DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism

DSB Summer Study

on

Special Operations and Joint Forces in

Support of Countering Terrorism

Friday

August 16, 2002

Final Outbrief

For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering TerrorismDr. Ted Gold

Mr. Don Latham

Prior CT Insights MG Bob ScalesDr. Wick Murray

Advanced CT Technologies & Systems

Dr. Mim JohnDr. Ron Kerber

Future Force CapabilitiesGEN Bill Hartzog

VADM Dave Frost

Intel PanelDr. Joe Markowitz

ADM Bill Studeman

Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against

U.S. Dr. Rich WagnerDr. Bill Graham

Biological WarfareDr. Anna SkalkaMr. Larry Lynn

Discriminant Use of ForceDr. Ted Gold

Dr. Josh Lederberg

Psyops

Managed Information Dissemination

Precision Targeting

Defensive Information Operations

Others

We drew on past DSB studies

We leveraged current DSB Studies

Enduring Freedom

2

USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM

Sponsors

04/19/23 21:15 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 3

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary

• Requires new strategies, postures, and organization

This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed

• Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with strategic reach

• A long, at times violent, and borderless war


Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign

• Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities

• Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others

• Hold states/sub-state actors accountable

• Foster information sharing

• Fight forward

• Focus particular attention on WMD

• Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy

All the above in parallel with consequence management and protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces


Guidance From Our Terms of Reference

• Focus is overseas military operations – Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities – Examined the role of intelligence in some detail

• Did not address homeland defense explicitly– But difficult to segment theaters in this war – We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US


The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks

• Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise

• Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts

• Extensive differences as well


Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists

OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities

• From– Air, land, sea, space

These emerging capabilities will be critical for an effective military role in GWOT

• To– Robust connectivity– Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR– Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed– Effective remote fires– Adaptive joint command and control– Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset)


Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist

• A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities

• Joint integration at very low levels

• Discriminant use of force

• Interagency partners play major roles

• Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners


Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT

• Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) initiatives

– Interagency – Link analysis

• Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands– JFCOM – CENTCOM – NORTHCOM

• New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg– Multi-agency – Joint – Global perspective – New analysis tools – Multi-option analysis

• Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance Analysis• Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group• Physical Security Equipment Action Group• Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center• J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section• DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence• JFCOM Initiatives

– Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group – Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term– Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability

• USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group)• USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept• USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives


Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT

• DARPA projects, e.g.:– Genoa– Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery– Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization– Babylon– Human Identification at a Distance– Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors– Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I)– Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data– Digital Radio Frequency Tags– Advanced ISR Management

• ACTDs:– High-Altitude Airship– Pathfinder– Active Denial System– Thermobaric– Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode– Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness – Language and Speech Exploitation Resources– Cave and Urban Assault– Urban Reconnaissance – Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS)


Major Concerns

• DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the likelihood and consequences of major theater war

• DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right

• Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel

• Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain input- rather than product-oriented


Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors

Adaptive and responsive

national-level decision making

Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric

operations

“Tools” to handle tough environments and

difficult targets

Understanding adversaries and

providing “actionable” intelligence


Not the focus of our study




operations


difficult targets







operations

A much more responsive, flexible, and effective military

capability


difficult targets

Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities



1

2



4

3


Discussion Outline

• Organization, context, and themes

• Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence

• “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities

• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations

• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

• Recap


A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability

1. Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks

2. “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities

3. Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations

4. Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities


Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the

Terrorists and Their Networks

- Key Initiatives –

• Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical) operations

• Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations

• Intelligence surge/unsurge capability

• Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against asymmetrical adversaries

• Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems


Transformation of HUMINT Operations

• SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities

• Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence

• Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities

• NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support of DoD HUMINT in the field

• SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO)

• Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections

• Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond current compartmented programs)

• A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint

• Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next chart

Classified HUMINT Chart

Transformation of HUMINT Operations


Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG)

CLASSIFIED


Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations

• Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative subject matter operational experts such as:

– IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception– Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF

• Improves information collection by stimulating reactions

• Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support preemptive options and actions

• Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk

• Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall:

– Define the national strategy– Coordinate action– Enunciate policy– Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate

* The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001


Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability

• Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates– Make investments now– Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually– Maintain a database of individuals and skills– Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary– Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks

• Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills

• Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related to callups

• Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities


Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput

• Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools focused on counterterrorism (CT)

• Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis approaches

• Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT intelligence and support

• Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration and production

• Support for intelligence collection-related “target development”

• Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new sources and methods

• Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming and simulation


Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information

• SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP)

• Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments

• Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration

• Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart push and pull

• DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc.

• Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence and situational information


Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems

• These capabilities are also needed to:– Focus information collection efforts– Provide context to better understand collected data

• The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and execution (effects-based operations):

– To influence as well as respond– Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional

maneuver/fires

• Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like capabilities

– Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered– Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions– Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other


Recommendation: Proactive Operations

Recommendation• Develop an entirely new capability to

proactively, preemptively evoke responses from adversary/terrorist groups

– Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) at the NSC level

– Highly specialized people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence warfare/deception operations

– Reports to NSC principal level

Lead Responsibility• NSC lead with DCI,

SecDef, State, Justice participation

“Cost”• 100 “new” people • $100M/yr for

operations and support


Recommendation: Improve Intelligence

Recommendation• Develop new capabilities, sources, and

methods to enable deep penetration of adversaries

– DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert operations – See classified chart on HUMINT

– Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target access

– Develop new clandestine technical capabilities

• Create a surge capability in intelligence to preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in the GWOT

– Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists and specialists, qualified to serve on short notice

– Contract roles for industry universities and think tanks

Lead Responsibility• DCI Lead

SecDef/CJCS

• ASD(C3I) and DCI Community Management Staff (CMS)

• DCI/DoD co-shared lead

“Cost”• $1.7 Billion/FY

beginning in FY-04 and continuing

• $100M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of gaming, and real operations

Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives


Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.)

Recommendation• Expand counter terrorism and

asymmetric adversary analytical capabilities and throughput

– Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500 people over the next 18 months to add depth of expertise

– Focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc., to better characterize potential adversaries

– More virtual collaboration architecture for analyst support and customers interaction

Lead Responsibility• CMS shared lead with

ASD(C3I)

“Cost”• $800M/yr for technical

capabilities development and 500 new staff


Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems

Recommendation• Establish additional “centers” of

excellence to handle the greatly increased work load and to augment JWAC to support “targeting” (in the broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure—these activities will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a great variety of subject matter experts (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard sensors)

• Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational net assessment activity employed in millennium challenge

Lead Responsibility• JFCOM

“Cost”

• Add to existing initiatives up to $100M per FY as appropriate

• $100M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM,

NORTHCOM, and DARPA








“Tools” to Handle Tough Environments and Difficult Targets and to Understand Our Vulnerabilities

- Key Initiatives -

• Tough Environments: Urban Warfare

• Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction- Theater and CONUS protection- The consequence management challenge

• In-theater• CONUS

- Finding terrorists and WMD—persistent ISR- The Red Team

• Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection


Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to Improving Capabilities to Operate in Urban Environments

• URBAN OUR FOCUS: Most likely terrorism environment and the one for which we are the least prepared

• Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology for urban operations– Doctrine: JFCOM Executive Agent in FY03

• Put priority and resources behind the effort to create joint urban operations doctrine and address DOTMLPF challenges

– Training: Current urban ops training facilities inadequate• Include an urban facility in the Joint National Training Capability Initiative

– Technology: Develop urban-specific technologies including:• Knowledge systems• Movement capabilities• Precision fires• Special sensor systems• Communications unique to urban environment• Integrated system solutions


Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain

• Urban terrain presents unique challenges in:

– Precision strike to avoid collateral damage

– Command and control communications limitations

– Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations

– Standoff weapons’ advantages diminish

– The need to call for and control supporting arms at platoon and squad levels

• To meet the unique urban challenge, we need better capabilities in:– Ground and aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV helos)– Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR)– Urban training and development (dedicated center)– Command, control and communications (DARPA SUO/SAS system)– Low level combined arms maneuver– Precision supporting fires– Detecting and preempting WMD threats


Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis”

• USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment

• Concept– Penetration, thrust– Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank, helo, etc.)– 4-5 weeks intense training– Packaged combat support teams– Bounding overwatch– Spherical security

• Schedule– Victorville, California – Summer 02– Urban ground reconnaissance

• Rotary-wing tactics• Command and control• Small unit logistics


The Way Ahead

• Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and operational levels– We don’t do cities– We do cities into rubble– We have some good ideas for new urban warfare operations

• Develop a dedicated joint urban training and development center– Part of joint West Coast training centers– Subordinate to JFCOM

• Develop specialized tools for urban environments– Many good ideas

• Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emphasizing:– Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques– Small unit action– Leadership initiative and flexibility– Low level call for and control of supporting fires

• Develop a precise urban environment representation


Urban Point Position Database(CityMap)

Creation

• Theater-based sensors (LADAR, IFSAR) update a priori maps

• Semi automated feature extraction to model structures

• Update/revisit rate much higher than traditional maps

• Urban context added to basic geometry using other sources (e.g., building plans, Integrated Survey Program, …)

Utility

• Gridlock sensor and report data for fusion and handoff

• Precisely locate targets for remote fires

• Perform accessibility analysis to find routes in and around city

• Coordinate movement and position of forces

• Construct urban IPB

• Precision 3D representation of• Structures (windows and doors)• LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground)• Obstacles (power lines)• Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm)

• Database of supporting information• Addresses, occupants, functions, more


Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation

• Precision 3D representation of:• Structures• LOCs (minor streets and alleys

and underground)• Obstacles (power lines)• Critical infrastructure elements

(water, power, comm)• Database of supporting information

• Addresses• Occupants• Functions• More

Gridlock of sensor data• Enable HD multi-sensor

processes• Locate and track targets

for long epochs

Gridlock of report data• Fuse disparate INT types

precisely• Locate targets for remote

precision fires

Urban C2• Coordinate movement• Select / prioritize targets

for remote precision fires

Mission planning and rehearsal

• Critical node analysis• Accessibility analysis

(ground and air)


Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments

Intelligence Data to Focus Engagement

Target Detection and Identification

Engagement Region Monitoring

Target Preparation, Precision Strike and Kill

Assessment

Engagement Chain• Intelligence for target engagement

• Very smart sensor management

• Understanding the asymmetric adversary and his tactics

• Sensors for detecting and locating people and WMD weapons – especially in urban areas

• Achieving local high density persistent ISR coverage

• Communications for difficult environments

• Data processing and fusion for target detection, ID, and precision location

• Precision location of sensor and shooter assets to minimize collateral damage and aid precision strike

• Integrated systems solutions for strike and kill assessment

Critical Required Capabilities


The Integrated Battlespace

• ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Earth’s Surface

• Navigation / Position Fixing

• Precision Time

• Ballistic Missile Launch Warning

• Weather

Space:

• ISR: SIGINT & Imagery ofGround and Sea

• Airborne Object Detection /Tracking / ID

• Atmospheric Sampling

• Localized Weather

Air:

• ISR: SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic

• Terrain & Man-made Feature Data

• Weather

• Oceanographic Data

• Internet & World Wide Web

• Weapons of Mass Destruction Data & Warning

• ISR

• Oceanographic Data

• Other

Undersea:

Terrestrial / Ocean Surface:


Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities

• Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space, air, ground sensor dwell (persistent ISR)– Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to create a layered capability and

an integrated ISR battlespace– Optimize resource allocation to achieve localized, persistent, high density

coverage– Address the unique urban ISR problems– Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking, locating (TTL), close and

clandestine technologies

• More centralized planning and coordination of architectures, technology, and capabilities – Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture (JSAA) program

• Acquisition of system-of-system (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR architectures and systems – Multimission Command and Control Constellation (MC2C)

• New approaches to acquisition, architecture development and systems engineering – capabilities-based approach being used in the MDA


An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported Through A Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII)

Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite

Intel Data /CONUS Commands

Covert UplinkMultiple RF Circuits

Ground/Maritime Sensors

Low-AltitudeUAVs

OpticalLinks

OpticalLink

Communications Node with Multi-Beam Antenna and Data Switching Capability

Airborne Command Center

Broad-Area Surveillance Radar UAV

•All entities: people, platforms, sensors, weapons are interconnected•All entities can pull data in real time•All entities have access (as appropriate) to relevant data at all times

Forces

Attributes:

Forward deployed data to everyone


New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating People and WMD

Four Tiers of Sensors NeededRole

• Global reference data • Coherent change detection

• Detecting fixed and moving targets

• Cueing lower-tier sensors

• Identification of fixed and moving targets

• Tracking targets including people

• Determining terrorist objectives with persistent close-up surveillance

• Provide tactical commander “a look over the next hill”

New Technology

• Automated urban feature extraction• Sensor interoperability across tiers

• Foliage and building penetration • People detection with differential

imaging radar• Precision real-time tracking and EO/IR

imaging techniques of moving objects

• Airborne platforms with long-range and endurance

• Ultra low-power sensors and data processors

• Energy for long-term power • LPI communications• Sensor Network Fusion• WMD sensors

High-Altitude Surveillance Radar

Netted Tactical Sensor Arrays

Medium-Altitude Optical Imagers

II.

III.

IV.

I.

Sensor Tier

Space


Tracking Individuals

• Many ideas are in the laboratory phase

– Passive/active

– Line of sight/non-line of sight

– Cooperative/non-cooperative

• Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/environment

• Spectrum of ideas/options

– Short term (6 mos.)/long term (years)

– Physical tags

– Remote biometrics

• Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of capabilities and operationalize concepts, especially in placement and exfiltration schemes


Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD

Needed• Standoff detection and tracking at

kilometer ranges• Active interrogation; high-resolution,

high-efficiency devices

• Passive spectral systems with km’s stand-off range for detection

• Low false alarm

• Remotely emplaced sample collection and retrieval

• Handheld units for ID characterization in seconds to minutes with low false alarms

• Emplacement, networking, data processing, exfiltration – all clandestine

State-of-the-Art• No operational stand-off

capability

• No clandestine stand-off capability

• “Shoe box” size requiring agent collection with limited agent list capability, in development

• No operational standoff capability

• Bio assays requiring agent collection/contact for detection

• Nothing yet to support clandestine operations

Nuclear detection

Chemical Detection

Biological Detection

WMD Sensor Systems


• Remote sensing has not proved out—seems to require in place sensors

• Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end, but initial work should focus on phenomenology and sensing techniques

• Network monitoring and analysis of inferential signatures (e.g., deliveries, manifests, people movement) should be undertaken

• Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear choke point monitoring

• Energize followup on the Zebra Chip recommendation

• No matter the sensing, “agent defeat” is critical and requires additional resources

WMD—The Way Ahead


WMD—The Way Ahead

Chem

Bio

Nuclear

Sensor Physics/Chemistry

Precision Sensor (Stealth

) Deployment

(LPD) Data Exfilt

ration

Choke Point Monito

ring

Attack Sensing

Agent Destru

ction

Consider ProvocativeDeployment

CONOPS

Network and In

ferential S

ignature Analysis

Relative Investment

Proposed

Among N, C, B


An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD Consequence Management Capability

• The Counter-WMD Force Element: expanding on today’s capabilities– A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element, trained and equipped for

CONUS or overseas: force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR, helping to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search and render-safe

• Must address consequence management capabilities and serious shortfalls

– CONUS• National Guard has civil support teams in 32 locations today• Greatly expand role of National Guard and Reserves and improve training and

equipage• The 50 states need to define their roles and budgeting for this mission and

other disaster relief missions

– Overseas• Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host nation as well as US forces• A coalition developed plan for consequence management is needed – country

by country – with US assistance• No plans, and little capability, in place today


Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection

• Create a special WMD “Red Team” dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas

– Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making and terrorist cultural beliefs

– Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from scenarios and focus collection on these

– Major reach out to creative people outside government for their ideas, scenarios, and postulated adversary capabilities

– Major intelligence analytic support on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and WMD


Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities in a GWOT Environment

• DoD GWOT force projection capabilities are highly dependent on both commercial and Defense Department infrastructure

– Approximately 450 DoD bases involved in some aspect of force projection– (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are involved as well

• The responsibilities for DoD force projection risk assessment effort must be clarified

– DoD asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in importance and reported to the appropriate levels within DoD

– The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM must add the DoD critical commercial infrastructure required for force projection to their critical national infrastructure protection priorities

• No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and associated vulnerabilities to mission requirements exists

– Currently multiple DoD entities have some responsibility for assessing site-by-site vulnerabilities:

• Local installation/base commanders• Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with

NIMA and DTRA in support• Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) with DTRA in support

– Others responsible based upon the attack vector


Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation

• Responsibilities for mitigation of identified force projection risks must be clarified

– The Combatant Commander does not have the resources to fix the problem– Resources must flow from who “owns” the site day to day, not the “gaining

command”

– At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation funding competes with other installation sustainment demands

• SecDef should consider establishing a new line item in each Service and Agency budget for force projection risk mitigation

– Segregates the funding– Enables assessments to be matched against mitigation efforts

– Provides senior DoD leadership better visibility into this issue


The following list of missiles are manufactured in Tucson, Arizona:

• AIM-9X• AMRAAM• EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill

Vehicle for the BMD system)• ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow)• Javelin• Maverick• Phalanx

•Phoenix•RAM•Sparrow•Standard Missile•Stinger•TOW (anti-tank missile)•Tomahawk

All of Raytheon’s missiles except Hawk and Patriot(Massachusetts)

All of Raytheon’s missiles except Hawk and Patriot(Massachusetts)

Missiles Made in Tucson

Classified

Sustainability Enables Force Projection


Recommendation: Take Urban Environment Seriously by Building on Emerging Activities

Recommendation• Create infrastructure to enable new

capabilities in urban operations – New urban-like facility able to support battalion-

size forces to train, exercise, and experiment realistically

• Replicates different types of urban environments• Large numbers of structures – some high rise• Networked to other ranges/facilities• Mission rehearsal capability• Equipment evaluation

– Develop urban-unique modeling and simulation tools

– Develop the Urban Point Positioning Database– DARPA develop a major R&D thrust

• Provide guidance and resources to JFCOM in their new role as Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations

– Develop new concept at operational level– Integrate Service efforts– Conduct and sponsor experiments, exercises,

and ACTDs– Work with allies and draw lessons learned

fostering urban-relevant M&S

Lead Responsibility• JFCOM with Army,

USMC

• DARPA

• NIMA

“Cost”$300M/yr for POM

period


Recommendation: Improve ISR

Recommendation• Significant improvement in battlespace

ISR and supporting analysis – Develop the capability to employ a 24/7

Persistent ISR in a designated area for days or weeks

– A layered architecture from space, air, and a rich set of new ground sensor capabilities for now, next and after-next ISR systems

– Overlay with Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) for support of network centric and gridlock capabilities

Lead Responsibility• ASD(C3I) and CMS

“Cost”• $1.6 Billion/FY over

FY-04 POM period

• IOC in FY-06• FOC in FY-09


Recommendation: Scenarios, Plans, and Templates: An Important Initiative For a “Red Team”

Recommendation• For the WMD issues, there should be a dedicated

team of smart, creative individuals dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas

–Collect and collate terrorist MOs from previous incidents

–Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making

–Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from the scenarios and focus collection on these

• Includes comprehensive tagging, tracking and locating critical componentry

• Includes monitoring of support structures• Monitoring individuals and institutions with critical know-

how

–Provide the systems support so that the notional components can be stored and recombined, and can index into intelligence reports

• Avoid premature focus on one or several end-to-end scenarios

–Reports to Director CIA

Lead Responsibility• DCI with support from

SecDef and CJCS

“Cost”

Hiring/finding the two dozen skilled people

Resources to reach out to non-government skills

Operations support cost of $20M/yr


Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan

Recommendation• Execute consolidated oversight and funding of

an aggressive and coordinated RDT&E program

– Create and exercise WMD operational decision support systems

– Push R&D on WMD sensors, sampling, and retrieval concepts

– Develop networked C4ISR systems specific to WMD targets

– Get serious about acquiring a WMD agent, device, and/or delivery defeat

• Provide resources for near-term staffing and equipage for an expanded Counter-WMD Force Element

– Joint, deployable; CONUS or overseas– Force protection, offensive action, consequence

management

Lead Responsibility• USD(AT&L), ATSD(NCB)

–Services, SOCOM

• SOCOM

–Services

“Cost”

$1B/yr

$500M/yr


Recommendation: Identify and Redress Force Projection Vulnerabilities

Recommendation• Increase tenfold (over three years) the

people and resources devoted to assessing vulnerabilities of our DoD force projection capabilities and critical infrastructure

– Support with extensive Red Teaming and R&D on new analysis techniques

• Assign Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security [ASD(HLS)] as Executive Agent for DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection and assure the vulnerabilities are addressed

• Task NORTHCOM and ASD(HLS) to coordinate the vulnerability assessments and develop a plan to redress the vulnerabilities

• Move funding for the JPO-STC to a new NORTHCOM funding line

Lead Responsibility• JPO-STC

“Cost”> $100M

Personnel costs. Need to coordinate multiple groups conducting

vulnerability assessments

$150M/year








Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations

Traditional

SOF

Combat Support&

Combat Service Support

Allied SOF

Allied Conv. Forces

Covert Action

“SOF-Centric”

US SOF Conventional Forces

Combat Support&

Combat Service Support

US SOF

USConventional

Forces


Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations

- Key Initiatives -

• Provide operational command flexibility

• Increase SOF capabilities

• Couple SOF and conventional forces more tightly

• Enhance the contributions of conventional forces

• Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies


Provide Operational Command Flexibility

• Prepare SOF to be the supported command in at least some phases of future campaigns

– Enhance the robustness of the theater special operations commands and joint special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters (level/resources, skills, C4)

– Expand exercises and training with conventional forces

• Provide for seamless transition of supported/supporting commands during a campaign; task JFCOM and SOCOM to:

– Develop transition phasing experiments and exercises – Ensure interoperable situational awareness capabilities among SOF and

conventional forces


Increase SOF capabilities

• A greater role in “preparing the battlefield”– Focus SOF worldwide day-to-day presence to exploit human and

geographic access in potential crisis locations– Exploit SOF’s inherent intelligence collection capabilities

• “Modest” increase in personnel – ~2% per year (+ some additional growth from transfers possible)– CENTCOM crisis response element

• Substantial increase in equipage:• Blue force tracking• Sensor “emplacement” • Common Operating Picture• Communications and other equipment• Upgrade special mission aircraft, maritime and ground mobility


Couple SOF and Conventional Forces More Tightly

• More training and rehearsal for both SOF-led and conventional-led operations

• Standardize TTPs between SOF and conventional forces for SOF-initiated operations– Command relationships– Enhanced institutional and unit education

• Tailor force packaging to enhance pre-conflict/post-conflict capabilities – Identify “packages” of engineers, civil affairs, military police, and medical

personnel that can be coupled to in-theater SOF– These resources reside mostly in Reserve Component (RC)


Enhance Conventional Force’s Contributions in the GWOT

• Improve selected conventional capabilities to support SOF-centric operations – Night vision/night flying/tactical resupply– Sea-basing – Fire support– Foreign internal defense (training)

• Accelerate development and fielding of specialized capabilities in selected conventional forces– Includes changes to training, professional military education, equipage,

personnel practices• Operate dispersed and distributed• Leverage remote fires and aerial ISR• Use language and cultural awareness as force multipliers• Leverage indigenous ground forces

• Have conventional forces with requisite capabilities assume missions currently being performed by SOF- E.g., USMC MEU(SOC)

– Explosive ordnance disposal– Consequence management– Force protection– Combat service support


Make SOF More Central in Military Engagement Planning With Our Allies/others

• One of few areas where allies can be near peer partners– JSOTF-South in OEF provides a model: forces of eight nations

• Focus efforts at early stages of emerging crisis

• Center Allied and coalition planning operations at Combatant Command level

• Prioritize engagement opportunities

• Aggressively fund combined exercises and training events


Recommendation: Preparing For More, Larger and More Complex Operations in Which SOF (and SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role

Recommendation

• Provide operational command flexibility

• Increase SOF capabilities

• Couple more tightly SOF and conventional forces

• Enhance the contributions of conventional forces in

– Warfighting– Shaping

• Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies and coalition partners

Lead/Supporting Responsibility• SecDef/JFCOM

• SecDef/SOCOM

• CJCS/JFCOM & SOCOM/Services

• SecDef/JFCOM/Services

• SecDef/ASD(SO/LIC)

“Cost”$10s of M

Billions

$10s of M

$100s of M

$10s of M








Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities

• Extensive joint experimentation, training, and doctrine development

• Adaptive joint C4 systems

• Interoperability at low levels

• Hard-headed assessment of real world operations and experiments

- Key Initiatives -

Business as usual puts us at risk of not having capabilities when needed. Achieving capabilities will require


Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT

• SecDef/CJCS should formally and visibly recognize JFCOM’s new focus – As their “executive agent” for joint doctrine, training, experimentation, and

joint integration to meet GWOT requirements• Linchpin for integration of joint and special ops efforts by services, USSOCOM,

and other Combatant Commands• Relieved of geographic and homeland defense responsibilities• Transition to NATO functional Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation or

divest SACLANT


Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint Doctrine, Training, Experimentation Roles

• Create and sustain continuous experimentation/spiral development capability– flexible to connect to real world operations

• New responsibility for joint doctrine

• Establish closer links to other Combatant Commands and Services

• Enlarge interagency and multinational initiatives

• Serve as Executive Agent for improving Joint Urban Operations

• Joint training capability


Accelerate Development and Fielding of More Adaptive and Capable Joint Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems

• Provide, through spiral development, continuous improvement of joint C4 systems (including Joint Headquarters) at the Regional Combatant Commanders

• Work closely with:– Regional Combatant Commands to tailor to theater

– SOCOM to empower SOF-centric operations

– The new STRATCOM in their potential role as provider of global sensors and comms


Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and Interoperability at Appropriate Levels

• Establish Service acquisition program standards for processing/formatting (not just interface)

• Make JFCOM effective “gatekeeper” for interoperability for all Service requirements

• Accelerate integration of common operational pictures


Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted Upon

Needed: a standing process for development and top-down direction of lessons learned

– Make Joint Center for Lessons Learned subordinate to JFCOM– Collect from operations, experiments, and training events (US and others)– Create synthesis capability– Develop an integrated electronic library– Facilitate horizontal dispersion– Create action plan– Routinely report high priority lessons to SecDef/CJCS

Result: Greater likelihood of discovering weaknesses before our adversaries do


Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT

• Create a program (set of program elements) to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out for:

– Joint training, doctrine development, and experimentation – Providing of joint C4 at the Combatant Commands– Ensuring interoperability at all joint levels– Joint urban operations – Joint Center for Lessons Learned

Should include funds and contracting authority for limited “acquisition” of products and other opportunities in support of this mission

Should make maximum use of existing acquisition and procurement organizations in carrying out these responsibilities

• Provide JFCOM additional intellectual resources– JFSC and NDU– A formal relationship with counterpart activities in the Services (TRADOC, NWDC,

AFDC, MCCDC/MCWL)

• Establish a premier system-of-systems engineering and integration capability to support JFCOM


Recommendation: Creating an Organizational Center for

Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT

Recommendation

• Create a program to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out

• Provide them premier system engineering and integration support

• Assign NDU/JFSC to JFCOM to ensure more influence of Service institutional counterparts

Lead Responsibility• SecDef/CJCS

“Cost”


What Will You Get If You Implement Our Recommendations

• Understanding of the adversary– Proactive operations for Intelligence– Deeper understanding and broader coverage

• A new and new kind of expansion of HUMINT• Intelligence surge capability• Understanding the enemy as a complex adaptive system (beyond physical dimensions)

– Deeper, broader, and more expert analysis– Customer and query-driven analysis

• More capabilities for “tough” operations– Facilities for urban operations, experiment, training, and mission rehearsal/planning– 3D maps of urban environments– Responsive ISR, persistent focus– Tagging, tracking, and locating – even of people– Sensors for WMD– A “red team” to anticipate the terrorists – A “SWAT-like” team to contain WMD weapons

• Powerful SOF-centric military options tailored to the GWOT– Greater contributions from the conventional forces

• Robust, adaptive, and flexible operational-level C4• Finally, interoperability of C4 – and at the lower levels needed


What It Will Mean

• Much better able to anticipate terrorist behavior and react to “bolts-out-of-the-gray”

• Much richer set of proactive/preemptive options

• More responsive, flexible, and effective military instrument to prosecute the GWOT

– better prepared for simultaneous campaigns

– more capable in tough environments and against difficult targets

• Allies much more capable (and perhaps willing) to contribute militarily

• DoD’s missions much less vulnerable to terrorist disruption

• A catalyst for a broad and deep transformation of DoD’s capabilities and practices


“ Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen…What is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and

freedom.”

President George W. BushSeptember 20, 2001

Date post:	31-Dec-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	judah-garza
View:	52 times
Download:	1 times

DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism

Documents