N.S. 156

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND DISASTER RELIEF:

LESSONS FROM A FEW EXPERIENCES

AIDS. TO FROGRAWING UNICEF ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATION

*************************** * * * RESOURCE MATERIALS 17 * December 1984 * * ***************************

By Hans Reiff Programme Specialist Division of Educational Policy and Planning Unesco, Paris

From a paper presented to the Summer Institute for Development in the Context of Disasters, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University 15 - 20 July 1984

Unit for Co-operation with UNICEF and WFP Unesco, Paris

(ED-85/WS/6)

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Unesco.

CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

II PROBLEMS OF METHOD

III GEOPOLITICAL FORCES

External (Donor-Recipient Dialogue)

Internal (Decentralization; Participation)

IV SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES AND THE EFFECT OF POPULATION DYNAMICS

V ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES

VI EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES: OBJECTIVES/NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS; STAFF, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY; ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT; PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

VII THE IMPACT OF AID PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES

VIII CONCLUSION

ANNEX

NOTES

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND DISASTER REFLIEF:

LESSONS FROM A FEW EXPERIENCES

******************************************************************** * * * * * "For more than three years I did not go to school. There were * * no schools to go to. Now T don'::t like holidays. They make me * * think of the had days. " * * *

* Rum Sakhom3 14 years * * Kampuchean Chronicles3 1980 * * * ********************************************************************

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to summarize the relative successes and major con­straints in harmonizing and managing short-term disaster relief work and longer-term educational development programmes in Kampuchea (1980-1981) and Lebanon (1983).

******************************************************************** * * * * . * The critical issues are obvious: in a disaster situation * * both donors and recipients3 preoccupied with immediate problems * * and the need for "crisis management"3 exert pressures to make * * decisions as regards education incrementally_, resulting in a * * discounting of long-term benefits; how to balance this reality * * with a long-time horizon, focussing on anticipated problems, * * and how to minimize ad-hoc policies of expendiency which, in * * the long run3 may be self-defeating. * * * ******************************************************************** What follows is a personal account of a few limited experiences in

disaster relief in education, based on memory and on information extracted from national documents, agency reports and old notebooks, d' The paper is not about what educational programming should be in future situations of disaster relief. The purpose is at the same time more modest (excluding "recipes" for a manual) and more ambitious as I shall try to outline the major constraints and potentials for effective programming of educational development in a disaster context.

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********************************************************************* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Both the governments and the agencies involved in the two relief operations have formulated their cooperative action along the continuum of "emergency relief - rehabilitation -reconstruction - development"'. In the case of UNICEF and most of the NGO'Sj the adjective "humanitarian" was added, suggesting * a focus on the individual. *

*********************************************************************

In view of this, the following general framework and definitions are proposed:

"~"-~—___irocus Action —-_^__^

Educational Emergency Relief

Educational Rehabilitation

Educational Reconstruction

Educational Development

National

-

Put back in good condition

Rebuild after destruction

Growth; distribution; change

Individual children/adults (Humanitarian)

Comfort at the ending of anxiety

Make able to live an ordinary life again

Reorganization of human action

-

II PROBLEMS OF METHOD

Our knowledge about the interrelationships between education, basic human needs and aspirations of people and governments in a context of development co­operation is extremely limited; in a situation of educational relief after or during disaster periods the only information available is that generated by the experience of project implementation.

************************************************************************** * * * * * One of the most important methodological lessons learned * * . regarding the ways in which education can have a crucial impact * * on meeting survival needs in situations of man-made disaster (war, * * civil war) is that human needs require a mixture of "material * * relief" and "relief of mind"* efforts and that relief (a feeling * * of comfort at the ending of anxiety3 fear or pain) cannot be easily * * reflected in proposals for investment in either physical or human * * capital at national levels. The concept of relief, basic needs * * and development3 as interpreted and translated into criteria for * * resource mobilization and utilization by national and international * * bureaucracies3 (%) tends to be in conflict with that at the micro * * (village/household) levels where resources (goods, money3 time3 * * knowledge/information, human energy) aré conceived differently. * * * **************************************************************************

Anecdotal information, collected through interviews with parents, school children and local educational leaders and authorities, illustrates the wealth of human inventiveness and energy in finding original solutions to local problems. This potential can be further strengthened and mobilized with relatively modest external inputs. The paper tries to show how such information should and can be increasingly explored, systematized and used in guiding disaster relief operations in education and human development with a view to "humanizing" the relatively rigid models and monitoring mechanisms imposed by the major bilateral and multilateral donors and their technical advisers.

************************************************************************** * * * * * As education is mainly a domestic affair, a mechanism is required * * to screen the inflow of culturally dominated "knowledge about * * schooling which accompanies aidstreams from industrialized countries * * (and which risks disrupting fragile internal processes of human and * * educational rehabilitation) and to revive the use of indigenous * * intellectual and practical knowledge which -is "hidden", especially * * after periods of human disaster. * * * **************************************************************************

The truth of educational reality in periods of disaster cannot be measured by isolated facts (e.g. enrolment statistics) or by relationships among facts (e.g. percentage of over-aged children in grade I), but only in their relationship with human beings, their suffering, values, ambitions, etc. ("The school is the clinic of the soul", Headmaster of a primary school, Kampuchea, 1980).

"... since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." (Constitution of Unesco, 16/11/45).

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********************************************************************** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Unfortunately, as the various actors -involved in educational development hold almost always competing views about the social reality of a specific educational environment, and as relief workers do not have the time to discuss their shared experiences ,in a structured and perspective way, conceptualization and a common language hardly ever emerge. This vacuum provides often the "alibi" of the external adviser to assume the role of "advocacy planner"*, identifying himself with population group(s) which, from his perspective, are most vulnerable and risk remaining marginalized for a longer period of time. There is nothing wrong with this, as long as the adviser clearly identifies and states the time/place of his observation and his sources of information.

* - - . - • *

*************************************************************************

The following framework is therefore merely a tool for structuring subjective reflections on what was learned through past relief and development action in education and is to guide the readers through the information presented in this paper. In no way should it be seen as a model for analysis/planning; for that it lacks both rigour and comprehensiveness.

"̂"̂ "̂ -̂ »̂ Type of inter-Unit ^ * < Í L vention of ^--*^_ analysis/learning ^*****^»^^

Education < > Society

Educational Process

Historical Perspective * *

Geo-political Forces

Socio-cultural Forces

Population Dynamics

Economic and Technological Forces

National Objectives

Individual Needs and Aspirations

Staff, Content, Technology

Organizational Struc­tures £ Management

Physical Infrastructure

Educational Emergency Relief

Undoing (shock, fear, anger, etc.)

Mainly external : donor-recipient dialogue

Cohesion at family and community levels

Target group focus : children, family, orphans, etc.

Technician training for reconstruction

Rather- tsimplet tar­gets (visibility)

Food, shelter, health, security, understand­ing

Focus on teachers

Intersectoral tactics

. Repair/construction of schools and class­room furniture

Educational Development Cooperation

Creating (confidence, hope, knowledge, etc.)

Mainly internal : degrees of decentraliza­tion, participation, etc.

National identity, free­dom, sovereignty, etc.

Demographic trends, human resources,.adult literacy, etc.

Education - work -productivity - income -welfare

Rather «complex» goals : endogeneity and non* intervention

Quality of life, happi­ness , literacy, etc.

Beyond a «Production Function»

Capacity building and programming

Schoolmapping; local workshops; etc.

Term used by Noël McGinn.and Luis Porter Galetar in "An introduction to strategic planning in education", Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, September 1983 (miraeo).

** Not further developed in this version of the paper.

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III. GEOPOLITICAL FORCES

EXTERNAL (DONOR-RECIPIENT DIALOGUE)

In both Kampuchea and Lebanon, aid streams for emergency relief in education were a function of the total behaviour among donors and recipients which cannot be captured through a classical demand-supply model (below), which was eventually rejected:

Those wishing to help

People (anxious)

/

¥• State

n

B

C '

Those in need

State — People

(urgent)

A,

Internal situation of the "rich" (stagflation/unemployment but also information explosion on' Lebanon/Kampuchea through mass media).

Internal situation of the "poor" (material disaster, human suffering but also complex "politics" in both cases).

Behaviour of the "rich" towards the "poor": people are anxious to help people; States are sometimes either reluctant to give (Kampuchea: "inter­national/regional politics") or to let their people receive (Lebanon: no •interférence allowed -in the equity /distributive repercussions of powerful market economy forces accompanying aid). Especially in the area of educa­tion which is mainly an affair of the State (Kampuchea) or of State and Church (Lebanon), direct help from people to people, through NGO's, remains marginal.

Conclusions, as expressed in the behaviour of the "poor" in redirecting aid streams and their internal distribution and. in utilizing scarce national human and material resources .Lebanon: teachers expressed need for schoolbuilding repairs and simple3 traditional school furniture; State invested in design/production of sophisticated ("modern") school furniture and passed large school construction contracts; Kampuchea: people expressed need for slates/chalk ("Paper is like rice; when we have some for one -day we need more for. the next"3 primary schoolteacher3 Phnom Penh); State invested national and external resources in paper, printing and transport of textbooks.

- 6 -

The events observed in both the Lebanon and. Kampuchea cases can possibly be explained (and thus be planned more realistically) through a "model" borrowed from organization theory:

\. Power

Trust N.

High: human relief

Low: national development

Only donors have

Marginal material charity (Kampuchea 1979-1982)

Training to facil­itate transfer of technology (Lebanon, 1983-84)

Recipients have in certain spheres

Socio-cultural strength (Kampuchea, 1979 - now)

Economic/intel­lectual elites (Lebanon, 1983-1984) ,

None have

Moral support and sympathy (Kampuchea, 1984)

Indifference (Lebanon, 1980-1981)

Both have

Substantial material aid (Lebanon, 1982-1984)

Conflict and stagnation (Kampuchea, 1983-1984)

Over time (1979 - 1984), and seen mainly from the point of view of educational intervention, both Lebanon and Kampuchea have passed through different phases of international "trust levels" and power relationships which can explain to a large extent the direction and intensity of the cooperative/aid dialogue. In extreme language (reality is more "subtle"):

Lebanon receives large amounts* of material aid in school (re)construction (1982 ->• now); just before this period the country passed through a time of relative international indifference about human resources development (1980/31) contrasted with a newly emerging phase (1983 onwards) in which the free mechanism of international economic (banking) elites in "harmony" with the aspirations of intellectual elites ^) manoeuver development initiatives mainly in the direction of economic growth (ignoring aspects of distribution/ change). The translation of these growth priorities into criteria for human resources development emphasizes middle level technical training to facilitate technology transfer (role of transnationals) at the relative cost of intro­ducing a "culture technique" in primary education for all.

* About 94 million Lebanese Pounds (+ 20 million US $) representing 3.4% of the total public reconstruction programme and ± $130 per enrolled child. Source: progress reports of Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).

- 7 -

Kampuchea passed from an emergency relief period (1979/81) of marginal charity (pencils/notebooks, etc.), carefully preserving cultural identity (Buddhist learning) and ideological preferences (Vietnamese curriculum advisers), to one of international moral support and sympathy in matters of relief (1982/83) and stagnation/conflict (4) in educational development assistance (1983/84).

An explanation of these international shifts iii trust and power falls outside the scope of this paper.

INTERNAL (DECENTRALIZATION; PARTICIPATION)

Lebanon

Given the fact that about 32% of students at primary level and 50% of students at secondary level attend fee-paying private schools and a further 31% of-all students at the primary level attend non-fee-paying private-aided schools, there is a great amount of freedom of initiative at institutional levels. But private schools were not included in the relief operation which focussed on public schools (although some of the private-aided schools are among the "poorest").

As the Central Government exercised only a relatively modest control over public education in the country, initiatives of motivated Government officials at the grass-root levels (e.g. teachers) had a fair chance of being supported by external aid, even if, officially, no decentralization policy in educational manage­ment was forthcoming. While historically and traditionally (and because of a complex interaction of socio-cultural and political factors) the Centre has trans­lated the goal of "National Unity" into a policy of educational centralization, there is now an increasing recognition that real unity can only be achieved through a gradual decrease in educational disparities (measured by access, success and quality/relevance).

********************************************************************* * * * * * We can thus observe that3 partly because of the hostilities and the * * urgent needs of the most victimized, population groups, a certain * * degree of decentralization of education authority is taking place * * (especially in matters of budgeting)s although stilt with a focus on * * strengthening the implementation capacity of educational projects at * * the regional and local levels. * * * **************************************************************************

The "South Lebanon Educational Reconstruction Programme", supported with aid from UNICEF (± 8 million US dollars) and from the "Tunis Pledge"* (± 30 million US dollars over five years, executed by UNICEF) thus had a considerable impact on strengthening the decentralized authority of the Saida Education Department, in close cooperation with the Council of Development of the South.

* . Grant of US $2 billion (all sectors) over five years from the Arab States, half of which to be used for reconstruction of the South.

- 8 -

However, community participation in education is not a "natural" phenomenon in a competitive free market economy, and has only succeeded when sufficient financial incentives were provided by public authorities (supplemented by aid) to-which the community then added some of its own resources (land, time/work for school repairs).

********************************************************* * * * * * Local educational authorities felt that increased community particip- * * ation would be required not so much for income generating purposes * * but more to enhance self-management and self-reliance of the population * * and counterbalance its natural tendency to "receive and continue to * * make some small private business as usual" (Social Affairs Officer3 * * Salda, 25 March 198S). * * * ******************************************************************************

Kampuchea

There is a large degree of decentralization to the provincial levels where all political and sectoral forces are represented. In the field of education, a Provincial Committee for Education- and Social Action executes educational programmes in cooperation with other sectoral committees (e.g. Production Units under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) under the general supervision of the Central Committee (a Revolutionary Council) and the FUNSK (Political Party).

******************************************************************************* * * * * * The community3 village3 family are seen as basic units of participatory * * developmentj based on the principle of self-help and the search for a * * new identity. This has resulted in solidarity among people in the * * fulfilment of their most basic needs and in pro-social behaviour regard- * * ing matters of education (e.g. voluntary part-time teachers). * * * *******************************************************************************

The above form of social organization has very much facilitated emergency relief efforts in terms of food distribution (a critical point, carefully watched by the donors) and cooperation among educational donors in delivering "packages" of educational aid (pedagogical and basic needs inputs) to the schools which sometimes served as a central point for community help in the villages (e.g. nutrition/health services).

Comparison

The experiences in Lebanon and Kampuchea regarding the impact of decentral­ization and participation on the effectiveness of emergency relief and development cooperation in education were almost completely the opposite. The practical model that emerged from our action research in this area would suggest the following:

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Aid ^_

_1_ Emergency ~

1

Central Education Authority

Relief Development Cooperation

Local.Education/ Development Officer

1 Decentralized Programme

********************************************************************** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The links are self-explanatory : Emergency relief in education reaches the target (pupil) most effectively through strengthen­ing the capacity of the local education/development officer in mobilizing the participation of the community (including minimum infrastructure: "schools as shelter") and the family by a "package" of basic needs/educational inputs. Development co­operation in. education reaches the pupil through material and technical support of a decentralized programme of institutions3

involving the teacher (in-service training) and reform of content (often "sacred").

* * * • . i - - * **********************************************************************

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be overlapping (e.g. teacher as community leader in the case of Kampuchea) ; however-, the difference is* a concentration on people in the relief effort and ón programmes/institutions in the development effort, requiring.different, "mixes" of external inputs.

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IV SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES AND THE EFFECT OF POPULATION DYNAMICS

In both Lebanon and Kampuchea, the location of dispersed population groups (still very much on the move) as well as the identification of their age-structures and of their basic needs profiles in relation to past and present hardship and degrees of dependency, was among the most difficult tasks of joint donor-recipient action. In the area of health, mobile clinics (Lebanon) succeeded in following population movements, and the portable saw-mill project (Australian NGO in Kampuchea) could flexibly assist in the repairs of orphanages and village dispen­saries.

***************************************************************** * * * • * * But the school had to be firmly located as it serves as a centre of * * security and social cohesion in communities which gradually emerged * * from periods of collective stress and complete social disorganiza- * * tion ("The school serves as a spiritual clinic for children. It is * * the only place where hope can be injected in addition to medical * * cave and food aid. The school is where one can be of service to the *

child, where his physical and moral health can be cared fori education * is part of the survival operation.", school teacher, Kampuchea).

* child, where his physical and moral health can be cared for; education * * *

* * * * *****************************************************************************

In relief operations, donor agencies in education have to work with a very limited field staff ("education" always being under suspicion of being a tool of ideology). Thus the "economies of scale" principle tends to result in relatively large inputs of standard supplies, materials, equipment and school construction or repair contracts. Donors and central governments cannot be overly concerned with the question of whether these inputs in fact reach the most deprived target popula­tion groups. The immediate concern is usually to spread educational supplies as widely as possible so that children and illiterate youths are stimulated to come to school and the donor or central authority becomes clearly identifiable with emergency aid.

The NGO's and private organizations (working on the principle "small is beautiful") usually fill the gaps left by the above macro approach and sometimes succeed in convincing the major educational donors to modify the contents of their emergency aid "packages".

****************************************************************************** * Whether the combination of supply or infrastructure inputs will provide * * an adequate response to the diversified learning needs of the target * * group (children of various ages, illiterate parents, orphans, etc.) and * * to the existing socio-cultural forces working towards community cohesion, J. * remains often an academic question.

* remains often an academic question. *

* ******************************************************************************

- 11 -.

Evaluation specialists should not be too worried about this, as the errors made in the timing and mixes of pedagogical/basic needs supplies met with a great inventiveness of recipients at the local levels, who usually ensured their close-to-perfect allocation and utilization, and who were not constrained by borders between public sectors (in cases where formal schooling was not yet organized, places where informal learning took place also received supplies).

********************************************************************* * * * * * Donor- agencies which attempted, to shift, prematurely, the emphasis * * of their cooperation from individual or community relief to * * national educational development concerns (e.g. human resources * * development, national indenpendence/'endogeneity, New Socio- . *

, * cultural Order, etc.) were in general allowed to formulate their * * views and present their scenarios (received with scepticism in * * Lebanon and with polite smiles in Kampuchea) but these had very *

. * little noticeable effect on the direction of the relief efforts(5) * * * * * ***********************************************************************

Lebanon

The process of rapid socio-economic and political change is characterized by continuous population movements, resulting in new social and individual needs and aspirations and multiple private initiatives, to which public institutions and traditional structures (e.g. family) are reacting in unforeseen ways.

************************************************************************ * * * * * In the absence of a population census or of demographic surveys, * * the donors were dependent on the very scattered information * * which was not always available in the places where it was needed * * for project formulation (e.g. requests from headmasters of individ- * * ual schools backed up with irrelevant statistics and "high level" * * recommendations) which they had difficulty in verifying and * * absorbing. % * . . . * * As a consequence, the donor agency's approach had to remain * * flexible: to "move in" where villages and suburbs were opened up * * to Government control and educational needs were identified (often *. * by construction engineers who happened to make a road survey in the % * area). Socio-political constraints, however, prevented emergency * * support reaching some of the neediest population groups: Palestinian.* * children in private (non-fee/subsidized) schools in Greater Beirut * * and in refugee camp schools (a responsibility of UNWRA; however, * * lack of resources resulted in a shift whereby education became a * * "last priority"). % * * ************************************************************************

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The impact of educational emergency support was mainly measured by the influx of people who came to settle in villages where schools were repaired and became operational, taken as a sign of increased confidence and security in which learning could take place effectively if basic facilities and supplies were provided.

But mistakes were also made, especially because of a lack of insight into socio-cultural reality. For example, the Social Services Project, including many learning components and partly supported by UNICEF, faced many problems of implementation: "Culturally, the village people perceived the project mainly as receiving philanthropic and second-rate services designed for the poor with which it did not wish to be associated, let alone participate as volunteers. Programmes such as. the non-formal pre-vocational courses, based on principles of quality and relevance, income-generation and production/profit, have a greater chance of suc­cess." (Director, Office of Social Development for the South, Saida, 26 March 1983).

At the macro level, the World Bank supported-project of schoolmapping and clustering, aiming at creating "aggregate" schools and based on rational cost-benefit criteria of increasing class size and pupil-teacher ratios (which are extremely low), had problems in being implemented as both teachers and parents preferred to support village schools for reasons of security and community cohesion.

Kampuchea

Population movement within the country and abroad is a dynamic force difficult to follow and predict as it is dependent on the availability of food (supplies and agricultural productivity) and rapid shifts in the location of war zones. The population structure is characterized by an unequal age-group distri­bution (less male adults in the productive age-group; less children born in the period 1975-1979) and an unequal sex distribution (many widows). The combined .impact of these demographic forces on the social demand for education and on the needs for training in productive skills and socially useful work of future occupational structures is still largely unknown. The socio-cultural forces in society are difficult to measure at-a macro level and can only be illustrated by examples from institutions and families.

(6) ************************************************************************* * * * * * The socio-cultural needs felt by the population were expressed * * through a "hunger" for books, information, recreation opportunities * * and different forms of cultural expression with a view to rebuild- * * ing a sense of confidence, solidarity and cultural identity. The * * Government, in response to this social demand for restoring a rich * * cultural heritage and endogenous cultural values, reinforced the * * information and communication channels with the local communities * * by distributing literature3 audio-visual equipment, national flags * * (symbol of Angkor Wat) and by organizing, around the school, mani- * * festations of national dance/theatre, music/folklore, handicraft * * production, etc. * * * *************************************************************************

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The organization and management of these activities was shared by the official responsible authorities and by a number of mass movements such as the Women's Association (created 2 December 1979) and the Youth Association (created 2 September 19?9) . .

Originally, the international donor community did not support this type of activity, mainly out of respect for local customs and cultural and spiritual values which were basically unknown, but also because some of them had a. dominantly ideological character. However, the Government increasingly requested their international support: "To merge a rich cultural heritage with all components of a modern educational system is a difficult process which can only be enriched by information and lessons of experience available universally and should not be limited by those generated by recent colonial and neo-colonial experiences." (High Official, Ministry of Education, 27 February 1980).

ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL. FORCES

The experiences in Lebanon and Kampuchea in this area were almost totally the opposite. In Lebanon, the forces of work, and technology (investment) dominated the educational and human resources development processes and tended, indirectly, to influence international donor support in the area of training. In Kampuchea, education and training were seen as incentives to productive and socially useful work (the "culture of work"), mainly in the form of community self-help activities; donors responded in terms of the supply of simple tools, workshop facilities, etc., in order to facilitate the harmonization of work and learning (on-the-job).

In summary, the two experiences can be visualized as follows:

Donors in Infrastructure (Roads, Housing, etc.)

• 1 i

Donors in Education

>

Donors in pro­ductive sectors .

(agricul etc.)

ture,

*.~»

~\ r

.7

Formal and Non-formal Technical Training

'

School : gardens; work­shops; etc.

Informal Learning + Information + Technical Assistance

<r—

— >

Skills (Construction)

i

I 1

Functional Literacy

1

Organization of Self-help

« - - -

Work

Productivity

Technology

Investment

> *

•v r

Basic Needs;

Food ;

Volunteers;

etc.

Main focus Lebanon (devel opmenï)

Main focus Kampuchea (rel ief )

- 14 -

Lebanon

The reconstruction programme generated projects for rehabilitating destroyed or badly damaged housing and schools, implementing a planned network of new public schools and renovating and expanding physical infrastructures. This, logically, resulted in an emphasis on vocational training to replace migrant workers who were previously employed, particularly in the building construction and industrial sectors. The preparation of trained manpower for the massive reconstruction tasks in various sectors also required an expansion and moderniza­tion of technical education programmes to compensate for the large emigration of well-qualifed technicians (major donor: World Bank). In addition, an estimated 200,000 persons (UN estimate) may be in need of some form of vocational rehabilit­ation for the disabled.

*********************************************************************** * , * * Major constraints encountered in programme implementation are: * * lack of decentralization; cultural or historical preference for * * academic types of education (rational, if one considers tine * * education/income profiles); role of private sector (transnationals) * * in structuring the labour market; etc. Much more modest resources * * are directed towards the problems of unemployed (marginalized) * * youth; however, the problem for the public sector is "how to create * * a demand for functional literacy training in a community charac- * * . terized by a free market mechanism which provides the most motivated- * * youth with income-generating skills on the job." * * * **************************************************************************

Kampuchea

In 1970/80 the economy was characterized by food searching by families; a mixed mechanism of commodity exchange (no currency) on the market and government controlled food supplies; payment of government workers in rice rations; teachers partly paid by mutual assistance farm groups? agricultural production units; small repair shops, family handicrafts, market vendors; etc. Children, traditionally involved in family work or forced labour (7) fully participated in the above survival operations; the level of unemployment must have been close to zero in those days.

Food distribution was partly guided by work-points earned by the recipient adults (children received food in schools or orphanages and special measures were taken for the aged). When the children started to come to school (also attracted by the nutrition/health services provided there), the introduction of a "work spirit" and of practical activities in educational programmes at all levels was almost im­mediate. At the primary schools, the time-table included handicrafts and school gardening as well as wood and metal work (from grade 3 onwards). The donors (NGO1s plus UNICEF) responded with supplies of simple tools for gardening, woodwork, etc., but in insufficient quantities and sometimes of the wrong quality/size. At the

- 15 -

post-primary, teacher training and adult education levels, workshop equipment and tools were provided not only because of their pedagogical significance ("learning fay doing") but also because of their urgent function in repairing schoolbuildings and furniture and producing simple pedagogical tools (blackboards, slates). Girls' schools received sewing machines, cloth materials and kitchen equipment to allow the students to make dresses and prepare food "bought" by the community in exchange for free labour (school repairs).

************************************************************************** * * * With the exception of a few "failures" (e.g. the production of milk * * at schools for free distribution to pupils was discontinued because * * of lack of good quality water, irregular supplies of milk powder * * because of lack of transport, and, most seriously, sickness because * * of culturally different eating habits at home), the donors were * * generally successful in this type of relief operation linking edu- * * cation, training and work to basic needs. . * * * **************************************************************************

However, little progress was made in enhancing technical and vocational education and training, a priority development objective of a Government eager to link human resources development to the productive sectors? traditionally and culturally the population continued to show a preference for liberal arts and academic types of courses at the post-primary levels which they could materialize in the absence of an effective incentive system (recruitment/wages) and of centrally planned control of student streaming.

VI. EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES: OBJECTIVES/NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS; STAFF, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY; ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT; PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

In Kampuchea and, to a lesser extent, in Lebanon, donor agency inputs combined "hardware" (supplies and construction) with "software" (advice, recurrent cost of training/transport, etc.) which, in combination, had an important impact on the educational process, the direction and significance of which is, however, almost impossible to assess.

The only issue which this section attempts to deal with is therefore a negative one: "Where were the points of entry for external intervention in education relief or development wrongly identified and what went wrong with the criteria under­lying such mistaken choices?"

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES VERSUS INDIVIDUAL NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS

In general it was observed that, in earlier periods of disaster relief, the distance between immediate educational targets set by the State and the "education-to-facilitate-survival" needs of the people and communties tended to be narrow, but would gradually widen again as relief efforts took the form of recon­struction and development.

- 16 -

********************************************************************* * * * * * External donors tended to prolong educational relief assistance *. * (supplies are relatively simple to manage and nicely visible) * * even when recipients had already reached educational reconstruc- * * tion/development stages), scarce national human and material *. * resources were thus misallocated. J * * *********************************************************************

The example of support to orphanages versus family welfare in Kampuchea is a classical one. NGO's and most private organizations, under continuous pres­sures to please their home constituencies with information/news about their help to the most deprived, over-supplied educational classes organized in orphanages with facilities and supplies, thus attracting children who could also have been enrolled in regular primary schools if foster parents could have been supported to take care of them materially. This happened in spite of the official Government policy: "The school is the main place in the community where all types of ..deprived population groups will benefit from educational and basic services under, the guidance of the teachers, the intellectual and ideological leaders of the people. " .

To mention another example, donor agencies in Lebanon could have attempted to bridge the gap to some extent between the relief phase (more of the same "minimum standard") and the development phase (quality and capacity building), if they had allocated a modest share of their inputs to construct teachers' houses in the villages' (retaining teachers or enhancing their return) and to supplement scarce recurrent funds available for in-service training of teachers at the provincial levels.

************************************************************************ . * . * * # - # • • * * Processes of learning and of aid have both their own dynamics * * which are difficult to harmonize. Especially in the sensitive area * * of education, donors do not like to be labelled "supply agencies" * * while governments resist being forced into a role of dependent * .* • recipient. The variations in degrees of difficulty in phases of * * relief, reconstruction.or development are only slightj the "key. * ' • * concept which satisfies all parties is "cooperation", the inter- * * pretation of which can range from constructing a schoolbuilding to * * subsidizing university research on basic needs and fundamental * * learning. * * * ************************************************************************

Extreme examples at both ends of this continuum could be found in both Kampuchea and Lebanon. In general terms, the Kampuchean strategy was: to "fill-up" the country with massive supplies (food, agricultural seeds, medicine, notebooks/ pencils, etc.) as quickly as possible, to ensure rapid distribution to the remotest areas (transport) as long as donors, with a well-known short "disaster memory", are still prepared to donate and the authorities are still prepared/motivated to receive.

- 17 -

**************************************************************** * * * * * Education fared rather well in this approach as the Ministry * * ' of Education (run by ex-teachers) was better organized and * * intellectually equipped for crisis management in absorbing * * and monitoring massive supplies than most of the other sectors * * (e.g. health, agriculture). * * * *******************************************************************

At the other extreme, in Lebanon, scarce resources were allocated by donors to the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World (University College, Beirut) to finance academic research on "socialization processes to Lebanese pre-school children; moral judgements of Lebanese children; etc." with little or no relevance to the learning needs of the most deprived.

******************************************************************* * * * * * In general, both governments and donors were very eager to * * formulate jointly a type of "production function"* which could * * accommodate simultaneously the newly defined educational * * objectives i.e. long-term: cooperation for educational deve- * * lopment; medium-term: typically a five-year plan period; and * * short-term: the best point of entry of external educational * * relief efforts. * * • * ******************************************************************* ,

Different tactics were used in the allocation of means : in Kampuchea the focus was mainly on inter sec tor a.l cooperation (among donors as well as recipients) and on the. strengthening of local educational capacity in which the role of the teacher was central;•in Lebanon a greater emphasis was put on physical infrastructure and on the strengthening of central educational capacity with a central role for administrator s/managers. Both countries expressed a desire for relief and cooperation to support, in order of priority, educational growth (school construction)- s distribution (transport)—^ change (programmes).

******************************************************************** * * * # . * % Within this common desire, the Kampuchean authorities * * favoured international support to such educational func- * * tions as custodial care (shelter) and the introduction * * of productive, socio-cultural and political values to * * children and their parents (textbook printing, teacher * * training, adult literacy classes) while Lebanese educators * * favoured external support to functions like: skill deve- * * lopment for economic growth .(vocational training) and * * selection for (classical) roles: curriculum development, * * examinations/testing, etc. * * * * * *******************************************************************

* For an illustration of a "production function" approach applied in Kampuchea, see Annex.

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VII THE IMPACT OF AID PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES; AM ILLUSTRATION FROM LEBANON

The impact of aid processes on educational processes can be best illus­trated in the following chart which compares the original intentions of the donors (all sources combined) with the actual programmes being executed.

Resources

Relief

Recon­struction

Rehabili­tation

Develop­ment

Who is Learning

Where How When What

= Donors' preferences

+ + + + + + +

= Actual programmes

= Over-emphasis

= No/little donor impact

Who is learning : here the donors' intentions and the recipients' wishes more or less coincided. The focus was on deprived children and their families.

- 19 -

Inter-agency cooperation generally worked well in identi­fying and mobilizing the target population : e.g. the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) assisted UNICEF in the South in the identification of priority com­munity needs, provision of community health services (partly in schools)and distribution of furniture to schools. But also some gaps were left: education in refugee camps; private poor schools in Beirut slums; children in the Bekaa Valley (reasons of insecurity).

Where : Here the focus was almost entirely on schools.

"Over-emphasis" here means that the donors could have diversi­fied their inputs: e.g. non-pedagogical (basic needs) supplies, support to teacher training, non-formal training for unemployed youths, etc. On some occasions, the "eager" civil engineers, under contractual pressures to construct, actually built an over-capacity of low quality school space (sometimes in still empty villages) with the expectations that future population movements could thus be attracted, and misguided by the incor­rect advice that schoolbuildings would be used by the adult population in the afternoons for non-formal educational training and social activities.

How : Here the central point was the teacher, in classical classroom instruction and few linkages with work activities and out-of-school learning.

The donors supported the quantitative capacity of teacher training facilities without being requested by the recipients to be concerned with the relevance of programmes and the introduction of new teaching/learning technologies. -It must, however, be said here that the donors had very few possible points of entry in this area, because of the large influence of the private sector and the absence of non-formal, parti­cipatory learning practices in the community.

When : Here the main question is the age of the target groups served.

Adults and youths received very little attention. Still, the needs are large: it is estimated that about 38% of the people of 10 years and over are illiterate (women 52%). Young people between the ages of 12 - 20, who have missed out on formal schooling during the war, have few productive skills for entering the labour market and the percentage of un (der)-employment is high, especially in the villages. However, as the needs may be felt but hardly ever expressed by the community, only few literacy programmes are in operation, mainly organized by the private sector (religious -groups) and supported by international NGO's and private organizations.

- 20 - -

What : The reference is to the content or type of education.

Decades of international and regional cooperation with the specialized agencies in programme development has resulted in little change, mainly because of cultural reasons (advice is often ignored by foreign-trained national experts) but also because of the powers of the private sector (programmes in technical and vocational training are rather successful).

In summary, a more intensive dialogue between the donor agencies and decentralized educational authorities as well as with representatives from the private educational sector might have resulted in bringing the curve and the dotted line in the above chart more in harmony, and in overcoming seme of the constraints which, up to now, have forced international aid for educational reconstruction to concentrate on school construction in Greater Beirut and the South.

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is clear from the above personal account that the lessons learned from experiences in Kampuchea and Lebanon in the area of disaster relief and education are, and can only be, tentative in nature. The few visual presentation suggested in the text should by no means be interpreted as attempts to approach greater scientific rigour; they merely provide an illustration of ways in which a balance in rational and ethical perspectives can, in situations of disaster, become an important incentive for joint inter-sectoral action by government authorities as well as national and international non-governmental groups who generally work with flexible resource inputs from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.

The key issues which the paper has tried to clarify is:

********************************************************************* * * * . * * "How can we identify and mobilize those national and inter- * * national forces (not necessarily identical with bureau- * * oratio power) which can transform conviction into commitment * * and commitment into innovative educational action which * * produces relatively quick results3 measurable in terms of * * basic needs ' satisfaction of those populations hardest hit * * by a disaster?" - ' * * * * * *********************************************************************

Educational planners and development specialists can learn a lot from work­ing in a disaster situation. They will observe that disasters tend to result in a shift in paradigms regarding both the concepts of- development and of education.

- 21 -

A disaster, defined as a set of acute events that outstrip a society's ability to cope with them, is only marginally different from an extreme situa­tion of under-development, now re-defined as the absence of a life support system for reducing the vulnerability of ccmmunities/people and for minimizing suffering.

Responses to a disaster are therefore more than emergency relief (e.g. food); they include elements of mitigation (to lessen the seriousness of the disaster's impact) and recuperation or recovery (e.g. self-help/solidarity programmes).

"Education" in a situation of disaster means both "learning how to survive" and "using the school as shelter and. a place of security and •peace".

In view of the above considerations and findings, a tentative answer to the earlier question would thus go more or less as follows: "Disasters, while hurting people, do not leave the victims helpless. They are capable of making rational decisions if confronted with well-informed alternative, choices. When provided with the necessary (critical) resources, they will mobilize energy for participating in post-disaster relief activities. As disasters often high-light the inherent weaknesses of social organization at the national and community levels, forcing all parties concerned to reappraise societal goals and to re-design action programmes for implementation, we can observe the emergence of a greater focus on human (resources) development, including innovative educational and training responses to urgent problems of survival."

ANNEX

KAMPUCHEA

Testing external inputs into a "production function" for human educational relief:

(i) L = f(Ee, Er, Hr)

L = learningr f = function; E e = "minimum" educational environment (improving basic living conditions of students and teachers);

Er = educational reconstruction (construction/repairs of facilities and reorganization of human action) ; Hr = human rehabilitation (support the mind to "engineer" an ordinary life again).

(ii) Inputs into an educational environment

E = f (S./ D, S. , S_, S , S , S ) e f k d c w g

Sf = supplementary schoolfeeding programme (cooperation with WFP/FAO, but discontinued); D = dormitory equipment (beds, mosquito nets, etc.; note; mainly used for orphanages, in-service teacher training courses and ideo­logical seminars for government officials recruited among supporters of the "old regime"); S^ = school kitchen equipment (note: midday meals for children and community members); S¿j = school dispensaries (cooperation with WHO and "friendly" East-European Dilaterais); Sc = clothing/shoes for school-children (note: probably a "luxury" which should have been left to self-help/inventiveness of the people); Sw = water supply (pumps), to schools (cooperation with PAO) ,- Sg = school gardens (cooperation with FAO; not very successful in view of bad soil and relatively complex to manage by an agency preoccupied by massive food/seeds supplies).

(iii) Educational reconstruction

E r=f(S r, W, E s / d, Se, Tt, Td, O)

Sr = school repairs; re-opening of schools under social demand pressures allowing for a "miracle" increase of primary school enrolment of 300,000 pupils in May 1979 to about 1 million pupils early 1980, and 1.5 million pupils (4000 schools) early 1983, representing 60-70% of the school-age population more or less comparable to pre-war statistics (1968: 68%); W = workshops for producing/repairing furniture and basic pedagogical equipment (note: judged by the recipients as more successful than pure consumer goods supplies); Es/d

= educational supplies and distribution (note: competition/coordination with transport of food and of teachers attending in-service training seminars); Se = school equipment (partly manufactured locally in workshops); Tt = teacher training facilities; tea­chers ("ideological leaders of the people with a revolutionary socialist spirit, a broadly based general culture and a sense of great commitment and patience will treat pupils with respect - with a view to enhancing their harmonious internal development - and with friendship based on socialist ideals and not governed by differences in age and social class.") were considered the backbone of educational change and thus received priority

(i)

support,- Tâ = curriculum and textbook development (note: contents were "closed" to the UN agencies; printing suffered from lack of technical expertise and competition by information/propaganda needs; in summary, a not-so-successful operation as paper was stocked in badly needed schools and distribution of paper and textbooks, mainly printed in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, competed with scarce transport facilities for food distribution) ,- O = office equipment like typewriters/ roneo machines, etc., for decentralized educational management and supply monitoring at provincial and institutional levels.

(iv) Human rehabilitation

Hr = f(P, T, Es, E , Efc, P/M)

P = pupils, physically/emotionally deprived, faced with severe problems of confidence, security and discipline ("powerful" having been in a position to accuse adults of treason). Note: a "black box" for the donors, who responded with (at least) decreasing physical suffering in school envi­ronments; T = teachers; only one-third formally trained, lack of memory and concentration; obsolete knowledge and access to few reference materials (note: housing facilities provided through relief aid; conflict between work role versus family role of teachers reduced through food aid); E .= educational structures; problems of transition between formal and non-formal education (the adult literacy campaign achieved only a 20% success rate), over-aged children in primary grades (e.g. Grade I includes children ranging from 6-11 years); problems of testing for examinations (no criteria after disorganization of learning for 5 years), etc. Note: apart from a calculation of the statistical repercussions of these phenomena, the external agencies had little impact in this area; E p = educational program­mes. Note: the only impact the multilateral agencies had was to promote a link between learning and work (workshops, school gardens,. etc.) and between learing and self-help (nutrition, health); the links with ideology and with culture (theatre, dance, music, etc.) were monopolized by the socialist bilaterals; Et = Educational technology: principles of democratiza­tion and participation implied that anyone in the community having a potential contribution to make to education could be mobilized; this "people-intensive" technology motivated donors to provide incentives (food, trans­port, housing) to volunteers; P/M = planning and management; decentraliza­tion favoured inter-agency cooperation, thus avoiding "red-tape" which existed at the centre (note: "planning" scored high on the agenda of a future-oriented government; education was the best "intellectually" equipped to provide the lead in this area and thus received privileged attention, also in terms of resource allocated by the Central Committee).

(ii)

NOTES

On Kampuchea see e.g. "Kampuchean Chronicles; narrated by refugee children in words and pictures", National Federation of Unesco Associations in Japan, 1980; "The will to live", Jacques Danois, UNICEF, Bangkok, 1980; "Education Emergency Assistance in Kampuchea" (3 volumes 1980/81), Consultant Reports to UNICEF, Hans Reiff.

On Lebanon see e.g. "Aid and capacity building for education in Lebanon", consultant report to UNICEF, Hans Reiff, March 1983; "Social and moral issues of children and. youth in Lebanon", Beirut University College, 1981; "The development of three to six year-old Lebanese children and their environment", Beirut University College, 1980.

The higher one moves up the hierarchies of the State and of organiza­tions of Member States, the moré complex it becomes to balance the allocation of scarce resources between the development concerns of peoples with the basic needs of people (persons). In the case of Lebanon, a relief focus on the most affected population of South Lebanon (UNICEF) was thus counterbalanced by global assistance programmes for national reconstruction and development (World Bank, Unesco). In the case of Kampuchea, the fragile border-lines between humanitarian emergency assistance and development aid were carefully watched by the international community and any accidental trespassing resulted in withdrawal of support. Many of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) were able to reconcile the above issues and took rational action often against the advice of their own national constituencies. Staff in these organizations thus realized that, as the State is almost never a coherent entity, moral/ethical forces can usually be mobilized for attracting and utilizing educational assistance in direct response to urgent human needs, irrespective of the power/ funding forces which determine priorities of educational development plans.

Intellectuals, as well as Christian and Moslem leaders from within and outside Lebanon, gathered together in an international symposium "Lebanon, war or peace" (Beirut, March 1983) organized by the "Mouvement Culturel Antelias". During the discussions it became shockingly evident that the distance between globally accepted norms (peace) and individual reality a few blocks away from the Conference Hall (aggression/war) had not narrowed. There was an exchange of spiritual knowledge (securing a peace of mind) but no real learning took place as the participants did not come to grips with the major issue: "How to ensure State authority in nation-building while preserving cultural pluralism (plurality) in an open economy determined by the powers of international business?"

(iii)

Stagnation of educational assistance can have a counter-productive effect as expectations are created and promises not kept, sometimes resulting in disillusionment: "I want to learn English. That will help me to make friends with foreigners. I like them because they help me. They also make me laugh. But sometimes they make me cry too. They say they will come back to meet me, but they never do." (Y.S. 12 years, Kampuchean Refugee).

I once, during a training seminar for officials of the Ministry of Education, Phnom Penh, attempted to illustrate the effects of population dynamics on technology/work and social change in the community by using a chart with boxes and arrows. When the floor was opened for discussion, the first remark was : tThe learned foreign expert has shown a very interesting and innovative design of school-clustering. Unfortunately we forgot to explain to him that we have, in this poor country, a lot of rain and no electri­city, so that the buildings without a roof and without windows may not be always functional - » After this learning experience, we all became much more careful in using conceptual models (a «foreign» tool) to illustrate relationships between education and the community. In contrast, »technocratic» projections of single variables like school-age population', enrolments, literacy rates, etc., based on extrapolations and guesswork using sample data, were very much appreciated (and too readily accepted) as they pro­vided a direct indication to the authorities of future resource needs and external aid requirements.

Orphanage No. 1 (Phnom Penh): 605 children (364 boys) of whom 244 were originally from Phonm Penh and 112 from bordering provinces,- occupation of parents: Government officials 184; farmers 134; soldiers 91; teachers 64; unknown 132. Causes of death of parents (16 prior to 1975, 867 during 1975/79):

Male

Female

Total

Starvation

102

60

162 (19%)

• Forced Labour

36

21

57 (7%)

Imprisoned

63

31

94 (11%)

War/oppression Casualty

263

291

554 (63%)

Total

464

40 3

867

Interviews : "The orphans we found were profoundly sad. Their spirits were sick. Several of them wanted to commit suicide." (Volunteer, 1979); "I would like to go back and clean the temples. I miss them very much." (Phorl, 13 years); "I want to become a fisherman. One day, when no-one was watching, I caught some fish and brought it home. We ate it quickly so no-one would notice. The soldiers never found out. That's the happiest memory I can recall." (N.M.R., 12 years); "They forbade us to pick

(iv)

fruit from trees that we had planted. That made me very angry. But I was helpless. And that made me even more angry." (S.V. 12 years); "I want to become a teacher. I will talk to my students about war and peace. When I grow up perhaps I will explain these things better." (N.E. 13 years); "I would like to be a soldier. Soldiers are not frightened of anyone. I want to become big and strong when 1 grow up so that I can protect my little sister and brothers better." (M.V. 12 years); "Only 30,000 remain of the 80,000 monks professing the faith before 1975. Most of thpm were elimin­ated by anti-religious forces. Not a single temple was spared. All were turned into pig-sties or fertilizer depots. The first thing they did was to destroy respect. When you replace the rule of respect by that of crime you can make anyone commit the most drastic acts of sacrilege. They killed the images of goodness. But we are now rebuilding and resettling the entire structure of our social and religious life. In Phnom Penh alone, 571 monks have returned to the temples in order to restore them. The only thing the Government has asked of us is to advise the people not to enter into monkhood before the age of fifty, so that strong young men are available for the tasks of national restruction and rice production." (Reverend Tep Vong, Wat Unalom, 1979).

"We were too poor and too frightened. And we were made to work through­out the day. We dug canals; we carried baskets loaded with mud and stones; we chopped wood. No, we did not play or sing. That was not allowed." (Y.V. 13 years).

(v)