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Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

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Q1. The figure below shows: a) Private education expenditure as % of total b) Public education expenditure as % of total 0% 50%100% S. Africa Malaysia Bolivia France UK Venezuela Ghana USA Indon. German. Peru Uganda Sierra Leone S. Korea Netherlands
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Economic Analysis of Education: Public- Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008
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Page 1: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private

Roles E. Jimenez

March 2008

Page 2: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private interactions: Outline

• A Quiz on the functions of government: financing, providing and regulating

• Financing education – analyzing issues and options

• Providing and regulating education – analyzing issues and options

Page 3: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Q1. The figure below shows:a) Private education expenditure as % of total b) Public education expenditure as % of total

0% 50% 100%S. AfricaMalaysia

BoliviaFranceUK

VenezuelaGhanaUSA

Indon.German.

PeruUgandaSierra LeoneS. Korea

Netherlands

Page 4: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Q2. The figure below shows (secondary)a) Private education enrollment as % of total b) Public education enrollment as % of total

0% 50% 100%

MexicoUSANigerCyprus

KuwaitFrance

AustraliaKorea Chile

Belgium

NetherlandsMauritius

Page 5: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Options for interventionDegree of public financing

100%

0% 100%Degree of public provision

Unsubsidized privatesector (Philippine, tertiary level)

Public schools with no cost recovery (many)

Page 6: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Options for interventionDegree of public financing

100%

0% 100%Degree of public provision

Unsubsidized privatesector (Philippine, tertiary level)

Voucher supportedschools; Regulatedprivate schools (Netherlands, Belgium)

Public schools with no cost recovery (many)

Public facilitieswith cost recovery(US universities)

Page 7: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

What lessons?

• Public intervention through finance is different from provision

• It’s hard to generalize where the private sector may be large.

• If there is a private sector, then the gov’t has an important regulatory role.

• Finance, provision and regulation must be set to meet economic efficiency and equity goals

Page 8: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private interactions: Outline

• Functions of government: financing, providing and regulating

• Financing education – analyzing issues and options

• Providing and regulating education – analyzing issues and options

Page 9: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Market failures in education

Characteristic• Market Failures

– Externalities• Productivity• Nation-bldg,

community

Applies to?

– Primary education: the effects of numeracy and literacy

Page 10: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Example of externality effects: Effect on earnings of an illiterate of having a literate

member in the household (%) in Pakistan, 1998-99

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Urban Source: Pakistan Poverty Assessment, 2001 World Bank

Page 11: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Example of externality effects:Effects on health

1 Child mortality by educational attainment of the mother

0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0

D e a t h s p e r 1 ,0 0 0 liv e bir t h s

Ma li 1 9 9 5 - 9 6

B o liv ia 1 9 9 4

Ug a n d a 1 9 9 5

Ne p a l 1 9 9 6

Y e me n 1 9 9 1 -9 2

Mo r o c c o 1 9 9 2

N o educatio nP rimary o nly

S eco nd ary o r hig her

Ph illip in e s 1 9 9 3

Note: Mortality data are for children under five. Source: DHS Final Reports, various years.

Child mortality falls as mothers learn.

Page 12: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Market failures in education

Characteristic• Market Failures

– Externalities• Productivity• Nation-bldg,

community

Applies to?

– Primary education: the effects of numeracy and literacy

-- Research

Page 13: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Market failures in education

Characteristic• Market Failures

– Externalities• Productivity• Nation-bldg,

community– Capital Mkt

Failures• Redistribution

Higher education

Page 14: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Richest 20 percent

0 2 4 6 8 10

Egypt 1995-96

Philippines 1998

India 1992-93

Bolivia 1997

Kenya 1998

Brazil 1996

Mozambique1997

Mali1995-96

Grade

Median grade attained by 15-19 year olds:

Inequalities in education outcomesInequalities in education outcomes

Page 15: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

0 2 4 6 8 10

Egypt 1995-96

Philippines 1998

India 1992-93

Bolivia 1997

Kenya 1998

Brazil 1996

Mozambique1997

Mali1995-96

Grade

Median grade attained by 15-19 year olds:

Inequalities in education outcomesInequalities in education outcomes

Poorest 40 percent

Page 16: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Proportion of public subsidy received by poorest quintile

00.050.1

0.150.2

0.250.3

0.350.4

0.45

Colomb Kenya Ghana Indones Malaysia

PrimarySecondaryTertiary

Colombia: 92; Kenya: 92/3; Ghana 91/2; Indonesia, Malaysia 89

Page 17: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public finance: What is the appropriate public share in

exp?Because public budgets are

constrained, priorities must be set – does spending correct for market failure?– Basic: strong efficiency & equity– Higher: strong efficiency in some

areas but poor equity– Tech/Voc: weak efficiency & equity

Page 18: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private interactions:

Outline• Functions of government:

financing, providing and regulating• Financing education – analyzing

issues and options • Providing and regulating

education – analyzing issues and options

Page 19: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private provision

• Given that public chooses to finance, should it provide?– Scale economies– Control

Page 20: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private provision

• Given that public chooses to finance, should it provide?– Scale economies– Control

• Why might it finance and not provide?

Page 21: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Private schools deliver better education at lower cost

00.20.40.60.8

11.21.4

Colombia Dom Rep Phil Tanzania

CostAchievement

Ratio of private to public cost and achievement

Page 22: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private provision

• Given that public chooses to finance, should it provide?– Scale economies– Control

• Why might it finance and not provide?– Lower unit costs: stimulate competition,

increase accountability, reward perform.

Page 23: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Contracting with communities:

El Salvador• School governance to community

associations: hire/fire teach, adm gov funds

• Members elected from community• Legally responsible for operations

Page 24: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

El Salvador Achievement Results

0.45

2.17

-0.77

0.74

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Math Language

WithoutWith

Without: w/o school input and community participation variables; * Significant at 5%Values are in terms of Raw Scores (Averages are 4 and 2)

*

Page 25: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private provision

• Given that public chooses to finance, should it provide?– Scale economies– Control

• Why might it finance and not provide?– Lower unit costs: stimulate competition,

increase accountability, reward perform.– Concern: equity

Page 26: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Enrollment in Slums in Lahore• Data: 1,000 HHs in 26 slum areas

• % of children in HHs living on less than $1/day: 55%

0102030405060708090

Bot14%

Next41%

Top 5% All

No schoolPrivatePublic

Percent of Children Enrolled in Lahore by Income Group, School type

Alderman, Orzem and Paterno, “School Quality, Cost and Public/Private School Choice of Low Income HHs in PakistanWP 2, Impact Evaluation of Education Reforms, DECRG, World Bank 1996

Page 27: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private provision

• Given that public chooses to finance, should it provide?– Scale economies– Control

• Why might it finance and not provide?– Lower unit costs– Problem may be demand, not supply side

Page 28: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

FSSAP Bangladesh• Criteria:

– Attendance in school– Passing grade– Unmarried

• Girls to receive scholarship deposited to account set up in her name

• School to receive support based on # of girls

Page 29: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Pakistan: Encouraging private schools to meet social goals

• Urban Girls’ Fellowship Program in Quetta: is establishing private schools in poor neighborhood cost-effective?

• Subsidies paid directly to schools for 3 years:– Initial: Rs.100 ($3)/mo/girl to limit of Rs10K

plus Rs.200/girl– Reduced in 2nd and 3rd years; then zero. – Unsubsidized boys to be no more than 1/2

of enrollment• Randomized selection of neighborhoods

Page 30: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Pakistan: Encouraging private schools to meet social goals

0

20

40

60

80

Control Girls Program Girls

Pre-Prog 1995 1996

Page 31: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Pakistan: Encouraging private schools to meet social goals

0

20

40

60

80

Control Boys Program Boys

Pre-Prog 1995 1996

0

20

40

60

80

Control Girls Program Girls

Pre-Prog 1995 1996

Source: J. Kim, H. Alderman and P. Orazem, 1998

Page 32: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Analyzing public-private interactions:

Outline• Functions of government:

financing, providing and regulating• Financing education – analyzing

issues and options • Providing and regulating education

– analyzing issues and options: analyze NET impacts

Page 33: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Private-Public Interactions: Estimating NET Impacts

What happens to quantity when the public sector expands?

• Build more schools:– attract more students who didn’t go to

school– attract more students from private schools

• Increase subsidies:– attract more students into schools– cause private spending to decline.

Page 34: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Philippines: Effect of Enrolling 10 more students in public secondary schools

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

Priv EnrlTot Enrl

Source: E. Jimenez and Y. Sawada, forthcoming, “Public for private: the relationship between public and private enrollment in thePhilippines,” Economics of Education Review.

Page 35: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

MessagesMessages• Public finance and provision are distinct• Investigate the market for education

– Market failures are not the same for all levels

– Public investment can affect overall market

• Alternative delivery mechanisms can work

Page 36: Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.

Implications for economic analysis

• Define the counterfactual • Measure externalities or other

market failures• Measure distributional effects These are not easy. In addition

must resolve• Attribution• Measurement of diverse outcomes


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