AIRBORNE EW

INTRODUCTION• WHAT IS EW?– MIL ACTION INVOLVING THE USE OF EM

ENERGY TO• DETERMINE• EXPLOIT• REDUCE• PREVENT HOSTILE USE OF• RETAIN FRIENDLY USE OF

THE EM SPECTRUM

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ELECTRONIC SP MEASURE(ESM)

(ECM)ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURE

ELECTRONIC COUNTER COUNTER MEASURE(ECCM)

ESM• ELECTRONICS SP MEASURES (ESM)

– SEARCH– INTERCEPT – LOC RADIATED EM ENERGY FOR OWN EXPL– RECORD– ANALYSE

• ESM PROVIDES EW INFO FOR ECM & ECCM– SIGINT

• ELINT• COMINT

– WARNING – RWR, LWR, MWR, ETC– HOMING – WPN LOC RDR, ETC

• INFO PROVIDED BY ESM RECEIVERFREQ OF OP PRF PW ANTENNA SCAN RATEDIRN/ LOC TYPE OF MODULATION EOB FREQ IN USECALL SIGNS LOC OF UNITS

ESM PLATFORMS• DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF ESM PLATFORM– HT OF ESM RXR– CONTINUITY OF OP– FLEXIBILITY– RELIABILITY– ACCURACY– ECONOMY – EASE OF MAINT

• TYPES OF ESM PLATFORMS– GRND BASED – SHIP BORNE– SUBMARINE– AEROSTAT BASED– AIRBORNE– SATELLITE BASED

AIRBORNE ECM

INTRODUCTION

• WHY ECM REQD?– SPEED, ACCURACY, STEALTH & LETHALITY OF MSLS &

GUNS HAVE INCREASED EXPONENTIALLY– HIGH SPEED DETECTION, ANALYSIS OF SIGNATURE,

TRACKING AND COUTER MEASURES HAVE BECOME IMPERATIVE FOR SURVIVAL

ECM

CONFUSION DECEPTION

ACTIVE PASSIVE ACTIVE PASSIVE

•SPOT JAMMING•BARRAGE JAMMING•SWEEP THROUGH JAMMING•SMART NOISE

•CHAFF •REPEATER•SYNTHESISED

•DECOYS•IR FLARES•CORNER REFLECTORS•STEALTH•DRONES/RPVs/UAVs

HARDKILL

EMP

NOISE JAMMING

• THE DELIBERATE RADIATION OR REFLECTION OF

EM ENERGY WITH THE OBJECT OF IMPAIRING THE

USE OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEM, EQPT, DEVICE OF

THE ADVERSARY

DECEPTION JAMMING

THE DELIBERATE RADIATION, ALTERATION OR

REFLECTION OF EM ENERGY IN A MANNER

INTENDED TO MISLEAD THE USE OF ELECTRONIC

DEVICES, SYSTEMS OR EQPT BY THE ADVERSARY

SPOT JAMMER

JAM

MIN

G P

WR

FREQFO

• Continuous.

• High power.

• Requires knowledge of victim rdr freq.

• Inability to counter freq agile rdrs.

• One jammer per victim.

BARRAGE JAMMER

JAM

MIN

G P

OW

ER

FREQUENCY

FO

• Continuous.

• Low power.

• Requires knowledge of victim approx rdr freq rg.

• Inability to counter freq agile rdrs.

• One jammer for many victims.

F1 F2 F3

• Not continuous.

• High power.

• Precise freq of victim rdr not essential.

• One jammer for many victims.

SWEEP JAMMER

JAM

MIN

G P

OW

ER

FOFREQUENCY

F1 F2 F3

PASSIVE ECM• CHAFF. • IR FLARES.• DECOYS.

• CHAFF LOOKS LIKE MILLIONS OF TINY STRANDS OF ALUMINUM FOIL AND EACH STRIP IS CUT TO LENGTH TO MATCH THE VARIOUS WAVELENGTHS OF THE RADAR. USING CHAFF TO COMBAT RADAR WAS USED AS EARLY AS WWII AND STILL PROVES VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST NEARLY ALL RADAR THREATS. • FLARES ARE WHITE HOT MAGNESIUM THAT ARE DESIGNED TO DEFEAT A MISSILE'S INFRA-RED (IR) TRACKING MECHANISMS.

CHAFF

• GLASS SILICATE FIBRES WITH ‘AL’ FOILS/STRIPS COATING.

• RADAR OUTPUT AMPLIFIED AND REFLECTED TO PRODUCE

SPURIOUS TARGET ECHOES. IT PROVIDES A MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGET TO THE RADAR.

• FOR CHAFF TO BE EFFECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE A BETTER

TARGET THAN AC, BY PROVIDING MORE RCS THAN AC’S RCS

• AFTER THE CHAFF IS EJECTED FROM THE AC AND INTO THE AC

SLIPSTREAM, THE CHAFF PACKAGES BURST OPEN AND THE

FIBERS SCATTER TO FORM A RADAR-REFLECTIVE CLOUD CALLED

A CHAFF CORRIDOR. EACH CHAFF PACKAGE IS DESIGNED TO

SIMULATE AN AC. SEVERAL AC CAN CREATE A CHAFF CURTAIN,

CONSISTING OF THOUSANDS OF FALSE TARGETS, WHICH

CONFUSE THE RADAR GUIDANCE PACKAGE ON A MISSILE SO

THEY ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE REAL TARGETS WITHIN THE

CHAFF CLOUD.

FLARE• HEAT SOURCES DEPLOYED IN THE ATMOSPHERE TO CONFUSE

THE HEAT SEEKING MISSILES.• GENERALLY MADE UP OF MAGNESIUM TEFLON PELLET

CONTAINED IN IR FLARE CARTRIDGE.• A DISPENSE SIG WILL FIRE EXPLOSIVE SQUIB IN CARTRIDGE

AND EJECT THE IGNITED PELLET IN THE SLIPSTREAM. WHICH

ON BURNING GIVES POWERFUL IR SOURCE ( DURATION

SEVERAL SECONDS) TO HEAT SEEKING WEAPON

• TYPES•DECOY FLARES•GROUND ILLUMINATION FLARES

SQUIBSQUIBFlareFlareCartridgeCartridge

Missile FOV

Power Centroid of Aircraft and Flare

Missile Seeker Seduction from Aircraft by FlareMissile Seeker Seduction from Aircraft by Flare

DECOY• SMALL AIRCRAFT LIKE VECHILE MADE TO APPEAR TO THE RADAR OF SAME RCS AS THAT OF AIRCRAFT

• DECOYS LURE THE INCOMING MISSILE BY PRESENTING A MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGET.

Towed Decoy – Basic Theory

STEALTH TECHNOLOGY

• A VARIETY OF TECHNOLOGY COMBINED TO MAKE AC ‘DISAPPEAR’

• VARIOUS TECHNIQUES• THERMAL SIGNATURE REDUCTION.• EMISSION CONTROL.• CAMOUFLAGE.• NOISE SUPPRESSION.• RADAR CROSS SECTION REDUCTION.   • ELIMINATION OF SMOKE TRAIL.

ECCM

INTRODUCTION

• WHAT IS ECCM REQD?– ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENSURE FRIENDLY

USE OF EM SPECTRUM DESPITE ENEMY’S USE OF EW

ECCM

ANTI ESM ANTI ECM

EEP EES OPERATIONALMEASURES

TECHMEASURES

TRGMEASURES

RXR RELATEDECCM

TXR RELATEDECCM

ANTENNA RELATEDECCM

DETECT ENEMY ESM ACTIVITY BY

• JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF ELECTRONICEMISSION POLICY (EEP)

• MEASURES INVOLVING ELECTRONICEMISSION SECURITY (EES)

EEP• ELECTRONIC EMISSION POLICY (EEP) IS A COMMANDFUNCTION.

• IT LAYS DOWN RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OFELECTRONIC SYSTEMS OF

OPERATIONS.

• IT IS EVOLVED AT THE FIELD FORCE LEVEL AND IS CONVEYED TO THE

LOWER FORMATIONS THROUGH OPERATIONAL ORDERS AND

INSTRUCTIONS

• EEP IS THE POLICY WHICH LAYS DOWN DEGREE OF FREEDOM ALLOWED

IN THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TO COUNTER ENEMY’S

CAPABILITY TO DETECT, IDENTIFY AND LOCATE OWN EMITTERS FOR

EXPLOITATION BY HOSTILE ACTION AND EXERCISE CONTROL OVER

OWN EMISSIONS TO MINIMIZE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

PURPOSE OF EEP

• IT REDUCES THE REACTION TIME AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY ESM ORGANIZATION

• TO ACQUIRE INTELLIGENCE• STUDY THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF OUR

ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS.• IT DENIES INTELLIGENCE THAT MAY BE

GAINED BY THE ENEMY THROUGH INTERCEPTION.

• IT ENABLES A BETTER CONTROL ON ALL EMISSIONS

ELECTRONIC EMISSION SECURITY(EES)

• ONCE THE EMISSION POLICY HAS BEEN DECIDED MEASURES ARE TAKEN

TO ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY’S ESM ORGANIZATION GETS THE LEAST

POSSIBLE INFORMATION FROM OWN ELECTROMAGNETIC

TRANSMISSIONS. THIS IS KNOWN AS EES.

• THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR EES ARE :-

• (A) THE DIRECTION OF TRANSMISSION.

• (B) THE FREQUENCIES OF TRANSMISSION.

• (C) SECURITY OF TYPES OF EMITTERS AND CHARACTERISTICSOF

ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS.

• (D) OBSERVANCE OF SECURITY RULES AND SAFETYMEASURES.

AIM OF ANTI-ESM

ECCM IS TO COUNTER AND DETECT THE ENEMYESM ACTIVITY BY

• JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF ELECTRONICEMISSION POLICY (EEP)

• MEASURES INVOLVING ELECTRONICEMISSION SECURITY (EES)