E T AT

v e h s i 1 t

f A e n r nta n h t e n te t

Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda. Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States. With the major ex ion of the Middle East. there appears to be no region in which Soviets are now apprehensive that action in support of clients could lead to Soviet-American armed collision. By ng up the •war ,• Moscow hopes to encourage resistance to INF deployment in Western Europe. deepen cleavages within Atlantic alliance, and increase public pressure in the United States for a more conciltatory posture toward the USSR.

Soviet policymakers, concerned that trends programs could fifteen ncrease

1

Moscow 1 1 enge United States is difficult near-term i dilenwnas which US Kremlin must consider painful any increases in the of military spending; it must provide or

additi assistance to client regimes under ous insurgent it react to a sharp ideological

ve st rule at a time of growing public demorali on ion in living standards in the USSR and stern Not surprisingly, Moscow is frustrated

and angry at Admi stration.

u gest y ncrea Un i e

the President i nali y n

have ha ged rike apa

war as a m ans of cru ng

e f

f

tates is purs reparin t ommu sm.

ea er to ntent1on of

hat the eagan Admi is r in he T rd World a d

rat on as no

egot ati n. th t ndropov

t r danger.

onversations dicate that the

w de y e eved ts of

fferences with Moscow throu h v sitor to Mosc w was recently t ld etter to all party organ zat on

ring~th t e fatherla d was ru y i n

n

a

n oura a e

rea e u or r n si more c

Foster a lon neutralism.

e rm h f t n tern ur pe t w

eepen su pic o s in West ro ean gov tives and ompet f t e eagan Ad st

crease pu c nce-s ions

got t ons.

pre sure h S R

the ut r

t

r

o Soviet policyma rs almost certainly realize that the developments most disturbing to them--full U I F deploymen , the broad US strategic buildup, and strengthen·ng of US general purpose forces--could influence the military balance only gr dually, would not affect the near-term US calculus of risks, and are still subject to substantial political uncertainty.

0 Historically, Soviet policy has generally been driven by prudent calculation af interests and dogged pursuit of long-term objectives, even in the face of great adversity, rather than by s~dden swells of fear or anger.

0 However disturbed Soviet polfcymakers might be by the Reagan Administration, they also have a sense of the USSR's strengths and of potential domestic and international vulnerabilities of the United States. They typically take a longer view of Soviet prospects, and the perception from the Kremlin i~ b no ~eans one of unrel eved gloom.

6. These considerations imply that any anticipations of near-term confrontation ~~at may exist in Moscow are likely to affect policy more at the margin than at the core. We believe this genera11~ation 1s supported by how the Soviets probably assess the risk of conflict with the United States arising from two most likely quarters: nucleat_-strateg_ c _rivalry, and competition in the Third World.

The Nuclear-Strategic Rivalry

7. 0 spite thP.ir impassioned rhetoric about thP. "nuclear danger,• we strongly believe that the Soviets are undamentally concerned no about any hypothetical near-term liS nuclear attack, but about possible five-to-ten year shifts fn the stra egfc balance. In a TV interview on S December, t e Chief of the r,eneral Staff, Mar hal garkov. pointed o t e factors ~ha woul presumably now deter even t P mo s ostil~ liS administ a ion from a deliberate first trikP at mpt--~he large Sovie s·ockpi e of nuclear weapons, diverse delivery sy~tems, "repeatedl; e~undant y ms of co rolling t em,~ and the v lnerabili yo Uni ted

States to retaliation. And, in a speech on 18 necemb~ , Mins er of ef nse U tinov tated t er was no ne d to ~draffla 'ze" ·he current tense situation.

a. he Soviets probabl do believe that S F missiles wen fu lly deployed, wou ld signi icantly affect their plans for conduct'ng nuclear w r. The h" t at hP P r i g par

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t easur appear to be em

een n ser ous e oc atic Le t

v ax m

ey are wa e t t to be completen u

ea y ol t cal pp si be aborted or limite •

t NF lo ent are t v tiona11y nspired. n urope, in Soviet threaten ng. and eff rt wo and mai tain economic ties continue.

1

e

9. As N deplo ent is completed about the same time new trateg y ems a e eing fie ded, he S v ets ou d see a

great r ass bi ty of o frontat on wi h the Un ted Sta es. We d lieve the oviets h nk that depl ent w 11 dec sive1

strategic balance, but th ould think it would bolden the nit States to take more risks a d increase the

f ace dental war. With the sharp re uct on g eplo ent o the Pershing I Is. th

1 • In at oviet mi ht f

front at ct milita

threatened h si all

force rapid1

p n to good on the r threats.

But Moscow's eater itself nited States

the

ty 0 n wavs that

s 1~ ite

The

genera with he 1970s.

PO A m

defea percei e

S action aid to

ng

cti

he IJ

e ce t of anger

elligeren

t s

n

ems ous

n the ade v r

f g ver

urgenc es gainst lient e mes a1so rate unp sant near term po icy choices which probably reinforce erta sei ge mentality n Moscow 1 s part. Instead of be ng n

the at ack, the SSR has been placed on the defensive. t is constrained either to up the ante of m lita and c d, or pay he price of oss f olitical in iuence. n oviet ass stance car wit t oss b1e indire t n

1 N t the e f

f

i s c o a

9. he sit a

c unt ng

w

oviets av a n m er of ey e r v e t. T

n the Reagan Admin strat o

ptions for a r ab

overreaching it

0 Rev ta izing the ace ovement" in Wester

nism e Middle East, e tr 1 i r 1

os ng su port am n American oters.

d

Their response to NF dep n t abandone ho e of ap

ent pr vides evidence that they ave zin po su h deve e s.

20. Th could attem t to heighten the war f ves y ngaging in threatening 1 operations, c nd nac ili ary exercises or he 1 e. Their approach here w u1d have

to be selective n order to avoid counteractin the attempt to epict he Un ted States a he aj r threat to eace. S ar

they have not systemat ca engaged in such activities. To some extent their war scare propa anda has lready backfired on them in Eastern Europe. where there has been considerab1e resistance to the emplacement of new Soviet missiles as a "countermeasure" to NATO INF de 1 ent.

s r a t