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ECE454/CS594 Computer and Network Security

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ECE454/CS594 Computer and Network Security. Dr. Jinyuan (Stella) Sun Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Tennessee Fall 2011. Secret Key Cryptography. Modes of operation Stream cipher. Encrypting A Large Message. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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ECE454/CS594 Computer and Network Security Dr. Jinyuan (Stella) Sun Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Tennessee Fall 2011 1
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ECE454/CS594 Computer and Network Security

Dr. Jinyuan (Stella) SunDept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceUniversity of Tennessee Fall 2011

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Secret Key Cryptography• Modes of operation• Stream cipher

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Encrypting A Large MessageHow to encrypt a message > 64 bits? • Electronic Code Book (ECB)• Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)• Output Feedback Mode (OFB)• Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)• Counter Mode (CTR)

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ECB ModeECB Encryption

ECB Decryption

• Message is broken into 64-bit blocks• Each block is independently encoded with the same secret key

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Pros and Cons of ECB• Suitable for use in secure transmission of single values (e.g. an encryption key)• Error in one received ciphertext block does not affect the correct decryption of other ciphertext blocks• Identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks resulting in recognizable pattern

• Ciphertext blocks can be easily rearranged or modified

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ECB Rearranging and Modification Attacks

• 10,000’s digit of salary easily modified• 10,000’s digit blocks easily swapped

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CBC Mode

• Selects a random number: IV (initialization vector) that is XORed with the first plaintext block. Why?

• Then generates its own random numbers: the ciphertext from the previous block, XORed with the next plaintext block

CBC Encryption

CBC Decryption

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Pros and Cons of CBC• Suitable for use in general-purpose block-oriented transmission, and authentication • The same block repeating in the plaintext will not cause repeats in the ciphertext• Subject to modification attack: (but error propagates)

• Subject to ciphertext block rearranging attack• IV: needs to be shared between sender and receiver, either a fixed value or sent encrypted (How to encrypt?)

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CBC Modification AttackOriginal message

Decrypted message after modification

• Solution?

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CBC Rearranging Attack

• If the ciphertext blocks are rearranged as: C1, C5, C3, C2, C4, C6

• The resulting plaintext blocks can be deduced…

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AES Example: ECB vs. CBC

AES in ECB mode AES in CBC mode

Similar plaintextblocks producesimilar ciphertextblocks (not good!)

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Output Feedback Mode (OFB)

• OFB is a stream cipher: encryption is done by XORing plaintext with one-time pad• One-time pad: b0|b1|b2|b3…, where b0 is a random 64-bit IV, b1 is the secret key encrypted b0, and so on…

k-bit OFB

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Pros and Cons of OFB• Suitable for use in stream-oriented transmission

over noisy channel (e.g., satellite communication)• One-time pad can be generated in advance, only

XOR operations are performed in real-time• Bit errors do not propagate: error in one ciphertext

block only garbles the corresponding plaintext block

• Message can arrive in arbitrarily sized chunks, get encrypted and transmitted immediately

• Plaintext modification attack: if attacker knows <plaintext, ciphertext>, he can XOR the plaintext and ciphertext, and XOR the result with any message of his choosing

• Must not reuse the same IV or secret key (Why?)

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Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)

• Similar to OFB• k bits shifted in the register are the k bits of ciphertext from the previous block (k can be any number: 1, 8, 64, 128, etc.)

k-bit CFB

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Pros and Cons of CFB• Suitable for use in general-purpose stream-oriented transmission, and authentication• Less subject to tampering: with k-bit CFB, the change of any k-bit of plaintext in a predictable way will cause unpredictably garbling the next b/k blocks• One-time pad cannot be pre-computed, encryption needs to be done in real-time• Error in a k-bit ciphertext block propagates: it garbles the next b/k plaintext blocks

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Counter Mode (CTR)

• Similar to OFB• Instead of chaining the encryption of one-time pad, the IV is incremented and encrypted to get successive blocks of the one-time pad

Counter Mode

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Pros and Cons of CTR• Suitable for use in general-purpose block-oriented transmission, and high speed encryption• One-time pad can be pre-computed• Decrypting at any point rather than the beginning: ideal for random access applications• Hardware/software efficiency: parallel encryption/decryption on multiple blocks of plaintext or ciphertext• Provable security: at least as secure as other modes• Simplicity: unlike ECB and CBC, no decryption algorithm is needed in CTR (also true for OFB and CFB)• Must not reuse the same IV or key, same as OFB• Because: An attacker could get the XOR of two plaintext blocks by XORing the two corresponding ciphertext blocks

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Generating MACs• Integrity: protect against undetected modifications, cannot be guaranteed by any mode of operation if attacker knows the plaintext• Plaintext + CBC residue (when message not secret)

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Privacy and Integrity: The Don’ts• Privacy: CBC encryption• Integrity: CBC residue• Ciphertext + CBC residue?• Encrypt {plaintext + CBC residue}?• Encrypt {plaintext + CRC}?

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Ciphertext + CBC Residue

• Problem?

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Encrypt {plaintext + CBC residue}

• Problem?

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Encrypt {plaintext + CRC}

• Longer CRC maybe Okay

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Privacy and Integrity: The Do’s• Privacy: CBC encryption + Integrity: CBC residue, but with different keys• CBC + weak cryptographic checksum• CBC + CBC residue with related keys• CBC + cryptographic hash: keyed hash preferred• OCB: offset codebook mode: both privacy and integrity in a single cryptographic pass, desirable

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3DES: CBC Outside vs. Inside

CBC on the outside(Why this one?)

CBC on the inside

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Stream Ciphers A key is input into a pseudorandom generator to

produce a pseudorandom keystream Pseudorandom stream: unpredictable without

knowing key Keystream is bitwise XORed with plaintext stream

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Design ConsiderationsThe encryption sequence should have a

large period without repetitionsThe keystream k should approximate the

properties of a true random number stream as close as possible

Input key K need be sufficiently longWhen properly designed, a stream cipher

can be as secure as block cipher of comparable key length

Advantage of stream ciphers: almost always faster and use far less code than block ciphers

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RC4Designed by Ron Rivest in 1987 for RSA securityVariable key-size stream cipher with byte-oriented

applicationsPopular uses: SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security), WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)

protocol and the newer WiFi Protected Access (WPA)A variable-length key (1—256 bytes) is used to

initialize a 256-byte state vector SA byte in the keystream k is generated from S by

selecting one of the 256 entries for encryption/decryption

The entries in S are permuted after generating each k

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RC4 (Cont’d)

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RC4 Keystream Generation

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Strength of RC4 No practical attack on RC4 is knownMust not reuse keyA known vulnerability in WEP: relevant

to the generation of the key input to RC4 but not RC4 itself

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Reading Assignments

[Kaufman] Chapter 4


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