Future Sustainability Programme - Policy Paper
2008
Carbon Footprint of Housing in the Leeds City Region – A Best Practice Scenario Analysis John Barrett and Elena Dawkins
20092009
Economics of Climate Change in Rwanda
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Summary and Key Messages
This study has assessed ‘the Economics of Climate Change in Rwanda’. It was funded by DFID andundertaken by the Stockholm Environment Institute (in Oxford) working with local partners. It covers:1. The impacts and economics costs of climate change;2. The costs of adaptation; and3. The potential for low carbon growth.
The study has advanced a number of approaches to investigate these areas, using aggregated analysis(top-down), sector assessment (bottom-up) and case studies. The key messages are presented below.
1. The Economic Costs of Climate ChangeImpacts in Rwanda
Existing climate variability has significanteconomic costs in Rwanda.Periodic floods and droughts (extreme events)already cause major socio-economic impactsand reduce economic growth in Rwanda. Majorflood events occurred in 1997, 2006, 2007,2008, and 2009, where rainfall resulted ininfrastructure damage, fatalities and injuries,landslides, loss and damage to agriculturalcrops, soil erosion and environmentaldegradation. In some regions of the countrythere have also been periodic droughts, forexample in 1999/2000 and 2005/6.
The study has undertaken case studies andsurveys to investigate recent flood events. Astudy of the Nyabugogo River Plain found thatflood damages occur each rainy season, whichlead to direct (damage) and indirect effects,particularly to informal settlements. The secondcase study in Bahimba Valley reports that the2005 flood damaged crops, bridges and led toenvironmental degradation. The final casestudy, in the Nyabihu Musanze and Rubavudistricts, reports that the 2007 floods led tofatalities, agricultural losses, building andinfrastructure damage and populationdisplacement.
The impacts of these events are economicallysignificant. The most severe of the recentevents was the 2007 flood. The study hasestimated that the direct measurable economiccosts of this event were $4 to $22 million(equivalent to around 0.1 – 0.6% of GDP) for twodistricts alone. However, this only includes the
direct economic costs of household damage,agricultural losses and fatalities. It does notinclude the wider economic costs frominfrastructure damage (including loss of transportinfrastructure), water system damage andcontamination, soil erosion and direct andindirect effects to individuals.
The total economic costs of the 2007 floods aretherefore much larger and would increase furtherwhen other national level effects are considered.It is clear that these events have economic coststhat would be very significant in terms of nationalGDP. The continued annual burden of theseevents leads to reductions in growth over time.
Floods 2007 in Bigogwe, northern Rwanda(Rose Mukankomeje, REMA)
There are also wider impacts from the currentclimate. The study has found some indicationthat recent temperature trends may have shiftedthe altitudinal pattern of malaria and raised thenational burden of malaria in recent decades(increasing preventative and treatment costs).Some of these recent trends (e.g. temperature
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shifts, climate variability and flood intensity) mayreflect an already changing climate. However,any impacts also have to be seen in the contextof changing patterns of vulnerability over time.
The implications of these findings are thatRwanda has a current adaptation deficit, i.e. it isnot adequately adapted to existing climate risks.
Future climate change will lead to additionaleconomic costs.Africa is predicted to have greater impacts thanother world regions, because of highervulnerability and lower adaptive capacity.Impacts could threaten past development gainsand constrain future economic progress. Someregions and populations in Rwanda have veryhigh vulnerability.
The Economic Costs of Climate Change in Africa(Source: FUND Model)
The future economic costs of climate change arevery uncertain. However, aggregate modelsindicate that the additional net economic costs(on top of existing climate variability) could beequivalent to a loss of almost 1% of GDP each
year1 by 2030 in Rwanda, though this excludesthe future effects of floods and other extremes.This estimate is therefore considered a potentiallower bound.
In the longer-term, after 2050, the economiccosts of climate change in Africa are expected torise, potentially very significantly. However, theaggregate models report that global stabilisationscenarios towards a 2ºC target could avoid themost severe social and economic consequencesof these longer-term changes. This emphasisesthe need for global mitigation, as well as localadaptation.
The study has also undertaken bottom-upassessments of the impacts and economic costsof climate change for a number of sectors,working with climate and socio-economicprojections. Rwanda already has a complexexisting climate, with wide variations across thecountry and very strong seasonality, though it ismore temperate than much of East Africa. It hastwo wet seasons, and has strong patterns ofclimate variability and extremes, not least due tothe periodic effects from the El Niño – SouthernOscillation (ENSO) and La Niña, which areassociated with extreme rainfall and flooding anddroughts (respectively) in the region.
The study has considered projections of futureclimate change from a suite of downscaledglobal models for Rwanda, though geographicaldis-aggregation has been limited by dataavailability. The projections indicate futureincreases in mean annual temperature (averagemonthly temperatures) of broadly 1.5 to 3 ºCover the range of models by the 2050s (2046 -2065). The changes in precipitation are moreuncertain. All the climate models show thatrainfall regimes will change and the majorityindicate an increase in average annual rainfall(with a central value of typically 10%),particularly in September to November,indicating a potential strengthening of the rains.However, some models project reductions insome months.
1 Central net values (sum of positive and negative) formarket and non-market effects. The results exclude futureextremes (floods & droughts) and do not capture a largerange of potential effects including all ecosystem services.
20302030
Key0 – 1% GDP loss
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>10% GDP loss
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The information on extreme events (floods anddroughts) is much more variable. While there issome evidence of a recent intensification, thefuture projections vary widely. Nonetheless,many models indicate an intensification of heavyrainfall in the wet seasons, which is particularlyimportant in relation to a greater flood risk.
The range of model results highlights theconsiderable uncertainty in predicting futureeffects, especially in relation to scenarios offuture rainfall, floods and droughts, though alsodue to future socio-economic conditions andenvironmental services. Nevertheless, theanalysis here does reveal potential areas ofconcern and helps focus priorities.
Kigali
Change in monthly average minimumtemperature by 2045-2065, Kigali.
Change in monthly average precipitation,2045-2065, Kigali.
Climate projections for RwandaSource CCE
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Furthermore, it is essential to recognise thisuncertainty, not to ignore it. There is a need toplan robust strategies to prepare for uncertainfutures, rather than using uncertainty as areason for inaction.
In the absence of adaptation, the studyestimates that there could be a potentially largeincrease in the health burden of malaria inRwanda. This arises because a large part of therural population lives at higher elevations, wherethe disease is currently restricted bytemperature. The study has applied a newmalaria risk model, based on altitude, and findsthat climate change could increase the ruralpopulation at risk for malaria by 150% by the2050s.
Malaria Risk model for Rwanda
The increase in the disease burden is significantand could lead to full economic costs that areover fifty million dollars/year. These effects areraised as a future priority area for consideration(further research and early action, seerecommendations). The study also identifiesother possible direct and indirect health effectsfrom climate change.
In the agricultural sector, the net economiceffects vary with the range of climate projectionsand the analytic models used. Under somefutures and with certain models, modest impactson agriculture are predicted in the medium term(with some regions even experiencing increasedagricultural yields). However, under otherscenarios and other models there are economic
costs projected for the sector. A range ofadditional factors are also important, which arenot included in these assessments, including theeffects of extreme events, pests and diseases,etc. The range of potential effects and the highimportance to the economy and livelihoodsmean that this sector is a priority for futureconsideration (further research and earlyactions).
Even in the absence of climate change, theeconomic costs of the periodic floods that affectRwanda could rise significantly in future years,due to socio-economic change (population andeconomic growth). The study has assessedthese changes and finds that in the absence ofadaptation, these drivers could increase thecosts of events by a factor of five by 2030, i.e. aperiodic large-scale regional event similar to the2007 flood could have direct economic costs ofup to one hundred million dollars (though eventsof this size are infrequent). A key prioritytherefore is to increase the resilience of Rwandato cope with these extreme events. Climatechange is likely to further increase the economiccosts of these events. Many of the projectionsindicate a change in heavy precipitation eventsfor Rwanda. A number of models suggest a 10%increase in intensity for 1 in 10 year and 1 in 100year rainfall events (though other projectionsindicate increases of 50% for 1 in 10 yearevents).
These increases in intensity would increase theeconomic costs of periodic flood eventssignificantly, because of the non-linearity in thecosts with flood depth and strength. They wouldalso mean a reduction in the return period oflarger events, i.e. more significant floods wouldoccur more frequently. Even when annualised,these indicate significant increases in economiccosts. The effects on droughts are moreuncertain, but the range of model projectionsdoes include changes that would exacerbateexisting periodic events for some regions of thecountry.
The study has investigated additional issues withenergy supply and demand. For the energysector, the relatively high level of hydrogeneration in the Rwandan electricity mix mightincrease future vulnerability under a changingclimate, though the main trends in the
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projections indicate the primary concern wouldbe for coping with more extreme events (greaterrainfall intensity). It is noted, however, thatfuture land-use patterns will also be important ininfluencing future hydro potential. Similarly, thetrend in average temperatures will increase thenumber of hotter days and potentially increasethe cooling burden in urban areas, important inrelation to building comfort levels and equipment(including I.T.). However, analysis across therange of model projections shows effects arelikely to be modest even by the 2050s, due tothe existing temperate climate.
Finally the sectoral analysis has consideredecosystem effects. Rwanda has exceptionalbiodiversity. These ecosystems provide multiplebenefits to society, which in turn have economicbenefits, though these are rarely captured bymarkets. These benefits are known as‘ecosystem services’ and include provision offood, supporting services, regulatory servicesincluding flood protection and recreational andcultural services. The study has mapped thepotential ecosystem services in Rwanda andconsidered (qualitatively) the potential additionalpressures from climate change.
The study finds that ecosystem services areintegral to the Rwandan economy and underpinover 50% of Rwandan GDP, as well assustaining a very large proportion of thepopulation. There are many stresses on thesesystems already and climate change will add tothese pressures. These potential effects arealso highlighted as an early priority area.
The study has undertaken a number of casestudies to provide more detailed local analyses.This has included the consideration of floodevents, vulnerable groups and iconicecosystems (including the Mountain gorillas).
Overall, the bottom-up analysis indicates that inthe absence of adaptation, the aggregatedestimates of economic costs - which occur ontop of the existing effects of climate variability -could potentially be very large. Detailed analysisfor a single burden (malaria) in a single sector(health) indicates that future economic costscould be over fifty million dollars a year by the2050s. There are also potential effects onecosystem services, which whilst difficult to
estimate in economic terms, could be just asimportant. The analysis of future costs ofextreme events indicates that large increases inthe economic costs of these events will occurover the same period. Finally, there are somepossible scenarios of climate change on theagricultural sector which would lead to higheconomic costs and have very significant effectson rural livelihoods.
Overall, the bounded range of economic costscould potentially be very large, in terms of theequivalent costs to GDP. There is also likely tobe a strong distributional pattern of effects, withsome sub-regions and some groups affectedmore than others.
The Economics of Adaptation in Rwanda
Adaptation can reduce the economic costs ofclimate change but it has a cost. The costs ofadaptation are still emerging and as they followfrom impacts, these too are uncertain. However,this does not mean that no action should betaken. Instead it requires more robuststrategies.
The study has investigated the top-downaggregated estimates of the costs of adaptation.This has used estimates for Africa/East Africaand scaled these to Rwanda. Four categories ofadaptation have been identified. Two of theseare development activities and are targetedtowards the large economic costs of currentclimate variability. They are 1) addressing thecurrent adaptation deficit and 2) increasingsocial protection. The second two areassociated with tackling future climate risks andare 3) building adaptive capacity and 4)enhancing climate resilience. The overall costsof adaptation vary according to which of thesecategories is included.
The immediate needs (for 2012) for buildingadaptive capacity and addressing early prioritiesrequires a significant scaling up from the currentNAPA estimates ($8 million), estimated at $ 50million/year. However, a much higher value ofapproximately $ 300 million/year is warranted ifthe categories of social protection andaccelerated development (to address the currentadaptation deficit) are included. As highlightedabove these categories are associated with
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current climate variability – such as the existingvulnerability to floods - and are thereforeassociated with development, rather than withfuture climate change. However, investment inthese areas provides greater resilience for futurechange and they are essential in reducing futureimpacts.
The estimated costs of adaptation will rise infuture years. The aggregated estimates providea possible range, with implications for the sourceand level of finance required. Estimates ofmedium-term costs to address future climatechange are typically of the order of $50 – 300million per year for Rwanda by 2030, focused onenhancing climate resilience. Note that theinvestment in 2030 builds resilience for futureyears when potentially more severe climatesignals occur. However, higher values (inexcess of $600 million /year) are plausible ifcontinued social protection and accelerateddevelopment are included, noting that these areprimarily development activities.
The study has also assessed the costs ofadaptation for Rwanda using a sectoral bottom-up approach, to test the estimates above and togive greater insight into sectoral planning. Thestudy has advanced a framework to prioritiseearly adaptation in the sectoral analysis, whichconsiders uncertainty within an economicframework. This identifies early priorities of:
! Building adaptive capacity;
! Focusing on win-win, no regret or low costmeasures (justified by current climateconditions or involving minimal cost);
! Encouraging pilot actions to test promisingresponses; and
! Identifying those long-term issues thatrequire early pro-active investigation (thoughnot necessarily firm action).
Enhancingresilience for
future investment
$400 Mill.
$200 Mill.
$600 Mill.
SocialProtection
AcceleratedDevelopment
Adaptation toCurrent Climate(development)
but essential forfuture resilience
+
2012 2030Potential Costs of Adaptation to Current and Future Climate in Rwanda $Million per year
$200 Mill.
$100 Mill.
$300 Mill.
Immediatepriorities Inc.
capacity building
Adaptation toFuture Climate
Change$50 M/yr
~300 M/yr
~$280 M/yr~$300 M/yr
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A series of ‘adaptation signatures’ have beendeveloped to identify actions in each of thesefour categories for each sector. The broadoutline of steps (as above) is the same in eachsector. However, the exact activities vary, hencethe use of a ‘signature’ concept that considersoptions on a case by case basis. Thesesignatures have been to develop indicativeadaptation costs for the health, water andagriculture sectors. These have beencomplemented by case studies which includeexamples of adaptation projects and costs.
In the health sector, the potential costs ofadaptation to address the potential increasingburden were considered based on treatment andprevention costs. An example of the adaptationsignature is shown below.
In the water sector, water resource investmentswere assessed across sectoral activities toidentify areas for climate resilient developmentand adaptation mainstreaming, based on theRwanda’s NAPA and EDPRS recommendationsfor integrated water resource management(IWRM), as well as 2009/10 public expendituresand MTEF projections. In the agricultural sector,estimates are provided to illustrate the scale ofeffort that may be required and some of theurgent priorities.
A large number of immediate priorities areas andno regrets options have been identified fromthese assessments. As examples, they includethe strengthening of effective surveillance andprevention programmes for health linked toenhanced meteorological systems and similarstrengthening programmes in other areas (e.g.expanded monitoring of key ecosystems).
Training new health careworkers, increasing laboratoryand other capacities
Relocation
Strengthening of surveillance andprevention programmes
Preventive treatmentof pregnant women
Early warning systems (including forecasting)
Improve inter-agency,regional coordination Indoor residual
spraying
Emergency response plans (health aftercare)
Full sectoral programmes
Basic prevention and treatment facilities, environmental and health standards
Insecticide treated nets
Assessment and modelling studies, research
MigrationSectoral protectionBuilding Institutional capacity
Pilot actions
No regrets: variability and disaster reductionMonitoring, vulnerability assessment
No regrets: trends and climate outlooks
An Adaptation Signature for Health
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They also include capacity building to strengthenthe meteorological analysis and forecasting forseasonal outlooks (agriculture) and extremeevents (flood risk), with the latter linked to thestrengthening and development of early warningand disaster risk reduction, as well as riskmapping and basic screening in planning.Finally, they include pilot actions across allsectors and for promising options (e.g. terracing,malaria prevention) the potential scaling up ofsectoral programmes.
The sectoral assessments and the case studiesshow relatively high adaptation costs, whichconfirm the lower end of the adaptationestimates for 2030 above and justify investmentneeds. They also demonstrate the potentiallymuch larger costs when development-adaptationneeds are included. The studies demonstratethat adaptation has very large benefits inreducing present and future damages.
Terraces in Kisaro
However, while adaptation reduces damages, itdoes not remove the impacts of climate changeentirely. Residual impacts in Rwanda,particularly for some regions and groups ofsociety, will need to be considered. They willalso be important for recovery after climaticdisasters and for future impacts. It is highlighted
that the costs of adaptation are only part of thefull costs of climate change: both adaptationcosts and residual effects are important forinternational negotiation discussions.
Finally, while there is a large need for adaptationfinance, and entitlement to substantial fundsmust be assured, accessing these funds willrequire the development of effectivemechanisms and institutions. There is a needfor Rwanda to agree on next steps, the futurefocus and to build capacity, including nationaland sectoral planning objectives, enhancedknowledge networks and verifying outcomes ofadaptation strategies and actions.
Low Carbon Growth in Rwanda
The analysis has first considered the currentemissions in Rwanda. These show that thecountry currently has relatively low emissions ofgreenhouse gas emissions (total and per capita).Moreover, Rwanda has already introduced arange of low carbon options across manysectors (see below.
The study has then considered the potentialchange in emissions consistent with planneddevelopment in the Vision 2020 plan anddeveloped a future emissions profile for Rwanda.This projects that the strong growth planned inthe Vision document, as well as other changesfrom population and urbanisation, will increasefuture total and per capita GHG emissionssignificantly, even though Rwanda is initiatingpolicies that are consistent with low carbondevelopment.
Under the future ‘business as usual’development scenario, the study estimates thattotal emissions of greenhouse gases will doublebetween 2005 and 2020. These futureincreases are driven by the transport andagriculture sectors, which are likely to becomethe dominant sources of future emissions.However, even in the electricity sector, whichcurrently has a high share of renewables(hydro), the plans for the development of LakeKivu would start to increase the absoluteemissions from electricity generation in theshort-term and potentially increase the carbonintensity of the entire Rwandan generation mix inthe medium term.
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Following these higher carbon pathways willtherefore lead to an opportunity loss for Rwanda.They could also lead to other economic, socialand environmental costs: an example would bethe congestion, higher fuel costs, greater fuelimports and higher air pollution that would occurif private car use grows rapidly in Kigali.
The current plans across the economy (or forsome sectors, the lack of plans) could ‘lock-in’Rwanda into a higher emission pathway. Theincreases from the transport, agricultural andelectricity sectors, and the associated increasein national emissions, would occur at exactly thetime when there are likely to be greatereconomic opportunities for carbon credits andmarkets, particularly if national levelmechanisms emerge.
The study has therefore investigated low carbonoptions across the economy, developing a lowcarbon alternative pathway. This shows thatthere are a large number of ‘no regrets’ options,particularly from improvements in transportefficiency, domestic stoves and agriculture, aswell as for the electricity sector, which wouldenhance economic growth, as well as allowingfurther access to international carbon credits.
These options produce significant emissionsavings and can be realized at negative cost, i.e.the economic benefits outweigh the costs. Anexample would be with an energy efficiencymeasure that actually saves the individual orcompany money (e.g. from reduced fuel costs)when compared to the current baseline. Theseoptions also have wider economic benefits from
Methane recovery and fuel switchingLake Kivu. 100 MW due on stream,reducing fugitive emissions from thelake and displacing high cost diesel
generation and CO2 emissions
Biomass Energy Strategy,including Efficient Cooking Stoves and Biogas
Improved cook stoves and charcoal production,improving efficiency and reducing air pollution.
Large-scale biogas plants in prisons in Rwanda
Solar Power Plant (Jali Hill)Africa largest solar power plant (250kW)reduce reducing dependency on diesel-generated electricity
Micro hydro potentialLarge potential for off grid micro hydro anddecentralised generation
Large scale hydro5 hydropower plants in use in RwandaLarge potential for large-scale hydroNew regional plants at Rusumo / Rusizir.
Existing Low Carbon Projects in Rwanda
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greater energy security and diversity, reducingair pollution and environmental impacts. Thestudy has evaluated the emission reductionpotential from such options, for a number ofpotential sectors, and compared this against the2020 baseline.
This finds that large-scale national emissionreductions could be achieved under a scenariowhich would also be economicallyadvantageous. The study also highlights theneed to widen this analysis and to develop alonger term strategy beyond 2020.
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BiomassTransport and industry (75% of which is for transport)Electricity – gas from Lake KivuElectricity – oil / diesel
WasteLand-use change (excl. Forest sink)Agriculture (non-CO2 GHG),based on draft numbers from 2nd Nat. Com.
Energy related
Non-energy related
Emission projections for Rwanda
Indicative marginal abatement cost curve (energy) for Rwanda
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Recommendations
The study has outlined a number ofrecommendations and future priorities.
This needs to consider how the internationalaction by developed countries to address climatechange might affect Rwanda, notably in relationto its planned economic growth in areas such astourism, exports, etc. as well as considering howbest to co-ordinate co-operative regional (EastAfrican) responses.
Further work is needed to improve these initialestimates and to give a degree of confidence inthe analysis.
! Such as follow-on phase might include abroader (and for key priorities, a deeper)analysis by sector, particularly for healthburdens, agriculture, water/flood risks andecosystem services.
! This would need to be accompanied by amore systematic adaptation assessment,with estimates of costs, focused on short-and medium priorities at a sectoral (andcross-sectoral) level.
! On the low carbon side, it would be useful toundertake a more comprehensive analysis ofpotential opportunities, with marginalabatement cost curves and consideration ofpriorities across all sectors.
! This would provide both adaptation and lowcarbon costs in detail, and as part of aninvestment and financial flow analysis (bysector), it would establish the potentialadditional funding needs above the currentdevelopment baseline. This would provide afirm basis for increased future funding.Taken together, this follow-on analysis couldform the basis of a new strategy.
There are a number of urgent priorities forbuilding adaptive capacity in Rwanda that shouldbe fast-tracked, notably in relation tometeorological monitoring, forecasting andinformation (as these underpin future predictionand analysis) and early warning systems, as wellas information provision, monitoring (indicators)networks and focal points. The early priorities
also include increasing the knowledge base,education and training and strengtheningexisting programmes.
There is also a need to build future climatechange risk screening into development andplanning, at a sectoral and regional level.Information on climate, resources and adaptationstrategies and options should be mainstreamedinto all sectoral plans.
! To enable this, the study recommends that anational knowledge management system bedeveloped; with easy access by allstakeholders to compile more detaileddatabases of potential climate risks acrossall areas of the economy.
Access to substantial adaptation funds must beassured. However, mechanisms and institutionsfor effective use must be developed to allowRwanda to access these funds. This requiresearly and concerted action to build capacityacross stakeholders and with the affectedcommunities themselves. This is an earlypriority.
! To progress this, some form of nationaladaptation authority should be set up toassess the potential for climate resilientgrowth across all areas of the economy andto mainstream adaptation into governmentdepartments and with Rwanda’sdevelopment partners. There is also a needto encourage the linkage between nationaladaptation and low carbon action (the latterincluding the designated national authority).
There are many benefits if Rwanda switches to alower carbon pathway. However, this will nothappen on its own and steps are needed torealise these benefits and to maximise thepotential flow of carbon credits under existingand future mechanisms.
Low carbon plans should extend beyond thepower generation sector. This will necessitate agreater focus on transport and agriculture.
There is a particular need to consider areas ofdevelopment that might ‘lock-in’ Rwanda intohigher emissions pathways, notably in theenergy, transport and urban environment. It
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would be useful to specifically address thesethreats and to identify alternatives.
All future development and planning, includinglow carbon investment, should consider futureclimate change, which necessitates climate riskscreening in future low carbon plans across allsectors. Potential linkages between adaptationand low carbon development (especially infinance) should be explored.
The planned revision of the EDPRS shouldexamine the potential effects of climate changeand the potential for adaptation and low carbongrowth – and this should also extend toforthcoming revisions of PRSP and otherstudies. There is also a need to build on existinggovernment and donor activities (such as theenvironmental sector working groups). In thelonger-term, there is a need to develop a newstrategic vision for Rwanda that addresses theseareas, for example, with the revision of theVision 2020 document, including both domesticand international aspects.
The steps above would provide national actionon a low-carbon, climate resilience investmentplan and would establish Rwanda as aninternational leader, with the ‘first moveradvantage’ in negotiations and securing finance.
Finally, the potential for a more radical policyshift is also highlighted as an option for Rwanda.Because of the level of current development andthe importance of near-term decisions indetermining the long-term economic and socialstructure of the country, it might be possible totruly promote a visionary approach to low carbondevelopment and climate resilient growth withinthe context of environmental sustainability andeconomic growth, i.e. to set a new model forAfrica. This would position Rwandainternationally along a very progressive vision,consistent with the recent Presidentialstatements on climate change and adoption ofgreen technology.
Key priorities for adaptation and low carbongrowth are outlined below.
Adaptation Strategies Priority Actions
Immediate needs & capacitybuilding
• Expanded research assessment into effects, adaptation andeconomics. Early capacity building, e.g. meteorologicaldata/systems and early warning systems
• Develop national climate change strategy including knowledgemanagement and screening of sectoral and regional plans forclimate risks and adaptation opportunities. Include in EDPRSrevision. Build into long-term vision (e.g. next Vision 2020)
• Prepare plans for a national adaptation authority to improvesectoral coordination, link to international finance, and supportprivate sector. Enhance links between adaptation and low carbon.
Climate resilience • Develop climate resilience strategies for immediate concerns (e.g.cross sectoral meteorological systems, information and forecasting,health and malaria monitoring and actions, flood risk screening)
• Develop prototypes of sectoral actions (pilots) and pathways forscaling up to cover all vulnerable regions and populations
Social protection • Protect vulnerable livelihoods and strengthen existing socialprotection programmes, expanding the coverage to considerclimate change.
Accelerated development • Adapt existing development projects to include ‘no regret’measures to reduce climate risks and opportunities to developadaptive capacity
• Scale up successful prototypes to sectoral development plans
Adaptation Strategies Priority Actions
Immediate needs & capacitybuilding
• Expanded research assessment into effects, adaptation andeconomics. Early capacity building, e.g. meteorologicaldata/systems and early warning systems
• Develop national climate change strategy including knowledgemanagement and screening of sectoral and regional plans forclimate risks and adaptation opportunities. Include in EDPRSrevision. Build into long-term vision (e.g. next Vision 2020)
• Prepare plans for a national adaptation authority to improvesectoral coordination, link to international finance, and supportprivate sector. Enhance links between adaptation and low carbon.
Climate resilience • Develop climate resilience strategies for immediate concerns (e.g.cross sectoral meteorological systems, information and forecasting,health and malaria monitoring and actions, flood risk screening)
• Develop prototypes of sectoral actions (pilots) and pathways forscaling up to cover all vulnerable regions and populations
Social protection • Protect vulnerable livelihoods and strengthen existing socialprotection programmes, expanding the coverage to considerclimate change.
Accelerated development • Adapt existing development projects to include ‘no regret’measures to reduce climate risks and opportunities to developadaptive capacity
• Scale up successful prototypes to sectoral development plans
Mitigation Strategies Recommended Actions
Low-Carbon Growth (LCG) • Full analysis of low carbon options, costs and potential forprioritisation and development of strategy for mechanisms.
• Develop national strategies to mainstream LCG in planning,including a revised EDPRS and possibly new Vision.
• Facilitate carbon finance opportunities in voluntary and compliancecarbon markets (VCM, CDM)
• Prioritize agriculture, transport and electricity generation low carbonmeasures, considering short-term opportunities but also longer-termareas where potential ‘lock-in’ and identify alternatives. Improvesectoral co-ordination.
• Look for synergistic adaptation – low carbon project opportunities,e.g. agro-forestry and sustainable land-use
Climate resilience& co-benefits
• Climate risk screening of low carbon growth pathways
• Consider opportunities to achieve robust development, e.g. inplanning hydropower (large reservoirs, small in-stream turbines),biofuels, on-farm carbon management (e.g. zero grazing, woodlots)
Mitigation Strategies Recommended Actions
Low-Carbon Growth (LCG) • Full analysis of low carbon options, costs and potential forprioritisation and development of strategy for mechanisms.
• Develop national strategies to mainstream LCG in planning,including a revised EDPRS and possibly new Vision.
• Facilitate carbon finance opportunities in voluntary and compliancecarbon markets (VCM, CDM)
• Prioritize agriculture, transport and electricity generation low carbonmeasures, considering short-term opportunities but also longer-termareas where potential ‘lock-in’ and identify alternatives. Improvesectoral co-ordination.
• Look for synergistic adaptation – low carbon project opportunities,e.g. agro-forestry and sustainable land-use
Climate resilience& co-benefits
• Climate risk screening of low carbon growth pathways
• Consider opportunities to achieve robust development, e.g. inplanning hydropower (large reservoirs, small in-stream turbines),biofuels, on-farm carbon management (e.g. zero grazing, woodlots)
Project Description and Project TeamThe project has been funded by DFID, the UK Department for International Development.
The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI Oxford Office) led the study. SEI is an independent, internationalresearch institute, engaged in environment and development issues at local, national, regional and global policylevels. The SEI has a reputation for rigorous and objective scientific analyses of complex environmental,developmental and social issues. The Oxford office leads development of the weADAPT.org platform, managed bythe Global Climate Adaptation Partnership (www.ClimateAdaptation.cc).
This study was commissioned under DEW Point, the DFID Resource Centre for Environment, Water and Sanitation(Bruce Mead) which is managed by a consortium of companies led by Harewelle International Limited. The projectteam included.! SEI Oxford, UK: Tom Downing, Paul Watkiss, Jillian Dyszynski, Ruth Butterfield, Tahia Devisscher, Steve Pye,
Jane Olwoch (RSA).! SEI Nairobi: Basra Ali, Brian Harding, Adriaan Tas, Mark de Blois.! IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC).! Metroeconomica: Alistair Hunt and Tim Taylor.! London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine: Menno Bouma and Sari Kovats.! ILRI: Joseph Maitima, Simon Mugatha, Patrick Kariuki.! IIED: Muyeye Chambwera and Tom Birch.! Vi-LIFE Programme: Bo Lager, Jorge Suazo, Faustin Rwamuhizi, Ylva Nyberg.! GGISNUR: Jean Pierre Bizimana, Theodomir Mugiraneza, Robert Ford, contributors, Dr Jean Nduwamungu, Dr
Emmanuel Twarabamenye, Marie Christine D. Simbizi, Edward K. Mwesigye.! Rwanda NGOs Forum on water, sanitation and environment (RWASEF). Frank Habineza and contributors.
For further information, contact: Tom Downing, Director of SEI in Oxford ([email protected]) or PaulWatkiss, Project Director ([email protected]). To follow up in Rwanda, contact Sion McGeever, DFID ([email protected]).
Full project reportsMore detailed technical annexes to support this document are available on the project website:http://rwanda.cceconomics.org or http://rw.cceconomics.org/
AcknowledgementsThe project has been funded by DFID. Additional resources on the economics of climate adaptation and low carbongrowth in Africa were provided under the AdaptCost project from UNEP and the EC ClimateCost project.
We acknowledge the valuable contributions of many people and organisations. In particular we would like to thank thenational steering committee, led by Mr Prosper Musafiri (DG Minecofin) and Dr Rose Mukankomeje (DG REMA).
We acknowledge the valuable contributions of many people and organisations. Although the study was commissionedby DFID, the views expressed in this brief are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent DFID’sown views or policies, or those of DEW Point.
