ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA PORT REGION

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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA PORT REGION

SEPTEMBER 2011

PUBLICATION PREPARED FOR ING Bank

PUBLICATION PREPARED BY Prof. Dr. Theo Notteboom and Indra Vonck ITMMA – University of Antwerp

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Economic Analysis Rhine-Scheldt Delta

September 2011

DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this report reflect the personal views of the analysts about the subject of this report. No part of the compensation(s) of the analyst(s) was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the inclusion of specific views in this report. This report was prepared on behalf of ING Bank N.V. (“ING”), solely for the information of its clients. This report is not, nor should it be construed as, an investment advice or an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument or product. While reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the information contained herein is not untrue or misleading at the time of publication, ING makes no representation that it is accurate or complete in all respects. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Neither ING nor any of its officers or employees accept any liability for any direct or consequential loss or damage arising from any use of this report or its contents. Copyright and database rights protection exists with respect to (the contents of) this report. Therefore, nothing contained in this report may be reproduced, distributed or published by any person for any purpose without the prior written consent of the copyright holders. All rights are reserved. Investors should make their own investment decisions without relying on this report. Only investors with sufficient knowledge and experience in financial matters to evaluate the merits and risks should consider an investment in any issuer or market discussed herein and other persons should not take any action on the basis of this report. ING Bank N.V. is a legal entity under Dutch Law and is a registered credit institution supervised by the Dutch Central Bank (“De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.”) and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (“Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten”). ING Bank N.V., London branch is regulated for the conduct of investment business in the UK by the Financial Services Authority. ING Bank N.V., London branch is registered in the UK (number BR000341) at 60 London Wall, London EC2M 5TQ. ING Financial Markets LLC, which is a member of the NYSE, NASD and SIPC and part of ING, has accepted responsibility for the distribution of this report in the United States under applicable requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to express our gratitude to the members of the Editorial Board of this publication for providing valuable input and comments on earlier drafts of this report. The Editorial Board includes Bram Debruyne (ING), Bart Eekhaut (ING), Didier Keters (ING), Kris Liesse (ING), Inge Stoop (ING), Machiel Bode (ING), Koen Klein (ING), Rico Luman (ING), John Schijvens (ING), Bastiaan van der Knaap (ING), Jan Blomme (Antwerp Port Authority) and Peter de Langen (Rotterdam Port Authority)

Publication commissioned by

ING Bank ING House Amstelveenseweg 500 1081 KL Amsterdam (The Netherlands)

Publication prepared by ITMMA - University of Antwerp

ITMMA House Kipdorp 59 2000 Antwerp (Belgium) Tel: +32 3 265.51.52 www.itmma.ua.ac.be

Title: Economic Analysis of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta Port Region Authors: Theo Notteboom and Indra Vonck Publication date: 8 September 2011 Cover design and lay-out: Theo Notteboom Print: Drukkerij Bietlot, Gilly © 2011 – ING Bank and ITMMA – University of Antwerp ISBN 978 94 9135 900 2

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FOREWORD

The ITMMA (Institute of Transport and Maritime Management Antwerp) of the University of Antwerp, headed by Professor Theo Notteboom, is the global benchmark for information on international transport. Little is known about the Rhine-Scheldt Delta other than information provided by the ports in their own publications. In addition, the network of international goods flows is highly complex and subject to constant change. The ports located in the west of Europe are still the point of entry to Europe for goods and commodities, but will they remain so? The aim of this study is to assess how firmly goods flows are bedded in, and whether any shifts are to be expected. In addition to having a significant impact on the ports located in the west of Europe, such shifts could affect the entire intra-European transport chain. In turn, this study could also help shape the conclusions of the European Commission’s Europe 2050 White Paper. A White Paper is the guide for the Commission’s decisions on laws and regulations, and one of its objectives is to attract responses from interested parties in Europe. In the Europe 2050 White Paper, the European Commission recently stated its concerns about the impact of these goods flows on intra-European traffic, and on the environmental footprint in particular. By way of illustration, the Commission wishes to help the ports located in the south of Europe to become more efficient and thereby attract increased traffic. This study shows that a strong and efficient Rhine-Scheldt Delta can make a significant contribution in this regard. ING welcomes this study and considers it an important contribution that further elucidates the Commission’s White Paper. We hope you enjoy reading this study. Luc Truyens Sébastien D’Hondt Arnaud Laviolette Head of Mid Corporate Head of Corporate Clients Head of Commercial Banking & Institutional Clients ING Belgium ING Belgium ING Belgium < more names >

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD .................................................................................................................................................. i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... v SAMENVATTING ........................................................................................................................................... xi SYNTHÈSE ................................................................................................................................................ xvii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 1 1 I THE FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PORTS IN THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA ................................................ 2

1.1 The changing role and function of seaports ............................................................................ 2 1.2 The economic significance of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports .................................................. 3

1.2.1. The Flemish ports ................................................................................................................. 3 1.2.2. The Dutch ports .................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 The strategic role of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ........................................................... 8 2 | DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS ................... 11

2.1 Patterns in global economic development ................................................................................. 11 2.1.1. The role of emerging economies and the BRIC countries .................................................. 11 2.1.2. Intra-regional differences: the case of Africa ..................................................................... 12 2.1.3. Mixed results for Europe .................................................................................................... 13 2.1.4. Trade imbalances persist .................................................................................................... 15 2.1.5. Maritime transport after the bubble .................................................................................. 16

2.2 The growing importance of clusters in the global economy....................................................... 17 2.3. Changes in logistics networks .................................................................................................... 19

2.3.1. Dynamics in logistics networks throughout Europe ........................................................... 19 2.3.2. Top locations for EDC and networked EDC activity ............................................................ 21 2.3.3.Impacts on cargo routing in Europe .................................................................................... 22

2.4. Market players: logistics integration and coordination ............................................................. 23 2.4.1. Logistics integration and consolidation in the logistics industry ........................................ 23 2.4.2. Consolidation and integration in liner shipping ................................................................. 25 2.4.3. Consolidation in the cargo handling business .................................................................... 27 2.4.4. The hinterland battle among market players ..................................................................... 29

2.5. Corridors, intermodality and inland ports ................................................................................. 31 2.5.1. Intercontinental maritime and land corridors .................................................................... 31 2.5.2. European land corridors ..................................................................................................... 32 2.5.3. The growing importance of inland ports and logistics zones ............................................. 35 2.5.4. The rise of intermodality .................................................................................................... 36

2.6. Regulation and government policies ......................................................................................... 38 2.6.1. IMO ..................................................................................................................................... 38 2.6.2. EU policy ............................................................................................................................. 38 2.6.3. European port policy .......................................................................................................... 39 2.6.4. The 2011 White Paper on a future European transport policy .......................................... 39 2.6.5. TEN-T policy ........................................................................................................................ 42

3 | TRAFFIC POSITION OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA ...................................................................................... 43 3.1. Total maritime traffic ................................................................................................................. 43 3.2. Liquid bulk .................................................................................................................................. 44 3.3. Dry bulk ...................................................................................................................................... 46 3.4. Conventional general cargo ....................................................................................................... 49 3.5. Roro cargo .................................................................................................................................. 52 3.6. Containers .................................................................................................................................. 55 3.7. Summary on the traffic position of Rhine-Scheldt Delta region ................................................ 62 3.8. Latest developments: traffic volumes for the first half of 2011 ................................................ 64

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3.9. Expectations for the future ........................................................................................................ 65

3.9.1. General considerations ....................................................................................................... 65 3.9.2. Containers ........................................................................................................................... 66 3.9.3. Conventional general cargo ................................................................................................ 68 3.9.4. Dry bulk ............................................................................................................................... 69 3.9.5. Liquid bulk ........................................................................................................................... 70 3.9.6. RoRo cargo .......................................................................................................................... 72

3.10. Traffic position of the Delta port region in the hinterland ...................................................... 73 3.10.1. Bulk versus containers ...................................................................................................... 73 3.10.2. Local hinterland remains very important ......................................................................... 73 3.10.3. Competition with German ports and Le Havre for serving the core hinterland or ‘blue banana’ area ................................................................................................................................. 75 3.10.4. Modal split of the Delta ports ........................................................................................... 76 3.10.5. Competition with ports outside the Hamburg-Le Havre range ........................................ 77

4 | CHALLENGES AND POLICIES FOR THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA PORT REGION ..................................................... 79 4.1 Key challenges to the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ................................................................................. 79

4.1.1. Challenges linked to a changing world and European market ........................................... 79 4.1.2. Challenges linked to the strategies of logistics market players.......................................... 80 4.1.3. Challenges linked to national and supranational policies .................................................. 81 4.1.4. Challenges linked to cargo flows through the Delta ports ................................................. 83

4.2. What policies regarding seaports and broader logistics development are being developed? . 83 4.2.1. Corporatisation and decentralisation ................................................................................. 83 4.2.2. Mainport Network strategy in the Netherlands ................................................................. 85 4.2.3. Flanders Port Area, Flanders Logistics and Extended Gateways in Flanders ..................... 86

4.3. Capitalising on potential synergies within the Delta ................................................................. 88 4.3.1. Stimulate interactions between seaports and inland ports ............................................... 88 4.3.2. Strengthen the focus on multi-port gateway regions ........................................................ 91 4.3.3. Cooperation in the multi-port gateway region of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ....................... 93

4.4. Closing remarks: keeping an eye on the fundamentals ............................................................. 96 ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................ 102

Annex 1. Global Competitiveness Index and European Competitiveness Index ............................ 102 Annex 2. Key figures on economic development ........................................................................... 103 Annex 3. Rail Freight Corridors ....................................................................................................... 104 Annex 4. Modal split and market share of Delta in hinterland regions .......................................... 105

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. This report provides an economic analysis of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The Delta

features established large ports as well as a whole series of medium-sized to smaller ports each with specific characteristics in terms of hinterland markets served, commodities handled and location qualities. The unique blend of different port types and sizes combined with a vast economic hinterland shapes port dynamics in the region.

HIGH IMPORTANCE OF THE PORTS IN THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA 2. The Netherlands and Belgium show a high economic performance and competitiveness, even

compared to other regions/countries on a global scale. Their seaports, as important pillars in the logistics infrastructure of the countries, are key enablers to the performance and competitiveness of the two countries.

3. The economic effects of seaport activities are no longer limited to the local environment, but are spread over a much wider geographical area and among a large number of international players. According to the National Bank of Belgium, the four Flemish seaports combined generated a direct and indirect value added of 27.1 billion euro in 2009 or 8.2% of total GDP of Belgium in crisis year 2009. The direct added value reached 13 billion euro in 2009 or 4.3% of total Belgian GDP. Direct employment reached 105,000 fulltime jobs in 2009 or 2.7% of Belgian domestic employment. Direct and indirect employment combined amounted to 236,307 jobs or 10.4 % of employment in Flanders and some 6% of employment in Belgium. According to the ‘Port Monitor’, the Dutch sea ports generated a direct value-added of 20.5 billion euro or 3.6% of the total GDP of the Netherlands in 2009. Indirect value-added amounted to 11.9 billion euro in 2009. The Dutch sea ports employed 163,386 directly seaport related persons in 2009 which corresponds with 1.9% of the total Dutch employment. Indirect employment amounted to 108,617 units in 2009. There exists no standard methodology in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta on the definition of the types of impacts, which makes port comparisons between Flemish and Dutch ports difficult. The figures of Flemish and Dutch ports can therefore not be compared on an equal basis.

4. A good infrastructure and a high accessibility are becoming more and more basic requirements for the competitiveness of countries and regions. Innovation and advanced production factors become essential in order to remain competitive. Private companies and port authorities in the Delta are or should be drivers of innovation. Next to pure economic arguments, these more strategic aspects should also be taken into account when evaluating port development plans and a port’s significance.

A STRONG TRAFFIC POSITION OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA

5. Total cargo throughput in the ports of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta reached 812 million tons in 2010 or about 65% of total port throughput in the Hamburg-Le Havre range and 20% in total European port traffic.

6. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta region plays a key role in liquid bulk traffic in North-West Europe. Total throughput of liquid bulk products reached 311 million tons in 2010 or an elevated 73% of total liquid bulk handled in the range. The growth curve in liquid bulk since the late 1990s is almost completely attributable to the performance of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region. Next to oil and oil

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products and chemicals manufacturing and products, there is a growing activity in biofuels manufacturing and products, edible oils, industrial gases and water plants and steam and power plants. The Delta features a vast pipeline system and tank storage capacity. The (petro-)chemical and industrial complexes in the Delta ports attach great value to sustainability and ‘ecologies of scale’. Future liquid bulk cargo flows will be affected particularly by (a) the shift away from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, (b) increased processing of crude oil at the source, i.e. the oil rich countries, and (c) the energy policies of supranational and national governments. Ports within the Delta are already trying to face these challenges by differentiating themselves in higher processes requiring specialized labour and extensive know how.

7. The dry bulk market, particularly the major bulks, is a mature market with a low growth potential. It is mainly driven by demand in raw materials for construction or energy production. Stronger growth is observed in the minor bulk market such as minerals, non-ferrous concentrates and fertilisers. Total dry bulk cargo in the H-LH range reached about 250 million tons in 2010. The market share of the Rhine-Scheldt delta in the range fluctuates between an elevated 70% and 75%. Coal and iron ore are destined for the main players in Europe’s most prominent industrial centres and steel plants and power plants in or in the vicinity of the ports. Quite a number of Delta ports are aiming for an improved nautical accessibility, partly to accommodate larger bulk carriers.

8. Changes in the traffic position of the Delta as a whole in dry bulk and liquid bulk are to a large

extent linked to (1) economic cycles - demand, (2) terminal and inland transport supply in the Delta, also taking into account the environmental space, such as the carbon footprint profile; (3) energy policies in the Benelux and Germany and (4) location decisions of major steel and chemical companies for which competition plays at a global scale.

9. Overall the conventional general cargo market is a market in decline as containerisation has

conquered a substantial share of the total general cargo market. The growth opportunity of this sector lies with specialized cargoes. The Delta is quite strong in handling this type of cargo. The diversity of cargo types in the conventional general cargo market (e.g. steel, forest products, project cargo, fruit via reefers, etc..) limits the value of an overall market positioning of ports.

10. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports handled some 42% of total roro traffic in the range compared to

60% in the early 1980s. The main market for unaccompanied roro freight transport for the Delta is the North Sea with particularly strong relations between Zeebrugge and Rotterdam and the central and northern part of the UK. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta also receives substantial volumes of paper and forest products from local manufacturers in Scandinavia. The transport of new cars is slowly evolving towards a mature market as the demand for new cars in Western Europe is reaching its ceiling. The large car handling ports in the Delta region can benefit from rising demand in Eastern and Central Europe, Russia and Turkey by further strengthening their position in hub-feeder networks. The car recycling industry and the rise of hybrid and electric cars offer opportunities to the Delta to diversify know how and to develop new business. The continuous outflow of second hand cars towards Africa also remains a market for the Delta.

11. In the container market, the market share of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region in Europe saw

an upward trend since 2001 to reach 22.3 million TEU or 25.9% of total European container traffic in 2010. In volume terms the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region is the fifth most important container handling region in the world and the largest multi-port gateway region in Europe. The container trade is the only trade that has increased substantially and is expected to increase substantially over the coming years. The local or immediate hinterland of the Delta ports remains very important. The high share of rather local traffic is partly linked to the role of the Low Countries in EDCs and re-exporting activities. Belgium, the Netherlands and Nord Pas-de-

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Calais in northern France are virtually captive to the Delta port region. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta container ports have a very strong traffic position in relation to the German States and French regions along the Rhine Basin. The competitive position is weak in the eastern part of Germany, east and central Europe and in the western part of France.

12. Container ports of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta are increasingly facing competition from container

ports in other European port ranges (Baltic, Adriatic and Med) as an increasing number of ports gain direct hinterland access to the ‘blue banana’ area. These contestable hinterlands are increasingly being served not only by the ports of one gateway region, but by several multi-port gateway regions. In theory, mainland Mediterranean ports offer transit time advantages over the north European ports for accommodating cargo flows between Asia/Middle East and large parts of Southern and Central Europe. But so far, they seem to have difficulties in substantially extending their hinterland reach north through rail services. The concentration of flows in the Delta port region largely explains why the range and diversity of the intermodal service offer of large Delta ports is still far bigger and more established than in their Mediterranean counterparts.

A STRONG BUT CHALLENGED RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA

13. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region is highly dependent on bulk commodities linked to energy production and the oil-based chemical industry. The shift away from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels is considered as a major challenge and opportunity. The Delta port region should adopt a leading role in this transition to remain competitive as one of the most important energy and chemical clusters in the world. This can be done by further strengthening the linkages between the (petro-)chemical complexes in different ports of the Delta, and by leading the way in innovation in the area of sustainable production methods and ‘ecologies of scale’. It is imperative that these ‘ecologies of scale’ advantages at individual port level (e.g. via co-siting), but also on a regional cross-border scale (e.g. the combined chemical industry in Rotterdam, Antwerp, Moerdijk and Terneuzen and along axes such as the Albert Canal), should be fully acknowledged in environmental policy.

14. Containers are becoming increasingly important in the traffic composition of the Delta port region. The position of the Delta in this market segment remains more vulnerable than in many other cargo segments due to the partial reliance on EDC and re-exporting activities in the Low countries, the existence of vast shared hinterlands, corridor development throughout Europe and the rather footloose character of sea-sea transhipment traffic. Remaining competitive in this market not only demands efforts from individual ports and market parties, but also requires a stronger positioning of the Delta region as an integrated European gateway region which combines scale with routing flexibility.

15. At the foreland side, Asia and other emerging economies become more important in the cargo

flows. At the hinterland side, growth in the Delta ports will increasingly have to come from regions outside the traditional ‘blue banana’, as the traditional hinterland of the Delta comprises mostly rather mature economies. Both developments combined point to an increased competition with ports outside of the Hamburg-Le Havre range in attracting cargo flows, reinforced by port reform schemes in countries such as France, Italy and Spain. The Delta port region should consider broadening its hinterland reach without disregarding the needs and continued importance of its core hinterland regions. The port and wider logistics community in the Delta is challenged to deliver strong and integrated business propositions to bind global supply chain activities to the region.

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16. The rise of economic centres in Eastern and Central Europe creates opportunities for the Delta

ports to develop shortsea shipping services and water- and land-based hub-feeder networks to these areas. At the same time, the expanding European market challenges the strong reliance of the Low Countries on EDCs and re-exporting activities. Any major changes in the design of distribution networks (e.g. through a move of EDCs to other regions, a network redesign towards a system of RDCs or more DC bypass operations) will have an impact on the distribution of container flows among European ports, with potentially a negative traffic effect on the container ports in the Delta.

17. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region and the North German port region are early adopters of

intermodal solutions. However, the Delta cannot sit back and rely on its ‘early mover’ status and scale advantages. Continuous innovation in processes (cf. cargo bundling, information flow management, port-inland port concepts, etc..) and technologies is needed, not only to keep the Delta competitive, but also to demonstrate to policy makers that the Delta port region takes up its European leader role in a responsible and innovative way, driven by market responsiveness and sustainability.

18. While the Delta ports overall welcomed the principles in the White Paper of the European Commission, it is important to underline that out-of-pocket costs alone are not sufficient to understand the current routing of containerized goods in Europe. Co-modal bundling effects, connectivity effects and aggregated service quality effects at specific gateway ports make that a ‘natural’ gateway for a certain hinterland region is not necessarily the port closest to that hinterland region. A non-consistent implementation of pricing throughout the EU can lead to cargo shifts away from the Delta. The Delta port region is challenged to bring the message to policy makers that the present cargo distribution patterns in Europe, among which the strong position of the Delta, are a reflection of market-based decisions by logistics players.

19. The ‘core network’ discussion as part of the TEN-T policy can impact the ports in this region if

this would result in an increase of coastal access points and a policy directed towards cargo dispersion in the European port system. The Delta ports have to continue capitalizing on their cargo bundling and consolidation potential on the large inland corridors created by the TEN-T network.

FOCUS ON THE FUNDAMENTALS TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE

20. Space, accessibility, efficiency in dealing with supply chains and sustainability seem to be the key themes for the future port development within the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The Delta ports can be considered as frontrunners in many of these areas through the development of innovative business cases, new governance structures and or novel ways in dealing with stakeholders. The corporatisation of port authorities should help to enter into more partnerships in the commercial logistics sector and to improve their performance in the face of international competition.

21. The Mainport Network strategy in the Netherlands or the Extended Gateway strategy in Flanders partly help to deal with scarcity of port land, but this does not necessarily lead to a net decrease in space requirements for the Delta as a whole. It is important that the space requirements at a Delta level are examined in detail so that the implications of future port developments can be assessed in terms of their spatial implications on the regional logistics and transport structure.

22. Accessibility, particularly to the hinterland, constitutes another major theme. Port authorities

should take up an even more prominent role in shaping the network and in enhancing coordination and cooperation between partners involved (e.g. in view of cargo bundling). Port

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authorities can be catalysts or facilitators in these processes. The capacity expansion of highways in the Delta has to keep up with the persistent traffic growth of road transport. The quality of the services to information flows are fast becoming as important as the services to the physical flows. This implies ports have to make sure the right infrastructure, software and human skills are in place to respond to the ever higher market requirements for the accommodation of global information flows. A seaport should not tackle this challenge in isolation as one singly node, given the network focus of market players.

23. When it comes to sustainability, port authorities and port companies must continue to

demonstrate a high level of environmental performance in order to ensure community support and to attract trading partners and potential investors. The Delta is challenged to further optimize the use of space and to minimize emissions of existing and future activities in the port areas and the wider logistics pole.

24. A last factor concerns the efficiency in dealing with supply chains. The economic position of the

Netherlands and Belgium is in large part linked to trading, physical flows and manufacturing activities. These activities form the basis for the logistics industry and related services. Narrowing down the focus to pure orchestration/control type of services while de-prioritizing the accommodation of physical flows and industrial activities might make the position of the Delta more vulnerable in an economic sense. Also the strategic location of the Delta in the ‘blue banana’ remains a trump card that should be played out in international competition.

CAPITALISING ON SYNERGIES WITHIN THE DELTA 25. From a hinterland perspective, the relevance of a single port is more and more placed within a

broader network perspective. The overall qualities of the whole Delta port region in relation to the hinterland are important next to the qualities of each of the individual ports in the region. A successful hinterland strategy is more and more determined by the ability of the port community to fully exploit synergies with other transport nodes and other players within the logistics networks of which they are part. These developments call for closer co-ordination and cooperation with logistics actors and nodes outside the port perimeter.

26. The ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta understand that inland ports can help them in facing a wide

array of local constraints (road congestion, lack of available land, environmental issues, etc..). Participation in inland terminals abroad (particularly in the ‘blue banana’ area outside the Benelux) deserves more attention. This might demand a cautious approach in dealing with foreign inland ports, for example by first considering joint ventures in the development of new port-related sites.

27. Routing flexibility is one of the keystones for the logistics attractiveness of a region. Production

units and logistics sites (such as EDCs) in the hinterland typically value the flexibility the Delta offers in terms of available routing options for import and export cargo. Next to an inland focus of ports, seaports should therefore develop a greater attention to the benefits offered by the presence of adjacent seaports in terms of the flexibility it offers to customers. Several gateways together can create synergies in reaching out to the hinterland. In this framework, it is highly relevant to approach the Delta as a multi-port gateway region.

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28. Compared to other port regions in Europe, the Rhine-Scheldt Delta does not only offer routing

flexibility towards the hinterland, but can also capitalize on its unrivalled scale in terms of the volumes, connectivity and frequencies in land transport services. The bundling of cargo towards the hinterland allows the ports in the Delta to gather critical mass to access regions in the more distant hinterland using shuttle services that meet customer requirements in terms of frequency. Coordination and collective actions between ports and market players are essential to meet the objective of increasing the share of co-modal solutions and to bundle cargo, also on short distances. Synergies between ports in the Delta can also be further enhanced by improving inter-port linkages.

PUTTING PORT COOPERATION IN PERSPECTIVE

29. Cooperation between the Delta ports already exists in some areas where there are clear mutual interests and even on commercially sensitive issues. Still, there is scope for more (cross-border) cooperation in bundling cargo to the hinterland and in improving the functional exchanges between the different port areas. Such cooperation initiatives should be market-based (i.e. following a strong business case) and initiated by market players with facilitation by port authorities and other relevant (semi-)public bodies.

30. A major point of attention is the spatial scale needed for cooperation in the Delta. Government policies in the Netherlands and Flanders are too much focused on the own territorial borders without fully acknowledging the possibilities for more intense cross-border cooperation. This is illustrated by the Dutch Mainport Network policy, the Flemish Extended Gateways, the ‘Dutch only’ connotation of Portbase and the rather limited cross-border interaction that is taking place in the area of creating knowledge relationships between Flemish and Dutch ports and logistics regions. Restricting the focus of port cooperation to national or regional administrative borders creates blind spots and ignores the logistics dynamics in the wider Rhine-Scheldt Delta.

31. The modalities and governance structures for cooperation are less important than the objectives to be achieved. Informal forms of cooperation are easier to set up and often lead to desired results without having the burden of a heavy bureaucracy linked to a complex governance structure. Mergers between port authorities should not be an aim as such. Allowing another port authority to hold a minority shareholding in a specific port authority might enhance the sense for a common mission without completely erasing much needed competition between the ports to keep the Delta alert and efficient. Alternatively, cooperation between ports on a project basis (e.g. to establish a joint multimodal service to a hinterland region) helps to keep focused and might also yield good results.

32. It is important that any government initiative to facilitate/encourage cooperation between ports is not imposed on ports. Forcing ports to go for specialisation can harm diversification in individual ports, thus increasing commercial risks for the ports concerned (due to more eggs in one basket) and making the choice to customers less rich (lower flexibility). Actions towards any form of port cooperation, particularly in the commercial area, should mainly come from the ports themselves. The government only needs to step in when there is market failure, for example when there is abuse of market power or when external costs are too high or not optimally distributed. The road of institutional entrepreneurship might be the best approach to port cooperation: the government is responsible for regulation and for developing general policy lines, but leaves the actual strategy development more to a more decentralized level (i.e. the port authority and individual market players).

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SAMENVATTING

1. Dit rapport geeft de resultaten weer van een economische analyse van de havens gelegen in de Rijn-Schelde Delta. De Delta omvat havens van verschillende omvang en grootte, waarbij elke individuele haven specifieke kenmerken vertoont op het vlak van achterlandbereik, goederenmix en ligging. De unieke combinatie van verschillende haventypes en –groottes, gecombineerd met een uitgestrekt Europees achterland, ligt aan de basis van de dynamiek in deze havenregio.

HET GROTE BELANG VAN DE HAVENS IN DE RIJN-SCHELDE DELTA

2. Nederland en België leggen op een mondiaal vlak goede prestaties en cijfers voor op het vlak van concurrentiekracht. De havens waarover zij beschikken vormen belangrijke speerpunten in de logistieke infrastructuur van de Lage Landen en zijn onmisbaar voor de goede economische prestaties en concurrentiële positie van de betrokken regio’s.

3. De economische impact van de havens in de Delta is niet langer beperkt tot het lokale niveau. Ze deinen uit over een groot geografisch gebied en over een groot aantal internationale bedrijven en marktspelers. Op basis van recente gegevens van de Nationale Bank van België bedraagt de directe en indirecte toegevoegde waarde van de Vlaamse havens ongeveer 27,1 miljard euro in 2009 of 8,2% van het BBP van België. De directe toegevoegde waarde bedroeg 13 miljard euro in 2009 of 4,3% van het Belgische BBP. De directe tewerkstelling bedroeg 105.000 voltijdse betrekkingen in 2009 of 2,7% van de totale Belgische werkgelegenheid. Wanneer ook de indirecte werkgelegenheid wordt meegeteld zorgen de havens voor 236.307 banen of 10,4% van de Vlaamse en 6% van de Belgische werkgelegenheid. Volgens de ‘Havenmonitor’ genereerden de Nederlandse havens een directe toegevoegde waarde van 20,5 miljard euro of 3,6% van het Nederlandse BBP in 2009. De indirecte toegevoegde waarde wordt geschat op 11,9 miljard euro in 2009. De Nederlandse havens stelden 163.386 personen direct te werk, wat overeenkomt met 1,9% van de totale Nederlandse tewerkstelling. De indirecte werkgelegenheid bedroeg 108.617 voltijdse banen in 2009. Er bestaat echter geen standaardmethodologie in de Rijn-Schelde Delta voor de meting van de economische impact van de havens. De cijfers van de Vlaamse en Nederlandse havens kunnen dus niet op eenzelfde basis vergeleken worden.

4. Steeds vaker worden een goede infrastructuur en een hoge toegankelijkheid basisvereisten voor de concurrentiekracht van landen en regio’s. Innovatie en geavanceerde productiefactoren worden essentieel om competitief te blijven. Bedrijven en havenautoriteiten zijn belangrijk als initiators van innovatie in de Delta. Naast de zuivere economische argumenten zijn ook deze meer strategische aspecten belangrijk wanneer men havenontwikkelingsplannen en de havenimpact evalueert.

DE STERKE TRAFIEKPOSITIE VAN DE RIJN-SCHELDE DELTA 5. De totale goederenoverslag in de Rijn-Schelde Delta bedroeg 812 miljoen ton in 2010 of

ongeveer 65% van de totale maritieme trafiek in de Hamburg-Le Havre range en 20% van de totale trafiek in het Europese havensysteem.

6. De Rijn-Schelde Delta regio speelt een sleutelrol in de behandeling van vloeibare massagoederen in Noordwest-Europa. In totaal bereikte de overslag van vloeibare massagoederen ongeveer 311 miljoen ton in 2010, wat neerkomt op 73% van de totale vloeibare bulktrafiek in de range. De sterke groei in de overslag van vloeibare massagoederen in de range sinds 1990 is bijna volledig

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toe te schrijven aan de Delta. Naast olie en chemische producten is er een groeiende markt voor biobrandstoffen, oliën, industriële gassen en grondstoffen voor energiecentrales. De Delta beschikt over een uitgebreid netwerk van pijpleidingen en een substantiële capaciteit aan tankopslag. De (petro-)chemische en industriële complexen in de Deltahavens hechten een grote waarde aan duurzaamheid en ‘ecologische schaalvoordelen’. De toekomstige stromen in vloeibare massagoederen zullen voornamelijk beïnvloed worden door (a) de verschuiving van fossiele naar niet-fossiele brandstoffen, (b) de toegenomen verwerking van ruwe aardolie aan de bron (bvb. in de olierijke landen), en (c) het gevoerde energiebeleid op nationaal en internationaal vlak. De Deltahavens trachten aan deze uitdagingen tegemoet te komen door in te zetten op differentiatie in meer geavanceerde chemische processen, welke meer gespecialiseerde werknemers en knowhow vereisen.

7. De markt van de droge massagoederen, en dan vooral de ‘major bulks’, vertoont een laag groeipotentieel. Deze sector wordt sterk gedreven door de vraag naar grondstoffen voor staalproductie en energie. Een sterkere groei is waar te nemen in de ‘minor bulks’ zoals mineralen, non-ferro concentraten en meststoffen. De totale overslag van droge massagoederen in de Hamburg-Le Havre range bereikte ongeveer 250 miljoen ton in 2010. Het marktaandeel van de Delta in de range varieert tussen 70% en 75%. Kolen en ijzererts zijn bestemd voor de belangrijke industriële centra in het Europese achterland en voor staalfabrieken en energiebedrijven in of nabij de havens. Een groot aantal Deltahavens mikt op een verbeterde nautische toegang, gedeeltelijk om grotere bulkschepen te kunnen accommoderen.

8. Wijzigingen in de positie van de Delta met betrekking tot de trafieken van droge en vloeibare

massagoederen zijn voor een groot deel gekoppeld aan: (1) economische cycli (vraag), (2) het aanbod aan terminals en achterlandvervoer in de Delta, rekening houdende met de beschikbare milieugebruiksruimte (carbon footprint), (3) het energiebeleid in de Benelux en Duitsland en (4) de locatiebeslissingen van verschillende chemische en staalgerelateerde bedrijven, waarvoor de concurrentie zich op een mondiale schaal afspeelt.

9. De markt van het conventioneel stukgoed kent een terugval door de opmars van containers. De

voornaamste groeimogelijkheden in dit marktsegment bevinden zich op het vlak van de gespecialiseerde ladingen. De Delta is redelijk sterk vertegenwoordigd in dit ladingsegment. De diversiteit van ladingtypes in de markt van het conventioneel stukgoed beperkt de relevantie van een algemene marktpositionering van de havens.

10. De Deltahavens vertegenwoordigen ongeveer 42% van de totale roro trafiek in de range. In de

jaren tachtig was dit 60%. De voornaamste markt voor de Delta op het vlak van het onbegeleid roro transport is de Noordzee, met sterke trafiekrelaties tussen Zeebrugge en Rotterdam en het centrale en noordelijke deel van het Verenigd Koninkrijk. De Rijn-Schelde Delta ontvangt ook aanzienlijke volumes papier- en houtproducten vanuit Scandinavië. De overslag van nieuwe wagens evolueert langzaam naar een mature markt, aangezien de vraag naar nieuwe wagens in West-Europa stilaan het verzadigingspunt bereikt heeft. De grote autohavens in de Delta kunnen voordeel halen uit een stijgende vraag vanuit Oost- en Centraal-Europa, Rusland en Turkije door hun positie in hub-feeder netwerken te verstevigen. De autorecyclage industrie en de opmars van hybride en elektrische wagens bieden nieuwe ontwikkelingskansen voor de Delta. De export van tweedehands wagens naar Afrika blijft ook een belangrijke deelmarkt.

11. In de containermarkt stijgt het aandeel van de Rijn-Schelde Delta op Europees vlak sinds 2001. In

2010 ging het om 22.3 miljoen TEU of 25.9% van de totale Europese containeroverslag. In volumetermen is de Delta de vijfde meest belangrijke containerregio in de wereld en de grootste ‘multi-port gateway region’ in Europa. De containermarkt is het enige overslagsegment dat de laatste decennia aanzienlijk is gegroeid. Ook de komende jaren wordt een toename

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verwacht. Het locale en directe achterland van de Deltahavens blijft zeer belangrijk. Het hoge aandeel van relatief lokaal verkeer is gedeeltelijk te verklaren door de belangrijke positie van de Lage Landen in Europese distributiecentra (EDCs) en ‘re-export’ activiteiten. De Deltahavens hebben een dominante positie in de containerstromen in relatie met België, Nederland en Nord Pas-de-Calais in Noord-Frankrijk. De containerhavens in de Delta hebben een sterke trafiekpositie in bepaalde Duitse deelstaten en Franse regio’s nabij het Rijnbekken. De concurrentiële positie is veel zwakker in het oostelijk deel van Duitsland, in Oost en Centraal Europa en in het westen van Frankrijk.

12. De containerhavens in de Delta komen steeds meer in directe concurrentie te staan met havens in andere Europese ranges (Baltische Zee, Adriatische Zee en Middellandse Zee), aangezien een groter aantal havens toegang krijgen tot de ‘blauwe banaan’ regio. Deze achterlandregio’s worden steeds vaker bediend door meerdere ‘multi-port gateway regions’. Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt hebben de zuidelijke havens een voordeel t.o.v. de Noord-Europese havens als het gaat om de reistijden vanuit Azië naar achterlandregio’s in zuidelijk en Centraal Europa. In de praktijk lijken de zuidelijke havens problemen te hebben om hun achterland aanzienlijk uit te breiden. De grote concentratie aan ladingstromen in de Delta verklaart waarom het achterlandbereik en het aanbod aan intermodale diensten van deze havenregio nog steeds veel groter is dan in het Middellandse Zeegebied.

DE RIJN-SCHELDE DELTA: STERK, MAAR EEN TOENEMENDE CONCURRENTIËLE DRUK

13. De overslag in de Delta is sterk afhankelijk van massagoederen verbonden aan energieproductie en de (petro-)chemische industrie. De verschuiving van fossiele naar niet-fossiele brandstoffen is één van de grootste uitdagingen maar tevens één van de grootste kansen. De Deltaregio moet een voortrekkersrol spelen in deze transitie, als ze haar positie wenst te behouden als één van de voornaamste energie- en petrochemische clusters in de wereld. De versterking van de wisselwerking tussen de (petro)chemische complexen in de verschillende havens is hier belangrijk, net als de inzet op innovatie op het vlak van duurzame productiemethodes en het verder versterken van ecologische schaalvoordelen. Het is van groot belang dat deze ecologische schaalvoordelen niet enkel op individueel havenniveau worden bekeken (bvb. via co-siting), maar ook op een grensoverschrijdend niveau (bvb. Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Moerdijk en Terneuzen). Het belang van deze ecologische schaalvoordelen zou volwaardig deel moeten uitmaken van het gevoerde milieubeleid.

14. Containers winnen aan belang in de trafieksamenstelling van de Deltaregio. De positie van de Delta in dit segment blijft kwetsbaar door de afhankelijkheid van EDC en ‘re-export’ activiteiten. Ook het bestaan van overlappende achterlanden, corridorontwikkeling in Europa en het ‘footloose’ karakter van zee-zee overslag dragen hiertoe bij. Om de concurrentie succesvol aan te gaan dient de Delta zich sterker te profileren als een geïntegreerde Europese ‘gateway’ regio, die schaalgrootte combineert met flexibiliteit op het vlak van routemogelijkheden.

15. Aan zeezijde worden Azië en andere opkomende economieën steeds belangrijker. In het hinterland zal de groei van de Deltahavens meer en meer afhangen van regio’s buiten de traditionele ‘blauwe banaan’. De combinatie van beide ontwikkelingen leidt tot een toegenomen concurrentie met havens buiten de Hamburg-Le Havre range. Dit wordt versterkt door havenhervormingen in Frankrijk, Italië en Spanje. De Deltahavens moeten overwegen om hun achterlandbereik verder uit te breiden zonder de noden en het belang van het huidige kernachterland uit het oog te verliezen.

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16. De opkomst van economische centra in Oost en Centraal Europa creëert mogelijkheden voor de

Deltahavens op vlak van kustvaart en hub-feeder netwerken over land en zee. De groei van de Europese markt kan echter leiden tot wijzigingen in de configuratie van Europese distributienetwerken (bvb. door een verschuiving van EDCs naar andere regio’s, een alternatief netwerk met RDCs of meer DC bypass) met een potentieel negatief effect op de containertrafieken van de Deltahavens.

17. De Delta havenregio en de Noord-Duitse regio zijn pioniers in intermodale oplossingen. Deze

‘early mover’ voordelen zijn echter niet voldoende om toekomstig succes te garanderen. Een doorlopende innovatie in processen en technologieën is vereist, niet enkel om de Delta competitief te houden, maar ook om beleidsmakers duidelijk te maken dat de Deltaregio haar Europese leidersrol op een verantwoorde en innovatieve manier waar maakt, daarmee rekening houdend met de noden van de markt en duurzaamheid.

18. Hoewel de Deltahavens zich over het algemeen kunnen vinden in de principes van het Witboek

van de Europese Commissie, is het belangrijk te benadrukken dat de huidige trafiekdistributie in het Europese havensysteem niet enkel kan verklaard worden door te kijken naar kosten. Co-modale bundelingeffecten, connectiviteit en de integrale kwaliteit van de dienstverlening hebben tot gevolg dat de “natuurlijke” gateway vaak niet de dichtstbijzijnde gateway is. Een niet consistente implementatie van heffingen in de EU kan leiden tot een ladingsverschuiving weg van de Delta. De Deltaregio dient beleidsmakers de boodschap te brengen dat de huidige trafiekdistributie in Europa en de sterke positie van de Delta een weerspiegeling zijn van marktconforme beslissingen van logistieke spelers.

19. De discussie rond het ‘core network’ binnen het TEN-T beleid kan de havens in de regio

beïnvloeden indien dit zou resulteren in een toename van maritieme toegangspunten in Europa en in een beleid gericht op de verspreiding van lading over een groot aantal Europese havens. De Deltahavens moeten blijven inzetten op hun kracht in het bundelen van lading op de grote corridors binnen het TEN-T netwerk.

OOG VOOR DE KERNZAKEN TENEINDE COMPETITIEF TE BLIJVEN

20. Ruimte, toegankelijkheid, de efficiëntie in het accommoderen van supply chains en duurzaamheid blijven de kernthema’s voor een verdere havenontwikkeling binnen de Delta. De Deltahavens kunnen beschouwd worden als koplopers in veel van deze gebieden door middel van de ontwikkeling van innovatieve business cases, nieuwe bestuursstructuren en originele manieren om met stakeholders om te gaan. De verzelfstandiging van de havenautoriteiten zou moeten helpen om meer partnerships in de commerciële sfeer te kunnen aangaan en om de prestaties van de havens te verbeteren met het oog op een toenemende internationale concurrentiedruk.

21. Het ‘Mainport Netwerk’ beleid in Nederland en de ‘Extended Gateway’ strategie in Vlaanderen helpen gedeeltelijk het mogelijk tekort aan havengronden op te vangen. Dit leidt echter niet noodzakelijk tot een netto afname in de ruimtenoden binnen de Deltaregio. Het is belangrijk dat deze noden op het niveau van de gehele Delta worden onderzocht zodat toekomstige havenontwikkelingen kunnen worden geëvalueerd op het vlak van hun ruimtelijke impact op de gehele logistieke en transportinfrastructuur in de Lage Landen.

22. De toegankelijkheid, vooral in relatie tot het achterland, blijft een hoofdbekommernis voor de

Delta. Havenautoriteiten moeten een prominente rol spelen in het bevorderen van netwerkvorming in relatie tot het achterland en in de coördinatie en samenwerking tussen de

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betrokken partners (bvb. met betrekking tot ladingbundeling). De uitbouw van het autowegennetwerk moet gelijke tred houden met de aanhoudende groei van het transport over de weg. Op het vlak van dienstverlening worden informatiestromen even belangrijk als de fysieke goederenstromen. Dit betekent dat de havens moeten beschikken over de juiste infrastructuur en de geschikte software en expertise om een afdoend antwoord te vinden op de steeds hogere eisen die de mondiale informatiestromen stellen. Een haven kan deze uitdaging niet als een aparte schakel aangaan, temeer aangezien de marktspelers een sterke focus op netwerken hebben ontwikkeld.

23. Op het vlak van duurzaamheid moeten havenbesturen en havengerelateerde bedrijven goede

resultaten kunnen voorleggen om zich te verzekeren van de steun van de gemeenschap en om klanten en investeerders aan te trekken. De Delta moet inspanningen leveren om het ruimtegebruik verder te optimaliseren en de uitstoot van huidige en toekomstige activiteiten in het havengebied te beperken.

24. Een laatste kernzaak betreft de efficiëntie in het accommoderen van supply chains. De

economische sterkte van Nederland en België is in grote mate verweven met import- en exportactiviteiten en productieprocessen. Deze activiteiten vormen de basis voor de aanwezige logistiek en aanverwante dienstverlening. Een verminderde aandacht voor het aantrekken van fysieke goederenstromen en industriële activiteiten zou de economische basis van de Delta op termijn kwetsbaarder maken. De strategische ligging van de Delta nabij de ‘blauwe banaan’ is een troef die internationaal voortdurend moet uitgespeeld worden.

INZETTEN OP SYNERGIE IN DE DELTA 25. Een haven dient steeds meer vanuit een netwerkperspectief benaderd worden, zeker wanneer

het gaat over haven-achterland relaties. De gezamenlijke troeven van de Delta havenregio in relatie tot het achterland zijn belangrijk, net als de troeven van elk van de individuele havens in de regio. Het vermogen van de havengemeenschappen om synergie met andere knooppunten en marktspelers te bewerkstelligen draagt in belangrijke mate bij tot een succesvolle ontplooiing van de havens. De noden op het vlak van coördinatie en samenwerking met andere knooppunten en logistieke spelers buiten het havengebied worden daardoor steeds belangrijker.

26. De havens in de Rijn-Schelde Delta zijn zich bewust van het belang van binnenhavens. Meer aandacht dient te gaan naar investeringen en deelnames in de activiteiten van buitenlandse binnenhavens (meer bepaald in de zones van de ‘blauwe banaan’ buiten de Benelux) ondermeer via joint ventures.

27. De geboden flexibiliteit in de keuze van transporttrajecten vormt een belangrijke factor voor de

logistieke attractiviteit van een regio. Productielocaties en logistieke sites (bijvoorbeeld EDC) prijzen de geboden flexibiliteit binnen de Delta om inkomende en uitgaande goederenstromen te accommoderen. De aanwezigheid van een groot aantal havens maakt de gehele regio aantrekkelijk op het vlak van de geboden flexibiliteit voor de klanten. De synergie tussen de verschillende havens speelt ook op het vlak van het achterland. In dit opzicht is het belangrijk om de Delta als een ‘multi-port gateway region’ te beschouwen.

28. In vergelijking tot andere havenregio’s in Europa biedt de Delta niet enkel flexibiliteit op het vlak

van trajectkeuze, maar ook een ongeëvenaarde schaalgrootte in termen van volumes, connectiviteit en geboden frequentie in de achterlandverbindingen. De bundeling van lading laat de Delta toe een kritische massa te verkrijgen om gebieden in het verdere achterland te

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bedienen. Coördinatie en collectieve acties tussen havens en marktspelers zijn nodig om lading te bundelen en om het aandeel van intermodaal vervoer verder op te drijven (ook op kortere afstanden). De synergie tussen de Deltahavens kan ook verder versterkt worden door de verbindingen tussen de havens onderling verder te verbeteren.

HAVENSAMENWERKING IN PERSPECTIEF 29. Er wordt reeds samengewerkt tussen de Deltahavens in zaken die de wederzijdse belangen

dienen en zelfs op het vlak van meer commercieel gevoelige thema’s. Toch is er ruimte voor meer (grensoverschrijdende) samenwerking op het vlak van de bundeling van lading en de versterking van de functionele wisselwerking tussen de verschillende havengebieden. Samenwerkingsinitiatieven dienen marktconform te zijn (d.i. gebaseerd op een sterke business case) en geïnitieerd te worden door marktpartijen, daarbij gefaciliteerd door havenautoriteiten en andere relevante (semi-)publieke entiteiten.

30. Een belangrijk aandachtspunt blijft de geografische schaal die het meest opportuun is voor een goede samenwerking in de Delta. Het beleid van zowel de Nederlandse als Vlaamse overheid gaat te sterk uit van de eigen administratieve grenzen zonder de voordelen van een meer intensieve grensoverschrijdende samenwerking voldoende te belichten. Dit is duidelijk binnen het Nederlandse ‘Mainport Netwerk’ beleid en het Vlaamse ‘Extended Gateway’ concept. Bij het Portbase project werd enkel uitgegaan van Nederlandse havens. Ook op het vlak van logistieke kennisontwikkeling blijft de samenwerking tussen Nederlandse en Vlaamse havens en logistieke regio’s beperkt. Door het beperken van havensamenwerking tot nationale of regionale grenzen worden blinde vlekken gecreëerd en wordt de dynamiek binnen de gehele Rijn-Schelde Delta niet ten volle benut.

31. De modaliteiten en beleidsstructuren voor samenwerking zijn minder belangrijk dan het

uiteindelijke doel. Informeel overleg en samenwerking zijn sneller en makkelijker op te starten; vaak leiden ze tot goede resultaten zonder de bureaucratische lasten die een complexe organisatiestructuur met zich kan meebrengen. Het samenvoegen of de fusie van havenautoriteiten mag geen doel op zich zijn. Het kan interessanter zijn om havens toe te laten een minderheidsaandeel in één of meerdere andere havens te verwerven: gemeenschappelijke doelen kunnen worden nagestreefd zonder de broodnodige havenconcurrentie volledig te elimineren. Het is ook mogelijk om samenwerking tussen verschillende havens op projectbasis te regelen. Hierbij worden doelstellingen (bijvoorbeeld het opzetten van een gemeenschappelijke intermodale achterlandverbinding) scherp afgebakend.

32. Samenwerking tussen havens mag niet opgelegd worden door hogere overheden. Een haven dwingen te specialiseren in een bepaald goederensegment kan aanzienlijke gevolgen hebben voor de mogelijkheden tot diversificatie en uiteindelijk de commerciële levensvatbaarheid. Het kan ook het aanbod en de flexibiliteit voor klanten van de Delta beperken. Initiatieven tot samenwerking moeten, zeker als het gaat om commerciële zaken, door de havens zelf worden ontwikkeld. De overheid dient enkel in te grijpen wanneer er marktfaling optreedt, bijvoorbeeld door misbruik van (markt)macht of het bestaan van aanzienlijke externe kosten. ‘Institutioneel ondernemerschap’ lijkt de beste aanpak met het oog op havensamenwerking: de overheid blijft verantwoordelijk voor regelgeving en voor het uitstippelen van de algemene beleidslijnen, maar laat de eigenlijke strategiebepaling over aan een meer decentraal niveau (d.i. havenautoriteiten).

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SYNTHÈSE

1. Ce rapport propose une analyse économique des ports à travers le Delta du Rhin-Escaut. Le Delta est caractérisé par des ports assez grands et plusieurs ports de taille moyenne ou petite. Chacun a des caractéristiques spécifiques concernant l’accès de l’arrière-pays, les marchandises traitées et les qualités vis-à-vis la location. Ce mélange unique de types et tailles de ports, en combinaison avec un arrière-pays substantiel, forme la dynamique de cette région.

LA GRANDE IMPORTANCE DES PORTS DANS LE RHIN-ESCAUT DELTA 2. Les Pays-Bas et la Belgique montrent une grande performance et compétitivité économique en

comparaison avec autres régions/pays au niveau mondial. Leurs ports, étant des points de support pour l’infrastructure logistique des pays, sont des initiateurs pour la performance et compétitivité des deux pays.

3. Les effets économiques des activités des ports ne sont plus limités aux environnements locaux. Ils sont dispersés sur une région géographique beaucoup plus vaste et à travers une grande quantité de joueurs internationaux. Selon la Banque Nationale de la Belgique, le montant des quatre ports Flamands a généré une valeur ajoutée directe et indirecte de 27,1 billion d’euro en 2009 ou 8,2% du PIB total de Belgique. La valeur ajoutée directe a atteint 13 billion d’euro en 2009 ou 4,3% du PIB Belge. L’emploi généré directement par les ports a atteint 105.000 emploies à plein temps en 2009 ou 2,7% de l’emploi total de la Belgique. L’ensemble d’emplois direct et indirect est bon pour 236.307 employés ou 10,4% d’emploi total dans la Flandre et 6% de la Belgique. Selon le ‘Port Monitor’, les ports localisés dans les Pays-Bas ont généré une valeur ajoutée directe de 20,5 billion d’euro ou 3,6% du PIB Hollandais en 2009. La valeur ajoutée indirecte a atteint 11,9 billions d’euro en 2009. Les ports des Pays-Bas étaient capables d’employer 163.386 personnes en 2009 ce qui correspond avec 1,9% de l’emploie total des Pays-Bas. L’ensemble des emploies indirectes élevait à 108.617 personnes en 2009. Il n’existe aucune méthodologie uniforme dans le Delta concernant la définition des types d’impacts, ce qui rend les comparaisons entre les ports Flamands et Néerlandais très difficile. Les chiffres des ports Flamands et Hollandais ne peuvent pas être comparés selon les mêmes valeurs essentielles.

4. Une infrastructure adéquate et une grande accessibilité sont de plus en plus des conditions minimales pour la compétitivité des pays et régions. L’innovation et les facteurs de production avancée deviennent essentiels si on veut rester compétitif. Entreprises et autorités portuaires dans le Delta doivent continuer à pousser l’innovation vers des nouveaux sommets. A coté d’arguments économiques, ces aspects stratégiques doivent être considérés quand on estime l’importance du développement des ports.

UNE POSITION SOLIDE DU DELTA EN MATIERE DE TRAFICS

5. Le trafic total dans les ports du Delta a atteint 812 millions de tonnes en 2010 ou 65% du trafic total de la rangée nord de l'Europe et 20% du trafic maritime en Europe.

6. Le Rhin-Escaut Delta joue un rôle décisif dans les transports de liquides en vrac dans la partie Nord-Ouest de L’Europe. Le trafic total de ce type de cargo a atteint 311 million de tonnes en 2010 ou 73% du trafic des vracs liquides dans la rangée nord de l'Europe. La courbe de croissance qui démarre en 1990 dans ce secteur est presque complètement attribuable au Delta. Appart des produits pétroliers et chimiques il y a une activité grimpante dans la production du bio fuel, huiles comestibles, gazes industriels et usine d’eau, vapeur et électricité. Le Delta est équipé d’un

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réseau de pipes et d’une capacité de stockage de liquides substantiels. Les complexes (petro-) chimiques et industriels dans les ports de la Delta prennent les développements durables et les ‘écologies d’échelles’ très sérieux. Les trafics de vracs liquides seront affectés par (a) l’évolution de combustibles fossiles aux combustibles bio, (b) une augmentation de traitement de pétrole à la source et (c) les directives d’énergie nationaux et internationaux. Les ports du Delta sont déjà en train de faire face à ces défis par différentier leur processus nécessitant des employés spécialisés et un savoir faire extensif.

7. Le transport du vrac solide, en particulier les commodités majeurs, est un marché mature avec une potentielle d’expansion lente. Tout ceci est stimulé pour la plupart par la demande des matériaux de construction et de sources d’énergie. Une croissance plus intense est observée dans la catégorie des produits vrac mineurs comme les minéraux, concentrâtes non-ferreux et les engrais. Le trafic total des vracs solides dans la rangée nord de l'Europe a atteint environ 250 million de tonnes en 2010. Le segment du marché du Delta dans l’étendue, oscille entre 70% et 75%. Le charbon et le minerai de fer ont comme destination des clients dans les secteurs d’industrie d’Europe, étant des aciéries ou des centrales électriques, des fois localisés près des ports. Quelques ports dans le Delta essaient d’améliorer leur accès nautique partiellement pour accommoder des navires vrac solide.

8. Le changement dans la position du Delta dans le marché en vrac (liquide et solide) est pour une

grande partie lié à (1) les cycles économiques (2) l’offre de terminaux et le transport d’arrière-pays (sans oublier les directives concernant l’environnent) (3) les directives d’énergie dans le Benelux et l’Allemagne et (4) les décisions de location prises par les aciéries et industries chimiques qui sont sujet a une forte compétition globale.

9. Le marché de marchandises conventionnelles est en train de dégrader : l’augmentation

d’utilisation de containers a capturé une partie importante du marché. Les plus grandes opportunités se trouvent dans la section spécialisée (comme le ‘heavy lift’). Le Delta est relativement fort pour ce type de cargo. La diversité de types de cargo conventionnel limite la valeur d’un positionnement général des ports.

10. Les ports du Rhin-Escaut Delta ont traité 42% du volume total de RoRo dans la rangée Hambourg

– Le Havre, en comparaison, vers 1980 ce pourcentage atteignait 60%. Le marché principal pour le RoRo dans le Delta est la Mer du Nord, avec des relations particulièrement fortes entre Zeebrugge et Rotterdam et la partie centrale et le Nord de l’Angleterre. Le Delta reçoit également des quantités de produits forestiers substantiels provenant de la Scandinavie. Le transport de voitures nouvelles est lentement en train d’évoluer vers un marché plus ou mois mature causé par la maximation de la demande de nouvelles voitures dans l’Europe de l’ouest. Les ports qui traitent la plupart du trafic RoRo peuvent prendre avantage de l’augmentation de la demande dans l’Europe de l’est, la Russie et la Turquie en améliorant leur position dans les réseaux hub-feeder. L’exportation de voitures d’occasion pour l’Afrique reste un marché viable pour le Delta.

11. Dans le trafic de conteneurs, le segment de marché occupé par le Delta Rhin-Escaut a fait face à

une tendance grimpante depuis 2001 pour atteindre 22,3 million TEU ou 25,9% du marché Européen en 2010. En termes de volume le Delta est la région placée cinquième mondial pour trafic de conteneurs. Ce marché est le seul qui a augmenté et qui devrait augmenter fortement dans le futur. L’arrière-pays local du Delta reste très important. Une grande partie du trafic local est partiellement lié au rôle des Pays-Bas et de la Belgique dans les EDC et les activités de ‘re-export’. La Belgique, les Pays Bas et le Nord Pas-de-Calais dans le Nord de la France sont des arrière-pays virtuellement captif pour la région du Delta. Les environs ou le Delta est fort sont les

xix

états Allemands et les régions Françaises dans le bassin du Rhin. Le Delta est mois présente dans les parties est de L’Allemagne, l’Europe de l’est et la partie ouest de la France.

12. Les ports de conteneurs dans le Delta doivent de plus en plus faire face a la compétition

provenant d’autres parts de l’Europe (Baltique, Adriatique, Méditerranée) depuis qu’un nombre de ports a réussi à servir avec succès le ‘blue banana’. Ces régions ne sont plus servi par un seul ‘multi-port gateway region’ mais par plusieurs de ces régions ensemble. En théorie les ports localisés vers la Méditerranée sont plus près de l’arrière-pays pour les trafics provenant de l’Asie destiné pour central/sud Europe. Mais ils semblent avoir des problèmes avec l’extension de leurs trafics ferroviaires. La concentration de trafic dans la région du Delta explique pour une grande partie pourquoi la portée et diversité des services intermodaux offerts ici sont plus grandes et plus développées que dans la région Méditerranée.

UN DELTA FORT POSITIONNE MAIS DISPUTE

13. La région du Rhin-Escaut Delta est fort dépendent des vracs liquides et solides pour la production d’énergie et pour la (petro) chimie. Le mouvement de combustible fossiles aux non-fossiles est un défi mais aussi une opportunité. La région devrait adopter un rôle dirigeant dans cette transition si elle veut rester compétitive en étant une des plus importants clusters dans le monde. Ceci peut être accompli par améliorer les liens entre les différents ports du Delta, et par montrer le chemin en innovation concernant la production des produits durables et l’implémentation des ‘écologies d’échelle’.

14. Le trafic de conteneurs devient de plus en plus important dans la composition du trafic dans la région. La position du Delta est particulièrement vulnérable à cause de notre rôle dans les EDC et les activités de ‘re-export’. En plus l’existence d’arrière pays non-captif, de corridors en développent à travers l’Europe et la conduite capricieuse du ‘sea-sea transhipment’ ne fait qu’empirer les choses. Rester compétitif dans ce marché ne nécessite pas seulement des réactions de ports et parties concernés mais aussi un positionnement du Delta comme ‘gateway’ Européen intégré qui combine l’ampleur avec la flexibilité.

15. L’Asie et les autres économies émergentes deviennent de plus en plus d’importants joueurs dans les trafics. Dans l’arrière-pays la croissance doit venir des régions en dehors du ‘blue banana’ traditionnel à cause de la maturité des régions habituelles. Ces deux développements ont comme conséquence une compétition d’avantage provenant des ports en dehors de la rangée nord de l'Europe. Cette tendance est fortifiée par les réformes portuaires dans des pays comme la France, l’Italie et l’Espagne. Les ports dans le Delta devraient considérer d’agrandir leur portée d’arrière-pays sans oublier les besoins de leur arrière-pays de base.

16. L’apparition de centres économiques dans l’est de l’Europe et la partie centrale d’Europe crée des opportunités pour les ports du Delta si ils développent des services ‘short sea’ et des ‘hub-feeder’ liens destinés pour ces régions. En même temps l’expansion de l’Europe crée un risque vis-à-vis la dépendance de la Belgique et les Pays-Bas sur les EDC en risque. Chaque changement dans la conception du réseau de distribution (par exemple la transition des EDC, plus de RDCs ou des ‘DC by-pass’) crée un impact sur les trafics entre les ports Européens. Cet impact peut être négatif pour le Delta.

17. La région Rhin-Escaut et le nord de l’Allemagne ont compris asses tôt que l’intermodalité a ces avantages. Mais le Delta ne peut pas relier uniquement sur son avantage d’avant-coureur. Une innovation permanente est nécessaire, pas seulement pour sauvegarder la compétitivité mais aussi pour montrer aux organisations qui conçoivent les directives que le Delta prend son rôle de

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September 2011

dirigeant Européen sérieux et se rend compte des dynamiques du marché et de la nécessité de durabilité.

18. Même si les ports du Delta ont accepté les principes décrits dans le Livre Blanc de la Commission Européenne, c’est important de stresser que les couts payé ne sont pas suffisent pour comprendre les routes prises par les conteneurs. Les effets de la co-modalité, une certaine connectivité et les services rendus par des gateways spécifiques peuvent provoquer une situation dans laquelle le gateway le plus près n’est pas le ‘natural gateway’ pour cette région. Une fixation non-uniforme des prix routiers peut résulter dans des diminutions de trafic dans le Delta. La région est responsable de transmettre le message que la position établi du Delta est basé sur des décisions imposé par le marché.

19. La discussion concernant le ‘core network’ de la politique TEN-T peut impacter les ports dans cette région. Ceci peut créer des nouveaux points d’accès à travers la côte et une politique visée sur la dispersion de cargo. Les ports du Delta doivent continuer à capitaliser leur pouvoir de consolider du trafic sur les grands corridors du réseau TEN-T.

SE CONCENTRER SUR LES FONDAMENTAUX AFIN DE RESTER COMPETITIF

20. L’espace, l’accessibilité, l’efficacité vers les chaînes logistiques et la durabilité restent des points essentiels pour le développement des ports du Delta. Les ports dans la région peuvent être considérés come des pionniers dans beaucoup d’aspects concernant ces évolutions: les études d’investissement, les nouvelles structures de gouvernance et des façons révolutionnaires d’intégrer les stakeholders dans les développements. La réforme des autorités portuaires devrait aider à entretenir plus de partnerships dans le secteur logistique et commercial et d’améliorer leur performance vis-à-vis la compétition internationale.

21. La politique ‘Mainport Network’ dans les Pays Bas et le concept ‘Extended Gateway’ dans les Flandres aident partiellement à gérer le manque d’espace libre. Mais ces stratégies ne mènent pas nécessairement à une situation dans laquelle les espaces requises dans la Delta s’améliorent. C’est important que les conditions d’espace sont étudiés sur la totalité du Delta, dans ce cas les futures implications des développements des ports peuvent être évalue correctement.

22. L’accessibilité, particulièrement face à l’arrière-pays, est un autre thème principal. Les autorités

portuaires doivent renforcer leur rôle dans la formation des réseaux et améliorer la coordination et coopération entre les partis impliqués. Ils peuvent être des facilateurs dans ces processus. L’expansion de la capacité des autoroutes à travers le Delta doit marcher au même pas que la croissance de la circulation routière. Les qualités vis-à-vis les informations transmises sont en train de devenir aussi importantes que les services physiques. Ceci implique que les ports doivent avoir l’infrastructure correcte, un logiciel adéquat et les employés ayant des amples capacités pour répondre aux exigences de plus en plus extrêmes imposées par le marché. Les ports ne peuvent pas opérer comme entités isolées pour résoudre ce problème, ils doivent former une union pour consolider leurs forces.

23. Concernant la durabilité, les autorités portuaires doivent montrer une grande performance

environnementale s’ils veulent captiver le support de la communauté ou attirer des investisseurs et des partenaires commerciaux. Le Delta est censé d’améliorer l’utilisation d’espace et de diminuer les émissions des activités dans les ports et les environs.

xxi

24. Le dernier facteur formulé est l’efficacité concernant les supply chains. La position économique des Pays-Bas et de la Belgique est pour une grande partie liée à trafiquer des transactions physiques et des activités de productions. Ces activités créent la base pour l’industrie logistique et pour les services associés. Limitant la portée du service à une structure basée uniquement sur le contrôle/orchestration de services peut rendre la position du Delta plus vulnérable. La location du Delta sur le plan géographique reste un avantage dont on doit tirer du profit.

LES SYNERGIES DANS LE DELTA

25. Les ‘stratégies du réseau’ implémenté par les joueurs du marché augmentent l’importance d’approcher les ports comme nœuds intégrés dans un réseau. Les qualités de tous les ports unis, comme dans la Delta, sont assez importants que ceux de chaque port individuel dans la région. Le succès est déterminé par l’habilité d’exploiter les synergies avec les autres nœuds qui font partie du réseau. Ces développements nécessitent des coopérations et coordinations plus intensives avec les nœuds et acteurs situés en dehors des ports.

26. Les ports dans le Delta comprennent que les ports intérieurs peuvent les aider à faire face à une grande diversité de contraints local. La participation dans des ports intérieurs étrangers mérite plus d’attention. Ceci nécessite une approche prudente, par exemple en considérant des ‘joint ventures’ sur le développement des nouveaux sites.

27. La flexibilité est une des sujets importants pour l’attractivité de la région. Les unités de productions et les sites logistiques (comme des EDC) dans l’arrière-pays apprécient la flexibilité offerte par le Delta en guise d’options offertes pour relier leurs imports et exports. A part de se focaliser sur l’arrière-pays, les ports doivent payer une plus grande attention aux bénéfices offerts par la présence de multiples ports dans les environs. Plusieurs ‘gateways’ ensemble offrent des synergies et peuvent garantir les meilleurs possibilités de connectivité. Dans ce cadre c’est très important d’adresser le Delta comme un ‘multi-port gateway region’.

28. Comparé à d’autres régions en Europe, le Rhin-Escaut Delta n’offre pas seulement la flexibilité mais peut aussi capitaliser sur une étendue sans égal en guise de volume, connectivité et fréquences en services terrestres. La consolidation de cargo vers l’arrière-pays permet aux ports du Delta de générer la masse critique pour l’accès des régions les plus profondes. Une coordination et des actions collectives entres ports et clients sont essentiels si ils veulent atteindre l’objective d’agrandir les trafics intermodales et la consolidation du cargo. Des synergies entre ports dans le Delta peuvent gagner en valeur s’ils améliorent les connections entre les ports.

METTRE LA COOPERATION EN PERSPECTIVE

29. La coopération entre ports dans le Delta existe déjà sur des sujets ou il y a des intérêts mutuels et même sur des issues commercialement sensitives. Néanmoins il y a une marge pour plus de coopération en consolidant du cargo destiné pour l’arrière pays et d’améliorer les échanges fonctionnels entre les ports.

30. Un point essentiel est la portée des actions de coopération au Delta. Les politiques des Pays-Bas et de la Belgique sont trop souvent limitées entre leurs propres frontières sans se rendre compte du potentiel de coopération internationale. Par limiter le point focal aux frontières nationales on crée des angles morts et on néglige des dynamiques logistiques importantes dans le Delta Rhin-Escaut.

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September 2011

31. Les modalités concernant la coopération ne sont pas aussi importantes que les objectifs qui

doivent être réalisé. Des liens de coopération décontractés sont plus facile à créer et sont souvent asses efficace pour accomplir les résultats sans se charger d’une bureaucratie extensive. Des fusions entre des autorités portuaires n’est pas un objectif en lui même. Accorder la possibilité à une autorité de devenir actionnaire minimal dans une autre autorité peut améliorer la perception d’une mission commune sans effacer la compétition nécessaire pour garder le Delta alerte et efficace. Une alternative est la coopération entre ports sur une base de projets. Ceci peut générer les résultats souhaités.

32. C’est essentiel qu’aucune politique gouvernementale pour faciliter/encourager la coopération entre ports soit imposée sur les ports. En forçant des ports de se spécialiser, la diversification de ports individuels peut être nuit. En même temps ça agrandit les risques commerciaux pour les ports affecté et réduit le choix pour les clients, diminuant la flexibilité. Des actions vers la coopération entre ports, particulièrement dans le secteur commercial, doivent être démarrées par les ports eux-mêmes. Le gouvernement doit quand même s’imposer quand le marché entre en défaille, par exemple quand il y a un usage excessif du pouvoir ou quand les coûts externes ne sont pas distribués de façon optimale. La route prise par ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ est probablement la meilleure solution pour la coopération des ports. Le gouvernement est responsable pour les directives générales, mail laisse le développement de la stratégie pour les nivéaux plus décentralisés (comme l’autorité portuaire et les entreprises logistiques).

1

Economic Analysis Rhine-Scheldt Delta September 2011

INTRODUCTION This report provides an economic analysis of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The Delta features established large ports, such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Amsterdam, as well as a whole series of medium-sized to smaller ports each with specific characteristics in terms of hinterland markets served, commodities handled and location qualities. The unique blend of different port types and sizes combined with a vast economic hinterland shapes port dynamics in the region. While Figure 1 features all seaports in the Delta region, we will mainly focus on the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Zeeland Seaports, Zeebrugge and Ghent. Figure 1. The ports under study in this report

This report is structured as follows. The first part analyzes the function and economic and strategic importance of the Delta port region. The second part discusses the impact of changes in the global economy and logistics and distribution patterns on the seaports in the Delta. We adopt a top-down approach: an analysis of the patterns in global economic development is followed by sections on changes in logistics. Next, the report elaborates on the role of corridors, intermodality and inland ports, and on relevant regulation and government policies. Part three contains the results of an extensive analysis of the past, present and future competitive position of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in different cargo segments (i.e. liquid bulk, dry bulk, conventional general cargo, roro cargo and containers). Special attention is given to the traffic position of the Delta in the hinterland and associated patterns in European-wide port competition. The last part of this report presents the main challenges and policies for the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region. Key challenges are identified in relation to a changing European market, the strategies of logistics market players, national and supranational policies and cargo flows through the Delta ports. Part four concludes with a plea for a stronger focus on the existing and potential synergies between the ports of the Delta.

0 50 100 150 20025Kilometers

France

Belgium

Lux

Germany

Netherlands

BrusselsLille

Liège

Duisburg

Duesseldorf

Cologne

Bonn

Dortmund

North Sea

Canal/Amsterdam

The HagueUtrecht

Koblenz

Seaport in Rhine-Scheldt Delta

Rotterdam

Zeeland Seaports

(Flushing/Terneuzen)

Zeebrugge

Ostend Antwerp

Ghent

Dordrecht

Moerdijk

The Delta offers a unique blend of seaports.

Structure of the report.

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September 2011

1 I THE FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PORTS IN

THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA

1.1 The changing role and function of seaports

Seaport functions are diverse in scope and nature and evolve over time. Port roles and functions can be identified through political, geographical (urban and spatial), economic and social perspectives. From a macro-analytical and public policy perspective ports are viewed as economic catalysts for the regions they serve where the aggregation of services and activities generates benefits and socio-economic wealth. Ports create direct and indirect value-added and employment. Often, port macro-economic impacts focus a lot on national or regional competitiveness, thereby ignoring port impacts on the wider economic space and on international trade and logistics. Ports are often approached as clusters (De Langen, 2002) and maritime industrial development areas (MIDAs). Consequently, they receive a lot of attention as part of national or supranational maritime cluster policy and industrial policy. Other issues of interest to the public policy maker at a macro-level include urban planning and expansion, safety, security and environmental sustainability. Port development is often associated with urban planning. The emphasis here lies on the port-city interface and on waterfront redevelopment and other initiatives to re-establish the link between port area and city. From an environmental perspective, port planning and management should ensure sustainable development. Environmental sustainability of port projects has become as important as economic and financial viability. Ports often form an integral part of coastal management policies. As such ports have adopted a real environmental role and function. Another perspective is to look at ports from a micro-perspective approach. Port operations are usually oriented towards the two traditional components of ships and cargo. Services to ships include those performed at the sea or waterways side (dredging, pilotage, mooring/unmooring, etc.) and at the ship/shore interface (berthing, repair and maintenance, supply and bunkering, etc.). Services to cargo can be divided into those performed at the ship/shore interface (stowing, loading, discharging, etc.) and those entirely performed in land-side areas such as consolidation, storage and distribution. Key in the micro-perspective approach are the concepts of efficiency/performance and sustainability at the operational level (i.e. a company or terminal). A third approach consists of a hybrid perspective on port roles and functions combining both macro- and micro-elements. The widely cited port-type generations of UNCTAD (1994) and later port generation models (Van Den Berg and Van Klink, 1995; Flynn et al., 2011) look at port roles and functions, but also institutional structuring and operational and management practices. An evolving new approach perceives ports as business ventures regardless of their institutional, operational or functional status. The wave of corporatisation of port authorities, also in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta, reflects this increasing business and market-oriented approach to port management. Ports are part of a wider logistics and production system and increasingly performing teleport functions. Port functions are extended to trade,

A macro perspective on

the role and functions of

seaports.

A micro perspective:

services to ships and cargo.

A hybrid approach:

seaports as business

ventures and part of global supply chains.

3


logistics and production centres with an extensive portfolio of operations spanning across production, trade and service industries. More than ever, a seaport is not an end in itself: port activities in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta contribute to the industrial and logistics development in the port areas and the hinterland.

1.2 The economic significance of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports

Nowadays, ports are viewed as independent commercial undertakings aiming at full cost recovery and a rapid response to the customer. The economic effects of seaport activities are no longer limited to the local environment, but are spread over a much wider geographical area and among a large number of international players (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001). In other words, the economic benefits of port activities are expanding from the local port system towards a much larger economic system (Benacchio and Musso, 2001). Measuring the impacts of ports is not an easy task. The identification of activities that are dependent on the port, their degree of dependency and the associated multiplier effects lead to methodological discussions. Measuring direct, indirect, induced and related jobs is often difficult due to a lack of data. There exists no unique standard methodology in Europe or even within the Rhine-Scheldt Delta on the definition of the types of impacts, which makes port comparisons difficult. Detailed studies on port impacts are however available for Dutch ports and Belgian ports separately. The figures for Flemish and Dutch ports can therefore not be compared on an equal basis.

1.2.1. The Flemish ports

The National Bank of Belgium provides detailed data on the economic impact of the ports within the region of Flanders. The reports assess the economic situation within ports based on three criteria: employment, added value and investments. While the studies of the National Bank of Belgium also consider other ports like Liège and Brussels, we will only consider the figures for Antwerp, Gent, Zeebrugge and Ostend. Antwerp and Zeebrugge will be analyzed in more detail (NBB, 2011). In assessing the added value of a port, a division is made between the maritime and non-maritime cluster. The non-maritime cluster is further subdivided in trade, industry, land transport and other logistics services. In this way, one gets a rather complete picture of the economic impact of the port sector. The four Flemish ports combined generated a direct and indirect value added of 27.1 billion euro or 8.2% of total GDP of Belgium in crisis year 2009. This is almost a 19% increase compared to 2002. The direct added value reached 13 billion euro in 2009 or 4.3% of total Belgian GDP, mostly created by industry (52%). The maritime cluster creates over a quarter of this direct added value. A closer look at the total added value figures reveals the impact of the 2008-2009 crisis: the biggest drop since the minor decline in 2002-2003 is occurring in this period.

A seaport is not an end in itself.

Economic benefits of ports are expanding.

Measurement of economic impacts remains difficult.

National Bank of Belgium provides data on impacts Flemish ports.

27.1 billion euro in direct and indirect value added.

4


September 2011

Table 1. Direct and indirect value-added created in the Flemish ports (in million euro)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Growth

2009/2002

Direct added value Antwerp7056 7334 8257 9352 9091 9826 10087 8591 17.9

Direct added value Gent 2729 2785 3252 3383 3457 3745 3258 3094 11.8

Direct added value Ostend 323 334 355 394 409 436 477 457 29.4

Direct added value Zeebrugge 732 753 795 794 840 895 948 879 16.7

Total direct added value Flemish ports 10840 11206 12659 13923 13797 14902 14770 13020 16.7

Indirectadded value Antwerp 7478 6673 7345 7970 8424 8849 9262 9120 18.0

Indirect added value Gent 3444 3140 3494 3431 3465 3744 3720 3785 9.0

Indirect added value Ostend 296 304 339 357 388 398 446 434 31.7

Indirect added value Zeebrugge 890 701 674 713 750 820 800 776 -14.7

Total indirect added value Flemish ports 12108 10819 11852 12471 13026 13811 14228 14114 14.2

Source: based on data of the National Bank of Belgium

Figure 2. Value-added created in the Flemish ports

0,0

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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Direct and indirect added value: Flemish ports

Non maritime

Maritime

Indirect added value


The direct and indirect value-added created by the port of Antwerp reached 17.7 billion euro in 2009, an increase of 22% compared to 2002. The port of Antwerp is responsible for 68.6% of the total for the Flemish ports. Over 50% of the non-maritime added value is created by industry, rendering Antwerp as an industry-based port. The port of Zeebrugge reached an added value of 1.6 billion euro in 2009 around 6% of the Flemish ports. Since 2002 we see only very little change in the total figures. The 2008-2009 crisis brought the port back to its 2002 level. The direct added value of the port of Zeebrugge is for over 40% created by the maritime cluster, the highest share in any Flemish port. Direct employment reached 105,000 fulltime jobs in 2009. Direct and indirect employment combined amounted to 236,307 jobs. In 2009, the workers employed in the Flemish ports represented 2.7% of Belgian domestic employment. Altogether (including indirect employment), the Flemish ports accounted for 10.4% of employment in Flanders, and some 6% of employment in Belgium. These last two figures are down against 2008. A more detailed look at direct employment shows that 34% is created in the maritime cluster itself. In the non-maritime cluster 45% is generated by industry, making it the most dominant sector for employment. Compared to 2002 we see a minor decrease of less that 2%. This is mainly due to the crisis in 2008-2009, where 5% of the total created employment was lost.

Antwerp largest creator of value

added in Flemish port

system.

Direct and indirect

employment of 236,307 jobs.

5


Antwerp remains the biggest employer of all Flemish ports with a direct and indirect employment of around 150,000 FTE representing 63% of all jobs created by the four Flemish ports. The direct employment is comprised for 43% of maritime cluster employment. The non-maritime cluster is mostly impacted by the industrial sector. Zeebrugge is responsible for 10% of employment in the Flemish ports: 24,552 jobs in 2009 of which 10,500 where direct employment. Almost 50% of the direct employment was created in the maritime cluster. Figure 3. Employment impact of the four Flemish ports

Source: based on data National Bank of Belgium and Flemish Ports Commission

Table 2. Direct and indirect employment in Flemish ports (in number of jobs)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Growth

2009/2002

Direct employment Antwerp 61955 60937 61930 62550 63274 64156 64054 62577 1.0

Direct employmen Gent 26642 27067 27038 27203 27109 27385 27643 26733 0.3

Direct employment Ostend 4123 4274 4441 4445 4643 4839 5025 5079 18.8

Direct employment Zeebrugge 10151 10221 10390 10162 10491 10483 10889 10480 3.1

Total direct employment Flemish ports 102871 102499 103799 104360 105517 106863 107611 104869 1.9

Indirect employment Antwerp 90430 79927 81113 84524 86819 90164 92968 86749 -4.2

Indirect employmen Gent 40014 37523 38723 36629 37334 39278 41184 38537 -3.8

Indirect employment Ostend 4428 4231 4337 4499 4623 4587 5295 4893 9.5

Indirect employment Zeebrugge 13150 11489 11227 11503 12783 13477 14475 14073 6.6

Total indirect employment Flemish ports 148022 133170 135400 137155 141559 147506 153922 144252 -2.6


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180000

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

Flemish ports (Antwerp, Zeebrugge, Ghent and Ostend)

Car

go t

hro

ugh

pu

t in

mill

ion

to

ns

Nu

mb

er

of

em

plo

yee

s in

FTE

Direct employment in port (in FTE)

Direct employment in maritime cluster (in FTE)

Direct employment in non-maritime cluster (in FTE)

Indirect employment (in FTE)

Total throughput (in million tons) - right axis

Antwerp largest employer.

6


September 2011

1.2.2. The Dutch ports

The Ministry of Transport, Public works and Water Management of the Netherlands, recently restructured to the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, regularly commissions a ‘Havenmonitor’ report (Port Monitor). The last available report in the series was published in 2011 and contains economic impact figures for crisis year 2009. The Port Monitor looks at the economic significance of seaport related activities in four Dutch port areas: the sea ports in the North (Delfszijl, Eemsmond, Harlingen, Den Helder), the North sea canal area (Amsterdam, Velsen/Ijmuiden), the Rhine and Meuse estuary area (with specific attention to Rotterdam-Rijnmond) and the Scheldt basin (Flushing, Terneuzen, Borssele). The economic significance is defined in terms of added value, employment, business establishments and business dynamics and private investments. Table 3 shows the results for the direct and indirect value-added in Dutch Seaports. The Dutch seaports generated a direct value-added of 20.5 billion euro or 3.6% of the total GDP of the Netherlands in 2009. Direct value-added increased by 51.7% in the period 2002-2008 (current prices) but crisis year 2009 brought the growth in the period 2002-2009 down to 17.2%. The North Sea Canal area shows the highest growth in direct value-added with a growth of 52.7% in the period 2002-2008 and 27.2% in the period 2002-2009. Rotterdam-Rijnmond generates 65.5% of the total direct value-added in Dutch seaports, while the North Sea Canal port area takes up about 17%. Indirect value-added amounted to 11.9 billion euro in 2009, a 30.8% increase compared to 2002. Rotterdam takes a share of 54% (same as in 2002) and the North Sea Canal 15.8% (down from the 2002 figure). About 55% of direct value-added is linked to the presence of industries and this share is still increasing despite the lower direct employment generated by industries in Dutch seaports. With 35.4% in 2009 the share of industries in the direct value-added of Rotterdam is below the Dutch average. In Amsterdam 53% of total direct value-added is linked to industries. Table 4 provides an overview of the direct and indirect employment in Dutch Seaports. The employment figures are based on data of LISA (Landelijk Informatiesysteem van Arbeidsplaatsen en Vestigingen) at business establishment level. The basis for the definition of the employment of non-location related activities for a seaport municipality is formed by the transport services allocated to a seaport municipality. Details on Rotterdam and the North Sea Canal area, the two largest port complexes in the Netherlands, are provided separately. In crisis year 2009, the Dutch sea ports employed 163,386 directly seaport related persons which corresponds with 1.9% of total Dutch employment. Direct employment showed a small decrease of 0.4% in the period 2002-2009, while total throughput in Dutch ports increased by 18% (figures Nationale Havenraad). Rotterdam shows the highest growth in direct employment with a growth of 6.6% in the period 2002-2008 and 2.1% in the period 2002-2009. Rotterdam generates nearly 54% of the total direct employment in Dutch seaports, while the North Sea Canal port area takes up 20.7%.

The Port Monitor offers impact figures

on Dutch ports.

Direct added value of 20.5 billion euro.

Indirect added value of 11.9 billion euro.

A large and increasing share

of industry.

A direct employment of

163,386 jobs.

7


Table 3. Direct and indirect value-added of the Dutch seaports

Source: based on Rebelgroup and Buck Consultants (2008; 2009) and Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam – RHV (2010; 2011)

Indirect employment amounted to 108,617 units in 2009, a 4.2% increase compared to 2002 (despite the crisis). Rotterdam takes a share of 48.1% (down from 49% in 2002) and the North Sea Canal 19.5% (down from 19.7% in 2002). Growth in indirect employment in the North Sea Canal area is much higher than the growth in direct employment, which points to widening employment effects. In Rotterdam this effect is far less visible.

About 35.6% of direct seaport employment is linked to the presence of industries, but this share is slightly decreasing. With 21.9% in 2009 or about 20,000 people the share of industries in the direct employment of Rotterdam is below the Dutch average despite the presence of a large petrochemical cluster. In Amsterdam an impressive 48.4% of total direct employment is linked to industries (Tata Steel, Cargill, etc..). Transport represents 29.4% of total employment in the Dutch seaports compared to 27.6% in 2002. This relative figure is much higher in Rotterdam (41.1%) and lower in Amsterdam (17.8%). Table 4. Direct and indirect employment impact of the Dutch seaports

Source: based on Rebelgroup and Buck Consultants (2008; 2009) and Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam – RHV (2010; 2011)

The Dutch ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta (Rotterdam, North Sea Canal and Scheldt ports) generate a very substantial an increasing share of employment and value-added in the whole Dutch seaport system: 95.1% of direct employment (up from 94.7% in 2002), 93.7% of indirect employment (up from 93% in 2002), 94.9% of direct value-added (up from 94.8% in 2002) and 95.2% of indirect value-added (up from

in mln euro - current prices 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 Growth 2009/2002

Direct value-aded Northern Seaports 911 1058 1222 1184 1314 1040 14.2%

Direct value-added North Sea Canal Area 2730 3239 3841 4015 4168 3472 27.2%

Direct value-added Rhine- and Maasmond 11691 12955 15077 16400 17608 13410 14.7%

of which Rotterdam-Rijnmond 9901 11013 12778 14011 15181 11422 15.4%

Direct value-added Scheldt Basin 2120 2525 2908 3239 3387 2538 19.7%

Total direct value-added Dutch ports 17452 19777 23048 24838 26477 20460 17.2%

Indirect value-aded Northern Seaports 482 556 580 622 617 568 17.8%

Indirect value-added North Sea Canal Area 1491 1618 1976 2163 2250 1876 25.8%

Indirect value-added Rhine- and Maasmond 5892 6262 7394 8288 8884 7723 31.1%


Indirect value-added Scheldt Basin 1242 1326 1714 1880 2057 1744 40.4%

Total indirect value-added Dutch ports 9107 9762 11664 12953 13808 11911 30.8%

2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 Growth 2009/2002

Direct employment Northern Seaports 8674 8282 7961 7867 8047 7963 -8.2%

Direct employment North Sea Canal Area 34240 32160 33802 34760 36194 33893 -1.0%

Direct employment Rhine- and Maasmond 105973 102593 106584 109651 110426 106429 0.4%


Direct employment Scheldt Basin 15195 14673 15212 15905 16037 15101 -0.6%

Total direct employment Dutch ports 164082 157708 163559 168183 170704 163386 -0.4%

Indirect employment Northern Seaports 7259 7714 7727 7986 7206 6790 -6.5%

Indirect employment North Sea Canal Area 20508 20437 22615 24823 23851 21142 3.1%

Indirect employment Rhine- and Maasmond 64071 63199 67778 73771 71278 66578 3.9%


Indirect employment Scheldt Basin 12437 12116 13429 14991 14979 14107 13.4%

Total indirect employment Dutch ports 104275 103466 111549 121571 117314 108617 4.2%

Cargo throughput (in mln tons) - Dutch ports 435.2 471.7 513.3 542.4 561.8 513.3 18.0%

Cargo throughput (in mln tons) - North Sea Canal 69.9 72.4 83.7 87.1 94.1 86.3 23.5%

Cargo throughput (in mln tons) - Rotterdam 321.8 352.6 381.8 406.8 421.1 386.9 20.2%

An indirect employment of 108,617 jobs.

A high but decreasing share of industry.

Increasing importance of Dutch Delta ports in Dutch seaport system.

8


September 2011

94.7% in 2002). The direct employment generated by the industries is declining, while transport activities take up an ever higher share in the total. However, the industrial sector remains very strong in terms of value-added creation pointing to further advances in productivity and capital intensity in the industrial complexes of the ports considered.

1.3 The strategic role of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta

Two distinct approaches can be followed when considering the strategic and economic significance of ports. The first is the quantitative approach as presented in the previous part of this study: the significance of the ports is measured via distinct parameters (i.e. added value, investments and employment). The second approach is more of a qualitative nature and tries to evaluate the significance and value of seaports for the economic development and performance of a country or region. These strategic aspects are hard to quantify but nevertheless deserve full attention. Through the provision of cost-efficient, reliable and frequent connections to overseas and inland markets seaports play an essential role in facilitating trade and in increasing the competitiveness of a nation or region. A variety of studies compare countries across economic performance criteria. One of the most influential is the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) from the World Economic Forum. The GCI is a composed index of three groups of indicators: basic requirements (institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education), efficiency enhancers (higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness and market size) and innovation and sophistication factors (business sophistication and innovation). The Netherlands moved up two positions to 8th place in the 2010 report compared to the previous year. However, the ranking of the Netherlands is still lower in comparison to the early 2000s (see Table A1 in Annex 1; World Economic Forum, 2010). Belgium is in 19th position, but lost a lot of places compared to its 12th position in 2000-2001. The strategic importance of seaports as key infrastructures and guarantors of accessibility is also echoed in the 2006-2007 edition of the European Competitiveness Index (the last available year – Huggins and Davis, 2006). The index is based on five core themes: creativity, knowledge economy, sectoral productivity performance, economic performance, and infrastructure and accessibility. It covers more than one hundred European regions. The National Index rates the Netherlands in 7th position, behind four Scandinavian countries and Switzerland and Luxemburg. Belgium is on the 11th position. On the Regional Index the four regions of the Netherlands are ranked 18th (West), 31st (South), 41st (East) and 54th (North). The Brussels region is ranked first among regions, while Flanders and Wallonia are positioned 38th and 72nd respectively (see Table A2 in Annex 1). There are also a number of studies focusing on the logistics performance of regions and countries. In November 2007, the World Bank published its first report which ranked 150 nations according to their logistics performance based on the so-called Logistics Performance Index (LPI). Countries that are able to connect to the global logistics network have access to vast new markets. The results are based on survey

Strong position of the Low

Countries in the GCI of World

Economic Forum.

Rather good position of the Low Countries

in the European Competitiveness

Index.

9


data from over 800 freight forwarders and other logistics service providers thought to have good insights into the ease and costs of moving goods into, out of, and within 150 different countries. This survey data was supplemented with input from sources operating within the countries where the survey was carried out. The LPI is a composite of a country’s rating across seven criteria: customs clearance, logistics infrastructure, ease of international shipments, logistics competence/internal skills sets and service providers, tracking and tracing capabilities, domestic logistics costs and timeliness/consistency. Obviously, the availability of efficient seaports supports a strong LPI. The Netherlands ranks very high at 4th place in 2010, but lost some places compared to its runner-up position in 2007. Belgium is in 9th position. No details are provided on specific regions within the Netherlands and Belgium. The differences among the LPIs of the top 10 countries are quite small (Table 5). Table 5. The ‘Logistics Performance Index’ (LPI)

Source: The World Bank

Overall, the Netherlands and Belgium show a high economic performance and competitiveness, even compared to other regions/countries on a global scale. The excellent logistics performance of both countries is a necessary condition for the performance of their open economies. The seaports are important pillars in the logistics infrastructure of the Netherlands and Belgium. However, a good infrastructure and a high accessibility are becoming more and more basic requirements for the competitiveness of countries and regions. When trying to create a competitive economy a country goes through multiple phases as illustrated in Figure 4. For high-income countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, innovation and advanced production factors become essential in order to remain competitive. This also alters the strategic role of seaports. Instead of just ensuring connectivity to overseas and inland markets, seaports also have a role to play as centres for innovation. Each of the layers requires a port. At the first level, any surplus or shortage of resources needs to be levelled by import or export. Some resources may not be available through land-based corridors or are too expensive to ship in small quantities. A port offers the possibility to access markets which would otherwise be out of bounds for the developing country, be it by market size or distance. The second phase in the development of a nation is an efficiency-based economy. When

2010 LPI 2007 LPI

LPI

rank

LPI

score

% of highest

performer

LPI

rank

LPI

score

% of highest

performer

Germany 1 4.11 100 3 4.10 97.9

Singapore 2 4.09 99.5 1 4.19 100.0

Sweden 3 4.08 99.3 4 4.08 97.4

the Netherlands 4 4.07 99.0 2 4.18 99.8

Luxembourg 5 3.98 96.8 23 3.54 84.5

Switzerland 6 3.97 96.6 7 4.02 95.9

Japan 7 3.97 96.6 6 4.02 95.9

United Kingdom 8 3.95 96.1 9 3.99 95.2

Belgium 9 3.94 95.9 12 3.89 92.8

Norway 10 3.93 95.6 16 3.81 90.9

Strong position of the Low Countries in terms of the LPI of the World Bank.

The increasing role of innovation and advanced production factors.

10


September 2011

efficiency comes into play, just getting resources out is no longer enough. Batch sizes and speed come into play. A possibility of choice between road, water and air becomes a key selling point for foreign investors when deciding where to locate their business. The final phase is the innovation phase, a phase where the economies of the Low Countries are increasingly finding themselves in, while many of its competitors are also moving up the pyramid. Even in this phase the presence of ports remains vital. A port is no longer a quayside area where cargo is simply shifted from land to sea. A port becomes a vital link in global supply chains and international transport networks. By striving for competitiveness and efficiency improvements, seaports can become drivers of innovation. This sense for innovation is strengthened by a good port cluster management that enhances knowledge exchanges among companies in and outside the port. Through clustering, a knowledge spill-over is created increasing innovation and added value of the surrounding area. Figure 4. Pyramid of the development stages in the economy

Source: adapted from Van Den Bosch et al. (2011)

Along these lines, Van Den Bosch et al. (2011) provide a discussion on the strategic value of the port of Rotterdam. The report argues that the importance of the port to the Netherlands is higher than shown by the Port Monitor figures. By using Michael Porter’s Diamond Framework as the main theoretical foundation, the report demonstrates that the port of Rotterdam provides a substantial contribution to the international competitiveness of firms in the Netherlands, mainly through existing innovation and advanced business networks and management. First, the port is a source for innovation, productivity enhancements and strategic cooperation via the presence of large multinational firms, leader firms and clusters of related and supporting industries. Second, the port enhances specialization, innovation and productivity improvements through cooperation with ports and other logistic hubs in the Netherlands. Finally, through cooperation with foreign ports and other logistic hubs abroad, the port of Rotterdam helps to bring in orders for Dutch companies and supports the diffusion of competencies and the further gathering of knowledge in the areas of port management and logistics. The report estimates that the strategic value of the port of Rotterdam amounts to at least 6 billion euro or 30% more than the economic importance reported in the Port Monitor. While the methodology deployed to measure the strategic value is debatable, the report rightly points to the strategic role ports can play in stimulating innovation and reinforcing the competitiveness of national companies and the

Factor-driven economyMain pillar 1: focus on basic requirements

Efficiency-driven economyMain pillar 2: focus on efficiency enhancers

Innovation-driven economyMain pillar 3: focus on innovationand advanced prodcution factors

Inco

me

pro

file

co

un

try

High

Low

Seaports (should)

become drivers of innovation

and knowledge exchanges.

The strategic value of the

port of Rotterdam

serves as an example.

The strategic role of ports needs more

attention in port development

and policy.

11


national economy as a whole. Next to pure economic arguments, these more strategic aspects should also be taken into account when evaluating port development plans and a port’s significance. Box 1. Example on the role of ports in driving innovation in the Delta

The dredging and land reclamation sector is a truly unique asset for the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. Local firms like DEME, Van Oord, Boskalis and Jan de Nul dominate the open world dredging market through continuous innovation, knowledge development and experience. They also have developed a leading role in environmental engineering related to the treatment of soil and water. Part of their success is linked to the possibilities offered in the Delta, their home market, in the area of capital and maintenance dredging (cf. river Scheldt), large port projects (cf. Maasvlakte 2, Deurganckdock) and environmental projects (cf. Slufter in Rotterdam and Amoras in Antwerp). Dutch shipbuilder IHC has developed strong expertise and innovation in the field of trailer hopper dredgers, suction dredgers and other dredging equipment. Since this sector is highly specialized, it strongly induced knowledge creation requiring highly educated employees. Creativity and productivity are of the highest priority when creating multi-billion euro projects, be it locally or abroad.

2 | DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

2.1 Patterns in global economic development

2.1.1. The role of emerging economies and the BRIC countries

International trade represents a growing share of global output, and growth in trade is expected to outstrip overall growth in output for the foreseeable future. The rising significance of trade is a consequence of the increasing integration of the global economy. Legal and cultural obstacles to trade are diminishing at the same time as the motivation to trade is increasing. Integration is occurring both at the regional level, through initiatives such as NAFTA and the EU Single Market, and at the global level, supported by the continuing evolution of WTO. The last three decades have seen important modifications in international trade flows. The bulk of international trade occurs within economic blocs, especially the European Union and NAFTA. Other significant flows are between Asia / Pacific and North America (especially the United States), between Europe and North America and between Europe and Asia/Pacific. For several reasons, such as geographical proximity (Eastern Europe), energy (Middle East) and colonial (Africa), the European Union has significant trading linkages with the rest of the world. The world economy is increasingly influenced by developing countries and economies in transition. Recently, other regions of the world have seen much faster population growth than West Europe. Eventually this will lead to economic areas shifting in the direction of these concentrations of people with an increasing income profile. A

Global trade is supported by regional economic integration.

12


September 2011

prime example is the rise of China. In the last ten years, China posted an annual GDP growth of between 7% and 13%. China’s relative dependence on export to achieve this growth has somewhat diminished as a growing middle class is having a strong impact on domestic demand. For example, China’s car fleet reached 96 million cars in 2010 with car ownership growing from 5 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in the mid 1990s to 70 in 2010 (Eurostat figures show 458 in the Netherlands and 477 in Belgium). Table 6. GDP growth across the world

Region/country 1991–2003

Average

2007 2008 2009 2010

WORLD 2.8 3.9 1.7 1.9 3.5

Developed economies 2.5 2.5 0.3 3.4 2.2

of which: 3.3 2.1 0.4 2.4 2.9

Japan 1.0 2.4 1.2 5.2 2.5

European Union (27) 2.3 2.8 0.7 4.2 1.1

of which: 1.7 2.5 1.3 4.9 1.5

France 2.0 2.4 0.2 2.6 1.2

Italy 1.6 1.4 1.3 5.1 0.8

United Kingdom 2.9 2.6 0.5 4.9 1.1

Developing economies 4.6 7.8 5.4 2.4 6.9

of which: 10.0 13.0 9.6 8.7 10.0

India 5.8 9.6 5.1 6.6 7.9

Brazil 2.5 6.1 5.1 0.2 7.6

South Africa 2.4 5.5 3.7 1.8 3.0

Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 4.2 8.4 5.4 4.7 5.7

Transition economies .. 8.5 5.4 6.3 4.1

Russian Federation .. 8.1 5.6 7.9 4.3 Source: UNCTAD (2010)

The BRIC countries recovered quite fast from crisis year 2009 and consistently outperform the rest of the world, developed and developing countries alike. They are therefore expected to become more important in the total cargo flows that pass via the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The EU had a remarkable uptake in GDP growth in 2009, but seems unable to get out of the economic slump with disappointing figures in 2010 leaving it lagging behind the rest of the globe. The least developed countries (LDCs) survived the crisis rather well thanks to their limited investment in other economies. One could argue that, except for a decrease in export, the crisis went by without doing any damage in these LDCs. The export volumes of the emerging countries including the BRIC countries are bouncing back after the crisis year 2009. The current levels are nearly or already past pre-crisis peaks. The developed countries are not recovering at the same rate but over the next few years a slow recovery is expected despite the government debt problems in the US and a number of European countries. Forecasts predict a world trade growth by 6.5% in 2011 and 2012. The question posed by the UN and UNCTAD is if emerging countries can remain the drivers of world trade in this unstable environment.

2.1.2. Intra-regional differences: the case of Africa

Africa is an interesting example of economic development. Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly composed of LDCs, implying most countries have not been affected that much by the crisis. Africa is still lagging in industrial development but local governemnts are trying hard to change their resource based economy, mainly via Industrial Policy Action Plans (IPAP). In February 2008, African Heads of State adopted a Plan of Action for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA). Countries with the highest GDP growth include South Africa, Mauritius and Angola each of which have

Developing and emerging

economies are taken the lead

in growth.

BRIC countries show strong

post-crisis recovery.

EU is lagging behind in

growth recovery.

Africa is gaining momentum..

13


an average GDP growth of at least 15% over the last decade. The IMF forecasts show an increase in GDP for the Sub-Saharan African countries. The biggest problem in Africa is distinguishing the countries which have trade potential and the ones which still require a lot of improvements. The UN created a typology based on two indicators: their industrialisation level in 2010 and industrial growth performance 1990-2010 (Table 7). Despite these differences, Africa is a continent that should be considered as a future growth region for the Delta port region. Table 7. Industrial performance of African countries

Type Description Examples Forerunners Long-term sustained-growth path with an

industrialisation at least twice the African average and an industrial growth performance of more than 2.5%.

Egypt, Namibia, Seychelles, Tunisia

Achievers High industrialisation level in per capita terms. Industrial growth performance is below 2.5%.

South Africa, Morocco, Libya (pre-war), Gabon

Catching up Fairly promising fast growth path which, if sustained, has the potential to take them to a substantially higher industrialisation level.

Sudan, Angola, Mozambique

Falling behind

Relatively low industrialisation level. Industrial growth rate not high enough to significantly improve their situation.

Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Algeria, Mauretania, Senegal, Niger, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar

Infant stage Very low industrialisation level. Very poor industrial growth performance.

Mali, Niger, Chad, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Somalia, Malawi, Liberia, Gambia

Source: own compilation based on UNCTAD typology

2.1.3. Mixed results for Europe

Also in Europe there are growth differences between the different Member States. The GDP evolutions from 2001-2011 show that the eastern European countries record the highest GDP growth, partly given their developing economy phase and their linkages with non-EU members. For example, the customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation has also benefited a number of EU Member States. On the other end of the scale we find the Mediterranean region (Spain 2%, Italy 1.3%, Portugal 1.3% and Greece 1.3%) accompanied by Ireland which had a negative average GDP growth of -2.9% over the past 5 years. This observation is particularly important in light of the hinterland outlook for the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports and the discussion on the current and future traffic distribution between port regions around Europe (see later in this report). Some manufacturing activities have already moved from Western Europe towards low-cost regions in Eastern Europe. This tendency is generating larger bi-directional East-West flow of raw materials and consumer products within the European Union.

.. but differences among African countries remain huge.

Different speeds in Europe can hamper economic power.

14


September 2011

Table 8. Top 10 EU countries in terms of nominal GDP growth, compared to Euro area and Belgium and the Netherlands

Source: IMF – June 2011

The European industrial production has been severely affected by the crisis. Among the larger European economies, Spain and Italy are the worst performers while Poland, Germany and the Netherlands are among the best (Figure 5). Figure 5. Evolution of the industrial production in the world (left) and a selection of European countries

Source: based on data European Commission

In order to analyze the structure of the European trade patterns, the internal freight trade (intra-EU trade) and external freight trade (extra-EU trade) are examined. External foreign trade has a less significant position compared to internal foreign trade. Indeed, intra-EU trade is representing more than 50% of the EU’s trade total despite the globalisation trend. The volume of intra-EU trade increased significantly with the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007. The share of intra-EU trade varies widely from one member state to another. To a considerable extent, EU trade, both internal and external, is conducted by six member states: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, UK and Belgium (Table A3 in Annex 2). In 2009, these six countries conducted 67% of intra-EU 27 trade and 74% of extra-EU 27 trade. The Low Countries together represent 21.8% of intra-EU dispatches, 15.7% of intra-EU arrivals, 19.6% of EU exports and 13.2% of EU imports.

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Bulgaria 15.2 29.3 22.3 14.3 14.9 26.8 23.1 -6.3 -1.8 11.1

Romania 13.3 29.3 27.5 30.8 23.7 39.1 19.8 -20.1 -1.0 7.9

Luxembourg 12.1 28.9 16.8 10.5 12.9 20.6 13.5 -9.2 3.7 12.1

Latvia 12.1 20.1 23.0 16.6 24.3 44.4 17.6 -23.4 -7.3 8.7

Lithuania 16.5 31.4 21.2 15.2 15.8 30.0 21.0 -21.9 -1.5 10.9

Malta 10.1 17.9 11.9 7.1 6.6 17.9 15.3 -6.2 1.7 8.4

Poland 3.7 4.3 9.3 6.6 7.8 11.1 8.3 5.3 5.4 6.9

Cyprus 9.1 26.2 18.8 7.4 8.4 18.5 16.5 -7.2 -1.8 8.0

Slovak Republic 8.6 10.3 11.2 9.2 11.7 11.8 8.9 -5.9 4.5 5.6

Hungary 12.6 9.2 9.7 6.1 8.3 6.8 4.9 -2.1 3.9 6.7

Euro area 3.6 3.0 3.9 3.8 5.2 5.3 2.3 -3.2 2.6 3.1

Belgium 3.4 2.8 5.3 4.4 5.0 5.2 2.8 -1.6 4.0 4.6

Netherlands 3.9 2.5 3.0 4.5 5.2 5.8 4.3 -4.1 3.4 2.2

Industrial production in

Europe recovers slowly, but

some countries stay behind.

Low Countries and immediate

hinterland show significant share

in EU internal and external

trade.

15


According to the monthly economic update of ING (August 2011 – ING, 2011), the economic outlook for 2011-2012 remains bleak. The US economy is weaker than previously thought lowering the 2011 GDP forecast from 2.1% to 1.7% and an upturn of events is expected only in the first quarter of 2013. In the meantime the Eurozone debt crisis continues with tensions on the peripheral countries unlikely to vanish soon. This leaves the GDP forecast for the region at 1.9% in 2011 and 1.3% in 2012. China is still dominated by inflation and debt. The inflation forecasts have been lowered to 5% for 2011 and the local governments have an estimated debt of 10.7 trillion Yuan. There are also growing concerns in China about the growing pressure in the housing market.

2.1.4. Trade imbalances persist

Trade imbalances remain important. Table 9 provides an overview of the import and export growth rates while Figure 6 provides more insight on the imbalances in containerized trade on the main shipping routes. With the emergence of global trade imbalances, ports and inland transportation are facing acute pressures to cope with disequilibrium in container flows. The imbalance in container flows between Asia and Europe increased from a factor 1.2 (i.e. 20% more cargo going eastbound than westbound) to a factor 2 in 2009. The outcomes are rate imbalances and more complex freight planning. The repositioning of empty containers has become one of the most complex problems in global freight distribution, also in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta where ports like Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge serve as important turntables in box flows. Table 9. Annual growth figures in imports and exports, 2007-2009

Import Export

2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009

5.8 3 -13.7 World 6.6 2.2 -13.1

3.9 2.8 -14.8 developed 3.7 0 -14.2

6.8 4.9 -25.3 Japan 0.8 -0.9 -12.8

6.8 5.5 -14.9 US 1.1 -3.7 -16.5

3.2 2.5 -13.7 EU 4.8 1.1 -13.7

8.6 0.8 -15.5 Transition eco. 26.1 16 -28.2

8.7 4.2 -11.7 Developing 10.6 5.3 -9.5

4.8 -2.8 -10 Africa 11.2 11.6 -2.4

2.4 -0.6 -9.7 Latin America 11.6 8.6 -17.1

15.6 7.3 -10.2 East Asia 10.2 0.6 -4.6

21.8 10.5 -13 China 14.1 2.4 -0.2

6.3 18.9 -18.9 South Asia 10.9 7.2 -6.9

15.2 10.9 -7.9 India 16.9 10.4 -7.5

6.9 2.1 -9.7 South E Asia 6.7 8 -15.9

2 7.2 -14.4 West Asia 16.7 8.4 -12.8 Source: UNCTAD (2010)

Trade and traffic imbalances significant, particularly in relation to Asia.

16


September 2011

Figure 6. Containerised cargo flows along major trade routes (in million TEU)

Source: based on Notteboom and Rodrigue (2011a)

2.1.5. Maritime transport after the bubble

It is widely acknowledged that 2008 marked the end of the super cycle in maritime transport where more cargo was shipped than ever before. Developing countries are the drivers of maritime trade: 61.2% of all goods loaded and 55% of all goods unloaded are in relation to the developing countries showing their resilience to the economic setbacks (figures UNCTAD). The share of the developed economies in global goods loaded and unloaded were 32.4% and 44.3% respectively. Transition economies accounted for 6.4% of goods loaded, and only 0.8% of goods unloaded. This discrepancy underlines the role many transition economies play in bulk exports of raw materials and energy products. Asia continues to dominate, with a share of 41% of total goods loaded, followed in decreasing order by the Americas, Europe, Oceania and Africa. Noticeable is the surpassing of Africa by Oceania as the fourth biggest export region, showing the growing impact of Australian commodity trade, mainly in iron ore, coal and minerals. Table 10. Trade volumes per route to/from Europe (SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, EB = Eastbound, WB = Westbound)

Source: based on figures of European Liner Affairs Association (ELAA)

4,0

5,2

5,6

7,2

8,8

10,2

12,4

12,4

15,0

15,2

14,5

11,5

3,5

3,3

3,3

3,9

3,9

4,1

4,2

4,4

4,7

5,0

5,6

6,9

2,8

3,5

4,5

5,9

6,1

7,3

8,9

10,8

15,3

17,2

16,7

11,5

2,3

2,7

3,6

4,0

4,2

4,9

5,2

5,5

9,1

10,1

10,5

5,5

1,2

1,3

2,2

2,7

1,5

1,7

1,7

2,1

2,5

2,7

2,9

2,5

1,4

1,7

2,9

3,6

2,6

2,9

3,2

3,8

4,4

4,5

4,3

5,3

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

1995

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Asia-USA

USA-Asia

Asia-Europe

Europe-Asia

USA-Europe

Europe-USA

Q1-2009 Q2-2009 Q3-2009 Q4-2009 Q1-2010 Q2-2010 Q1-2011 Q1-2011 vs. Q1-2008

Europe-SSA Northbound -4.2% -4.3% -7.1% 3.5% 7.8% 2.5% 10.9% 30.7%

Europe-SSA Southbound -1.3% -3.1% -1.8% 2.6% 5.7% 7.3% 27.5% 43.3%

Europe-Asia Westbound -22.1% -22.2% -13.2% -0.2% 21.2% 24.1% 6.3% 0.2%

Europe-Asia Eastbound -15.6% -1.6% 9.2% 29.1% 23.0% 0.6% 4.3% 8.6%

Europe-North America WB -16.9% -21.6% -15.0% -6.5% 13.4% 22.2% 5.3% -1.1%

Europe-North America EB -29.0% -35.0% -25.6% -6.6% 12.3% 16.0% 8.1% -13.3%

Europe-India/Middle East WB -12.1% -7.4% -0.5% 4.7% 18.1% 20.1% 15.4% 24.9%

Europe-India/Middle East EB -4.1% -0.6% 1.7% 6.4% 14.4% 6.8% 6.0% 18.2%

Europe-South/Latin America NB -12.9% -12.3% -18.6% 2.7% 4.7% -5.1% 13.7% 0.9%

Europe-South/Latin America SB -27.4% -26.4% -22.5% -0.8% 47.5% 57.7% 20.1% 28.7%

Europe-Oceania NB -6.8% -9.1% -14.0% -12.9% -11.1% -2.3% 2.4% -15.3%

Europe-Oceania SB -14.7% -26.4% -8.5% -6.0% 19.6% 32.8% 2.6% 4.1%

A ‘new normal’ for maritime

transport?

Asia continues to dominate

maritime trade.

17


The container industry took the largest blow during the crisis. Dented demand for consumer and manufactured goods, as well as for durables impacted the container business more than any other. The average annual growth rate in the past two decades fluctuated around 10%. In 2009 trade volumes dropped 9% on a global scale. Container flows along the three major east–west container trade routes, namely the trans-Pacific, Asia–Europe and the trans-Atlantic, were the most significantly affected. In relation to Europe, the trade flows with India/Pakistan, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa climbed already far above the volume level of early 2008 (Table 10). Container trade to South America also shows strong growth, while containerised cargo from South America to Europe only reached the Q1 2008 level in the first quarter of 2011. The trans-Atlantic trade has still not reached pre-crisis volumes. The Europe-Asia trade shows a positive though modest growth pattern. The ‘China effect’ is still strong. Shipping lines are dedicating higher capacities and deploying larger vessels to cope with the increasing Chinese container imports and exports, especially in relation to the China-Europe trade. The boost of Chinese exports to Western countries led to low freight rates on the return haul, creating new opportunities for the containerisation of low-value goods. On the eastbound leg between Europe and China, metal scrap, fertilizers and waste paper are among the many goods increasingly being containerised.

2.2 The growing importance of clusters in the global economy

Multinational enterprises (MNEs), as key drivers of globalisation, have adopted flexible multi-firm organisation structures on a wide variety of markets. They are typically organized to achieve economies of scope, including greater flexibility, rather than to achieve economies of scale by spreading fixed costs. Many of the world’s largest MNEs manage extensive networks of globally dispersed inputs through supply chain management practices. China is one of the countries that succeeded in linking foreign investor capital and expertise with a large and low-cost Chinese labour force. Moreover, export-oriented enterprises were encouraged by the designation of a growing number of special economic zones (SEZs), coastal open cities, and economic and technological development zones (EDTZs), all designed to encourage manufacturing exports. Other countries such as Vietnam are following a similar path. Companies are typically seeking location advantages when deciding on where to set up a production unit, a logistics facility or service centre. Over the last few decades we see an increasing tendency for companies to regroup and relocate forming clusters in the process. Clusters appear in all forms and sizes, from the basic manufacturing industry to high tech productions as regions covering hundreds of hectares to a simple street. An example of a cluster on a more regional scale is the (petro-)chemical industry cluster in Antwerp and Rotterdam. The Low Countries also have other clusters such as the diamond sector in Antwerp. This cluster has been around for over 500 years. Recently Antwerp lost its position as most important diamond polisher as these activities are shifting to regions where labour is cheaper (like in India where a diamond cluster is forming in Bombay with 80,000 polishers). Antwerp still handles large amounts of diamonds for trade, but the actual polishing is only done for exceptional pieces where craftsmanship is of the highest importance. In the region of Kortrijk, we have a grouping of textile dying

Container trade only in some markets well above early 2008 figures.

Europe-Asia shows more modest growth compared to pre-crisis figures.

MNEs as a structuring factor in globalisation.

Clusters are on the rise, also in the Delta.

18


September 2011

companies. Antwerp has a minor fashion cluster built around the fashion academy. In Delft there is a concentration of maritime related companies mostly due to the Delft University of Technology. The Brainport region near Eindhoven is one of the top-level technology regions in Europe. Some resource bound clusters for fruit or flower produce can be found in the Netherlands and Belgium. The initial reason for companies to group together in a certain location is linked to a certain advantage presented by the area in question. This could have been a particular resource, tax advantage presented to a specific type of company or any competitive advantage presented by the area. These days resources, technology, capital and other inputs can be efficiently sourced in global markets. The advantage of distances has diminished noticeably. It is no longer of prime importance to locate near markets to serve them. After the initial grouping around a certain resource or near a particular market other advantages surfaced. Most companies in a cluster are not direct competitors but instead differentiate in order to attract a particular market segment or are on a different vertical level (supplier, producer, warehousing, etc..). They are thus often linked by input/output relationships. Yet, they share many common needs, opportunities and constraints. The cluster provides the companies with a larger entity when contacting outside investors, be it public or private. The clustering of activities facilitates knowledge transfers and spill-over, creates a local labour market of skilled workers and enhances the possibilities for innovation. Seaports can be regarded as clusters (De Langen, 2002) since ports typically consist of geographically concentrated and mutually related business units centred around transport, trade and industrial production. Next to the advantages discussed above, port clusters exhibit strong scale and scope advantages linked to physical cargo flows. The concentration of activities opens more opportunities to the bundling of cargo flows via intermodal transport (shortsea, barge or rail) and to achieve a higher connectivity to the rest of the world via frequent transport services. While particularly industrial activities in ports are often associated with negative effects in terms of emissions and noise pollution, port clusters can exert strong environmental advantages. For example, ‘ecologies of scale’ are achieved in the (petro-)chemical industry by which companies utilize each others’ waste material or by-products such as heat. It would be far more difficult to achieve this when the plants concerned would be spatially scattered. It is imperative that these ‘ecologies of scale’ advantages are fully acknowledged in environmental policy. Successful port clusters also face some challenges, mainly in terms of accessibility (congestion) and higher land costs.

Cluster formation

enhanced by input/output

relations, knowledge

transfers, labour market

effects and possibilities for

innovation.

Seaports are clusters with

strong cluster advantages.

‘Ecologies of scale’ as a

positive environmental contribution of

seaport clusters.

19


2.3. Changes in logistics networks

2.3.1. Dynamics in logistics networks throughout Europe

The classic view on supply chain engineering was very linear. In recent years, logistics networks have become far more complex. Macro-economic changes like globalisation and containerisation have contributed to the emergence of reverse logistics, the decoupling of order and delivery and the creation of transport networks instead of chains. Before 1993, most companies set up a distribution structure based on a network of distribution centres in major countries in which they were present. Since cross-border transactions have increased drastically after the creation of the European Internal Market in 1993 and the fall of the Iron Curtain, most companies consolidated their national distribution centres to European distribution centres (EDC) covering all of Europe. When it comes to overseas goods not all companies have the same distribution structure. It stands to reason that not all goods can be handled and distributed in the same manner. Companies can opt for delivery without the use of a distribution centre, distributing through an EDC, distribution through a group of NDCs (National Distribution Centres) or RDCs (Regional Distribution Centres) or a tiered structure with one EDC and several supporting NDCs/RDCs. The choice is mainly influenced by the type of product and the frequency of delivery (Table 11). Table 11. European distribution structures for imported goods

- = no application, + = limited application, ++ = broad application , +++ = dominant logistics concept (*) Direct distribution from production-unit to final customer (**) Distribution network consisting of a main distribution centre and several RDCs Source: Notteboom (2009)

In the fresh food industry for example, EDCs are not common because the type of product (perishables) dictates a local distribution structure. In the pharmaceuticals industry, EDCs are common but RDCs or local distribution centres are not present, because the pharmaceutical products are often manufactured in one central plant and delivery times are not very critical (hospitals often have own inventories). However, in the high tech spare parts industry, all of the distribution centre functions can be present because spare parts need to be delivered within a few hours and high tech spare parts are usually expensive (which would require centralised distribution).

Automotive Electronics Food Health care Textile

Direct (*) +++ + + + +

EDC + + + + +++

NDC/RDC + ++ +++ ++ -

Tiered (**) - + - + +

Direct (*) ++ + + + +

EDC ++ + + ++ ++

NDC/RDC - + +++ + -

Tiered (**) + ++ - + ++

Present

Future

Increasing complexity.

EDC and other distribution structures.

Distribution structure depends on product type.

20


September 2011

The primary goal of an EDC is servicing a substantial part of the market. It is located closer to the distribution hubs for a faster access and a wider selection of modes. RDCs, however, serve a regional market, making its location closer to the market in question more important. Most EDCs are located in the Netherlands, Belgium, France or Germany, close to gateways. Most RDCs, depending on the market they serve, are found deeper in the hinterland. At present a certain degree of decentralisation takes place where EDCs are combined with lower tier RDCs, cross docks and rapid fulfilment centres in order to offer the best results in terms of a high service level, frequency and cost control. When multiple products are delivered by the same company, a hybrid distribution structure is an option allowing the slower goods to pass through the EDC and the faster goods with a shorter life cycle through RDCs. However there is a downside to the hybrid system. Total handling and operations costs are quite high compared with the other options. To solve this a new, slightly altered, structure is on the rise: the networked distribution centre. The EDC system loses its fulfilment function and gains importance as a network control centre, hence networked distribution centre. Figure 7. Dynamics in the configuration of logistics networks in Europe

Contemporary logistics networks are characterised by a few main developments (Figure 7). First, the evolution from EDC to a networked EDC reducing labour requirements but demanding higher skills. Second, less value added services (VALS) are performed at the central distribution centres as these are decentralised or moved to low cost production facilities or even overseas to the source (e.g. a warehouse at an export zone in China). Third, the EDC can be bypassed altogether by cross docking, merge in transit or adequate consolidation at the supplier transport hub. Fourth, a shift in location takes place caused by market dynamics (distribution follows demand) and logistics trends (a shift from push to pull logistics). This can lead to a decoupling of one EDC serving the whole European market to two or even three EDCs of similar

Distribution based on RDCs Distribution based on one EDC

Distribution based on tiered system (EDC+RDCs)

Towards a new wave in logistics networks?

• Networked EDC• Less VALS in EDC• DC bypass• Twin/triple EDC system

From EDC to a networked EDC.

EDC concept under scrutiny.

21


status spread over Europe (twin or triple EDCs). Fifth, specific sectors require EDCs for their supply chain like basic processing industries (chemicals, food, etc..), sectors with a low logistics cost (pharmaceutical, medical) and Asian SMEs with new emerging global brands from China. These trends could cause a stagnation in EDC investments and growth. The fifth trend does not offset the others. Existing EDCs will be transformed to networked EDCs reducing employment possibilities. This does not mean that investments in new specialised EDCs in ports is not possible. For the aforementioned sectors or transporters requiring sea-sea trades these distribution centres are still required.

2.3.2. Top locations for EDC and networked EDC activity

Every two years Cushman & Wakefield publishes the European Distribution Report to compare European top-regions for logistics. The reports initially gave a ranking of countries in and around the so called “Blue Banana” area, but which is now expanded to the “Key European Hubs” including 61 regions. Cushman & Wakefield sees access to markets, transit points and customers as the key factors in location decisions. The Netherlands gradually lost its top position as best location for EDCs, mostly because of changing logistics concepts of shippers, higher land prices in the Netherlands and attractive packages (including subsidies) offered in Wallonia and northern France to attract investors. In 2009, Liège in Belgium ranked as the top location for EDCs, closely followed by the provinces of Limburg and Hainaut in Belgium and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in France. The main reasons for this top ranking are excellent access to main European markets, a central geographic location to cover a wide range of European markets, top transport infrastructure and volume, close to main ports or with good multimodal links to these ports, low costs for land, warehousing and labour, and a labour force that is available, highly productive, skilled for supply chain jobs, and with a good language knowledge (Cushman & Wakefield, 2009). Table 12. Top EDC locations 2009

Source: Cushman & Wakefield (2009)

C&W also reports forecasted top regions for logistics for the time horizon till 2020. According to this forecast Liège will not be able to hold its top position: it is well located, but the limited availability of land gives this region a slight disadvantage compared to the province of Hainaut which will receive the top ranking in C&W’s view. This reflects the growing importance of good transport infrastructure towards

Netherlands lost top position as best EDC location.

Centre of gravity for EDCs moving to Flanders, Wallonia and Northern France.

Belgian-French border region at top in 2020.

22


September 2011

markets south of the actual core European logistics regions. The Seine-Nord canal junction that will upgrade the inland waterway infrastructure between the Paris region and the North of France and Belgium also increases the score of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Hainaut. Table 13. Forecast top EDC locations by 2020

Source: Cushman & Wakefield (2009)

Cost savings and the expansion of the retail industry due to a rise in wealthy consumers in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are driving growth in the distribution and logistics markets of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Romania and Bulgaria rely more on low wages and low land prices. The growing importance of the manufacturing industry in CEE also supports its attractiveness as a location for distribution activities. However, despite ongoing infrastructure development, transport networks continue to be of poor quality compared to Western Europe. Logistics companies are thus increasingly confronted with a trade-off between relatively stable key markets (such as the Delta with higher prices and low land availability) and a location in secondary markets.

2.3.3.Impacts on cargo routing in Europe

The distribution system configuration obviously has an impact on the cargo routing patterns in Europe. A strong dependence on EDCs in the Delta favours the container throughput figures of the ports in the region. EU enlargement up to now has not had a huge impact on the location of EDCs in the blue banana as this zone still offers the best access to the EU’s core markets and infrastructure. However, road congestion, increasing labour costs and scarcity of land may encourage companies to search for alternative distribution structures that might even degrade existing EDCs in the blue banana to RDCs. High potential candidates are northern Germany and Finland for northern access, Hungary and Austria for central access, northern Italy and the north Adriatic region for southern access and the Czech republic and Poland for eastern access. Corridors (see later in this section) might prove to be crucial in order to support the further development of efficient European distribution network configurations. However, efficient long-distance corridors can also have a downside to well established EDC regions such as the Rhine-Scheldt Delta: they make it easier for logistics service providers to move distribution facilities inland closer to the customer base without having to sacrifice a good accessibility to the maritime gateways.

New opportunities

for CEE.

Dynamics in distribution

structures affects position

Delta.

Corridors are important enablers.

23


2.4. Market players: logistics integration and coordination

2.4.1. Logistics integration and consolidation in the logistics industry

Globalisation and outsourcing open new windows of opportunities for shipping lines, forwarders, terminal operators and other transport operators. Manufacturers are looking for global logistics packages rather than just basic shipping or forwarding. Global logistics is the name of the game. Most actors in the transport chain have responded by providing new value-added services in an integrated package, through a vertical integration along the supply chain. The level of functional integration of land distribution is increasing rapidly. Many distribution functions which used to be separated are now controlled by a single entity. Mergers and acquisitions have permitted the emergence of large logistics operators that control many segments of the supply chain: the megacarrier. The megacarriers meet the requirements of many shippers to have a single contact point on a regional or even global level (the ‘one-stop shop’). Technology also has played a particular role in this process namely in terms of IT (control of the process) and intermodal integration (control of the flows). The crisis has made a lot of companies to reconsider these integration strategies and to focus more on their core activities. Figure 8. Functional integration of supply chains

Source: adapted from Robinson (2002)

Mergers and acquisitions shape the contemporary business environment. They are not only driven by companies searching for take-over candidates, but also by companies who have decided to divest aspects of their businesses and are consequently looking for buyers of these businesses. The logistics challenges emerging from mergers and acquisitions stretch from a proliferation of customer service policies to multiple, overlapping distribution networks and infrastructure overcapacity.

Shipping Line

ShippingAgent

Stevedore

CustomAgent

FreightForwarder

Rail / Trucking

Depot

Trucking

Megacarrier

Eco

no

mie

s o

f sc

ale

Land DistributionMaritime Distribution

Level of functional integration

Cu

sto

mer

Terminal

Vertical integration along the supply chain is unfolding..

.. and leads to megacarriers.

Horizontal integration through M&A.

24


September 2011

Consolidation and vertical integration strategies have created a logistics market consisting of a wide variety of service providers ranging from megacarriers to local niche operators. Not only the geographic coverage of the players differs (from global to local). Major differences can also be observed in the focus (generalist versus specialist), in the service offering (from single service to one-stop shop) and in asset-orientation (asset based versus non-asset based). The growing trend of outsourcing logistics activities in a wide variety of industrial sectors has led to a surge in the field of third party logistics (3PL) and the creation of very large logistics groups (Table 14). Many of these 3PL players are based in Europe, but have networks of offices and freight handling facilities that stretch around the world. Deutsche Post World Net (DPWN), through its acquisitions, has become the leading 3PL in the European logistics market and the world. Its businesses include those formerly owned by such names as Danzas, DHL, AEI, Airborne, ASG, Nedlloyd and Exel. Kuehne & Nagel is a global freight forwarder with an asset-light, high financial return business model. The other large European 3PL companies are mainly based in the core economic regions of Europe such as Germany, the UK, France and the Benelux countries. Table 14. Gross revenue of the world’s 25 leading 3PL companies (in million US$ - figures for 2008)

3PL company Country Gross revenue (million US$)

Deutsche Post World Net (DPWN) Germany 39,900 Kuehne & Nagel Switzerland 20,220 DB Schenker Logistics Germany 12.503 Geodis France 9,700 CEVA Logistics The Netherlands 9,523 Panalpina Switzerland 8,394 Logista UK 8,190 CH Robinson Worldwide USA 7,130 Agility Logistics Kuwait 6,316 UPS Supply Chain Solutions USA 6,293 Expeditors International of Washington

USA 5,650

Dascher & Co Germany 5,377 DSV Denmark 5,351 UTi Worldwide USA 4,996 Sinotrans China 4,757 NYK Logistics Japan 4,723 Wincanton UK 4,331 Bolloré France 4,330 Hellmann Worldwide Logistics Germany 4,209 Rhenus & co Germany 3,940 Toll Holding Australia 3,125 JB Hunt Transport Services USA 3,088 Logwin (formerly Thiel Logistik) Luxemburg 3,081 Kitetsu World Japan 2,991 Penske Logistics USA 2,910

Notes: Gross Revenue for non-asset based logistics. In 2006 TNT Logistics was sold and rebranded to CEVA Logistics. TNT Express remains a big player in the global express and mail business.

Source: SJ Consulting Group Estimates, www.jindel.com/aboutsjc.htm

Diversity in the logistics market.

The emerging global networks

of large 3PLs.

The largest 3PLs show annual

gross revenues of close to or

above 10 million US$.

25


Competition between logistics service providers is no longer focused only on services to the cargo flows: advanced services in the management of information flows are increasingly key to gaining a competitive advantage in the market. These advanced services are more and more aimed at offering total pipeline/supply chain visibility to customers in terms of reliability performance through advanced tracking and tracing, environmental impact measurement (e.g. carbon footprint calculator), security risks and related event management. Figure 9. The evolving service demand in ocean freight logistics

Note: OFR = ocean freight, FCL = full container load, LCL = less than container load Source: DHL (2010)

2.4.2. Consolidation and integration in liner shipping

Shipping lines are viewing market mass as one of the most effective ways in coping with a trade environment that is characterized by intense pricing pressure. Operational co-operation between container shipping companies comes in many forms ranging from slot-chartering and vessel-sharing agreements to strategic alliances. The container shipping industry has also been marked by several waves of mergers and acquisitions. Trade agreements in the form of liner conferences were very common till these forms of co-operation were outlawed by the European Commission in October 2008 when the EC exemption from the anti-trust law for liner shipping was lifted. The first strategic alliances among shipping lines date back to the mid 1990s. The main incentives for shipping lines to engage in strategic alliances relate to the need for critical mass in the scale of operation and to spread the risks associated with investments in large post-panamax vessels. The alliance partnerships evolved as a result of mergers and acquisitions and the market entry and exit of liner shipping companies. A number of shipping lines stay out of alliances for reasons of commercial independence and flexibility (e.g. Evergreen). The main strategic alliances operational today are the CKYH alliance (Cosco, K-Line, Yang Ming and Hanjin), the Grand Alliance (Hapag-Lloyd, NYK and OOCL) and the New World Alliance (APL/NOL, HMM and

The provision of advances information services is key in competition.

Operating agreements in liner shipping are widespread.

Strategic alliances in view of market power, also in seaports.

The largest 3PLs show annual gross revenues of close to or above 10 mln US$.

26


September 2011

Mitsui OSK Lines). Alliance members increasingly opt for dedicated terminal facilities or berths in those ports were volumes are sufficient to do so. The shipping business has been subject to several consolidation waves. The main M&A events include the merger between P&O Container Line and Nedlloyd in 1997, the merger between CMA and CGM in 1999 and the take-over by Maersk of Sea-Land in 1999 and P&O Nedlloyd in 2005. Shipping lines opt for mergers and acquisitions to obtain a larger size, to secure growth and to benefit from scale advantages. Other motives for mergers and acquisitions in liner shipping relate to gaining instant access to markets and distribution networks, obtaining access to new technologies or diversifying the asset base. The liner shipping industry has witnessed a concentration trend in slot capacity control, mainly as a result of M&A activity (Table 15). The top twenty carriers controlled about 83% of the world’s container vessel capacity in early 2011 compared to only 56% in 1990 and 26% in 1980. The top three lines (i.e. Maersk Line, MSC and CMA-CGM) alone supplied about a third of the global fleet capacity. Table 15. Slot capacities of the fleets operated by the top 20 container lines (in TEU)

Source: compiled from BRS Alphaliner, ASX Alphaliner and Containerisation International.

In recent years horizontal integration has slowed down remarkably. No new global mergers occurred between shipping lines. A possible explanation for this is the economic crisis but other evidence points towards the fact that the consolidation process that has rapidly taken place till 2007 may have reached limits. Shipping lines have always attached great attention to cost and asset management. Since the 1990s a great deal of attention is devoted to larger, more fuel-efficient vessels. The average vessel size increased from 1,155 TEU in 1987 to 2,618 TEU in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009). The size of a typical container vessel deployed on the Far East - Europe trade increased from 4,500-5,500 TEU in 2000 to about 8,500 TEU in 2011. Units of close to 15,000 TEU are already calling at ports in the Delta and the announced triple ‘E’ class of Maersk Line with a unit capacity of 18,000 TEU should

January 1980 September 1995 November 2005 March 2007 August 2011

1 Sea-Land 70000 Sea-Land 196708 Maersk Line 1620587 Maersk Line 1758857 Maersk Line 2426466

2 Hapag-Lloyd 41000 Maersk 186040 MSC 733471 MSC 1081005 MSC 2018446

3 OCL 31400 Evergreen 181982 CMA/CGM Group 485250 CMA CGM Group 746185 CMA CGM Group 1295744

4 Maersk 25600 COSCO 169795 Evergreen Group 458490 Evergreen Group 566271 COSCO 624353

5 NYK Line 24000 NYK Line 137018 Hapag Lloyd/CP Ships 413281 Hapag-Lloyd 467030 Hapag-Lloyd 618501

6 Evergreen 23600 Nedlloyd 119599 China Shipping 334337 CSCL 417337 Evergreen Group 614115

7 OOCL 22800 Mitsui OSK Lines 118208 NOL/APL 331639 COSCO 391527 APL 580658

8 Zim 21100 P&OCL 98893 Hanjin/Senator 315153 NYK 353832 CSAV Group 519628

9 US Line 20900 Hanjin Shipping 92332 COSCO 311644 Hanjin/Senator 345037 Hanjin Shipping 511661

10 APL 20000 MSC 88955 NYK Line 303799 APL 342899 CSCL 510958

11 Mitsui OSK Lines 19800 APL 81547 OOCL 236789 OOCL 303864 MOL 420821

12 Farrell Lines 16400 Zim 79738 CSAV Group 230699 K-Line 283076 OOCL 415638

13 NOL 14800 K-Line 75528 K Line 228612 MOL 281447 Hamburg Süd Group 403183

14 Trans Freight Line 13900 DSR-Senator 75497 Mitsui OSK Lines 220122 Yang Ming Line 253104 NYK 397439

15 CGM 12700 Hapag-Lloyd 71688 Zim 201263 CSAV Group 250436 K Line 338331

16 Yang Ming 12700 NOL 63469 Yang Ming 185639 ZIM 248922 Yang Ming Line 336328

17 Nedlloyd 11700 Yang Ming 60034 Hamburg-Süd 185355 Hamburg-Sud Group 222907 Zim 333697

18 Columbas Line 11200 Hyundai 59195 Hyundai 148681 HMM 168966 Hyundai M.M. 316108

19 Safmarine 11100 OOCL 55811 Pacif ic Int'l Lines 134292 PIL 146174 PIL 267651

20 Ben Line 10300 CMA 46026 Wan Hai Lines 106505 Wan Hai Lines 116439 UASC 234815

Slop capacity of top 20 435000 2058063 7185608 8745315 13184541

C4-index 38.6% 35.7% 45.9% 47.5% 48.3%

Share top 5 in top 20 44.1% 42.3% 56.3% 57.6% 57.6%

Share top 10 in top 20 69.1% 67.5% 73.9% 74.0% 73.7%

Waves of consolidation

have reshaped the liner industry.

M&A activity slowed down in

recent years.

27


start calling in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in 2014. At the same time, slow steaming or the reduction in the sailing speed of maritime vessels, has become an increasingly common practice in container liner shipping since 2008, as the amount and unit size of available vessel capacity rises and the price of fuel increases (Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009). Slow steaming helped to absorb vessel overcapacity during the crisis (more vessels required to maintain the same service frequency), to save on fuel costs, to restore liner shipping company profitability and to reduce environmental emissions by ships at sea. However, the focus of container carriers on larger vessel sizes and slow steaming did not lead to a more stable market environment. Unpredictable business cycles and the seasonality on some of the major trade lanes (e.g. demand peak just before Chinese New Year) have more than once resulted in unstable cargo guarantees to shipping lines. In June 2011, Maersk Line started the discussion on a new mission for container shipping based on three pillars: (1) on time performance / reliability; (2) ease of business (i.e. avoid complexity, increase transparency) and (3) environmental performance. These three aspects should be considered in a supply chain perspective.

2.4.3. Consolidation in the cargo handling business

The container terminal operating industry has witnessed an internationalisation process during the last decades, leading to the emergence of terminal operators offering globe-spanning services. The top ten global container terminal operators control an increasing share of the world’s total container handlings: 64.6% in terms of total throughput handled in 2009 compared to 41.5% in 2001 (Table 16). The table also shows the relative importance of the respective home ports (if any) in the total container throughput of each terminal operating company. Table 16. Top ten container terminal operators

Notes: Rot = Rotterdam, Ant = Antwerp, Ams = Amsterdam, Zeeb = Zeebrugge (*)As part of future Rotterdam World Gateway at Maasvlakte 2 (**) In mid 2011, it was reported that ECT allowed the entry of MSC in 2010 in one of its facilities (Delta Dedicated North) for a shareholding of 49% or 50%. ECT denied this report (Journal of Commerce, 20 June 2011). Source: own compilation based on data from Drewry Shipping Consultants (2006, 2010)

Importance home port Presence

Operator m teu share Operator m teu share Operator m teu share Home port % in 2009 in Delta

HPH 29.3 11.8% HPH 60.9 13.9% HPH 64.2 13.6% Hong Kong 17.4% Rot/Ams

PSA 19.5 7.9% APMT 52.0 11.9% APMT 56.9 12.0% - - Rot/Zeeb

APMT 13.5 5.5% PSA 47.4 10.7% PSA 55.3 11.7% Singapore 44.4% Ant/Zeeb

P&O Ports 10.0 4.0% DP World 41.6 9.4% DP World 45.2 9.5% Dubai 24.1% Ant/Rot*

Eurogate 8.6 3.5% Cosco Pacific 22.0 5.0% Cosco Pacific 32.5 6.9% - - Ant

DPA 4.7 1.9% Eurogate 11.7 2.7% MSC 16.4 3.5% - - Ant/Rot**

Evergreen 4.5 1.8% Evergreen 9.4 2.1% Eurogate 11.7 2.5% Bremerhaven 36.4% no

Cosco Pacific 4.4 1.8% SSA Marine 8.9 2.0% Evergreen 8.6 1.8% - - no

Hanjin 4.2 1.7% MSC 7.6 1.7% SSA Marine 7.7 1.6% Seattle 7.4% no

SSA Marine 4.0 1.6% HHLA 6.6 1.5% CMA-CGM 7.0 1.5% - - Ant/Zeeb/Rot*

Top 10 102.7 41.5% Top 10 268.1 60.9% Top 10 305.5 64.6%

2001 2006 2009

Slow-steaming mega ships are becoming a common sight in liner shipping.

Liner shipping will put more emphasis on logistics and environmental performance and the ease of doing business.

Global terminal operators are here to stay.

28


September 2011

The rankings have significantly been affected by mergers and acquisitions with 2001 (HPH-ECT, PSA-HNN and HPH buying ICTSI’s International Business Division) and 2005-2007 (e.g. DP World acquired CSX World Terminals and P&O Ports) standing out as most active periods in M&A activity. Evidence underlines that the consolidation process that has rapidly taken place in recent years may have reached limits. Global terminal operators are now increasingly hedging the risks by setting up dedicated terminal joint ventures in cooperation with shipping lines and strategic alliances. As demonstrated in the last column of Table 16 and in Figure 10, most of the top 10 terminal operators have invested in container operations in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta often in partnership with shipping lines and other companies. This has resulted in very complex ownership structures with many operators present in more than one port. The same applies to bulk trades where terminal groups are expanding the scope over more than one port. A very good example is the Belgian Sea-Invest group which operates dry bulk terminals in Antwerp, Ghent, Gdansk, a large number of French ports and holds a 21.5% share in EMO in Rotterdam since 2006. In Europe, the group also operates fruit terminals in Antwerp, Zeebrugge, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Dieppe, Dunkirk, Marseille, Fos and Le Havre. Figure 10. Complexity in container terminal ownership structures in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta – situation early 2011

Source: updated from Notteboom and Rodrigue (2011b)

DP World

PSAHUTCHISON PORT HOLDINGS

APM Terminals(AP Moller Group)

ANTWERP

Antwerp Gateway

PSA (Antwerp/

Zeebrugge)

MSC Home terminal

CHZ

APM Terminals

ZEEBRUGGE

ROTTERDAM

Rotterdam World Gateway

(Maasvlakte 2)

Operational by 2013

ECT

APM Terminal Maasvlakte CMA-CGM

MSC

NYK

Terminal 1

(Maasvlakte 2)

Operational by 2014

Minority

Shareholding

Waal- and

Eemhaven

Delta Terminal

Euromax

phase 1

Majority

shareholding

ZIM Line

DP World Delwaidedock

North Sea Terminal

Europe Terminal

Deurganck Terminal

New World Alliance

CYKH Alliance

Antwerp International

Terminal (AIT) Shipping Line

(Global) Terminal

Operator

Terminal

Shanghai International Port

Group (SIPG)

Zeebrugge International

Port (ZIP)

Cosco Pacific

100%

20%

50%

100%

100%

50%

50%

50%

60%

30%

10%

100%

100%

100%

50%50%

100%

42.5%

10%

20%

10%

35%

100%

65%

75%

25%

PORT

Financial Holding

AMSTERDAM

ACT Smaller facilities (*)

(*) e.g. United Stevedores Amsterdam, Container Stevedoring Ijmuiden

M&A activity has been

strong, but is weakening.

Complex terminal

ownership structures in the

Rhine-Scheldt Delta.

29


2.4.4. The hinterland battle among market players

Many market players have come to understand that landside operations are key to a successful integration along the supply chain. The deployment of larger vessels, the formation of strategic alliances and the waves of M&A have resulted in lower costs at sea, shifting the cost burden of shipping lines to the landside. Therefore, a number of shipping lines extend their scope beyond terminal operations to include inland transport and logistics. In order to streamline the inland distribution system, shipping lines and alliances between them seek to increase the percentage of carrier haulage on the European continent. The share of carrier haulage presently is about 30% on an average, but large differences can be observed among routes and regions: the UK is a typical example of a strong carrier base, while merchant haulage remains very dominant in the Benelux and in particular Switzerland. The carrier haulage share is estimated at 30% in Rotterdam and 25% in Antwerp. Contrary to the Rotterdam-Antwerp inter-port market where barge container transport is ‘dominated’ by the deepsea shipping lines in the framework of second moves (carrier haulage – see Figure 11), the inland market is still dominated by large shippers (merchant haulage). The crisis has made merchant haulage even stronger as some shipping lines and terminal operators have reduced their commitments in inland transport by focusing more on their core activity (i.e. maritime transport when considering shipping lines). Figure 11. Evolving role of shipping lines in the hinterland: towards a ‘push’ strategy

Source: Notteboom - ITMMA

Still, a number of larger shipping lines such as Maersk Line and MSC are developing hub-concepts in the hinterland of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports. Inland terminals and rail and barge services are combined to push import containers from the ocean terminal to an inland location, from where final delivery to the receiver will be initiated at a later stage. This “push” strategy (see Figure 11) is initiated by the shipping line, yet prioritized based on the required delivery date. Export containers

x B/L seaport X

y

x B/L seaport X

Second move

by rail, barge or truck

B/L inland port

z Rail, barge (or truck)

x

y

Multi-port gateway region

CONTAINER PUSH STRATEGY

Shipping lines seek to increase the share of carrier haulage in mainland Europe..

.. but merchant haulage remains dominant in Delta ports.

Pushing containers to the hinterland.

30


September 2011

are pushed from an inland location to the ocean terminal, initiated by the shipping line, yet prioritized based on available inland transport capacity and the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of the mother vessel. Some terminal operators in Europe are also increasing their influence throughout supply chains by engaging into inland transport. They seem to do so mainly by incorporating inland terminals as ‘extended gates’ to seaport terminals (see Box 2) and by introducing an integrated terminal operator haulage concept for the customers. The advantages of the extended gate system are substantial: customers can have their containers available in close proximity to their customer base, while the deepsea terminal operator faces less pressure on the deep-sea terminals due to shorter dwell times and can guarantee a better planning and utilization of the rail and barge shuttles. However, the success of both extended gates and terminal operator haulage largely depends on the transparency of the goods and information flows. Unfortunately, terminal operators often lack information on the onward inland transport segment for containers that are discharged at the terminal. A close coordination with shipping lines, forwarders and shippers is needed to maximize the possibilities for the development of integrated bundling concepts to the hinterland. Box 2. About ‘extended gates’ and ‘terminal operator haulage’

Inland terminals can be incorporated as ‘extended gates’ to seaport terminals and as such can help to reduce container dwell times on seaport terminals. Container terminal operator ECT in Rotterdam (part of HPH) follows an active strategy of acquiring key inland terminals acting as extended gates to its deepsea terminals. Through ‘European Gateway Services’, ECT offers shipping lines, forwarders, transport companies and shippers a variety of services to facilitate the optimal flow of containers between the deep-sea terminals in Rotterdam and the direct European hinterland. ECT bundles cargo, which allows for highly frequent inland barge and rail connections to various logistics hotspots in the European hinterland. The inland network includes the TCT Venlo rail and barge terminals (the Netherlands), DeCeTe terminal in Duisburg (Germany), TCT Belgium in Willebroek (Belgium), ACT in Amsterdam, MCT in Moerdijk, AVCT in Avelgem (Belgium) and LCT in Liège (Belgium). ECT is not the only deepsea terminal operator developing an active extended gate policy. The door-to-door philosophy of other companies such as APM Terminals, DP world and Eurogate has transformed these terminal operators into logistics organisations and or organizers/operators of inland services. Maersk Line wants to push containers into the hinterland supported by its terminal sister APM Terminals and its rail branch European Rail Shuttle (ERS). DP World is working in partnership with CMA CGM to streamline intermodal operations on the Seine and Rhône axes, while the large terminals of Antwerp Gateway (open since 2005) and London Gateway (future) are both linked to inland centres. DP World uses the concept of ‘terminal operator haulage’ from the Antwerp Gateway terminal to the hinterland. The terminal operator haulage concept is aimed at a more active involvement of the terminal operator in hinterland connections by establishing closer relationships with shipping lines and inland operators.

Source: ECT, Rodrigue and Notteboom (2009) and Notteboom (2009)

Terminal operators developed ‘extended

gates’ and terminal operator haulage.

31


2.5. Corridors, intermodality and inland ports

2.5.1. Intercontinental maritime and land corridors

Corridors have become the main arteries of world trade. Strategic points along maritime corridors such as the Panama Canal, Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Gibraltar function as important turntables in extensive hub-and-spoke and relay/interlining activities. An estimated 31 million TEU passed through the Suez Canal in 2008 compared to 20 million in 2004. Nearly 93% of these container flows are related to the Europe-Asia trade routes. Many of the world’s larger ports can be found near these key locations: e.g. Port Said and Damietta near Suez Canal, Algeciras and Tanger Med near the Straits of Gibraltar and Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas near the Straits of Malacca. Shipping lines have designed liner services with slow steaming large vessels connecting a limited number of global ports on each side of the trade routes. Maersk Line, MSC and CMA-CGM are among the truly global liner operators, with a strong presence also in secondary routes. The networks are based on traffic circulation through a network of specific hubs. However, shipping lines do not necessarily opt for the same hubs. For example, MSC uses Antwerp as its main North-European hub next to Bremerhaven and Le Havre, while Maersk Line mainly opted for Rotterdam and Zeebrugge to serve the Delta port region. There is an upper limit to the concentration of flows in only a few hubs as shipping lines have commercial reasons for not bundling all their cargo in one port (i.e. not all eggs in one basket). For instance, Maersk Line and MSC did not opt for one European turntable, but several major hubs. The opening of new larger Panama Canal locks in 2014 (allowing container vessels of up to 14,000 TEU) opens opportunities for shipping lines to reintroduce equatorial round-the-world container services. This could pull some direct calls away from major port regions such as North Europe and the North American East Coast to transhipment hubs on the maritime beltway of the world. Furthermore, the almost monopolistic position of the Suez route on many trade routes is being scrutinized by rising security concerns caused by piracy acts, high Suez Canal charges and an ever-changing geography in world trade patterns. The Cape route could in the long run serve as an alternative to the Suez option on trades between Asia and South America, Asia and West Africa and South America and East Africa (Notteboom, 2011a). The flows related to the first two trade lanes now typically pass through the Suez Canal and are interlined in hubs such as Algeciras, Tanger Med or even in more northern ports such as Rotterdam (Maersk Line) and Antwerp (MSC). This partial rerouting could thus negatively affect the traffic position of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in the global liner shipping network. The expected emergence of the Cape route should be seen as the embodiment of a promising development of south-south trade volumes between Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America. A number of other routing alternatives are being planned or are in operation to accommodate part of the trade volumes between Europe and Asia (Figure 12), but their market shares are expected to remain low compared to the Suez route. First there is the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a set of all-water shipping lanes between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean along the Russian coast of Siberia and the Far East. Future ice cap reductions would open new possibilities for commercial shipping

Corridors are the arteries of world trade.

Shipping lines focus on hubs, but not necessarily the same hubs.

Panama Canal could trigger new RTW services.

Cape route could focus on South-South trades.

NSR route being considered.

32


September 2011

on this route. In cost terms the route today is still less favourable due to the need for ice-classed ships and ice breaker assistance, non-regularity of the liner services, slower sailing speeds, navigation difficulties and Russian transit fees. Secondly, North South land corridors could develop as land bridges from the Persian Gulf via Iran to Russia. Third, the east-west rail corridors, a set of railway lines connecting East Asia and the western part of Russia with the Eastern part of Russia, are becoming more commercially interesting. The main arteries are the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Trans-Manchurian Railway, the Trans-Mongolian Railway and the Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM – opened in 1991). The ‘Trans-Siberian in Seven Days’ program sets a target speed of 1,500 km a day by 2015. Also the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region is benefiting from improved land bridge connections. For example, in the Spring of 2011, the Combinant terminal in the port of Antwerp established a rail service to Chongqing in China passing via Duisburg. Rail land bridges in principle offer lead time advantages to shippers, but capacities remain low compared to container liner services. Figure 12. The main routing alternatives between East Asia and Northern Europe

Source: Notteboom and Rodrigue (2011c)

2.5.2. European land corridors

On a more European scale, existing transport corridors by rail, road and inland navigation between the core of the EU, the Baltic, the Mediterranean, East and Central Europe and third countries are likely to grow in importance, whereas a number of new corridors will emerge to deal with growing transport volumes between Member States. The development of these corridors is enhanced by EU

Major intercontinental

land corridors are emerging.

33


policy on the creation of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and initiatives of rail operators, megacarriers and other market players to extend their European transport networks. Corridors are created by economies of scale formed by the clusters in question. When compound demand in clusters reaches a critical mass, cargo can be consolidated, allowing other modes of transport and creating (multi-modal) corridors. Corridors act in a way that (large) gateways face less ’resistance’ in reaching the natural hinterland of other ports. Major contestable hinterlands are increasingly being served not only by the ports of one region, but by several gateway regions (see section 3 for a more elaborate discussion). Examples are the Black Sea port region/Constantza as a new eastern gateway region to Europe and the port regions near the Gdansk Bay and the North Adriatic. The performance profile of each of the corridors in terms of infrastructure provision (capacity), transport operations (price and quality of the shuttle services) and the associated logistical control (i.e. the management in a supply chain context) is a key attribute for port competition in Europe. RailNetEurope (RNE), which groups the rail infrastructure managers in Europe, has developed corridor management along a set of European rail corridors in view of planning international train paths and of shaping corridor infrastructure capacity according to market requirements. Corridors C02, C03 and C05 are particularly important to the Delta (Figure 13). Most progress has been made on corridor C02 that starts from Rotterdam and goes down all the way to Genoa covering a number of the most important economic regions in Europe. Its catchment area comprises 70 million inhabitants and operates 50% of the north-south rail freight. Figure 13. RNE corridors

Source: www.rne.eu

Corridors intensify port competition.

RNE, ERTMS and other European rail corridor initiatives.

34


September 2011

Six European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) Corridors exist. Each ERTMS-corridor is corresponding to a freight corridor. For example, corridor A corresponds to the Rotterdam-Genoa rail link while Corridor C concerns the connection Antwerp-Basel-Lyon. The European Commission is also working on the creation of a number of international freight-oriented corridors. The ultimate goal is at least one corridor in each EU Member State by 2012. The governance structures established for the ERTMS-corridors will form the basis of the governance structures to be established for the majority of the Rail Freight Corridors (see Table A4 in Annex 3). Each Rail Freight Corridor is a “single entity”, a One-Stop-Shop (OSS), but several possibilities are open for its setting-up or designation. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta faces the fact that no new major corridor infrastructures have been developed in the recent past. The rail-dedicated Betuweroute (Box 3) in the Netherlands is the last major accomplishment. The planned full reactivation of the Iron Rhine link between Antwerp and Germany would also mainly target freight. The focus has therefore been on stretching existing capacity on the corridors via advanced traffic management systems and the implementation of effective cargo bundling and cargo coordination systems. While measures to optimize the use of existing capacity are obviously the right way to go, there are limits to the ‘stretching’ of the use of existing capacities. In Eastern Europe and parts of Southern Europe the focus is more on developing the much-needed corridors in the first place. Box 3. The Betuweroute

The Betuweroute is a double dedicated freight rail track towards Germany and further into Europe. Work on the Dutch part of the track began in 1998. Delayed by two years, the railway was finished mid 2007, at a cost of 4.7 billion euro, more than two times the original budget. The Betuweroute is managed by Keyrail. The shareholders of Keyrail are Prorail (50% - Prorail is the rail infrastructure manager in the Netherlands), Rotterdam Port Authority (35%) and Amsterdam Port Authority (15%). In 2010, rail traffic on the 120 km stretch between shunting yard Kijfhoek and Zevenaar near the German border increased by almost 80% to 17,600 trains. The market share of the Betuweroute in comparison with the other border crossings for freight transport by rail to and from Germany has increased to more than 70% in 2010 compared to 45% in 2009. The main driver behind this growth has been the electrification – at the end of 2009 – of the Port Railway Line, the stretch between the Maasvlakte and the Kijfhoek shunting centre. As a result of this, many carriers switched from the 'mixed network' to the Betuweroute. The Port of Amsterdam got connected to the Betuweroute in March 2011 via a railway connection to the Betuweroute near Meteren/Geldermalsen. A key problem limiting capacity of the Betuweroute is that the German part - the final stretch Emmerich-Oberhausen - is still not completed. The German government’s crisis package emphasizes that money has been earmarked for this project.

Source: press releases of Keyrail, Port of Rotterdam and Port of Amsterdam

Corridors are also found in inland waterway infrastructure network. The main axes include (a) the Rhine and its tributary rivers (Main, Neckar, Mosel), (b) the river system in the Benelux and northern France, including main canals such as the Albert Canal between Antwerp and Liège, (c) the Rhône-Saône basin, (d) the Northern network around the Elbe and Weser and associated canals, (e) the Rhine-Main-Danube linking the Alpine Region to the Black Sea. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta is strategically located on most of these corridors.

ERTMS corridors and the

emergence of Rail Freight

Corridors.

The use of rail infrastructure in

the Delta is ‘stretched’.

35


The Seine-Nord project is among the most significant infrastructure projects with potentially structural effects on port competition and cargo routing in the Benelux and Northern France. A second project is being prepared to also connect the Rhône-basin via the river Saône and the Moselle with the Rhine. In eastern Europe ships have the possibility to reach the Danube from the Rhine, opening up the larger industrial areas in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. Via the Elbe and the Oder the industrial areas in Austria, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic are within reach. For this region an impressive attempt to improve the network is the connection of these two waterways (Elbe and Oder with the Danube) in order to create a new trans-European shipping lane. Vienna will in that case become the most important inland shipping centre in Central Europe. Other countries in Europe which boast inland shipping are Italy, Finland, Sweden, Russia and Ukraine. However these pertain to isolated national waterways networks which (except maritime) have no connection with the European network.

2.5.3. The growing importance of inland ports and logistics zones

In the last fifteen years, the dynamics in logistics networks have created the right conditions for a large-scale development of freight villages and inland ports throughout Europe. The range of functions presented by inland logistics centres is wide ranging from simple cargo consolidation to advanced logistics services. Many inland locations with multimodal access have become broader logistics zones. Not only have they assumed a significant number of traditional cargo handling functions and services, but they also attracted many related services, a.o. distribution centres, shipping agents, trucking companies, forwarders, container-repair facilities and packing firms. The concept of logistics zones in the hinterland is now well-advanced in Europe: e.g. ‘platformes logistiques’ in France, the Güterverkehrszentren (GVZ) in Germany, Interporti in Italy, Freight Villages in the UK and the Zonas de Actividades Logisticas (ZAL) in Spain. Logistics zones are usually created within the framework of regional development policies as joint initiatives by firms, intermodal operators, national, regional and or local authorities, and or the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Quite a few of these logistics zones are competing with seaports for what the location of European distribution facilities and value added logistics (VAL) are concerned. Shortage of industrial premises, high land prices, congestion problems, the inland location of the European markets and severe environmental restrictions are some of the well-known arguments for companies not to locate in a seaport. Corridor development enhances the location of logistics sites in inland ports and along the axes between seaports and inland ports. The interaction between seaports and inland locations leads to the development of a large logistics pool consisting of several logistics zones. This trend towards geographical concentration of distribution platforms often occurs spontaneously as the result of a slow, market-driven process. But also national, regional and/or local authorities try to direct this process by means of offering financial incentives. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta is a prime example. The logistics zones in the Netherlands are mainly located in ports or around new or existing barge or rail terminals in the hinterland. Dordrecht and Moerdijk are important overflow locations for the port of Rotterdam. There are now large concentrations of logistics sites in and around the inner port of Liège, along the Geel-

Seine-Nord project important for Delta.

Vienna to become major inland shipping centre.

The rise of inland logistics centres in Europe.

Competitors of but also complements to seaports.

Corridors enhance the creation of logistics poles.

36


September 2011

Hasselt-Genk axis and the Antwerp-Brussels axis, and in the Kortrijk/Lille border region. Apart from the Liège area, also other parts in Wallonia are becoming logistics hotspots. Northern France shows logistics clusters mainly around Lille and Valenciennes. The existing geographical concentration of logistics sites has stimulated the development of inland terminals in these areas. Figure 14. Logistics polarisation and logistics zones in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta

Source: updated from Notteboom (2000)

In the future a further integration of intermodal transport and supply chain management will undoubtedly lead to new value-added services in inland locations. This will enhance the provision of logistics services at key transfer points and the organisation of distribution patterns around such nodes. The availability of fast, efficient and reliable intermodal connections is one of the most important prerequisites for the further logistical development of inland terminals.

2.5.4. The rise of intermodality

The European port system has witnessed significant advances in inland transportation. Modal shift and ‘co-modality’ policies have been implemented by supranational, national and regional governments aimed at stimulating the use of barges, rail and shortsea shipping. In March 2011, the European Commission published its White paper on the future European Transport Policy entitled ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system’ (COM(2011) 144 final). One of the key points in the paper on transport is a 50% shift of medium distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail and waterborne transport, combined with a new legislation for a further liberalisation of rail passenger transport for 2012. This can only be accomplished by drastically increasing the availability and use of the intermodal network present in Europe.

The Delta is Europe’s

leading logistics pole.

New VALS activity in inland

locations.

White Paper aims for further

co-modal solutions.

37


The rail system is evolving from a national control policy towards a more harmonious European policy. The liberalization of the rail network led to a split between infrastructure management and rail operations. By creating choice to customers the price should drop and the service level increase. Kirchner developed a liberalisation index (LIB) in 2002, comparing the status of the relative degree of market opening in the European rail transport markets within the European Union, including Norway and Switzerland. The countries in the Advanced Group, which is the top group in the LIB Index, consists of Sweden (score of 872), Great Britain (865), Germany (842), Denmark (825), the Netherlands (817) and Austria (806). All countries in the Advanced Group have regulatory bodies with wide-ranging powers and competencies as well as experience in dealing with complaints from external operators. Belgium is in the ‘On Schedule’ Group with a score of 753. The third group (Delayed) includes Lithuania, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland. Belgium is thus a medium to late adopter of rail liberalisation, but is catching up fast. Licensed rail operators in Belgium include NMBS, Fret SNCF, Crossrail Benelux, Veolia Cargo Nederland, Trainsport, ERS Railways, SNCF Fret Benelux, Rotterdam Rail Feeding and CFL Cargo. Infrabel is the rail infrastructure manager in Belgium. NMBS controls passenger transport and a large part of freight transport (NMBS Logistics, Xpedys, IFB). NMBS Logistics is developing a stronger commercial policy to face increasing competition from newcomers such as SNCF on international connections. Big pitfalls are capacity shortages on peak moments and the priority of passenger trains leading to an uncertain cargo service. Until half of the 1990s, only the national Dutch railway company NS provided regular freight rail services in the Netherlands. The gradual liberalisation of the EU rail sector allowed new entrants. In total there were 14 licensed rail operators in the Netherlands in 2010. The largest cargo carrier in the Netherlands is DB Schenker, others are ACTS, Crossrail, ERS Railways, B-Cargo, Fret SNCF, Häfen und Güterverkehr Köln, Rail4chem, Veolia Cargo, etc... The whole network, except for the Betuweroute, is maintained and managed by the government agency ProRail. It is also responsible for allocating slots to the different companies. According to Francke (2009) the efficiency gains of rail liberalisation in the Netherlands have been estimated at a 25-35% drop in costs and 15 to 25% lower freight rates. The second transport mode that needs to be promoted in order to fulfil the EU requirements by 2050 is the inland navigation sector. Inland navigation is the most sustainable of all modes and can increasingly pose an alternative to road without the traffic jams, environmental impact and safety hazards. There are multiple projects running in an attempt to create a European barge network (see previous section). The configuration of rail and barge networks proofs to be of crucial importance to the European port system. A certain level of traffic concentration in a seaport system is required in order to allow a virtuous cycle of modal shifts from road haulage to high-volume transport modes. But even port systems with a low degree of concentration have embraced intermodal transport. Extensive cargo concentration on a few trunk lines opens possibilities for economies of scale in inland shuttles, but even more likely for higher frequencies. Smaller ports and new terminals often seek connection to the extensive hinterland networks of the larger ports.

Nearly completed liberalisation should enhance position of rail.

The Netherlands in top group liberalisation, Belgium ‘on schedule’.

NMBS Logistics facing more competition in Belgium.

Many new entrants in Dutch rail operations.

Traffic concentration in ports generates needed scale for intermodality.

38


September 2011

2.6. Regulation and government policies

2.6.1. IMO

Regulation impacts transport and seaports at many different levels: spatial planning, environmental issues, price regulation, etc.. . The regulations governing port activities are vast. At the supranational level we find among others the IMO regulations (such as SOLAS, MARPOL, IMDG, BIC and ISPS). IMO regulations mostly deal with safety, security and pollution affecting the waterborne leg of transport. Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention aims for a reduction in sulphur oxide emissions from ships. The sulphur limits in ship fuels applicable at sea in Emission Control Areas (ECAs - basically the Baltic, the North Sea and the Channel) were reduced from 1.5% to 1% in 2010 and are planned to be further reduced to 0.1%, effective from 1 January 2015. There are serious fears that the reduction to 0.1% may be quite costly for the participants in the shipping industry and will result in higher freight rates and a ‘modal back shift’ from shortsea to road transport (see Notteboom, 2011b for a detailed discussion). There are also questions being raised on the level playing field in Europe: as the ECAs are in Northern Europe, the north European ports would be affected by stricter rules on the sulphur content of ship fuels than ports in the Med, the Black Sea and along the Atlantic coastline.

2.6.2. EU policy

European regulations regarding transport and ports can be split up in multiple sections. Only recently EU regulations were developed which impact the managing of ports directly (since 2001). Most activities regarding shipping, cargo, permits and labour where free to be determined at a local level. The Integrated Maritime Policy of the EC was laid down in a Green Paper. It includes an action plan suggesting an integrated maritime policy covering all aspects of European seas, oceans and policy lines concerning maritime affairs. Some major environmental guidelines exists such as the Birds and Habitat Directive and the Water Directive. The former directive is part of the Natura 2000 initiative to stop the regression of biodiversity. For Dutch and Flemish ports this particularly affects the Wadden Sea, Zeeland, the Western part of the Scheldt, and the zone between Ostend and the French border. Certain regions are branded Natura 2000 protected areas. Some major port projects like the energy plants in Eemshaven and Rotterdam, the building of the Deurganckdok in Antwerp and Maasvlakte 2 in Rotterdam and the Western part of the Scheldt container terminal have felt the implications of this policy. Except regulations and guidelines concerning ports and their affiliated activities the EU has many regulations and acts concerning pollution and the environment. Some examples: garbage disposal facilities in ports, garbage transport, pollution by ships, soil protection, greenhouse gas emissions, noise pollution, etc.. .

IMO very influential in shipping, but

also impacts on seaports.

Concerns over low sulphur fuel policy for ships.

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affects seaports.

Environmental regulation at EU

level is vast.

39


Next to the environment, the European Union edited legislation concerning safety and security at sea and in ports, mostly conform with the general IMO recommendations (double hull, port state control, security of terminals and ports, etc..), and hinterland connections (TEN-T, MoS). The EC has also taken policy initiatives in the area of road pricing.

2.6.3. European port policy

The Green Paper on Ports and Maritime Infrastructure (1997) had as main target to improve the debate surrounding competitiveness and efficiency of European ports and the TEN-T networking. The European Commission published in 2001 a Directive proposal on market access to port services (European Commission, 2001). The aim of the proposal was to establish rules for market access to port services. The political debate, animated by aggressive trade union protests, focused on labour-related aspects of the proposal. Influenced by continued labour unrest as well as internal political meddling, the European Parliament voted off the final compromise on the Directive proposal in November 2003. In 2004 a second version was published (European Commission, 2004) which also failed to find political support, mainly because some of its key features did not respect the compromises already reached on the first proposal (Verhoeven, 2006). Following the double failure of the port services Directive, the European Commission took its recourse to ‘soft law’ and published, after an extensive process of consultation, a Communication on a European Ports Policy (European Commission, 2007) which contained guidance on a lot of relevant issues to ports (e.g. port concessions).

2.6.4. The 2011 White Paper on a future European transport policy

The 2011 White Paper on a future transport policy is another key policy document with implications to European seaports. The policy aim of the EC is to build a competitive transport system that will increase mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment. At the same time, the proposals will dramatically reduce Europe’s dependence on imported oil and cut carbon emissions in transport by 60% by 2050. Other key goals by 2050 include: (a) no more conventionally-fuelled cars in cities, (b) 40% use of sustainable low carbon fuels in aviation, (c) at least 40% cut in shipping emissions, and (d) a 50% shift of medium distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail and waterborne transport. All the above should contribute to a 60% cut in transport emissions by 2050. The White Paper refers to a further liberalisation of the different modes, emission reductions, creating pan-European zones allowing more fluent cargo transport and transferring the price of congestion, pollution and other externalities to the user of transport. In order to achieve this, infrastructure must be planned and altered in a way that maximizes the positive impact on economic growth and minimizes the negative impact on the environment, whilst attacking congestion with funding and correct pricing.

IMO regulations also embedded in EU Law.

Green Paper of 1997 brought EU port policy (back) on the agenda.

Attempts for a Port Services’ Directive failed.

‘Soft law’ approach to ports.

High ambitions in terms of modal split and emission reductions.

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September 2011

Other statements include the alignment of western and eastern European transport systems to service the entire continent and to create efficient entry points in coastal regions in order to access the continent in the most productive manner possible. This point implicitly opens the formal discussion at EU level on what some observers call the North-West imbalance in port traffic distribution in Europe, a point that will be further discussed in section 3. Targets are set for reducing emissions across various modes. The paper proposes to do this by supporting the creation of corridors running through a Single European Transport Area with no more barriers between modes and nationalities. This implies an increase in co-modality. The document splits up traffic in long, medium and short distances hinting that trucks will mostly be used for all cargo moves less than 300 km (medium and short distance). The Motorways of the Sea project is the maritime dimension of this core corridor network. A further incentive will be given by fully optimizing these corridors regarding emissions, minimizing environmental impacts, increasing reliability, limiting congestion and allowing for low operating and administrative costs. Pricing policies should facilitate the realisation of the goals. The future policy of the EU is to impose various taxes and fees so that the costs of transport are reflected in its price in an undistorted way. The internalisation of external costs should take into account the creation of a level playing field between the various modes regarding taxes and subsidies. The long-term goal is to apply user charges to all vehicles and covering the entire network in order to reflect at least the maintenance cost of infrastructure, congestion, air and noise pollution. In addition to the taxation component a diversified source of finance, both from public and private sources, is required. Member States need to ensure that sufficient national funding is available in their budgetary planning (despite ongoing government debt problems), as well as sufficient project planning and implementation capacities. The EC aims for the further establishment of the Single European Railway Area, a homologue structure across Europe with improved liberalisation. Also track access charges for cross European corridors are briefly mentioned. The Blue Belt initiative is considered a key policy step for maritime corridors and ports. The Blue Belt initiative is aimed at creating a zone with uniform labour rules, certain pilot exemptions and increased transparency in port finances. Inland navigation is mentioned within the White Paper but the EC does not elaborate further beyond stating that a further optimisation of the Internal Market for inland waterway transport is needed. In road transport, the EC lays further emphasis on uniform pricing and training programs and a uniform cargo measurement system. Several port-related organisations and ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta have commented on the White paper. The reactions are aimed at providing a response and further input to the discussion on the future European transport policy. We discuss three reactions.

Policies on cargo traffic

distribution in the European ports system.

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of external costs of transport.

New funding sources?

41


First, the European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO) is generally positive about the White Paper and supports the ambitious targets set in the document. The organisation, however, underlines that even for distances below 300 km, which is the threshold established in the White Paper, freight shipments coming in or out of ports are often transported by rail or barge. The organisation sees port infrastructure investments as a priority for White Paper implementation. Currently seaports which are key nodal points already set distinct intermodal targets. Since they offer all modal possibilities they are subject to all advantages but also shortcomings and externalities. The policy should further be aimed at exploiting the full potential of the modes and reducing the shortcomings but taking into account all segments of transport, including the deep-sea leg. Whilst implementing this vision, the EU should set concrete milestones, prioritize and ensure adequate coordination and coherence on all levels from national policy to the modes itself. ESPO feels that non-legislative measures are the best option in order to achieve these goals, taking into account the large diversity among European ports. Finally ESPO mentions that all measures undertaken at EU level should avoid distortion of competition. Second, the Flemish Ports Commission applauds the fact that the White paper on Transport is a vision document, but notes that the emphasis is too much on the economic and ecological aspect of mobility and not the socio-economic dimension. Further studies should be conducted in order to analyze the short and long term effects of the changes, together with a clear action plan for the coming five years. The last mile problem, consolidation issues and container transfer points should be examined in more detail. The Commission raises questions about paragraph 27, a paragraph which could be interpreted as a statement referring to an ambition of the EC to establish a cargo shift from northern Europe to southern Europe. Clarification seems required together with more attention to the current available infrastructure and the dangers of overcapacity. The Flemish Ports Commission supports the plea of the EC for internalisation of external costs but stresses the fact that this must be a uniform action across the EU, just like the ambitious emission reductions of 40%. Finally, the port of Rotterdam supports the White Paper’s intermodal shift directives but points out a discrepancy. By creating more entry points along the coastline, consolidation and corridors are discouraged. In order to transport more cargo to and from the hinterland via short sea, rail and inland shipping as the Commission proposes, a concentration of volume streams is necessary. Also consciously and artificially creating and developing more so-called entry points goes against the very free market principles that the European Commission is striving for. In addition the Port of Rotterdam Authority does insist that the Blue Belt pilot be independently evaluated upon its completion. Concerning the market access and transparency the Port of Rotterdam feels that the current existing legal frameworks in this area offer sufficient guarantee for an open market. Also an equal application of the state aid guidelines is requested in order to create a level playing field. The same concern is raised for the emission reductions where sulphur emission areas distort the level playing field by increasing costs in certain zones surrounding Europe. Also, only CO2 reductions are mentioned but the White Paper is less clear about SOx and NOx.

Reactions to White Paper.

42


September 2011

2.6.5. TEN-T policy

The TEN-T policy is closely intertwined and explicitly discussed in the White Paper. It deals with the development of a European transport network covering all modes. In 1996 the European Council and Parliament created guidelines in order to form a Trans-European (transport) Network. The 1996 TEN-T policy has been reviewed in 2001-2003. A list of projects with a high priority was assembled which had to be completed before 2010. The Betuweroute and Seine-Nord projects are some of the projects that featured on the priority list. The maritime leg of the TEN-T program is the MoS project or Motorways of the Sea. In 2009, the European Commission published a Green Paper on “Towards a better integrated trans European transport network at the service of the common transport policy”. Findings indicate that, given the current developments of the European community, technical progress and increased demand, the current TEN-T network has lost relevance and has become too expensive to construct. In the end, a new policy on TEN-T was developed consisting of a core network and a comprehensive network, comprising a – geographically defined – priority network and a conceptual pillar to help integrate the various transport policy and transport infrastructure aspects. Seaports are now an integral part of these networks. The TEN-T ‘dual layer’ approach proposed by the EC and also applicable to ports can work provided that the comprehensive network remains as inclusive as possible. In the past months, stakeholders have engaged into a debate on the selection criteria for integration of ports in the core network. These criteria should be future-oriented and be sufficiently robust to anticipate future needs and trends for the next decades. The principle of distributional equity and Member States’ ambitions make that a good spread of core network ports around Europe is high on the political agenda. However, at the same time it should be recognized that a degree of consolidation is necessary to collect positive economies of scale, also in terms of sustainability. This principle is key to the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region given its scale and market position in Europe (see section 3). The key challenge in the design of a sustainable and market-based European core network is thus to find an appropriate balance between these two principles. This balancing game is difficult given the interest of national Member States.

TEN-T policy initially a list of

priority projects.

New approach via a ‘dual

layer’: core network and

comprehensive network.

Difficult balance between

concentration and a good

spread of core network ports

across Europe.

43


3 | TRAFFIC POSITION OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA

3.1. Total maritime traffic The Rhine-Scheldt Delta is centrally located in the so-called Hamburg-Le Havre range (H-LH). With a total maritime throughput in 2010 of 1.22 billion tons (i.e. 30.3% of total European port throughput) and a container throughput of 37.8 million TEU (i.e. 43.9% of total European container port volumes) handled along a shoreline of merely 500 nautical miles, the Hamburg-Le Havre range ranks among the busiest and most competitive port regions in the world and is by far the most important port region in Europe. This section of the report analyses the performance of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta compared to other ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. For containers a comparison is also made on a more European scale. Total cargo throughput in the ports of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta reached 812 million tons in 2010. In throughput terms Rotterdam is by far the largest port of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta and in Europe followed by Antwerp (178 million tons), Hamburg (121), Amsterdam (89) and Marseille (86). The market share of Rotterdam in the H-LH range gradually fell from an elevated 40% in 1990 to 32.5% in 2006, but then saw a strong recovery to reach 35.1% in 2010. The port of Antwerp gradually increased its market share in the range to reach 14.5% in 2010. Amsterdam also witnessed a gradual increase to about 7.3%. Zeebrugge realized a sharp rise in market share in the 1980s followed by a fluctuating share between 3% and 4%. Zeeland Seaports reached a peak of 3% in the mid 1990s. The ports of Ghent and Ostend face stable or declining market shares. Figure 15. Total cargo traffic in the ports of the H-LH range (1980-2010, in 1000 tons)

Source: own compilation based on throughput data respective port authorities

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September 2011

Figure 16. Market share evolution in the H-LH range based on total cargo throughput

Source: own compilation based on throughput data respective port authorities Figure 17. Detail of market share evolution of ports in Rhine-Scheldt Delta in total range traffic (excluding Rotterdam and Antwerp)


3.2. Liquid bulk The Rhine-Scheldt Delta region plays a key role in liquid bulk traffic in North-West Europe. Total throughput of liquid bulk products reached 311 million tons in 2010 or an elevated 73% of total liquid bulk handled in the range. The growth curve in liquid bulk since the late 1990s is almost completely attributable to the performance of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region.

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45


Rotterdam has always played and still plays a key role in the liquid bulk market in Europe. Liquid bulk cargo handled in Rotterdam reached nearly 210 million tons in 2010 representing almost half of the total cargo volumes handled in the H-LH range and 13.5% of the total liquid bulk traffic in European ports. Rotterdam’s position in this market segment remained fairly stable over the years with its share in the H-LH range fluctuating between 45% and 53%. Crude oil alone amounted to 100.3 million tons in 2010. Particularly the handling of mineral oil products saw strong growth in recent years (nearly 78 million tons in 2010). Rotterdam is the home port for one of the main oil and chemical centres in the world. The port features a refinery cluster (Shell Nederland, ExxonMobil, Esso Nederland (ExxonMobil), Koch HC Partnership, BP, Kuwait Petroleum Europoort) with synergy between more than 45 petro-chemical concerns. The chemical cluster is also connected to other (petro-chemical) clusters in the area such as Antwerp, Moerdijk and Flushing/Terneuzen via product pipelines and high capacity barge and rail transport connections. Pipelines transport crude oil to amongst other Antwerp (27 million tons via the Rotterdam-Antwerp Pipeline) and Germany (Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline). Product pipelines for ethylene, propylene and other base products are either already operational or planned. Pipelines also play a key role in connecting companies in the port (cf. the Multicore pipeline system). Rotterdam is also a major centre for the storage of all kinds of liquid bulk boasting the largest cluster of tank storage facilities in Europe. The industrial cluster in Rotterdam is vast and diversified. Next to oil and oil products and chemicals manufacturing and products, there is a growing activity in biofuels manufacturing and products, edible oils, industrial gases and water plants and steam and power plants (see also Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2010). Four ports of the H-LH range converged to a market share of close to 10% each: Le Havre (mainly Cap d’Antifer), Wilhelmshaven, Antwerp and Amsterdam. In 2010 the port of Antwerp handled almost 41 million tons of liquid bulk or 9.6% of total range traffic. Antwerp is a major chemical centre with a strong emphasis on the distribution of chemicals, for which the port occupies a leading position in Europe. The port is the largest petrochemical cluster in Europe with plants operated by ten of the world’s top 20 chemical producers. The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline supplies the refineries in the Antwerp port area with crude oil. The vast pipeline system in the port (some 300 km of pipelines) allows transfers of products between the chemical plants. Tank storage capacity amounts to 3.6 million m³ (1,474 tanks), including 164,147 m³ of stainless steel tanks. Amsterdam witnessed a remarkable growth in liquid bulk handling in recent years leading to a jump of its market share from 4% in 2003 to 8.6% in 2010. During this period Amsterdam rapidly became a major European centre for petrol and one of the largest petrol ports in the world. The (petro-)chemical and industrial complexes in the Delta ports attach great value to sustainability. ‘Ecologies of scale’ play an essential role here, combined with further increases in energy-efficiency and plans for carbon storage. The ports also have plans to cope with a partial transit from fossil energy to sustainable energy. The shift away from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels is considered as a major challenge and opportunity.

Rotterdam is Europe’s leading liquid bulk port.

Rotterdam’s chemical cluster is part of a larger industrial network in the Delta area.

Antwerp is strong in chemicals.

Amsterdam became a leading port in petrol.

Sustainability is high on the agenda in the Delta.

46


September 2011

Figure 18. Liquid bulk cargo handled in the H-LH range (1980-2010, in 1000 tons)


Figure 19. Market share evolution of the most important liquid bulk ports in range


3.3. Dry bulk Compared to the liquid bulk market, the dry bulk market in the H-LH range only saw a very modest growth. Total dry bulk cargo in the H-LH range reached about 250 million tons in 2010 compared to about 200 million tons in the early 1980s. The sector was hit hard in crisis year 2009 mainly due to a steep decline in the demand for iron ore for steel production, but recovered strongly in 2010. The market share of the Rhine-Scheldt delta in the range fluctuates between an elevated 70% and 75%. The market share remained quite stable over the years while volumes handled showed a modest increase.

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Rotterdam is the largest dry bulk port in Europe with a total volume of some 85 million tons, i.e. a share of 33.1% in the H-LH range and 9.2% in the European port system. Rotterdam’s market share peaked to about 38% in the early 1990s, but remained fairly stable around 32-34% in the 2000s. Rotterdam is accessible to bulk carriers up to 350,000 dwt (draft of 75 feet) giving it a competitive edge over many other ports in the H-LH range. Iron ore and scrap totalled 40 million tons in 2010, coal 24 million tons and the remaining volumes relate to agribulk. Coal and iron ore are destined for the main players in Europe’s most prominent industrial centres. Major bulk terminals include EMO at the Maasvlakte, EBS in the Botlek area and the dedicated terminal EECV of German steel concerns ThyssenKruppSteel and Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann. Almost 50% of all maritime imports of iron ore in Northwest Europe is discharged in Rotterdam. About half of all iron ore that is imported via Rotterdam comes from Brazil. Other important source countries are Canada, Australia, South Africa and Sweden. A major growth market is scrap. Scrap from the Netherlands and Germany is consolidated in Rotterdam to be shipped to the Far East and some Mediterranean countries. Growing demand for major bulks in the German hinterland and new coal plants on the Maasvlakte are expected to further fuel demand. Amsterdam has been very successful in the past decades in strengthening its position in the dry bulk market. Its market share in dry bulk cargo handling in the range steadily increased from 4.4% in the early 1980s to 18.1% in 2010 (46 million tons). In the past years, Amsterdam has developed into one of the leading coal ports worldwide mainly as a result of growing demand in Germany. The links with Germany have become stronger through a participation in a coal terminal in Duisburg. OBA Bulk Terminal, Rietlanden Terminals Amsterdam and the Tata Steel terminal in Ijmuiden are the main dry bulk terminals. In 2005 the Ijgeul, the maritime entrance to Ijmuiden, was deepened to 17.8m to allow Capesize vessels to reach the terminals in Ijmuiden in front of the lock system to the North Sea Canal. Amsterdam is accessible to Capesize ships up to 150,000 tons with a draught of 16.5m, which after lightering can pass the locks at a draught of 13.7m. The plant of Tata Steel in the Ijmuiden port area generates a lot of coal (4.5 million tons), iron ore and scrap traffic. The port of Antwerp is the third leading bulk port in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta with a volume of nearly 20 million tons in 2010. However, as volumes have gradually decreased since the peak of 34 million tons in 1980, the market share of Antwerp dropped from 16.6% in 1980 to 7.7% in 2010. When it comes to major bulks like coal and iron ore, the port of Antwerp is mainly serving the Belgian market, i.e. the power plants of Electrabel and the steel mills in Wallonia. The draft restrictions for fully laden Capesize vessels, increasingly the standard vessel in this market, made major bulk traffic divert to Rotterdam (with onward barging to Belgian destinations) or resulted in the “topping-off” of Capesize vessels in Dunkirk before sailing up the river Scheldt to Antwerp. The latest deepening program of the river Scheldt, which was completed in 2010, offers more possibilities to receive Capesize vessels (i.e. a tide-independent draft of 13.1m and a significant widening of tidal windows for larger vessels). Antwerp remains strong in the minor bulk market such as minerals, non-ferrous concentrates, cement, fertilisers and China clay. Antwerp offers 143 ha of open and closed storage space for bulk goods.

Rotterdam is the leading dry bulk port in Europe.

Rotterdam is strong in major bulks, mainly for Germany.

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Nautical access to North Sea Canal remains major concern.

Local market focus for major bulks via Antwerp.

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Antwerp’s strong position in minor bulks.

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September 2011

The position of the port of Ghent in dry bulk is strongly entwined with imports of major bulks for the vast steel plant of ArcelorMittal (which is located in the port area) and the port’s strong position in grain and some minerals. Just like the port of Amsterdam, the port of Ghent is hoping to provide a much needed improved accessibility to its canal area by the realisation of a new lock in Terneuzen. This lock should allow fully-laden Panamax bulkers to reach the port. The port of Zeebrugge has a very modest traffic position in dry bulk. Its market share peaked at 4% in 1991. However, after the closure of a major bulk terminal in the inner port, Zeebrugge’s share in the range fell below 1%. Next to Amsterdam, Zeeland Seaports is the only other port in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta which has been able to substantially improve its position in the market. Growing local demand in the port area has been the main driver for growth. Figure 20. Total dry bulk cargo handled in the H-LH range (1980-2010, in 1000 tons)


Figure 21. Market share evolution of ports of the H-LH range – dry bulk


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49


Figure 22. Detail of market share evolution of ports in Rhine-Scheldt Delta – dry bulk (excluding Rotterdam)


3.4. Conventional general cargo European seaports handled a total throughput of 229 million tons of conventional general cargo in 2010 compared to 253 million tons in 2005 (figures ITMMA-ESPO). Overall the conventional general cargo market is a market in decline as containerisation has conquered a substantial share of the total general cargo market (see the increasing container penetration rate in Figure 23). However, despite the container boom, the project cargo/heavy lift market has started flourishing again in recent years due to growing economies in the Far East as well as Brazil, Russia and Southern Africa and rising demand for oil and gas equipment and building materials. The submarkets in break bulk shipping include conventional liner-type concepts, barge carriers, container ships, forest products carriers, heavy lift and project carriers and conventional reefer ships. Antwerp is the market leader with a volume of 7.7 million tons in 2010. However, its market share in the range has plummeted from an elevated 40% in the early 1990s (over 23 million tons) to a modest 18.8% in 2010. Antwerp has a long tradition in break bulk cargo. New dedicated break bulk terminals (including an all-weather terminal) have been constructed in recent years. Also the renovation of existing terminals and quay walls (particularly in the older port area) has attracted investments from private companies (e.g. a large cluster of state-of-the-art fruit terminals developed by Sea-Invest’s daughter company Belgian New Fruit Wharf). Rotterdam and Amsterdam are among the larger general cargo ports in the range. Rotterdam’s market share fluctuates between 15 and 20% while Amsterdam’s share during the last decade amounted to 10-12%. Both ports have been able to only benefit a little from the ‘free fall’ of Antwerp. Best performer in conventional general cargo is Zeeland Seaports: an aggressive commercial policy, a low cost base and a flexible dock labour system have helped Flushing and Terneuzen to lure away break bulk cargo from competing ports.

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September 2011

Figure 23. Degree of containerisation in the ports of the Hamburg-Le Havre range

Note: The degree of containerisation is the ratio between the port’s total container traffic in tons and the port’s total general cargo traffic in tons (i.e. total traffic minus bulk cargo)

Source: own elaboration based on statistics respective port authorities

Figure 24. Total conventional general cargo in the H-LH range (1980-2010)


Containerisatiegraad op jaarbasis

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51


Figure 25. Market share evolution of the most important conventional general cargo ports of the H-LH range


Figure 26. Detail of market share evolution of the ports in Rhine-Scheldt Delta in conventional general cargo (excluding Antwerp)


The diversity of cargo types in the conventional general cargo market (e.g. steel, forest products, project cargo, fruit via reefers, etc..) limits the value of an overall market positioning of ports. For example, Antwerp has lost a lot of ground mainly due to losses in steel traffic (though Antwerp recovered strongly in the first half of 2011, see later) and forest products. The port remains strong in the conventional fruit business (particularly bananas) and heavy lift cargo.

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52


September 2011

3.5. Roro cargo Roro stands for “roll-on/roll-off,” i.e. vehicles that are able to drive on and off a cargo ship. The roro market in the range showed a gradual traffic increase till 2008. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports handled some 42% of total roro traffic in the range. Their joint market share gradually declined from 60% in the early 1980s to around 45% in 2010. The ferry port of Calais gained a lot of market share in the H-LH range till the mid 1990s due to its strong position in the handling of accompanied trucks. Since then, Calais’ share fluctuates around 40% of total range traffic. Rotterdam and Zeebrugge are the leading roro ports in the Delta. Rotterdam handled nearly 17 million tons of roro freight in 2010. The port has a strong position in ferry services. Five different roll-on roll-off operators provide a multitude of daily departures to and from the United Kingdom and other destinations. Though smaller than the car traffic in Zeebrugge and Antwerp, the car terminal in Rotterdam can process 450,000 cars a year. Zeebrugge accounts for about 13% of the roro market in the range. During the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, its market share was around 20%. The coastal port is a prominent roll-on/roll-off port in Europe with a particularly strong position in the handling of new cars and ferries (mainly for unaccompanied trucks). P&O Ferries, Cobelfret, DFDS Seaways and Transfennica are the main ferry players in the port calling at facilities in the outer port. Car carriers of a.o. Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics, “K” Line, NYK, Cobelfret Ferries and UECC call at the specialised car terminals in the inner port behind the locks (Sea-Ro Terminal, Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics, ICO, Toyota and CdMZ). Figure 27. Total roro cargo handled in the H-LH range (1980-2010, in 1000 tons)


Antwerp is the third roro port in the Delta, with extensive terminals where, among other things, new and second hand cars are loaded and unloaded. Around 7 million tons of roro freight was loaded and unloaded in Antwerp in 2010 or 7.3% of total range traffic. Due to its upstream location, Antwerp has a very low presence in the ferry market to the UK. Most roro ships in the port of Antwerp are handled at the left bank of the Scheldt, in the Verrebroek and Vrasene docks. Antwerp is the market leader for exports of second hand cars and an important player for exporting trucks. The port also acts as a shortsea hub for cars imported from all over Europe. The

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53


other ports in the Delta each have their own specialisation with Zeeland Seaports handling mainly cars and forest products, Ghent providing strong roro connections with Scandinavia (partly linked to the presence of Volvo Cars and Volvo Trucks in the port area) and Amsterdam mainly focused on ferry services to/from the UK. Figure 28. Market share evolution of the most important roro ports of the H-LH range


Figure 29. Detail of market share evolution of ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta (excluding Zeebrugge and Rotterdam)


The ferry market is being characterized by an increasing focus on freight transport (and thus a reduced focus on passenger transport), less duty-free sales and the deployment of faster and more modern ships. The market for unaccompanied freight transport is booming and characterized by scale increases (larger vessels), a shortage of vessels and a rather old age profile of the fleet. The main market for unaccompanied roro freight transport for the Delta is the North Sea with particularly strong relations between Zeebrugge and Rotterdam and the central and northern part of the UK. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta also receives substantial volumes of paper and forest products from local manufacturers in Scandinavia. The market between

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September 2011

the Delta and the Mediterranean remains a very difficult market for unaccompanied roro-transport, due to fierce competition from road transport. The main vehicle ports in Europe are Zeebrugge, Bremerhaven, Emden, Antwerp, Barcelona and Southampton. After the gigantic drop in new car transports in 2009, the maritime volumes of cars are expected to increase steadily over the years to come, driven by strong demand in Russia, Eastern Europe and Turkey. In 2009, total vehicle production in Europe (cars, trucks, buses) decreased by 17.3% compared to 2008 and by 23% compared to the pre-crisis level of 2007. All car producers combined operate over 250 plants in 18 EU countries. The number of assembly plants is in the EU is estimated at around 150 (www.autonewseurope.com). The main axes of car assembly and supplier activities in Europe are increasingly being complemented by strong developments in Eastern and Central Europe. In the last decade, car assembly activity in Belgium and the Netherlands was affected by downsizing, relocations and closures. For example, car production in Belgium decreased from 1.1 million units in 1997 to 537,000 units in 2009 (figures Febetra), mainly caused by the downsizing and eventual closure of the Opel plant in Antwerp, the closure of a Renault assembly line in Vilvoorde and the closure of the Volkswagen plant in Brussels (with later reconversion for the production of the Audi A1). Ford in Genk and Volvo in Ghent remain the strongholds in Belgian car production. Only a relatively small amount of the European production is exported overseas. Seaborne trades are nowadays increasingly focusing on the developing economies and emerging markets. About 20-25% of the world car production is exported by ship from their country of manufacture. Japan and South Korea are the main drivers of maritime export flows. The port of Zeebrugge is among the top ports in the EU and even in the world for car related roro transport. With a consistent rising trend since 1987 the port is only matched by Bremen giving it the top position for new car transport. Since the low figure of around 1.2 million new cars in 2009, the sector is recovering in Zeebrugge totalling 1.6 million units handled in 2010. Zeebrugge is a prime example of a port where car carrier operators have invested in dedicated hub terminals from which other destinations are feedered. The leading deepsea car carrier operators are heavily involved in the intra-European shortsea trades. This combination of deepsea and regional service provision is part of the general trend towards the ‘one stop shop/total service logistics package’ which operators now have to provide to vehicle manufacturers to retain their business. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports offer more than just loading and unloading roro freight: the car terminals have pre-delivery inspection (PDI) centres where the cars are fully readied for delivery to e.g. dealers and rental companies. The storage of cars in Zeebrugge and Rotterdam is partly in multi-storey car parks. The Delta is also one of the leading European locations for the European distribution of car parts.

Delta ports among main

European ports for new cars.

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industry is challenged.

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the handling of new cars.

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55


3.6. Containers With a total maritime container throughput of an estimated 86 million TEU in 2010, the European container port system ranks among the busiest container port systems in the world. There are about 130 seaports in Europe handling containers of which around 40 accommodate intercontinental container services. Growth has been particularly strong with an average annual growth rate of 10.5% in the period 2005-2007, compared to 6.8% in the period 1985-1995, 8.9% in 1995-2000 and 7.7% in 2000-2005. The economic crisis which started to have its full effect in late 2008 has made an end to the steep growth curve. Figures based on a large sample for 78 European container ports show that total container throughput decreased from 82.5 million TEU in 2007 to 78 million TEU in 2010. In 2009, volumes dropped by more than 14% followed by a recovery of 10% in 2010. The market share of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region in Europe declined till the start of the new millennium, but saw an upward trend since 2001. Also during and after the crisis year 2009, the Delta succeeded in reinforcing its position in Europe to reach 22.3 million TEU or 25.9% of total European container traffic in 2010. In volume terms the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region is the fifth most important container handling region in the world, after the Pearl River Delta (Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, etc..), the Malacca Straits port system (Singapore, Port Kelang, Tanjung Pelepas), the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai, Ningbo, Nanjing, etc..) and the Bohai Bay (Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Yingkou, etc..). Till the early 1990s the Rhine-Scheldt Delta still was the most important container region (see Figure 31). The figures clearly demonstrate the shift of the container gravity centre to Asia. During the last twenty years the transatlantic container trade gradually lost its dominance to the transpacific and Europe-Far East trades. In 2010 fourteen of the twenty busiest container ports came from Asia, mainly from China. In the mid 1980s there were only six Asian ports in the top 20, mainly Japanese and Taiwanese load centres. Figure 30. Container throughput in the European container port system (78 ports)

Source: compilation based on data respective port authorities

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September 2011

Figure 31. Most important container handling regions in the world – in million TEU


The container ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range handle about half of the total European container throughput. The market share of the Mediterranean ports grew significantly between the late 1980s and the late 1990s at the expense of the ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. The significant improvement of the market share of the Med was mainly the result of the insertion of transhipment hubs in the region since the mid 1990s. In the new millennium, the position of the northern range has gradually improved while the Med ports and the UK port system lost market share. The Baltic has strengthened its traffic position (Figure 32). Figure 32. Market shares in the European container port system

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H-LH range: half of Europe’s

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57


Table 17. The top 15 European container ports (1985-2010, in 1000 TEU)

Source: based on traffic data respective port authorities

Table 17 provides an overview of the fifteen largest container ports in Europe. The top ten features three ports of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. About 69% of the total container throughput in the European port system passes through the top fifteen load centres, compared to 61% in 1985. One third of all containers is handled by the top three ports, whereas this figure was 29% in 1985. These figures suggest an increasing concentration of cargo in only a dozen large container ports. Figure 33 provides an overview of the main multi-port gateway regions in Europe as well as transhipment hubs and stand-alone gateways. The concept of a multi-port gateway region was coined by Notteboom (2009; 2010) to refer to groups of adjacent gateway ports. A more detailed discussion on the concept follows in section 4 of this report. Stand-alone gateways are somewhat isolated in the broader port system, as they have less strong functional interactions with adjacent ports than ports of the same multi-port gateway regions. The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of Figure 34.

The Rhine-Scheldt Delta is the largest multi-port gateway region in Europe in volume terms. The share of North-German ports in total European container traffic increased from 14% in the late 1990s to 18.3% in 2008. Bremerhaven’s volume surge and Hamburg’s pivotal role in feeder flows to the Baltic combined with land-based flows to the developing economies in East and Central Europe are the main causes. The North-German ports were hit hard during the crisis due to falling demand, but also a substantial shift of transhipment volumes to mainly Rotterdam. The share consequently fell to 14.9% in 2009 and remained at that level also in 2010.

The Seine Estuary, the third region in the Le Havre–Hamburg range, suffers from a gradual decline in its European share from 4.1% in 1985 to 2.0% in 2010. The ‘Port 2000’ terminals in Le Havre, a new hinterland strategy and the recent port reform process should support a ‘renaissance’ of Le Havre. Le Havre’s strategy goes hand and hand with the ambition of the port to stretch its hinterland reach beyond the Seine basin (its core hinterland) and even across the French border, mainly supported by rail services.

in 1000 TEU

R 1985 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 R

1 Rotterdam 2655 Rotterdam 4787 Rotterdam 6275 Rotterdam 9287 Rotterdam 10784 Rotterdam 9743 Rotterdam 11146 1

2 Antwerp 1243 Hamburg 2890 Hamburg 4248 Hamburg 8088 Hamburg 9737 Antwerp 7310 Antwerp 8468 2

3 Hamburg 1159 Antwerp 2329 Antwerp 4082 Antwerp 6488 Antwerp 8664 Hamburg 7008 Hamburg 7896 3

4 Bremen 986 Felixstowe 1924 Felixstowe 2793 Bremen 3736 Bremen 5448 Bremen 4565 Bremen 4888 4

5 Felixstowe 726 Bremen 1518 Bremen 2752 Gioia Tauro 3161 Valencia 3597 Valencia 3654 Valencia 4207 5

6 Le Havre 566 Algeciras 1155 Gioia Tauro 2653 Algeciras 2937 Gioia Tauro 3468 Algeciras 3043 Felixstowe (*) 3400 6

7 Marseille 488 Le Havre 970 Algeciras 2009 Felixstowe 2700 Algeciras 3324 Felixstowe (*) 3021 Gioia Tauro 2851 7

8 Leghorn 475 La spezia 965 Genoa 1501 Le Havre 2287 Felixstowe (*) 3200 Gioia Tauro 2857 Algeciras 2807 8

9 Tilbury 387 Barcelona 689 Le Havre 1465 Valencia 2100 Barcelona 2569 Marsaxlokk 2330 Zeebrugge 2499 9

10 Barcelona 353 Southampton 683 Barcelona 1388 Barcelona 2096 Le Havre 2502 Zeebrugge 2328 Marsaxlokk 2370 10

11 Algeciras 351 Valencia 672 Valencia 1310 Genoa 1625 Marsaxlokk 2337 Le Havre 2234 Le Havre 2359 11

12 Genoa 324 Genoa 615 Piraeus 1161 Piraeus 1450 Zeebrugge 2210 Barcelona 1801 Barcelona 1931 12

13 Valencia 305 Piraeus 600 Southampton 1064 Marsaxlokk 1408 Genoa 1767 Southampton (*) 1600 Genoa 1759 13

14 Zeebrugge 218 Zeebrugge 528 Marsaxlokk 1033 Southampton 1395 Southampton (*) 1710 Genoa 1534 Southampton (*) 1400 14

15 Southhampton 214 Marsaxlokk 515 Zeebrugge 965 Zeebrugge 1309 Constanza 1380 La spezia 1046 La spezia 1285 15

TOP 15 10450 TOP 15 20841 TOP 15 34698 TOP 15 50067 TOP 15 62697 TOP 15 54072 TOP 15 59266

TOTAL Europe 17172 TOTAL Europe 33280 TOTAL Europe 51000 TOTAL Europe 73729 TOTAL Europe 90710 TOTAL Europe 78011 TOTAL Europe 86014

Share R'dam 15% Share R'dam 14% Share R'dam 12% Share R'dam 13% Share R'dam 12% Share R'dam 12% Share R'dam 13%

Share top 3 29% Share top 3 30% Share top 3 29% Share top 3 32% Share top 3 32% Share top 3 31% Share top 3 32%



(*) Estimate

Three Delta containers ports in Europe’s top10.

Multi-port gateway region as relevant unit of analysis.

German ports benefited from pivotal role for Baltic and East and Central Europe.

French ‘renaissance’ should curb position Le Havre.

58


September 2011

Figure 33. The European container port system


Figure 34. Container throughput evolution, 1985-2010, in million TEU

Among the major winners we find the Spanish Med ports (from 3.9% in 1985 to 7.4% in 2010). Also the ports in the Bay of Gdansk are witnessing a healthy growth and an increasing European share (now 1.2% compared to 0.6% five years ago). While some large post-panamax vessels call in Gdansk, the Polish seaports are still heavily bound by their feeder port status, competing with main port Hamburg for the Polish hinterland. The Black Sea ports (mainly Constantza) went from virtually no traffic to a

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Gdansk Bay

South Finland

Kattegat/The Sound

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UK Southeast Coast

West Med hubs

Stand-alone gateways

59


European share of 1.7% in 2008, but the crisis led to a collapse in volumes and to a share of only 0.8% in 2010. These ports have still to benefit fully from the extension of the economic hinterland in Europe.

The Portuguese port system shows a more modest growth path. Portuguese ports Lisbon, Leixoes and Sines are trying very hard to expand business by developing a transshipment role (e.g. shipping line MSC is using Sines) as well as tapping into the Spanish market (particularly the Madrid area) through rail corridor formation and dry port development. After a long period of declining market shares, the Portuguese port system has succeeded in stabilizing its share at around 1.6%. The Ligurian ports in Italy (Genoa, La Spezia, Savona, Livorno) have difficulties in keeping up with other regions in Europe. The ports jointly represent some 4.5% of the total European port volume, a decline compared to 5-6% throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Ligurian ports rely heavily on the economic centres in northern Italy and also aim at attracting business from the Alpine region, the southeast of France and southern Germany.

Just like the Ligurian ports, the North-Adriatic ports (Trieste, Koper, Ravenna, Venice) have been facing lower than average growth rates. However, in the last couple of years the tide seems to have turned. The recent cooperation agreement among the ports of Koper, Venice, Trieste and Ravenna (NAPA – North Adriatic Ports Association) underlines the ambition of the region to develop a gateway function to Eastern and Central Europe and the Alpine region. The strategy should also enable the region to develop larger scale container operations. With 1.33 million TEU in 2010 the Adriatic ports only handle a fraction of the volumes of the leading multi-port gateway region in Europe, i.e. the Rhine-Scheldt Delta.

In the Mediterranean, extensive hub-feeder container systems and shortsea shipping networks emerged since the mid 1990s in order to cope with the increasing volumes and to connect to other European port regions. The (pure) transhipment hubs in the Mediterranean such as Algeciras, Cagliari, Taranto, Marsaxlokk and Gioia Tauro have substantially increased their role in the container market. After a steep increase of their joint European share from 5.1% in 1995 to 12.2% in 2005, the last few years have brought a decline to 10.7% in 2010. This decline came as volume growth in mainland Med ports allowed shipping lines to shift to more direct calls, but also because of the strong competition from Tanger Med in Morocco. In reaction, mainly Italian transhipment hubs have reoriented their focus, now also serving Central and East Med regions. Figures 35 and 36 provide more details on the position of Rhine-Scheldt Delta in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. In the 1980s Rotterdam was undoubtedly the main container hub in Europe. With a market share in the Hamburg - Le Havre range of 37.1% in 1980 the position of Rotterdam was unrivalled. Rotterdam was able to reap the full benefits of the early stages of the containerisation process. In the early 1990s, Rotterdam’s dominance started to fade. Its market share in the range had fluctuated between 35 and 40% since the late 1970s, but fell sharply in the new millennium to a level of about 26.8% in 2008. Traffic concentration in north Europe decreased steadily mainly due to stronger growth figures of nearest rivals Antwerp, Hamburg and Bremerhaven, and relative newcomer Zeebrugge. Hamburg was able to capitalize a lot on the new opportunities offered by an enlarged European hinterland as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s. The location of Hamburg gave the port a competitive edge in setting up feeder services and rail services to countries like the Baltic States, Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In absolute volume

(Temporary) setback for Black Sea ports.

Portuguese ports vying for hub status.

Ligurian ports remain focused on North Italy.

North-Adriatic ports as new southern European gateway.

Pure transhipment hubs in Med lose share.

Rotterdam’s dominance in range eroded till 2008.

60


September 2011

terms, Hamburg decreased the throughput gap with Rotterdam from about 1.8 million TEU in 1994 to about 0.9 million TEU in 2007. Rotterdam was going through a difficult time in the first half of the 2000s as the port was facing some social unrest, ICT implementation problems at the ECT container terminals and congestion problems (at a moment when rival Antwerp opened the tidal Deurganckdock in 2005 with a capacity, when fully operational, of some 9 million TEU). The crisis year 2009 brought an end to the market share losses of Rotterdam in the container business, particularly due to a strong performance in capturing sea-sea transhipment cargo and the decision of some large shipping lines to consolidate cargo in hub ports. The further scale increases in vessel size to over 14,000 TEU equally helped the position of Rotterdam, as the deepening of the River Elbe to Hamburg is still pending and the deepening of the River Scheldt to Antwerp only had its full effect in the second half of 2010 (i.e. now offering 13.1m tide-independent access, with container vessels of up to 15.5m draft able to enter and leave following strict tidal windows). The approval of the Maasvlakte 2 project and the awarding of the first two container terminals to the Rotterdam World Gateway consortium (led by DP world) and APM Terminals also gave a strong signal to the market that Rotterdam secured capacity for container growth also in the longer term. Figure 35: Total container traffic in the ports of the H-LH range (1980-2010, in TEU)


In 2008, Antwerp overtook Hamburg to become the second largest container port in Europe. Growth in the port of Antwerp was partly boosted by a strong shift from conventional general cargo to containerised cargo, the realisation of the Deurganckdock which opened in 2005 and the decision of MSC in the early 2000s to develop Antwerp into their North European hub. MSC handled 4.5 million TEU at its MSC Home Terminal (joint venture with PSA) in 2010 or some 53% of the total container throughput in Antwerp. MSC is thus by far the largest single container customer of the Scheldt river port. The MSC Home Terminal is at present the largest dedicated terminal in Europe.

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Rotterdam bounces back in

last few years.

Antwerp’s growth cycle, partly due to

“MSC”-effect.

61


The coastal port of Zeebrugge shows a steady increase in its market share, only to be interrupted by a small decline in 2010. The Flemish coastal port has benefited from investments led by PSA (Container Handling Zeebrugge - CHZ and Zeebrugge International Port - ZIP) and APM Terminals with lines such as Maersk Line, CMA CGM, China Shipping and UASC bringing in most of the deepsea volumes. Figure 36: Market share evolution of the ports of the H-LH range – container traffic


The Amsterdam and Flushing cases (see Boxes 4 and 5) demonstrate that it is not easy to successfully enter the deepsea container business. The planned additional terminal supply in small and medium-sized container ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta has been overshadowed by massive expansion in established larger seaports such as the Deurganckdock in Antwerp and Maasvlakte 2 in Rotterdam (Box 6). Box 4. Container development in Amsterdam

In an ambition to vie for deepsea container cargo and with a prospect of a new larger sea lock at the entrance of the North Sea Canal port area, the Dutch seaport Amsterdam developed its Ceres Paragon terminal with its distinctive state-of-the-art handling system based on an indented berth. The terminal with a capacity of some 950,000 TEU opened in early 2002 during a market slump. The facility remained empty for years. The Ceres Paragon terminal changed owner in 2005. The new owner NYK followed an aggressive policy in pursuing clients and its alliance partners to use its Amsterdam facility. This resulted in several calls of the Grand Alliance on the Europe-Far East trade. As a result, Amsterdam was able to increase throughput from 65,844 TEU in 2005 to 436,074 TEU in 2008 partly supported by competitive inland services to the Rotterdam area. However, this success was short-lived. The crisis made the Grand Alliance to concentrate its vessel calls in Rotterdam. The Amsterdam terminal finally ended up in the portfolio of ECT (Hutchison Port Holdings). Volumes of the port of Amsterdam plummeted to about 60,000 TEU in 2010 and the renamed Amsterdam Container Terminal (ACT) no longer receives intercontinental deep-sea services. The terminal has taken up a new role as an ‘extended gate’ in the terminal network of ECT (mainly receiving barges, shortsea vessels and feeders).

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Le Havre

Rhine-Scheldt Delta

Zeebrugge joined the league of large container ports in Europe.

Amsterdam and Flushing as challengers of established container ports?

62


September 2011

Box 5. The plans of Flushing to enter the deepsea container business

The first concrete plans to develop a large-scale terminal in Flushing date back to 2002-2003. The idea at that time was to develop the Westerscheldt Container Terminal (WCT) at the mouth of the river Scheldt with a 2 km quay. Right from the start, PSA was actively involved in the design of and the support to the terminal initiative. The decision process on the development of WCT has still not been completed. The uncertainty surrounding the realisation of a number of strategic projects in Antwerp and Rotterdam opened a window of opportunity for Flushing to successfully enter the container market. Recently, all these strategic projects have been approved. At present, three initiatives are developing to start deepsea container terminal handling: the Westerscheldt Container Terminal (WCT), the Verbrugge Container Terminal (VCT) and the South Sea Terminal (SST). Sea Invest/Zuidnatie is already constructing the South Sea Terminal with a maximum initial capacity of 600,000 TEU. The other terminals are still in a planning phase.

Source: based on Jacobs and Notteboom (2011)

Box 6. Maasvlakte 2

Maasvlakte 2 is the expansion of the port of Rotterdam westwards on land reclaimed from the sea. Its construction began in 2008. The land reclamation measures around 2,000 ha. Half of this consists of infrastructure, such as seawalls, waterways, railways, roads and port basins. The remaining net 1,000 ha of land is available for industrial sites: container terminals, distribution facilities and chemical and energy industries. Two container terminals are under construction: the Rotterdam World Gateway and AMP Terminals. The new docks will offer deep water access with a draft of 20 m. The first seagoing ship will be able to moor in 2013. The project involves nature compensation, the construction of a 750-hectare nature and recreation area, and the improvement of the Existing Rotterdam Area. The project underwent a lengthy planning and decision-making process involving a large number of stakeholders.

Source: based on press releases

3.7. Summary on the traffic position of Rhine-Scheldt Delta region The previous sections gave more insight on the traffic position of the Delta ports in the H-LH range. This section serves as a summary on the positioning of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region. The data in Figure 37 underline that the share of the Delta in the entire European port system is particularly high in the container business, followed by liquid and dry bulk. Figures 38 and 39 show the changing market position of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in the H-LH range based on two dimensions: market growth and market share in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. The line trajectories over time confirm earlier findings of this report. Total cargo throughput growth in the Delta was the highest in the mid to late 1980s and in the three-year periods between 2000 and 2008. The roro market in the Delta saw high annual growth rates throughout the 1980s and in the period 2004-2007. The last period of observation shows the poorest

Growth path analysis

provides more insight.

63


performance both in terms of market share and growth. The market share in conventional general cargo showed a positive trend to reach an elevated 78% share in total range traffic. However, this cargo segment is typically suffering from declining volumes leading to a negative growth in many of the periods under consideration. Figure 37. The share of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta and other ports of the H-LH range in total European port traffic – figures for 2010

Source: own compilation Figure 38. Position of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in terms of market growth and market share in the Hamburg-Le Havre range – three year periods

25,9%

19,8%

20,0%

10,3%

13,6%

20,1%

18,1%

7,8%

7,5%

12,8%

4,5%

10,2%

56,0%

72,4%

72,5%

76,9%

81,9%

69,6%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Containers (TEU)

Dry bulk (ton)

Liquid bulk (ton)

Roro (ton)

Conventional general cargo (ton)

Total port traffic (ton)

Share in total European throughput per cargo type

Rhine-Scheldt Delta Other ports in H-LH range Other European ports

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Average market share of Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports in Hamburg-Le Havre range (three-year periods)

Total

Conventional general cargo

Roro

Average annual growth in % (three-year periods)

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64


September 2011

Figure 39: Position of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in terms of market growth and market share in the Hamburg-Le Havre range – three year periods (continued)

The fluctuations in the market share of the Delta ports in total container traffic of the H-LH range remained rather small (i.e. a narrow band between 54 and 59%) compared to many other market segments. Container throughput saw a particularly strong growth in the second half of the 1990s and throughout the time span 2001-2007. The trajectories in dry and liquid bulk show mixed results with periods of high growth rates followed by more modest growth periods or even traffic losses. The market share of the Delta port region in dry bulk peaked in the 1990s to reach 75%, while the last period of observation boosted the share in liquid bulk to around 70%.

3.8. Latest developments: traffic volumes for the first half of 2011 Table 18 provides an overview of growth figures per traffic category for the first half of 2011. The results are quite mixed across ports and goods categories. Rotterdam shows a strong performance in container traffic. The port of Zeebrugge recorded a decline of 6.8% in H1 2011. As one of the few ports in Europe, the coastal seaport recorded a growth in containerised traffic during crisis year 2009. Dry bulk cargo shows a modest growth of 2-3% in the larger dry bulk ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta, except in Amsterdam. Liquid bulk grew strongly in the Flemish ports and Amsterdam, but saw a decline in Rotterdam. Antwerp and Rotterdam show a strong growth in conventional general cargo traffic. Antwerp’s growth is however quite different across cargo segments: a very strong growth of 48% in the handling of steel, a moderate growth in fruit (+3.2%) and a weak performance in paper and cellulose (minus 44.5%).

-8%

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-4%

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Average market share of Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports in Hamburg-Le Havre range (three-year periods)

Dry bulk

Liquid Bulk

Containers

Average annual growth in % (three-year periods)

07-10

83-86

86-89

89-9292-95

95-98

98-01

01-0404-07

80-83

07-1083-86

86-8989-92

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95-98

98-01

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80-83

07-10

83-86

86-89

89-92

92-95

95-98

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01-04

04-07

80-83

H1 2011 results mixed across

ports and cargo segments.

65


Table 18. Traffic growth in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta based on figures for the first half of 2011 compared to same period in 2010

Source: based on press releases respective port authorities

3.9. Expectations for the future

3.9.1. General considerations

This section of the report investigates the probable future evolution of the different cargo segments handled by the Rhine-Scheldt Delta ports. For each segment a basic SWOT analysis will be made outlaying the opportunities and threats that these product flows will face in the future. First a projection of future cargo demand/supply will be presented followed by the impact of location, capacity and infrastructure requirements, hinterland connections and particularities for the cargo segment. The projections are mainly based on information provided by the port of Rotterdam (Port Compass) and the Antwerp Port authority. They both made forecasts till 2030 for some cargo segments. Antwerp used a high and low growth scenario approach. At this point, it should be mentioned that the relevant study was completed in 2005 before the economic crisis so the estimates are based on more optimistic scenarios. The Antwerp port is updating the forecasting exercise but these updates were not publicly available at the time of writing this report. The Port of Rotterdam used four different estimates based on different economic scenarios: the European trend scenario (current policies and moderate economic growth), the Global Economy scenario (globalisation and low oil price resulting in high economic growth), the High Oil Price scenario (moderate economic growth and increased sustainability) and the Low Oil Price scenario. The figures are added to each cargo segment but not discussed in any detail to avoid drawing too much the attention to any particular port. Some of the factors influencing demand and supply of the product flows are common to all sectors active within the delta. Maritime trade evolution – Some 80% of world trade is carried by sea whilst short-sea shipping carries 40% of intra-European freight. Risks of overcapacity in certain market segments, protectionist trade measures by third countries, volatility in energy markets or loss of know-how due to the scarcity of skilled human resources in Europe could prompt shipping head offices and maritime industries to relocate overseas (UNCTAD, 2010). Looking ahead to 2018, the European economy should recover from the current crisis. Thus, maritime transport in the EU-27 is predicted to grow from 3.8 billion tons in 2006 to some 5.3 billion tons in 2018.

Growth H1-2011 compared to H1-2010

Rotterdam Antwerp Amsterdam (*) Zeebrugge Zeeland Seaports Ghent Ostend

Containers (TEU) 9.8% 4.3% -34.0% -6.8% 2.9% 1.9% -

Containers (tons) 12.5% 3.4% -36.9% -11.9% 2.9% -3.0% -

Dry bulk (ton) 2.4% 2.3% -5.4% 5.8% 12.3% 2.3% -6.5%

Liquid bulk (tons) -6.8% 31.8% 15.6% 18.1% 2.5% 15.7% -

Roro (ton) 5.6% -26.6% 4.0% 9.2% 10.0% -16.9%

Conventional general cargo (ton) 27.7% 17.8% -22.0% -6.6% 18.5% 1.9% 531.6%

Total 1.1% 10.4% 2.8% -1.6% 10.3% 4.5% -9.8%

(*) Only Amsterdam, excluding Ijmuiden, Beverwijk and Zaanstad

Ports use different scenarios for forecasting purposes.

Evolution in maritime trade.

66


September 2011

Location of the Delta ports - Location is one of the major strengths of the Delta. On the maritime side, the region is close enough to the important East-West trade routes so as to allow the large ships sailing on this route to incorporate the ports in their schedule. On the land side, over 60% of the EU spending power is located in an area stretching 500 km from the ports. The central European location and the presence in the blue banana create a unique selling ports for the Delta ports. The latest studies show an expansion of the blue banana to the east caused by the rising economic activity in eastern Europe. The Delta is located further away from these hinterlands compared to Hamburg, Polish ports and some ports in the Med and the Black Sea. In order to offset the distance disadvantage the Delta is challenged to capitalize on its scale combined with further improvements in developing highly efficient intermodal transport services and infrastructure towards the central and eastern part of Europe. Labour - Expensive labour in and outside of the port areas remains a threat to the position of the Delta in logistics and industrial activities. The high costs are somewhat compensated by a high labour productivity. Still, there are concerns on the present and future flexibility of the labour force (e.g. a lower willingness to work during the night) and the availability of skilled people. Seaports can help to solve some of the social problems in port cities linked to a high unemployment rate for young low-skilled workforce. The ports need low-skilled labour mainly in logistics and at terminals. At the same time, changing port functions make that more high-skilled people will be needed. However, high-skilled workers often opt for jobs in other sectors given the poor image or even the absence of an image of the port sector. Too many people don’t consider to work in the port. Particularly larger ports such as Rotterdam and Antwerp face the effects of an expanding port area. As port development moves further away from the city (as illustrated by the Maasvlakte 2 development), people of the respective port cities find it more attractive to work in the city than to commute a long distance to the port area. Regulation - The impact of regulation has been extensively discussed in previous parts of this study. It is important that any type of local/regional policy is not going to negatively impact on the competitive position of the ports because of an imbalance created in the level playing field among competing ports (e.g. through a national road tax scheme or national sustainability regulations).

3.9.2. Containers

The container trade is the only trade that has increased substantially and is expected to increase substantially over the coming years. For now the growth has been halted by the crisis but it is assumed that by 2012 growth will be picking up the slack. The large advantage of containers is that they allow an easy consolidation of cargo flows. This being one of the primary objectives of the EU we can expect a future rise in containerisation. Shipping lines traditionally choose larger ports. The Delta has a nice spread of larger and smaller ports allowing a maximum choice for potential clients. Figure 40 shows the growth expectations for the container trade in Antwerp and Rotterdam. The forecasts of the Port of Rotterdam use 2008 as the base year. In the worst case scenario of low growth during the next 20 years, the port of Rotterdam is expected to have an increase of 70% in container handling adding 93 million tons to the 2008 container volume of 132 million tons. In the best case scenario of global economy, its container volume would reach about 355 million tons, an increase of

Location of Delta ports

remains key asset, but economic

geography is changing.

Cost, quality and quantity of labour are key

concerns for the future.

Need for level playing field.

Container market remains growth market.

Container forecasts of

Rotterdam and Antwerp.

67


169% or 224 million tons compared to 2008. The remaining two scenarios are situated in between the upper and lower scenarios. The forecasts of Antwerp are based on the reference year 2005. In the worst case scenario of low growth, container traffic in Antwerp is expected to reach 158 million tons in 2030. This corresponds to an estimated 14.4 million TEU compared to 8.4 million TEU in 2010. In the best case scenario of high growth, the port is estimated to reach more than 200 million tons of containerised cargo in 2030. Figure 40. Forecasts for container volumes in Rotterdam (base year 2008) and Antwerp (base year 2005)

Source: Port of Rotterdam (Port Compass) and Port of Antwerp

The location of container ports is important but not crucial. Carriers are increasingly relying on hub-and-spoke systems. The proximity of the Delta to the hinterland combined with a good (and improving) nautical accessibility creates a potent competitive position. Not all ports in the Delta are equipped to handle the increasing size and depth of the container ships. Constant maintenance and dredging is required in order to keep some of the ports competitive. Also, the lock capacity in many port areas is too small for future growth in the container area. If not solved, these nautical accessibility issues could in the medium to long run prove a threat to the particular ports concerned and to the flexibility and choice offered in the Delta.

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September 2011

There are also some concerns on the potential creation of container terminal overcapacity in the medium term. While container capacity in the Delta (including the first phases of Maasvlakte 2) is expected to be more than sufficient to cope with expected growth in the coming five to ten years, the Delta ports should continuously monitor the capacity needs and develop a proactive policy towards the stretching of existing terminals (through productivity gains) and or the creation of new terminal capacity. As the time span between the initial plans and the opening of a new container terminal can easily take between 10 and 15 years, a proactive attitude is required from all stakeholders involved. Containers require a co-modal approach in order to reach the hinterland in the fastest, most cost-effective and sustainable way. The ports within the Delta all have different modal properties, but overall the entire region scores very well on intermodal connectivity for container transport. Some basic threats remain like the expected deteriorating congestion problem surrounding major ports. A more detailed discussion on the competitive position of the Delta in relation with the European hinterland will be provided in section 3.10 of this report.

3.9.3. Conventional general cargo

Conventional general cargo might be facing a future decline, as more and more cargo will be transported by containers. The growth opportunity of this sector lies with specialized cargos. The Delta is quite strong for this type of cargo. For example heavy lift or particular steel products can be found extensively in the Delta ports. The location of the Delta ports is very well suited for conventional cargo. Shippers prefer to deposit their cargo close to the water and the clients prefer it close to the final destination. This is caused by the total transport cost being closely related to land transport for this segment. The Delta port region is located near important industrial areas such as the Ruhr area in Germany. Since vessels used for conventional cargo are relatively small, all ports within the delta can be serviced without any draft restrictions. Overall, no major terminal capacity problems are expected since the trend for conventional general cargo is in a slightly downwards spiral. However, terminals are becoming more specialized. The port infrastructure is exceedingly present with dedicated steel terminals and multipurpose terminals able to accept paper products. A major threat for capacity usage is the shift from conventional cargo towards containerised cargo. For example, an increasing containerisation of fruit products could imply that a higher share of fruit traffic will be sent to the hinterland in a containerised form without being manipulated in the port area. This trend could make dedicated terminals and storage facilities in the port to some extent redundant. The requirements for modalities differ from the type of conventional cargo discussed. Fruits are mostly transported by road making it vulnerable to road congestion. Wood and steel products are transported via all modes. The projects of the European barge network offer a great opportunity to attract additional conventional general cargo in this receding segment.

Terminal capacity

dynamics.

Eye on co-modal solutions.

Weaker prospects for conventional

general cargo.

More specialized

terminal facilities and

concerns about ‘warehouse

bypass’.

69


Labour and customs are a typical threat to this cargo segment, certainly when compared to containers. Customs operations for conventional general cargo are still too meticulous and time-consuming in some ports of the Delta.

3.9.4. Dry bulk

The dry bulk market is considered a mature market with a low growth potential. It is mainly driven by demand in raw materials for construction or energy production. Also here we present the forecasts of the two largest ports in the Delta. Figure 41 shows the growth expectations for dry bulk traffic in Antwerp (base year 2005) and Rotterdam (base year 2008). The year 2020 seems to be the milestone year for Rotterdam since from that year onwards the four different scenarios follow different directions. Also in dry bulk, the rank from the best to the worst case scenario is distinct as follows: global economy, European growth, high oil prices and low growth scenarios. Only two scenarios of global economy and European trend show a quite satisfying trend with a very small increase in the level of throughput handled. The remaining two scenarios of high oil prices and low growth show a downward trend. Also in Antwerp, the estimations for dry bulk handling are not so optimistic. In the best case scenario, a stagnation of the traffic volumes are expected. Under the low growth scenario, a decline of about 10% is expected by 2030. The location of ports is crucial for dry bulk goods. Since these goods are heavy and voluminous the cheapest option is to bring them as close as possible to the targeted hinterland. The combination of ports within the Delta is a great advantage for dry bulk. The major bulks (iron ores and coal) are transported in large, mostly Capesize, ships requiring a substantial draft, limiting the potential ports of call available and leading to lightering operations to access those ports which do not provide the necessary draft. The minor bulks are transported in smaller ships (Panamax or Handysize) and can enter nearly all ports within the range. The ports within the Delta are well equipped. Since the market is mature a large increase in terminal capacity demand is unlikely. Since these are (mostly) easy to handle products with low IT requirements we might see a shift of cargo towards cheaper ports. While dust emissions and noise pollution at dry bulk terminals have been reduced considerably over the years, the tendency remains to keep this kind of port activities far away from populated areas. Dry bulk cargo relies very strongly on rail and barge transport to reach inland destinations. Some interesting trends are having an impact on dry bulk cargo handling in ports. A number of bulk commodities such as grain and certain types of minerals are being containerised. While volumes are still small, it is expected that the containerisation of commodities could imply a new growth market for containers (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2011). Also the rise of biofuel could lead to a decrease in coal transport (although biofuel is a fuel and coal an energy source there is a certain overlap present), but this could be offset by the decision of Germany to abolish nuclear power. It remains to be seen if this will cause a rise in conventional fuels like coal or in biofuel. For now coal remains the most used power source in the world, but with the European Union pressing for more sustainable solutions a partial replacement of this means of energy production is highly likely.

Dry bulk shows signs of a mature market.

Importance of proximity to destinations.

Commodities in containers on the rise.

Impact of biofuels on coal.

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September 2011

Figure 41. Forecasts for dry bulk volumes in Rotterdam (base year 2008) and Antwerp (base year 2005)


3.9.5. Liquid bulk

Just like dry bulk, liquid bulk is often considered as a mature market for European ports. However, some segments of the liquid bulk market show a lot of prospects like for e.g. natural gas and tank storage. As illustrated earlier, the Delta port region mainly imports crude oil and basic chemical products in order to process them into higher chemical products and fuels. This means that the sector is dependent on the incoming supplies mainly from the OPEC countries. The limited availability of other sources could be considered a threat that cannot be remedied. Future liquid bulk cargo flows will be affected particularly by (a) the shift away from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, (b) increased processing of crude oil at the source, i.e. the oil rich countries, and (c) the energy policies of supranational and national governments. Ports within the Delta are already trying to face these challenges by differentiating themselves in higher processes requiring specialized labour and extensive know how. This seems to work but creates a new threat namely availability of qualified labour.

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One of the sub products of liquid bulk is natural gas. This highly specialized cargo has been on the rise over the past decades. The crisis plummeted demand, but if we keep in mind that new and cleaner energy sources are in high demand, we should see a substantial increase in this product group over the next years. Particularly Zeebrugge (since long) and Rotterdam (quite recently) are active in this segment, both featuring large LNG terminals. Figure 42. Forecasts for liquid bulk traffic in Rotterdam (base year 2008) and Antwerp (base year 2005)


The estimations of Rotterdam for liquid bulk are mixed depending on the scenario. Only the global economy and European trend scenarios show a clear straightforward and increasing trend. The high oil prices scenario shows an increasing trend up to 2020 and then goes to lower levels but still above the current traffic level. The low growth scenario shows a quite steady trend until 2020 and then a decline that reaches a traffic level below the 2008 figure. Under the low growth scenario, liquid bulk volumes in Antwerp are expected to stabilize at around 30 million tons. In the high growth scenario, liquid bulk handling is expected to follow a moderate growth curve up to a volume of around 40 million tons (Figure 42). These forecasts, made in 2005, underestimated real growth: the level of 40 million tons was already reached in

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September 2011

2010 and new large tank storage investments by companies such as Sea-Invest would further increase the tank storage capacity in the port of Antwerp with 25 to 30 million tons in the medium term. The location advantages of the Delta port region for liquid bulk are mainly related to the strong (petro-)chemical industry in the region. Draft restrictions remain a problem for the smaller and more inland ports when considering crude oil, but chemical carriers are often smaller and can freely enter all ports. Terminal capacity and infrastructure are crucial and excessively present in the Delta. All ports have some chemical installations or storage tanks for crude oil and chemicals. The strategic position of this region as one of the main (petro-)chemical centres in the world is a major advantage in safeguarding the cargo flows in this segment. The intricate pipeline network is a major strength of the Delta. The large amounts of storage space for liquid bulk is used by traders to hedge against future price increases. It also ensures storage capacity for the large amounts of base products needed by industry. Liquid bulk transport is done by all modes including pipeline.

3.9.6. RoRo cargo

The transport of new cars is slowly evolving towards a mature market as the demand for new cars in Western Europe is reaching its ceiling. Growth expectations remain higher for Eastern and Central Europe, Russia and Turkey. The large car handling ports in the Delta region, such as Zeebrugge, can benefit from rising demand in these markets (and even the North African market) by further strengthening their position in sea-sea networks: linking intercontinental car traffic performed by ultra-large car carrier to feeder traffic with somewhat smaller vessels. The car recycling industry and the rise of hybrid and electric cars offer opportunities to the Delta to diversify know how and develop new business. The continuous outflow of second hand cars towards Africa also remains a market for the Delta. In the ferry business the picture is more mixed. The amount of passenger traffic is diminishing and the amount of cargo traffic (unaccompanied trucks) is rising. The demand for ferry transport within the Delta is expected to remain stable thanks to the proximity of the United Kingdom. The Delta ports are increasingly focusing on the central and northern part of the UK to find new markets in light of the intense competitive pressure from the Channel Tunnel and the port of Calais in cross-Channel traffic (mostly accompanied trucks). Intermodal connections are dependent on the type of roro cargo transported. For second hand cars and paper rolls road connectivity is important so the congestion problem could present a threat. New cars are mainly transported by truck and train, while a small barging segment is developing.

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increasingly oriented

towards central and north UK.

73


3.10. Traffic position of the Delta port region in the hinterland

3.10.1. Bulk versus containers

The traffic analysis underlined that the share of the Delta in the entire European port system is particularly high in the container business, followed by liquid and dry bulk. However, the competitive focus for these cargo segments is different. A large part of the volumes in dry and liquid bulk products is relatively captive to the discharging port region since the customers are typically located in the port region or in the vicinity of the port (steel plants, power plants, oil refineries, chemical companies, etc..). The gateway function for major dry and liquid bulks of the Delta ports mainly involves one traffic direction (incoming seaborne cargo), a limited number of market players and a few nodes, i.e. the port and a limited number of destinations in the hinterland. Changes in the traffic position of the Delta as a whole in dry bulk and liquid bulk are therefore to a large extent linked to (1) economic cycles - demand, (2) terminal and inland transport supply in the Delta, also taking into account the environmental space such as the carbon footprint profile; (3) energy policies in the Benelux and Germany and (4) location decisions of major steel and chemical companies for which competition plays at a global scale. For containerised cargo, however, the hinterland profile involves numerous origins and destinations dispersed over a vast hinterland (and thus more competitors), a large number of economic players and two traffic directions. A more detailed analysis of the hinterland aspects and the competitive reach of the Delta ports will be provided later in this section. Here it is important to underline that the captive nature of container cargo for the Delta is much smaller than for bulk cargo and that the high European share of the Delta in container cargo is partly entwined with re-export and EDC activities in the region. We focus the remainder of the hinterland traffic analysis on container trade.

3.10.2. Local hinterland remains very important

The local or immediate hinterland of the Delta ports remains very important. Even large European gateways such as Rotterdam and Antwerp have a high proportion of container flows that is generated by the port city and its immediate surroundings. The most significant distance class for container cargo in relation to Rotterdam is the 0-200km radius. This is directly related to the port’s role as a cargo generating location linked to the strong manufacturing base of the immediate hinterland (the Netherlands and the Ruhr area in Germany). The importance of the local/national hinterland is demonstrated in Figure 43. The combined Belgian and Dutch hinterland is responsible for almost 60% of the inland container flows (i.e. by barge, rail and truck) of the container ports in the Delta. The Dutch hinterland generates 38% of Rotterdam’s total rail/truck/barge flows. About half of the land-based container flows of the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and Antwerp have an origin or destination in Belgium, while Germany represents more than three quarters of the land-based container volumes of Hamburg (83% in 2004 and 78% in 2007) and Bremerhaven. About 89% of the land transport flows out of Le Havre are linked to France.

Hinterland dimension in seaport competition for dry and liquid bulk cargo.

Strong competition for capturing container flows to hinterland regions.

Local hinterland forms backbone of container volumes.

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September 2011

Figure 43. The hinterland distribution of containerised cargo by road, rail and barge in the main container ports of the Le Havre-Hamburg range – estimates for 2007

Source: own elaboration based on data compilation

The high share of rather local traffic is partly linked to the role of the Low Countries in EDCs and re-exporting activities. As mentioned earlier in this report, the Netherlands and Belgium are home to a large number of EDCs. A large portion of the containers flows by truck leaving the Delta container ports is destined for EDCs or other logistics centres in the immediate hinterland (estimated to about 20% of the total container flows of Rotterdam). Containers arriving in these EDCs are typically stripped and after some value-adding manipulations the cargo is regrouped to reach the final destinations - even in the more distant hinterland – mostly by truck in a conventional non-containerised form. Figure 44. Relative importance of sub-regions in containerised inland cargo (by road, rail and barge) of the Delta port region with Germany and France – estimates for 2007


Germany, and to a lesser extent France, are the two most important foreign hinterlands for the Delta port region. However, cargo flows with these countries are largely concentrated in a few regions: the western part of Germany with a strong position of Nordrhein-Westfalen (the ‘Ruhr’ area), one of the economic powerhouses of Germany, and the north and northeast of France (Figure 44).

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75


3.10.3. Competition with German ports and Le Havre for serving the core hinterland or ‘blue banana’ area

The Rhine-Scheldt Delta is strategically located in relation to the area of the European Union with the highest concentration of main economic centres, i.e. the so-called ‘blue banana’ reaching from the southern part of the United Kingdom over the Benelux, central and eastern France to northern Italy. The ‘blue banana’ is the core hinterland of the Delta ports but competition for cargo to this blue banana is fierce. The Delta ports compete heavily with Le Havre for French cargo and with Bremen and Hamburg for traffic to/from Germany, the Alpine region, northern Italy and Central and Eastern Europe. Major hinterland overlap regions characterized by intense port rivalry are the Rhine-axis (the German Ruhr Area in particular), northern France, northern Italy and the east-west corridors from the Benelux ports to the hinterland. Figure 45. Estimated shares of the Delta port region in containerised inland cargo (by road, rail and barge) compared to Hamburg, Bremerhaven and Le Havre (2007)

Note: Only six north European container ports were considered when calculating the market share. Source: Notteboom/ITMMA - own elaboration based on data compilation

Figure 45 and Figure A2 in Annex 4 provide estimates for 2007 on the competitive situation in the core hinterland areas. The figures were estimated based on fragmented information from individual port authorities and a calibration of databases. Belgium, the Netherlands and Nord Pas-de-Calais in northern France are virtually captive to the Delta port region. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta container ports have a very strong traffic position in relation to the German States and French regions along the Rhine Basin. In the important Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen more than 70% of the container cargo is channelled via the West ports. The competitive position is weak in the eastern part of Germany and in the western part of France.

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NordrheinWestfalen

Intense competition for ‘blue banana’ traffic.

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September 2011

Bayern (Bavaria) is the most important German State for the port of Hamburg (after the City State of Hamburg itself) and a major economic growth region. More than 60% of cargo between Hamburg and Bavaria goes via rail. The Delta ports only have a modest market share in Bavaria of less than 15%, which underlines that the Delta is challenged to take up a more prominent role in more eastern hinterland regions.

3.10.4. Modal split of the Delta ports

While road haulage has always played a major role in reaching the core hinterland regions, intermodal transport is slowly but surely acquiring a strategic role as well. Table 19 summarizes the modal split in the most important container ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. The German ports have developed a strong orientation on rail shuttles, whereas Rotterdam, Antwerp and Amsterdam heavily rely on barges to reach water-linked hinterland regions. Most ports have achieved a considerable modal shift in hinterland container transport. Figure A3 in Annex 4 gives more details on the modal split per hinterland region. Table 19. Modal split for inland transport of containers – ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range

Source: Data respective port authorities, Containerisation International and Schiffahrt Hafen, Bahn und Technik

With each of the ports handling more than two million TEU of barge container, Rotterdam and Antwerp are by far the largest container barge ports in Europe featuring inland waterway traffic on the axis Antwerp-Rotterdam, the Rhine Basin, Northern France and the Benelux. The ability to offer cheap and reliable services has attracted the interest of shippers and carriers in barge transport and explains the significant growth of container barge transport since the mid eighties. The main barge flows are found in relation to the Rhine, between Rotterdam and Antwerp and in serving inland terminals in the Benelux at distances ranging from 50 to 250 km. Barge container transport enabled the Delta port region to create a patchwork of overlapping areas served by individual inland terminals, within which it is possible to achieve a cost advantage over other European container ports. The huge scale of barge operations in Rotterdam and Antwerp generates advantages not found in

Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp Zeebrugge

Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge

2004 60 5 35 1998 51.3 14.5 34.2 1998 64.5 7.8 27.7 1990 70.5 26.9 2.6

2005 57 2 41 2000 48 13 39 2000 60.6 10.1 29.3 2000 79.8 17.7 2.5

2006 54 3 43 2002 59 9 32 2002 59.5 9.3 31.2 2002 78.3 20.5 1.2

2007 50 7 43 2003 59 10 31 2007 59.8 8.0 32.2 2005 62.0 36.6 1.4

2004 60 9 31 2008 57 11 32 2006 61.2 37.6 1.2

2005 60 9 31

2008 57 13 30

Bremerhaven (Eurogate) Hamburg Dunkirk Le Havre

Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge Road Rail Barge

2002 53.1 44.4 2.5 1998 70.1 29.7 0.2 2002 82 14 4 1995 82.5 16.9 0.6

2005 43.0 53.0 4.0 2000 70.0 28.7 1.3 2002 72 25 3 1998 84.6 14.3 1.3

2006 39.6 56.3 4.1 2002 69.6 28.7 1.7 2005 88 8 4 2000 85.1 12.2 2.7

2008 34 62.9 3.1 2005 67.4 30.5 2.1 2006 88 8 4 2002 85.4 11.7 2.9

2009 31.3 64.5 4.2 2006 69.0 28.7 2.3 2005 87.4 6.2 6.4

2007 68.9 29.0 2.1 2006 86.8 5.1 8.1

2008 63.1 34.7 2.2 2008 86.2 6.6 7.2

2009 64 34 2 2009 83.8 6.9 9.3

2010 61.7 36.5 1.8

The Delta is relatively weak

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dominate the European

container barge transport scene.

77


smaller container ports. The organizational advantages are apparent in the clustering of barge operators and related companies (e.g. ship repairs and ship chandlers). Other seaports such as Le Havre, Hamburg, Bremerhaven and Marseille are seeking to give inland barging a more prominent place in their inland distribution patterns of maritime containers, but the existing port hierarchy vis-à-vis Antwerp and Rotterdam is unlikely to be challenged in this respect. Until now rail transport has played a modest role in container hinterland traffic of the Delta. Zeebrugge is the only exception, partly caused by less favourable inland waterway connections and strong container exchanges by rail with Antwerp. In the past the lack of rail capacity and a lack of competition made that rail was never able to gain a large share of the hinterland transport market. Infrastructural investments (such as the completion of the Betuweroute, the ongoing construction of the Liefkenshoek rail tunnel in Antwerp, new shunting yards and rail terminals across the Delta and the removal of infrastructural bottlenecks) combined with an increasing competitive landscape in rail (see part 2) offers opportunities for substantial growth in rail transport. Still, the rail sector and the Delta seaports are challenged to (a) provide rail services at competitive freight tariffs and quality; (b) to deal with environmental aspects and noise, (c) to enhance bundling of cargo via joint rail services and (d) to offer competitive ‘last mile’ solutions. The specific cost structure of rail shuttles (i.e. pre- and or end-haul costs by truck and a large share of handling costs in total railing cost) means that rail-based flows tend to penetrate deeper in the hinterland than road-based flows. Rail container traffic is predominantly international traffic at distances ranging from 150 km to 1100 km (North Italy) and more. Rotterdam has between 150 and 200 intermodal rail departures per week. Only Hamburg’s rail connections outperform Rotterdam in numbers (i.e. more than 160 international and national shuttle and block train services per week) and in traffic volumes by rail (i.e. about 1.9 million TEU in 2010).

3.10.5. Competition with ports outside the Hamburg-Le Havre range

An increasing number of ports gain direct hinterland access to the ‘blue banana’ area. This development has broadened container port competition and altered spatial hierarchy, in the sense that the container ports of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta are increasingly facing competition from container ports in other European port ranges (Baltic, Adriatic and Med) particularly for cargo related to the four coloured hinterland areas in Figure 46. These contestable hinterlands are increasingly being served not only by the ports of one gateway region, but by several multi-port gateway regions. The decades-old debate on the traffic imbalance between North and South is linked to this discussion. The joint market share of the Le Havre-Hamburg range ports in liner services between the Far East and Europe is estimated at 76%, compared to 24% for West Med ports (Milà, 2008). In the 1980s the Europe–Far East trade was still totally concentrated on Northern range ports. The more local gateway function of mainland Med ports versus a sometimes European wide gateway position (including transhipment flows and land-based intermodal corridors) of ports such as Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp is a major cause for the observed traffic situation. In theory, mainland Mediterranean ports offer transit time advantages over the north European ports for accommodating cargo flows between Asia/Middle East and large parts of Southern and Central Europe (time savings for vessels of up to 5 days).

Rail challenged to increase market share in Delta.

Contestable hinterlands and competition from outside the range.

The North vs. South discussion.

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September 2011

Gateway ports in the west Med have gained a much better connectivity in the global shipping networks than before, which gives these ports the opportunity to benefit from a higher critical mass and economies linked to larger vessels. But so far, they seem to have difficulties in substantially extending their hinterland reach north through rail services (Gouvernal et al., 2005). In practice, only Spanish Med ports have been successful in large part due to the strong economic growth in Catalonia and Madrid, while Italian and French Med ports lag behind in growth (see Notteboom, 2010 for a more detailed discussion). While Spanish ports are slowly entering the French market using rail shuttles (despite the difference in rail gauge), the north-south paradox for North-Italian cargo is mainly linked to a weaker intermodal organizational performance for intra-Italian rail products, and existing differences in port efficiency between Northern ports and North Italian ports. Figure 46. Gateway traffic (inland traffic excl. sea-sea transhipment) in major multi-port gateway regions in Europe (TEU – figures 2008)


One of the main obstacles to Med ports is that the hinterland volumes are a lot smaller than in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta, which implies that frequent intermodal services are hard to maintain and sometimes disappear soon after introduction. In 2008, the container ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta (mainly Rotterdam, Antwerp and Zeebrugge) jointly generated an inland cargo flow – so excluding sea-sea transhipment flows - of some 16.8 million TEU, much more than any other port region in Europe (Figure 46). This concentration of flows largely explains why the range and diversity of the intermodal service offer of large Delta ports is still far bigger and more established than in their Mediterranean counterparts.

Delta benefits from scale in

inland transport flows.

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4 | CHALLENGES AND POLICIES FOR THE RHINE-SCHELDT

DELTA PORT REGION

4.1 Key challenges to the Rhine-Scheldt Delta

4.1.1. Challenges linked to a changing world and European market

҉ Belgium and the Netherlands show a high economic performance and competitiveness, even when comparing with other regions/countries on a global scale. The logistics performance of the two countries is a necessary condition for the performance of these open economies. Based on the analysis provided, it is fair to conclude that the seaports, as important pillars in the logistics infrastructure of the countries, have been key enablers and not a burden to the performance and competitiveness of the two countries. The Delta port region together with the whole economic and logistics structure in the respective countries is continuously challenged to remain competitive. ҉ The contemporary European ports’ environment looks very different when compared to 15 years ago and this has impacted port competition. The number of Member States of the European Union increased from 15 in the mid 1990s to 27 at present. Economic centres in East and Central Europe, the Nordic triangle and the Iberian Peninsula have taken up a more important position next to the traditional economic heartland of Europe. The increased participation of these regions on the European economic scene opened possibilities for new seaports and inland transport corridors to emerge. As discussed in section 3, seaports located far away from each other are now to some extent competing, as more and more port regions are in a good position to reach the economic and industrial heartland of Europe. ҉ The local hinterland remains the backbone of the cargo volumes in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region. Intermodal solutions even on these shorter distances should be further developed. The rise of economic centres in Eastern and Central Europe creates opportunities for the Delta ports to develop shortsea shipping services and water- and land-based hub-feeder networks to these areas. Given its scale, the Delta has opportunities to increase the inland penetration of its intermodal offer so as to increase its capture area. The existing dense network of direct shuttles to nearby destinations can then be complemented by inland services to more distant destinations built around one or more inland hubs. Containers for the more distant hinterland benefit from the strong local cargo base in the Delta as local containers often provide the critical mass for allowing frequent deepsea liner services. The limitation in the number of ports of call per loop enhances a concentration on trunk lines. ҉ The expanding European market challenges the strong reliance of the Low Countries on EDCs and re-exporting activities. The ‘EDC-effect’ is one of the reasons why 26% of the total container throughput of the European container port system is routed via the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. This effect is estimated to about 20% of the total container flows of Rotterdam. Any major changes in the design of distribution networks, e.g. through a move of EDCs to other regions, a network redesign towards a system of RDCs (Regional Distribution Centres) or more DC bypass operations will

Port region is key enabler of economic performance.

Low Countries challenged to remain at the top.

Increased competition with more distant ports.

Intermodality on shorter distances.

Enhance intermodal connections to more distant hinterlands.

Position in EDC and re-exporting activities is vulnerable.

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September 2011

have an impact on the distribution of container flows among European ports, with potentially a negative traffic effect on the container ports in the Delta.

4.1.2. Challenges linked to the strategies of logistics market players

The logistics integration and coordination at the level of market players as discussed in section 2 has several implications on seaports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. ҉ The Delta ports increasingly have to deal with large port clients who possess a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis terminal operations and inland transport operations. This development brings about strategic questions on the structuring of the port market (e.g. enhancing intra-port competition through land concession policy in the port). The integration strategies of the market players created an environment in which ports are increasingly competing not as individual places that handle ships but within transport networks or supply chains. For example, large terminal operators are becoming more footloose in spatial terms as the network approach loosens their former strong ties with one particular seaport in order to offer the customers a more differentiated product range. As the loyalty of port clients cannot be taken for granted, ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta are striving to approach some shippers and carriers who control huge cargo flows and who are in a good position to generate value-added for the port region. ҉ In line with the above, instead of port competition between clearly-defined port areas with spatial boundaries (nodes), competitive forces are shifted to groups of spatially-dispersed but functionally-integrated terminals in different ports (networks). This leads to an increased functional interdependency between ports. The network focus is further supported by the ‘push’ strategies of shipping lines and terminal operators towards the hinterland: cargo will be channelled through the system not only based on individual port qualities but primarily by network-related considerations regarding asset deployment (ships, barges, rail, etc..), schedule optimisation at sea and on land and transit times. The overall qualities of the whole Delta port region in relation to the hinterland are thus more important than the qualities of each of the individual ports in the region. ҉ It has become increasingly difficult for port managers to identify the port customers who really exert power in the logistic chain or who are driving port selection. Market players are sometimes port user and port service supplier at the same time. For example, the AP Moller Group operates container terminals in Rotterdam and Zeebrugge via subsidiary APM Terminals, but is at the same time also a major shipping line customer via Maersk Line. Another example: German steel concerns ThyssenKruppSteel and Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann control EECV, a dedicated dry bulk terminal in Rotterdam EECV. The question who really decides which port to choose, typically depends on factors such as the type of cargo involved, the cargo generating power of the shipper, the characteristics related to specific trade routes and the terms of trade and terms of sale. ҉ Supply chain managers and shipping lines base their port choice decisions increasingly on reliability and capacity considerations next to pure cost considerations. Given that seaports are turntables in global liner shipping networks, the strategic directions shipping lines take in responding to customer demands will have an effect on the balance of factors that affect a port’s competitiveness. To be

Ports are increasingly

competing within networks

and supply chains.

From a single port to a broader

functional port region.

Identifying the real decision-

makers becomes

harder.

Reliability and capacity

considerations.

Need for synergies with

other nodes and

81


successful, the ports in the Delta have to think along with the customer, try to figure out what his needs are, not only in the port but throughout the supply chains and networks. Success is more and more determined by the ability of the port community to fully exploit synergies with other transport nodes and other players within the logistics networks of which they are part. As will be demonstrated later in this report, these developments call for closer co-ordination and cooperation with logistics actors and nodes outside the port perimeter and a more integrated and broader spatial approach to port infrastructure planning. ҉ The quality of the services to information flows are rapidly becoming as important as the services to the physical flows. This implies that ports have to make sure the right infrastructure, software and human skills are in place to respond to the ever higher market requirements for the accommodation of global information flows. A seaport should not tackle this challenge in isolation as one singly node, given the network focus of market players. ҉ Environmental issues are having an ever-larger impact on port development and port operations: dredging and dredge disposal, wetlands preservation, emissions into the air (both from ships and from port facilities), water pollution, congestion, light and noise externalities and potential conflicts with commercial fishing and recreational uses of area waters. Port authorities and port companies must demonstrate a high level of environmental performance in order to ensure community support. However, environmental aspects also play an increasing role in attracting trading partners and potential investors. A port with a strong environmental record and a high level of community support is likely to be favoured by market players.

4.1.3. Challenges linked to national and supranational policies

Policy development at the national and supranational level is having an effect on the future development potential of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region and its position in the European port and logistics system. ҉ The policy push in modal shift and ‘co-modality’ policies at supranational, national and regional level is evolving towards a demand pull where market players across Europe are getting more involved in setting up intermodal initiatives. The Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region and the North German port region are early adopters of intermodal solutions. However, the Delta cannot sit back and rely on its ‘early mover’ status and scale advantages. Continuous innovation in processes (cf. cargo bundling, information flow management, port-inland port concepts, etc..) and in technologies is needed, not only to keep the Delta competitive, but also to demonstrate to policy makers that the Delta port region takes up its European leader role in a responsible and innovative way, driven by market responsiveness and sustainability. ҉ Major changes have taken place in port governance across Europe. Port authorities around Europe have gained a more autonomous status via commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation processes. Drastic port reform schemes in countries such as France, Italy, Spain and many east European countries were considered needed in view of increasing efficiency and competitiveness of the ports concerned. These reforms are expected to lead, in due time, to efficiency improvements and more market-oriented strategies. These changes will imply more intense commercial

Managing information flows.

Environmental performance of seaport also important to attract business.

Innovation to go beyond scale and ‘early mover’ advantages in co-modality.

Port reform makes rival ports more market-oriented

test

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September 2011

battles among ports to attract cargo. The port and wider logistics community in the Delta is challenged to deliver strong and integrated business propositions to bind global supply chain activities to the region. ҉ Ports need to comply with ever higher regulatory and societal requirements in the fields of environmental protection, safety and security (e.g. the ISPS code). These regulations particularly have an impact on the further space/room for the Delta ports to grow, not only in terms of hectares, but also in terms of the so-called environmental space. The Delta is challenged to further optimize the use of space and to minimize emissions of existing and future activities in the port areas and the wider logistics pole. ҉ While the Delta ports overall welcomed the principles in the White Paper of the European Commission, it is important to underline that out-of-pocket costs alone are not sufficient to understand the current routing of containerised goods in Europe. Co-modal bundling effects, connectivity effects and aggregated service quality effects at specific gateway ports make that a ‘natural’ gateway for a certain hinterland region is not necessarily the port closest to that hinterland region. The combination of the above effects also makes that environmental impacts per TEU-km generated by cargo passing through large gateways are typically lower compared to ports which are not able to benefit from the same connectivity and bundling effects. The White Paper focuses mainly on rail while the importance of and opportunities for barge transport, a key transport mode for the Delta, are not fully highlighted. The focus on co-modality on medium and long distances ignores the potential and proven track record of rail and barge shuttles to capture a significant share of short distance transport between the Delta ports and the immediate hinterland. A non-consistent implementation of pricing throughout the EU can lead to cargo shifts away from the Delta. The Delta port region is challenged to bring the message to policy makers that the present cargo distribution patterns in Europe, among which the strong position of the Delta, are a reflection of market-based decisions of logistics players. ҉ The core network discussion as part of the TEN-T policy can impact the ports in this region if this would result in an increase of coastal access points and a policy directed towards cargo dispersion in the European port system. The Delta ports have to continue capitalizing on their cargo bundling and consolidation potential on the large inland corridors of the TEN-T network. ҉ The port communities in the Delta, together with policy makers, are challenged to further enhance the strategic role the ports can play in stimulating innovation and reinforcing the competitiveness of Belgian and Dutch companies. Policy makers should also take into account this more strategic role of the ports when evaluating port development and designing port policies. ҉ The need to focus more and more on innovation to remain competitive does not imply that the basic infrastructural conditions should be ignored. Ports and the respective governments at different functional levels are challenged to guarantee a good maritime and land accessibility.

Managing the use of physical

and environmental

space.

White Paper challenges Delta

to underline market logic

behind cargo routing in

Europe.

Impact of TEN-T discussion.

Innovation as a competitive

factor.

The role of basic infrastructure should not be

ignored.

83


4.1.4. Challenges linked to cargo flows through the Delta ports

҉ The Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region is highly dependent on bulk commodities linked to energy production and the oil-based chemical industry. The shift away from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels is considered as a major challenge and opportunity. The Delta port region should adopt a leading role in this transition to remain competitive as one of the most important energy and chemical clusters in the world. ҉ Containers are becoming increasingly important in the traffic composition of the Delta port region. The position of the Delta in this market segment remains more vulnerable than in many other cargo segments due to the partial reliance on EDC and re-exporting activities in the Low Countries, the existence of vast shared hinterlands, corridor development throughout Europe and the rather footloose character of sea-sea transhipment traffic. Remaining competitive in this market not only demands efforts from individual ports and market parties, but also requires a stronger positioning of the Delta region as an integrated European gateway region. This point will be further developed in section 4.2. ҉ At the foreland side, Asia and other emerging economies become more important in the cargo flows. At the hinterland side, growth in the Delta ports will increasingly have to come from regions outside the traditional ‘blue banana’, as the traditional hinterland of the Delta is comprised of mostly rather mature economies. Both developments combined point to an increased competition with ports outside of the Hamburg-Le Havre range in attracting cargo flows. The Delta port region should therefore consider broadening its hinterland reach without disregarding the needs and continued importance of their core hinterland regions. The Delta port region has a very strong traffic position in West-Germany, North-France and the Benelux. The Delta is challenged to consolidate or even expand its position in these core hinterland regions.

4.2. What policies regarding seaports and broader logistics development are being developed?

Governments in Flanders and the Netherlands have developed extensive policies related to ports and their role in the competitiveness of the regions. These policies are also partly aimed at dealing with many of the challenges facing the ports. The approaches are somewhat different in the Netherlands and Flanders.

4.2.1. Corporatisation and decentralisation

The port authorities in Rhine-Scheldt Delta are working within the so-called ‘Hanseatic’ tradition, which means that almost all of them are governed by the local community – most of the time the own municipal government or the own city-state. Not just profit maximization, but also the general interest for the community in the form of employment, added value creation and stability are at the centre stage of their interest. Most ports in the Delta have implemented corporatisation schemes in which port authorities are given more commercial and financial autonomy by changes in the governance structure.

Towards a leading cluster in non-fossil fuels.

Facing rising competition in the container business.

Reassessing the foreland and hinterland orientation of the Delta port region.

Corporatisation in the Delta ports.

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September 2011

In the Netherlands, Rotterdam and Amsterdam have chosen for the path of corporatisation. Zeeland Seaports is also considering such a step. The corporatisation of Port of Amsterdam is planned and if all goes well should be completed by the Autumn of 2012. A lot was at stake since the former Dutch transport minister Camiel Eurlings called corporatisation a conditio sine qua non for a possible new lock in Ijmuiden. In practice, the corporatisation would imply that all activities, company divisions and associated risks would be transferred to NV Haven Amsterdam. All shares in the NV Haven Amsterdam would initially be owned by the City of Amsterdam. In January 2004, the Port of Rotterdam Authority NV was formed following a corporatisation process. The planning process on Maasvlakte 2 played an essential role in speeding up the corporatisation process. Hence, the central government was willing to grant permission for and partially fund Maasvlakte 2, only when the port authority was corporatised and the State would receive a stake in the newly formed port authority (Jacobs, 2007). The Port Authority is a public limited company (NV) with two shareholders: the Municipality of Rotterdam and the Dutch State. The port authority is no longer a passive landlord but an active ‘mainport manager’ with substantial investments in activities other than developing port land and managing vessel traffic in the port. Examples are the port community system Portbase and port marketing and promotion. The port authority is now controlled by a Supervisory Board and no longer controlled directly by the Municipality. Supervisory board members have experience in managing public corporations, the transport and energy industries and stakeholder management. This specific governance arrangement increased the commercial attitude and success of the port and made the port authority management less politicized. In Flanders, the Port Decree of the early 2000s was an essential step towards the corporatisation of the Flemish ports and the redefinition of the responsibilities of the port authorities and the Flemish government. All Flemish ports are corporatised and each have one shareholder: the respective municipality. Contrary to the situation in Rotterdam, the management structure of the port authorities in Flanders involves less participation of industry people, which typically makes decision-making somewhat more politicised. Still, the reform brought a much stronger commercial and market-based attitude in the Flemish ports and a much more proactive role of port authorities in issues affecting the logistics performance of the ports concerned. The strategic plans and actions of ports like Ghent and Antwerp strongly echo the increased commercial focus. Through the corporatisation of port authorities in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta more responsibilities were given to them in terms of port development, management and finance. Limited funds for port development at the national or regional government level even pushed port authorities into the co-financing of maritime accessibility infrastructure (which was typically paid for by the government). A good example is the discussion in Flanders on the involvement of port authorities in the financing of new locks: the new lock at the Left Bank in Antwerp, the proposed new lock in Terneuzen (mainly serving the Ghent canal area) and a potential new lock giving access to the inner port section of Zeebrugge. Corporatisation has also created opportunities for the port authorities to go beyond a passive landlord function. Port authorities are now more engaged in preserving and strengthening the competitive position of the port. The tools at their disposal include

Rotterdam: from landlord to

mainport manager.

Port Decree crucial in

corporatisation Flemish ports.

Shifts in the funding of port infrastructure.

Ports go beyond traditional

landlord tasks.

85


land concession agreements and procedures, the awarding of dedicated terminals to specific shipping lines and the development of a network strategy with other nodes (seaports, inland ports, airports, etc..). It even opened the road to strategic port development overseas, such as the involvement of Port of Rotterdam in the port of Sohar in Oman and Suape in Brazil and similar initiatives by Antwerp, mainly through Port of Antwerp International (PAI). Operating as some sort of governmental limited liability companies, port authorities are more able to enter into partnerships in the commercial logistics sector and to improve their performance in the face of international competition. The corporatisation of the ports should therefore also ease co-operation with other ports in the Delta.

4.2.2. Mainport Network strategy in the Netherlands

In the 1980s the Dutch government started to develop a mainport strategy. This implied that the two mainports – the port of Rotterdam and the airport of Schiphol – were considered as gateways to Europe and important strongholds and facilitators for the Dutch economy. The mainport strategy was supported by strong commercial initiatives to attract logistics and distribution activities to the Netherlands as well as European head offices. The overarching government policy was entitled ‘The Netherlands, distribution country’ (Nederland Distributieland) leading to a surge in re-exporting activities through the Netherlands and the establishment of a large number of EDCs (Kolk and Van der Veen, 2002; EUR & TNO, 2010).

In recent years, the focus on nodes only has somewhat been softened and the attention shifted to the metropolitan region of the Randstad Holland as a competitive unit (Van Gils et al., 2009). The Randstad is the functionally differentiated motor of the Dutch economy with nearly 7 million inhabitants and as main cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The role of the mainports in this setting is different: the value of Schiphol to the Randstad primarily lies in the frequent and direct linkages to the global network, which is of importance for the development of economic functions in the region. The new policy thus implies that the mainports are now acting as facilitators for the competitive development of Randstad Holland. In the economic vision on the long-term development of Mainport Rotterdam (Ministry of Economy, 2009) explicit reference is made to a transition from a mainport strategy to a so-called Mainport Network strategy.

The shift in policy direction implies that growth of the two mainports is no longer a prime objective. It is more about strengthening the integration between mainports and other parts of the economy. Investments in mainports should be more focused on facilitating the competitiveness of Randstad Holland for the location of businesses and for strengthening its role in orchestration/control functions in global supply chains. This even implies that, at least in principle, there would be less focus on attracting physical warehousing activities (such as regional distribution centers), but more focus on attracting the advanced centres that control/orchestrate the European or even global distribution networks and supply chains. The spatial-economic structure of mainports Schiphol and Rotterdam are more or less fixed: realising new runways in Schiphol or a third or fourth Maasvlakte is not part of the agenda. Growth would have to be realised within existing spatial structures, by developing a network strategy with regional nodes and also by actively striving for cooperation (EUR & TNO, 2010).

The international ambitions of Rotterdam and Antwerp .

The former mainport strategy in the Netherlands.

Policy shift towards Mainport Network.

Competitiveness of Randstad at centre stage.

No further large expansion of mainports.

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September 2011

The Dutch government is calling for more cooperation between the Dutch ports as this could contribute to a more optimal deployment of investments by the national government. The need for more cooperation between ports is echoed in the Mainport Network concept. A report by the Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis (KiM, 2008) even brought forward the idea of creating a National Port Company which in theory would open more possibilities towards specialisation of ports. However, the idea of creating such a National Port Company is not broadly welcomed by individual port authorities as they fear it might lead to a weakening of the role of municipalities, a greater inefficiency due to increased bureaucracy, a lower commercial attitude and a less market-based port development strategy. In April 2010, a report on “Gateway Holland” issued by a Dutch independent government body, intensified the discussion on cooperation by advising the Minister that the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam should merge or at least cooperate more closely (Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2010). Also here, the plea for cooperation was focused on a more optimal use of resources: a merger could prevent resources from being wasted on competition or redundant investments. Closer cooperation or a merger between the two could lead to the creation of a Dutch network of ports ('Gateway Holland').

4.2.3. Flanders Port Area, Flanders Logistics and Extended Gateways in Flanders

The Flanders Port Area initiative is aimed at coordination and cooperation among the Flemish seaports without discarding the principles laid down in the Port Decree. The Flemish government aims for participation of the entire port cluster and all relevant stakeholders and also stimulates cooperation between all sectors since each has its own expertise. As such, the Flemish policy should lead to a balanced approach that combines empowerment and commercial strength of individual port authorities with forms of coordination in those areas where synergies can be created. One of the first strategic targets of Flanders Port Area is creating a social awareness concerning ports. Far too often the word port has a negative connotation for the population. A lack of understanding and general indifference is bad for the image of the sector. By organizing activities like joint port days, involving surrounding communities in port activities and supplying ample information, Flanders Port Area tries to improve the perception that the general public has of ports. Another strategic direction of Flanders Port Area is aimed at anchoring the Flemish ports in supply chain and logistical networks through innovation in sustainability and creating a maximum of added value. A project was also completed in view of creating a joint hinterland strategy for the Flemish ports. Commercial strategies and actions in this field were not always warmly welcomed by individual port authorities as they see commercial strategy as one of their key responsibilities. A third theme relates to the removal of bottlenecks or barriers of all kinds towards a higher competitive position of the Flemish ports. Flanders Port Area is part of a broader policy on Flanders Logistics devised by the Flemish government. All aspects relating to logistics are covered by Flanders Logistics: land transport, ports, inland shipping and air transport. The main target of this initiative is to make Flanders the most prominent logistics region in Europe by 2020 based on a sustainable, multimodal and fully integrated transport system. Keeping an eye on total transport costs and choosing the most sustainable mode of

Dutch central government

aims for more cooperation

among ports.

Flanders Port Area as part of

Flemish port policy.

Increase public image of ports.

Embedded in broader Flanders

Logistics policy.

87


transport should create a maximum of added value with a minimum of negative externalities for the surrounding communities. Multiple actions are taken in the area of education, knowledge creation and innovation. The entire structure supporting Flanders Logistics is based on communication and the bundling of forces between the public and private sector. By including the corporate and scientific world in actions undertaken by the government the initiative tries to avoid a lack of focus and to create a common goal.

The Extended Gateway policy was initiated by the Flanders Institute for Logistics (VIL) in 2006 and consists of several plans for the development of logistics sites and inland cargo centres in the Flemish hinterland as part of an integrated multimodal hinterland network that can offer attractive attributes to supply chains. The Extended Gateway idea can be considered as a practical application of the port regionalisation concept on the scale of Flanders (see next section). The implementation of the idea of the Extended Gateway received top priority status in Flanders in view of preserving or even increasing the pace of logistics development. The Extended Gateway concept is founded on an integrated multimodal approach of transport, more and stronger partnerships among logistics actors and a continuous search for innovation in logistics concepts and technologies. Through better collaboration among companies in the different links in the supply chain, cost reductions and more important flows of goods can be obtained. Following the introduction of the Extended Gateway concept for Flanders in 2006, several regional studies have been carried out to analyze the logistics potential of each province in Flanders. These plans are now entering an implementation phase.

Figure 47. The Extended Gateway Flanders

Source: Flanders Institute for Logistics (VIL)

Extended Gateways as practical application of port regionalisation in Flanders.

.

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September 2011

4.3. Capitalising on potential synergies within the Delta In part 2 of this report, we discussed the growing importance of clusters as structuring elements in the economic development of regions. Ports can be seen as clusters. However, the question is whether the individual port is still the relevant unit of analysis when considering regional economic development. In this section of the report, we discuss how the Rhine-Scheldt Delta port region can enhance synergies among the ports concerned, to overcome some of the challenges discussed above and to improve the competitiveness of the ports and the respective regions and nations. The existing policies discussed in the previous section will be critically assessed in light of this.

4.3.1. Stimulate interactions between seaports and inland ports

Determining the geographical boundaries of a port cluster becomes increasingly difficult given growing functional linkages with inland locations. Seaports are only as competitive as the inland links that connect to it. Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005) introduced a regionalisation phase in port and port system development. The phase of regionalisation brings the perspective of port development to a higher geographical scale, that is, beyond the port perimeter. The port regionalisation phase is characterised by a strong functional interdependency and even joint development of a specific seaport and (selected) multimodal logistics platforms in its hinterland, ultimately leading to the formation of a regional load centre network or logistics pole. The transition towards port regionalisation is a gradual and market-driven process that mirrors the increased focus of market players on logistics integration. The ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta are engaging in port regionalisation strategies as they understand that inland ports can help them in facing a wide array of local constraints (road congestion, lack of available land, environmental issues, etc..). Inland terminals and the corridors towards the inland terminal network can create the necessary margin for further growth of seaborne container traffic. Inland terminals as such acquire an important satellite function with respect to the ports. The Port of Rotterdam is expanding its involvement with and in (container) handling in the hinterland. This is being done in both the Benelux and Germany, by individual companies: ECT (extended gate strategy through European Gateway Services), APMT (also adopted an extended gate strategy), DP World, Van Uden, CMA CGM, NYK, partly in collaboration with the Port of Rotterdam Authority. The Port Authority of Rotterdam has also launched the ‘Container Transferium’ concept to support further growth of container activity in Rotterdam by transferring cargo to barges (Box 7). The Port Authority is involved in the expansion of the Wanssum container terminal (North Limburg) and the terminal in Alphen a/d Rijn, which is being built for use by Heineken, among others. The Port Authority is advancing cooperation with the nearby smaller ports of Dordrecht and Moerdijk. Involvement with more existing or new terminals is possible if this contributes to throughput in the port of Rotterdam, the financial returns meet certain criteria and the terminal has or will have an independent form of management to guarantee neutrality.

Port regionalisation

as a strategic proposition to

strengthen interaction

between seaports and inland ports.

Rotterdam’s path of port

regionalisation.

89


Box 7. Container transferium

Rotterdam is developing a series of container transferia in the vicinity of the port near the main transport corridors to the hinterland service areas. At a container transferium trucks would be loaded and discharged and inland barge shuttles would secure a frequent and reliable connection between the transferium and the large container terminals in the port. The container transferia would also provide space for additional services such as empty depots, distribution centres and customs. Next to reduced dwell times at the deepsea terminals, the concept can also lead to time savings for trucks, a better deployment of transport equipment, a better spread of container arrivals at deepsea terminals, shorter turnaround times for barges and most importantly a higher reliability in supply chains. While the Rotterdam Port Authority and the government are promoting the concept, the eventual operation of a Container Transferium will be the task for private operators. The first container transferium was developed by a.o. APMT and ECT in Alblasserdam near the A15 and should lead to a reduction of 500,000 truck trips. The Port Authority will ultimately serve as landlord.

Source: based on www.containertransferium.com

The port of Antwerp has developed multiple initiatives concerning its hinterland development. Through its hinterland policy the Port Authority seeks to raise the proportion of freight sent by barge and rail and to develop multimodal hinterland hubs. The Antwerp Port Authority has set up task forces together with various stakeholders (carriers, shippers, transport operators, labour and government bodies) to address issues related to inland transportation. A successful example of the task force approach was Antwerp Intermodal Solutions (AIS) in the mid 2000s. The main terminal operators and 15 of the 19 largest shipping companies and agents in Antwerp took an active part in the project with the aim to survey and concentrate rail volumes. The project led to new rail links and a closer coordination between market parties. The port authority acted as facilitator. Many of the more recent initiatives as regards hinterland strategy are integrated in the “Total Project for a More Competitive Port” which started in 2009 by the Antwerp Port Authority and Alfaport (the association of port companies). The inland strategy of the port of Antwerp is build around three tiers or geographical layers (Figure 48). Tier 1 encompasses the consolidation of volumes via transferia close to the port (e.g. WCT Meerhout, Beverdonk Container Terminal, TCT Willebroek). Tier 2 focuses on trimodal hinterland hubs in the southwest (LAR Kortrijk / Moeskroen) and southeast (Athus / Liège) of Belgium. At tier 3, we find the hinterland corridors by rail and barge to the south (mainly to France and Spain: Lille/Paris, Hendaye, Lyon, Marseille, Perpignan, Irun, Barcelona, and to Italy/Switzerland: Basel, Milan East & West) and the eastern Lanes (including the Rhine corridor, Germany/Austria/Hungary and the Czech Republic and Poland). The Antwerp Port Authority participates in the Beverdonk Container Terminal, situated about 50 km east of the port. The terminal offers a starting capacity of 70,000 TEU (expandable to 300,000 TEU) and is being operated by DP World. The project is supported by the AIS II program which aims at an improved rail connectivity of the port, intense cooperation with the Limburg Logistics Platform and economic cooperation with the Port of Liège Authority. The collaboration agreement with the port of Liège is aimed at making various sites in and around the latter ready for development and to actively attract investors. For example, the Antwerp Port Authority is involved in the development of the Trilogiport site in Liège, a new terminal and logistics area located along the Albert Canal. Liège is the third largest

The inland strategy of Antwerp.

Recent inland initiatives by the port of Antwerp.

.

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September 2011

inland port in Europe after Duisburg and Paris. Euroports has developed the new Trilogiport Terminal in a consortium including DP World as a minority partner. The terminal has an initial capacity of 100,000 TEU. A major new logistics park is being developed adjacent to the terminal. Figure 48. Tiers in the inland strategy of the Antwerp Port Authority

Source: Antwerp Port Authority

Zeebrugge and Zeeland Seaports are relatively well connected to the different modes of transport. For Zeebrugge a mediocre access to the inland waterway system is being countered by a strong focus on rail, the use of ‘estuary’ ships in reaching the Rhine area and infrastructure plans to improve the inland waterway access to the hinterland. The accessibility by road will increase in the near future when expressways N31 and N49 will be altered to highways and the new highway AX will be constructed. Zeeland ports prides itself in its excellent connections to the intermodal network characterised by a low congestion level and a high intermodal share. Both ports may not be investing directly in inland terminals but have developed more informal ways of cooperation with inland ports. For example, Zeebrugge cooperates with Duisburg. The above initiatives should secure non-congested and highly efficient connections to the intermodal transport network. The new hinterland strategy of the Port of Amsterdam is geared towards combined traffic flows that will see increased transport over water and rail networks to help ease congestion. In the container business, Amsterdam is adopting a role as extended gate of Rotterdam and a turntable for container traffic to/from the northern part of the Netherlands. The port of Ghent is positioning itself in a complementary role to the large container ports in the region, by focusing on shortsea and container barge flows. Ghent particularly aims to benefit from its strategic position on the North-South routes between the extensive waterway system in the Delta and the Seine-

Zeebrugge and Zeelands Seaports

Amsterdam as extended gate of Rotterdam.

Ghent as strategic inland

navigation node on the North-

South axis.

91


Nord connection, which is currently under construction, to guarantee a high capacity waterway link with the Seine Basin in France. Participation in inland terminals abroad is also an option. In early 2011, Rotterdam and Antwerp were considering a joint shareholding of about one third in the Port of Duisburg when the national German government announced it would dispose of its shareholding in the Duisburger Hafen AG. However, the German government and the State of North Rhine-Westphalia were not very enthusiastic about allowing foreign capital in Europe’s largest inland port and a key turntable for traffic to/from east Europe. While the joint offer of the ports still stands, it is more likely that the other shareholders, the city of Duisburg and the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, will extend their interest in case the central government would pull out of Duisburg. Earlier attempts of the Port Authority of Rotterdam to buy into the development of Neuss also failed for political reasons. Therefore, it is likely that the respective port authorities in the Delta will now move towards a more cautious approach in dealing with German inland ports, for example by first considering joint ventures in the development of new port-related sites. One of the problems that port authorities are facing relates to the infrastructural part of the port regionalisation phase. Port authorities try to enhance the intermodal capacity of the port with a heavy reliance on the performance of infrastructures and transport services. However, the manoeuvrability offered to port authorities seems to be restricted. First of all, the hinterland infrastructure level is dominated by public authorities who have to take into account social and political aspects and financial limitations in the decision-making process. In most cases, the role of the port authority is restricted to initiator and facilitator of the necessary infrastructures that should guarantee a maximum of land accessibility in relation to the logistics pole. Second, the logistical hinterland is dominated by private companies, which, under normal circumstances, do not have to give any account to the port authority. While market players are key in developing market-based inland networks, relying too much on private players to take initiatives in strengthening the port-hinterland interface also bears some risks: private parties seem more sensitive to short-term profitability than to long-term strategic investments and thus might be tempted more to go for fast growth instead of a long-term sustainable development path.

4.3.2. Strengthen the focus on multi-port gateway regions

In a logistics world confronted with mounting reliability and capacity issues, routing flexibility is one of the keystones for the logistics attractiveness of a region. The need for a high level of flexibility is also reflected in the complex networks designed by logistics actors and transport operators. Logistics players tend to opt for a flexible network design offering various routing alternatives. A transport network that guarantees routing flexibility will allow for a high responsiveness of infrastructure networks to continuous changes in routing decisions of market players. Production units and logistics sites (such as EDCs) in the hinterland typically value the flexibility a multi-port gateway system offers in terms of available routing options for import and export cargo. For example, the logistics attractiveness of large parts of Belgium and the Netherlands for EDCs is partly due to the reality of having several efficient gateways at disposal. Next to an inland focus of ports, seaports should therefore develop a greater attention to the benefits offered by the presence of

Focus on cooperation with foreign inland ports and terminals.

Dependency on governments to provide basic corridor infrastructures.

Market parties have a strong role in port regionalisation.

Routing flexibility is important to logistics players.

Multi-port gateway regions offer flexibility.

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adjacent seaports in terms of the flexibility they offer to customers. Several gateways together can create synergies in reaching out to the hinterland and in offering the best possible maritime connectivity to overseas regions. In this framework, the multi-port gateway region level is highly relevant and supported by the liner shipping networks as developed by shipping lines and the communality in hinterland connectivity issues among ports of the same multi-port gateway region. Throughout Europe, port authorities and or regional governments are taking initiatives to strengthen synergies at the level of multi-port gateway regions. A good example is the creation of the North Adriatic Ports Association (NAPA) which envisages close cooperation between the port authorities of Venice, Ravenna, Trieste and Koper, particularly in promoting the port region to develop into a major gateway to central Europe and parts of the ‘blue banana’ hinterland (Figure 49). NAPA has developed an active lobbying at the European level in view of establishing large-scale corridor infrastructure to the hinterland. NAPA, just like most other multi-port gateway regions in Europe, offers routing flexibility to customers as it involves several gateways. However, the Rhine-Scheldt Delta does not only offer routing flexibility, but can also capitalize on its unrivalled scale in terms of the volumes, connectivity and frequencies in maritime and land transport services. This seemingly paradoxal and quite unique combination of network flexibility on the one hand and concentration and bundling of flows on the other enhances network complexity and challenges network governance. The position of each of the ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta is not only determined by its own weaknesses and strengths but also by the way the ports succeed in valorising existing synergies between the ports of the same multi-port gateway region. Figure 49. The North Adriatic Ports Association (NAPA)

Source: based on NAPA website

50

Multi-port gateway region is relevant level

for strategy development.

NAPA as an example of

ports building synergies at the

level of the multi-port

gateway region.

Delta: unique combination of

scale and routing

flexibility.

Need to valorize existing

synergies in the Delta.

Improve inter-

93


The bundling of cargo towards the hinterland by joint services or by using inland hubs as bundling points within rail and barge networks can serve this purpose. The bundling of cargo allows the ports in the Delta to gather critical mass to access regions in the more distant hinterland using shuttle services that meet customer requirements in terms of frequency. As local or immediate hinterlands remain the backbone of ports’ cargo bases, the bundling issue also plays at shorter distances. Gateway ports are the central nodes driving the dynamics in a large logistics pole consisting of several logistics zones and inland terminals. While road haulage has always played a major role in the immediate hinterland, intermodal transport is slowly but surely acquiring a strategic role as well. Coordination and collective actions between ports and market players is essential to meet the objective of increasing the share of co-modal solutions and to bundle cargo on short distances. Synergies between ports in the Delta can also be further enhanced by improving inter-port linkages. Large cargo exchanges over land are already taking place between the container ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The container exchanges between Antwerp and Rotterdam are estimated at nearly 1 million TEU in 2008 compared to 560,000 TEU in 1997 (both directions) of which 30% are empty containers. Shuttle trains between Antwerp and Rotterdam transported 285,000 TEU in 2004 compared to 120,000 TEU in 1997. Rail also plays an essential role in container exchanges between Antwerp and Zeebrugge. The exchanges are partly a result of the practice of second moves. Containerized cargo often receives a bill of lading (B/L) for one port, although the physical handling from deep-sea vessel to land takes place in another port. Shipping lines stimulate cargo to come to the ship by installing port equalization systems. In other words, having several potential ports of call in the same gateway region offers flexibility to shipping lines to optimize their liner shipping networks (multiple calls or one port of call in the region) and inland networks. Such cargo exchanges between ports are also found in other sectors such as liquid bulk. The Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline (RAPL) each year transports between 25 and 30 million tons of crude oil from Rotterdam to the refineries in Antwerp. The pipeline provided a solution at a time when oil tankers became too large (i.e. ULCC and VLCC) for a direct call in Antwerp. Also some base chemicals are exchanged by pipeline between the industrial port complexes in the Delta.

4.3.3. Cooperation in the multi-port gateway region of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta

҉ Cooperation already exists in some areas Individual port authorities in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta are already cooperating in those areas where there are clear mutual interests and even on commercially sensitive issues. A first example is the establishment of a joint port community system to smoothen electronic information flows. Good examples are Portbase and APCS (Antwerp Port Community System). Portbase is the joint Port Community System of the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Portbase was formed by a merger in October 2008 between Port infolink in Rotterdam and PortNET in Amsterdam. The owners are the Port of Rotterdam Authority (75%) and the Port of Amsterdam (25%). Companies and authorities in both ports can exchange information via the platform. The aim is to become the national Dutch platform for all ports and airports within the foreseeable

Scope for more cargo bundling initiatives.

Improve inter-port linkages.

Examples of IT initiatives: Portbase and APCS.

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future based on a new system that can communicate openly with other systems. This implies that for instance airport Schiphol, all Dutch seaports and inland ports are scheduled to join Portbase in the foreseeable future. APCS was launched in May 2011 by the Antwerp Port Authority and Alfaport. Via preferential partner Descartes Systems Group companies who link to APCS can get access to a worldwide network of 35,000 logistics companies. A second example is the joint investment in hinterland infrastructure. The Port Authority of Rotterdam (35%) and the Port Authority of Amsterdam (15%) are both shareholders of Keyrail, the company that manages the Betuweroute. A third example involves joint actions on environmental issues. The ports in the Delta played a key role in the establishment of the Ecoports foundation which is aimed at exchanging environmental best practices among European ports and also at developing standards in environmental monitoring and reporting in ports. Together with the port authorities of Le Havre, Hamburg and Bremen, the Delta ports of Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Antwerp participate in the Environmental Ship Index. Shipping companies can register their ships for this index on a website. On the basis of the data entered, such as fuel consumption and emissions, each ship is a given a score from 0 to 100 (from highly-polluting to emission-free). The ports themselves decide what advantages to offer participating ships. ҉ There is scope for more (cross-border) cooperation In line with the previous section, there is some scope for further cooperation in the multi-port gateway region of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta in bundling cargo to the hinterland and in improving the functional exchanges between the different port areas. As competition in the (petro-)chemical industry is taking place at a global scale, Port Compass, the port plan which presents a vision for the port of Rotterdam to 2030, explicitly calls for a further strengthening of the regional industrial cluster also in combination with Antwerp and other nearby chemical complexes: “In 2030, the Rotterdam industry and energy sector functions as an integrated complex with Antwerp. Thus it is the largest, most modern and sustainable petrochemical and energy complex of Europe. This complex competes on a world scale through its cluster advantages, integrated supply chains and energy-efficiency. The transition to sustainable energy supply and bio based chemicals is in full swing.” (Port of Rotterdam, 2011, p. 5). A further improvement of the pipeline system in the Delta is important for the entire Delta, but also plays at the level of individual ports. Individual ports can further enhance ‘ecologies of scale’ through co-siting, asset sharing and product exchanges among chemical plants. A major point of attention is the spatial scale needed for cooperation in the Delta. Government policies in the Netherlands and Flanders are very much focused on the own territorial borders without fully acknowledging the possibilities for more intense cross-border cooperation. In the Mainport Network strategy in the Netherlands the mainports are expected to play a facilitating role, depending on the source, for the Netherlands as a whole, for the so-called Randstad Plus region (i.e. Randstad Holland plus the Brabant axis with clusters such as brainport Eindhoven) or for Randstad Holland. Also the potential role of smaller cities such as Breda, home to the new high-profile and innovation-oriented Dutch Institute for Advanced Logistics (Dinalog), and the relation with Flemish seaports and Flemish logistics growth poles is not well

Joint management of

key hinterland infrastructure.

Joint actions in the

environmental area.

Scope for further

cooperation in the area of

petro-chemical clusters.

Need for a stronger cross-

border perspective on

cooperation.

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developed in policy documents. For example, for the moment government policies remain vague on Rotterdam’s ambition to increase synergies between the industrial clusters in Rotterdam and Antwerp. Another example is the artificial restriction of the Extended Gateways policy to Flanders, involving only Flemish ports and Flemish inland centres. In reality, many of the logistics zones and inland terminals in Flanders also have a strong cargo link with the Dutch gateway Rotterdam, while many logistics zones in Northern France, the southern part of the Netherlands and Wallonia rely heavily on Flemish gateway ports. Confining the port regionalisation process to Flanders thus creates blind spots and ignores the logistics dynamics in the wider Rhine-Scheldt Delta.

The geographical confinement of policies and cooperative actions is also demonstrated by the ‘Dutch only’ connotation of Portbase and the rather limited cross-border interaction that is taking place in the area of creating knowledge relationships between Flemish and Dutch ports and logistics regions. Strengthening the international and European competitiveness of the Rhine-Scheldt Delta will require more cross-border initiatives in this field. ҉ Modalities and governance structures for cooperation The modalities and governance structures for cooperation are less important than the objectives to be achieved. Still, it is our feeling that informal forms of cooperation are easier to set up and often lead to desired results without having the burden of a heavy bureaucracy linked to a complex governance structure. The need for mergers between port authorities is often cited in the discussion on more formal forms of cooperation. It is our belief that mergers should not be an aim as such. Allowing another port authority to hold a minority shareholding in a specific port authority might enhance the sense for a common mission without completely erasing much needed competition between the ports to keep the Delta alert and efficient. Alternatively, cooperation between ports on a project basis (e.g. to establish a joint multimodal service to a hinterland region) helps to keep focused and might also yield good results. It is interesting to observe that the corporatisation of local port authorities does not imply the central government adopts a ‘laissez-faire’ approach to port cooperation. Given the strategic and economic importance of ports to the national and regional economy, governments are still heavily involved in defining a national ports’ policy which often includes elements of a more ‘centralised’ view on ports. It is important that any government initiative to facilitate/encourage cooperation between ports is not imposed on ports. Actions towards any form of cooperation, particularly in the commercial area, should mainly come from the ports themselves. The government only needs to step in when there is market failure, for example when there is abuse of market power or when external costs are too high or not optimally distributed. Port authorities typically are unwilling to have their choices limited when it comes to matters like choosing whether or not to focus on specific cargo flows. Forcing ports to go for specialisation can harm diversification in individual ports, thus increasing commercial risks for the ports concerned (due to more eggs in one basket) and making the choices to customers less rich (lower flexibility).

Plea for creating stronger cross-border knowledge relations.

Informal forms of cooperation can lead to good results.

Mergers between port authorities should not be the aim.

Empowerment of port authorities on cooperation issues.

Pitfalls linked to specialisation of ports.

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The road of institutional entrepreneurship might be the best approach towards port cooperation: the government is responsible for regulation and for developing general policy lines, but leaves the actual strategy development more to the decentralized level (i.e. the port authority and individual market players). This, in our view, is the right approach. Enforcing cooperation without a proper involvement of the port authorities and market players through a bottom-up setting would not lead to sustainable solutions.

4.4. Closing remarks: keeping an eye on the fundamentals

Space, accessibility, efficiency in dealing with supply chains and sustainability seem to be the key themes for the future port development and for developing synergies within the Rhine-Scheldt Delta region. The ports in the Rhine-Scheldt Delta can be considered as frontrunners in many of these areas through the development of innovative business cases, new governance structures and or novel ways in dealing with stakeholders. Space for port development, as one of the key themes, remains a critical point of attention. With the realization of Maasvlakte 2, Rotterdam has secured room for future growth. While the port vision document of Rotterdam refers to strong traffic growth in the coming decades, there is no foreseeable need for a Maasvlakte 3 and the growth should be accommodated by benefiting from a stronger network orientation with inland ports and other seaports. Antwerp has room for growth on the left bank within strict port boundaries. Zeebrugge, Zeeland Seaports and Amsterdam have some strategic land reserves inside the port area, but they are rapidly diminishing. Amsterdam’s vision to 2020 underlines that the existing port area should be able to cope with future growth of the traffic through an increase in land productivity, redevelopment of existing port areas and changes in land lease policy. While port-city relation issues are high on the agenda in all Delta ports, Amsterdam experiences a particularly strong tension from city expansion and related environmental concerns. The Mainport Network strategy in the Netherlands and the Extended Gateway strategy in Flanders partly help to deal with scarcity of port land, but it does not necessarily lead to a net decrease in space requirements for the Delta as a whole. It is important that the space requirements at a Delta level are examined in detail so that the implications of future port developments can be assessed in terms of their spatial implications on the sub-regional logistics and transport structure. Accessibility, particularly to the hinterland, constitutes another major theme demanding a multidisciplinary approach combining business insights, environmental management and governance structures. Given their large container traffic, the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp are walking the path of port regionalisation and intermodality more than other ports, often relying a lot on private players to take initiatives. Port authorities should take up an even more prominent role in shaping the network and in enhancing coordination and cooperation between partners involved (e.g. in view of cargo bundling, avoidance of duplication of facilities or networks, etc..). Port authorities can act as catalysts in these processes. The adoption of a catalyst role requires a supply chain focus of port authorities and an institutional and governance framework that encourages collective actions in the port community.

Institutional entrepreneur-

ship is the way forward.

Delta ports are frontrunners in

many areas.

Limits to space for port

development.

Space requirements

not only in ports.

Port authorities as catalysts in

ensuring accessibility.

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Box 8. Available space in the Delta ports

The Rotterdam port area covers 10,500 ha, of which half can be used for businesses. In 2009 about 5,272 ha was leased by the port authority to private operators. In the existing port area only 175 ha are still available for lease. This only involves small plots of land. With the Maasvlakte 2 extension a total of 1,000 ha of leasable land is created. The port of Antwerp encompasses 13,057 ha of which 3,750 are managed and 300 are owned by the Antwerp Port Authority. On top of that the port authority owns over 300 acres of storage warehouses. Currently 2 sites with infrastructure are up for lease, located on the right bank of the river (1.3 ha and 3.6 ha). One additional site is available of 8.2 ha with no infrastructure present. The Saeftinghe development zone on the left bank of the river Scheldt will have another 1,070 ha (including dock) available for logistical and industrial development. The port area of Amsterdam amounts to some 2,600 ha, of which 1,600 hectares are business sites and the remaining 1,000 ha involves harbours and other infrastructure. The supply of vacant business sites has decreased sharply from 426 hectares in 2003 to 270 in 2009. The Zeeland Seaports area amounts to 4,600 ha. This encompasses the port of Flushing and Terneuzen. In Flushing 70 ha are available for quay related activities. On the site of the Terneuzen Value Park specialised in chemical production 80 ha are available for further development. In the Quarleshaven an extra 50 ha are available creating an available area of 200 ha for Zeeland Seaports. The port of Ghent covers 4,667 ha of which 620 are occupied by water. Ghent constructed the Kluizendock with 80 ha of water and 400 ha of industrial sites. Some 80 ha of the non-waterfront space is reserved for the bio-based chemical industry. Of all available spaces near the dock about a quarter has been leased to new companies. Furthermore adjacent areas are created leaving 260 ha of new development sites. On other locations in the port 210 ha are being redesigned to be leased in the future. The port area of Zeebrugge covers 2,847 ha, of which 1,010 are occupied by water. The port authority allows 120 ha to be made available for new logistics activities. These sites are located in the land-locked part of the port and are to be used for European or worldwide import and export with a focus on developing economies.

Despite the observed modal shift, the expected future volumes of trucks to and from the hinterland remain a major concern. The capacity expansion of highways in the Delta did not keep up with the persistent traffic growth of road transport. In Rotterdam, the much needed plan to widen the A15, the only available major road giving access to the port, has been approved and should be finished by the end of 2015. In Antwerp the situation remains very precarious given that no concrete implementation steps have been taken yet to lower the pressure on the congested Antwerp ring road and tributary access roads.

When it comes to sustainability, the Delta ports have recognized quite early the necessity to carefully consider environmental issues in their strategic planning and behaviour, and to communicate actively with the entire range of stakeholders. They have taken measures to show their environmental concerns and their reliability in taking care, and have started to implement the concept of sustainability. For example, the port of Rotterdam has an ambitious program embedded in the Rotterdam Port

Focus on co-modality does not imply less demand for road infrastructure.

Sustainability is high on the agenda of Delta ports.

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Climate Initiative for reducing, capturing and storing CO2. The whole emissions discussion at international and national level does not fully recognize the advantages linked to a further intensification of ‘ecologies of scale’ in port areas. It is imperative that these ‘ecologies of scale’ advantages at individual port level (e.g. via co-siting), but also on a regional cross-border scale (e.g. the combined chemical industry in Rotterdam, Antwerp, Moerdijk and Terneuzen and along axes such as the Albert Canal), is fully acknowledged in environmental policy. A last factor is the efficiency in dealing with supply chains. In light of a stronger supply chain focus, port authorities have somewhat shifted their attention from tons to value added creation for customers and the economic region. Government policies in Flanders and the Netherlands are more and more focused on facilitating the competitiveness of the regions for the location of businesses and for strengthening the regions’ role in orchestration/control functions in global supply chains. This could even imply that, at least in principle, there would be less focus on attracting physical flows but more focus on attracting the advances centres that control/orchestrate the European or even global distribution networks and supply chains. This would require more high paid high skilled jobs with a strong focus on innovation and IT. However, there seems to be some gap between the volume growth projections for the Delta ports and the policy focus on growth in the advanced services sector. The economic position of the Netherlands and Belgium is in large part linked to trading, physical flows and manufacturing activities. These activities form the basis for the logistics industry and related services. Narrowing down the focus to pure orchestration/control type of services while de-prioritizing the accommodation of physical flows and industrial activities might make the position of the Delta more vulnerable in an economic sense. Also the strategic location of the Delta in the ‘blue banana’ remains a trump card that should be played out in international competition.

Ecologies of scale should be

part of policy agenda.

Attracting physical flows

remains important.

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Verhoeven, P. (2006), Port management reform in Europe: is there a role for the EU?, in: Notteboom, T. (ed.), Ports are more than piers – Liber Amicorum presented to Prof. Dr. Willy Winkelmans, Antwerp: De Lloyd, pp. 35-55

102


September 2011

ANNEXES

Annex 1. Global Competitiveness Index and European Competitiveness Index

Table A1: Global Competitiveness Index

Source: World Economic Forum (2000, 2007, 2010) Table A2: The European Competitiveness Index (regions and nations)

Source: based on Huggins and Davis (2006)

Economy

Rank

2010-2011 Score

Rank

2009-2010

Rank

2007-

2008

Rank

2000-

2001

Switzerland 1 5.63 1 2 5

Sweden 2 5.56 4 4 7

Singapore 3 5.48 3 7 9

United States 4 5.43 2 1 2

Germany 5 5.39 7 5 3

Japan 6 5.37 8 8 14

Finland 7 5.37 6 6 1

Netherlands 8 5.33 10 10 4

Denmark 9 5.32 5 3 6

Canada 10 5.3 9 13 11

Hong Kong 11 5.3 11 12 16

United Kingdom 12 5.25 13 9 8

Taiwan 13 5.21 12 14 21

Norway 14 5.14 14 16 20

France 15 5.13 16 18 15

Australia 16 5.11 15 19 10

Qatar 17 5.1 22 31 -

Austria 18 5.09 17 15 13

Belgium 19 5.07 18 20 12

Luxembourg 20 5.05 21 25 -

Region

Index

2006-07

Rank

2006-07

Index

2004

Rank

2004 Nations

Index

2006-07

Rank

2006-07

Index

2004

Rank

2004

be1 Région de Bruxelles 193.5 1 248.1 3 fi Finland 166.1 1 140.9 5

fi181 Uusimaa 188.3 2 261.8 1 lu Luxembourg 165.9 2 222.0 2

fr1 Île de France 185.2 3 230.0 4 ch Switzerland 135.9 3 224.7 1

se01 Stockholm 177.8 4 252.3 2 no Norway 135.6 4 184.6 3

fi18 Etelä-Suomi 175.4 5 117.7 28 dk Denmark 133.9 5 142.6 4

lu Luxembourg 165.9 6 222.0 6 se Sweden 131.7 6 136.5 6

cz01 Prague 165.7 7 - - nl Netherlands 124.1 7 129.1 7

de6 Hamburg 163.5 8 211.5 7 uk United Kingdom 121.4 8 99.2 10

uki London 162.6 9 186.4 8 at Austria 119.1 9 86.5 12

sk01 Bratislavský kraj 159.6 10 - - fr France 117.9 10 101.2 9

[…] be Belgium 115.1 11 93.2 11

nl3 West-Nederland 133.6 18 168.2 14 de Germany 114.7 12 117.7 8

nl4 Zuid-Nederland 119.3 31 135.0 20 ie Ireland 114.1 13 71.0 13

be2 Vlaams Gewest 114.0 38 98.8 41 it Italy 100.5 14 59.0 14

nl2 Oost-Nederland 112.1 41 116.1 29 es Spain 99.3 15 35.3 15

nl1 Noord-Nederland 102.4 54 87.9 50 si Slovenia 86.2 16 - -

be3 Région Wallonne 90.0 72 55.3 72 gr Greece 84.2 17 17.1 17

pt Portugal 81.1 18 34.9 16

cy Cyprus 75.5 19 - -

mt Malta 69.6 20 - -

hu Hungary 65.6 21 - -

cz Czech Republic 63.9 22 - -

sk Slovakia 63.9 23 - -

pl Poland 61.3 24 - -

ee Estonia 49.4 25 - -

lt Lithuania 45.7 26 - -

lv Latvia 42.7 27 - -

103


Annex 2. Key figures on economic development

Figure A1: Evolution of GDP in regions of the world

Source: IMF

Table A3. Internal and External EU-27 Trade by Member State (2009) as percentage of EU total (neighbouring countries in light blue)

Intra-EU27 Extra-EU27

Dispatches Arrivals Imports Exports

BE 9.2 8.4 6.1 5.8

BG 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4

CZ 3.1 2.8 1.4 1.1

DK 2.1 1.9 1.5 2

DE 23.2 20.6 19.6 27.3

EE 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2

IE 2.3 1.4 1.3 2.9

EL 0.4 1.3 1.3 0.5

ES 4.9 6 6.6 4.5

FR 9.8 13.1 10.3 12

IT 7.6 8 10.6 11.3

CY 0 0.2 0.1 0

LV 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2

LT 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4

LU 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2

HU 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.2

MT 0 0.1 0.1 0.1

NL 12.6 7.3 13.5 7.4

AT 3.2 3.8 1.9 2.5

PL 3.6 3.7 2.5 1.8

PT 1.1 1.8 0.9 0.7

RO 1 1.3 0.9 0.7

SI 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5

SK 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.5

FI 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.8

SE 2.5 2.8 2.3 3.6

UK 6.4 8.6 13.6 10.4

Source: based on Eurostat data

104


September 2011

Annex 3. Rail Freight Corridors

Table A4. List of initial Rail Freight Corridors and corresponding ERTMS Corridors

ERTMS Corridor

Rail Freight Corridors

Member

States Principle Routes Date of

implementation

1. A Rhine Corridor

NL, BE, DE, IT

Zeebrugge-Antwerp/Rotterdam-Duisburg-[Basel]-Milan-Genova

9 Nov 2013

2.

C

Benelux-France Corridor

NL, BE, FR, LU

Rotterdam-Antwerpen-Luxemburg-Metz-Dijon-Lyon/[Basel]

9 Nov 2013

3.

B

Central North-South Corridor

SE, DK, DE, AT, IT

Stockholm-Malmö-Copenhagen-Hamburg-Innsbruck-Verona-Palermo

9 Nov 2015

4. Atlantic Corridor PT, ES, FR

Sines-Lisboa/Leixões - Madrid-Medina del Campo/Bilbao/San Sebastian-Irun-Bordeaux-Paris/Le Havre/Metz -Sines-Elvas/Algeciras

9 Nov 2013

5.

Balt-Med Corridor (Baltic-Mediterranean Corridor)

PL, CZ, SK, AT, IT, SI

Gdynia -Katowice-Ostrava/Zilina-Bratislava/Vienna-/Klagenfurt - Udine- Venice/ Trieste/ •/ -Bologna/Ravenna//Graz-Maribor-Ljubljana-Koper/Trieste

9 Nov 2015

6. D Mediterranean Corridor

ES, FR, IT, SI, HU

Almería-Valencia/Madrid-Zaragoza/Barcelona-Marseille-Lyon-Turin-Milan-Verona - Padua/Venice - Trieste/Koper-Ljubljana-Budapest-Zahony (Hungarian-Ukrainian border)

9 Nov 2013

7. E Orient Corridor

CZ, AT, SK, HU, RO, BG, EL

Prague-Vienna/Bratislava-Budapest- Bucharest-Constanta - Vidin-Sofia-Thessaloniki- Athens

9 Nov 2013

8.

F

Central East-West Corridor

DE, NL, BE, PL, LT

Bremerhaven/Rotterdam/Antwerp-Aachen/Berlin-Warsaw-Terespol (Poland-Belarus border)/Kaunas

9 Nov 2015

9.

Eastern Corridor (Czech-Slovak Corridor)

CZ, SK

Prague - Horni Lide• - Žilina-Košice-•ierna nad Tisou -(Slovak/Ukrainian border )

9 Nov 2013

Source: DG Move

105


Annex 4. Modal split and market share of Delta in hinterland regions

Figure A2. Estimated market shares of the Delta ports in containerised inland cargo (by road, rail and barge) – estimates for 2007


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Schleswig-Holstein

Hamburg

Niedersachsen

Bremen

Nordrhein-Westfalen

Hessen

Rheinland-Pfalz

Baden-Württemberg

Bayern

Saarland

Berlin

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Brandenburg

Sachsen-Anhalt

Thüringen

Sachsen

GERMANY (TOTAL)

North Netherlands

East Netherlands

South Netherlands

NW Netherlands

SW Netherlands

NETHERLANDS (TOTAL)

East Belgium

Middle Belgium

West Belgium

BELGIUM (TOTAL)

Nord-Ouest France

Nord-Est France

Sud-Ouest France

Sud-Est France

FRANCE (TOTAL)

OTHER HINTERLAND REGIONS

Rhine-Scheldt Delta

Hamburg

Bremerhaven

Le Havre

106


September 2011

Figure A3. Modal split of the Delta port region in relation to hinterland regions – estimates for 2007


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Schleswig-Holstein

Hamburg

Niedersachsen

Bremen

Nordrhein-Westfalen

Hessen

Rheinland-Pfalz

Baden-Württemberg

Bayern

Saarland

Berlin

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Brandenburg

Sachsen-Anhalt

Thüringen

Sachsen

GERMANY (TOTAL)

North Netherlands

East Netherlands

South Netherlands

NW Netherlands

SW Netherlands

NETHERLANDS (TOTAL)

East Belgium

Middle Belgium

West Belgium

BELGIUM (TOTAL)

Nord-Ouest France

Nord-Est France

Sud-Ouest France

Sud-Est France

FRANCE (TOTAL)

OTHER HINTERLAND REGIONS

Barge

Rail

Road

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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RHINE-SCHELDT DELTA PORT REGION

Economy & Finance