Economics and International Relations

Running head: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Economics and International Relations:

A Conceptual and Analytical Consideration of Global Economic Drivers

Austin Lee

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 2

The study of economics and the study of international relations (IR) have two things in

common. Both can drown you in theories and neither are particularly agreed upon. Each

economist and each international relations academic will have their own opinions on what makes

the world tick, and all are convinced that they’re right. Politics in international relations and the

global economy don’t have a striking causal relationship on the surface, but when you dig below

the surface of the IR theories, it becomes evident that one drives the other. The study of this

phenomenon is called International Political Economy (IPE). IPE is a relatively new school of

thought in social sciences; one that attempts to connect the dots between economics and

international relations. The scope of IPE is flexible, the scholars within the discipline have

disagreements on what exactly constitutes the boundaries of the study. However, the basis of the

study is to find the connection between political actions shaping the global economy. The

broadness of IPE leaves it fraught with critics, attacking the discursive analysis of the

trichotomy. IPE focuses on the three major theoretical concepts of International Relations;

Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. The divides of these extents are not always clear, in

fact, often the means on which each theoretical construct attains its end are similar, but the

perception of the ends is what differentiates them. However, the question in economics is never

what happened (economics is often reactionary), but why it happened. From a purely economic

perspective, money is the driver of the global economy. This is an agreeable and understandable

motive for states while constructing policy, but International Political Economy draws the

conclusion that influence on the global markets is much more of a chess game than it seems. This

paper will discuss the three main schools of International Political Economy, and then analyze

the actual economic drivers.


To begin, there must be an understanding of the history that led to an International

Political Economy. The initial stages of a global economy were mercantilism. The mercantile

system was coined by Adam Smith, a leading economist in the 18th century. The Library of

Economics and Liberty defines mercantilism as economic nationalism for the purpose of

building a wealthy and powerful state. The goal of a mercantilist system is to maintain a highly

favorable trade balance, accomplished by imposing high tariffs on imports and maximizing

domestic resources. The decline of mercantilism bred the rise of Free-Trade agreements (FTA),

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and Multinational Corporations (MNC). World War I

was the first stage of failure of autarkic protectionist economies. The proceeding economic chaos

caused by WWI eventually led to the uprising of the regimes responsible for World War II.

World leaders recognized the need for inter- and post-war economic stabilizers, birthing the

Bretton Woods institutions. 43 countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to repair the

devastated post-war economy and encourage global economic cooperation (Ghizoni, 2013). Two

institutions were immediately established, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,

their purpose being to stabilize exchange rates, lend reserve currencies with balance-of-payments

deficits, and to provide financial assistance in the reconstruction of the world economy.

Following the stream of economic globalization set about by Bretton Woods, the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was negotiated in 1957, dropping or reducing

thousands of tariffs, opening the door for billions of dollars of world trade (Rose, 2009). GATT

evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO), further constructing the cooperation of an

international economy. Along with these three Bretton Woods Institutions, there have been

several intellectual forums of world leaders, most recently and still prominently, the G20. The


G20 is a summit of leaders from the economically leading 19 countries and the European Union,

to continue the growth of a supportive global economy. G20 nations account for 80% of global

GDP, three quarters of international trade and two thirds of the world population (G20 Germany,

2016). With the parameters of our current IPE elucidated, the question remains of why a state

actor would be willing to contribute to this international system.

The oldest vein of thought in international relations is realism. Since the commencement

of ancient civilization, states, which are the principle actors of realism, have been focused on

security by means of power. Self-survival is the most critical agenda in any established state, and

especially with an emerging state. What differentiates realism from all other IR paradigms, is

realists want power, and will do anything to get it. In classical realism, ethics play no part in the

endeavor for power, and their gain will almost certainly come at someone else’s loss. This zero-

sum game concept is the basis of action for realists, whether politically or economically. They

believe the global system is anarchic, and conflict takes the place of politics. Realism considers

things as they are, not as they should be. One of the first theorists to outline this concept was

Thucydides (460-411 B.C.E.), unwittingly outlining the foundations of the realist perspective for

centuries to come. In his account of the History of the Peloponnesian war, the famous “Melian

Dialogue”, a debate between Spartans and Athenians, explains the cause for the Peloponnesian

War. The line from the dialogue, “Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in

power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”, identifies the

moral code of the realist (Maye, 2013). In this era, wealth and military strength were causally

related. In Thucydides’ History, he explains conflict as, “a matter not so much of arms as of


money, which makes the arms of use”.1 The International Political Economy during this time

was simple; conquer territory, and gain resources, wealth, and power. There are other examples

of this theory at work, such as the Trojan war. Historians argue that the Achaeans were in pursuit

of Troy because it was a wealthy, prosperous city with a location that controlled trade routes,

rather than the pursuit of Helen, as Homer’s Iliad would suggest. The Roman Empire, always

striving for increased power, defeated Carthage, likely motivated by the financial gains of

controlling the Mediterranean Sea and its trade network (Kat, 2015). This sentiment of achieving

wealth being the primary objective of states continued into to the Current Era, and evolved into

Mercantilism. Mercantilist economic policy assumes that all states achieve wealth for the

purpose of increasing military power and therefore security. Realists and mercantilists go hand in

hand, for the focus of the theories is to be self-sufficient. However, as industrialization and

globalization became inevitable, the thesis of mercantilism became less realistic and applicable.

With free trade evolving rapidly, the realist approach became nationalist, and bred the

process of protectionism, which is the theory of shielding a state’s domestic industries by

limiting imports, whether through quotas or substantial tariffs. Conceptually, protectionism and

mercantilism ends seem similar, but protectionism limits free trade, instead of abandoning it. At

this stage, we begin to see the arguments for the realist course of economic action clash against

the rising liberal tide, as states begin to grow wary of global competition. Free Trade is

conceptually contradictive to a realist; it requires parties to mutually benefit from the transaction,

instead of providing zero-sum gains for the stronger state involved. Unfortunately for realists,

Classical Trade Theory, or simply, competitive advantage, provided too strong of an argument to

1 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, Chapter 83


ignore. Realists did then, and still do now, endorse “Import Substitution Industrialization”, the

policy of replacing foreign imports with domestic production. (Baer, 1972). Industrialization is

important in developing strong manufacturing, not only allowing for higher quality military

products, but because of the fact that manufactured goods are more valuable than raw materials.

Strong manufacturing means the ability to maintain a positive trade balance, which in many

realist minds, is the key to a strong state, politically and economically. Realists abhor

intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization because it means further

opening boundaries to change. A realist could also argue that intergovernmental organization’s

such as the WTO are incredibly inefficient (Perry, 2008). The WTO has been stuck on the Doha

round of negotiations since 2001, with talks disintegrating between the United States and India in

2008, over agricultural trade and special safeguard mechanism (SSM).2 From an economic

standpoint, their apprehensions are somewhat valid. Historically most of the major free trade

agreements internationally are “Hub and Spoke”, meaning that one large state negotiates with

multiple small actors (Barfield, 2013). These smaller states often see a large amount of benefit

trading with the wealthier state, and occasionally, the large state actually suffers from the FTA.

For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an FTA between the United

States, Canada, and Mexico, set the precedent for US corporations outsourcing labor, and then

selling back to their own country (Faux, 2013). The result was a landslide decline of

manufacturing in the US. NAFTA is arguably responsible for a net loss of up to 600,000 jobs

and as of 2015 a $58 billion trade deficit with Mexico (McBride, 2016). Similar trade deficits

can be found worldwide, and realists angered with the results of free-trade have formed an

2 In Doha Round agriculture: a tool that will allow developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges or price falls.


alternative form of trade policy, described as “retaliatory protectionism”, using trade subsidies

and tariffs to pressure other nations to end market-distorting policies (Boudreaux, 2011). The

predictable pattern of realist behavior is when the economy declines, protectionist policies

increase, exacerbating the downturn. While trade increases at a faster rate than output during

times of economic prosperity, trade growth falls at three times the rate of GDP growth during

times of economic recession, assuming the crises are not special (Freund, 2009). Powerful states

continue to attempt to establish trade in their favor, setting up free trade agreements, like the

biggest kid on the block asking for a fair fight (Yeager & Tuerk, 1984/85). Providing further

arguments for the need for realism in IPE, Charles Kindleberger, the creator of the Hegemonic

Stability Theory stated, “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer – one

stabilizer.”3

The modern economist would like to think otherwise, the modern economist would argue

that they key to a successful IPE is not a winner takes all economy, it’s a cooperation between

states to create financial continuity. In International Relations, liberalism is focused on

interdependence between nations to avoid conflict, instead of cultivating it. In realism, anarchy is

the natural state of being for international relations, but liberalists would argue that the

individuals and states corrupt the international system, creating anarchy. A liberal state is

interested in security as is a realist, they just use different means to achieve the end. Liberals

believe that peace must be constructed, and a way of creating that peace is through

intergovernmental organizations such as the WTO, UN and G20. Flipping to the other side of the

argument for NAFTA, the benefits from a liberal perspective are clear. The argument from the

3 Kindleberger 1986, pg. 304


realist point of view only held weight if one were to only consider the benefits to the United

States, however, there were three countries involved. Trade between the triad quadrupled from

1993-2015, from $297 billion to $1.14 trillion, boosting economic growth for all countries

involved. The US increased exports from $142 billion to $517 billion, NAFTA trading now

accounts for a third of total US exports (Amadeo, 2016). It reduced the cost of commerce, which

benefits multinational corporations (MNC) and small businesses alike, spurring an increase of

international investment and growth. All parties involved gained a mutual benefit, which is the

basis of liberalist theory of economic interdependence. For the supposed lack of action that a

realist suggests the WTO takes, the growth of free trade and trade interdependence is undeniable;

over 300 bilateral FTA’s are in place and various others are in the process of negotiation,

covering the exchange of goods, services, and intellectual property. The variety of topics covered

by the WTO shows the commitment to democratic principles such as human rights, law, and

property rights, as the base of promotion for free markets. Liberalists have more in mind than

just economic and military power; they strike complex and varied compromises to attain their

economic, social, and political goals (Moravcsik, 2010). The trading world is essentially

experiencing an experiment of how fast and how far free trade can go. There is little empirical

evidence to suggest the value of a truly libertarian “Laissez-Faire” economy, and liberalism does

not necessarily plan to ever achieve utopian trade, but the international benefits of integrating a

cooperative economic society are substantial. Liberalism still recognizes the value of appropriate

regulation, although at a level far less stringent than a realist such as Adam Smith claims. In

1776, he stated that Great Britain would never see free trade, purporting that, “Not only the

prejudices of the public, but what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many


individuals irresistibly oppose it. [Domestic manufacturers defend their “monopoly” of the home

market.]” (Smith, 1937).4 As it turns out, Smith was wrong, on a massive scale. Instead of seeing

stunted trade growth, we are in the midst of “hyperglobalization”, which takes form as rapid

trade growth and surges in direct foreign investment (Subramanian & Kessler, 2013). The

causation being multinational companies, expanding as fast as FTA’s will allow. While the

World Bank and the IMF provide regulation and capital support, the true drivers of the growing

free trade policy are MNC’s. As of 2011, the ten largest multinational corporations are

responsible for revenues of $2.8 trillion and employed 6.9 million workers. The sheer size of

these companies alone is enough to create economic interdependence, with MNC’s utilizing

several nations in their supply chain.

This economic interdependence invokes Capitalist Peace, a theory simply stating that

highly developed nations are unlikely to invoke military conflict when parties involved have

direct economic investments in each other. A sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of economic

cost versus the benefit of war would certainly show that disrupting the global economy would be

far more expensive to a state than any benefit of winning a war (Moravcsik, 2010). An example

of this would be the US and China. With the immense amount of trade conjoining the dyad, a

conflict would one, cripple the global economy, and two, with the amount of capital invested in

the two from international states and individuals, the bifurcation of trade caused by conflict

would undoubtedly escalate into a third world war. The parameters of Capitalist Peace are only

expanding, with the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement

4 Smith 1937, pg. 437-438


(TAFTA), and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) under negotiations.5

Unfortunately, with President-Elect Donald Trump vowing to dismiss the US from the TPP,

protectionist policy could again be providing roadblocks for Capitalist Peace.

In the International Political Economy, it is agreed upon that interests are not natural,

they are constructed and become identity. Constructivism is the third conceptual theory in

International Relations and IPE. Constructivists abandon the idea of state actors and focus on the

individual that makes up the greater society. Driven by ideas, knowledge, and norms

constructivism attempts to decipher state interests and their individual construction. This is

largely the most analytical of the three theories, requiring hermeneutic sensibility and value

rationality (Alder, 2013). The study of constructivism in IPE implies none of our essential states

are made naturally, rather constructed and influenced over time by society. The IPE is a society

rather than a system, and the ideas of the constructed social environment have a causal efficacy

on the actions of states. Instead of categorizing actions and states into the bifurcation of realism

and liberalism, both of which have assumed normative order, constructivism attempts to analyze

the facts more philosophically, using priori reasoning to explain the actions (Konings, 2015).6

Liberalism and realism have two main issues in IPE that constructivism argues against. The

couplet of realists and liberalists contain themselves into essentialism, meaning that they assign

themselves withstanding attributes in which create their identities. For realism, they become

“Black Boxes”, which assumes that all states are unitary, self-interested, and rational actors, and

the decision-making process by which they come to action is of minimal importance (Konings,

5 RCEP is between ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the six states which ASEAN has existing FTA’s. TPP consists of 12 Pacific Rim countries (Not including China). TAFTA is a FTA proposal between the EU and the United States of America. 6 Priori – reasoning that proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than empirical evidence.


2015). Liberalism assumes the opposite, theorizing that states would be automatically willing

and would prefer to work in unison. One could illustrate this with game theory. Take the game of

Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two prisoners given equal circumstance, are given the choice to

confess, or cooperate. If both stay quiet, they get to go free and split the profits; if one sells out

the other that does not talk, the sentence is harsh; if both confess, there is a light sentence

(Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2001). Convert that into economic terms, and make the prisoners

state actors, and the environment global conflict and trade, a liberalist will trust that through built

relationships, both will choose to cooperate, and split the profits. This would mean presupposing

that a state takes their opposites outcomes into consideration. This has exceedingly proven to be

untrue in IPE, considering that each actor values the variables at stake. The perception of fairness

for each actor is different. A constructivist digs deeper than the state and looks deeper into the

ideas driving each decision that is made. Constructivism attempts to be the midpoint of the

liberalist/realist dichotomy, by using the actor-network theory, which is understanding the

combinations and interactions of elements that make it successful (Konings, 2015). This exercise

of discursive mapping is a sophisticated way to see the world, a view that says that globalization

is dependent on political choices (Siles-Brugge, 2013). The EU is an example of constructivism

in practice in the IPE, where the administration must value each countries values, benefits and

concerns when making policy decision.

There is a glaring issue with all three of these theories. None of the three hold weight by

themselves in the current International Political Economy. The EU, that has been so expertly

socially constructed by committing to the interests of all its constituents, has just has its largest

member, the United Kingdom, decide to remit their membership. The cause was disenfranchised


individuals, suffering local economies, and immigration. The individuals went against economic

state and possibly individual interest to change into the unknown. 63% of trade in the UK is

linked with European Union free trade, all of which stands to be restructured once the

referendum is ratified.7 Neither priori or posteriori reasoning is used, in fact, it seems no

rationality was used at all, other than emotional reaction.8 The future of the EU with the UK

leaving seems to leave the door open for restructuring at best, and degradation at worst. For its

sophisticated concepts, it seems constructivism has provided little substantive benefit to the IPE.

That is not to say that international relations and the economy are not interrelated, they

inextricably are, but the constructs of traditional IR theories are difficult to comprehensively

explain economic actions. The argument is that humans are inexplicably complex and

unpredictable. They are also quite different, some are impulsive by nature, and some are rational.

Some will make decision deliberating only their self-interests, while others will pursue solutions

that appease all parties involved. The global economy has only one predictable attribute, that it is

unpredictable. Socially and institutionally the world is in constant change, the only thing you can

depend on is the certainty of change. The nature of economics, as it relates to international

relations, is that the actions of an actor will depend on the social, political, and economic

environment at the time they are faced with that particular decision. The volatile beast that is the

IPE leaves room for multiple lines of thinking, with blurred lines and grey areas between them.

Less recognized conceptual veins apply, such as positivism, empiricism, and instrumental

rationality. Positivism argues that observation and testing is the only way to justify claims to

knowledge of the world, in other words, fact is key. Empiricism claims that only by experience 7 The UK must invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, allowing two years to negotiate the terms of the split. Talks are expected to begin March 2017 and end summer of 2019.8 Posteriori is the knowledge or justification dependent on experience or empirical evidence.


can one gain sensory knowledge. Instrumental rationality says that an actor will pick a suitable

means to their end (Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). Rational thought is the way things ought to be,

although even then, evades our current reality. The theory that seems most applicable is homo

economicus, which states that humans are consistently rational and narrowly self-interested

agents who pursue their subjectively-defined ends optimally (Houston, 2010). Which would

work, if actors acted rationally. Also, the theory require that a decision would mean the non-

consideration of the trade partner. Although, when you look at US-China relations, both sides

have conducted currency wars against each other, manipulating each their exchange rates to

devalue the others imports, although it hurts certain domestic industries as well. Risking their

own skin to get ahead or retaliate shows that narrow self-interest applies, but rational thought,

does not (Gagnon, 2013).

The only clarity that comes from the IPE is that actors do what is necessary when it is

needed. Sometimes that means being a realist, other times a liberalist, and often a constructivist.

Countries follow reciprocity, not because they want to, but because they must. In a global

economy where competitive advantage is no longer the binding principle of trade, states need to

interconnect themselves to allow for continued growth and security. That sounds like liberalism,

except for there is still international conflict. Sure, the closest thing to a militarized war between

established states is the proxy conflict between Russia and the United States in Syria, but that

discounts the financial war that has been consistently waged throughout history. Aggressive use

of economic foreign policy tools such as sanctions, can cripple an economy, and possibly do

more damage than an actual militarized war would (Kat, 2015). Take both world wars into

account, economic sanctions crippled Germany post-WWI, causing the rise of the Nazi regime


which was a socially constructed regime, not a forceful takeover. Nazi economic policy was one

of protectionism, constricting foreign trade. By the end of WWII 90% of Germany’s GDP was

short-term debt, and Europe’s economy was in tatters. In comes the United States with the

Marshall Plan, aid offered to all of Europe to ease the burden of rebuilding their economies,

which many accepted. A liberalist measure it would seem, however the US had more up their

sleeve. The plan included a measure that restricted claims against German debt until Germany

had paid back the US for the Marshall plan, as well as reducing trade barriers (Ritschl, 2012).

The plan was offered to the Soviet Union and its allies as well, which they rejected and forced

their allies to reject the aid as well. Although the aid was partially for the repair of Europe, the

deeper core mission of the plan was to influence American ideals into European business and

stifle the spread of communism by extending free trade. This was a perfect example of a state in

the grey area with multiple schools of thought, using their power to influence, while constructing

a cooperative force against their common enemy through free trade. Another example of a state

going against traditional IPE theory is North Korea. Even though it is economically inefficient,

and therefore against their military interest, they continue to close off their borders to change,

resorting instead to creating security by the means of becoming an existential nuclear threat to

the rest of the world. The curious case of communism, is borne out of misunderstanding of the

variety of state interests. Each individual and each state has their own set of values that are based

in normative order that is constructed by our societies. That is an undeniable fact. What states

fail to understand when considering economics is that each society has a different normative

order and values. Empirically, things are experienced differently, materials are valued on diverse

rationality and power is subjective. A truly efficient member of the heterogenous IPE is one that


can adapt to each situation as it is presented, being able to obtain what they want, while being

able to concede certain things. The key to constructing a deal in the IPE is one that leaves both

with a perceived advantage. As is shown, wealth is not the principle driver in the IPE, but each

state has something specific that is. Discover what that is and it is possible to create a world

where concise rational self-interest and morality can find common ground.

For all the discursive theories and analysis that has been applied to IPE, the surprising, or

unsurprising, depending on which part of the world you are sitting in, is that there has been

remarkably little impact on the economy when the theories are applied. When the Great

Recession stuck the world economy in 2007, protectionist policies began to creep their way back

into the IPE. However, the IPE remain relatively unchanged. Just before the recession took hold

in July of 2007, the Federal Reserve Board’s broad nominal exchange rate was 102.8, after the

worst 26 months of the recession, the nominal exchange rate stood at 102.0. The largest bilateral

exchange rate, US dollar to Euro, fluctuated only 3 cents, from $1.36/euro in August 2007 to the

end of 2008 where it finished the year at $1.39/euro (Rose, 2009). The point being, that the

current IPE stands, because it is too large to be disabled. If any major state actor removed

themselves from the global economy by closing its borders, not only would that state suffer, but

the entire international system would. Realism shows strength from the actors; “give me what I

want because I have more money and a bigger stick”. The contemporary application of realism to

the IPE can produce results, but on a short-term basis and at the cost of other states. Creating

imbalances with other major states will eventually lead to conflict, and in the current reality, this

means trillions of dollars, rising debt, and the possibility of nuclear war. Militarized conflict is

simply unacceptable, and cost inefficient. The IPE must then adopt forms of liberalism, affording


free trade between all sizes of nations in an effort to form capitalist peace. This means

abandoning a zero-sum game and adhering to reciprocity, allowing for mutual benefit. This is the

ideal utopian fantasy we would all like to live in, however, as stated before, humans are by

nature unpredictable, and regimes change constantly, rendering a full free trade economy

impossible. States and individuals are also sometimes greedy, and not working at an advantage is

unbearable to them regardless of who has to suffer the consequences. Constructivists try to

explain why human nature is the way it is, such as the study of behavioral economics. Working

to get a deeper understanding of the decisions made in the IPE, constructivists use ideas to

influence the economy. These ideas are often validated by facts and constructed with values, but

the infinite fluctuating variable of irrational actors voids these ideas. The main problem as

outlined by Leonard Gomes, is that economic arguments rarely create change, rather the

economic environment forces policy alteration.9 The answer is a posteriori positivist approach,

with societal hermeneutic sensibilities to define the perceived values on a case by case basis.

There is hope with the current systems in place that we as a society, can continue to grow

relations through a sustainable IPE, that is focused on provided what is necessary for each state,

while not retracting material of importance from another.

9 Gomes 2003, pg.214


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Date post:	15-Apr-2017
Category:	Documents
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Economics and International Relations

Documents