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* Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,Criminal Division, United States Department ofJustice, United States of America

EFFECTIVE METHODS TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONALORGANIZED CRIME IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

Bruce G. Ohr *

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most serious unintendedconsequences of the globalization that wehave been experiencing for the last fewyears has been the rapid r ise o ftransnational organized crime groups.There are several reasons for this,including the following.

F i r s t , t h e i n c r e a s i n g e a s e o finternational communications brings theworld to each individual more directly andpotentially more dangerously than everbefore. The internet allows the individualto access information, do business with andcommunicate instantly with persons inevery nation, but at the same time it allowscriminals to perpetrate confidence schemesand stock market manipulations, runillegal gambling operations and peddlechild pornography across the globe.

Second, the growth of internationalcommerce and the staggering number ofinternational banking transactionsperformed every day by major banksprovide vital benefits to the world’seconomies, but they also present ampleopportunity for fraud and theft and allowinternational money launderers to easilyhide their ill-gotten gains.

Third, the fall of Communism in theSoviet Union and Eastern Europe hasbrought freedom and democracy tomillions, but has also resulted in massive

economic upheavals in those countries andan often-violent free-for-all amongbusinessmen for the rich natural resourcesof those regions. These changes have notonly spawned new criminal enterpriseswithin the area of former Sovietdomination, but have led directly to moneylaundering and other crimes in the rest ofthe world as well.

Finally, the international traffic in illegalcommodities, chiefly narcotics and would-be immigrants to wealthy nations, showsno signs of abating. Organized criminalshave already shown themselves to bemasters of these illegal markets. Giventhese developments, it is easy to see whythese are boom times for transnationalorganized crime.

The growing threat of transnationalorganized crime is forcing radical changesin traditional methods of law enforcement.Law enforcement has historically been amatter primarily of domestic concern. Inthe United States, for example, we havetraditionally focused our anti-organizedcrime efforts solely on the American Mafia,or La Cosa Nostra. We, and our colleaguesin other countries, have therefore beencaught unprepared by the sudden rise intransnational organized crime activities.We are not used to criminals who mightreside in country A and travel to country Bin order to commit a crime that takes placein countries C, D and E. Our organizedcrime investigators and prosecutors are notused to obtaining evidence from otherc o u n t r i e s a n d c o n d u c t i n g j o i n tinvestigations with law enforcementofficials of other countries. Indeed, in many

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instances our laws and procedures slow usdown instead of aiding us in theseendeavors. And we have not spent enoughtime studying the new organized crimegroups, learning their faces, theirorganizations, their ways of doing business.

We are now working energetically toclose the gaps in our knowledge and toexpand cooperation with other countries onlaw enforcement matters. This work isbeing done on several fronts. First, ourprosecutors and investigators are workinghard to improve their understanding oftransnational organized crime groups.With the help of the Justice Department’sOffice of International Affairs, they areinvestigating new cases in which they arelearning to work more closely with theirforeign counterparts. Second, the US.Government is stationing more lawenforcement personnel in other countries.The FBI has legal attaches in over 20countries and is planning to open moreoffices as well. The Justice Department’sOffice of International Affairs has judicialattaches in London, Rome and Mexico City,and is trying to arrange for a person to beassigned to Moscow as well. Other U.S.law enforcement agencies such as the DrugEnforcement Administration, the CustomsService, and the Immigration andNaturalization Service are also expandingtheir overseas presence. Finally, weapplaud the efforts of forums such asUNAFEI which provide us with thevaluable opportunity to meet directly withour colleagues for other countries. Theseforums are extremely important forstrengthening mutual understanding ofeach others’ legal systems and for givingus the chance to improve cooperation onspecific matters.

I will first briefly discuss the currentsituation with respect to transnationalorganized crime in the United States. I willthen cover in somewhat more detail some

of the most important methods that we usefor fighting transnational organized crime- electronic surveillance, undercoveroperations, accomplice testimony and theRICO statute. Finally, I will discuss ingeneral terms some of the challenges thatwe face in improving law enforcementcooperation between countries ontransnational organized crime cases.

II. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZEDCRIME IN THE UNITED STATES

The Organized Crime and RacketeeringSection is responsible for overseeing theJustice Department’s programme for thefight against organized crime in the UnitedStates. As I mentioned, the Section’s workand the work of its 24 Organized CrimeStrike Forces across the country hashistorically focused on the activities of LaCosa Nostra, the American Mafia. Inrecent years, the Attorney General has alsodirected the Section and its Strike Forcesto attack the growing presence of Russianand Asian organized crime groups in theUnited States. As a result, the Section nowsupervises investigations into all threemajor areas of organized crime activity inour country - LCN, Asian and Russian. Ishould mention that, for operationalreasons, the South American narcoticstra f f i ck ing groups are genera l lyinvestigated and prosecuted by other partsof the Department of Justice, and theOrganized Crime and Racketeering Sectiondoes not supervise these prosecutionsunless they also involve one of our groups.In addition, while we also see some signsof organized criminal activity from Africanand South Asian groups, they have not yetreached a serious enough level to demandthe attention of our Strike Forces. I willtherefore limit my comments to the twomajor kinds of international organizedcrime groups within the Section’s area ofactivity - first the Asian, then Russian andEast European.

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A. Asian Criminal EnterprisesAs you are al l aware, cr iminal

enterprises have existed in Asian countriesfor centuries. However, we have so farfound little evidence that the traditionalAsian criminal groups have been able toset up extensive networks in the UnitedStates. Asian immigrant communities inthe United States have suffered from thepredations of gangs and organized crimegroups, but in most instances these arehome-grown groups, without formal ties toorganized criminal groups in Asiancountries. Furthermore, in contrast to LaCosa Nostra, the Asian CriminalEnterprises found in the United Statestend to be loosely structured and often lacka formal organization.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , A s i a n C r i m i n a lEnterprises pose a significant crimeproblem in the United States. Thesegroups commit traditional organizedcrimes within various Asian communities,such as extortion, murder, kidnaping,illegal gambling, prostitution, and loan-sharking. Additionally, Asian CriminalEnterprises have engaged in internationalcriminal act ivity, including al iensmuggling, drug trafficking, financialfraud, theft of automobiles and computerchips , counter fe i t ing and moneylaundering.

1. Chinese Criminal EnterprisesChinese criminal enterprises operating

in the United States often bear namesfamiliar to students of the traditional HongKong or Taiwan triads, such as 14 K, SunYee On, Wo Hop To, or Hung Mun.However, while these groups may indeedhave some links to the traditional HongKong or Taiwan triads, the U.S.-basedgroups usually operate independently ofthe parent organizations. For example, theTung On Gang was a major criminalorganization operating in New York andother cities on the east coast of the United

States. Its former leader was a Red Poleof the Sun Yee On Triad, but the Tung OnGang’s only connection to the Sun Yee Onwas for the purpose of importing SoutheastAsian heroin into the United States.Otherwise, the Tung On Gang engaged inlocal criminal activities in the UnitedStates such as extortion, murder, illegalgambling and money laundering withouttaking direction from Hong Kong.

The range of Chinese criminal groups inthe U.S. runs from simple street gangs,such as the Flying Dragons and GhostShadows of New York’s Chinatown, toquasi-legitimate businessmen, sometimesassociated with criminally-influencedTongs, engaged in complex frauds.Currently, the principal criminal Tongs inthe United States are the Hip Shing Tong,located in New York and on the West coast,principally in San Francisco, and the OnLeong Tong, located predominately in NewYork, Chicago, Houston, Detroit, andAtlanta. These Tongs mainly operateillegal gambling, prostitution, aliensmuggling and stolen property activitiesalong with narcotics trafficking.

Chinese criminal groups in the UnitedStates traditionally preyed almostexclusively on residents of Chinesecommunities in American cities. Morerecently, however, these groups haveexpanded the scope of their activities toattacks on other U.S. companies andinstitutions and to international crimessuch as alien smuggling, drug trafficking,credit card fraud, theft of automobiles andcomputer equipment, counterfeiting,money laundering, and piracy ofintellectual property.

Chinese criminal enterprises haveproven themselves to be flexible andsophisticated, capable of engaging incomplex crimes requiring a considerableamount of planning and/or coordination

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with individuals overseas. Differentgroups may pool their resources whennecessary to complete an ambitiouscriminal scheme. Furthermore, the loosestructures of their organizations makes itdifficult for law enforcement to identify andtarget key individuals.

One of the most dramatic cases ofChinese organized crime in the last coupleof years was the so-called “Bites Dust”operation, centered in San Francisco, inwhich a Chinese criminal group engagedin robberies of computer chips fromwarehouses and sold them on the blackmarket. Carefully planning theiroperations, the robbers had arranged inadvance with buyers exactly what kind ofcomputer chips to steal. As with manyother Chinese criminal enterprises in theU.S., the gang committing the robberieswas loosely organized and not affiliatedwith a specific triad or tong.

2. Vietnamese Criminal EnterprisesVietnamese criminal enterprises are the

major Asian organized crime problem insome parts of the United States such asTexas, Louisiana and the Washington, D.C.area. Currently, more than 750,000Vietnamese have settled in various partsof the United States, with Californiahousing a large majority.

Compared to other Asian groups,Vietnamese criminal groups are the mostflexible groups in terms of cooperating withcriminals of other ethnic and racialbackgrounds. U.S. law enforcementagencies face not only traditional organizedcrime problems within various Vietnamesecommunities such as extortion, murder,kidnaping, illegal gambling, prostitution,home invasion robbery, illegal weaponstrafficking, and loan-sharking, but alsonational and international organized crimeproblems including alien smuggling, drugtrafficking, credit card, check and food

stamp fraud, white collar crime, theft ofautomobi les and computer chips /equipment, counterfeiting of monetaryinstruments, money laundering and piracyof intellectual property.

Although the crime problem generatedfrom Vietnamese criminal enterprises inthe United States has been in existence fora little more than a decade, their violenceand their proliferated criminal activitieshave generated grave concerns to lawenforcement agencies and the public.Vietnamese criminal enterprises are thefastest growing Asian crime group in theUnited States. Not only have theyestablished a foothold in various newerAsian communities, they are challengingthe established crime groups in older Asiancommunities. For the moment, they arenot as sophisticated as other moreestablished Asian crime groups, such asChinese, Japanese and Korean, and do nothave the same level of financial backing,but this is changing.

Recently our Houston Strike Forceprosecuted a Vietnamese group engaged inhealth care fraud. The defendants, whoran four health clinics, would stage autoaccidents and then submit false medicalb i l l s f o r r e i m b u r s e m e n t b y t h eGovernment. Enlist an attorney to assistthem in the scheme, the defendantsmastered complicated paperwork to obtain$ 4 million dollars within a three yearperiod.

3. Korean Criminal EnterprisesAs with the Chinese criminal groups,

Korean criminal enterprises in the UnitedStates have ties to Korean criminal groupsin Korea and Japan, but they areindependent entities. While Koreancriminal enterprises are generally lesssophisticated and less organized thanChinese criminal enterprises and JapaneseBoryokudan, they are best known for and

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are extremely proficient in criminalactivities related to the trafficking ofcrystal methamphetamine and SoutheastAsian heroin, extortion, illegal gambling,alien smuggling, prostitution, publiccorruption, and money laundering.

Many of the criminal activities of theKorean groups require an extensivenational and/or international network ofcriminal contacts. Adapting to theexpanding international economy, Koreantraditional criminal organizations arelinking up with organized crime groupsabroad, including Japanese and Russiangroups, to form business joint ventures andto learn new methods of committing crimes.

Since Korean immigrants in the UnitedStates are often reluctant to report crimesto law enforcement agencies, the activityof Korean criminal enterprises oftenremains undetected by law enforcementorganizations in the United States. As aresult, these groups have flourished in thepast decade. They have gained a strongfoothold in various prosperous Koreancommunities, have controlled a large shareof methamphetamine trade in Hawaii andthe U.S. West Coast, and have had anetwork of prostitution/alien smugglingoperations that span the nation. Koreancriminal enterprises have the potential tobecome “entrenched organized crimegroups” within the United States, similarto their counterpart criminal groups inKorea.

4. Japanese Criminal EnterprisesJapanese criminal enterprises, the

Boryokudan, also known as Yakuza, can becategorized as traditional criminalenterprises. Japanese criminals based inother countries with Asian communities,such as the United States, Australia, andBrazil, are either associates of theJapanese Boryokudan, Boryokudanmembers, or Japanese delinquents

(chimpira) who are would-be Boryokudan.

T h e p r i m a r y a c t i v i t i e s o f t h eBoryokudan in the U.S. are moneylaundering, drug trafficking, handguntrafficking, monopoly of the Japanesetourist trade, and manipulation of the realestate market. The most aggressiveBoryokudan groups in the U.S. includeYamaguchi-gumi, Sumiyoshi-rengo-kai,Inagawa-kai, and Toa Yuai Jigyo Kumiai.

The Boryokudan’s main activity ismoney laundering, a very difficultoperation for law enforcement to detect.Japanese victims are usually reluctant toreport crimes to law enforcement for fearof retaliation. Boryokudan members andtheir associates have also invested in high-volume cash businesses , such asrestaurants, bars, gift shops, and hotels,and in other legitimate businesses, such asconstruction companies, oil companies,banks, casinos, golf courses, and U.S.securities.

Nevertheless, recent investigations haveindicated a decline of the Boryokudan’sactivities in the United States. It has beenspeculated that this could be related toJapan experiencing a long period ofeconomic downturn, providing anabundance of opportunities in Japan for theBoryokudan to take over ailing businessesand prof i t f rom them. 1 St i l l , theBoryokudan pose a significant threat to theUnited States through their financialresources, their ability to launder largeamounts of money, their ability to infiltratelegitimate businesses in the United States,and their international connections withhigh-level political, financial and criminalfigures.

1 See Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, A New MobMentality in Japan, WASH. POST, April 11, 1999,at A1.

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Although the Boryokudan groups haveformed alliances with various internationalorganized crime groups, such as Chinese,Korean, Taiwanese, Russian, and Italian,they remain the most closed ethnic crimegroup. Only Japanese or Japanese-relatedindividuals are included in theirorganizations. They have establishedthemselves to some extent in Hawaii andSouthern California. United States lawenforcement organizations are focusingmore attention to the Boryokudan becausethey fear that the Boryokudan will becomea truly entrenched criminal organizationsimilar to the La Cosa Nostra crime family.However, evidence thus far does notindicate that they possess a substantialthreat in the U.S.

B. Russian and Other EurasianOrganized Crime

The U.S. Justice Department uses theterms “Russian Organized Crime” and“ E u r a s i a n O r g a n i z e d C r i m e ”interchangeably to refer not only toorganized crime groups operating inRussia, but also those groups operating inor headquartered in countries in EasternEurope and Asia that were formerly partof the Soviet bloc, such as Poland, Hungary,Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraineand others. Eurasian Organized Crime hasbecome prominent in the West only in thepast ten years, since the collapse of theSoviet bloc.

As I mentioned earlier, the dissolutionof the Soviet Union in 1991 led towidespread economic upheaval across theformer Soviet bloc countries. The economyof Russia and other former Soviet countriesshrunk drastically as unprofitable stateenterprises lost their state funding andshut down. The considerable naturalresources of these countries became theprizes in a fierce struggle betweencompeting businessmen who often alliedthemselves with organized crime elements,

resulting in dozens of murders and othercrimes as the contestants vied for control.Criminals who managed to gain access tothese resources sought to cash in on theirsuccess, selling oil and other resourcesoverseas in violation of Russian laws andconcealing the profits in a series of offshorebank accounts. Finally, the criminalssought to use the proceeds of their crimesto purchase real estate and other assets inthe United States and others westerncountries.

At the same time the loosening of travelrestrictions from the former Soviet Unionallowed many individuals to emigrate tothe United States and other westerncountries. Among these immigrants werea few criminals who took advantage of thenew environment to set up new criminalorganizations which preyed on their fellowimmigrants. Thus, in the United States,we have seen the growth of organizedcriminal groups in places such as theBrighton Beach neighborhood of New York,where their members practice extortion onlocal businesses and commit excise tax andhealth care frauds, drug trafficking andvisa and immigration fraud. The BrightonBeach groups show particular flexibility inworking with other established criminalgroups such as La Cosa Nostra. In oneparticularly egregious example, Russianmobsters in New Jersey combined with LaCosa Nostra members in a scheme to cheatstate authorities of millions of dollars inexcise taxes on the sale of gasoline.

So far we have identified roughly twentylarge Russian Organized Crime groupsoperating worldwide. Over the last decade,these groups have expanded theiroperations into more than 55 countries,including the former Soviet Union, Europeand North America. The most prominentof these groups are:

(i) the Ivankov group, also known asthe “Organizatsiya,” based in

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Vladivostok and Moscow, withinfluence in New York, Miami,Boston, and Los Angeles;

(ii) t h e S e m i o n M o g i l e v i c hOrganization, based in Budapestand Moscow and located inPhiladelphia, Miami, Los Angeles,New York and Boston;

(iii) the Izmailovskaya Organization,which operates in Moscow, Tel Aviv,Paris, Toronto, Miami and NewYork City; and

(iv) the Solntsevskaya Organization,which is based in Moscow andBudapest, and has moved intoFlorida, Southern California, andChicago. These groups areinvolved in a variety of crimesinc luding business f rauds ,especially excise tax frauds ongasoline, money laundering,health care fraud, drug trafficking,e x t o r t i o n a n d v i s a a n dimmigration fraud.

The transnational aspects of EurasianOrganized Crime, as practiced by the largercriminal groups, pose a particularly acutethreat to the societies of the West. Our lawenforcement bodies face great difficultiesin attempting to investigate large scalefinancial fraud and money launderingschemes emanating from the former SovietUnion. Often the only part of the crimetaking place within western jurisdictionsis the movement of millions, or evenbillions, of dollars through western bankaccounts. Obtaining a clear picture of thepossibly criminal activities linked to thismoney requires the close cooperation ofauthorities from Russia, other members ofthe Commonwealth of Independent Statesand many other countries . Suchcooperation is extremely difficult to obtainin a timely manner, particularly whenmany different countries are involved. Asa result, it is often impossible to investigatethese cases as thoroughly as they deserve,

and the criminals gain the ability to hideand make use of their ill-gotten assets inthe west.

I don’t have to tell you that it is a verydangerous situation when organizedcriminals have access to large amounts ofmoney in your country. In the UnitedStates, La Cosa Nostra historically used itscontrol of the pension funds of certain largelabor unions to fund its criminal activitiesand further the power of the Mafia,including in the political arena. If we failto check the ability of these criminals tomake use of the billions of dollars they havemoved out of Russia, you will find theinfluence of Eurasian Organized Crimespreading to other sectors of the economyand the political life of western countries.

III. METHODS OF COMBATINGTRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED

CRIME - DOMESTIC RESPONSES

United States international lawenforcement has increased its ability tocombat t ransnat iona l c r imina ls .Prosecutors have worked out thetechniques for acquiring evidence fromabroad, while extradition and mutual legalassistance treaties have proliferated andbecome more inclusive.2 Many domesticlegal obstacles to effective internationallaw enforcement have largely been reducedor eliminated by the actions of Congressand the federal courts. Additionally,foreign governments and law enforcementagencies have worked with U.S. officialstowards reducing the frictions created bytheir own criminal justice systems.3 Whilemuch work remains to be done, we feel thatour law enforcement bodies are graduallyacquiring the necessary tools to do the job.

2 Ethan A. Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: TheInternationalization of U.S. Criminal LawEnforcement 467-468 (1993)

3 Id. at 468.

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Our fight against transnationalorganized crime will, however, rely firstand foremost on the investigativetechniques and prosecutive tools developedin our long struggles against the AmericanMafia. I would therefore like to begin bydiscussing with you some of the mostimportant law enforcement tools in ourarsenal. I will begin with three techniquesused by our investigative agencies with theassistance and under the oversight ofprosecutors: electronic surveillance,undercover operations and the use ofconfidential informants.

A. Electronic SurveillanceElectronic Surveillance represents the

single most important law enforcementweapon against organized crime. There isnothing as effective as proving a crimethrough the defendant’s own words.Electronic Surveillance evidence providesreliable, objective evidence of crimesthrough the statements of the participantsthemselves. Additionally, electronicsurveillance enables law enforcement tolearn of conspirators’ plans to commitcrimes before they are carried out. Thisallows them to survey the criminalactivities, such as delivery of contrabandand conspiratorial meetings, or to disruptand abort the criminal activities wherea p p r o p r i a t e , m a k i n g e l e c t r o n i csurveillance particularly helpful inpreventing the occurrence of violent crimes.

Additionally, electronic surveillance isparticularly helpful in transnationalcrimes because it enables law enforcementto intercept conspirators in the UnitedStates discussing crimes with theircriminal associates in countries outside theUnited States. Electronic surveillancegives United States law enforcementevidence of conspiratorial planning againstco-conspirators operating outside of theUnited States that would otherwise be verydifficult to obtain.

While electronic surveil lance isextremely valuable, it is also a verysensitive technique because of legitimateconcerns for a person’s privacy interests.These concerns impose significantrestrictions on electronic surveillance. Forexample, electronic surveillance can onlybe used to obtain evidence of some specificserious offenses listed in the governingstatute.4 If an agent or governing attorneywishes to secure electronic surveillance, heor she must submit an affidavit to a UnitedStates district court judge containingspecific facts establishing probable causeto believe that the subjects of the electronicsurveillance are committing certainspecified offenses and that it is likely thatrelevant evidence of such crimes will beobtained by the electronic surveillance.5

Thus, the government must receive theapproval of a neutral independent judge tobe authorized to conduct electronicsurveillance. Additionally, before electronicsurveillance is permissible, the governmentmust establish probable cause to believethat other investigative techniques havebeen tried and failed to obtain the soughtevidence, or establ ish why otherinvestigative techniques appear to beunlikely to succeed if tried, or establish whyother techniques would be too dangerousto try.

In executing the electronic surveillance,the government must minimize theinterception of innocent conversations,taking reasonable steps to assure that onlyconversations relevant to the crime underinvestigation are intercepted.6 In practice,the monitors are required to turn offrecording machines when conversationsare not discussing matters relevant to thecrimes under investigation.

4 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West Supp. 2000).5 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West Supp. 2000).6 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2518 (West Supp. 2000).

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Once the electronic surveillance begins,the government must submit regularreports to inform the court of theinformation obtained through thesurveillance. In these so-called “10-dayreports” the prosecutor lists the number ofintercepted calls, the number of callscontaining criminal conversations,summarizes of those conversations, anddescribes any unusual events thattranspired in connection with thesurveillance. This constant report writingis part of what makes electronicsurveillance so labor-intensive for theprosecutor.

Electronic surveillance is also restrictedin terms of its duration. Court-authorizedelectronic surveillance is limited to thirtydays.7 This may be extended for additionalthirty-day intervals, provided that all therequirements are met every thirty days andapproved by the judge.8 Althoughsubstantially useful in law enforcement, itis evident that there are considerablerestrictions on electronic surveillancedesigned to protect individuals’ privacyinterests.

B. Undercover OperationsAs far as organized crime control goes,

undercover operations are second only toelectronic surveillance, often workinghand-in-hand with each other. Anundercover investigation may be of veryshort duration, lasting only a few hours,or may be quite lengthy, lasting a few years.It may be directed at only a single criminalincident, or a long term criminal enterprise.In some instances, the undercoveroperation may involve merely the purchaseof contraband, such as illegal drugs, stolenproperty, or illegal firearms, or it mayinvolve the operation of an undercoverbusiness, such as a tavern or other

operation, where criminals meet anddiscuss their activities with undercoverofficers or informers. Through suchundercover operations, law enforcementagents are able to infiltrate the highestlevels of organized crime groups by posingas criminals when real criminals discusstheir plans and seek assistance incommitting crimes.

Agents often are able to gain theconfidence of criminals, inducing them toreveal their past criminal activities as wellas plotting with the agents to engage inadditional, ongoing criminal activities. Inconjunction with electronic surveillance,the undercover approach providescomprehensive coverage of the targets’daily activities. However, undercoveroperations are extremely sensitive andpose the danger of luring otherwiseinnocent people into criminal activity.Because this technique carries thepotential for problems, it requiresexceptional preparation.

For example, the physical safety of theundercover agent must always beconsidered. To prevent the prematuredisclosure of his or her identity, the agentmust be provided with a fully substantiatedpast history, referred to as “backstopping,”and careful briefings of the targets’ modusoperandi. Every conceivable scenario thatmay induce suspicion of, or hostilitytowards the agent must be considered inadvance. Additionally, the undercoveragent must undergo careful testing, oftenincluding psychological profiling, to ensurethat he or she possesses the intangiblequalities to ensure that he will “fit”comfortably into the new identity.

In the United States, before anundercover investigation may occur, theconsent of agency supervisors andprosecutors is required. The level at whichthe activity is reviewed increases as more

7 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West Supp. 2000).8 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2519 (West Supp. 2000).

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sensitive circumstances are involved in theinvestigation. To balance the concerns andavoid harm to the public, the Departmentof Justice has set up Undercover ReviewCommittees, comprising senior prosecutorsand investigators. These UndercoverReview Committees are responsible forreviewing, approving, and controlling allsensitive undercover operations. To beapproved, an undercover proposal must bein writing, contain a full factual descriptionof the suspected criminal activity and theparticipants therein, set out, in detail, theproposed undercover scenario, theexpertise of the undercover team, theduration of the project, the anticipatedlegal issues, and it must evaluate the riskto the agents and the public.

If the undercover activity is of relativelyshort duration, such as a one time purchaseof narcotics or other contraband, a first lineinvestigative agency supervisor and firstline prosecutor must approve the activityafter having been advised of all the factsof the matter. If the undercover activity isof a longer duration, with an undercoveragent and informant engaging in whatwould otherwise be ordinary violations ofthe law on a repeated basis, then theapproval of a higher level supervisor, suchas a local lead investigative agent, and asupervisory prosecutor must be informedof all the facts and give his or her approvalto the activity. These long-term undercoveroperations are essential to assist ininfiltrating organized crime groups thatcontinue their illegal activities over manyyears. Finally, if there are sensitivecircumstances involved, such as a risk thatinnocent third parties might be affected bythe activity, or there is extensive andongoing criminal activity of a seriousnature, then the activity must be reviewedand approved at the headquarters of theinvestigative agencies and by Washington-based Department of Justice prosecutors.

Whenever an undercover operationreveals that a crime of violence is about totake place, law enforcement authorities arerequired to take necessary steps to preventthe violence from occurring. This mayinclude warning the potential victim,arresting the subjects who pose a threat,or ending the undercover operationaltogether.

C. InformantsAnother critical law enforcement

technique involves the use of confidentialinformants. When United States lawenforcement uses the term confidentialinformant, we refer to an individual whois not willing to testify but who providesinformation or assistance to the authoritiesin return for a promise that we will try tokeep his identity confidential. We cannotabsolutely guarantee such confidentialitybecause in relatively rare circumstancescourts may conclude that due process, orconcerns of fundamental fairness, requirethat a confidential informant’s identity bedisclosed to a defendant charged with acrime where the informant can provideevidence that could exculpate thedefendant. Absent such a rare case, we areable in most cases to keep an informant’sidentity confidential.

Confidential informants are typicallymotivated to provide information to theauthorities in exchange for money orlenient treatment regarding chargespending against them or likely to bebrought against them. In many casesconfidential informants are themselvesengaged in criminal activities whichenables them to provide valuable directevidence of criminal activities by theircriminal associates. Confidentialinformants frequently provide theinformation that enables law enforcementofficials to obtain judicial warrantsauthorizing electronic surveillance. Manysuccessful prosecutions of the LCN

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leadership have involved informationsupplied by confidential informants whoprovided information for many years aboutthe leadership of the LCN; indeed some ofthe informants have been “made members”of the LCN. Incriminating evidence byinformants who deal directly with the LCNleadership is simply invaluable to breakthrough the layers of insulation that theleadership uses to conceal their activities.

However, there are high risks associatedwith the use of informants. Sometimes,informants do not fully disclose their owncriminal activities, or they falsely implicatetheir enemies in crimes, or they engage inunauthorized criminal activities. In thatlatter respect, under United States law, lawenforcement may authorize informants toparticipate in some forms of non-violentcriminal behavior that would otherwise beillegal, if they were not acting asinformants with authority to engage in theactivities. For example, depending on thecircumstances, in order to protect aninformant’s cover and to enable him to bein a position to obtain incriminatingevidence against others, informants maybe authorized to participate in illegalgambling, trafficking in stolen property,and other non-violent crimes. Therefore,it is important for law enforcement toclosely monitor the activities of informantsto minimize the danger that the informantwould use his association with lawe n f o r c e m e n t t o s h i e l d h i s o w nunauthorized criminal activities.

On balance, however, experience teachesus that as a general rule, the benefits fromthe use of informants greatly outweigh therisks. But, we must be ever vigilant of therisks.

These three techniques, electronicsurveillance, undercover operations, anduse of informants are the most importanttechniques that have assisted the

investigative agencies to combat organizedcrime and transnational crimes. Next, Iwill discuss the weapons available to thefederal prosecutors in the United States tocombat organized crime and transnationalcrimes.

D. Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Statute(RICO)

In every organized crime case, the goalis to convict the highest levels of a crimeorganization. To accomplish this,prosecutors must be equipped with theproper tools. One particularly valuable toolis a law which singles out the activity ofongoing criminal organizations. In theUnited States, the most important law ofthis sort is the Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Statute (RICO). Ingeneral, RICO provides heavy penalties,including life imprisonment in certaincircumstances, when a defendant conducts,or conspires to conduct, the affairs of anenterprise through a pattern of specifiedacts, known as predicate crimes. Anenterprise can include anything from acorporation, to a labor union, to a group ofindividuals working together to commitcrime, such as the Asian and Russianorganized crime groups discussed above.

Interestingly, the RICO statute did notactually create a new crime, as the crimesof murder, arson, and extortion, to name afew of the 46 predicate offenses in RICO,were all made criminal long before RICO’senaction in 1970. However, RICO was stilla dramatic legislative initiative because itpermitted many of these genericallydifferent crimes to be charged in a singleindictment. After RICO, these differentcrimes could even be charged in a singlecount against a defendant, so long as thecrimes were part of the defendant’s patternof acts that related to the enterprise. Inessence, RICO made it a crime to be in thebusiness of being a criminal.

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RICO is particularly effective inorganized crime cases, as it allows aprosecutor to demonstrate the full rangeof criminal activity of an individual or agroup of criminals. For example, RICO hasa reach-back feature that enables aprosecutor to show a pat tern o fracketeering activity. As long as one of thepredicate crimes alleged against adefendant occurred within the five yearsof when the indictment is brought, the nextprevious cr ime in the pattern ofracketeering need only be within ten yearsof the most recent crime. Similarly, thethird most recent crime need only haveoccurred within ten years of the second act.This reach-back feature enables thisprocess to continue, possibly extendingtwenty years or longer into the past.Ordinarily, the evidence of past criminalactivity that may be presented under RICOis outside the period for which a personcould be prosecuted, as indictments in theUnited States generally cannot allegecrimes that occurred more than five yearsprior to the date of the indictment. Thismakes RICO particularly useful inorganized crime cases.

Additionally, RICO’s reach is very broad,as the predicate crimes that qualify asRICO predicates span all forms of criminalactions. Without RICO, most United Statesjudges would prohibit the prosecution ofsuch diverse crimes in a single case andwould be more likely to break it up into aseries of smaller trials, especially ifnumerous defendants were being charged.Organized crime groups prefer dividing upa prosecution because no one jury gets tosee the entire picture. Organized crime iscomposed of many crimes, all linked by asingle chain-of-command to the sameenterprise. Thus, any effective prosecutionof a crime family requires proof of manycrimes in a single trial. RICO allows this,enabling the jury to see an entire patternof crimes.

RICO allows the government toprosecute criminal activity on a systematicbasis, enabling them to punish themembers of an organized crime group forthe criminal activities each has engaged inon behalf of that group. In an ordinaryRICO prosecution, often six or moreracketeers are charged with perhaps adozen or more predicate crimes extendingover a decade. In each of the allegedpredicate crimes, usually only some of thedefendants are named. There have beencases where RICO indictments havecharged several defendants withcommitting over fifty offenses as part of apattern of racketeering activity!

Furthermore, RICO also allows thepresentation of evidence of criminalactivity that has been the subject of earlierprosecutions. Ordinarily, this would notbe allowed in the United States because ofconstitutional rules against successiveprosecutions for the same conduct.Nevertheless, this is also permitted underRICO. RICO has proven to be an extremelyimportant tool assisting in the preventionof organized crime in the United States.

As powerful as RICO is, there were onlya few RICO prosecutions brought againstorganized crime in its first fifteen years.That was primarily because it took Federalprosecutors that long to feel comfortableenough with the complicated instrumentto make it the centerpiece of organizedcrime prosecutions. Another reason wasthat the investigative techniques necessaryto build a suitable RICO case, such aselectronic surveillance and undercoveroperations, were not routinely used againstorganized crime bosses in the 1970’s.

Currently, it is evident that control oforganized crime in the United States wouldbe inconceivable without RICO. Beyondorganized crime, RICO cases have alsobeen brought against hundreds of police

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officers, judges, and public officials forofficial misconduct, and against terroristgroups, radical hate groups, street gangs,stock manipulators, and drug cartels.However, like any powerful tool, RICO hasthe capability of being abused. To protectagainst potential abuses, the OrganizedCrime and Racketeering Section has aspecial unit of attorneys who carefullyreview all proposed RICO indictments forlegal and factual sufficiency. This unitensures that RICO is used only when it isnecessary, disapproving of a RICO chargewhen less powerful statutes would be justas effective.

E. Organized Crime Strike ForceUnits

As I previously stated, the LCN is thenumber one organized crime problem in theUnited States. The LCN is an extensivenationwide criminal organization.Therefore, it was essential to attack theLCN and other organized crime groupsthrough a closely coordinated nationwideeffort. However, law enforcement is veryfragmented and decentralized in theUnited States. The United StatesDepartment of Justice at the federal levelis divided into 94 different United StatesAttorneys offices throughout the countryt h a t o p e r a t e w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l eindependence of the main JusticeDepartment located in Washington, DC. Inaddition, there are literally hundreds,perhaps over 1,000 state, county and cityprosecutors’ offices and police departmentsthat have criminal jurisdictions that aretotally independent of the federalDepartment of Justice. This fragmentedprosecutorial authority makes nationwidecoordination difficult. These difficulties aremade even greater when you factor in thelarge territorial size of the United Statesand its relatively large population of over260 million people.

To improve coordination of federal effortsto attack organized crime, in the late 1960sthe Department of Justice created 24specialized prosecutive units calledOrganized Crime Strike Forces located inthe cities where the 24 LCN families weremost active. These Strike Force Units werestaffed by career prosecutors who wereexperienced in electronic surveillance,undercover operations, and long termproactive investigations. Moreover, theseprosecutors are only allowed to work onorganized crime matters. To assure thatthey work only on organized crime mattersand to assure that the Strike Force casesare properly coordinated from a nationalperspective, supervising prosecutors inWashington, DC must approve everyinvestigation, every indictment, everywiretap and every other principal activitythat each Strike Force Unit undertakes.Through such oversight, the supervisingattorneys in Washington, DC are able tomaintain the focus of efforts againstorganized crime groups and to see to it thatrelevant information developed by oneStrike Force office gets to another office inanother part of the country that may needit.

Moreover, because the supervisors inWashington, DC, are aware of all LCNinvestigations and prosecutions in theUnited States, they are able to reduceduplication of efforts and coordinateinvestigations and prosecutions conductedby more than one office.

The creation of these Strike Force Unitsproved to be invaluable. Over the past 25years, the vast majority of all the majorconvictions of LCN bosses and memberswere obtained by these Strike Force Units.Although the LCN remains strong in themetropolitan New York City area whereroughly 80% of the LCN members operate,the LCN has been substantially weakenedin other parts of the United States -

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particularly in San Francisco, Los Angeles,Kansas City, Milwaukee, St. Louis, andother cities.

Although the Strike Force Units wereinitially created to combat the LCN, theirmission was expanded in 1990 to combatAsian and Russian organized crime groups.In 1990, the Attorney General of the UnitedStates adopted a national strategy tocoordinate the federal attack against thennewly emerging organized crime groupsoperating in the United States. The StrikeForce approach became the centerpiece ofthat national strategy since it had been sosuccessful against the LCN. The StrikeForce Units were well equipped to handlethe new challenges because of theirexperience, and also because the StrikeForce Units were already located in thecities where the Russian and Asianorganized crime groups were most active.Not surprisingly, the Russian and Asianorganized crime groups are active in thesame large cities as the LCN.

To implement this national strategy, theAttorney General created the AttorneyGeneral’s Organized Crime Council, themembers of which are the heads of theFederal Bureau of Investigation, the DrugEnforcement Administration (DEA), theDivision of Enforcement of the Securitiesand Exchange Commission, the SecretService, the Marshals Service, the CustomsService, the Postal Inspectors, and theInternal Revenue Service. The Councilmeets as necessary to set the officialpriorities of the Federal Government’sorganized crime programme, whichcurrently are LCN, Asian, and Russianorganized crime. In order to set thesepriorities, each agency and the country’s94 top Federal prosecutors (called UnitedStates Attorneys) are required each yearto file written plans assessing the problemsposed by organized crime groups in theirdistricts and for attacking organized crime

groups in their districts. The Departmentof Justice ’s Organized Crime andRacketeering Section then reports itsanalyses of these plans to the Council. Themost important feature of this system iscontrol : It obl igates the regionalprosecutors and agents to keep constantpressure on La Cosa Nostra and Asian andRussian crime groups, and prevent themfrom succumbing to periodic temptationsto assign prosecutors and agents to non-organized crime cases.

Implementing this national strategy hasenabled the Federal Government tocoordinate its nationwide efforts againstorganized crime groups and to keep thepressure on them to prevent them fromexpanding their corrupt influences onsociety.

F. Immunity SystemAnother va luable too l used by

prosecutors in organized crime cases is thepower to grant immunity under certainconditions in return for a witness’stestimony. Every individual in our countryhas a right under Fifth Amendment of ourconstitution to refuse to testify againsthimself. The immunity system allows thegovernment to force an individual to testifyin return for a promise that the testimonymay not be used against the witness in anysubsequent criminal case.9

Until 1970, there were numerous federalimmunity statutes providing transactionalimmunity, protecting people testifyingunder these laws against prosecution orpenalty on account of any transaction,matter, or thing relating to their testimonyor production of evidence. Therefore, undertransactional immunity, the witnessreceived immunization from a subsequent

9 See 18 U.S.C.A § 6002 (West Supp. 2000); Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

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prosecution as to any matters about whichhe or she testified.

Today, however, transactional immunityno longer exists in the federal system. Itwas replaced by what is referred to as “useimmunity.”10 In 1970, the United StatesCongress enacted the so-called “useimmunity” statutes that explicitlyproscribe the use in any criminal case oftestimony compelled under the ordergranting immunity. In essence, useimmunity only provides that the witness’testimony itself will not be used againsthim or her; he or she may still beprosecuted using other evidence. Althoughuse immunity is not considered as broad ap r o t e c t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l a stransactional immunity, it is neverthelessconsistent with the proscriptions of theFifth Amendment because it “prohibits theprosecutorial authorities from using thecompelled testimony in any respect, and ittherefore insures that the testimony cannotlead to the infliction of criminal penaltieson the witness.”11

The United States attorney, with theapproval of the Attorney General, theDeputy Attorney General, or a designatedassistant attorney general is empoweredto seek a court order granting useimmunity when, in the judgment of thegovernment, the testimony or otherinformation is necessary to the publicinterest and the individual has asserted oris likely to assert his or her privilegeagainst self-incrimination. In 1999, theDepartment of Justice authorized 2,059requests for witness immunity, and 1,444of those requests were granted to theCriminal Division.

In addition to the Immunity system,there is also the “Crown Witness” systemwhich, although it is not codified in theUnited States Code, is a widespread andapproved practice in obtaining witnesses.Under the “Crown Witness” system, thereare two types of agreements that theUnited States can enter into withwitnesses, non-prosecution agreementsand cooperation agreements.

Non-prosecution agreements, are mainlyused for situations where a witness’sinvolvement in a criminal act is minimal.12

These agreements grant immunity fromprosecution in connection with that casein return for full, truthful cooperation.Although non-prosecution agreements areavailable, they are rarely used.

Cooperation agreements, on the otherhand, are the most commonly usedinstrument to compel testimony. Theseagreements require the defendant to incursome type of liability for his or her criminalconduct. In a cooperation agreement, thedefendant agrees to plead guilty to certainagreed-upon charges, to fully andtruthfully cooperate with prosecution, andto testify in any court proceedingconcerning all matters asked of him or her.In exchange for the de fendant ’scooperation, the government agrees to filea motion pursuant to Federal SentencingGuideline § 5K1.1.13 This motion gives ajudge discretion with respect to thedefendant’s sentence, something he or sheordinarily would not possess. Upon receiptof such a motion, the sentencing judge willusually decide to reduce the sentence. Thiscreates a powerfu l incent ive forcooperation, and is a particularly valuabletool in the prosecution of organized crime

10 See: 18 U.S.C.A §§ 6001, 6002, 6003 (West Supp.2000); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441(1972).

11 See: Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.

12 US Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorney’sManual, ch.9, § 27.600(B)(1)(c) (1997).

13 US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1 (1998).

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groups.

G. Witness Protection ProgramsAnother valuable asset that aids the

prosecution of organized crime groups isthe federal Witness Security Programme.Because of the often violent nature oforganized crime, witness intimidation canbe a significant obstacle in the way of asuccessful prosecution. To address thatproblem, the Department of Justice createdthe Federal Witness Security Programmein 1970. Requests for protection ofwitnesses must be made as soon as it isknown that the Witness SecurityProgramme candidate will be a significantand essential witness, and will needrelocation due to proximity to a “dangerarea.” Naturally, because of the securityconcerns regarding the witness and his orher family, a witness’s pending and actualparticipation in the Programme is notdisclosed unless under the authorizationof the Office of Enforcement Operations(OEO). This allows the United StatesMarshals Service (USMS) time to conductpreliminary interviews, psychologicaltesting, and appropriate review, therebyminimizing the disruption to both thewitness and the concerned governmentagencies.

A witness is admitted into theProgramme when he or she is able tosupply significant evidence in importantcases, and there is a perceived threat tohis or her security. Once in the programme,the witness and his or her family are givennew identities, relocated to another partof the United States where the danger totheir security is decreased, and are givenfinancial assistance until the witness isable to secure employment.

The Witness Security Programme is verycostly. Since the beginning of theProgramme, over 6,800 witnesses havebeen admitted, along with an additional

roughly 9,000 family members. Theaverage cost is $75,000 per witness, peryear, and $125,000 per family, per year.Despite these numbers, the results derivedfrom the Programme have made it worththe cost. Since its inception in 1970, over10,000 defendants have been convictedthrough the testimony of witnesses in theProgramme.

The vast majority of protected witnesses,about 97 percent, have criminal records.However, the recidivist rate for witnessesin the programme is 21 percent, which ishalf the rate of those released from prisonin the United States. Overall, the WitnessSecurity Programme has proven to beextremely beneficial and effective in theprosecution against organized crimegroups.

H. ForfeitureIt cannot be overstated that making

money is the primary goal of organizedcrime and transnational criminal activities.Therefore, it is imperative to take the profitout of crime. Strong forfeiture laws do justthat. Forfeiture is a criminal penalty formany offenses in the United States.Generally speaking, upon conviction for anoffense that carries forfeiture as a penalty,a defendant may be ordered to forfeit allprofits or proceeds derived from thecriminal activity, any property, real orpersonnel, involved in the offense, orproperty traceable to the offense such asproperty acquired with proceeds of criminalactivity. For example, if a defendant usesa residence or car to distribute drugs, thatproperty is subject to forfeiture. Thus, aconvicted defendant may be ordered toforfeit all proceeds of his criminal activityincluding money and other forms ofproperty.

In addition to criminal forfeiture, civilforfeiture laws also allow the governmentto obtain property used in criminal

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activities. The principal difference betweencriminal and civil forfeiture is that criminalforfeiture is limited to a convicteddefendant’s personal interest in propertysubject to forfeiture, whereas civilforfeiture focuses on the property itself.

For example, suppose a defendantrepeatedly used a house to sell drugs, buthe did not have an ownership interest inthe house. If he is convicted of drugdealing, that house is not subject tocriminal forfeiture because the defendantdid not own the house. However, a civilforfeiture law suit could be brought againstthe house itself as a defendant, even if theowner of the house was not engaged incriminal activity. The house, nonetheless,is subject to civil forfeiture because it wasrepeatedly used to facilitate criminalactivities, and the owner did not takeadequate steps to prevent his house frombeing used for criminal activities.

There are various defenses to such civilforfeiture, such as the “innocent ownerdefense”, but I do not want to digress intothe complexity of United States forfeiturelaw. To some extent I have generalized andoversimplified United States forfeiture lawwhich is complex so as not to detract ourattention from the main point I am tryingto make. That is, that criminal and civilforfeiture laws are powerful weapons in theprosecutors’ arsenal to take the profit outof crime.

I. Money LaunderingStrong money laundering laws go hand-

in-hand with forfeiture laws as powerfulweapons against criminal activities. UnderUnited States money laundering laws, itis a crime to knowingly conduct a financialtransaction with the proceeds of certainspecified unlawful activity set forth in thestatute with either the intent to promotethe specified unlawful activity or with theintent to conceal the specified unlawful

activity. The term transaction is broadlydefined to include “a purchase, sale, loan,pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or otherdisposition” and “with respect to a financialinstitution includes a deposit, withdrawal,transfer between accounts, exchange ofcurrency, loan, extension of credit,purchase or sale of any stock, bond,certificate of deposit, or other monetaryinstrument, use of a safe deposit box, orany other payment, transfer, or delivery by,through, or to a financial institution, bywhatever means effected.”

As you can see, the money launderingstatute covers nearly every imaginable typeof transaction. Moreover, the penalties formoney laundering include forfeiture whichgreatly enhances law enforcement’s effortsto take to profit out of crime.

For example, in one recent case inBoston, defendants were convicted oflaundering $136 million in drug proceedsfor Colombian drug traffickers. Thedefendants received the cash drugproceeds, and used it to buy money orders,cashiers’ checks, or gold to conceal theillegal source of the cash; this constitutedmoney laundering. The defendants arguedthat they should only be required to forfeitthe 5% laundering fee (or roughly $7million) that they charged the drugtraffickers since the $136 million belongedto the drug traffickers. The court rejectedthis argument and held that thedefendants were liable for forfeiture of theentire $136 million that they laundered.

Other examples of money launderingillustrate the breadth of the statute. Forexample, proceeds of fraud that aredeposited in bank accounts or otherfinancial institutions which is commingledwith legitimate money in accounts underthe names of nominees constitutes moneylaundering subjecting, under somecircumstances, the entire amounts in the

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accounts to forfeiture, including the moneyobtained legally as well as the crimeproceeds.

In many cases, not just organized crimecases, money laundering violations coupledwith forfeiture have proven to be powerfulweapons to take the profit out of crime.

J. SentencesFinally, I would like to briefly discuss

United States sentencing laws. Fairpunishment upon conviction is obviouslythe ultimate goal of all prosecutions.Perhaps most important is the protectionafforded by incapacitating the convictedcriminal through incarceration. To be sure,imprisonment substantially reduces, butdoes not totally eliminate, opportunities forcriminals to continue their illegal activities.

In 1987, the United States FederalGovernment adopted a comprehensivechange in its sentencing laws to makepunishment more definite and moreuniform throughout the federal system.First, federal parole was abolished.Therefore, a sentence of 10 years in jailmeans a defendant will not be paroled at ashorter time and the defendant willactually serve 10 years in jail, with somemodest reduction for good time behaviorwhile in jail. Other changes involvedsubstantial restrictions on the discretionof judges in imposing sentences. Pursuantto the changes, sentences are nowdetermined by application of a complexnumerical weighing system. Under theformula, specific numbers are assigned torelevant factors such as the type of offense,t h e n a t u r e o f t h e u n d e r l y i n gcircumstances, the defendant’s role in theoffense and the defendant’s criminalhistory. The numbers are added up andthe defendant is generally sentenced to aguideline range according to the resultingnumber. Again, I am oversimplifyingcomplex legal provisions.

Most prosecutors and police in theUnited States would argue that the longerprison sentences under the FederalSentencing Guidelines and similar stateguidelines are in part responsible for thelarge decrease in the rate of serious crimein the United States over the last ten years.Others may take the contrary view andpoint to some cases in which theGuidelines, and the mandatory minimumsentences associated with certain drugcrimes, lead to harsh results in individualcases. I take no view on this debate, exceptto argue that for the most serious criminals,especially high-ranking members oforganized crime groups, the Guidelines andmandatory minimum sentences haveensured that the most serious criminalconduct will be matched with a seriouspunishment. The certainty of longsentences for criminal convictions alsotends to convince defendants that theywould be better served by cooperating withthe Government and testifying againsttheir bosses, rather than hope that a judgewill be swayed by their lawyers’ argumentsinto giving them a light sentence. In thisway the Guidelines help our cases bymaking it more likely that defendants willchoose to “flip” and testify for our side.

IV. METHODS FOR COMBATINGTRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED

CRIME - INTERNATIONALRESPONSES

I would now like to turn my discussionfrom the principal aspects of the UnitedStates domestic responses to transnationalcrimes and organized crime to what we aredoing together with other countries in theinternational arena to combat suchcriminal activities.

A. ExtraditionIt is imperative that international

criminals be denied a safe haven.

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International extradition treaties remainthe most effective legal mechanism toobtain the return of international fugitives.In 1990, the United States sought theextradition of 1,672 accused or convictedcriminals. By 1996, that number hadjumped to more than 2,894, includingnumerous fugitives wanted for murder,major drug trafficking offenses, moneylaundering, multi-million dollar financialscams, and other serious crimes committedagainst the United States.

The United States is currently party toover 110 such extradition treaties. TheUnited States Departments of State andJustice, with appropriate input from otherlaw enforcement agencies, are involved inan active programme to negotiate moderntreaties in order to replace old, outdatedinstruments, to create extradition treatieswhere none previously existed, and toensure that new crimes are covered byextradition treaties. We encourage theinternational community to work togetherto deny safe havens to internationalcriminals through procedures consistentwith domestic and international law.

B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties(MLATS)

In light of the international nature oftransnational and organized crimeactivities, it is also essential to be able toobtain, in a timely way, the testimony ofwitnesses, bank records, other financialrecords and other evidence from foreigncountries, and in some cases from severaldifferent countries, and for the UnitedStates to give similar assistance to othercountries. Therefore, Mutual LegalAssistance Treaties have become importanttools to address international criminalactivities.

Barely 20 years ago, the United Statesentered into its first MLAT. Today, thereare the United States has MLATs with 36

countries. These MLATs are invaluable insetting out clear procedures by whichprosecutors can gain evidence from othercountries. However, MLATs do not executethemselves. In some ways the MLAT isonly the first step. Prosecutors in bothcountries have to work hard to preparerequests that will be understood by thereceiving country, and have to work equallyhard in preparing responses to incomingrequests that will be useful to therequesting country.

In the United States Department ofJustice, the Office of International Affairsis responsible for coordinating bothincoming and outgoing requests for legalassistance with other countries. TheOffice’s attorneys become experts in the lawof their assigned countries and are able toprovide assistance and advice both to USprosecutors seeking evidence from abroadas well as foreign countries seekingevidence from the United States. Theyconfront all manner of problems andmisunderstandings that arise betweendifferent legal systems, where even similarterms like “judge” and “indictment” havevery different legal meanings and effects.In the years to come, the Office ofInternational Affairs and its counterpartsin other countries will be called upon toplay a larger and larger role in ourorganized crime investigations.

Even where there is no MLAT in force,the United States is hopeful that lawenforcement agencies will be able toexchange information and provide mutualassistance in ways that are fully consistentwith the laws of the countries involved.Such cooperation is essential to effectivelycombat the international criminalactivities of sophisticated criminals whoseek to exploit the difficulties inherent ininternational investigations.

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C. Expanding the Presence ofUnited States Law EnforcementAgents Abroad

Tough United States laws that protectUnited States citizens and interests abroadwill be of little value if the United Statesdoes not establish an investigative and lawenforcement infrastructure to pursueviolations of these laws. United States lawenforcement officials stationed abroadwork shoulder to shoulder with theirforeign counterparts to investigate crimesagainst United States nationals committedoverseas. Where offenders are identified,these officials also work to locate,apprehend, and return the perpetrators ofsuch crimes through extradition, expulsionor other lawful means. They also facilitatethe arrest and extradition of internationalfugitives located in the United States andwanted abroad.

The United States would like to expandits law enforcement presence in othercountries to work with the host countriesto respond to this growing need. Forexample, the FBI currently has FBI officesin 44 other countries and is looking toexpand further. Similar expansions arebeing planned by the Customs Service andDrug Enforcement Administration. Theseexpansions will bolster United States lawenforcement abilities to arrest and punishfugitives who have committed crimesagainst the United States, to dismantleinternational organized crime rings, andto strengthen law enforcement and judicialsystems around the globe. I have beenfortunate enough to work with FBI LegalAttaches in many foreign countries, and Ihave found their advice to be absolutelyessential to our work. I strongly encourageprosecutors and police officials of everycountry to make and maintain close contactwith the nearest FBI Legal Attache if youhave any kind of investigation that touchesboth your country and the United States,or if you want any kind of investigative

assistance from the United States.

One particularly bold step taken earlierthis year was the creation of a joint FBI-Hungarian National Police Unit based inBudapest that investigates organized crimecases. This advance was made possiblebecause the Hungarian governmentrecognized that transnational organizedcriminals based in Budapest werecommitting crimes that affected manydifferent countries, including the UnitedStates. The Hungarians and theAmericans agreed that a joint police unitw o u l d b e b e t t e r a b l e t o p u r s u etransnational investigations that wouldresult in prosecutions in Hungarian orAmerican courts. This unit has alreadymade a big difference in the operatingenvironment for criminals in Budapest,and we are open to considering similarinitiatives with other countries.

To complement the increasing numberof United States law enforcementpersonnel overseas, mutual legalassistance is greatly enhanced by theDepartment of Justice’s cadre of overseasattorneys. Their role includes facilitatingrequests for extradition and mutual legalassistance, providing substantive legalguidance on international law enforcementand treaty matters, and increasingcooperation between United States andforeign prosecutors. Currently, theDepartment of Justice has prosecutors inBrussels, Mexico City, Paris, London,Geneva, and Rome. This summer we alsohad a prosecutor stationed in our embassyin Moscow, a position that we hope to makepermanent. These attorneys do worksimilar to that of their Off ice ofInternational Affairs colleagues inWashington, D.C., but are even moreeffective because they are on the spot. Theyhave also proved vital for building the long-term working relationships that we hopeto establish with our overseas colleagues.

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If it were not for budget constraints, Iwould gladly see these positions expandedto a dozen other countries.

V. CONCLUSION

Transnational organized crime is arapidly growing problem. The criminalshave showed that they can adapt instantlyto new technologies, to exploitingopportunities created by the increasingglobalization of the world’s economies.They know how to use borders to their bestadvantage to protect themselves, but do notlet problems of national sovereignty,ethnicity, or language get in their way whenthey see an illegal way to make money. Wemembers of law enforcement, by contrast,must obey not only our own rules, with alltheir technicalities, but must scrupulouslyobey each others’ rules whenever weventure into another country. In theeternal battle between policeman andcrook, the criminals threaten today asnever before to gain the upper hand on aglobal scale.

The measures which I have outlinedabove are at most partial solutions. Theywill have at best only a limited effect untilwe undergo a more fundamental shift inour attitudes toward the difficult andfrustrating process of internationalinvestigations. We all have heavy demandson our time, more cases than we know whatto do with, and many leads to follow whichwill always seem more promising or moreurgent than a foreign bank accountnumber, or a telephone call by a criminalthat goes overseas. These foreign leads,we feel, are unlikely to amount to anything,and even if they did lead to a case it wouldbe a long and difficult one. My argumentto you today is that we have to overcomethis reluctance, we have to be willing totake the plunge and reach out for a foreigncolleague who may be looking at the otherend of the same case that you are puzzling

over. It is only when we learn to workeffectively across borders that we will beable to mount an effective attack ontransnational organized crime.