Set of
Provisions. Many comments have been presented during plenary sessions, and a number of informal
consultations have taken place, with a view to allowing delegations to present comments and
37
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1
Page 33
proposals, and hence explore all possibilities of language that could lead to a consensus on how to
move forward towards the Third Review Conference.
As regards the issues of “detectability” and “active life”, many delegations indicated that they
continue to support the adoption of legally-binding provisions on both pending issues, along the
lines of chapters III and IV of the Set of Recommendations38
by the previous Coordinator,
Ambassador Markku Reimaa of Finland.
One delegation, after consultations with a wide spectrum of other delegations, has prepared a
proposal of language on “detectability” and “active life” that follows the second approach suggested
in the introduction of the first version of the Set of Provisions, i.e., the inclusion of both issues as
optional legally-binding commitments. According to the proposal, a State that adheres to a possible
future Protocol on MOTAPM may indicate, at the time of the submission of the instrument of
ratification, that it agrees to be bound by one or both of such provisions, by means of a written
declaration to the Depositary. At any time after the entry into force of the future Protocol for a given
State, the State concerned may submit written declarations to the Depositary expressing consent to
be bound by one or both of such provisions. While some delegations expressed discomfort with the
idea of introducing optional provisions in an optional Protocol, as well as with the possibility of
creating obligations that would bind some States Parties while not binding others, a number of
delegations have indicated this approach as a promising possible way of reconciling humanitarian
concerns with the requirements related to national security and defence doctrines and needs.
Other delegations retained their reservations as to the adoption of legally-binding commitments on
“detectability” and “active life”, on the grounds that such commitments may impinge upon essential
capabilities related to national defence, in exchange of what they perceived as merely marginal
returns in terms of minimisation of an already limited humanitarian impact of MOTAPM. Against
such background, those delegations expressed their preference for the inclusion of both pending
issues on a non-binding “best-practices” annex to a possible future Protocol on MOTAPM.
Some delegations have also indicated that, in considering any restrictions on “detectability” and
“active life” of MOTAPM (both under the legally-binding and the optional approach), a transitional
period was needed in order to allow for adaptation of existing stocks and/or military procedures.
In addition to the debate on the pending issues, substantive discussions were held on other subjects
such as the definition of “MOTAPM/AVM” and “perimeter-marked areas”, the “scope of
application”, restrictions on “transfers”, as well as on “fuse design and sensors”.
In particular, it became clear that, for a considerable number of delegations, the issues of “transfers”
and the definition of “PMA” were intrinsically connected to the pending issues of detectability and
active life, and consequently could not be analyzed separately. Additionally, while some delegations
insisted upon the prohibition of transfers of non-detectable, persistent MOTAPM (except for the
purposes of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or
mine destruction techniques), other delegations have questioned such prohibition, on the grounds
38
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/Rev.2
Page 34
that the Set of Provisions allowed the operational use of such persistent, non-detectable mines inside
PMA.
One delegation has re-introduced a proposal on MOTAPM, according to which all the provisions
being discussed would be substituted by a prohibition of the use of MOTAPM by a State outside its
national territory. Another delegation has introduced a new proposal containing what it regards as
the “main features that could form the basis of future deliberations in the GGE on the issue of anti-
vehicle mines”.
After the extensive debate on all three approaches on “detectability” and “active life”, as well as on
other yet controversial issues mentioned above, the Coordinator has decided to revise his Set of
Provisions so as to include all alternative languages pertaining to each of the three approaches,
which may help to command consensus during discussions at the Third Review Conference, if
States Parties agree to demonstrate political will and flexibility to cope with all sensitive issues.
The Coordinator has enclosed the last version of the document to the present report. Alternative
texts on controversial issues other than “detectability” and “active life” were also included. All
modifications in relation to the previous version are displayed in the text in italics. Alternative
language is displayed between brackets.
It is the understanding of the Coordinator that, upon discretion of delegations that have introduced
proposals during the Fifteenth Session, in case such proposals are timely handed to the Secretariat,
they will be circulated as official documents of the Third Review Conference.
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the above, the Coordinator has the honour to submit to the consideration of the Third
Review Conference of the CCW, to be held between November 7th and 17
th, 2006, the revised
version of his “Set of Provisions on the Use of MOTAPM/AVM – A Compilation of Provisions that
Could Command Consensus in the Group of Governmental Experts”, as contained in the appendix I
to this report.
It is the understanding of the Coordinator that all other formal proposals put forward to the
consideration of the Group of Governmental Experts since its establishment – a list of which shall
also be enclosed to this report as appendix II - will be considered by the Third Review Conference,
in accordance with the mandate bestowed upon the Group by the 2005 Meeting of States Parties.
Page 35
REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE MEETINGS OF MILITARY EXPERTS ON
MOTAPM IN 2006
In the light of the three sessions held in 2006, this appraisal of the situation provides an overview on
the work performed by the Military Experts on MOTAPM. As a reminder, the overall mandate of
the GGE on MOTAPM states:”[…] Meeting of military experts shall also be conducted to provide
advice on these activities.”
At the opening meeting of the XIII Session, was realized that the persisting divergences in views -
which had undermined any possible progress on this issue – were still strong.
The Coordination was also aware that CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/Rev.2 was presented but not
thoroughly discussed at the XII Session of GGE in November 2005. Although not a consensual text,
it was officially submitted by the former coordinator and reflected positions expressed by many
State Parties on a wide range of subjects.
It was therefore necessary, before moving forward in a search of common grounds, to assess the
positions of States Parties on the issues contained in that specific paper and, as contained in our
mandate, in all proposals put forward since the establishment of this Group.
During the Thirteenth Session, one formal Meeting of Military Experts was held. This group also
participated in two plenary meetings conducted by the Coordinator on MOTAPM. However, the
most useful and productive events were the seven informal meetings, in both formats: bilateral and
plurilateral. In those sessions the Coordinator had direct contact with 16 State Parties and
International Organizations. As preliminary results, were improved the conditions to a frank and
constructive dialogue, mandatory step towards a mutual understanding.
As some discussions have clearly highlighted key controversial issues, under the guidance of the
Coordinator a questionnaire was circulated, focusing on the following topics: Perimeter Marked-
Areas (PMA) to emplace MOTAPM; Active Life; Transfer; and Detectability of MOTAPM. In
addition, the delegations were requested to make further comments or suggestions on possible ways
to address the mentioned items.
The responses to the questionnaire were helpful and oriented the organization of the Fourteenth
Session, which was intended to deepen the examination of the issues raised in that document.
In the Fourteenth Session another Meeting of the Military Experts took place, along with the two
formal sessions conducted by Coordinator on MOTAPM. Eleven informal consultations were
conducted, in different settings, in search of possibilities for mutual understanding and a concrete
breakthrough.
Page 36
Although it was clear that significant divergences still remained, the informal and formal works
during that Session have provided the coordination on MOTAPM valuable tools for building
confidence and orienting new possibilities to broker consensus in the elaboration of
recommendations on MOTAPM.
At that time, during the intersessional period, the Coordination team on MOTAPM has decided to
submit a comprehensive text, encompassing all the areas that command consensus and which
required an analysis in its entirety.
This paper, entitled “Set of Provisions”, was aimed to facilitate more focused discussions, to help in
assessing the level of acceptance of some key issues and, hopefully, to pave the way for successful
outcome of the Group`s work.
The Last Preparatory Session for the 3rd
Review Conference hosted intensive formal consultations
among military experts, in three plenary meetings and one specific technical-military meeting. In the
same session eighteen informal meetings were held in different settings, leading to more focused
and fruitful discussions. It should be mentioned that nine delegations presented proposals and
comments, which greatly helped the Coordinator in his efforts towards the refinement of the Set of
Provisions. In terms of tangible and recent outcomes, such consultations and exchanges of views led
to the elaboration of two revised versions of CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, both introduced during the
Fifteenth Session.
The last version of the abovementioned document incorporates new approaches, from different
perspectives, on issues that proved to remain controversial, such as the definition of
MOTAPM/AVM, transfers, detectability, active life, and fuse design and sensors of
MOTAPM/AVM. It was also consolidated a consensual definition and additional remarks on
perimeter marked-area. Moreover, innovative language was introduced on the humanitarian aspects
related to responsible use of mines.
Page 37
Appendix I
SET OF PROVISIONS ON THE USE OF MOTAPM/AVM –
A Compilation of Provisions that Could Command Consensus
Presented by the Coordinator
This version of the Set of Provisions outlines alternative options pertaining to each of the three
approaches on the issues of “detectability” and “active life” suggested in the introduction to
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, which are included in an appendix.
All other modifications in relation to the previous version (Rev.1) are displayed in italics.
Alternative texts are displayed [between brackets].
Article 1
General provision and scope of application
1. This set of provisions applies to the use on land or the transfer of MOTAPM/AVM, including
mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use
of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.
2. This set of provisions shall apply to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, as
amended on 21 December 2001.
3. This document is without prejudice to the existing international humanitarian law, provisions of
the Convention of 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which my be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects or
other international instruments and decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations which
provide for more strict obligations or have wider application.
Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purpose of this set of provisions:
(a) "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.
(b) "MOTAPM/AVM” means a mine which cannot be defined as an anti-personnel mine. An anti-
personnel mine is a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of
a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. A MOTAPM/AVM is
primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of armored or
transportation vehicles and that will damage, incapacitate or destroy one or more of such vehicles.
Page 38
(c) "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to,
attached to or placed under the MOTAPM/AVM and which activates when an attempt is made to
tamper with the MOTAPM/AVM.
(d) "Minefield" is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and "mined area" is
an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines. "Phoney minefield" means an area free of
mines that simulates a minefield. The term "minefield" includes phoney minefields.
(e) "Perimeter-marked area" is an area which, in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians,
is monitored by military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means.
(f) "Recording" means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the
purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating the location of
MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas.
(g) "Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM means those not directly emplaced but delivered by
artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. MOTAPM/AVM
delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 meters are not considered to be "remotely
delivered".
(h) "Self-deactivation" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of
the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of
the munition.
(i) "Self-destruction mechanism" means an incorporated or externally attached automatically-
functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated
or to which it is attached.
(j) "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism
which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.
(k) "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of MOTAPM/AVM into or from
national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the MOTAPM/AVM, but does not involve
the transfer of territory containing emplaced MOTAPM/AVM.
Article 3
Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM39
39
Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that
follows this set of provisions.
Page 39
Article 4
Active life of MOTAPM/AVM40
Article 5
Measures on the Restriction of Irresponsible Use of MOTAPM/AVM
1. Each State or party to a conflict is, in accordance with this set of provisions, responsible for all
MOTAPM/AVM employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as
specified in the relevant articles of this document.
2. Each State shall take action with a view to limiting the irresponsible use of MOTAPM/AVM,
which may include:
(a) establishment of adequate national systems and corresponding documentation;
(b) effective export and import control measures relating to MOTAPM/AVM;
(c) effective management and security of stockpiles and transport of MOTAPM/AVM;
(d) adoption of such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, penal
sanctions, to prevent and suppress activities prohibited by this set of provisions;
(e) suppression of activities related to the production of MOTAPM/AVM under invalid or expired
licenses; and
(f) strengthening cooperation with the purpose of implementation of this set of provisions.
3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any MOTAPM/AVM which is designed or of a nature
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
4. It is prohibited to use a MOTAPM/AVM which employs a mechanism or device specifically
designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result
of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.
5. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating MOTAPM/AVM equipped with an anti-handling device
that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the
MOTAPM/AVM has ceased to be capable of functioning.
40
Three possible courses of action are envisaged for this article, as described in the appendix that
follows this set of provisions.
Page 40
6. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct any MOTAPM/AVM, either in offence or
defense, or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians
or civilian objects, as defined by paragraph 7 of article 2 of Amended Protocol II.
7. The indiscriminate use of MOTAPM/AVM is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of
MOTAPM/AVM:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective, as defined in the Protocol on
Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices, as amended on 3
May 1996 (Amended Protocol II). In case of doubt as to whether an object
which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be
presumed not to be so used; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
8. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other
area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single
military objective.
9. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM.
Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
These circumstances include, but are not limited to:
(a) the short- and long-term effect of MOTAPM/AVM upon the local civilian population for the
duration of the minefield;
(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and
(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
10. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of a MOTAPM/AVM which may
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
11. States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate laws
and regulations in order to prohibit and sanction the production, acquisition, possession,
Page 41
development, transport, transfer or use of MOTAPM/AVM by any unauthorized individual or entity,
as well as participating in any of the abovementioned actions as an accomplice, or providing them
with assistance or finance.
12. States shall adopt and enforce effective national measures with a view to preventing illicit
circulation and trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, including the following:
(a) oversight and control over the production, storage or transportation of MOTAPM/AVM; and
(b) physical protection of stockpiles.
13. States shall cooperate among themselves in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, in accordance with national legislation and pursuant to international
law.
Article 6
Recording of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas
1. It is prohibited to use any MOTAPM/AVM unless all information concerning MOTAPM/AVM
minefields and mined areas is recorded in accordance with paragraph 1 of Technical Annex A. All
such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who shall, without delay after the cessation
of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such
information, to protect civilians from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas, in
areas under their control.
2. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, the parties to a conflict shall also make
available to the other party or parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations all such information in their possession concerning MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined
areas, laid by them in areas no longer under their control.
However, subject to reciprocity, where the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an
adverse party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the other
party, to the extent that security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the
territory of the other. Any information so withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security
interests permit.
Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the
release of such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent with the security
interests of each party.
Article 7
Removal of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas
Page 42
1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all MOTAPM/AVM, and minefields and
mined areas shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with the provisions of
this set of provisions.
2. States and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect to MOTAPM/AVM,
minefields and mined areas, in areas under their control.
3. With respect to MOTAPM/AVM, minefields and mined areas laid by a party in areas over which
it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the party in control of the area, pursuant
to paragraph 2 of this article, to the extent agreed by the parties concerned, technical and material
assistance necessary to fulfill such responsibility, without prejudice to the obligations set by
paragraph 1 Article 5.
4. At all times necessary, the parties to a conflict shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among
themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the
provisions of technical and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the
undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfill such responsibilities.
Article 8
Protection from the effects of MOTAPM/AVM, minefields, and mined areas
1. Each Party to this set of provisions shall be bound by the provisions in Article 12 of Amended
Protocol II, regardless of whether that State is a Party to Amended Protocol II. Such provisions
include the Scope of application; Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions;
Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the UN system; Missions of the International Committee
of the Red Cross; Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry; Confidentiality; and
Respect for laws and regulations.
Article 9
Transfers
1. Each State shall not transfer any MOTAPM/AVM:
(a) to any recipient other than a State or State agency authorized to receive it;
(b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM,
except for the use in perimeter marked area, or for the purpose of destruction or for development of
and training in mine detection, demining, or mine destruction techniques;41
[alternative language for subparagraph “b”:
41
Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”
Page 43
(b) which does not meet the standards set out for detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVM,
except for the purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining
, or mine destruction techniques; 42
]
(c) without an end-user certificate, which, in the case of mines that do not meet the standards set out
for detectability and active life, shall include an explicit commitment to abide by the restrictions
mentioned in subparagraph “b” above; and
(d) to States that are not bound by this set of provisions, unless the recipient formally agrees to apply
its provisions.
2. In order to prevent illicit trafficking of MOTAPM/AVM, States shall establish or improve
effective national controls.
3. Each State undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any MOTAPM/AVM with a
Category One fusing system, as described in Technical Annex B, paragraph 5 (b), except for the
purpose of destruction or for development of and training in mine detection, demining, or mine
destruction techniques.
4. Pending the entry into force of this set of provisions, all States will refrain from any actions which
would be inconsistent with this Article.
Article 10
Transparency and other confidence-building measures
1. Each State shall provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate to the
other States, information on the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions. This
information should include the following elements:
(a) an initial report, to be provided upon the entry into force of this set of provisions for each State ;
and
(b) periodic updating of the report.
2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 may include, information on:
(a) dissemination of the provisions of this set of provisions to their armed forces and to the civilian
population;
(b) demining and rehabilitation programmes;
(c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the provisions of this set of provisions and any
other relevant information pertaining thereto, other than that relating to weapons technology;
42
Language retained pending an agreement on Article 3 “Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM” and Article 4 “Active life of MOTAPM/AVM”
Page 44
(d) legislative and other measures taken for the implementation of the provisions of this set of
provisions;
(e) measures taken on cooperation and assistance provided under Article 11 of this set of
provisions; and
(f) general information on the national rules and requirements for transfers of MOTAPM/AVM, and
information on these transfers.
Article 11
Cooperation and assistance
1. Each State in a position to do so shall enhance cooperation and assistance at bilateral, regional
and international levels aimed at assisting the other States in the fulfillment of their obligations in
respect of MOTAPM/AVM. Cooperation and assistance may be provided through humanitarian
organizations. Such cooperation and assistance may include the following:
(a) Provision of technical and financial assistance, including exchange of experience, technology
other than weapons technology, and information, in order to facilitate the implementation of
necessary modifications to improve the reliability of, and minimize the humanitarian risks posed by,
existing and future MOTAPM/AVM. Provision of such assistance may be used to facilitate the
development, if feasible, of advanced mine detection equipment and to make such equipment readily
available.
(b) Cooperation and assistance in the destruction of stockpiles of MOTAPM/AVM that do not meet
and cannot be modified to meet the requirements of this set of provisions.
(c) Cooperation and technical, material and human assistance for the rapid and effective demining,
removal or destruction of MOTAPM/AVM.
(d) The timely provision of geographic and technical information on MOTAPM/AVM to relevant
humanitarian missions and to the database on mine action maintained within the United Nations
System.
(e) Cooperation and assistance on the provision of risk education for civilian populations.
(f) Cooperation and assistance for the care and rehabilitation and the social and economic
reintegration of victims of MOTAPM/AVM.
(g) Cooperation and assistance in the implementation of the provisions of this set of provisions.
Article 12
Page 45
Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM
1. The States should, to the extent feasible, follow the best practices on fuse design stipulated in
paragraph 5 of Technical Annex B.
[alternative approach:
1. The States, to the extent feasible, in the future production of MOTAPM/AVM, shall follow
the best practices in relation to the fuse and sensors production to design them to minimize
the possibility of involuntary or accidental activation of a mine by a person.
2. In the future production of fuses the States, to the extent feasible, shall strive to apply
modern, including multi-sensor, technology to develop them based on technology factors,
life environment factors.]43
[Article 1344
Transition Period
In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the requirements of [articles
3 and 4] of this Set of Provisions, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound
by this set of Provisions that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed [XX] years from the
entry into force of this Set of Provisions for that State. ]
43
This alternative language is based in a generic approach to fuse design, as opposed to the specific approach of
the current text, which makes reference to a list of fuses and sensors categorized according to sensitivity (in terms of the
risk of involuntary activation by a person), as included in Technical Annex B. In case the generic approach prevails,
subsection 5 of Technical Annex B should be deleted. 44
The inclusion of this article will depend on the decision on how to address the issues of “detectability” and
“active life”. See also Appendix I ( I. First Option: Article 3 paragraph 7 and Article 4 paragraph 4).
Page 46
Technical Annex A
1. Minefield Recording
(a) Recording of the location of MOTAPM/AVM other than remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM
shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions:
(i) the location of the minefields and mined areas shall be specified accurately by relation to the
coordinates of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area containing
these weapons in relation to those reference points;
(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to indicate the location of
minefields and mined areas in relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their
perimeters and extent; and
(iii) for the purposes of detection and clearance of MOTAPM/AVM, maps, diagrams or other
records shall contain complete information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and
life time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and any other relevant information
on all of these weapons laid. Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location of
every MOTAPM/AVM, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient.
(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM shall be specified by
coordinates of reference points (normally corner points) and shall be ascertained and when feasible
marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity. The total number and types of MOTAPM/AVM
laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded.
(c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee their safety as far as
possible.
(d) All MOTAPM/AVM produced after entry into force of this set of provisions shall be marked in
English or in the respective national language or languages with the following information:
(i) Name of the country of origin; and
(ii) Month and year of production; and
(iii) Serial number or lot number.
2. Marking of Perimeter-marked area
(a) a perimeter-marked area shall be marked by appropriate signage in accordance with paragraph 3
of this Technical Annex, except during periods of active hostilities. The marking shall be of a
distinct and durable character and shall at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the
perimeter-marked area;
Page 47
(b) the marking shall be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far as
possible; and
(c) during periods of active hostilities, a perimeter-marked area should, to the extent feasible, be
appropriately marked. After the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, the area shall
be marked in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.
3. International signs for Minefields and Mined Areas
(a) Signs similar to those specified within Amended Protocol II and detailed below shall be utilized
in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the
civilian populations:
(i) Size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches) by 20 centimetres
(7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a square;
(ii) Colour: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border;
(iii) Symbol: the symbol illustrated in the attachment, or an alternative readily recognizable in the
area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area;
(iv) Language: the sign shall contain the word “mines” in one of the six official languages of the
convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and the language or languages
prevalent in the area;
(v) Spacing: signs shall be placed around the minefield at a distance to ensure their visibility at any
point by a civilian approaching the area.
Page 48
Technical Annex B
This Annex contains best practices for achieving the objectives of this set of provisions.
This Annex will be implemented by States on a voluntary basis.
1. Control Measures
(a) Prior to Commencement of Active Hostilities
All minefields, within the territory controlled by the party concerned, should be monitored by
military or other authorized personnel, or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the
effective exclusion of civilians from the area.
(b) During Active Hostilities
Parties to a conflict should ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields known to them at the
time and within territory under their control are either monitored by military or other authorized
personnel or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from
the area. Remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM and nuisance minefields may be emplaced as
required during active hostilities noting the recording requirements detailed in Technical Annex A.
(c) After the Cessation of Active Hostilities
(i) All parties to a conflict should be encouraged to cooperate in order to facilitate, to the extent
feasible, the exchange to the other parties concerned of all information in their possession
concerning minefields, mined areas, and MOTAPM/AVM laid by them in areas no longer under
their control.
(ii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible all minefields within the territory controlled
by the party concerned, are to be secured and monitored by military or other authorized personnel,
or protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. If
fencing or other marking means have been removed from minefields during the conflict they should
be restored at the earliest opportunity in order to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the
area.
(iii) At the earliest opportunity and to the extent feasible, all remotely-delivered and nuisance
minefields emplaced during active hostilities, and within the territory controlled by the party
concerned, should be appropriately recorded in accordance with Technical Annex A. In addition and
to the extent feasible, they should be secured and monitored by military or other qualified personnel,
or protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.
2. Common Warning Measures Required At All Times
To the extent feasible, and as soon as practicable after MOTAPM/AVM are laid, signposted or other
warning measures should be provided on all primary traffic routes into the mined area to ensure the
effective warning of civilians. A primary traffic route is one over which most population movement
occurs between population centres. When providing these warning measures parties should be
Page 49
mindful of prevailing local environmental factors, such as regular flooding, which could contribute
to the natural but unintended movement of MOTAPM/AVM over time.
3. Marking Systems
Marking systems are utilized to effectively and efficiently identify the perimeter or boundary
between mined and unmined areas. They can include natural or artificial features or a combination
thereof but to the extent feasible they will be enhanced through the inclusion of warning signs, as
described in Technical Annex A. Notwithstanding the potential removal of these measures (fencing
or other means) at the onset of active hostilities and the ongoing requirement in these circumstances
for parties to ensure, to the extent feasible, that all minefields are monitored by military or other
qualified personnel, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area, the following
guidelines are provided for marking at all other times:
(a) Immediate Warning Markers. Immediate warning markers are used to expediently mark hazards
encountered by military or civilian personnel until a long-term or more permanent marker can be
established. The basic pre-requisites for these markers are:
(i) any marking means capable of identifying the hazardous areas as quickly as possible;
(ii) visibility at not less than 50 m indicating the location, direction and type of hazard;
(iii) the marking material(s) have a lifespan of at least 180 days; and
(iv) the marking means used should be readily recognizable in the area in which they are displayed
as identifying a hazardous area.
Immediate markers could include but should not be limited to:
(i) mine marking tape; or
(ii) wire, pickets (iron, timber, concrete, plastic or other) and signage; or
(iii) painting of natural features such as trees and rocks in hazard recognition colours; or
(iv) any other locally or otherwise available and accepted hazard recognition materials;
(v) sign should be robustly emplaced and difficult to remove.
To the extent feasible, the location of the hazard and its marking details such as the marking systems
employed should be promulgated in general terms to the civil population as soon as is practicable to
ensure their effective exclusion from the area. To the extent feasible they should be enhanced
through the inclusion of warning signs, as described in Technical Annex A.
(b) Long-Term Warning Markers. Long-term warning markers are to be used if the hazard is likely
to remain in location for a protracted duration or when immediate hazard markers need to be
Page 50
replaced and upgraded. Long-term markers represent an improvement on an immediate warning
system and the minimum standard of a long term warning sign could include but should not be
limited to:
(i) A fence (minimum single strand of barb wire) to waist height with appropriate military mine
hazard recognition markers as detailed in Technical Annex A at intervals appropriate to the terrain
and vegetation;
(ii) Permanent signage, visible to the extent feasible by day and by night, both proximate to the
hazard itself and on all identifiable primary traffic routes into the area in which the hazard is
contained;
(iii) A permanent cyclone wire type fence reinforced with barbed wire and anti-climbing measures
inclusive with mine hazard markers at specified minimum intervals and type;
(iv) Concertina wire and pickets;
(v) Concrete barricades; or
(vi) Other locally or otherwise available material enhancements.
4. Specifications on Self-destruction, Self-neutralization and Self-deactivation45
(a) MOTAPM/AVM that are designed to self-destruct or self-neutralize should do so within 45 days
after arming. Self-deactivation of MOTAPM/AVM that fail to self-destruct or self-neutralize should
take place within 120 days after arming.
(b) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that no more than 10 percent (with a 90
percent confidence level) of activated MOTAPM/AVM will fail to self-destruct or self neutralize
after 45 days.
(c) Each State should take the measures necessary to ensure that in combination with self-
destruction or self-neutralization mechanisms, no more than one in a thousand of activated
MOTAPM/AVM will function as a mine after 120 days.
5. Fuse design and sensors of MOTAPM/AVM46
(a) Based on information and data provided by States the following broadly available fuses and
sensors should be considered as relevant: acoustic sensors; break wires; fiber-optic wires; infra-red-
45
The assessment of the reliability rate of the SD/SDA or SN/SDA is left to the discretion of each State. 46
As mentioned in the footnote to article 12, this subsection of Technical Annex B should not be included in case the
generic approach to fuze and sensor design is chosen.
Page 51
sensors; magnetic sensors; pressure sensors; roller arms; scratch wire sensors; seismic/vibration
sensors; tilt rods; trip wires.47
(b) The broadly available fuses and sensors referred to in the previous paragraph should be graded
into the following categories:
Category One: Fusing systems that cannot be designed not to be excessively sensitive.
(i) Break wires and trip wires do not appear to be a recommended method of activation, as it does
not seem possible to design them in such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the
mine.
(ii) Tilt rods do not appear to be recommended method of activation, if they cannot be designed in
such a way that an individual cannot, within reason, initiate the mine.
Category Two: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, but are best
used in conjunction with other sensors.
(i) Acoustically activated fuses use electronic sensors to react to acoustic pressure and recognize the
acoustic signature. Use in conjunction with other sensors is preferable.
(ii) Infrared activated fuses should be designed so as not to be activated in the presence of a person.
The sensor should be able to match detected heat signatures to the intended target preferably in
conjunction with other sensors.
(iii) Seismic/Vibration sensors cannot currently locate their targets precisely; their use in
conjunction with other sensors appears therefore to be indispensable. The sensor should be capable
to match a seismic signature to the intended target.
Category Three: Fusing systems that can be designed not to be excessively sensitive, that can be
designed to operate satisfactorily without other sensors and which fulfill the best practice safety
guidelines of this Technical Annex.
(i) The pressure required to break the fiber-optic signal should be appropriate for the intended target.
(ii) To enhance military utility, magnetically activated mines should be capable of matching a
magnetic signature to the intended target.
(iii) Pressure sensors, pressure activated mechanisms, should, where possible, be subject to a
minimum pressure force appropriate for the intended target. Pressure should preferably be exerted
over a significant area (equal to that of a vehicle) rather than a single point.
47
The sequence of the fuses and sensors is strictly alphabetical and does not entail an assessment of their
availability, distribution or use.
Page 52
(iv) The number of turns required to initiate the roller arm fuse should be matched to the intended
target.
(v) The scratch wire sensor should be designed for specific targets by optimizing the scratch time,
frequency and amplitude required to initiate the sensor by the intended target.
(c) All MOTAPM/AVM, with the exception of those fitted with Category Three fuses, should
incorporate in future production, to the extent feasible, multi-sensor fuses technology in order to
reduce the possibility of inadvertent or accidental activation by a person taking into account
operational, life cycle, environmental and climate factors.
(d) The influence of environmental factors, particularly:
(i) of weather and climate;
(ii) of storage, handling and other external conditions should be taken into account when selecting
the types of fuses and determining the sensitivity of fuses; and
(e) Considerations and proposals of technical measures should take into account operational,
procurement as well as life cycle factors; they should address clearly identified humanitarian issues.
Page 53
Appendix
Three possible options on how to address the issues of “detectability” and “active life” are
envisaged:
I. First option – Insertion of legally-binding language on “detectability” and “active life”.
Article 3
Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM
1. It is prohibited to use a non-detectable MOTAPM/AVM, subject to the exclusions
specified below.
2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement:
(a) it provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of
iron in a single coherent mass buried five centimetres beneath the ground and can be
detected by commonly available mine detection equipment; or
(b) it can be reliably and effectively detected through the use of alternative methods and
equipment that reflect developments in detection methodologies, and if the States, taking into
account testing and evaluation by relevant institutions, have decided by a four-fifths majority
of the States present and voting that such alternative methods and equipment are effective
and commonly available.
3. A MOTAPM/AVM is also detectable if it can be reliably and effectively detected
through the use of methods and equipment that are not commonly available but are readily
available to a State, provided that:
(a) the State in question has, before the use of such MOTAPM/AVM, demonstrated to the
other States that the MOTAPM/AVM can be reliably and effectively detected through the use
of such readily available methods or equipment; and
(b) it is not used outside perimeter-marked areas located on the territory of the State in
question.
4. A MOTAPM/AVM emplaced in a perimeter-marked area is excluded from the
detectability requirement of this chapter.
5. It is prohibited to produce, after the entry into force of this set of recommendations,
any MOTAPM that is not detectable.
6. All MOTAPM/AVM from existing stocks shall meet the detectability requirement of this
chapter prior to their emplacement, except in the case referred to in paragraph 20.
Page 54
7. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with the
requirements of this chapter, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be
bound by this set of recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed
12 years from the entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State
shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not meet the
detectability requirement of this chapter.48
Article 4
Active life of MOTAPM/AVM
1. It is prohibited to use a remotely-delivered MOTAPM/AVM which does not incorporate a
self-destruction mechanism or a self-neutralization mechanism with, in either case, a back-
up self-deactivation feature (hereinafter referred to as "SD/SDA or SN/SDA"), whereby the
MOTAPM/AVM will no longer function as a mine when it no longer serves the military
purpose for which it was emplaced.
2. States shall not deliver a MOTAPM/AVM from a land-based system from less than 500
meters, nor shall they hand-emplace a MOTAPM/AVM, which does not incorporate a
SD/SDA or SN/SDA, outside a perimeter marked area.
3. When implementing the recommendations of this chapter the States shall take all
measures stipulated in Technical Annex A and should follow the best practices stipulated in
Technical Annex B.
4. In the event that a State determines it cannot immediately comply with paragraphs 24
and 25, it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this set of
recommendations that it will defer compliance for a period not to exceed 12 years from the
entry into force of this set of recommendations. In the meantime that State shall, to the extent
feasible, minimize the use of any MOTAPM/AVM that does not so comply.49
II. Second option – Inclusion of Provisions on Detectability and Active Life as two optional, legally-
binding Annexes.
In this case, provisions on detectability and active life would be incorporated into the text as two
separate optional annexes, and an article disciplining the entry into force of such annexes for States
Parties would be inserted on the main text.
48
See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions. 49
See also Article 13 / Set of Provisions.
Page 55
Article 3
Detectability and Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM
1. At the time of submittal to the Depositary of its instrument expressing its consent to be
bound to this set of provisions, a State may submit a written declaration agreeing to be
bound by Optional Annex A on detectability or Optional Annex B on active life, or agreeing
to be bound by both.
2. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 may also be submitted to the Depositary by a
State that has previously expressed consent to be bound by this set of provisions at any time
after the entry into force of this set of provisions for that State.
3. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 may stipulate that it is effective immediately
or may stipulate a specific date upon which it shall be effective.
Optional Annex A
Detectability of MOTAPM/AVM
1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM which are not detectable.
2. A MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement, it provides a response signal
equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass buried
five centimeters beneath the ground and can be detected by commonly-available technical
mine detection equipment.
3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the detectability
requirement of this Annex.
Optional Annex B
Active Life of MOTAPM/AVM
1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a self-destruction
mechanism or a mechanism for self-neutralization designed and constructed so that no more
than ten percent of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within forty-five days after
arming.
2. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVM that do not incorporate a back-up self-deactivation
feature that is designed and constructed so that, in combination with the mechanism referred
to in paragraph 1, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine
one hundred twenty days after arming.
Page 56
3. MOTAPM/AVM used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded from the requirements of
this Annex.
III. Third option – Inclusion of detectability and active life in the form of “best practices” in a
technical annex.
Some general ideas and proposals have been discussed as regards the inclusion of
provisions on detectability and active life as best practices in a technical, non-binding annex.
The adoption of a “best practices” approach to theses issues would necessarily imply
changes both in the main text of a possible understanding on MOTAPM/AVM and in the provisions
of a new binding technical annex.
Page 57
Appendix II
LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
ON THE ISSUE OF MINES OTHER THAN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
Symbol Title Submitted by
CCW/GGE/I/WP.1 Draft EU Food-for-Thought Paper on Mines Other
Than Antipersonnel Mines
European Union
CCW/GGE/I/WP.12 Discussion paper on the issue of restrictions on the
use of anti-vehicle mines
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/II/WP.2
(No electronic version
available)
Elements for discussion during the Second meeting
of GGE (Geneva, 15-26 July 2002) on the issue of
Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines
(MOTAPM)
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/II/WP.3 Elements for an EU paper on AVM European Union
CCW/GGE/II/WP.5 “Food for Thought” on Mines other than Anti-
Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) for the second
meeting of experts in July 2002 – Sensitive fuzes
Germany
CCW/GGE/II/WP.5/Ad
d.1
Addendum: Sensitive Fuses for Anti Vehicle
Mines
Germany
CCW/GGE/II/WP.9 Anti-vehicle mines: effects on humanitarian
assistance and civilian populations
ICRC
CCW/GGE/II/WP.12 List of Areas for Possible Discussion in the CCW
Group of Governmental Experts, Military Experts
Meeting on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines (MOTAPM)
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/II/WP.14 Anti-Vehicle Mines – Experience from Field
Operations
UNMAS
CCW/GGE/II/WP.16 Reflection Paper on Sensitive Fuses of Land Mines
Other than Anti-Personnel Mines
Romania
CCW/GGE/II/WP.17
and Corr.1
Certain technical aspects of anti-vehicle landmines China
CCW/GGE/II/WP.18 Current AV Mine Specific Restrictions under
International Law
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/II/WP.21 Information on Technical Measures Related to AV
Mines: Detectability and SD/SN/SDA
United States of
America
CCW/GGE/III/WP.2 Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM) – Draft Proposal by the Coordinator
on MOTAPM
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/III/WP.4 Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM) laid outside fenced and marked areas
Ireland
CCW/GGE/III/WP.5 Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM) – Sensitive Fuzes for Anti-Vehicle
Mines (Overview of Fuzes and Recommendations
Germany
Page 58
for Best Practice) - Synopsis
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W
P.1
Core Questions on Mines Other Than Anti-
Personnel Mines
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W
P.2
Irresponsible Use of Mines Other Than Anti-
Personnel Mines by Non-State Actors
India
CCW/GGE/IV/WG.2/W
P.3
Field Report Afghanistan UNMAS
CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W
P.1
Core questions on Mines Other Than Anti-
Personnel Mines
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W
P.2
Sensitive Fuses for Anti-Vehicle Mines: Overview
of Fuses, Sensors and Recommendations for Best
Practice (Synopsis)
Germany
CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W
P.3
‘Food for Thought’ Paper on International
Cooperation and Assistance for Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines
Canada
CCW/GGE/V/WG.2/W
P.4
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines:
Canadian Overview of Fuses, Sensors and
Recommendations for Best Practice
Canada
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.1
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines – Draft
Proposal by the Coordinator
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.2
Non-State Actors and the humanitarian dangers of
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
Mines Action
Canada
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.3
Sensitive Fuses for Anti-Vehicle Mines –
Overview of Fuses, Sensors and Recommendations
for Best Practice
Germany
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.4
Landmines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
Emplaced Outside Fenced and Marked Areas
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.5
Detectability of Mines Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.6
Improvised Explosive Devices Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.7
Consideration Relating to the Sensitivity of the
Fuses of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
Russian
Federation
Page 59
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.8
Consideration Relating to the Blowing Up of
Motor Vehicles Belonging to Humanitarian
Missions
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.9
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
and Transfer of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines
Denmark,
United States of
America and
other States
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.9/Corr.1
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
and Transfer of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines
Denmark,
United States of
America and
other States
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.10
Proposals by the Russian Federation for further
work by the Group of Governmental Experts on
the issue of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines (MOTAPM)
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/VI/WG.2/W
P.11
Field Report on Angola UNMAS
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.1
Military Experts Meeting: Tentative List of Areas
for Discussion
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.2
Landmine Detection Technology
Australia
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.2/Corr.1
(English only)
Landmine Detection Technology - Corrigendum
Australia
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.3
A Common Inter-Agency Coordination Group on
Mine Action (IACG-MA) on Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines
UNMAS on
behalf of the
IACG-MA
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.3/Corr.1
(English only)
A Common Inter-Agency Coordination Group on
Mine Action (IACG-MA) on Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines
UNMAS on
behalf of the
IACG-MA
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.4
Current and Future Technology for MOTAPM
Detection and Clearance
UNMAS
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.5
Two New Articles on International Cooperation
and Assistance and on Transparency Measures
Lithuania
CCW/GGE/VII/WG.2/
WP.6
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
and Transfer of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines
Secretariat
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/ Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of Coordinator
Page 60
1
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
2
Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the Military
Experts on MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
WP.1
Detectability of Anti-Vehicle Mines United Kingdom
of Great Britain
and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
WP.2
Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM) laid outside perimeter-marked areas
Ireland
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
WP.3
Sensitive Fuses and Sensors for Mines Other Than
Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM), Proposal for
Best Practice
Germany
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
WP.4
The current detectability status of Mines Other
Than Anti-Personnel Mines currently available to
States Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons
GICHD at the
request of the
Coordinator
CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/
WP.5
Responses to Certain Concerns Regarding a
MOTAPM Protocol
United States of
America
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/1
Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/2
Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the Military
Experts on MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meetings of
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/W
P.1
Sensitive Fuzes in Mines Other than Anti-
Personnel Mines
United Kingdom
of Great Britain
and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/IX/WG.2/W
P.2
Minefield Marking Methodologies Australia
CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/2
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the Military
Experts on MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
Page 61
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W
P.1
Visualising Operational Impacts of proposed
Detectability and Fusing Standards
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W
P.2
Observations on Pertinent Issues Related to Mines
Other than Anti-Personnel Mines
Germany
CCW/GGE/X/WG.2/W
P.3
Wrap-up of the Meeting of the Military Experts on
MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/2
Provisional Agenda for the Meetings of the
Military Experts on MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meetings of
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/W
P.1
Selected Rules on MOTAPM and Anti-Personnel
Mines in Amended Protocol II to the CCW
ICRC
CCW/GGE/XI/WG.2/W
P.2*
Package Solution to the Issue of MOTAPM People’s
Republic of
China
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1 Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/
Rev.1 (English only)
Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to
provide a basis for further work
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1/
Rev.2
Revised Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the
purpose to provide a basis for further work – Set of
recommendations on Mines Other Than Anti-
Personnel Mines (MOTAPM)
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/2
Provisional Agenda for the Meetings of the
Military Experts on MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
Page 62
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/
WP.1
Proposal on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines (MOTAPM)
Cuba
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/
WP.1/Corr.1 (Español
solamente)
Propuesta sobre el tema de las minas diferentes a
las minas antipersonal (MDMA) - Corrección
Cuba
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/
WP.2
Comments on the paper prepared by the
Coordinator on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel
Mines (MOTAPM) for the 12th Meeting of
Governmental Experts to the CCW
ICRC
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/
WP.2/Corr.1
Comments on the paper prepared for the twelfth
session of the Group of Governmental Experts of
the States Parties to the CCW by the Coordinator
on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
(MOTAPM), as contained in
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.2/1, dated 17 October 2005
ICRC
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.1
Impact of the detectability of mines other than anti-
personnel mines (MOTAPM) on their military
effectiveness
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.2
Practical experience in the Russian Federation in
the detection and deactivation of improvised
explosive devices
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.3
Promising technologies for the detection of
explosive objects
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.4
Anti-vehicle mines Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.5
Principal approaches to the development of
methods for checking the reliability of anti-
personnel mine self-destruction mechanisms and
self-deactivation devices
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.6
Mapping, fencing and marking of minefields:
practice in the Russian Federation
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.2/
WP.7
Current restrictions on the use of anti-personnel
mines
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1
/Rev.1
Set of provisions on the use of MOTAPM/AVM -
A compilation of provisions that could command
consensus in the group of governmental expert
(GGE)
Revised
proposal by the
Coordinator
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/
WP.1
Comments on the set of provisions on the use of
MOTAPM/AVM. A compilation of provisions that
could command consensus in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE), contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1 and Corr.1
European Union
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/ Proposal on Anti-Vehicle Mines (AVM) Pakistan
Page 63
WP.2
Page 64
Annex III
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE ON THE ISSUE OF
COMPLIANCE
Mandate
1. Paragraph 32 of the Report of the Meeting of the States Parties in 2005 (CCW/MSP/2005/2)
stipulates that “the President-designate shall undertake consultations during the intersessional
period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols,
taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the
States Parties.”
Friend of the President
2. The President-designate has requested Ambassador Markotić to continue his efforts in order
to achieve an agreement on the issue of Compliance as Friend of the Chair. The President-designate
thanks him for his agreement and his tireless efforts. With the consent of the States parties, the
President-designate is requesting him to continue this work until the Review Conference.
Status Report
3. On the basis of our consultations a revised document, “Proposal of amendment to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may
Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” was presented50
. It will
constitute the basis of the work for the Review Conference.
4. However, this document is not yet ready to be endorsed. To achieve a consensus the States
parties still need to resolve four pending issues:
• The question of the procedure on how to adopt the text: by a Decision or by an Amendment to
the Convention
• The content of paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of Part II of the proposal as contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1
Way forward
5. The President-designate and the Friend of the President consider that an agreement can be
reached on a Decision more easily than on an Amendment. Their advice is also that it will not be
possible to broaden the mandate of a the pool of experts provided for in Article 6, nor to restrict
further the possibility to transmit the report as provided in Article 9.
50
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.1
Page 65
6. Concerning Article 7, it would be advisable to explain in the appropriate form the concrete
manner in which the President-designate envisages the selection process of the members of the pool
of experts in consultation between the UNSG and the requesting State party.
7. In conclusion, it is the view of the President-designate that with a few last modifications, that
could be made to articles 6 to 10, the States Parties should be prepared to arrive at the Review
Conference, ready to take a final decision on the basis of the annexed text, and in particular on the
basis of the option of the Decision.
Page 66
APPENDIX
LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
ON THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE
Symbol
Title
Submitted by
CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/WP.8 Compliance Annex United States of America
CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.7 Working Paper Submitted
by South Africa. Additional
Articles on Consultations
and Compliance
South Africa
CCW/CONF.II/PC.3/WP.8 Working Paper Submitted
by Belgium on behalf of the
European Union on
Compliance
Belgium on behalf of the
European Union
CCW/GGE/II/WP.7 Working Paper on
Compliance. Compiled by
the Chairperson, GGE on
CCW
Chairperson-designate
CCW/GGE/III/WP.7 Compliance in the CCW
Context
Sweden
CCW/GGE/V/2 Compliance in the CCW
Context
Greece on behalf of the
European Union
CCW/GGE/VIII/2 Discussion Paper on
Compliance
Chairperson-designate
CCW/GGE/VIII/WP.1 CCW Framework
Convention: Additional
Articles on Consultations
and Compliance
South Africa
CCW/GGE/IX/WP.1 Ideas and Suggestions
regarding a Possible
Compliance Mechanism
under the Convention on
Certain Conventional
Weapons
European Union
CCW/GGE/X/3 Compliance Chairperson-designate
CCW/GGE/X/WP.1 Responses to Certain
Concerns regarding a
Possible Compliance
Mechanism under CCW.
Elaborative Memorandum
on CCW/GGE/IX/WP.1
European Union
Page 67
CCW/GGE/XI/2 Compliance Chairperson-designate
CCW/GGE/XII/3 Compliance Chairperson-designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/2 Amendment to the
Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.2 Alternative Approach to
Promoting Compliance with
the Convention and its
Annexed Protocols
United States of America
CCW/GGE/XV/2 Proposal of Amendment to
the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or
to have Indiscriminate
Effects
President-designate
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Rev.2 Proposal of Amendment to
the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or
to have Indiscriminate
Effects
President-designate
Page 68
Annex IV
PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME OF WORK OF MAIN COMMITTEE I
OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
DATE AGENDA
ITEM
TITLE
1 Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson Thursday,
9 November
2006
10 a.m. - 1 p.m. 2 Review of the scope and operation of the Convention and
its annexed Protocols. General statements regarding new
proposals
Friday,
10 November
2006
10 a.m. - 1 p.m.
3 Consideration of possible options to promote
compliance with the Convention and its annexed
Protocols51
4 Consideration of the scope and operation of the
Convention and its annexed Protocols:
4 (a) Plan of Action on the universalization of the Convention
and its annexed Protocols;
Tuesday,
14 November
2006
10 a.m.-1 p.m.
4 (b) Establishment of a Sponsorship programme under the
Convention.
5 Consideration of Laser Systems
6 Consideration of procedural matters and follow-up
7 Any other matters
Wednesday,
15 November
2006
10 a.m.-1 p.m.
8 Conclusions
51
In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 32 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006.
Page 69
Annex V
PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME OF WORK OF MAIN COMMITTEE II
OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
DATE AGENDA
ITEM
TITLE
1 Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson Thursday,
9 November
2006
3 p.m. - 6 p.m.
2 General statements regarding new proposals
Friday,
10 November
2006
3 p.m. - 6 p.m.
3 Consideration of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines52
.
Tuesday,
14 November
2006
3 p.m. - 6 p.m.
4 Consideration of Explosive Remnants of War53
.
5 Consideration of […]
6 Consideration of procedural matters and follow-up
7 Any other matters
Wednesday,
15 November
2006
3 p.m. - 6 p.m.
8 Conclusions
52
In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 31 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006. 53
In accordance with the mandate as contained in paragraph 30 of CCW/MSP/2005/2 dated 14 February 2006.
Page 70
Annex VI
DRAFT DECLARATION
ON THE OCCASION OF ENTRY INTO FORCE
OF CCW PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (PROTOCOL V)
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY
BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE
EFFECTS (CCW),
Recalling the general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of
hostilities,
Deeply concerned at the fact that after the end of hostilities, people continue to be killed or
injured by unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance, and that such explosive remnants of
war can remain for decades a cause of humanitarian suffering, a daily threat to civilians and
military alike, an obstacle to the return of refugees and other displaced persons, a serious
impediment to humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, post-conflict reconstruction and
economic development, as well as to the restoration of normal social conditions,
Recalling that the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) was negotiated by the
CCW Group of Governmental Experts in 2003 and was adopted by consensus on 28 November
2003 at the Meeting of the States parties to the CCW held in Geneva on 27 and 28 November
2003,
Recognizing that Protocol V provides for post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in
order to minimize the risks and the effects of explosive remnants of war and for encouraging
States Parties to take such post-conflict remedial measures and generic preventive measures
aimed at minimizing the occurrence of explosive remnants of war,
Emphasizing the importance that they attach to the universalization of Protocol V, and
expressing their determination to take all appropriate measures so that Protocol V attains
universal adherence,
Welcome the entry into force of Protocol V on 12 November 2006 and the fact that, […] States
have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Protocol V by that date,
Reaffirm their conviction that Protocol V aims to significantly reduce the suffering and
contribute to the protection of civilian population and humanitarian personnel from the effects of
explosive remnants of war,
Page 71
Reiterate their determination to address the humanitarian, developmental and environmental
impact of explosive remnants of war, including existing explosive remnants of war, and
welcome the efforts already undertaken in this regard,
Emphasize their determination to reinforce international cooperation and assistance on the issues
related to the implementation of Protocol V, and in particular in clearance, removal or
destruction of explosive remnants of war, transmission of information, protection of
humanitarian missions and organizations, risk education, victims assistance, and to dedicate
greater efforts and resources, as appropriate, towards that end,
Encourage High Contracting Parties to Protocol V in accordance with Article 10 of the Protocol
to commence preparations for a Conference,
Urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol, as soon as possible.
Page 72
Annex VII
DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT
OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
PART I
REPORT OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE
I. Introduction
II. Organization of the Third Review Conference
III. Work of the Third Review Conference
[TO BE COMPLETED]
PART II
FINAL DECLARATION
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE
DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS,
WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 7 TO 17 NOVEMBER 2006, TO REVIEW THE SCOPE AND
OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AND THE PROTOCOLS ANNEXED THERETO AND
TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS OF THE CONVENTION OR OF THE
EXISTING PROTOCOLS, AS WELL AS PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
RELATING TO OTHER CATEGORIES OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOT COVERED BY
THE EXISTING ANNEXED PROTOCOLS
Preambular paragraph 1. Recalling the precedent Declarations adopted by the First Review
Conference in 1996 and the Second Review Conference in 2001, in particular preambular
paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 14, as well as operative paragraphs 2, 3, 8, 12, 14 and 16 of the Final
Declaration of the Second Review Conference.
Preambular paragraph 2. Reaffirming their conviction that the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is significantly reducing the suffering of
civilians and combatants, [CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph 1, modified]
Page 73
Preambular paragraph 3. Recognising that most major armed conflicts are non-international in
character, and that such conflicts are also being brought within the scope of the Convention by
amendment, [CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph.4, modified]
Preambular paragraph 4. Emphasizing the importance of achieving universal adherence to the
Convention and their determination to call upon all States that have not done so to become parties to
the Convention and its annexed Protocols as soon as possible, [CCW/CONF.I/16, preambular
paragraph 3, CCW/CONF.II/2, preambular paragraph 2, modified]
Preambular paragraph 5. Welcoming the entry into force of the Amendment to Article 1 of the
Convention on 18 May 2004, by which the scope of application of the Convention was extended to
also cover conflicts of non-international character, [new]
Preambular paragraph 6. Emphasizing the importance of compliance with the provisions of the
Convention and its annexed Protocols by all State Parties, [new]
Preambular paragraph 7. Welcoming the entry into force of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants
of War (Protocol V) on 13 November 2006, [new]
Preambular paragraph 8. [MOTAPM]
Preambular paragraph 9. [ERW]
Preambular paragraph 10. Acknowledging the invaluable humanitarian efforts of non-
governmental organisations in mitigating the humanitarian impact of armed conflicts and welcoming
the expertise they have brought to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and to the
Review Conference itself, [CCW/CONF.I/16, preambular paragraph 17, CCW/CONF.II/2,
preambular paragraph 15, modified]
SOLEMNLY DECLARE:
Operative paragraph 1. Their commitment to respect and comply with the objectives and
provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party as an authoritative
international instrument governing the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed
to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, [CCW/CONF.I/16, operative
paragraph 1, CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 1]
Operative paragraph 2. Their commitment to the full implementation of, and compliance with,
the Convention and its annexed Protocols to which they are party, and to keep the provisions of the
Convention and its annexed Protocols under review in order to ensure their provisions remain
relevant to modern conflicts, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 6]
Operative paragraph 3. Their determination to consult and cooperate with each other in order to
facilitate the full implementation of the obligations contained in the Convention and its annexed
Page 74
Protocols to which they are party, thereby promoting compliance, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative
paragraph 7, modified]
Operative paragraph 4. [COMPLIANCE]
Operative paragraph 5. [SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMME]
Operative paragraph 6. Their satisfaction at the entry into force of the amendment to Article 1
of the Convention extending the application of the Convention and its annexed Protocols to armed
conflicts of a non-international character, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 4, modified]
Operative paragraph 7. Their desire that all States respect and ensure respect for the revised
scope of application of the Convention to the fullest extent possible, and their determination to
encourage all States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as appropriate,
to the amendment to Article 1 as soon as possible, [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 5,
modified]
Operative paragraph 8. Their determination to encourage all States to become parties, as soon as
possible, to the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996
(Amended Protocol II), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons (Protocol III), and the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and that all
States respect and ensure respect for the substantive provisions of these Protocols, [new]
Operative paragraph 9. Their satisfaction at the entry into force of the Protocol on Explosive
Remnants of War (Protocol V), as well as their determination to encourage all States to become
parties to Protocol V as soon as possible, and that all States respect and ensure respect for the
substantive provisions of Protocol V [new]
Operative paragraph 10. Their continuing commitment to address as a matter of urgency the
deleterious humanitarian effects of explosive remnants of war, through the effective and efficient
implementation of Protocol V and reinforced international cooperation aimed at minimizing the
risks and effects of unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance. [CCW/CONF.II/2, operative
paragraph 9, modified]
Operative paragraph 11. [MOTAPM]
Operative paragraph 12. [ERW]
Operative paragraph 13. Their continuing commitment to assist, to the extent feasible, impartial
humanitarian demining missions, operating with the consent of the host State and/or the relevant
States Parties to the conflict, in particular by providing all necessary information in their possession
covering the location of all known minefields, mined areas, mines, explosive remnants of war,
booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the mission is performing its functions,
[CCW/CONF.II/2, operative paragraph 13, modified]
Page 75
RECOGNISE that the important principles and provisions contained in this Final Declaration can
also serve as a basis for further strengthening the Convention and its annexed Protocols and express
their determination to implement them,
AND TAKE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:
Decision 1
DECIDE [ON ERW]
Decision 2
DECIDE [ON MOTAPM]
Decision 3
DECIDE [ON COMPLIANCE]
Decision 4
DECIDE to adopt a Plan of Action to Promote Universality of the Convention, as contained in Part III C of the
Final Document.
Decision 5
DECIDE [ON SPONSORSHIP]
Decision 6
DECIDE [ON FURTHER WORK]
[TO BE COMPLETED]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REVIEW
Preambular paragraph 3
The Conference recalls the obligation to determine in the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means and method of warfare, whether its employment would, in some
or all circumstances, be prohibited under any rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Parties. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of preambular paragraph 3]
Page 76
Preambular paragraph 8
The Conference reaffirms the need to continue, as appropriate, the codification and progressive
development of the rules of international law applicable to certain conventional weapons which may
be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,
review of preambular paragraph 8]
Preambular paragraph 10
The Conference underlines the need to achieve wider adherence to the Convention and its annexed
Protocols. The Conference welcomes recent ratifications and accessions to the Convention and its
annexed Protocols and urges the High Contracting Parties to accord high priority to their diplomatic
efforts to encourage further adherence with a view to achieving universal adherence as soon as
possible. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of preambular paragraph 10]
Article 1
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 1, as amended on 21 December 2001.
The Conference calls upon States which have not yet done so to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as
appropriate, to the amendment to Article 1. [new]
Article 2
The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be
interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by
international humanitarian law. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.2]
Article 3
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 3. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of
Art.3]
Article 4
The Conference notes that [100] States have ratified, accepted, acceded or succeeded to the
Convention.
The Conference calls upon States which are not parties to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve
or accede, as appropriate, to the Convention, thus contributing to the achievement of universal
adherence to the Convention.
Page 77
The Conference invites the High Contracting Parties to encourage further accessions to the
Convention and its annexed Protocols.
The Conference, in this context, welcomes the adoption of the Plan of Action to Promote
Universality of the Convention. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.4, modified
and updated]
Article 5
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 5.
The Conference recalls in particular the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article which stipulates
that each of the Protocols annexed to the Convention shall enter into force six months after the date
by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it. The Conference welcomes the
entry into force on 13 November 2006 of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V).
[CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.5, modified]
Article 6
The Conference encourages international cooperation in the field of dissemination of the
Convention and its annexed Protocols and recognizes the importance of multilateral collaboration
relating to instruction, the exchange of experience at all levels, the exchange of instructors and the
organization of joint seminars. The Conference underlines the importance of the High Contracting
Parties’ obligation to disseminate this Convention and its annexed Protocols, and, in particular to
include the content in their programmes of military instruction at all levels.
[SPONSORSHIP]
The Conference welcomes the establishment of a web page of the Convention and its annexed
Protocols on the website of the United Nations and on the website of the Presidency and requests the
United Nations Secretary-General to continue to make all documents relating to the Convention,
available on the UN website. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.6, modified]
Article 7
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 7.
[COMPLIANCE]
Article 8
[MOTAPM]
Page 78
[FURTHER WORK]
The Conference decides, consistent with Article 8.3 (c) to convene a Meeting of the States Parties to
be held on […] in conjunction with the next Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended
Protocol II.
The States Parties recall their agreement reached by the Second Review Conference in 2001 in
reviewing Article 8 of the Convention.
Article 9
The Conference notes with satisfaction that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.
[CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.9]
Article 10
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 10. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2, review of
Art.10]
Article 11
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 11.
The Conference notes the corrections to the original text of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of
War (French, Russian and Spanish versions) and to the certified true copies effected by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary. [CCW/CONF.I/16,
CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Art.11, modified]
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I)
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,
review of Protocol I]
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Protocol
II]
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as
amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol
The Conference acknowledges that the High Contracting Parties strengthened Protocol II in a
number of areas at the First Review Conference.
Page 79
The Conference also notes with satisfaction that in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol
II, eight Annual Conferences of High Contracting Parties were held for the purpose of consultations
and cooperation on all issues related to Amended Protocol II.
The Conference recommends that future Annual Conferences of High Contracting Parties to
Amended Protocol II coincide with any meetings of High Contracting Parties to the Convention and
Conferences of High Contracting Parties to Protocol V.
The Conference takes note of the reporting obligations of High Contracting Parties under Amended
Protocol II, and calls on High Contracting Parties to fulfil these obligations in a timely, consistent
and complete manner.
The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the United
Nations; of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist war
victims; of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining as well as of NGOs in a
number of fields, in particular the care and rehabilitation of mine victims, implementation of
mine-awareness programmes and mine clearance. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Amended Protocol
II, updated and modified]
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.I/16, CCW/CONF.II/2,
review of Protocol III]
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol. [CCW/CONF.II/2, review of Protocol
IV]
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) and Technical Annex to the Protocol
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol and welcomes with satisfaction its entry
into force.
The Conference encourages the High Contracting Parties to make all best endeavours to comply
with suggested best practices, as specified in the Technical Annex, for achieving the objectives
contained in Articles 4, 5 and 9 of the Protocol.
The Conference looks forward to the Conference of High Contracting Parties which will be
convened pursuant to Article 10 of the Protocol on [TO BE COMPLETED]
The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and bodies of the
United Nations; of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist
Page 80
war victims, of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining as well as of NGOs in a
number of fields, in particular care and rehabilitation of explosive remnants of war victims, risk
education, and clearance, removal or destruction of unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive
ordnance. [new]
PART III
A. [MOTAPM]
[TO BE COMPLETED]
B. [ERW]
[TO BE COMPLETED]
C. [COMPLIANCE]
[TO BE COMPLETED]
D. PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CONVENTION
1. The High Contracting Parties should:
Action # 1: Review thoroughly their participation in the Convention and its annexed Protocols
with the view to consider acceptance, at their earliest convenience, of those Protocols
and of the Amendment of Article 1 of the Convention, which they have not yet
ratified or otherwise acceded to.
Action # 2: Accord particular importance to encouraging the States signatories of the Convention,
to ratify it as soon as possible. These include: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iceland, Nigeria,
Sudan and Viet Nam.
Action # 3: Strengthen their efforts in promoting the universality of the Convention and its
annexed Protocols, by actively pursuing this objective, as appropriate, in their
contacts with States not parties, and seeking the cooperation of relevant international
and regional organisations.
Action # 4: Accord priority attention to encouraging adherence to the Convention and its annexed
Protocols by States in regions of conflict which could serve as a significant
confidence-building measure thus promoting reestablishment of understanding and
trust among Parties to an active conflict.
Action # 5: Direct specific efforts towards promoting adherence to the Convention and its
annexed Protocols in regions where the level of acceptance of the Convention
remains low.
Page 81
Action # 6: Undertake all appropriate steps to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention
and its annexed Protocols, by persons or on territory under their jurisdiction or
control.
Action # 7: Encourage and support involvement and active cooperation in these universalization
efforts by all relevant partners, including the United Nations, other international
institutions and regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and interested citizens.
2. For achieving the above actions the High Contracting Parties should undertake all
appropriate measures which should include, inter alia:
(i) seizing the opportunity of bilateral contacts and making use of diplomatic channels
available to promote adherence to the Convention and its annexed Protocols;
(ii) enhancing the knowledge of the Convention and its annexed Protocols through the
organization of workshops and regional and sub-regional seminars and workshops,
measures to increase awareness of the Convention and its Protocols, including
publications in UN official languages, as well as measures to reach the appropriate
audience in States not parties, and in cooperation with all relevant actors, be it
governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental;
(iii) coordinating regional actions in accordance with the characteristics of each region,
mostly in those where acceptance of the Convention remains low. UN regional centres
for peace and disarmament, as well as regional organizations as appropriate, may play
an important role in this regard;
(iv) review this issue during meetings of the High Contracting Parties of the Convention.
3. The Secretariat shall report on the implementation of this Plan of Action, and keep the High
Contracting Parties regularly informed, so that they may review progress and monitor its
implementation effectively.
4. The implementation of this Plan of Action will be reviewed by the next Review Conference
which will take any decisions deemed necessary.
E. [SPONSORSHIP]
[TO BE COMPLETED]
Page 82
PART IV
DOCUMENTS
A. Agenda
[TO BE COMPLETED]
B. Programme of Work
[TO BE COMPLETED]
C. Agenda of Main Committee I
[TO BE COMPLETED]
D. Report of Main Committee I
[TO BE COMPLETED]
E. Agenda of Main Committee II
[TO BE COMPLETED]
F. Report of Main Committee II
[TO BE COMPLETED]
G. Report of the Credentials Committee
[TO BE COMPLETED]
H. [TO BE COMPLETED]
Annex I
List of Documents
[TO BE COMPLETED]
Page 83
Annex VIII
DRAFT DECISION
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMME UNDER THE
CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (CCW)
The Conference of States Parties:
1. Decides to establish a sponsorship programme under/within the framework of the Convention
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to
be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW);
2. Agrees on the following general principles:
(i) contributions to the programme will be made on a voluntary basis;
(ii) this programme will be conducted in an informal and flexible way with full respect to the
specific ad hoc nature of the CCW forum;
3. Sets the following basic goals to the Sponsorship programme:
(i) to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols;
(ii) to promote universal observance of the norms and principles enshrined in the Convention
and its annexed Protocols;
(iii) to support the universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols;
(iv) to enhance the cooperation, the exchange of information and the consultations among the
States Parties on issues related to the Convention and its annexed Protocols;
4. Sets the following basic operational purposes to the Sponsorship programme:
(i) to support the participation of the representatives of States Parties, especially from ERW-
and mine-affected States that have limited resources, to participate in the CCW activities.
Priority should be given to States Parties which, according to the United Nations, have
the world's least developed economies;
(ii) to provide Signatory States and States not yet parties to the Convention and its Protocols
with an opportunity to participate in the CCW activities and to acquire an acquaintance
with the work related to the Convention. Preference should be given to States which,
according to the United Nations, have the least developed economies, States which are
on the path towards accession to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and States
which are engaged in activities related to their own implementation of the Convention
and its Protocols;
Page 84
(iii) to support the attendance of appropriate qualified experts with field experience or of
scholars, particularly from the States referred to in paragraph 4(i), to prepare studies
and/or presentations on certain topics of interest at relevant meetings or seminars;
(iv) to provide other related forms of assistance, that might be deemed appropriate by the
States Parties;
5. Decides that the Sponsorship programme will operate according to the following basic
operational modalities:
(i) States Parties entrust the technical management of the programme to the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining;
(ii) An informal Steering Committee (hereinafter “the committee”) will set operational
modalities which have not been specified in this decision and ensure the guidance of the
day-to-day implementation of the CCW Sponsorship programme; it will be constituted
by representatives of donor States to this programme and the UNDDA;
(iii) The Committee will operate in a transparent way; for this purpose, representatives of the
three Regional Groups, and China, the President-designate of the CCW and
representatives of UNMAS will be invited to participate to its meetings as observers and
advisors. It is understood that every State Party could ask to be heard by the Committee.
(iv) The Committee will take all decisions related to the operation of the Sponsorship
programme, including the granting of travel and daily subsistence allowances for
participation in the CCW activities or to other expenditures, in accordance with the basic
goals and the operational purposes of the programme as spelt out above;
(v) The Committee will report annually on its activities, including on the beneficiaries of the
programme, to the CCW States Parties. The programme will be reviewed and assessed
by States Parties at the next Review Conference, as well as the modus operandi of the
programme;
(vi) The funds allocated to the Sponsorship programme will be subject to an audit by an
external auditor and audit reports will be sent to all members of the Committee, and
made available upon request to any State Party by the United Nations.
Page 85
Annex IX
[English Only]
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
THIRTEENTH SESSION, 6 – 10 MARCH 2006
Symbol Title Submitted by
CCW/GGE/XIII/1
Provisional Agenda President-
designate
CCW/GGE/ XIII/2
Provisional Programme of Work President-
designate
CCW/GGE/ XIII/3 Provisional Agenda of the Third Review
Conference
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/ XIII/4 Draft Rules of Procedure of Third Review
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/ XIII/5 Universalization of the CCW and its Annexed
Protocols
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/ XIII/6 Sponsorship Programme under the Convention
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/
XIII/WP.1
Food for thought paper. Ensuring a thorough
review of the status and operation of the CCW and
its Protocols at the Third Review Conference
International
Committee of
the Red Cross
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on
ERW
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.1
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Italy
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.2
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Czech Republic
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.3
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.4
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
South Africa
Page 86
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.5
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Mexico
CCW/GGE/XIII/
WG.1/WP.6
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
Portugal
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.7
Assessment of the relative risk of categories of
explosive ordnances becoming Explosive
Remnants of War: Methodology
United
Kingdom of
Great Britain
and Northern
Ireland
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.8
Draft Table of Conventional Ammunition Types
and Systems
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on
ERW
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.9
(Original: Chinese)
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and
ERW, dated 8 March 2005
People’s
Republic of
China
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.10
German Understanding of Cluster Munitions Germany
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.11
Cluster Weapons-A Real Humanitarian Threat, or
An Imaginary One?
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.12
Report on States Parties’ Responses to the
Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law
& Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.12/Corr.1
(English Only)
Report on States Parties’ Responses to the
Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law
& Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005
Corrigendum
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.12/Corr.2
(Chinese, English and
Spanish Only)
Report on States Parties’ Responses to the
Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law
& Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005
- Corrigendum
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG. Report on States Parties’ Responses to the Asia Pacific
Page 87
1/WP.12/Add.1 Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law
& Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005 -
Addendum
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.12/Add.2
Report on States Parties’ Responses to the
Questionnaire on International Humanitarian Law
& Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March 2005 -
Addendum
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.13
A Critical Analysis on the “Report on States
Parties’ Responses to the Questionnaire” on
International Humanitarian Law and Explosive
Remnants of War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2,
Dated 8 March 2005, Prepared by the Asia Pacific
Centre for Military Law, University of
Melbourne, Australia and Presented at the Request
of the Coordinator on ERW as Document
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 and Addenda
Geneva
International
Centre for
Humanitarian
Demining
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.14
Munitions - a method to reduce the risks
associated with explosive remnants of war
France
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.15
Comments on the “Report on States Parties’
Responses to the Questionnaire ”on International
Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants of
War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, Dated 8 March
2005, Prepared by the Asia Pacific Centre for
Military Law, University of Melbourne, Australia
and Presented at the Request of the Coordinator
on ERW as Document
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12 and Addenda
International
Committee of
the Red Cross
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
1/WP.16
Responses to the Survey on the Humanitarian
threat Posed by Munitions and Sub-Munitions that
Have Become ERW-Preliminary Assessment
Based on responses and Finding, Document
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.11, Dated 12
December 2005
Belarus
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meetings of the
Military Experts on MOTAPM
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military
Experts on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.1
Impact of the detectability of mines other than
anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) on their
military effectiveness
Russian
Federation
Page 88
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.2
Practical experience in the Russian Federation in
the detection and deactivation of improvised
explosive devices
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.3
Promising technologies for the detection of
explosive objects
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.4
Anti-vehicle mines Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.5
Principal approaches to the development of
methods for checking the reliability of anti-
personnel mine self-destruction mechanisms and
self-deactivation devices
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.6
Mapping, fencing and marking of minefields:
practice in the Russian Federation
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.
2/WP.7
Current restrictions on the use of anti-personnel
mines
Russian
Federation
CCW/GGE/XIII/CRP.
1
Draft Procedural Report Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIII/INF.
1
(English/French/Spani
sh Only)
List of Participants Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIII/INF.
1/Add.1
(English/Spanish
Only)
List of Participants
Addendum
Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIII/MIS
C.1
(English/French/Spani
sh Only)
Provisional List of Participants Secretariat
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
FOURTEENTH SESSION, 19 - 23 JUNE 2006
Number Title Submitted by
CCW/GGE/XIV/1
Provisional Programme of Work
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/2 Amendment to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-
designate
Page 89
CCW/GGE/XIV/3 Sponsorship Programme under the
Convention. A Possible Operational
Way Forward
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/4 Proposal on a Plan of Action to Promote
Universality of the CCW
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/4/Re
v.1
Revised Proposal on a Plan of Action to
Promote Universality of the CCW
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XIV/5 Procedural Report Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.
1
Views on the CCW Sponsorship
Program
United States of
America
CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.
2
Alternative Approach to Promoting
Compliance with the Convention and its
Annexed Protocols
United States of
America
CCW/GGE/XIV/WP.
3
Preparing a Review of the CCW and its
Protocols
International
Committee of
the Red Cross
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of
the Military and Technical Experts on
ERW
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/1/Add.1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of
the Military and Technical Experts on
ERW – Addendum - Annotated
Provisional Agenda
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/1/Add.2
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of
the Military and Technical Experts on
ERW – Addendum - Draft Table of
Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/1/Add.2/Corr.1
(English and Russian
only)
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of
the Military and Technical Experts on
ERW – Addendum - Draft Table of
Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
- Corrigendum
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/WP.1
Remarks on documents
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12,
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.1 and
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.12/Add.2
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG Responses to document Hungary
Page 90
.1/WP.2 CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL
and ERW, dated 8 March 2005
CCW/GGE/XIV/WG
.1/WP.3
Technical Comments on Document
CCW/GGE/XIII/WG.1/WP.8
Argentina
CCW/GGE//XIV/WG.
1/WP.4
Preliminary Thoughts on a Possible
Approach to Recommendation 3
Asia Pacific
Centre for
Military Law,
University of
Melbourne,
Australia
CCW/GGE/XIV/CRP
.1
Draft Procedural Report Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIV/MIS
C.1
(English/French/Span
ish Only)
Provisional List of Participants Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XIV/INF.
1
(English/French/Span
ish Only)
List of Participants Secretariat
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
FIFTEENTH SESSION 28 August-6 September 2006
Symbol Title Submitted by
CCW/GGE/XV/1 Provisional Programme of Work President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/1/Re
v.1
Revised Provisional Programme of Work President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/2 Proposal of amendment to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may Be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Re
v.1
Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/2/Re
v.3
Revised Draft Proposal on Compliance President-
designate
Page 91
CCW/GGE/XV/3 Proposal for a Draft decision on the establishment
of a sponsorship programme under the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which
may Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/3/Re
v.1
Revised draft decision on the establishment of a
sponsorship programme under the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may Be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
President-
designate
CCW/GGE/XV/4 Provisional programme of work of the Main
Committee I of the Third Review Conference of
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-
Designate
CCW/GGE/XV/5 Provisional programme of work of the Main
Committee II of the Third Review Conference of
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects
President-
Designate
CCW/GGE/XV/6 Procedural Report Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XV/WP.
1
Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-
Binding Instrument that Addresses the
Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster
Munitions
Austria, Holy
See, Ireland,
Mexico, New
Zealand, Sweden
CCW/GGE/XV/WP.
2
Proposal for a Mandate to Study Laser Systems
Germany and
Sweden
CCW/GGE/XV/WP.
3
Proposal for a Mandate on Explosive Remnants
of War (ERW)
European Union
CCW/GGE/XV/L.1 Draft Declaration on the occasion of the entry
into force of CCW Protocol V on Explosive
Remnants of War
President-
Designate
CCW/GGE/XV/L.2 Draft Final Document of the Third Review
Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects
President-
Designate
Page 92
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/1/Add.1
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW –
Annotated Provisional Agenda
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/1/Add.2
Provisional Agenda for the Meeting of the
Military and Technical Experts on ERW – Draft
Table of Explosive Ordnance Types and Systems
Chairperson of
the Meeting of
the Military and
Technical
Experts on ERW
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/WP.1
Responses to document
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled International
Humanitarian Law and ERW, dated 8 March
2005
Spain
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/WP.2
The United Nations and the Implementation of
Protocol V
United Nations
Mine Action
Service
(UNMAS) on
behalf of the
IACG-MA
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
1/WP.3
Initiative on a common understanding of cluster
munitions within the Military Experts Group of
the CCW
Germany
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
2/1
Set of provisions on the use of MOTAPM/AVM -
A compilation of provisions that could command
consensus in the group of governmental expert
(GGE)
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
2/1/Rev.1
Set of provisions on the use of MOTAPM/AVM -
A compilation of provisions that could command
consensus in the group of governmental expert
(GGE)
Coordinator on
MOTAPM
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
2/WP.1
Comments on the set of provisions on the use of
MOTAPM/AVM. A compilation of provisions
that could command consensus in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE), contained in
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1 and Corr.1
European Union
Page 93
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.
2/WP.2
Proposal on Ant-Vehicle Mines (AVM) Pakistan
CCW/GGE/XV/MIS
C.1
Provisional List of Participants
Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XV/INF.
1
List of Participants
Secretariat
CCW/GGE/XV/CRP
.1
Draft Procedural Report Secretariat
The above documents are available in all official languages through the Official Document System
of the United Nations at http://documents.un.org and the official website of the CCW as part of the
website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/.
_____