Chapter 11
Economic Policies in a Globalized World
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
In this Chapter:
● The relation between the interest and the exchange rates
● The trilemma of economic policy
● Monetary and fiscal policies in an open world
● Currency crisis and stagflation
● The role of foreign saving
● Dirty floating and currency management
Chapter 11.1Interest rate parity
and monetary policy in
an open world
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
Interest Rate Parity
The idea behind the interest rate parity:
Given that capital is mobile, changes in interest rates reverberate
throughout the world through exchange rate variations. E.g.: The Fed
raising interest rates to 20% in 1981 caused massive devaluations in
countries vulnerable to capital outflows.
Rises in interest rates, ceteris paribus, result in appreciation of the
local currency, and expansionary monetary policy (lower interest rates)
causes depreciation.
The Four Channels
Changes in the money market affect economic activity through four major
channels:
Interest Rate
Balance Sheet
Expectations
Exchange Rate
Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
Changes in the yields on government bonds result in different incentives
for foreign investors.
If countries become more attractive due to high yields on government
bonds, capital flows in and the currency appreciates.
Conversely, during periods of economic or financial crises, capital
leaves and causes the currency to devalue.
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity establishes a relationship between
local and international interest rates, and the difference between those
rates impact the expectations in the devaluation or appreciation of the
local currency.
With “i” the national interest rate; “if” the foreign interest rate,
“ee” the expected exchange rate and “e” the actual exchange rate:
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
Countries can still maintain their monetary autonomy, but changes in
the money supply influence the price of the currency
Most importantly, the relationship between interest rate and
exchange rate reinforces the monetary policy outcomes
When combating inflation, a central bank raises interest rates,
which leads to a currency appreciation that helps with inflationary
pressures
When facing a growth gap, the monetary authority lowers the interest
rates, causing a currency devaluation that boosts net exports and
aggregate demand
Covered Interest Rate Parity
If there are free capital flows and financial markets work well, there
is a stronger link between interest rates and exchange rates through the
covered interest rate parity.
If e is the spot exchange rate, f forward exchange rate, i domestic
interest rate, and if foreign interest rate, then:
Covered Interest Rate Parity: Future Contracts
Agents can buy and sell currency establishing, today, that a
transaction will take place at some point in the future
Because agents can borrow or lend using the risk-free interest rates
in the local and international markets, the future price of a
currency has to bear a direct relation to the difference in interest
rates
Covered Interest Rate Parity
This has two main implications:
1. Changes in the local interest rate have an impact on the relative
price of the currency
2. International central banks’ decisions are transmitted to local
markets through the interest rate or the exchange rate channels
The US Example
Market agents closely follow the Fed’s decisions on monetary policy.
When the interest rate is expected to increase, the dollar appreciates
vis-a-vis other currencies, and a decrease in the of the target funds
rate causes the dollar to devalue.
For example, an increase in the interest rate in the American Market
leads to a depreciation of foreign currencies against the USD;
The US Example
QM
MD
MS
r
QM
SUSD
DTWB
Q USD in world market
QUSD
e
Nominal r etwb/USD S’USD
Q’USD
e'
QM’
r'
MS’
The US Example
Assuming that the strength of the US dollar is measured in relation to a
trade-weighted basket of currencies (TWB), then a higher exchange rate
in the graphic represents an appreciation of the greenback against the
currencies from the rest of the world.
An increase in the US fed funds rate will cause a surge of capital
outflows to the US market (SUSD to S’USD) and a relative appreciation
of the USD (e to e’).
Covered Interest Rate Parity among developed countries currencies
● Recently, the covered interest rate parity, which has been a staple
in international finance models, seems to be weakening among
developed countries currencies.
● Quantitative easing does change the relative price of currencies,
but currency manipulation is not its primary intended target.
What could explain the breakdown of the parity?
The covered interest rate parity misses one dimension: basis risk.
Covered Interest Rate Parity among developed countries currencies
Covered Interest Rate Parity among developed countries currencies
The figure shows the difference between the euro and the US dollar
adjusted for their interest rate differentials since 2008.
While many economists claim that it is time to reconsider our current
model, we can explain these breakdowns with two major events:
1. lack of liquidity following the financial crisis in 2008
2. increase in sovereign risk in the European debt crisis in 2011
South Africa and the currency crisis of 1998
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
South Africa and the currency crisis of 1998
South Africa initially had a dual exchange rate system that separated the
financial market for rand from the trade account: charging customers a higher
rand price for foreign exchange if the purpose was to acquire assets abroad.
With the introduction of the new democratic government, the country
liberalized its trade and capital accounts, dismantling capital controls on
the two rates.
By 1997, when Nelson Mandela was President, when the Asian crisis hit world markets, South Africa was the only Sub-Saharan African country truly interconnected with the global financial system.
South Africa and the currency crisis of 1998
Between the end of April 1998 and the end of August that year, the rand
depreciated by 28 percent in nominal terms against the U.S. dollar.
In response, the South African government hiked interest rates by 7%
(70bps), which exacerbated the crisis. This resulted in a recession
starting in the third quarter of 1998.
South Africa and the currency crisis of 1998: The LessonsSouth Africa’s decision to liberalize the foreign currency market
resulted in robust capital inflows, both though FDI and portfolio
investments. However, it also made the country more prone to external
shocks.
The situation highlighted the tradeoffs of global integration, and how
it constrains/ influences the decisions of policymakers.
Chapter 11.2Monetary and fiscal
policies in a
globalized world
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
Monetary Policy and the Exchange Rate
In addition to the market for goods and services, monetary policy also
has an effect on the exchange rate.
Exchange rate movements complement the action of central banks; A
decrease in the interest rate should bring a devaluation of the currency
as well as changes in investment and consumption decisions.
Monetary Policy and the Exchange Rate
A monetary expansion should increase aggregate demand through
higher investment, consumption and net exports (the last one
through the accompanying depreciation of the currency)
Y
AS
Y*
P AD
YGrowth gap
AD’
goal of expansionarymonetary policy
Fiscal Policy and Exchange Rates: Expectations
Unlike monetary policy, the relationship between fiscal policy and
exchange rates is far more context-dependent, with expectations playing
a crucial role in how the exchange rate moves according to changes in
the government budget.
E.g.: An expansionary fiscal policy should result in a currency
devaluation if market agents view it as unsustainable; there is a chance
of debt monetization, capital flees the country, and the price of the
local currency spikes.
Fiscal Policy and Exchange Rates: Net Exports
Net exports are another transmission mechanism from fiscal policy to
exchange rates.
E.g. Assuming no Ricardian equivalence, a decrease in taxes will boost
disposable income, leading to more demand for imports and thus creating
an incentive for the depreciation the currency.
However, this depends on on the perception of market agents regarding
the tax decrease, mainly whether its impact on the fiscal deficit is
sustainable or not.
Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes
With fixed exchange rate regimes, authorities cannot freely choose the
level of interest rate or fiscal imbalances, as the central bank needs
to act to keep the exchange rate stable.
In fixed exchange rate regimes central banks are committed to
interventions to supply liquidity in foreign currency or sterilize
excess capital inflows.
Therefore, central bank passive reactions to maintain a peg may
neutralize the action of other authorities in the monetary or fiscal
dimensions.
Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: Examples of neutralization
Imagine a country with an overvalued peg. A decrease in the interest
rate will make the local bonds less attractive and should result in
capital outflows as agents rebalance their portfolios, possibly even
triggering a speculative attack.
To keep capital from fleeing the country, the central bank may need to
increase the interest rate to incentivize agents to repatriate their
funds.
Chapter 11.3 Currency crises
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
Currency Crises
A currency crisis happens after a sudden devaluation that creates either
a growth gap or an adverse supply shock.
There are many reasons for that, but all currency crises share one
common trait: a rapid deterioration of expectations regarding either the
management of the economy or the country’s economic fundamentals.
Currency Crises and Fixed Exchange Rates
A fixed exchange regime is feasible only as long as the monetary
authority has the ability to intervene in the foreign exchange market to
provide or reduce liquidity in foreign currency.
Market agents can try to speculate on the strength of central banks by
exacerbating the underlying weakness of the exchange rate regimes. E.g.
borrowing in the local currency and fleeing the country to buy
international assets in an overvalued currency, or betting in the
opposite direction in an undervalued one.
Britain and Black Wednesday
On 16 September 1992, the
British government was forced to
withdraw the pound from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) after it was unable to
keep the pound above its agreed
lower limit in the ERM.
The country suffered from a
speculative attack, with short
sellers profiting from the
devaluation that followed the
pound withdraw.
Argentina and Conjoined Crises
In 2001, following the hyperinflation of the 1980’s and 1990’s,
Argentina suffered from a financial crisis after a currency crisis.
Argentinian authorities went beyond overvalued pegs to restore
confidence in the management of the economy and to induce the
normalization of price processes.
They created a currency board in which a convertible peso was tied to
the American dollar (it lasted from 1992 to 2002). How did it work?
Every peso in circulation had to be backed by a dollar in reserve
assets. In fact, dollars were accepted as legal tender, since they were
fully convertible into pesos.
Argentina and Conjoined Crises
The monetary base contracted following capital outflows, a result of the
1-1 parity between the supplies of the peso and the reserve assets.
A severe recession started in 1998 and the interest rates began to climb
anticyclically, reaching 16% in 2001. In December, the Argentinian
government defaulted on its external debt and, in January of 2002, it
abandoned the convertibility of dollars at the rate of 1 USD to 1 peso.
A financial crisis followed, as banks’ liabilities, mostly in USD,
shot up in value, while the corresponding assets, in peso, stayed the
same.
Argentina and Conjoined Crises
When a currency crisis leads to a financial crisis, there is a sharp
reduction in both aggregate demand and supply.
In Argentina, with the USD reaching 4 pesos in 2002, a severe
contraction in aggregate supply resulted in a depression that saw GDP
falling over 10% and inflation shooting up to 80%. The depression of
2002 was even more severe due to the fact that the economy had already
been shrinking, with an average negative growth of -3% in the 1999-2001
period.
The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998
The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998
The Asian crisis began when Thai authorities let the baht float on July
2, abandoning its peg to the USD after months of fighting speculative
attacks. A week later, the Philippine peso dropped significantly, while
Indonesia widened the trading band of the rupiah. In August, Indonesia
let its currency float, and in November the South Korean won fell below
1,000 to a dollar for the first time. Malaysia unveiled capital controls
that limit capital outflows, while Hong Kong and China managed to fend
off speculative attacks.
How did the Crisis Happen?
The seeds of the crisis were in the current account, which averaged
-8% of the GDP in the five years prior to the crisis. A similar
pattern of current account deficits was pervasive across Asia in the
mid-1990s.
GDP contracted in all Southeast Asian countries in 1998: -13% GDP
growth in Indonesia, -7.5% in Malaysia, -5.9% in Hong Kong, -5.7% in
South Korea, and -0.5% in the Philippines.
Asian Financial Crisis
Y
AS
Y*
P
AD’Y AD
AS’ 1997-98
1999-00
Price Level
Debt crisis, the lost decade and hyperinflation in Latin America
History of the Latin American Crisis
In the 1970s Latin American countries borrowed heavily to induce
industrialization. When the Fed hiked interest rates to 20% a year in
the early 1980s, capital outflows caused massive devaluations in Latin
American countries.
Policymakers in Latin America imposed import restrictions, tightened
capital controls and asked for funds from multilateral organization,
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Because of the total lack of fiscal restraint, governments started to
monetize the deficit, jumpstarting inflationary processes that resulted
in hyperinflation in many countries.
The Latin American Crisis
For Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru the annual consumer
price index topped 3,000% at some point in the 1982-1994 period.
In all the countries, debt monetization - because of external
restrictions and escalating fiscal deficits - caused hyperinflation.
Only after the countries committed to fiscal rectitude (at least
temporarily) and enacted an overvalued peg to anchor expectations was
the hyperinflation finally quenched.
All of them ended up defaulting on their external debt at some point in
this period
Reforms for disinflation –the case of Israel
Israel in the 80’s
Israel went through a hyperinflation period in 1984, when annual
inflation was 400% and rising
The budget deficit was 17% of GDP, capital outflows constantly
pressured the shekel to depreciate, and productivity had been
stagnant for over a decade
Israel was done with spiraling prices by 1987, when for the first
time since 1972 annual inflation dipped below 20%
How did the country do it?
The case of Israel
There were significant cuts in government expenditure, and the new
shekel was pegged to the US dollar. The international environment also
helped: oil prices, a major import, were down and the greenback was
depreciating against the rest of the world’s currencies. Market reforms
were credible.
Israeli institutions were stronger than those of the average middle-
income country. This allowed the country to make the reforms work in the
1980s and, since then, to climb the development ladder, escaping the
middle-income trap.
Rescue packages in developed countries
Rescue packages in developed countries
Ireland and Iceland were both extremely successful in the years before
the great financial crisis.
From 1996-2008 GDP growth in Ireland and Iceland outpaced the world by a
comfortable margin, on average. Ireland, in particular grew more than
10% a year from 1996 to 2000 and over 5% from 2001 to 2007.
The crisis revealed real estate bubbles and financial fragility that
caused a systemic failure of each country’s banking system and resulted
in a much stronger recession than in the rest of the world.
The Crisis in Ireland
The cost of bailing out the banks in Ireland was so high that the
country was on the verge of defaulting on its sovereign debt in
2010.
Because it is part of the Eurozone, Irish authorities could not act
as lenders of last resort and relied instead on help from abroad.
Ireland was able to stave off a full default by negotiating a
financial assistance program with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the ECB that totaled EUR 85 billion.
The Crisis in Iceland
Iceland, unlike Ireland, allowed its banks to fail.
Icelandic banks were so large that their assets were 10 times the
size of the island’s GDP.
Iceland was also a relatively indebted country, and in 2007 its
sovereign debt totaled €50 billion, more than 7 times the
country’s GDP.
Icelandic authorities negotiated a rescue package of USD 5.1 billion
with the IMF.
The Crisis in Iceland
Iceland, like Malaysia in 1998, chose a different route from most
countries when faced with capital flows reversal: it instituted
capital controls to maintain some measure of monetary policy autonomy
and prevent the currency from plunging.
There was no direct default regarding sovereign debt but the picture
is murkier if we consider the indirect effects of the capital controls
that the Icelandic authorities implemented.
Takeaways from the Iceland/Ireland Situation
The different decisions by Irish and Icelandic authorities reinforce the
inexistence of a fit-for-all strategy in terms of economic policies.
Choices matter and tradeoffs are important in decision-making.
Countries take distinct paths with different costs and benefits
resulting from their choices.
China, sterilization and the holdings of US debt
The Chinese Peg
China’s hard peg was in place from 1994 to 2005. Since then the
country has had a crawling peg.
In 2012 the PBOC announced a wider interval band for the trading of
its currency.
During the 2000s a combination of growth and integration resulted in a
jump in capital coming into the Chinese economy, despite capital
controls. The monetary authority sterilized the entry of foreign money
to keep its undervalued hard peg first and, later, to maintain a smooth
appreciation through a crawling peg.
What happens if China dumps all of its American assets?
In China, there are two possibilities:
1) Purchases of other foreign assets
2) Repatriation of reserve assets
There are no macroeconomic effects in the Chinese market but given the
size of China’s reserve assets there will be consequences in the
international public debt market, with a surge in the supply of loanable
funds in whatever market the People’s Bank of China decides to park its
reserves.
What happens if China dumps all of its American assets?
For the foreign market there is
an increase in the supply of
loanable funds (SLF to S’LF),
with a corresponding decrease in
the interest rate (r to r’),
with accompanying effects on the
market of goods and services,
specifically growth in the
aggregate demand given the lower
cost of capital.
Real r
QLF
DLF
SLF
r
QLF
S’LF
Q’LF
r'
What about in the United States?
In the United States, there are two immediate effects:
1) In the loanable funds market the exit of Chinese money from the
bonds market would represent a decrease in the supply of loanable
funds`.
2) In the foreign exchange market there would be an increase in the
demand for foreign currency.
What about in the United States?
There would be two simultaneous effects: an increase in interest rate
that the monetary authority can offset by purchasing the bonds sold by
China (i.e. printing money), and a devaluation of the greenback.
Net exports would go up and the effect on the rest of aggregate demand
would depend on the reaction by the Fed.
A minor currency crisis would be likely and inflation should go up.
The economy should eventually rebalance and there should be no lasting
damage.
The US government is not a hostage to Chinese policymakers who yield
power by holding trillions of dollars of American securities.
Chapter 11.4 The trilemma of
economic policy
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
What is the trilemma?
A country can pick only two out of three fundamental options:
1) Active monetary policy;
2) Fixed exchange rate;
3) Free capital flows.
Pursuing all three eventually leads to a speculative attack
and the abandoning of the fixed exchange rate regime.
The Trilemma Explained
Given the interest rate parity, if countries try to change interest
rates there will be an impact on the currency markets (if there are free
capital flows).
In a fixed exchange rate regime, the only way to proceed with an
expansionary or contractionary monetary policy is to be able to
intervene in the currency market to stem capital outflows or sterilize
capital inflows.
Reserves are finite and sterilizing capital inflows has fiscal costs,
thus countries cannot maintain fixed exchange rate regimes and at the
same time maintain monetary policy autonomy if capital can move freely.
The Trilemma Explained
Eventually agents will start betting heavily that a country cannot
maintain a peg and the central bank will capitulate
The only way to maintain a peg with free capital movements is to have an
endogenous interest rate. In essence, the central bank can either have a
say in the interest rate or exchange rate, but not both, unless it has
capital controls.
The Chinese trilemma and the speculative attack on the yuan
China’s 2015 Speculative Attack
China grappled with an indirect speculative attack on the yuan in 2015,
even though the country had at that time trillions of dollars in
reserve.
The country assumed it could maintain tight control over its money
supply and its exchange rate and, at the same time, introduce measures
to free up the flow of capital.
Chinese reserves (in USD trillions) and RMB per USD exc.rate, 2004-2018
China’s 2015 Speculative Attack
A global recession and the fear of a hard landing by the Chinese economy
shifted the peg from undervalued to overvalued.
Because the PBOC kept the yuan peg relatively unchanged, the Chinese
central bank had to start selling foreign currency to investors and
companies that wanted to take their money out of the country.
What Were the Options?
Faced with the assault, Chinese authorities had several options:
They could make capital controls tighter, impeding or even
prohibiting different types of outflows.
Increase the interest rate to try to bring in more foreign capital.
Ride the crisis out, until its reserves were close to exhausted.
Accede to the attack.
They chose the last one.
Repercussions of this Decision
On two days in August 2015 the PBOC allowed the yuan to devalue by 3%.
It started a process of mini-devaluations until there were no more net
capital outflows. China slowly brought the yuan closer to its shadow
price; the price of the yuan if the country had a fully flexible
currency regime.
In 2016 after the equivalent of US$1 trillion was spent on thwarting the
speculative attack, the Chinese economy stabilized. Capital outflows or
inflows were minuscule, and confidence rebounded.
In 2018 Chinese foreign holdings stood at around $US3 trillion.
Aftermath
China continues to manipulate its currency, but without real economic
effects on the rest of the world.
The yuan is still subject to PBOC’s control, but its value does not
influence world exporters negatively, because the PBOC keep it close to
what it would be if the currency was floating.
The main reason that the PBOC does not allow the currency to completely
float is to keep a hold on volatility.
Chapter 11.5The role of foreign
saving – sectoral
imbalances
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
The Role of Foreign Saving
Saving is a key variable to determine how likely poor countries are to
emerge as developed economies.
This is the main advantage of the choice for free capital flows; with
it, foreign banks and companies are more likely to commit funds to
emerging markets.
Sectoral Balance
Sectoral balance analysis is a simple way to integrate the government
budget as well as private and external saving. Algebraically:
S – I + T – G + M – X = 0
The first part (saving and investment) represents the balance of the
private sector; the second, taxes and government expenditure is the
balance of the public sector; and the third, imports and exports of
goods and services (the current account), is the external balance.
Sectoral Balance
A positive balance means that a sector has a net saving (is
accumulating wealth/reimbursing debts)
A negative balance means that a sector has a net indebtedness (is
accumulating debt/dissimulating wealth)
The balances must add to zero: it is impossible to have a situation
in which all countries enjoy a surplus, or all of them post a
deficit
Source: World Bank (2018).
Analyzing Currency Crises Through the Lens of Sectoral Balances
Private and public debt accumulation, financed by external
creditors, results in the building up of foreign debt that
eventually cannot be financed anymore.
A sudden stop of capital flows and a current account reversal lead
to devaluations or defaults on sovereign debt.
The public sector intervenes to sustain the private sector
deleveraging and the government deficit increases. If the deficit is
financed with bonds, there is an increase in public debt; if
monetized, inflation.
Why is the World Not Converging?
One of the reasons is that money tends to flow to more stable countries,
and those tend to be rich.
Europe is the recipient of the highest number of FDIs, most are intra-
European investment; an Italian company investing in Portugal, for
instance.
Asia is also an important destination for new foreign investment.
Africa, however, welcomes relatively few foreign investment, and
institutional instability explains most of the aversion of investors.
Source: Unctad (2017).
Currency Crises and Stagflation
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
Currency Crises and Stagflation
Currency crises may cause stagflation through changes in the short-
term aggregate supply.
External vulnerability, in terms of large current account deficits,
may trigger sudden stops of capital flows which make imports more
expensive.
Depending on the size of external restrictions, the productive
capacity of the economy falls.
It is hard to predict a situation in which a currency crisis generates
stagflation, as changes in the exchange rate affect prices through
costs, but also, in normal situations, aggregate demand through net
exports.
Output Through the Production Side
Remember 𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴L(𝑡𝑡), 𝐴𝐴N(𝑡𝑡)), where Y is output, A is an index of productivity (technology), K capital, L labor, and N natural
resources
Usually, production factors are fixed in the short run, and the same is
true of natural resources. Countries usually have a fixed amount of
natural resources in the short run, and only exploration and development
can increase it in the long run
However, in some countries their natural resources increase in the short
run, shifting aggregate supply to the right and creating the conditions
for expansion without inflationary pressures.
Currency Crises and Output
A currency crisis following a sudden stop of capital inflows usually
results in a sharp decrease in imports.
Imports of intermediate goods, which are either natural resources or
capital goods, are tied to both short and long run aggregate supply
through the country’s production function.
A sudden stop of capital flows and shrinking imports may lead to a
reshuffling of production factors that decreases aggregate
productive capacity.
The pass-through of massive currency devaluations to prices also
reduces production.
Currency Crises and Output
Y
AS’
AD
Y’ Y
AS
P’P
Price Level
Currency Crises and Output
In the beginning, actual output is almost at its potential level
(Y), and inflation at P
As the supply shock from the currency crisis unfolds, Output falls,
to AS’, and the price level increases, from P to P’
The result is a period of recession alongside inflation
Stagflation arises from relative price changes that reduce productive
capacity. Imports become much more expensive, and the marginal
productivity of the economy decreases as inputs are used to substitute
imports instead of their earlier more productive use.
Turkey and Stagflation
In 2011 the Turkish lira plummeted against the major world
currencies, falling over 20% against the US dollar
The weaker lira contributed to a reduced aggregate supply, with
corresponding deceleration in growth and rising prices
Growth stalled, decreasing from almost 9% in 2011 to a little over
2% in 2012, while inflation picked up its pace, from 6.5% to almost
9% in the same period.
The adjustment period was relatively quick and as aggregate supply
started to return to its earlier path, growth increased in 2013
(4.2%) as the pressure on prices eased (7.5%).
Source: World Bank
Chapter 11.6 Dimensions of currency
policy
Economics of Global Business, 1st Edition, MIT Press Copyright © Rodrigo Zeidan 2018
The Dimensions of Government Choices of Currency Policies
● The type of exchange rate
regime
○ fixed exchange rate
○ flexible exchange rate
○ currency board
○ foreign currency as legal
tender
● The operationalization of
currency market
interventions and reserve
assets building
○ Depreciated or Overvalued
peg?
○ Is the peg hard or
crawling?
○ Free capital flows or
autonomy of monetary
policy?
Fixed Exchange-Rate
Overvalued• Autonomy in monetary policy• Requires reserve assets and/or closed
financial account.
Overvalued/Undervalued• No monetary policy• Interest rate fluctuates with capital flows. • No reserves or closed financial accounts
needed.
Undervalued• Autonomy in monetary policy• Requires sterilization of capital inflows
and/or closed financial account.
Flexible Exchange-
Rate
Fully Floating• Autonomy in monetary policy• No need for reserve assets• In the US, reserves are foreign
holdings of US assets.
Dirty Floating• Autonomy in monetary policy• Reserve assets required.
Currency Board or
Dollarization
Eurozone• ECB has autonomy in monetary
policy • Reserve assets important for
eurozone countries.• National governments have no
monetary policy.
Dollarization• No monetary policy.• Interest rate fluctuates with capital
flows. • No reserves needed.
The Great Financial Crisis and the Turkish Lira
In July 2008, the Turkish Government would not intervene to support the
lira. As the financial crisis deepened, the government changed its
stance.
The government faced three options:
1. Use of reserve assets,
2. An increase of the interest rate,
3. A combination of the two.
Turkish officials chose direct intervention with reserve assets, selling
foreign currency in the local market to try and prevent further
devaluation of the lira.
The Great Financial Crisis and the Turkish Lira
The Turkish intervention was not successful in staving off aggregate
supply and demand shocks, and the economy contracted by more than 13%,
year on year, in the first quarter of 2009.
Countries with managed capital accounts, like China, were able to keep
deflationary pressures off their currency markets.
Exchange rate regimes have a major impact on the choices of economic
policy. Tradeoffs determine the costs and benefits, as well as the
limits of attempted interventions in foreign currency markets.
The underperformance of the Malaysian ringgit.
Malaysia in the Asian Crisis
Malaysia escaped the Asian crisis of 1997-98 faster than other Asian
countries. In the other Asian countries, flight to quality engendered
currency and financial crises.
The Malaysian government established capital controls to prevent capital
outflows.
Malaysia’s GDP contracted by 7.5% in 1998, with Indonesia (- 13%),
South Korea (-6%) and Thailand (-7.6%) following suit. Malaysia
recovered quicker, with GDP increasing by more than 7% a year in the two
subsequent years,
Current Currency Policy in Malaysia
The government still tries to maintain control over the currency policy,
with one example the explicit policy of non-internationalization.
The central bank prohibits the trading of ringgit assets outside of its
jurisdiction, with the aim to decrease the volatility that usually
accompanies free capital flows.
Nevertheless, the ringgit is still a floating currency; dirty floating
for sure, but it strengthens and weakens according to the path of the
Malaysian economy.
Lessons From the Performance of the Ringgit
In 2015 and 2016, as the world economy cooled down, so did the ringgit.
The currency lost more than 20% of its value, in line with the rest of
the emerging markets.
Capital controls may diminish volatility but do not change the
fundamental relationship between the vigor of the economy and the
relative value of its currency.
The ultimate choice of national governments is about the extent of
integration with the rest of the world. As long as the economy is
partially or totally integrated, authorities cannot have total control
over the exchange rate.
Dirty floating and a costly lunch in Mexico
Donald Trump and the Mexican Peso
On the day that
Donald Trump was
elected, the
Mexican peso
devalued 7.3%,
falling a further
6% in the next two
days. By the end
of 2016 the
Mexican currency
had devalued
almost 20% against
the US dollar.
History of the Peso
In the wake of the currency and financial crisis in 1994
Mexico opted for a dirty floating currency system.
This lasted until Donald Trump was elected, when Banco de
Mexico started to intervene in the foreign currency market
again, auctioning American dollars to contain the depreciation
of the peso.
Mexico’s tradeoffs
Dirty floating systems have clear tradeoffs. In order to be able to
intervene, central banks must first form reserves in foreign currency.
Reserves come at a fiscal cost equal to the differential in the interest
rates of the country and the American treasury bonds.
The Mexican government decided to restart interventions after the peso
had plunged on the back of uncertainties regarding trade, migration and
financial policies of President Donald Trump.
Two-Money Systems
Two Money Systems
An inefficient but common system adopted, usually, by emerging countries
to control currency and money markets
It was quite widespread in poor countries in the mid-20th century. It
may be used as a result of civil war (as in China during the 1927-1950
period), closed capital accounts (Tanzania from the 1960s to 1990s),
reunification (as in Germany in 1990), currency crises (Latin America in
the 1980s), currency board system (Argentina in the 1990s), artificial
trade surplus (Cuba) etc.
China’s Two-Money System
China had different two-money systems during the 20th century. During
the civil war period, two different currencies were issued by Communist
Party and the Kuomintang. From 1978-1994 China again dabbled in a two-
money system to ease the transition to a market-based economy.
Foreigners could not hold renminbi (the people’s money), and used
foreign exchange certificates issued by the Bank of China and accepted
at designated tourist hotels and the state-run Friendship Stores. Thus
the renminbi itself had two rates, one for trade and another for
transactions inside China.
China’s Two-Money System
In 1994, The Chinese government unified its two rates at the swap-market
rate of 8.7 to the dollar – much weaker than the official rate of 5.8.
At the same time, China abolished the foreign exchange certificates. The
black market faded quickly, providing a simple lesson in microeconomics:
if governments try to control prices without taking care of the
resulting excess demand or supply, a black market will emerge; however,
it dissipates as soon as the controls are eased.
Why Adopt a Two-Money System?
There are two main reasons:
1. The home rate acts as an overvalued fixed exchange rate that keeps
prices stable and inflation in check.
2. The trade exchange rate is undervalued in an effort to promote
exports.
Two-Money Systems: Black Markets
Countries can have even more exchange rates for foreign currency, with
distinct prices for trade, tourism etc. This was a feature of the 1980s
in Latin America. If their expenses were to be higher than the official
limit, travelers had to buy foreign currency on the black market, at
exorbitant rates.
Nigeria, Venezuela, and Argentina in 2015 all set up artificially low
rates for hard currency with significant restrictions regarding who
could buy dollars at these low prices. People simply shifted to the
black market. Meanwhile, multinationals had difficulties repatriating
profits due to capital controls.
Main Takeaways
Multiple currency regimes have little economic benefit to offer to
governments not desperate for foreign currency.
Distortions create black markets, allocate capital inefficiently from
sectors that use imported factors of production to export-oriented ones,
shift the incentives of individuals to acquire foreign currency, and
limit FDI inflows and outflows.