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An Empirical Analysis An Empirical Analysis of of Political Dynasties in the Political Dynasties in the
1515thth Philippine CongressPhilippine Congress
DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTHDEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Ronald U. Mendoza, PhDRonald U. Mendoza, PhD
AIM Policy CenterAIM Policy Center
http://Policy.aim.eduhttp://Policy.aim.edu
*Support from Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the AIM-Scientific Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the
Asian Institute of Management, AIM-SRF and KAS. This presentation is based on Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap (2011).
“An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress.” Asian Institute of Management Policy Center
Research Paper.
Voices of the Politicians
“There are some politicians who wish there were more poor people. The
poor are the bailiwick because […] if you are a moneyed politician, it’s
better to have poor people because you can buy them. Give them
P200, P300 in the elections and they will vote for you.” [A politician
interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).
“I’m just vice mayor but you know I have an average of twenty to thirty
people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have
no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a
people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have
no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a
day. It’s good I have other businesses, if not you’ll be forced to steal
money from the government to give to the poor […].”
[…] Once you’re a government official, people think you are a rich
person, that you can get money from the government. That’s not
true…My salary is only P21,000 [per month].” [A local politician
interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).
Motivation
In theory, democracies promote political participation and political equality—
equal voice in government decisionmaking—through various principles such as
one person one vote, equality before the law and equal rights of free speech.
Political equality, in turn, could promote stronger responsiveness and
accountability in addressing the needs of the majority of the citizenry, and in
many cases contribute to improved human capital and other investments.
With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments, With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments,
poverty and inequality reduction as well as higher and more inclusive growth
could ensue.
However, underdeveloped democratic institutions could also be associated with
weak political participation, leading in some cases to the phenomenon of
political dynasties.
How are political dynasties linked to the country’s prospects for inclusive
growth (i.e. high growth accompanied by poverty and inequality reduction)?
Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality
Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality:
•PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-
seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies
(e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003)
•STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for
reform and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson,
2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)
Additional complexity:
•PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for
dynasties as long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in
times of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005)
•SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties): being in
public office affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to
increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010)
Trend in US Legislators with Relatives in Previous
Congresses (Dynastic Legislators)11% in early 1800s
7% in 1966
Source: Dal bo et al (2009).
Clarification and Improvement of Dynasty Definitions
•Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress;
•Dynasty2: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress, or at least one
local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007;
•Dynasty3: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,14th or 15th Congress, or at least
one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010.
•Dynasty*: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least
one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government
official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government
official elected in 2010.
Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by
Definition
(Total number and percent share)
Dynastic
Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*
84 (36.7% 144 (62.9% 155 (67.7% 10 (4.4% Dynastic
84 (36.7%
of
Legislators
144 (62.9%
of
Legislators
155 (67.7%
of
Legislators
10 (4.4%
of
Legislators
Rough Comparison of the Share of Dynastic Politicians in
Selected Parliaments and Congresses
33%
10%
6%
Japan
Argentina
United States
Sources: United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, 2009); Argentina (Rossi, 2009); Japan and Mexico (Asako and others, 2010); Philippines (Authors’ calculations).
68%
63%
37%
40%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Philippines (Dynasty3)
Philippines (Dynasty2)
Philippines (Dynasty1)
Mexico
Share of Dynastic Politicians in the Philippine Congress
over Time: Preliminary snapshot
50
60
70
80
90
82
73
50
68
Sources: PCIJ as cited in Clarke and Sison (2003) and authors’ calculations based on data from the Philippine Congress.
0
10
20
30
40
50
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty
Sibling
Spouse
Cousin
PBM (Provincial Board
Member)
Note: Incumbent positions are in brackets.
Are dynastic legislators mostly male?
Female
Legislators Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*
50
21 (42.0%
of Female
Legislators)
32 (64.0%
of Female
Legislators)
36 (72.0%
of Female
Legislators)
3 (6.0% of
Female
Legislators)
Male 17963 (35.2%
of Male
Legislators)
112 (62.6%
of Male
Legislators)
119 (66.5%
of Male
Legislators)
7 (3.9% of
Male
Legislators)
Do dynasties dominate political parties?
LAKAS-
KAMPI
Liberal
Legislators Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*
76
75
38 (50.0% of
LAKAS-
KAMPI
Legislators)
53 (69.7% of
LAKAS-
KAMPI
Legislators)
58 (76.3% of
LAKAS-
KAMPI
Legislators)
7 (9.21% of
LAKAS-
KAMPI
Legislators)
18 (24.0% of
LP
40 (53.3% of
LP
43 (57.3% of
LP
1 (1.33% of
LP Liberal
Party
NPC
Nacionalista
Party
75
34
21
LP
Legislators)
LP
Legislators)
LP
Legislators)
LP
Legislators)
17 (50.0% of
NPC
Legislators)
24 (70.6% of
NPC
Legislators)
25 (73.5% of
NPC
Legislators)
0
7 (33.3% of
NP
Legislators)
17 (81.0% of
NP
Legislators)
17 (81.0% of
NP
Legislators)
1 (4.76% of
NP
Legislators)
Dynasty 3
24%
76%
LAKAS KAMPI
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
43%
57%
LP
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
26%
74%
NPC
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
19%
81%
Nacionalista
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
Are dynastic legislators older?
Legislators Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*
39
98
18 (46% of
Age 26-40
Legislators)
29 (74% of
Age 26-40
Legislators)
30 (77% of
Age 26-40
Legislators)
4 (10% of
Age 26-40
Legislators)
34 (35% of
Age 41-55
60 (61% of
Age 41-55
63 (64% of
Age 41-55
3 (3% of
Age 41-55
26-40
41-55 98
67
25
Age 41-55
Legislators
Age 41-55
Legislators
Age 41-55
Legislators
Age 41-55
Legislators
21 (31% of
Age 56-70
Legislators
37 (55% of
Age 56-70
Legislators
41 (61% of
Age 56-70
Legislators
11 (44% of
Age 70+
Legislators
18 (72% of
Age 70+
Legislators
21 (84% of
Age 70+
Legislators
1 (4% of
Age 70+
Legislators
41-55
56-70
70+
2 (3% of
Age 56-70
Legislators
Dynasty 3
23%
77%
26-40
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
36%
64%
41-55
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
39%
61%
56-70
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
16%
84%
70+
Non-Dynastic
Dynastic
Do dynasties tend to be located in jurisdictions with
lower average per capita income?
Average Standard Deviation
Non-Dynastic PhP26,872.38 PhP7,486.73
Dynastic PhP23,275.43 PhP6,358.38
Mean Mean
Difference -PhP3,596.95 --
Test Statistic
and P-Value
-3.565
(0.0003)*** --
Note: Provincial 1997 Prices
p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
Are dynastic legislators richer?
Net Worth Net Worth
(sans MP)
Dynasty
Non-Dynasty
PhP 52M
PhP 57M PhP 42M
PhP 52M
Non-Dynasty
Mean Difference
Test Statistic and
P-Value
Note: Both averages reflect a vacant seat for the 1st District of Ilocos Sur..
p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
PhP 57M PhP 42M
-PhP4,900,547 PhP9,857,260
-0.2525 (0.4013) 0.7671 (0.2236)
Do dynasties tend to be located in jurisdictions with
higher poverty?
Poverty
Incidence
Poverty Gap Poverty
Severity
Dynastic
Non-Dynastic
24.15%
18.95%
6.18%
4.93%
2.31
1.86Non-Dynastic
Mean
Difference
Test Statistic
and P-Value
Note: p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
18.95% 4.93% 1.86
5.2pp 1.25pp 0.45
2.606
(0.0039)***
2.107
(0.0174)**
1.794
(0.0367)**
Do dynasties tend to enjoy higher margins of victory?
Dynasty1
Definition
Dynasty2
Definition
Dynasty3
Definition
Dynastic
Non-Dynastic
Mean
36.43pp
28.49pp
33.34pp
28.23pp
33.26pp
27.64pp
Definition: If winning candidate received A votes and 2nd place candidate received B
votes; and the total number of votes cast is C , then the margin of victory is A/C minus B/C.
Margin of victory is expressed as the difference in percentage points (pp).
Mean
Difference
Test Statistic
Note: p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
7.94pp 5.11pp 5.62pp
2.3477
(0.0094)***
1.5068
(0.0655)*
1.6602
(0.0485)**
Preliminary Snapshot of Correlations
Dynasty3 by Per Capita Income
Controls Per Capita Income (1997 Prices)
Population (-)0.297 (0.004)***
Employment (-)0.331 (0.001)***
Poverty Incidence (-)0.248 (0.016)**Poverty Incidence (-)0.248 (0.016)**
Pop-Emp (-)0.309 (0.003)***
Pop-Pov (-)0.246 (0.018)**
Emp-Pov (-)0.259 (0.013)**
Pop-Emp-Pov (-)0.259 (0.013)**
Note: p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
Preliminary Snapshot of Correlations
Dynasty3 by Poverty/Inequality
Controls Poverty Incidence Provincial GINI
Population 0.179 (0.086)* (-)0.099 (0.345)
Employment 0.217 (0.037)** (-)0.077 (0.461)
PCI (-)0.56 (0.595) (-)0.012 (0.909)
Note: p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,
*** significant at 0.01
PCI (-)0.56 (0.595) (-)0.012 (0.909)
Pop-Emp 0.181 (0.084)* (-)0.099 (0.347)
Pop-PCI (-)0.050 (0.633) (-)0.007 (0.946)
Emp-PCI (-)0.039 (0.710) (-)0.010 (0.928)
Pop-Emp-PCI (-) 0.051 (0.629) (-)0.018 (0.868)
Selected References
•Asako, Y., T.Iida, T.Matsubayashi and M.Ueda. 2010. “Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan.”
Mimeo. [Available at: http://www.psci.unt.edu/~tmatsubayashi/research/seshu.pdf].
•Balisacan, A. and N.Fuwa.2004. “Going beyond cross-country averages:Inequality and poverty reduction in the
Philippines. Mimeo. South East Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture and UP
Diliman.
•Balisacan, A. and E.Pernia. 2002. “Going beyond cross-country averages: Growth, inequality and poverty reduction
in the Philippines.” World Development 32(11)1891-907.
•Clarke,G. and M.Sison. 2003. “Voices from the top of the pile: Elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in the
Philippines.” Development and Change 34(2):215-242.
•Coronel, S. 1998. Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines. Pasig: Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism.
•Dal Bo, E., P.Dal Bo and J.Snyder. 2009. "Political Dynasties." Review of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142.
•Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge, •Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge,
Mass.
•Hutchcroft,P. and J.Rocamora.2003. “Strong demands and weak institutions: The origins and evolution of the
democractic deficit in the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 3(2003):259-292.
•Manacsa, R. and A.Tan. 2005. “Manufacturing Parties.” Party Politics 11(6):748-765.
•Rodrik, D. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
•Querrubin, P. 2010a. “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
•Querrubin, P. 2010b. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the
Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
•Rossi, M. 2009. “The Causes of Political Dynasties in Democratic Countries.” Mimeo. [Available at:
economia.uniandes.edu.co/content/.../29957/.../Political_Dynasties_Rossi.pdf].
•Solon, O.,R.Fabella,and J.Capuno. 2009. “Is local development good politics? Local development expenditures and
the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the 1990s.” Asian Journal of Political Science 17(3):265-284.
Democracy and Inclusive GrowthDemocracy and Inclusive Growth
ADDITIONAL SLIDESADDITIONAL SLIDES
Studies Examining Links across Dynasties and Human Capital
Accumulation, Economic Growth and Poverty/Inequality
Solon, O.,R.Fabella,and J.Capuno. 2009. “Is local development good politics? Local
development expenditures and the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the
1990s.” Asian Journal of Political Science 17(3):265-284.
•Study of Philippine Governors elected in 1992,1995 and 1998; finds that incumbent
governors improve their re-election chances with higher spending on economic
development servicesdevelopment services
Balisacan and Fuwa (2004). “Going beyond cross-country averages: Growth, inequality and
poverty reduction in the Philippines.” World Development 32(11)1891-907.
•Study of growth and poverty reduction in the Philippines between 1988 and 1997, using
province-level data, controlling for contextual factors including a measure for political
dynasties; finds that “dynasty” variable is a significant determinant of mean expenditure
growth, but not the rate of poverty reduction; dynasty variable is negatively linked to
subsequent income growth
Studies finding evidence of dynastic self-perpetuation
Dynasties in the Japanese Diet: Asako, Y., T.Iida, T.Matsubayashi and M.Ueda.
2010. “Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan.” Mimeo. Bank of
Japan, Waseda University and University of Texas.
Dynasties in the Argentine Congress: Rossi, M. 2009. “The Causes of Political
Dynasties in Democratic Countries.” Mimeo.
Dynasties in the Philippine Congress: Querrubin, P. 2010. “Family and politics:
Dynastic persistence in the Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Dynasties in the US Congress: Dal Bo, et al (2009). "Political Dynasties." Review
of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142.
EMPIRICAL REGRESSION MODEL OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
AND POSSIBLE DRIVERS OF DYNASTIES
Dynasty = F [Legislator’s characteristics; Jurisdiction's characteristics;
Political Party Affiliation]
•Age: Are younger lawmakers less dynastic?
•Gender: Further to the previous point, are dynasties part of an "old boys
club" and older style of politics?club" and older style of politics?
•Net Worth: Are dynasties richer?
•Term: Are longer terms associated with legislators that belong to
dynasties?
•City: Are dynasties less prevalent in cities, where the institutions of
democracy (i.e. schools, NGOs, more free flow of ideas, info, people)
might tend to be stronger?
•Enrollment: Are dynasties less prevalent where access to education is
stronger?
•Intergovernmental allocations: Are dynasties associated with higher
(effective) allocations? Alternatively, are dynasties making more or less
use of their allocations? (Do dynasties "bring home the bacon"?)
•Political Parties: Are dynasties associated with the older more
established parties? Are the smaller parties and independents less established parties? Are the smaller parties and independents less
associated with dynasties?
•Poverty: Are dynasties associated with jurisdictions with higher
poverty (suggesting patronage politics)?
•Real GDP Per Capita: Are dynasties associated with lower average
real incomes?