EAC Carbon Budgets Enquiry BBC[b]

8/14/2019 EAC Carbon Budgets Enquiry BBC[b]

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1O GLOBAL TEMPERATURE RISE already.More than 1

Omore is extremely 'dangerous'.

280 CO2 parts per million 380 ppmv 450 ppmv 400 ppmv ?

CONCENTRATIONSONE

oCELSIUS TEMPERATURE RISE

copyright GCI 2008

Memorandum Submitted by GCI 27 April 2009to the UK House of Commons

Environmental Audit Committee Enquiry: -

Did carbon budgets in the UK Climate Act come from C&C?

Cont rac t io n & Conv ergen ce

the International Framework for

Preventing Dangerous Climate Change


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Achieving the goal of the United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change inevitably requires contraction and convergence.

Joke Waller HunterExecutive Secretary of theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

COP-9 in Milan in 2003


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CONTENTS

1. Summary

2. Where did the UK budgets come from and are they adequate to keep within a 2olimit?

3. Were the climate models and assumptions used by the Committee on ClimateChange valid in setting carbon budgets?

4. What was the basis on which the Committee on Climate Change arrived at theUKs share of the global effort to cut emissions?

5. Note on the methodology of C&C and how it came into RCEP

6. Note on the methodology of C&C and positive feedbacks7. Impact of C&C Proportionality-Rule on the UK Climate Act

8. The emerging consensus for C&C

9. Risk: the real danger of not doing enough soon enough

10. Reference material supporting the the GCI Memorandum


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RISK LEVEL Contracon & Concentraons

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RISK LEVEL Contracon & AcceleratedConvergence

C1 [2020] C2 [2040] C3 [2040]

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1. Summary

1. The UK budgets came from Contraction and Convergence via the Royal Commission on Environ-mental Pollution [RCEP] 2000 reportEnergy The Changing Climate. The report recommend-ed C&C but applied it at rates that are too slow to keep within the 2

olimit.

2. To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be based on aglobal emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction may still stayconstant @ ~50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing @ ~0.5%/yr, the outcomemay still be >450ppmv.

3. By not taking account of the new Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modelling in IPCC AR4 Chapter 10[2007], the UK Climate Change Committee models and the assumptions used by the Committeeon Climate Change are not valid in setting carbon budgets.

4. There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emis-sion scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efciency of the Earthsystem (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evidence that the CO2 airbornefraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate change.

5. Until about 1800 the overall climate system was at equilibrium. The very sudden rise of the at-mospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4 since then shows that the system is no longer in condi-tions of homeorhesis, it is going out of control.

6. Joke Waller Hunter, Executive Secrearty of the UNFCCCCOP-9 in Milan in 2003 said,Achievingthe goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change inevitably requirescontraction and convergence.

7. The basis on which the UK Committee on Climate Change arrived at the UKs share of the globaleffort to cut emissions was the RCEP and their advocacy of Contraction and Convergence.

8. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally for example by 2020, wouldreect the C&C principle where,if contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, con-vergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

9. There appears to be an emerging consensus for Contraction and Convergence as the UNFCCC-compliant global framework for climate mitigation, as evidenced in the reference material at-tached to this memorandum.


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2. Question: - Where did the UK budgets come f rom? Are they adequate to

keep w ithin the 2o limit?

1. whether the UKs statutory targets for greenhouse gas emissions are consistent with the Govern-ments objective of limiting global warming to no more than 2oC and whether they are enforce-able;

2. the extent to which the Committee on Climate Changes recommended budgets to 2020 are con-sistent with the UKs target for 2050.

Answ er: - They came from Contraction and Convergence [C&C], but appliedat rates that are too slow to keep w ithin 2o limit.

1. But with sinks failing @ ~0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be >450ppmv.

2. In concert with others, the UK Governments aim is to limit overal global temperature above pre-industrial to no more than two degrees Celsius. Not exceeding 450 ppmv CO2 in the atmosphere isconsidered a pre-requisite of keeping within that limit.

3. Enforcing the right target will be no harder than enforcing the wrong target.

Presently the budgets are a function of a global emissions contraction of 50% by 2050 with conver-gence to equal per capita entitlements globally by 2050. The UK budget came from IPCCs canon of

uncoupled carbon-cycle models assuming an airborne fraction of emissions constant @ ~50% giving

500 ppmv.

To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be a function of coupledmodelling with a global emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction maystill stay constant @ ~50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing @ ~0.5%/yr, the out-come may still be >450ppmv. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally forexample by 2020, would reect the C&C principle where, if contraction must be accelerated for reasonsof urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

Equal Per Capita by 2020

With an 80% cut globally

by 2050


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3. Question: - Were the climate models and the assumptions used by the

Committee on Climate Change valid in setting carbon budgets?

The suitability of the climate models and the validity of the assumptions used by the Committee onClimate Change in setting carbon budgets

Answ er: - No. By not taking account of the Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modeling inIP CC AR4 Ch. 10 [2007] , the Climate Change Committee was not up to date.

1. Lord Adair Turner incorrectly told the EAC that feedbacks were in the climate models that his

committee had relied on for their revision of the control gure for the UK.

2. He said, I mean youre absolutely right to identify thatone of the things that you have to be very aware of is theprocess of going to two degrees or three degrees in itselfproduces feedback loops that which increase the chanceof going to a higher level, but those feedback loopsshould be in the scientic models to start with. Right, sothat is precisely what the scientists are attempting to getto grips with. So when the scientists say this emissionstrajectory, we believe, has a 99% chance of keeping usbelow 4 degrees, they have embedded their best judg-ment of the feedback loops within it. They havent pro-duced a model without feedback loops and then you haveto add feedbacks loops as a separate thing; those feed-back loops are in there already. I think what gets verycomplicated is whether there is anywhere you know whatpeople call tipping points or thresholds - does it becometotally irreversible or do we simply have feedback loopswithout absolute irreversibility and I think the scientistsvary on that. But we did highlight that it was possiblethat some of the feedback loops became very stronglyreinforcing above a certain temperature and that therewere some physical things which might be irreversible;you know the melting of the Greenland ice-sheets etc. So

I think we have taken fairly rigorously those into accountin the way that we did it, and that was . . . it was a senseof those feedback loops and that irreversibility that madeus believe that the crucial thing is to limit the increase totwo or slightly above two degrees and to make very likelythat we dont go above three and almost certain that wedont go above four.

3. The underlined section above is signicantly incorrect. Indeed the opposite is true with regard to themodelling of carbon cycle feedbacks. This is the omission of feedbacks that was nally addressed inIPCC AR4, the modelled images here are unpacked on pages 12 and 13 of this document.

4. It comes from Ch 10 WG1 IPCC AR4 [2007]: -

http://ipccwg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_Print_Ch10.pdf

5. Lord Turner refers to the Hadley Centre mod-els. It is the Hadley Centre coupled model inthe image where the difference in the futureweight of global carbon emissions between the

uncoupled models [b - where feedbacks arelargely omitted] and the coupled models [c -where feedbacks are considerably represented]is greatest [as shown in d - where the differ-ences are weighed]. In a phrase, the contrac-tion events are accelerated [or shrunk by more

than 40%] when the carbon-cycle feedbacksare included. Lord Turners committee appeared to be unaware of this.

6. In concert with others, the UK Governments aim is to limit overal global temperature above pre-industrial to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. Not exceeding 450 ppmv CO2 in the atmosphere isconsidered a pre-requisite of keeping within that limit. As things stand that we will fail in that aim.

Atmospheric CO2 450 ppmv


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7. The contraction events for 450 ppmv modeled in the image on the bottom of page seven werepublished for the rst time by IPCC AR4 in 2007. They come from the Hadley Centre and are

uncoupled [without feedbacks] compared with coupled [with feedbacks].

8. With the effect of positive-feedbacks now understood as an issue of urgency, the coupledemissions contraction event has been shrunk to only 60% of the earlier uncoupled event.In weight terms, 2000-2100, it is the difference between around 550 and 330 Gtc.

9. In percentage terms, this is the difference between the 50% and the 80% cut in emissions glo-bally by 2050 shown. Note the 80% cut by 2050 was called for at WEF/DAVOS [p 24 point 1].

10. A full-term global emissions contraction-and-convergence-event at sufcient rates is the stra-tegic necessity to keep within the 450 ppmv limit. With a global cut of emissions by 50% by2050 and international convergence to equal per capita by that date, these rates of contraction& convergence [C&C] are the stated basis of the UK Climate Act as things stand. For reasons ofurgency and equity, these must be accelerated to for example the rates in lower graphic page 6.

11. C&C came from GCI via the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] report 2000.C&C requires rates sufcient to solve the problem. RCEP accepted the principle that the rate ofglobal convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction of greenhouse gasemissions required for to achieve the 550 ppmv they advocated 550 ppmv.

12. Lord Adair Turner, Chairman of the independent Committee on Climate Change, wrote to Ed Milli-band, the Minister for Energy and Climate Change [07/10/08]. He conrmed acceptance of the origi-

nal RCEP C&C target of a 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050, and justied its revision to the RCEPgure of an 80% cut by 2050 inside a 50% cut globally for 450 ppmv, on the grounds of urgency: -

the dangers of signicant climate change are greater than previously assessed;

13. being, on the grounds of equity, equal per capita globally by 2050, telling an enquiry by theHouse of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC),

The core [of the Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal which is both do-able and fair which doesnt end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capita to emit andthat is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has been saying.

14. The House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (ECCC) then told Lord AdairTurner that,

[your] pragmatic support for Contraction and Convergence, on the record from a meeting withthe EAC [04/02/09], is very welcome.

15. Then, referring to the call in January 2009 from World Economic Forum for an 80% cut globallyby 2050 on grounds of increased urgency, [see pages 24/25] they asked him,

Would you accept that as the speed of Contraction accelerates, the speed of the acceleration ofConvergence will also have to pick up? Theres always been a presumption at the InternationalClimate Change negotiations that Developing Countries will be allowed to increase temporarilytheir emissions to help development. But thats going to be a concertinad process - is that reallyhow youd see it?

16. Lord Adair Turner replied,

While this raises a complex issue of international negotiations, you are right.

Impact of Industrial Emissions on Homeorhesis on CO2 & CH4 from long past.

1. Noting the heat-trapping properties of carbon dioxide [CO2] and methane [CH4], they areknown as greenhouse gases [ghgs].

2. The record of these ghgs in ice-core samples collected around the world, now extends to onemillion years before the present. Measurements have been made of ows between their sourcesand sinks.

3. The correlation between the varying temperature and atmospheric concentration of CO2 and CH4is apparent from the data charted opposite through four ice-ages over the last 450,000 years.


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4. What is also observable is that the overallclimate-system was at equilibrium.

5. In conditions that were clearly homeorhetic,- in other words, overall self-correcting - thecorrelation between the varying temperatureand atmospheric concentration of CO2 andCH4 was in band-widths of

[a] 180-280 parts per million by volume

[ppmv] CO2

[b] 300-700 parts per billion by volume[ppbv] CH4, with

[c] Temperature varying between 5-15 de-grees Celsius.

6. This is fundamental to understanding thecircumstances we are now in. The very sud-den rise of the atmospheric concentration ofCO2 and CH4 since 1800, shows that whilethe correlation is still there, the system is nolonger in conditions of homeorhesis, it is go-

ing out of control.

7. John Knaess who led the US delegation tothe 2nd World Climate Conference in Genevain November 1990, made the key points at anews conference receiving the IPCC First As-sessment Report [FAR]. When he was askedif this global warming stuff was really hap-pening, he said: -

Its simple sophomore physics; the ques-tions are only how much change and howsoon?

Observed CO2 in todays atmosphere [Mouna Loa; US Government]

1. Since 1974 and from Mauna Loa Observatoryin Hawaii, the US Government has coordinated a worldprogramme making direct measurements of rising at-mospheric concentrations of CO2 and other gases.

2. The wavy blue line is the aggregate of meas-

urements, going up and down on a rising average,reecting seasonal ux in the carbon-cycle.

3. Compared with the straight line [the dot-ted line], the overall trend curvature [the solid as theaverage of the blue] shows acceleration in the rise ofthe concentrations of CO2.

4. This reects the rst and probably already aswell, the second of two things: -

[a] acceleration in the source-rise of human CO2 emis-sions globally and

[b] declining sink-capacity for these extra CO2 emis-

sions in the natural sinks of CO2

5. In geological time, as shown by linking to the graphic above, this rise is very sudden.It is like an explosion in slow motion and represents a complete loss of homeorhesis.


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Uncoupled Climate models to assess futures with sudden loss of homeorhesis.

1. Since the 1980s climate models have been developed to help predict the future atmospheric concen-tration of CO2 and CH4 under various forest and fossil-fuel burning scenarios. With that, the implica-tions of this array of potential futures on global temperature and climate change have been assessed.

2. A main focus of these has been on the carbon-cycle through the oceans, atmosphere and biosphere,but as inuenced by the impact of the emissions of these gases from human sources as a result ofthe start of burning forests and fossil fuels [coal, oil, gas] with the onset of industrialisation.

3. The principal carbon cycle model used to help answer this question was the Berne Model and out-put from it was rst published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] in 1994.Five scenarios were published; these were future carbon-emissions contraction-events or budg-ets for outcomes of 350, 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv atmospheric CO2 concentration in the globalatmosphere.

4. These reected a judgment given in the IPCCsFirst Assessment Report [FAR] from 1990. In1990 the atmospheric CO2 concentration was353 parts per million by volume [ppmv] or25% above the pre-industrial maximum valueof 280 ppmv. IPCCs judgment was that animmediate 60-80% cut in human emissions of

CO2

would be needed if the upward rise in theatmospheric concentration of CO2 in that yearwere to be halted immediately. They didnt sayit had to be done and they didnt say it didnt;but two things were crucial.

5. First: - it was apparently not the 100% cessa-tion of emissions that was required. Continu-ing with 40-20% of emissions was judged tobe consistent with atmosphere CO2 stabilisa-tion. This view came from observing humanemissions and global concentrations of CO2since 1800. Measurements covering those 200

years showed [a] roughly half of any yearsemissions from human sources returned tothe apparently enlarging natural sinks forCO2 and [b] the other half remained in theatmosphere - where a pattern seemed to haveemerged of what became misleadingly knownas the Constant Airborne Fraction [CAF].

6. Second: - the airborne fraction. Whether thisfraction was in reality constant or not, it wascumulative because the human emissions thatstayed in the atmosphere added up over timeas a rising stock. That explained the rise in

ppmv of atmospheric concentrations of CO2.By June 1992 the UN had agreed a ClimateConvention, the objective of which was tostabilise the rise of ghg in the global atmos-phere below a value that was dangerous. Theprobability of positive-feedback where natu-ral sinks ceased to enlarge, shrank and eventurned to sources, so accelerating the rates of climate change was largely ignored, as they were

speculative and difcult to model.

7. Fossil fuel dependency had become fundamental to modern economic activity and the correlationof GDP to CO2 from fossil fuel burning has been and remains at nearly 100%. The heat-trappingimplications of rising CO2 had serious implications for the future. The climate change questions how

much how soon became will the benets of global growth gradually be outweighed by the dam-ages caused by global climate changes.

8. All the questions about UK carbon budgets in the Climate Act asked by the EAC relate to that globalquestion. In this battle-of-the-rates the C&C propositions offered by GCI for the last 15 years re-late to feedbacks and ghting that battle by answering that question rationally.


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9. With the 350 ppmv budget removed and one for 1,000 ppmv added due to pressure from industrylobbyists in Working Group Three of IPCC, the IPCC re-published these Berne-Model-type resultsfrom 1995 onwards. As is shown below, for the IPCC 1995 Second Assessment Report [SAR] the2001 Third Assessment Report [TAR] and the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report [AR4], these scenar-ios were repeated and have remained the standard reference set for the climate-policy communityfor more than ten years until the present time.

10. It is of note that over 300 years of future time with CO2 concentrations theoretically stabilis-ing safely at up to 1,000 ppmv, on the back of nding, extracting and combusting an in-ventory of up to 2 trillion tonnes of future fossil fuel resources, these scenarios all modelledcontraction:concentration events that, ignoring the positive feedbacks not-too-mention the rapiddepletion of reserves of oil and gas, ludicrously assumed the airborne fraction of emissions in thesescenarios would all remain constant at around 50% right up to 1,000 ppmv.


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Coupled Climate models to assess futures w ith sudden loss of homeorhesis.

1. However, in Chapter 10 of IPCC AR4 [2007] Working Group One [WG1] an important contribu-tion from the Models Inter-Comparison Group was included which addressed this feedbackissue openly for the rst time. All the carbon-cycle emissions scenarios were revisited comparingthe past Uncoupled model runs with the new Coupled model runs, with IPCC saying: -

2. There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emis-sion scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efciency of the Earthsystem (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2.

3. Published in a non-headline-grabbing manner with a complexity of graphic information that dis-couraged interpretation, the graphic [exactly as below] appeared on page 791 where: -

4. Three models: -

Berne 2002,UVic 2004 andHadley 2006

5. in two versions each: -

Uncoupled andCoupled

6. for four scenarios: -

450 ppmv550 ppmv750 ppmv1000 ppmv

were largely superimposed oneach other [as shown].

7. Because of the density of thisoverlay, but especially becauseof the signicance of the ac-knowledgement of the positive-feedback issue being modeled andpublished by IPCC for the rsttime, GCI wrote to the Techni-cal Support Unit [TSU] of IPCCWorking Group One [WG1] to getconrmation that the informationas shown in the graphics on page13 had correctly disentangled theIPCC graphic on page 12. Withthanks, TSU conrmed this say-ing,we wish out authors hadbeen this clear.

8. The principal reason for this enquirywas the quite extraordinary dis-covery that in all the coupled-un-coupled comparisons and unclearlyshown in the images publishedin the AR4, two different pathsfor emissions globally were beingshown prior to 2000, as is shownby following the dotted lines.

9. The reason for this was nally givenby the Hadley Centre who said thatwhen coupling to reect feedbacks

was calculated, the revision of source:sink relations in the carbon-cycle showed that sink-function inthe models had certainly been over-estimated prospectively and retrospectively as well.

10. In other words, with the weight-record of concentrations and past fossil fuel emissions well docu-mented, the modelers concluded that the recent historic emissions from deforestation had also beenoverestimated, throwing their estimates of the strength of sink-function into further doubt.


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EmissionsGigaTonnes

EmissionsGigaTonnes

EmissionsGigaTonnes

550 ppmv

750 ppmv

EmissionsGigaTonnes

1000 ppmv

Difference by weight between

Coupled and Uncoupled Emissions







450 ppmv

It is the uncoupled and the coupled contraction events for 450 ppmv that are relevant here as they show 50%

and 80% cuts by 2050 respectively.


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4. Question: - What w as the basis on w hich the Committee on ClimateChange arrived at the UKs share of the global effort to cut emissions?

the basis on which the Committee on Climate Change arrived at the UK's share of the global effortto cut emissions

Answ er: - The basis was the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution[RCEP] and their advocacy of GCIs Contraction and Convergence [C&C] whomade C&C a key recommendation of their report Ener gy - t he Chang in g Cl i -

m a t e [ 2 00 0] .

Key RCEP recommendations: -

The UK should continue to play a forceful leading role in international negotiations to combat cli-mate change, both in its own right and through the European Union. The gov-ernment should pressfor further reductions in the greenhouse gas emissions of devel-oped nations after 2012, and con-trols on the emissions of developing nations (4.68).

The government should press for a future global climate agreement based on the contraction andconvergence approach, combined with international trading in emission permits. Together, these of-fer the best long-term prospect of securing equity, economy and international consensus (4.69).

The government should now adopt a strategy which puts the UK on a path to reducing carbon di-oxide emissions by some 60% from current levels by about 2050. This would be in line with a globalagreement based on contraction and convergence which set an upper limit for the carbon dioxideconcentration in the atmosphere of some 550 ppmv and a convergence date of 2050 (10.10).

Energy - the Changing Climate RCEP [2000] Chapter 4 - Prospects for anEffective International Response: Contraction & Convergence

The government should press for a future global climate agreement based on the Contraction &Convergence approach, combined with international trading in emission permits. Together, these of-fer the best long-term prospect of securing equity, economy and international consensus (4.69).

4.47 Continued, vigorous debate is needed, within and between nations, on the best basis for anagreement to follow the Kyoto Protocol. Our view is that an effective, enduring and equitable climateprotocol will eventually require emission quotas to be allocated to nations on a simple and equal percapita basis. There will have to be a comprehensive system of monitoring emissions to ensure thequotas are complied with. Adjustment factors could be used to compensate for differences in na-tions basic energy needs. Those countries which regularly experience very low or high temperaturesmight, for instance, be entitled to an extra allocation per capita for space heating or cooling.

4.48 A system of per capita quotas could not be expected to enter into force immediately. At thesame time as entitling developing nations to use substantially more fossil fuels than at present(which they might not be able to afford), it would require developed nations to make drastic and im-mediate cuts in their use of fossil fuels, causing serious damage to their economies.

4.49 A combination of two approaches could avoid this politically and diplomatically unacceptablesituation, while enabling a per capita basis to be adhered to. The rst approach is to require nationsemission quotas to follow a contraction and convergence trajectory. Over the coming decades eachnations allocation would gradually shift from its current level of emissions towards a level set on auniform per capita basis.

By this means grandfather rights would gradually be removed: the quotas of developed nationswould fall, year by year, while those of the poorest developing nations would rise, until all nationshad an entitlement to emit an equal quantity of greenhouse gases per head (convergence). Fromthen on, the quotas of all nations would decline together at the same rate (contraction). The com-bined global total of emissions would follow a prole through the 21st and 22nd centuries that keptthe atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases below a specied limit.

4.50 The upper limit on the concentration of greenhouse gases would be determined by internation-al negotiations, as would the date by which all nations would converge on a uniform per capita basisfor their emission quotas, and the intermediate steps towards that. It would probably also be neces-sary to set a cut-off date for national populations: beyond that date, further changes in the size of acountrys population would not lead to any increase or decrease in its emission quota.


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4.51 In table 4.1 we have applied Contraction & Convergence approach to carbon dioxide emis-sions, and calculated what the UKs emissions quotas would be in 2050 and 2100 for four alterna-tive upper limits on atmospheric concentration. We have assumed for this purpose that 2050 wouldbe both the date by which nations would converge on a uniform per capita emissions gure and thecut-off date for national populations. If 550 ppmv is selected as the upper limit, UK carbon dioxideemissions would have to be reduced by almost 60% from their current level by mid-century, and byalmost 80% by 2100. Even stabilisation at a very high level of 1,000 ppmv would require the UK tocut emissions by some 40% by 2050.

4 .52 The UK-based Globa l Com m ons I ns t i t u te has taken th e l ead i n p rom ot i ng Con t r ac - tion & Convergence, and has developed a computer model that specifes emission allo-ca t i ons under a r ange o f scenar i os . The concep t has been suppor t ed by seve ra l na t i ona l gove rnm en ts and l eg i sl a to rs . Som e deve loped na t i ons a re ve ry w ary o f i t because i t im - p l i es d ras t i c reduc t i ons i n t h e i r em iss ions , bu t a t l eas t one m in i s te r i n a Eu ropean gov e rn -

ment has supported it. Commentators on climate diplomacy have identifed contraction &conve rgence as a l ead ing con tender am ong t he va r i ous p r oposa l s f o r a l l oca t i ng em ission q u o t a s t o n a t i o n s in t h e l o n g t e r m .

4.53 The other ingredient that would make an agreement based on per capita allocations of quotasmore feasible is exibility of the kind already provided in outline in the Kyoto Protocol. Nations mostanxious to emit greenhouse gases in excess of their allocation over a given period will be able andwilling to purchase unused quota at prices that incline other countries to emit less than their quota,to the benet of both parties. The clean development mechanism, which allows developed nationsto claim emission reductions by sponsoring projects that reduce emissions in developing nations tolevels lower than they would otherwise have been, can also be seen as a form of trading.

4.54 In the longer term trading by companies in emission permits, drawn from national emissionquotas determined on the basis of a contraction and convergence agreement, could make a valuablecontribution to reducing the global costs of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations while transfer-ring resources from wealthy nations to poorer ones. Trading needs to be transparent, monitored andregulated, and backed by penalties on nations that emit more than they are entitled to. If it became

merely a means of enabling wealthy nations to buy up the emission entitlements of poor countrieson the cheap, thereby evading taking any action at home, trading would not serve the cause of cli-mate protection. Nor would it if developing countries that had sold quota heavily went on to emit inexcess of their revised entitlements.

[The 60% cut]

[The 80% cut]


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5. C&C methodology for a framework-based market - how it came into RCEP.

1. From 1990 GCI argued for the notion of the future sharing of permits to emit ghg on an equalper capita basis globally. It was seen as a general expression of global equity. When the resultsof the Berne Model were rst published in 1994 GCI uniquely created the rational calculatingmodel that we called Contraction and Convergence [C&C] that calculates any rate of achievingequal rights, subject to the limit that achieves the objective of the UNFCCC. Following the leadgiven by the Bern Model, in this order C&C calculates and integrates: -

[a] any global path-integrals of future emissions [Contraction:Stable-Concentration-events] with

[b] any rate of arriving at the globally/internationally equal per capita sharing of such events[Contraction:Convergence] with linear convergence and an optional population base-year function.

2. The model includes: -

[c] historic data for emissions of all countries 1800-2000 [CDIAC] and

[d] population projections for 50 years [UNSTAT] and the base-year function can be invoked forany one of those years as desired by users. As C&C is integrated in spread-sheet architecture,internationally comprehensive graphic output demonstrating different rates of C&C is quite easyto generate and the trend rates of growth for the economy, emissions, concentrations and thedamages caused by climate changes can be compared to this, as follows for example:

CO2 CONCEN TRATION

250

450

650

850

1050

p

pm

vBAU

Lowest outcome to C&C below

-4%

0%

4%

8%

12%

GDP

CO2 C&C

CO2 with trade

C O2 & GD P ' Lock s tep ' b rokenAnnual %s change

D AMAGES BAU

$

$100

$200

trillionsDamages @10%/year

GDP @3%/year

TEMPER ATU R E

-1

0

1

2

3

4

Celsius

BAU

Lowest outcome with C&C below

Zero-CO2

Renewables

Efficiency

Gtc

5Gtc

10Gtc

15Gtc

20Gtc

1800 1900 2000 2100 2200

Efficiency

Zero-CO2 RenewablesCO2 Non Annex One

Traded A rea - CO2?CO2 Annex One

BAU

CO2 CONTRACTION& CO NVERGENCE

Recorded surface temperature from 1860 until 2000 showsan overall rise of 0.9C. The future projections are follow-ing CO2 emissions and atmospheric greenhouse gas con-centrations in parts per million by volume (ppmv). The redlines here and below, show Business-As-Usual (BAU) wherethe underlying emissions grow at 2%/yr. The blue line hereshows the lowest possible climate sensitivity - a total rise of1.5C - assuming a contraction by 2100 of 60% of emissionsagainst a 1990 baseline.

Recorded atmospheric CO2 concentration from 1860 until2000 shows an increase of 34% over pre-industrial levels.This is a rise both higher and faster than anywhere in the ice-core sampling up to 440,000 years before now. Concentra-tions are rising as the result of accumulating emissions. In fu-ture, the worst case is the red line (BAU). The blue line shows

this concentration stabilised at 70% above pre-industriallevels due to the 60% contraction in the underlying emissionsby 2100 shown below.

Damages here are the global economic losses (Munich Re)for the four decades past for all natural disasters projectedat the observed rate of increase of 10% a year in compari-son to global $GDP at 3%. If the global trends continue BAU,damages will exceed GDP by 2065! The risks will soon risebeyond the capacity of the insurance industry and even gov-ernments to absorb. Damages will rise for the century aheadeven with emissions contraction, but this rate can be retardedwith early adoption of contraction & convergence with trade(see below).

For the past four decades, the output of CO2 and GDP from

global industry have been correlated nearly 100% (referredto here as lockstep). Breaking the lockstep is essential.Future GDP is projected here at 3% a year. Future CO2 goesto -2% with the retreat from fossil fuel dependency shownbelow, that limits CO2 concentrations to 70% above pre-industrial levels (shown above). If the traded area (below) isalso converted to zero-emissions supply the carbon retreatmight achieve up to -4% a year.

The red line shows BAU CO2 emissions. The solid segmentsshow C&C with trading to reduce emissions by at least 60%within a given time frame (here by 2100) within an agreed

contraction budget (here 680 billion tonnes of carbon). Theinternationally tradable shares of this budget (here, 100billion tonnes) result from convergence to equal per capitalemissions by an agreed date and population base year (here

2020). If this is invested in zero-emissions technologies, riskand damages are lowered further as the budget is then netof these emissions as well. The renewables opportunity is thedifference between C&C with trading and BAU. It is worth tril-lions of dollars per annum - the biggest market in history.


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3. The costs of continuing to cause the problem faster than we respond to avoid it are incalculable.The key is to calculate and demonstrate futures where we understand communicate and or-ganise to solve the climate problem faster than we cause it. C&C is a tool for that purpose. TheUK Climate Act is a globally dened, national response to what it now accepts is a C&C-basedengagement with that international dilemma.

4. GCI displayed large graphic output of C&C to the UN climate negotiations from 1996 onwardsand C&C immediately became fundamental to the UNFCCCs equity-debate on QELROs [Quanti-ed Emissions Reductions Limitations Options] and it came close to being adopted at COP-3 inKyoto in 1997: http://www.gci.org.uk/temp/COP3_Transcript.pdf[p 43].

5. In 1999, as a result of all this, theRoyal Commission on Environmen-tal Pollution [RCEP] requested GCIto provide Contraction and Conver-gence [C&C] input to the report theywere preparing based on the Bernemodel. GCI presented them withmaterial resembling the three sce-narios along-side. GCIs rule was asshown; where contraction was accel-erated, convergence was acceleratedrelative to that.

6. As shown on pages 14 and 15 of thisdocument, in their report to Gov-ernmentEnergy - the ChangingClimate[2000], the RCEP adoptedC&C at rates for 550 ppmv withconvergence to per capita equalityby 2050 and this gave the gure ofa 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050.RCEP made C&C and minus 60% forthe UK, a key recommendation toGovernment. While the Government

wavered on the adoption of C&C, thegure of minus 60% for UK emis-sions by 2050 derived from it be-came the initial basis of the UK ghgcontrol.

7. Keeping scenarios for 450 and 550ppmv, RCEP incautiously replacedthe scenario for 350 ppmv with onesfor 750 and 1000 ppmv adding:

8. Concentration of 550 ppmv rep-resents approximately double theconcentration of carbon dioxide in

the atmosphere prior to industriali-sation (2.7). Some environmentalgroups (including the Global Com-mons Institute, see 4.52) regard 550ppmv as a dangerously high concen-tration which is incompatible with theaim of sustainable development.8 8.Global Commons Institutes website,http:/www.gci.org.uk

9. The institute regards 450 ppmv asan upper limit.

4

8

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140

Gigaton

nesCarbon

Gross

Rest of World

INDIA

CHINA

Annex 1 (non-OECD)

OECD minus USA

UNITED STATES

0

2

4

6

tonnescarbonpercapita

USA Per Capita

Annex 1 (non-OECD) Per Capita

OECD minus USA Per Capita

CHINA Per Capita

Rest of World Per Capita

INDIA Per Capita

GLOBAL CO2"CONTRACTION" for 350 ppmv with

6 Region Linear "CONVERGENCE"from Status Quo in 2000 to Equal Per Capita by 2020

4

8

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140

GigatonnesCarbon

Gross

Rest of World

INDIA

CHINA

Annex 1 (non-OECD)

OECD minus USA

UNITED STATES

0

2

4

6

tonnescarbon

percapita

USA Per Capita


OECD minus USA Per Capita

CHINA Per Capita


INDIA Per Capita


6 Region Linear "CONVERGENCE"

from Status Quo in 2000 to Equal Per Capita by 2030

4

8

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140

GigatonnesCarbonGross

Rest of World

INDIA

CHINA

Annex 1 (non-OECD)

OECD minus USA

UNITED STATES

0

2

4

6

tonnescarb

on

percapita

USA Per Capita


OECD minus USA Per CapitaCHINA Per Capita


INDIA Per Capita


6 Region Linear "CONVERGENCE"

from Status Quo in 2000 to Equal Per Capita by 2040


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6. Note on the methodology and po litics of C&C and positive feedbacks

1. From the outset GCI had been concerned about the really problematic nature of the positive-feedback issue because: - [a] the threat of climate change becoming runaway was a realityproportional to the extent the effects of warming started feeding off each other, generating aglobal fast-breeder reaction the possibility of which was hard to discount though [b] the difcul-ties of numerically modeling this were nearly insuperable.

2. There was understandably erce resistance to allowing the questions about how much change,how soon? and at what rates will the benets of economic growth be outweighed by the costs

of the damages it causes? to entertain the possibility that all our efforts to organise a globalcontraction-and-convergence equivalent event may just become too little too late and so ulti-mately futile.

3. Moreover, by 1996 GCI had already generated a reputation for radicalism because of publiclyghting and also winning a battle against the economics of genocide in the preparation of theIPCC Second Assessment. [IPCC SAR WG3 Chapter 6].

4. With the C&C models introduction in 1996, the contraction:concentrations part of calculussimply mimicked the procedures of the Berne model. These, although modeled a different way,showed a relationship between emissions and concentrations that de facto equaled and extend-ed an airborne fraction forward over time that remained roughly constant at 50%.

5. Indeed, all the Berne-type emissions:concentration scenarios published by the IPCC 1994 to

2007, were for all practical purposes, expressions of an airborne fraction of emissions constantat 50% and these - dangerously - have held the status of holy-writ since 1994.

6. GCIs method was to go from mimicking the contraction:concentrations relationship as mod-eled in the Berne model [and the other models that were gradually appearing], to a method ofsimple mathematical trend-projection. Unlike the so-called carbon-cycle models, which whether

coupled or uncoupled were opaque, GCIs method was simple, precise and transparent. As theC&C model was designed to compute any rates of contraction with any rates of convergence, atrst mimicking the convention of 450, 550 ppmv and so on, GCI computed with C&C:

[a] a range of emissions contraction-events, with rates and dates and carbon weighed conven-tionally in gigatonnes of carbon [Gtc] as ows of carbon per unit time; but then: -

[b] with 1 ppmv CO2 equalling 2.13 Gigatonnes carbon, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were

converted to weight, so accumulations [concentrations] were more easily computed as a fractionof emissions. The value of 280 ppmv in 1800 gave atmospheric stock of carbon in that year as595 Gtc. and the rising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were then projected as an accumula-tion of various fractions of the emissions contraction-events i.e adding to the existing atmos-pheric stock at constant rates of of 50%, 75% and 100% airborne fractions. As the graphicsopposite show, this procedure gives a frame of reference [yellow band] against which differentrates of sink-failure, e.g. at 0.5%/year, 1%/year, 2%/year, can be projected for comparison.

7. Presently the budgets are a function of a global emissions contraction of 50% by 2050 withconvergence to equal per capita entitlements globally by 2050. The UK budget came from IPCCs

canon of uncoupled carbon-cycle models assuming an airborne fraction of emissions constant@ ~50% giving 500 ppmv.

8. To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be a function ofcoupled modelling where a global emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the air-borne fraction may still stay constant @ ~50% giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks fail-ing @ ~0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be >450ppmv.

9. Convergence to equal per capita emissions entitlements globally for example by 2020 [as shownhere], would apply the C&C principle where, if contraction must be accelerated for reasons ofurgency, convergence should be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

10. This rate-of-convergence of course is the principle means whereby correction of the past asym-metries of Expansion and Divergence can be negotiated.

11. As noted in the Garnaut Review [2007],The contraction and convergence approach addresses

the central international equity issue simply and transparently. Slower convergence (a later dateat which per capita emissions entitlements are equalised) favours emitters that are above theglobal per capita average at the starting point. Faster convergence gives more emissions rightsto low per capita emitters. The convergence date is the main equity lever in such a scheme.


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7. Impact of feedback on C&C proportionality-rule and the UK Climate Act

1. In a letter to the Secretary of State [07/10/08], Lord Adair Turner conrmed acceptance ofRCEPs C&C-derived target of a 60% cut in UK emissions by 2050. He then, consistent with RCEPgures for [uncoupled] C&C, [see RCEP table 4.1 row 1, page 13 of this document] justied itsrevision to an 80% cut by 2050 on the grounds of urgency and equity telling the EnvironmentalAudit Committee [EAC]: -

The core [of the Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal which is both do-able and fair which doesnt end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capita to emit and

that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has been saying.

2. The Energy & Climate Change Committee [ECCC] subsequently put to him that: -

[your] pragmatic support for Contraction and Convergence, on the record from a meeting withthe EAC, is very welcome.

3. Then, referring to the call from WEF for an 80% cut globally by 2050, [pages 24 25] asked him:

Would you accept that as the speed of Contraction accelerates, the speed of the acceleration ofConvergence will also have to pick up? Theres always been a presumption at the InternationalClimate Change negotiations that Developing Countries will be allowed to increase temporarilytheir emissions to help development. But thats going to be a concertinad process - is that reallyhow youd see it?

4. Lord Adair Turner replied: -

While this raises a very complex issue of international negotiations, you are right.

Equal Per Capita by 2020

With an 80% cut globally

by 2050


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8. The emerging consensus for C&C

1. Since 1992 and embracing the years of the so-called Kyoto-Protocol [1995-1997-2008], valu-able time has been lost in negotiation of a genuinely UNFCCC-compliant global framework.

2. At COP9, Milan, 4th December 2003, Joke Waller Hunter Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC saidpublicly,

Achieving the goal of the climate treaty inevitably requires contraction and convergence.

3. Lord Adair Turners evidence to the EAC in Feb 2009 was encouraging and said: -

The core [of the Climate Act] is contract and converge. We cannot imagine a global deal whichis both doable and fair which doesnt end up by mid-century with roughly equal rights per capitato emit and that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support for what Aubrey Meyer hasbeen saying.

4. After 20 years of campaigning for C&C, this was another notable example of feeding the theemerging consensus for C&C described by Kemal Dervis Chief Administrator of the UNDP. Onthe 5th of April 2008, the UK Government hosted an international Conference on ProgressiveGovernance outside London. At this a paper by Lord Nicholas Stern (LSE) and Laurence Tubiana(Iddri/SciencesPo) entitled A Progressive global deal on climate change was presented to theconference. It stated that: -

An international agreement is essential. It must be based on the criteria of effectiveness, ef-

ciency and equity. Effectiveness demands a long-term global goal capping global emissionsand providing a long-term trajectory for investment in low carbon technologies. This should beat least a halving of global emissions by 2050. A pragmatic principle of equity would require anequalisation of per capita emissions by then.

5. This was immediately then endorsed by the Head of UNDP, Kemal Dervis, who was present andwelcomed it as part of what he called the emerging consensus which the UNDP had itself de-scribed as C&C in their Human Development report for 2007/8 Fighting Climate Change; Hu-man Solidarity in a Divided World in the section Contraction and Convergence; Sustainabilitywith Equity [see Section 10.9 of this document].

6. Section 10 provides some of the evidence of this emerging consensus for C&C. The eminentpersons and institutions in this only partial list is long, but from it the names, Tony Blair, John

Schelnhuber, Kemal Dervis, Nicholas Stern stand out because they have been conspicuously partof a version of the emerging consensus for C&C that advocated minus 50% globally by 2050with equal per capita by then.

7. The 50% cut by 2050 globally coincided with the equalization of per capita emissions globally bythat date too, involving an 80% cut in the emissions of Developed Countries.

8. In other words part of the C&C principle where, for reasons of equity, convergence must be ac-celerated relative to the rate of contraction was accepted in this emerging consensus.

9. Yet a year later these people signed the statement from the World Economic Forum in DAVOS[Jan 2009] which called for an 80% cut globally by 2050 [see Section 8.2 of this document].

10. This new position of an 80% cut globally - i.e. by everyone - remarkably abandoning the equitypart of the principle that convergence must be accelerated relative to the rate of contraction.

11. For reasons of urgency, the call for the cut of 80% by Developed Countries stood and was sim-ply extended to everyone else in Developing Countries to do likewise.

12. The UK Climate Act applies the equity aspect of the C&C principle that convergence must beaccelerated relative to the rate of contraction. However, it is at overall rates that are too slow toachieve the UK Governments target of 450 ppmv/2 degrees.

13. The Stern et al WEF/DAVOS position correctly accelerates contraction for reasons of urgency toa rate that could keep us within that target, but abandons the aspect of the principle where con-vergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

14. It is notable these people on the WEF/DAVOS list didnt pick up on the issue of feedbacks evenwith the arrival of the coupled modeling published in IPCC AR4 in 2007 and that only, nally

with their publication of that WEF/DAVOS statement in 2009, would it appear that they did.15. However, to have abandoned the emerging consensus for C&C which they had become a

signicant part of generating, by failing to uphold the aspect that, if contraction must be accel-erated for reasons of urgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons ofequity as well, it was provocative and counter-productive.


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16. In the Energy and Climate Change Committee, Colin Challen MP correctly emphasized what hecalled the dangers of Developing Countries being concertinad as the rate of contraction inevita-bly picked up for reasons or urgency without the rate of convergence being accelerated relativeto that for reasons of equity.

17. He welcomed the acceptance by Adair Turner that the C&C principle was the core of the ClimateAct. He then questioned him about the situation created by the WEF statement where acceler-ated contraction was called for asking that, if contraction must be accelerated for reasons ofurgency, convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.

18. Lord Turner took Colin Challens point and responded by saying that he was right.

19. So the questions posed by EAC about the derivation of the carbon-budgets in the UK Climate Actare appropriate. The control gure as advocated and defended by Lord Adair Turners ClimateChange Committee is a result of being unaware of, or possibly just ignoring, the coupled mod-eling in the AR4, the debut of which was itself was years overdue.

9. Risk: - The Real danger of not doing enough soon enough

1. However, all this reveals another and more serious problem and it is in this risk-context that theemissions control paradigm outlined in the UK Climate Act needs to be understood. With sinksfailing and feedbacks becoming more net positive as concentrations rise, a reality becomes more

and not less likely that the higher concentrations are forced to go by unrestrained emissions oreven by insufciently restrained emissions, the faster the annual rate of sink failure will become.

2. The models dont really tell us that on current trends of failure to control emissions and the mo-mentum that is being generated by this, it is not implausible to foresee rates of net sink failurethat can eventually become greater than 100% of emissions per annum. The interactive effect ofpositive feedbacks can accelerate and even totally overwhelm the declining of source:sink bal-ance we still presently have.

3. Runaway climate change can become unstoppable as we all go beyond a point of no-return,where all attempts of emissions-control become futile as we are overtaken by the damagesfrom the momentum of what becomes increasingly catastrophic rates of global climate change.

4. As the RCEP correctly recognised in 2000, a fully global solution is needed to this denitively

global problem and that the global framework for organising the ghg emissions control to pre-vent this is Contraction and Convergence.

5. The key is to bring C&C to bear as an organising principle and then apply it at rates that are fastenough to head off the threat of what the eminent Australian Government economist Prof. RossGarnaut had already called in 2007, the diabolical problem of climate change to which humanitymay well lose. As with the UK RCEP his Climate Review for the Australian Government in 2007was based on Contraction and Convergence, about which this year he wrote: -

Over the last 20 years, Aubrey Meyers sustained work through the GCI with the Contractionand Convergence - or C&C - concept and campaign, has created a global standard that is nowwidely recognized as an outstanding and essential contribution to the global debate on what todo to avoid dangerous rates of climate change. This is remarkable and reects the integrity ofthe argument where C&C is mathematically rooted in the science of climate change and mar-ries the limit to future human emissions that avoids dangerous rates of climate change to thepolitically compelling requirement of equal shares in the use of the atmosphere subject to thatlimit. It embodies the economic political reality, that adjustment to equal per capita emissionsentitlements will take time. It is a rational, exible and transparent concept that holds out thebest hope of all urgent proposals that might form a basis of an environmentally and economi-cally rational global agreement on climate change mitigation. The contraction and convergenceidea was at the core of the proposals for inter-national agreement that are part of the GarnautClimate Change Review, commissioned by and presented to the Australian Prime Minister andall State Premiers (R. Garnaut, 2008, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Cambridge Univer-sity Press; www.garnautreview.org.au ). Support should be given to this campaign particularlyat this time as this year - 2009 - leads to a UN event in Copenhagen in December at which it isintended that the global plan to avoid dangerous rates of climate change is agreed and estab-

lished for the long-term.


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10. Reference materials supporting the GCI Memorandum, follow.

1. Garnaut Climate Change Review June 2008 [p 23].

2. World Economic Forum 2008: Shaping an Opportunity Out of Crisis - A message to participantsin the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009 from Members of the Global Agenda Councilon Climate Change. [pp 24/5].

3. Global Warming The Complete Brieng 3rd Edition 2004, Sir John Houghton. [pp 26/9].

4. Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change CUP 2006, edited by Schelnhuber, Cramer, Nakicenovic,Wigley, Yohe. [pp 30/1].

5. IPCC Third Assessment 2001: WGIII, Chapter 1, Page 90. [p 32].

6. IPCC Fourth Assessment 2007: WGIII, Chapter 3, Page 214. [p 33].

7. Climate Protection Strategies for the 21st Century: Kyoto and beyond 2003, German AdvisoryCouncil on Climate Change (WBGU). [p 34].

8. The Economics of Climate Change The Stern Review 2006, CUP: Part I, Climate Change, 2AEthical frameworks and inter-temporal equity, page 47. [p 35].

9. Human Development Report 2007/8, UNDP, [pp 36/9].

10. Breaking the Climate Deadlock A Global Deal for our Low-Carbon Future 2008, Tony Blairand The Climate Group. [p 40].

11. Energy The Changing Climate 2000, RCEP 22nd Report. [pp 41/2].

12. Letter from Sir Tom Blundell to GCI, 2000. [p 43].

13. UK Government response to RCEP 2000, Recommendation 3, RCEP para 4.69. [p 44].

14.The Scientic Case for Setting a Long Term Emission Reduction Target 2003, DEFRA. [p 45].

15. The International Challenge of Climate Change: UK Leadership in the G8 and EU 2005, Houseof Commons Environmental Audit Committee, page 268. [p 46].

16. Beyond Stern: From the Climate Change Programme Review to the Draft Climate Change Bill

2007, House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee. [p 47].17. Links to GCI materials and information. [p 48].

18. C&C At The Climax Of The Kyoto [Cop3] UN Climate Negotiation, 10-12-1997. [p 49].

19. The Incontestable Truth 2007 DVD commissioned by the UK All Party Parliamentary Groupon Climate Change. [p 50].

20. Carbon Countdown 2008, Global Commons Institute, Section 10, C&C Support. [pp 51/62].

21. Tributes and awards to GCI Director Aubrey Meyer.

22. Insurance Industry views of Contraction and Convergence.


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Garnaut CLIMATE CHANGE REVIEW

The per capita approach is generally referred to as contraction and convergence(Global Commons Institute 2000) and has gured in the international debate forsome time.

Global Commons Institute 2000, GCI brieng: contraction and convergence, available at , originally published as Meyer, A. 2000, Engineering Sustainability 157(4):18992.

It has been promoted by India and has been discussed favourably in Germany and

the United Kingdom (German Advisory Council on Global Change 2003; UK RoyalCommission on Environmental Pollution 2000). Recent reports have shown increas-ing support for this approach internationally: see, for example, Stern (2008) andthe Commission on Growth and Development (2008).5

Under contraction and convergence, each country would start out with emissionsentitlements equal to its current emissions levels, and then over time converge toequal per capita entitlements, while the overall global budget contracts to accom-modate the stabilisation objective. This means that emissions entitlements percapita decrease for countr ies above the global average, and increase (albeit t ypi-cally at a slower rate than unconstrained emissions growth) in countries below the

global average per capita level. Importantly, emissions entitlements would betradable between countries, allowing actual emissions to differ from the contractionand convergence trajectory.

The per capita approach addresses the international equity issue transparently:slower convergence (a later date at which per capita emissions entitlements areequalised) favours emitters that are above the global per capita average at thestarting point, while faster convergence gives more emissions rights to low percapita emitters. The convergence date is the main equity lever in such a scheme.


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Shaping an Opportunity Out of Crisis

A message to participants in the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009

from Members of the Global Agenda Council on Climate Change1

1. Few other challenges are as serious for the future of humanity as cl imate change. The IPCC in its FourthAssessment Report has highlighted an accelerated change in average surface global temperature as well as in thesea level rise since the mid-1980s. Growing scientific evidence suggests that failure to limit global warming to2Celsius (3.6Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels would make it impossible to avoid potentially irreversiblechanges to the Earths ability to sustain human development. According to the most advanced climate systemmodels, there is a 5 in 6 chance of success in holding the 2C-line if worldwide greenhouse gas output is reduced by80% by 2050, relative to 1990. In light of this scientific evidence, cuts in emissions of 50% by 2050 relative to 1990should be the absolute minimum for target reductions and the aim should be to make cuts as close to 80% aspossible if the cost is not prohibitive. For richer countries - as per recent announcements by US and Europeanleaders - the aspiration should be at least an 80% reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 levels, along with appropriatenearer-term targets such as in 2020 or 2025.

2. The need to begin the transition to a low-carbon global economy has become far more urgent. We need tomove fast. Scientific evidence shows world emissions must peak and decline in the next 10-15 years, to keep thedoor open for climate stabilization. We should be mindful that decreased emissions as a result of the economicslowdown should not be misinterpreted as real progress. Economic recession is not an answer to climatechange. We want the world economy to grow and this growth must be sustainable, which means transitioning to alow-carbon global economy. Developed countries must show leadership in driving forward the low-carbon transitionand in leading Research Development & Demonstration (RD&D) for low-carbon technologies. These challenges willbe impossible to meet without the full engagement of major developing countries as well.

3. We must innovate as we rebuild our economies during 2009. The world is facing a lack of financial liquidity andconfidence that require a synchronized global economic stimulus. It is essential that this stimulus also build ourcapacity to solve the longer term climate crisis. Well meaning, but short-sighted economic stimulus programmescould lock us into a predominately fossil fuel based world economy for decades. This will not bring the resilience thatis needed for sustained long-term economic growth. Presuming rapid growth follows this recession, demand forenergy will again grow, oil prices will rise, and energy security issues will again come to the forefront. If we fail to act,a unique opportunity to shift the world towards a sustainable growth path will have been lost. This means we mustdeploy aggressively and immediately those low-carbon technologies that are market ready; we must invest heavily toinnovate potential breakthrough technologies that can achieve success in the market over the next two decades.While the challenges of 2025 and 2050 seem distant today, the long lag times in the worlds energy system requireimmediate action.

4. Let us shape an opportunity out of this economic crisis . A large fiscal stimulus is required to mitigate the worsteffects of the economic crisis. In some economies, a significant portion of the stimulus spent today could be sensiblydeployed to lay the foundation for the long-term worldwide low-carbon economy of tomorrow. This makes sense insimple risk management terms: deploy a small percentage of global GDP now, to help ward off the risk of muchlarger impacts in the future.

5. There are real opportunit ies to stimulate jobs and growth today from investments in the low-carboneconomy. Clean technology is developing fast. Large-scale activities in low-emitting technologies, renewables,

energy efficiency, building insulation, information and telecommunications and some low-carbon public procurementprogrammes could be swiftly mobilized around the world. These activities will provide jobs and market stimulus aswell as quick economic returns and they will also help lay the foundations for a low-emissions future. Differentcountries will choose different strategies to implement such programmes, but the net global impact on emissionscould be significant. If governments provide the right policy incentives, businesses operating around the world,whether located in the OECD or in developing countries, will be able to respond rapidly to these economic stimuli.

6. At the same time, a foundation for the longer term can be built, if some of this money is also used to catalyselonger-term strategies, including: Boosting innovative public-private investment mechanisms that create a vested interest for business and society to

redirect capital flows around the world into low-carbon and energy efficiency technologies; Provoking a step change in research, development and demonstration efforts for technology innovation; Stimulating widespread deployment of clean and affordable technologies for the poor to help them leapfrog onto a

low-carbon development trajectory;

Realizing new investment and financing mechanisms to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, combinedwith national economic development and capacity building programmes, enabling forested countries and theircitizens to gain financially from being stewards in the conservation of their ecosystems and biodiversity;

1

The views expressed here emerged from the Council discussions. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the World EconomicForum or the views of all Members of the Global Agenda Council on Climate Change or the organizations they represent .


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Restructuring, expanding or creating international markets and capital flows that can stimulate and finance thedemand for both public and private sector activities in low-carbon goods and services - this requires a clear priceon carbon to correct a serious market failure and harness the power of markets to reduce emissions. Such a pricecan come inter aliafrom international levies, taxes or quotas, trading schemes, and the reduction and removal ofsubsidies for carbon based energy sources without hurting the energy poor. Other incentive structures includingprocurement standards and regulation can give clear signals and allow the exploitation of economies of scale.Different countries will pursue different combinations of policies but incentives to cut emissions are crucial;

Mobilizing human and financial resources for adaptation and climate preparedness; Strengthening and creating regional or sector based institutions that can help deploy knowledge, technology and

finance to help shift the major economies onto a low-carbon pathway;

Boosting global capacity for data collection, the harmonization of reporting and the enforcement of commitments.

Importantly, although public subsidies may play a role, each of these initiatives can identify smart ways to use limitedpublic funds to trigger much more private finance.

7. We believe that unprecedented multi stakeholder collaboration i s needed for 2009 to link the climate andeconomic agendas. The negotiation of international commitments and the development of multilateral institutionalarrangements for the new climate framework are best addressed by governments within the UN process. If designedin synch, however, the long-term international climate change agreement to be established in 2009 and the variousshort-term plans for economic recovery could be mutually reinforcing. The mobilization of an unprecedented public-private collaboration of international business, civil society side by side with environmental economists, trade andclimate experts working with governments could play a valuable role in synchronizing this design process. In concreteterms, such collaboration could: Help design the policy instruments, market incentives and investment vehicles that will mobilize the

entrepreneurialism and finance that exists around the world to focus on the low-carbon challenge; Identify critical actions as part of the stimulus packages of major economies that can sow the seeds for both

economic recovery andlong-term protection of the climate; Help key emitting countries develop project pipelines that can deliver results against the various climate change

national plans developed as part of the UNFCCC process.

8. We also believe that climate change now presents a diplomatic oppor tunity. An international narrative ofeconomic growth and a low-carbon future collectively presented by the governments of the major economies during2009, in a leadership collaboration with international business, civil society and climate experts, would offer apositive, unifying and long-term multilateral agenda for both the economy and the climate, as well as a positivemessage for consumers and voters. This affirmative and growth-based agenda would help the global public see howthe long-term economic interests of major economies such as the USA, China, India, the EU and Japan are servedby coming together around a shared set of objectives to drive forward a low-carbon global economy:

the shared desire to deliver climate security, energy, food and water security, economic security, equity between richand poor through enhanced capital and technology flows, all through the creation of a package that promotes economic

growth by decarbonizing the world economy.

9. We look forward to the discussions at this years World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos-Klosters. Wehope they lay the foundations for major government-civil society-business and expert collaboration on climate changein 2009 to pursue an agenda as described above. We encourage all participants in the Annual Meeting to engageactively in the range of climate change discussions on offer to help fulfil this objective. We stand ready to support andadvise such discussions.

January 2009

Members of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Climate Change 2008-2009 are:

Atul Arya, Chief Advisor, Climate and Energy Policy, BP, UnitedKingdom

Tony Blair, Founder, Breaking the Climate Deadlock initiative andPrime Minister of the United Kingdom (1997-2007)James Cameron, Vice-Chairman, Climate Change Capital, UnitedKingdomYvo De Boer, Executive Secretary, United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), BonnKemal Dervis, Administrator, United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), New YorkHarish Hande, Managing Director, SELCO Solar Light, IndiaConnie Hedegaard, Minister of Climate and Energy of DenmarkWilliam W. Hogan, Raymond Plank Professor of Global EnergyPolicy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,USASteve Howard, Chief Executive Officer, The Climate Group, UnitedKingdomKevin S. Leahy, Managing Director, Climate Policy, Duke EnergyCorporation, USAGerd Leipold, International Executive Director, GreenpeaceInternational, NetherlandsAnthony Leiserowitz, Research Scientist and Director, YaleProject on Climate Change, Yale School of Forestry andEnvironmental Studies, USA

Richard C. Levin, President, Yale University, USADavid MacKay, Professor of Natural Philosophy, Department

of Physics, University of Cambridge, United KingdomDan Reicher, Director, Climate Change and Energy Initiatives,Google, USADavid Sandalow, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, TheBrookings Institution, USAHans Joachim Schellnhuber , Director, Potsdam Institute forClimate Impact Research (PIK), GermanyRobert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business andGovernment, John F. Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, USANicholas Stern, IG Patel Chair, London School of Economics,United KingdomBjrn Stigson, President, World Business Council forSustainable Development, SwitzerlandSolomon D. Trujillo , Chief Executive Officer, TelstraCorporation, AustraliaDavid G. Victor, Professor of Law and Director, Program onEnergy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University,USATimothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation,Washington DC

For more information on the Global A enda Council on Climate Chan e, please write to Copenha [email protected]


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31.5 The Regional Emission Implications

This section presents regional emission allowances that follow from the global emission pathways.

We chose one out of many possible options, for the international regime of differentiating future (post-

2012) commitments: the Contraction & Convergence approach. This approach is selected here as it

is a widely known and transparent approach despite concerns in regard to its political feasibility. The

approach denes emission allowances on the basis of convergence of per capita emission allowances

(starting after 2012) of all countries (including the USA)5 in 2050 under a contracting global emissions

pathway (Meyer, 2000). Figure 31.7 gives the change in the regional emission allowances of the six

Kyoto gases (excluding land use CO2) compared to the 1990 levels for 2020 and 2050 for the CPI +

tech scenario.

This analysis suggests that Annex I commitments need to be strongly intensied after 2012, if global

emissions should follow any of the presented pathways. In 2020, Annex I Kyoto-gas emissions (ex-

cluding land use CO2) need to be reduced by about 25% in comparison with 1990 levels for 400 ppm,

and about 15-20% for 450 ppm stabilization. The reductions compared to the baseline are about 10-

15% higher. In 2050, the reductions below 1990 levels stand at about 90% (400 ppm) and (450 ppm),

respectively (see Figure 31.7).


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IPCC Third Assessment [ Published Cambr idge University Press]Working Group Three Chapter One Page 90

Rights-based, t hat is based on equal (or otherwise defensible) r ights t o the globalcommons.

A fo rm u la t ion t ha t ca r r ies th is insigh t t o i ts log ica l conc lusion is th a t o f con-

t r act i on and conve rgence ( Meye r , 1999 ) , whereby net aggregate emissions de-cline to zero, and per capita emissions of Annex I and non-Annex I countries reachprecise equality.

C&C in IPCC Third Assessment, CUP


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IPCC Four th Assessment [ Published Cambr idge University Press]Work ing Group Three Chapter Three Page 214

A number of scenario studies have been conducted for various countries within Eu-rope. These studies explore a wide range of emission caps, taking into account localcircumstances and potentials for technology implementat ion.

Many of these studies have used specic burden-sharing allocation schemes, such asthe cont rac t ion and convergence (C& C) approach ( GCI , 2005 ) for calculating t heallocation of worldwide emissions to estimate national emissions ceilings. The UKsEnergy Whit e Paper (DTI , 2003) examined m easures to achieve a 60% reduction inCO2 emissions by 2050 as compared to the current level.

C&C in IPCC Fourth Assessment CUP


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The Councils recomm endation: Aim towards equal per-capita emissionrights and linear harmonization of emissions shares The WBGU recommendsthat emission rights for the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocolbe allocated according to the contraction and convergence approach, taking2050 as convergence year.

This means that global emissions would need to be reduced substantiallyover the long term (contraction). In a further step, it would be agreed thatthe per-capita emissions of all states must reach equal levels in a continuous

process extending until 2050 (convergence).

In particular, this means that the percapita emissions of industrialized coun-tries, which are still comparatively high at present, must be reduced, whilesome developing countries can initially increase their per-capita emissions.

The principle of constancy requires that there be no sudden switch to equalper-capita emissions, because of the resulting stresses on the global econo-my. The approach further presupposes a functioning global emissions trad-ing scheme, in order to reduce the costs of the transformation process.

Contract ion and convergence

The model of contraction and convergence (C&C; Meyer, 2000) is basedupon a fundamentally equal right of all individuals to emit. This can be de-rived from the human right to equal treatment, and corresponds to the prin-ciple of equity under the UNFCCC (Art. 3(1)), and thus corresponds to theegalitarian principle postulated by the Council.

Under this approach, the global emissions budget resulting at each point intime from t he target path for global emissions is broken down such that theper-capita emission rights of all countries or regions converge and are equalfrom a set convergence year onwards. This process can be lin ear or non-lin-ear, at a rate that must also be set.

Thus, for pragmatic reasons (principle of constancy), realization of the rightto equal per-capita emissions is aimed at with a time lag of several dec-ades (roughly up to t he year 2050 or 2100). The approach does justice tothe principle of economic capability by the circumstance that industrializedcountries would be subject on average to substantially higher reductioncommitm ents than the developing countries.There are contradictions, how-ever, between taking the C&C approach or the capability principle as a ba-sis for allocating emission rights these conicts become particularly clearif, instead of comparing the industrialized country and developing country

groups, individual countries are compared. The principle of differentiatedresponsibilities is complied with to t he extent that the percapita reductionburden of countries is greater the higher t heir current percapita share ingreenhouse as emissions is. However, differences in historical responsibilitiesare largely not t aken into account.

In terms of the CO2 emissions path, the C&C approach is highly targeted, as emis-sion budgets are xed over the long term and are not subject to any uctuation.

C&C in WBGU


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NI CHOLAS STERNTHE ECONOMI CS OF CLI MATE CHAN GE [ 2 0 0 6 ]PART I : Cl im at e Chan ge Our Appr oach2A Eth ical Fram ew orks and I nt er tem poral Equi ty/ Cl im ate change p 47

The notions of the right to climate protection or climate security of future gen-erations and of shared responsibilities in a common world can be combined toassert that , collectively, we have the right only to emit some very small amount

of GHGs, equal for all, and that no-one has the right to em it beyond t hat levelwithout incurring the duty to compensate. We are therefore obliged to pay forthe right to emit above that common level.

This can be seen as one argument in favour of the contract and convergeproposition, whereby large emitters should contract emissions and all individ-uals in the world should either converge to a comm on (low) level or pay for t heexcess (and those below that level could sell rights).

Source: Contraction and Convergence (C&C) is the science-based, global climate policyframework proposed to the UN since 1990 by the Global Commons Institute (GCI).

www.gci.org.uk/briengs/ICE.pdf

C&C in Stern Review CUP

The notions of the right to climate protection or climate security of future generations and of

shared responsibilities in a common world can be combined to assert that, collectively, we have the

right only to emit some very small amount of GHGs, equal for all, and that no-one has the right to

emit beyond that level without incurring the duty to compensate. We are therefore obliged to pay forthe right to emit above that common level.

This can be seen as one argument in favour of the contract and converge proposition of Meyer,

1990, whereby large emitters should contract emissions and all individuals in the world should

either converge to a common (low) level or pay for the excess (and those below that level could sell

rights).


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C&C in Human Development Report 2007/ 8


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48 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008

1

The21stC

enturyclimatechallenge

achieve its prosperity. How many planets willIndia require for development?

We ask the same question for a world edgingtowards the brink of dangerous climate change.Using the annual ceiling of 14.5 Gt CO2, ifemissions were frozen at the current level of 29Gt CO2 we would need two planets. However,some countries are running a less sustainableaccount than others. With 15 percent of the world population, rich countries are using 90percent of the sustainable budget. How many

planets would we need if developing countrieswere to follow the example of these countries?

If every person living in the developing

world had the same carbon footprint as the av-erage for high income countries, global CO2emissions would rise to 85 Gt CO2a levelthat would require six planets. With a global per capita footprint at Australian levels, wewould need seven planets, rising to nine for aworld with Canada and United States levels ofper capita emissions (table 1.2).

Te answer to Gandhi s question raises somewider questions about social justice in climatechange mitigation. As a global community,we are running up a large and unsustainable

carbon debt, but the bulk of that debt has beenaccumulated by the worlds richest countries.

Te challenge is to develop a global carbonbudget that charts an equitable and sustainablecourse away from dangerous climate change.

Charting a course away from

dangerous climate change

We use the PIK model to identify plausible

pathways for keeping within the 2C threshold.One pathway treats the world as a single country, which for carbon accounting purposes it is,then identies targets for rationing or burdensharing. However, the viability of any system of

burden sharing depends on participants in thesystem perceiving the distribution of rations

to be fair. Te UNFCCC itself acknowledgesthis through an injunction to protect theclimate systemon the basis of equity and inaccordance withcommon but dierentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities.

While interpretation of that injunction isa matter for negotiation, we have distinguishedbetween industrialized countries and develop-ing countries, charting separate pathways forthe two groups. Te results are summarized ingure 1.11. Te cuts from a 1990 base-yearon our sustainable emissions pathway are as

follows: Te world. Emissions for the world will have

to be reduced by around 50 percent by 2050,with a peak around 2020. Emissions wouldfall towards zero in net terms by the end ofthe 21st Century.

Developed countries. High-income coun-tries would have to target an emissions peakbetween 2012 and 2015, with 30 percent cutsby 2020 and at least 80 percent cuts by 2050.

Developing countries. While there would belarge variations, major emitters in the devel-

oping world would maintain a trajectory ofrising emissions to 2020, peaking at around80 percent above current levels, with cuts of20 percent against 1990 levels by 2050.

Contraction and convergence

sustainability with equity

We emphasize that these are feasible pathways.Tey are not specic proposals f

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