Drugs, Guns and Rebellion: A Comparative Analysisof the Arms Procurement of Insurgent Groupsin Colombia and Myanmar

Michael Jonsson & Elliot Brennan

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract Several insurgent groups have financed their arms procurement through drugtrafficking, explaining in part the long duration of conflicts in drug producing countries.Incomes generated from this trade do not however automatically translate into improvedmilitary capabilities, since access to military-grade weapons typically requires tacit or activestate support. Hence, two groups with similar types of funding can still have access to verydifferent types of armaments, impacting their operational capability. This paper compares thearms procurement of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and theUnited Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar. Both insurgent groups have procured armsthrough networks and with finances from the drug trade. The UWSA's 20,000-strong force andsignificant armaments, including Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) believed tobe provided by China, is largely supported by these illicit activities and the networks theyprovide. FARC has ample access to small arms, the acquisition of which has been financed bytaxation of the drug trade. In spite of significant incomes, FARC however until very recentlylacked access to MANPADS, a fact which has significantly hampered its ability to withstandthe Colombian counterinsurgency campaign, specifically targeted aerial assaults. The explor-atory comparisons drawn in this paper offer insights into how insurgent groups can pass acrucial threshold of arms procurement, funded by illicit activities, that renders their dissolutionfar more difficult, while also highlighting the continued importance of state support inexplaining rebel group resilience.

Keywords Armsprocurement .Civilwar.Colombia .Drugtrafficking.MANPADS.Myanmar.

Political economy. Rebellion

Eur J Crim Policy ResDOI 10.1007/s10610-013-9228-0

M. Jonsson (*)Department of Government, Uppsala University, Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Swedene-mail: michael.jonsson@statsvet.uu.se

E. BrennanInstitute for Security and Development Policy, Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Nacka, Swedene-mail: ebrennan@isdp.eu

Introduction

During the past decade, an extensive literature has accumulated arguing that extensivefinancing of rebel groups results in more long-duration, high-intensity civil wars (Fearon2004; Ross 2004). Extensive funding removes many of the constraints that rebel groups face,including financing training, arms procurement, propaganda, recruitment and possibly payingwages to recruits (Dishman 2005). More controversially, several scholars have also argued thatrebel groups which acquire funding through organized crime tend to become more motivatedby personal financial gains than public ideological aims (Makarenko 2004). In this regard,financing through drug-trafficking is seen as particularly likely to change motives inside armedgroups (Cornell 2007) and units that specialize in financing and arms procurement are believedto be particularly likely to become corrupted (Shapiro 2007). Cornell summarizes the domi-nant view in the literature succinctly:

Where narcotics are present, armed conflict is likely to fundamentally alter the dynamicsof their production—and to be fundamentally altered by it. Narcotics production almostinvariably comes to involve and bolster insurgent groups in protracted conflicts, helpingto extend their capabilities and compounding the challenge they pose to states.1

These arguments are internally coherent and find some support in cross-country compar-ative studies.2 However, they also rest on several assumptions regarding micro-level causalmechanisms, which to date have been insufficiently explored. One of the most fundamentalassumptions is that increased funding easily translates into improved military capacity.However, as the article illustrates, this is not necessarily the case. Income generated throughdrug-trafficking allows an insurgent group to expand its fighting force, but when confronting awell-trained and well-equipped regular army, strength in numbers is not sufficient. In order toeffectively compete militarily with states, insurgents also need access to high-tech arms,especially man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which typically requires activestate support. Hence, two groups with similar types of funding can have access to differenttypes of armaments, impacting their operational capacity.

To preliminarily explore this theoretical argument, this paper compares the arms procure-ment of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the United Wa StateArmy (UWSA) in Myanmar.3 FARC and UWSA are both party to two of the most intractableconflicts of the modern era and have procured arms through networks and with finances fromthe drug trade, of which both groups control large shares in their respective regions. Whileevery insurgency is to some extent sui generis, FARC and UWSA represent two of the clearestexamples of rebel groups that are well-financed and long-lived, which makes them theoreti-cally relevant for this study. That is, if extensive financing easily translates into access to high-tech weaponry and improved operational capacity, then we would expect both of theseorganizations to have ample access to such armaments, especially since they have had decadesto develop channels for weapons procurement. The evidence however suggests that this wasnot the case – UWSA has had greater access to MANPADS, as a result of state support. Whileno universal generalizations should be drawn on the basis of two cases, case-selection heresuggests that other, less well-financed and long-lived insurgencies would seem even less likelyto independently acquire high-tech weaponry.

1 Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict,” 222.2 Ross, “What do we know about natural resources and civil war?” 337–340.3 Myanmar is the official name, since 1989, of the country formerly known as Burma.

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

The UWSA's 20,000-strong force4 and significant armaments, including MANPADSbelieved to be provided by China (Black and Davis 2008) and possibly also from Russia(US Department of State 2009a), is the region’s most potent non-state actor and is largelysupported by these illicit activities and the networks they provide. FARC has ample access tosmall arms, the acquisition of which has been financed by the taxation of the drug trade(Cragin and Hoffman 2003; Central Intelligence Agency 2001). In spite of significant incomes,FARC however until very recently lacked access to MANPADS and other types of military-grade weapons, a fact which has significantly hampered its ability to withstand the Colombiancounterinsurgency campaign (US Department of State 2010a; Stone 2012). Over the pastdecade, targeted aerial assaults have wreaked havoc on the organization, killing three of itssenior commanders, large numbers of mid-level commanders and countless foot-soldiers.Partly as a consequence of these military set-backs, FARC’s fighting force has shrunk froman estimated 30,000 to 9000 over the past decade (Semana 2012). Hence, while not contestingthe role of drug-trafficking in funding rebel groups, the article argues that the connectionbetween extensive financing and military capability is not a simple one-to-one equation.Instead, armed groups with access to active or passive state support, and specifically supportthat facilitates access to military grade-weaponry, will be disproportionately strengthened,whereas even well-funded insurgents without such access will remain weaker militarily.

The article initially summarizes existing research in this field, arguing that whereas rebel’sacquisition of financing has been explored in detail, the process through which such resourcesare translated into military hardware and operational capacity has not. This is followed by acomparative analysis of the involvement in drug trafficking, arms procurement methods andthe resulting impact on the military capacity of the FARC and UWSA, respectively. Thisanalysis builds on extensive interviews with Colombian intelligence officials and FARC ex-combatants,5 in combination with unorthodox sources such as intra-insurgent correspondenceand reporting from US Embassies. The interviews were in-depth, semi-structured and includeda discussion of the specific function (drug-trafficking, propaganda, combat, arms procurement,etc.) of the front to which the respondent had previously belonged. As two of the fronts studiedin-depth – the 16th and 48th fronts – specialized in drug trafficking and arms procurement,these fronts are used as illustrative examples in this study. While analyzing the arms procure-ment of active insurgent groups is an extraordinarily difficult undertaking, the evidenceprovides an empirical basis for judging the plausibility of the claim. It should however beemphasized that this article provides a preliminary exploration of the theoretical argument, notany conclusive hypothesis testing. The article concludes by highlighting that even though statefinancing of armed groups has declined following the end of the Cold War, state support canstill fundamentally impact the military resilience of insurgencies by providing access totactically vital weaponry.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

Over the past decade, research on the political economy of civil wars has advanced signifi-cantly. In standard accounts, it is argued that the end of the Cold War led to a steep decline in

4 The figure is widely accepted, although various estimates range between 15,000 and 30,000. See MaungMaung Than (2013).5 One of the authors conducted in total 82 interviews with FARC ex-combatants and a handful of Colombian policeandmilitary intelligence analysts, but the analysis here draws only on excerpts of direct relevance for this article. Allnames of the FARC ex-combatants cited have been changed to protect the anonymity of the respondents.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

state support of insurgent groups (Giraldo and Trinkunas 2007). This has prompted insurgentgroups to develop new sources of income, including diaspora support (Cochrane et al. 2009),domestic violent crime such as robberies, extortion and kidnappings (Jonsson and Cornell2007), but also transnational, demand-driven organized criminality (Roth and Sever 2007). Inthis field, involvement in drug-trafficking is seen as particularly important, since narcotic drugsoffer a high value-to-bulk ratio, are easily transported, difficult to interdict and rely on stableend-user demand, resulting in large profits. Hence, taxation of or direct involvement in drugtrafficking may impact the legitimacy of an insurgent group, but also provides a renewable andsignificant source of income that tends to disproportionately benefit insurgents.6 This in partexplains why civil wars where insurgents are financed through “contraband” (including drug-trafficking) last on average four to eight times longer than other conflicts.7 A substantialliterature has explored whether insurgent involvement in drug trafficking causes originallypolitically motivated insurgents to become more motivated by financial gains over time(Jonsson 2013). Different mechanisms have been proposed for how this motivational shiftoccurs – insurgent groups with “economic endowments” may offer wages and attract “oppor-tunistic joiners” (Weinstein 2007), involvement in organized crime may lead to imitation byand socialization of the entire group8 or financing units which are particularly exposed toprincipal-agent problems may become corrupted.9

By contrast, the conversion of incomes into operational capability, or specifically how drugincomes are used for procurement of military-grade weaponry, has received limited attention.Often, articles in this field offer extensive lists of the advantages that follows from extensivefunding, including ease of travel, propaganda, training, providing food and other logisticalnecessities, potentially paying wages and facilitating arms procurement (Sanderson 2004).Few articles to date have explored the mechanics by which insurgent groups obtain arms, andspecifically tactically crucial weapons such as MANPADS, which are disproportionatelyimportant for insurgent groups seeking to counter aerial operations. Recent conflicts howeverhighlight that whereas small arms are widely available in these regions, military-gradeweaponry may not be. Specifically, in order to seriously challenge a state in the battle-field(as opposed to merely surviving by evading extended confrontations) insurgent groups needaccess to weapons that primarily other states can offer. This is illustrated by, for instance,persistent calls by Syrian rebels to be provided access to MANPADS (Borger 2012) or thedevastating impact that weaponry allegedly provided by Iran has had on American troops inAfghanistan and Iraq (Solomon 2011). Whereas there is a limited black market for MANPADSand other military-grade weaponry, accessing the quantities and models necessary to contin-uously confront a well-trained and well-equipped regular army typically requires access to anactive state sponsor. Hence, whereas armed groups may have become increasingly self-financed, insurgents’ military capacity still hinges in part on state sponsorship.

Reluctant Dealers - FARC and UWSA Involvement in Drug Trafficking

FARC and UWSA represent two of the oldest, currently active armed groups in the world.Both organizations have extensive fighting forces and their longevity is often attributed toincomes from the drug trade. In spite of their similarities, these organizations however differ

6 Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict,” 220–222.7 Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?,” 280–285.8 Makarenko, “The Crime Terror Continuum” 130–134.9 Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies” 60–65.

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

significantly in terms of their access to state sponsorship and, as a result, access to military-grade weaponry. While most analysts date the founding of FARC to 1964, the guerilla itselftrace its roots back to a self-defense militia founded by Pedro Marin – better known under hisnom de guerre Manuel Marulanda - during La Violencia, a civil war between 1948–1958 inColombia. In 1964, the group survived a government offensive intended to re-establish statecontrol in southern Tolima, where the group had lived on after La Violencia ebbed about(Aguilera Peña 2010). During the 1960s and 1970s, FARC remained merely one amongst atleast seven small- to medium-sized left wing rebel groups in Colombia. Meanwhile, the groupgrew organically, spreading southeast from Tolima into Huila, Caquetá, Magdalena Medio andMeta, which to this day remain areas where the group finds some of its strongest support.10

While FARC has drawn inspiration from Soviet socialism and the Cuban revolution andbenefited from porous borders with Ecuador and Venezuela, it remains an eminentlyColombian organization. During its first four decades of existence, FARC did not receivesignificant state sponsorship, as opposed to for instance the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional(ELN) which has close ties to Cuba (Smith Lockhart and Inkster 2011). Instead, FARC laiddown deep roots among the rural poor in its historical areas of presence, often providingrudimentary education and healthcare as a way to shore up its popular legitimacy.

The origins of the United Wa State Army grew from similar “left-wing” roots, emergingfrom the vestiges of Myanmar’s communist party. Following the independence of the countryfrom the British Empire in 1948, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) won support in theShan region of eastern Myanmar. The CPB, a Maoist-inspired and Beijing-supported move-ment, had battled the military Junta for decades and kept pressure on the Kuomintang (KMT)along China’s southern border. The bond between the Communist Party of Burma and thePeople’s Republic of China strengthened such that in 1967 a “Cultural Revolution,” almostidentical to that in China, took place in CPB-controlled regions of Myanmar. The CPBcollapsed in 1989, spurred largely by internal debate over the ethnic make-up of the party’sleadership. Its demise led to the emergence of the UWSA (Cline 2009). Wa relations withChina continued after the UWSA took control from the CPB and the group signed a ceasefirewith the Myanmar armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, in 1989. In the absence of anindigenous written language for administrative purposes, written Chinese was adopted in theregion and is used almost exclusively today, even in some official correspondence withNaypyidaw. Cross-border trade ballooned along the Sino-Myanmar border between CPBmembers and their Chinese counterparts. Entrepreneurs on the border areas between Yunnanand ethnic minority dominated areas in northeastern Myanmar capitalized on this relationship.Business and cultural ties quickly developed and have strengthened over the past two decades(Kudo 2010). Chinese Reminbi is today used in Wa state while Chinese syndicates,headquartered outside of Myanmar, control much of the distribution of its drug trade (Sarno2009). Drug smuggling and cross-border ties between Wa state and Yunnan province arestronger and trade is facilitated, in preference over that with Thailand for example, due tolinguistic and cultural similarities, as well as better roads and transport routes (Chin 2009).

Drug trafficking has clearly facilitated the expansion of both FARC and the UWSA,allowing them to both expand their fighting forces and sometimes create a competing statestructure in remote areas of Colombia and Myanmar, respectively. In 1982, FARC celebratedits seventh national conference, after which the group began to advance from the distant, ruralareas of Colombia toward medium-sized cities and economic centers (Arenas 1985).11

Recognizing that this strategy required extensive financing, FARC increased extortion and

10 Aguilera Peña, Las FARC, 54–55.11 Arenas was the ideological leader of the FARC until his death in 1990

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

became involved in the emerging drug-trade in Colombia, initially through taxes and ensuringthat coca farmers were paid fair prices, but over time becoming increasingly involved in allsteps of the trade (Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramón 2002). From interviews withdefectors and intelligence analysts, it is clear that FARC has mainly used incomes generatedfrom this trade to finance its military struggle and does not pay wages to members.12 Theinflux of funds and stronger military focus led to an exponential growth of FARC and itsmilitary capacity. From 1982 until 1999, the group grew from having some 2,000 members toan estimated 18,000 full-time members and 12,000 militia members (Chernick 2005). Incomesfrom the drug trade, kidnappings and extortion made FARC one of the wealthiest insurgentgroups in existence (McDermott 2005). Coca cultivation expanded exponentially in Colombiaduring 1982–2001, but during 2002–2010 the area under cultivation decreased by on averagehalf from its record of 163,000 hectares under cultivation in 2000 (United Nations Office onDrugs and Crime 2012). Whereas FARC’s control over the Colombian drug trade has oftenbeen exaggerated, the organization plays a central role in the trade especially in southernColombia, where it has maintained its strongest presence.

Drug production in the “Golden Triangle” region of Southeast Asia has been a cornerstoneof the region’s economy for more than half a century, and for centuries previous for trading andmedicinal purposes. Wa state, also known as Special Region No. 2, is a semi-autonomousregion in the official Shan state. Wa state is a relatively self-administered region, controlled bythe administrative capital Pangkham with a population of approximately 600,000 people.Backed by its sizeable and well-equipped army, it is an independent country in all but name(Pedersen 2008). Bao Youxiang (鲍有祥) the supreme leader and commander-in-chief ofUWSA, operates drug trafficking as a family business (Chin 2009) largely entrusting businessto his family members. The success of the drugs trade in Wa state has also supported the rise ofthe state’s southern leader, Wei Hsueh Kang (魏学刚). With his accumulated wealth he has builtschools and infrastructure and, in turn, constructed a strong and stable support base for hisleadership of the southern Wa region.13 Both Bao and Wei are listed as “drug kingpins” by theUS Department of Treasury.14 In May 2003, the UWSAwas listed by the US government as adrug kingpin entity.15

In recent years drug production has increased in Myanmar. After a significant decrease dueto an unsuccessful campaign for drug eradication in the country, opium production increasedfrom 21,600 hectares (ha) in 2006 to 51,000 ha in 2012 (UNODC 2012a). The country todayremains the second largest opium poppy grower in the world, after Afghanistan, holding 25percent of the global share.16 During the eradication attempt, there was a growth in productionof the easier-to-manufacture amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), known locally as ya ba.Most of the ATS produced in Myanmar originates from Shan state and Wa regions (UNODC2012b). After losing its most recent battle against drug production, the Myanmar governmentinstead extended its deadline to eradicate drug production in the country by five years, to 2019.According to one report, for the Myanmar government drug enforcement is less a concern thanstability.17 In fact, complicity between drug trafficking and government officials has beenwidely reported. Perhaps as a result, the UWSA have successfully, a spokesperson claims,

12 Author’s interviews with military intelligence analysts in Bogota, September 2012.13 Ibid., 141.14 US Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Links 11 Individuals, 16 Companies to Burma Drug Syndicate 03November 2005,” Press Room, November 3, 2005, JS-3009.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2013 INCSR: Country Reports –Afghanistan through Costa Rica,” March 1, 2013.

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

established over 20 “official” companies in Yangon with investments of an estimated twobillion USD in a variety of different sectors throughout the country (US Department of State2009a).

Black Markets and Allies in Green - FARC and UWSA Arms Procurement

The impact of drug-trafficking was clearly transformational for both FARC and UWSA as itprovided both the finances and bolstered networks which allowed for access to small arms andlight weapons. Whereas the procurement of small arms shows significant similarities betweenthe groups, there is one crucial difference. Despite many attempts, FARC was unsuccessful ingaining access to MANPADS until 2011 or 2012, suffering major set-backs on the battle-fieldas a consequence. The UWSA on the other hand, first gained access to such weaponry as earlyas 2000,18 providing the group with a crucial deterrence against incursions into territory itcontrols.

FARC is a hierarchical organization, with a top-down command structure and strictmonitoring of its combatants, funds generated and weapons acquired. Whereas all FARCfronts formally have identical missions, involvement in arms acquisition is not uniformlydistributed across the organization. Instead, a handful of FARC’s 70 or so fronts – particularlythose present along smuggling routes in border regions – have dominated the drug trade andarms procurement. One case in point is the 16th front. Present in southeastern Colombia on theborder with Venezuela, the front shipped large quantities of coca paste produced in Meta andCaqueta east across the border and frequently exchanged drugs for arms. During the early2000s, the front controlled the small village of Barrancominas, which functioned as a market-place for drugs.19 At the turn of the millennium, the front had established a close relationshipwith the Brazilian drug trafficker Fernando da Costa, who by his own estimates helped thefront import some three million rounds of ammunition. In 1999 the front received a shipmentof 10,000 assault rifles dropped into their territory, in a deal arranged by a Lebanese armstrafficker in collaboration with then Peruvian spy chief Vladimir Montesinos (Shroeder 2004).Hence, the front played a disproportionately large role in the arms procurement of FARC.However, due to its strategic role inside FARC, the 16th front was targeted for repeatedmilitary operations, beginning with operation “Black Cat” in 2001, during which Da Costawas captured.20 Following several near misses, the front commander “Negro Acacio” waskilled in 2007 by an aerial bombardment of his camp. Acacio was replaced by a widelydisliked front commander, which led to unprecedented defections that brought the front to theverge of extinction by 2012.21 Hence, in spite of its vast incomes and arsenal, the 16th frontwas not able to obtain MANPADS and protect its commander, with far-reaching implicationsfor the arms procurement of FARC.

The initial arsenal of the UWSAwas inherited following the collapse of the CPB in 1989.Income from the drug trade was the backbone of the Wa region’s economy and financed thefurther procurement of arms. The symbiotic relationship of arms procurement and the drugtrade meant that both were essential to the continuation of the semi-autonomous state. As aShan state KMT general, Duan Xiwen, is reported to have said as his forces battled against the

18 Black and Davis (2008) “Wa and Peace”.19 Interview with FARC ex-combatant “David” from the 16th front, Villavicencio 2011-07-21. See also ElTiempo (2001)20 El Tiempo, “Golpe al Tranquilandia de las FARC”21 Interview with FARC ex-combatant “Juan” from the 16th front Villavicencio, August 2011; El Espectador”Quiero ver a mi niña” January 29 2008.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

CPB: “We have to continue to fight the evil of communism and to fight you must have anarmy, an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, theonly money is opium (Asia Pacific Media Services 2000).” Similar to FARC, the UWSA hascollected taxes within its controlled territory since the ceasefire agreement in 1989, whichfurther financed procurement of arms. The UWSA are also reported to have the capacity toproduce arms and munitions (US Department of State 2009a). Most importantly however, theyhave also received weapons and military training and advice from China22 as well as HN-5 NMANPADS from China as early as 200023 and several years later a similar arsenal fromRussia.24

FARC has exploited porous borders in the east with Venezuela and in the south withEcuador for the purposes of arms procurement. Beyond this, the organization also receivedsome of its small arms and light weapons (SALWs) from the armed forces of neighboringcountries. For instance, some 400 SALWs confiscated from FARC during 1995–2000 bore theinsignia of the Venezuelan Armed Forces.25 Likewise, in 2009 it was revealed that FARC hadobtained at least three anti-tank weapons, initially produced in Sweden and sold to Venezuela(US Department of State 2009b). As a result of these and similar events, several Venezuelanmilitary and intelligence officials have been designated by the US Treasury for materiallyassisting FARC, including with arms procurement.26 FARC also exploited Ecuadorean terri-tory as a safe haven for drug deals and smuggling arms into Colombia. For instance, the 48thfront of FARC was active in Putumayo in southern Colombia, but maintained several camps inEcuador27 which it used for arms procurement:

“The 48th front passes all borders, you understand me? At the border. They are the onesthat let’s say when an arms [shipment] is arriving from another country, they are the oneswho are there. The 48th and 32nd are the ones who are there most, they are the ones whoreceive the arms and send it to other parts [of Colombia]”28

The 48th front also protected Raúl Reyes, the second in command of FARC and nick-named the “foreign minister” of the organization, due to his extensive contacts with foreignofficials. In spite of the 48th fronts’ deep involvement in arms procurement, the front wasnonetheless unable to obtain access to MANPADS. On March 1 2008, Reyes was killed in anaerial attack on his camp, a little less than a mile inside Ecuadorean territory. Following hisdeath, Reyes computer was found and e-mails contained therein shone a light on FARC’sefforts to obtain MANPADS.29

Arms procurement, training and military advice to the UWSA has been supported by stateactors, namely China.30 Such support acts as a “second track” foreign policy for Beijing inMyanmar.31 One of the recent motives for this support has been to avoid a repeat of theKokang incident in 2009, which, following a Tatmadaw attack on the Kokang region, saw

22 Ibid.23 Black and Davis “Wa and Peace”24 US Department of State, “Burma: A heart-to-heart with the Wa,”25 Shroeder, Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS firearms convention, 22–23.26 US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC,”September 12, 2008; US Department of the Treasury “Treasury Designates Four Venezuelan Officials forProviding Arms and Security to the FARC,” August 9, 2011.27 Interview with FARC ex-combatant “Eduardo” Bogotá, July 2011.28 Interview with FARC ex combatant “Bergin”, Bogotá, July 2011.29 These e-mails formed the basis for Smith Lockhart and Inkster Los Documentos de las FARC.30 It should also be noted in the 1990s China supplied the Tatmadaw with tanks, armored personnel carriers,artillery equipment and military aircraft.31 Black and Davis (2008) “Wa and Peace”

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

some 37,000 refugees flood across the border into China’s Yunnan province (Li 2011)sparking a refugee crisis that proved a headache for Beijing. Indeed, Yunnan province mayhave a bigger influence on Wa state than the central government in Beijing. Kunming, theprovincial capital, is, as one analyst notes, the “narco-capital of China” (Swanström 2012).

Impact of Access to MANPADS on Military Capacity

Whereas FARC and UWSA arsenals show some similarities, the organizations differ signif-icantly in terms of access to MANPADS. This is a crucial difference, since MANPADS haverepeatedly proved successful for non-state actors and small state actors against larger and betterequipped state actors. The most well-known example is Afghani mujahedeen fighters, whodowned an estimated 269 Soviet aircraft between 1986 and 1989 using Stinger missilesprovided by the US.32 The US Department of Homeland Security estimate that more than40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS missiles since 1975, many of these attacksconducted by non-state actors.33 The transfer of MANPADS from state actors to non-stateactors has occurred and black- and grey- markets for such weaponry have been identified inseveral countries including, inter alia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq (AustralianDepartment of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008). MANPADS have successfully been used bynon-state actors in Iraq and Afghanistan (Saferworld 2010), and by Chechen and Tamil Tigerfighters in their respective conflicts.34 During Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf War,an estimated 80 percent of US aircraft lost were downed by MANPADS.

The proliferation of MANPADS, which can be purchased for as little as USD $5000 on theillicit market (Saferworld 2010), has led to tighter controls through international cooperationsuch as the Wassenaar Agreement35 (2003), aimed at restricting the proliferation ofMANPADS to non-state actors. MANPADS are particularly attractive to insurgents since theyrequire relatively little training to be used effectively, while also being mobile and effectiveagainst aerial attacks. For example a first-generation Soviet-designed MANPADS, a SA-7,using passive infrared homing guidance, can engage aircraft flying at an altitude of up to1500 m.

UWSA has obtained SA-7 Grail (also known a 9 K32 “Strela-2”) and Chinese-made HN-5 NMANPADS (Small Arms Survey 2012).36 Other reports suggest that heavier arsenal in theUWSA’s possession has also increased in the past decade, including anti-aircraft guns(12.7 mm and 14.5 mm), howitzers (104 mm) and mortars (60 mm, 82 mm, and120 mm).37 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have also provided artillery trainingin the use of 122 mm and 130 mm artillery in the Lu Fang mountain range outside of theadministrative capital Pangkhang.38 Both types of MANPADS possessed by the UWSA are ofearly generation designs and not the most effective type on the market, and evasive maneuversfrom targeted aircraft (such as infra-red flares) often prove successful. Nonetheless they offer a

32 Stratfor “Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems”33 US Department of State “MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable AirDefense Systems,” July 27, 2011.34 Stratfor “Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems”35 China is not a participating state to the “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Armsand Dual-Use Goods and Technologies” – an agreement that promotes transparency and greater responsibility fortransfers of conventional arms such as MANPADS.36 Black, Davis (2008) “Wa and Peace”; Stratfor (2010) “Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems”.37 Black, Davis (2008) “Wa and Peace”; US Department of State (2009), “Thai Intelligence Keeps Wary Eye onBurma Border,” 09CHIANGMAI167, Consulate Chiang Mai.38 Black Davis (2008) “Wa and Peace”.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

deterrent to an under-developed air force such as that of the Myanmar government. Indeed, inthe hill strewn terrain of Wa region, MANPADS constrict the ability of the Tatmadaw tolaunch an aerial attack against the UWSA similar to that launched against the KachinIndependence Army in 2012. While the transfer of arms from China to the UWSA continuesto be denied by Beijing, analysts, as well as leaked government cables, insist that any transferof military capacity would, at the very minimum, need tacit support from elements within thePeople’s Liberation Army (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism 2009; Davis 2001; StratforGlobal Intelligence 2010). A recent report by Jane’s Intelligence claimed that UWSA had, inearly 2013, purchased at least two Mil Mi-17 ‘Hip’ medium-transport helicopters armed withTY-90 air-to-air missiles (Davis et al. 2013). The report is disputed by Myanmar governmentofficials and recently UWSA itself.

Yet, even if UWSA are unable to obtain more military-grade weaponry, their possession ofMANPADS will, at least in the short-term, act as a key deterrent against governmentincursions into their territory. MANPADS, together with the extensive tunnel network in Wastate, allow for effective guerilla warfare in the event of an attack from any invading force.Such networks also provide protection against aerial bombardment and covert movement oftroops and arms, and may improve the effective maneuverability of MANPADS. Regardless,the longstanding success of the 1989 ceasefire between the UWSA and the government – inspite of constituting a constant infringement of the central authority of Naypyidaw – demon-strates that the UWSA’s military capability and relevant support networks have, at least tosome degree, granted it sufficient security from attack.

By contrast, in spite of being one of the most well-funded armed groups in recent history,FARC has faced significant challenges in obtaining military-grade weaponry, which hasdecisively undercut its ability to withstand the Colombian counterinsurgency campaign.Lacking access to short-range artillery, FARC during the early 2000s acquired the ability toconstruct gas-cylinder bombs.39 These weapons are however notoriously imprecise, which hasresulted in numerous civilian casualties, earning the organization repeated criticism fromhuman rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 2005).

More important is however the inability of FARC to withstand aerial attacks fromgunships and attack helicopters, typically used in combination with special operations forces.As noted above, such operations led to the death of the commander of the 16th front NegroAcacio (2007) and FARC’s second in command Raúl Reyes (2008) (Semana 2008). Similarraids also killed the military commander Mono Jojoy (2010) (Semana 2010) and the head ofFARC Alfonso Cano (2011) (Semana 2011). All of these raids involved Super Tucanosbought from Brazilian manufacturer Embraer in 2005 and none of these aircrafts have beenshot down, with the exception of one disputed case in 2012.40 Likewise, numerous frontcommanders and foot-soldiers inside FARC have been killed in aerial assaults, often at night,against which FARC has found no effective countermeasure. For instance, in March 2012two aerial operations led to the death of 69 FARC combatants,41 explaining why FARC hasbeen increasingly unwilling to mass large number of troops in a single location. In numerousinterviews, FARC ex-combatants recounted how the aerial attacks were terrifying, since theyhad no means of responding militarily, but simply had to retreat disorderly and seek tosurvive.42

39 Sanderson (2004) “Transnational terror and organized crime”40 Stone, H., “Did the FARC Shoot Down Colombian War Plane”41 Ibid.42 Author’s interview with FARC ex-combatant “Alex” in Villavicencio, July 2011. See also for instance Penhaul(2011)

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

There have been various claims that FARC has acquired MANPADS earlier, for instance inspeculations from a US embassy cable in 2005,43 an NGO report from 2010,44 and aSTRATFOR analysis from 2010.45 As noted above however, FARC failed to use such weaponseven to protect its most senior commanders or crucial fronts and there have been no recordedinstances of Colombian army aircraft downed byMANPADS. Such was the impact of the aerialraids, and the inability of FARC to counteract them, that a US embassy memo concluded thattwo events could change the conflict dynamic in Colombia during 2010 – the death of either“Mono Jojoy” or “Alfonso Cano”, or “the acquisition and successful use of MANPADS by theFARC – which could hinder the GOC's mobility and air supremacy which have been critical toits successes” (USDepartment of State 2010a). The cable turned out to be prescient – both Jojoyand Cano were killed, but FARC still did not successfully use MANPADS.

The inability of FARC to acquire MANPADS was not due to a lack of effort however.Correspondence collected from Raúl Reyes’ computer shows that FARC persistently requestedhelp from Venezuelan officials to obtain MANPADS during 2006–2008, which Venezuelanofficials allegedly agreed to do.46 In one e-mail Manuel Marulanda – the head of FARC untilhis death in 2008 – told other Secretariat members that the organization was planning anoperation to down 10 aircraft using MANPADS, in order to ensure that “certain rules of thewar are modified”.47 In another conversation, Venezuelan officials explained that they wereinclined to help but “it is complicated to obtain them [MANPADS] on the market due to thecontrols that exist”.48 Partly due to such challenges, another FARC commander discussed thepossibility of “hiding” arms purchases to FARC from Russia in a larger order made byVenezuela.49 By 2009, the US Department of State noted in a cable that they were deeplyconcerned over a sale by Russia to Venezuela of MANPADS:

“[T]he Colombian government is also concerned about FARC interest in acquiring man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Given that Russia has begun delivery ofsophisticated Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela, over the last several months we haveengaged at high levels with Russia to express our concerns over the possibility of theFARC acquiring them (US Department of State 2010b).”

Beyond diplomatic pressure, the US government also used covert operations to trap would-be providers of MANPADS to FARC. In 2008, the infamous arms trafficker Viktor Bout wasarrested in Thailand, after negotiating the sale of MANPADS with US Drug EnforcementAgency (DEA) agents posing as FARC members. After unsuccessfully fighting extradition,Bout was convicted to 20 years incarceration in the US (Schmidle 2012). A similar operation,with DEA agents posing as FARC members looking to acquire MANPADS and otherweaponry, was again used in an attempt to snare a Nicaraguan arms dealer in 2009, but theoperation was hampered by lack of cooperation from the Nicaraguan government.50 In 2012, aSwedish citizen pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell arms to FARC in exchange for drugs, after

43 US Department of State (2005), “Manpads in Colombia: Government no; Farc Maybe,” July 29, 2005, BogotaEmbassy 05BOGOTA7134.; This report speculated that FARC may have been keeping MANPADS in reserveeither to be able to kill President Uribe or to protect their senior Secretariat members, but neither type of usagelater occurred.44 Saferworld “Controlling the transfer of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems”45 Stratfor “Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems”46 Smith Lockhart and Inkster, Los Documentos de las FARC, 251.47 Ibid. 285.48 Ibid, 258.49 Ibid., 251.50 US Department of State, “GON Non-Cooperation on FARC Arms Smuggling Case,” Managua EmbassySeptember 2, 2009 09MANAGUA871.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

being arrested in Panama following a DEA sting operation (Copuroglu 2012). These opera-tions chip away at the non-state market for MANPADS, but presumably also undermine theconfidence of arms merchants in anyone purporting to be procuring arms for FARC.

Most evidence then suggests that FARC was unable to acquire MANPADS during 2002–2011. The rebel group was actively seeking to persuade Venezuelan officials to help it acquireMANPADS throughout 2006–2008, neither the US or Colombian government were aware ofthe organization having succeeded in doing so by early 2010, and FARC notably failed todeploy MANPADS to protect even its most valued assets and members throughout the period.Very recently, FARC may finally have been able to acquire MANPADS, although theirquantities and effectiveness remain unclear. In June 2012, a Colombian air force SuperTucano was downed in conjunction with confrontations in Cauca and FARC members quicklyclaimed that it had downed the aircraft using MANPADS, which the Colombian governmentdenied.51 In December 2012, footage aired by the Colombian media outlet RCN Noticiasshowed what appears to be a FARC fighter unsuccessfully firing a MANPAD at a Colombianarmy helicopter.

Whereas FARC finally seems to have been able to acquire MANPADS, evidence from theColombian conflict nonetheless supports the argument of this paper. In spite of being one ofthe richest insurgent groups in recent history, FARC was nonetheless unable to gain access toMANPADS during a critical and extended period of its history, fundamentally weakening itsoperational capability. Between 2004–2007 FARC deaths in combat reached a high, averagingaround 1,500 fighters annually, and between 2002 and 2011, some 17,000 members defectedfrom the organization, in part driven by fear.52 Due to devastating aerial attacks, FARC hasbroken up its troops into smaller units, begun to rely heavily on snipers and landmines andabandoned its attempts to hold significant territory over extended periods of time.53 In spite ofits extensive incomes, FARC also predominantly leaned on Venezuelan contacts to facilitateaccess to MANPADS, which still proved difficult. If anything, FARC’s anxiousness to claimcredit for the downing of the Super Tucano and its willingness to forego strategic surpriseadvantages in order to publicize its access to MANPADS in late 2012, signals that the aerialsuperiority of the Colombian army has taken a heavy toll not only on the battle-field, but alsosymbolically.

Conclusions

Contemporary research on civil wars is gradually moving away from large-N, cross-countryapproaches and toward micro-level analysis which provides greatly improved validity andtheoretical clarity. In so doing, some of the most influential lines of research today build on theargument that all rebel groups are not created alike. For instance, there is comparative researchillustrating the differences between rebel groups that have access to “economic endowments”versus those that rely on the local population for support54; the impact of differing organiza-tional structure on the behavior of armed groups (Sanin and Giustozzi 2010); the distinctionbetween structural integrity and cohesion inside rebel groups (Kenny 2010), and so forth.

51 Stone (2012) “Did the FARC Shoot Down Colombian War Plane”52 Whereas surveys suggest that fear was a minor cause of defections (see for instance Arjona and Kalyvas 2012)the lead author’s interviews with 82 FARC ex-combatants illustrated that when pressed on the issue, approxi-mately half of the respondents had defected due to fear either of combat or of their own mid-level commanders.53 Ariel Fernando Ávila Martínez, “La Guerra Contra las FARC y la Guerra de las FARC,” Arcanos, No.15,2010,18-19.54 Weinstein (2007) “Inside Rebellion,” 95–103.

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

In a similar vein, this article finds that the military capacity of armed groups is dependentnot on funding alone, but in equal measures on access to military grade weaponry, which canpredominantly be provided by state sponsors of rebellion. This implies firstly that there is nosimple one-to-one relationship between the financing that an insurgent organization obtainsand its military capacity. Smaller, poorer groups can still punch significantly above theirweight if provided access to effective weaponry, whereas larger, well-funded insurgenciescan swiftly be decimated if confronted by a technologically superior adversary. This is not toclaim that an insurgent organization’s battle-field success depends solely on the type ofweapons it can acquire, nor that FARC’s decline was caused solely by its lack ofMANPADS – widespread intelligence penetration and extensive defections were arguablyequally important. But the data presented above show that FARC commanders and Colombianofficials alike recognized that lack of access to MANPADS was a crucial component ofFARC’s weakening. Reversely, representatives of the UWSA openly discussed the organiza-tion’s access to MANPADS with US embassy officials,55 possibly hoping this would functionas a deterrent to Tatmadaw incursions into their territory. Accessing high-tech arms was thus acentral concern to these insurgent organizations, on par with better-studied aspects such asfinancing and recruitment, and seems to have influenced strategic calculations by insurgentsand government officials alike. Hence, as research shifts ever more toward studying insurgen-cies from the “inside”, paying greater attention to arms procurement is likely to provideinsights into why some insurgencies succeed whereas most fail.

References

Aguilera Peña, M. (2010). Las FARC: La guerilla campesina 1949–2010. ¿Ideas circulares en un mundocambiante? Bogotá: ARFO Editores e Impresores Ltda, pp.46–56.

Arenas, J. (1985). Cese al Fuego: Una historia política de las Farc. Bogota: Editorial Oveja Negra, 93–95.Arjona, A. M., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2012). Recruitment into armed groups in Colombia: A survey of demobilized

fighters. In Guichaoua (Ed.), Understanding collective political violence (pp. 143–174). New York: PalgraveMacMillan.

Asia Pacific Media Services (2000). “The Golden Triangle opium trade: An overview,” 7–8.Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2008). “Man-Portable Air Defense Systems: Countering the

Terrorist Threat,” 10.Black, M., Davis, A. (2008). “Wa and Peace—The UWSA and Tensions in Myanmar,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, March 1, 2008.Borger, J. (2012). “Arms and the MANPADs: Syrian rebels get anti-aircraft missiles,” The Guardian, November

28, 2012.Central Intelligence Agency (2001). FARC Arms procurement: A current assessment December 5, 2001.Chernick, M. (2005). “Economic resources and internal armed conflicts: Lessons from the Colombian Case”,

178–205. In I. W. Zartman & C. J. Arnson (Eds.), Rethinking the economics of war: The intersection of need,creed and greed. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Chin, K. (2009). The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia’s Drug Trade, Cornell University Press, 114.Cline, L. E. (2009). Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar. Small Wars & Insurgencies,

20(3–4), 574–591.Cochrane, F., Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2009). Home thoughts from abroad: diasporas and peace-building in

Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23(8), 681–704.Copuroglu, B. (2012). “Swede pleads guilty to FARC arms trafficking charges” Colombia Reports, January 18,

2012.Cornell, S. E. (2007). Narcotics and armed conflict: interaction and implications. Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism, 30(3), 207–227.Cragin, K., Hoffman, B. (2003). Arms Trafficking and Colombia Santa Monica: RAND, 5.

55 US Department of State (2009) “Burma: A heart-to-heart with the Wa”

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion

Davis, A. (2001). “Myanmar heat turned up with SAMS from China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 March 2001.Davis, A., Li, T., Hardy, J. (2013). “China ‘sends armed helicopters to Myanmar separatists’” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, April 29, 2013.Dishman, C. (2005). The leaderless nexus: when crime and terror converge. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,

28(3), 237–252.El Tiempo (2001) “Golpe al Tranquilandia de las FARC” 2001-03-01.Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3),

275–301.Ferro Medina, J. G., & Graciela Uribe Ramón, G. (2002). El Orden de la Guerra. Las FARC-EP: Entre la

organización y la política (pp. 98–100). Bogota: Centro Editorial Javeriano.Giraldo, J. K., & Trinkunas, H. A. (2007). The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing. In J. K. Giraldo & H.

A. Trinkunas (Eds.), Terrorism financing and state responses: A comparative perspective (pp. 7–20).Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Human Rights Watch (2005). “Colombia: More FARC killings with gas cylinder bombs” April 16 2005.Jonsson, M. (2013). The Kosovo conflict – From humanitarian intervention to state capture. In S. E. Cornell &

M. Jonsson (Eds.), Conflict, crime and the State in Eurasia (pp. 72–87). Pittsburgh: University ofPennsylvania Press.

Jonsson, M., & Cornell, S. (2007). Countering terrorist financing: lessons from Europe. Georgetown Journal ofInternational Affairs, 8(1), 69–78.

Kenny, P. D. (2010). Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from protractedconflicts in Ireland and Burma. International Studies Review, 12(4), 533–555.

Kudo, T. (2010). “Myanmar’s border trade with China: Situation, challenge and prospects.” In Japan and Koreawith the Mekong River Basin Countries, in Kagami, M. (ed) BRC Research Report No.3, Bangkok ResearchCenter, IDE-JETRO, Bangkok, Thailand.

Li, C. (2011). Effects of the conflict between the ceasefire groups and the military government on China since2009. In V. R. Raghavan (Ed.), Internal conflicts in Myanmar: Transnational consequences (p. 114). NewDelhi: Vij Books for Centre for Security Analysis.

Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crimeand terrorism. Global Crime, 6(1), 129–145.

Maung Maung Than, T. (2013). Ethnic Insurgencies and Peacemaking in Myanmar, 12. ISEAS Perspective, no.21–2013, Singapore.

McDermott, J. (2005). “Colombian Report Shows FARC is world’s richest insurgent group” Jane’s IntelligenceReview, September 1, 2005.

Pedersen, M. (2008). Burma’s ethnic minorities: Charting their own path to peace. Journal of Critical AsianStudies, 40(1), 45–66.

Penhaul, K. (2011). “Las FARC desde adentro, modelo 2011” El Espectador, April 30 2011.Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war. Journal of Peace Research, 41(3),

337–356.Roth, M. P., & Sever, M. (2007). The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as a Criminal Syndicate: Funding

Terrorism Through Organized Crime, A Case Study. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30(10), 901–920.

Saferworld (2010). “Controlling the transfer of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems: A guide to best practice,”Saferworld and HMG, Section 3:6.

Sanderson, T. (2004). Transnational terror and organized crime: blurring the lines. SAIS Review, 24(1),49–61.

Sanin, F. G., & Giustozzi, A. (2010). Networks and armies: structuring rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan.Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(9), 836–853.

Sarno, P. (2009). “The War on Drugs,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2009(1):223–242. Institute of Southeast AsianStudies. 230.

Schmidle, N. (2012). “Disarming Viktor Bout. The rise and fall of the world’s most notorious weapons trafficker”The New Yorker, March 5, 2012.

Semana (2008). “Raúl Reyes, ‘canciller’ y miembro del Secretariado de las FARC, fue muerte en combate enEcuador” March 1, 2008.

Semana (2010). “La Guerra Sin Jojoy” December 18, 2010.Semana (2011). “La historia secreta de la caída del Cano” November 12, 2011.Semana (2012). “El Gobierno Calcula que FARC tienen 9.000 integrantes,” September 7, 2012.Shapiro, J. N. (2007). Terrorist organizations vulnerabilities and inefficiencies: A rational choice perspective. In J.

K. Giraldo & H. A. Trinkunas (Eds.), Terrorist financing and state responses in a comparative perspective(pp. 56–71). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

M. Jonsson, E. Brennan

Shroeder, M. (2004). Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS firearms convention Federation of American Scientists,Occassional Paper 1, 22–24, Semana ”Mindefensa dice que las autoridades destruyeron ‘el bunker’ de lasFARC, en el corazón de la selva,” September 3, 2007.

Small Arms Survey (2012). “Guided light weapons reportedly held by non-state armed groups 1998-2012”.Smith Lockhart, J., & Inkster, N. (2011). Los Documentos de las FARC: Venezuela, Ecuador y el Archivo Secreto

de ‘Raúl Reyes’ (p. 39). London: International Institute of Security Studies.Solomon, J. (2011). “Iran funnels new weapons to Iraq and Afghanistan” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2011.Stone, H. (2012). “Did the FARC Shoot Down Colombian War Plane,” InSight Crime, July 16, 2012.Stratfor Global Intelligence (2010) “Man-portable air-defence systems: A persistent and potent threat”.Swanström, N. (2012). Sino-Myanmar relations: Security and beyond Asia Paper Series, Stockholm:Institute for

Security and Development Policy, 21.Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (2009). “United Wa State Army (UWSA),” 11 November 2009.United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). World Drug Report 2011 (p. 99). Vienna: UNODC.UNODC. (2012a). South-East Asia Opium Survey 2012: Lao PDR, Myanmar. Vienna: UNODC.UNODC. (2012b). World Drug Report 2012 (p. 63). Vienna: UNODC.US Department of State (2009). “Burma: A heart-to-heart with the Wa,” Rangoon Embassy, 09RANGOON704.US Department of State (2009b). “Sweden, Columbia and the FARC,” Augusts 25, 2009, Stockholm Embassy.

09STOCKHOLM543.US Department of State (2010a). “Fight over democratic security: Colombia conflict update for October-

December 2009” Bogota Embassy, 10BOGOTA171.US Department of State (2010b). “Combatting Venezuelan diversion of arms to the FARC” August 10 2009,

09STATE83014.Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. New York: Cambridge University

Press.

Drugs, Guns and Rebellion