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IRAQ ANALYSIS:
A SECURITY SUMMARY AND
POLITICAL FORECAST
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2PREFACE
The parliamentary elecons scheduled in April 2014 will dene Iraq’s polical and security landscape
for the next four years. Aer months of heightened sectarian tensions, reected in increased levels of
violence, polical change has indeed become a necessity. While the appointment of new legislave and
execuve bodies will undoubtedly have an eect on Iraq’s security outlook, they are unlikely to lead to
immediate improvements. A change of leadership will not suppress the dicules of the environment,
and the new government will be forced to operate within the same limitaons. The current administra-
on, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has largely avoided tackling the root causes of violence, insteadfocusing on counter-insurgency operaons. Whilst elecons have the potenal to disturb the status quo,
intractable challenges will most certainly connue to drive polical choices. Connuity, rather than serious
reforms, remains the most likely outcome.
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3IRAQ’S SECURITY LANDSCAPE
Aer months of protests againstthe perceived polical exclusion
of Sunnis by Iraq’s Shia-dominat-
ed government, violence esca-
lated following an army raid on
a Sunni Arab an-government
protest camp in April 2013. Inci-
dents have reached their highest
levels since 2008, with central
and northern Sunni regions
plagued with daily bombings andsectarian aacks.
Baghdad and Nineveh gover-
norates are parcularly prone
to violent and deadly incidents,
followed by Salahuddin, Anbar
and Kirkuk. These heightened
tensions were reected in the
polical sphere, with cross-sec-
tarian plaorms losing credibility
in the latest provincial elec-
ons which took place in April
2013. The secular Iraqiyya list
coalion, originally made up of
several Sunni and Shia pares,
disintegrated before the elec-
ons, with constuent pares
running separately and achieving
low scores.
Throughout 2013, Iraq was alsovulnerable to foreign penetra-
on, with the events in Syria em-
boldening Sunni insurgents and
encouraging some Shia retalia-
tory acons, with the suspected
backing of Iran. Iraq has seem-
ingly entered a cycle of violence,
with exclusionary polics fuel-
ling extremism. In turn, sectarian
conict has increasingly prompt-ed Iraqis to turn to sectarian
pares, which is only going to
exacerbate social fragmentaon
and violence. Maliki’s leadership
has resulted in growing polarisa-
on, and subsequent increased
levels of violence.
The geography of violence is
congruent with demographicrealies, with Sunni-dominated
provinces witnessing most at-
tacks against state assets. While
Shia-dominated governorates
are substanally more peaceful,
with the excepon of Baghdad,
they also witness regular mili-
tant penetraon as insurgents
seek to demonstrate their capa-
bilies.
High levels of violence essen-
ally result from a combinaon
of deep-rooted grievances and
polical inacon. Whilst these
elements explain the seeds of
instability, foreign inuence, lack
of state control and ISF capa-
bility provide the opportunity
structure for militant acvity.
Number of violent incidents by province in 2013 Source: EI Data
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4GRIEVANCES AND THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE
Despite being a polical majority
under previous regimes, Sunnis
are a demographic minority in
Iraq, represenng about 20% of
the overall populaon. The Iraqi
Sunni identy had tradionally
been associated with power,
through centuries of Sunni Ot-
toman control. Power connued
to be concentrated in the hands
of Sunnis under Saddam Hus-
sein, himself a Sunni Arab from
Tikrit, north of Baghdad. In a
country divided along sectarian
lines, democrasaon therefore
meant that Sunni Iraqis had to
surrender their authority to the
Shia majority. This sudden shi,perceived as an aack against
their very identy, automacal-
ly engendered grievances and
violence, exacerbated by the
interference of regional powers
vying for inuence in Iraq.
Addional layers fragment the
situaon further, with a Kurd-
ish-Arab divide and a collecon
of groups ranging from mod-
erates to radical religious en-
es. Whilst all Sunnis agree on
the nature of their grievances,
essenally a lack of polical
representaon and subsequent
socioeconomic disadvantage,
they arculate a dierent agen-
da as to the means to solve
them. A radical fringe launches
suicide aacks against govern-ment and civilian targets, while
others are merely sympathec
to extremist acons, seeing that
destabilising the government
is the only means to achieve
meaningful polical concessions.
More moderate groups connue
to oppose violence and convey
their grievances through ballot
boxes and peaceful protests
organised in the main cies. TheSunni insurgency, mainly orches-
trated by groups aliated with
AQI, has engendered a cycle of
violence which could only be
broken should the regime imple-
ment meaningful reforms.
The next parliamentary elec-
ons scheduled in April 2014
will decide on Iraq’s next PrimeMinister and will be determinant
for the post-elecon course of
events.
Iraq casualty gures by month Source: UNAMI
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5IRAQ’S STAGNANT POLITICAL SYSTEM
Sunni grievances are exacerbat-ed by a paralysed and structural-
ly-awed polical system, which
favours stagnaon over reforms
tackling the polical roots of
insecurity.
In the Iraqi electoral system,
each province elects a propor-
onal number of representa-
ves, who will then sit in theCouncil of Representaves, Iraq’s
Naonal Assembly. Due to the
extensive number of polical
pares in Iraq, party leaders
typically form coalions in order
to gain seats in the parliament.
Elecons lead to intra-elite
negoaons to select candidates
to the presidenal oce, includ-
ing members of the Presidency
Council. Appointments have to
be conrmed by at least two-
thirds of the Naonal Assembly.
The Presidency Council, includ-
ing the President, will then be in
charge of designang the Prime
Minister, which also has to be
approved by at least two-thirds
of the parliament. Since the
2005 Constuon, most execu-
ve powers are concentrated inthe hands of the Prime Minister,
which poses two main issues,
both connected to the nature of
the electoral process.
BUILTIN FLAWS
The power conferred to the
posion and the fragmentaon
of the parliament along hardlyreconcilable lines means that
members of parliament are likely
to need weeks of negoaons
before agreeing on a name,
unless a large coalion forms.
The current trajectory is towards
disintegraon rather than uni-
caon, with exisng coalions
likely to splinter in the lead-up to
the elecon date. As the processof agreeing on a candidate drags
on, the legimacy of the Prime
Minister will undoubtedly suer
and this will impact on the de-
cision-making capacies of the
new government.
Legimacy is also hindered
by the vong system itself, an
indirect surage which thereforelimits the representaveness
of the government. To a certain
extent, every government will be
illegimate and their ability to
enforce legislaon will be con-
strained.
Lacking legimacy, elites will
increasingly seek to compensate
with populist measures havinglile eect on Iraq’s long-term
outlook, and rhetoric aimed at
manipulang foreign threats
(such as the interference of the
United States in the country’s
aairs) to gather support around
their leadership.
Iraq’s major sectarian and ethnic divide
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6MAIN POLITICAL FORCES
The polical landscape is splitbetween three main Shia forces,
which will most likely arbitrate
the elecons.
• The State of Law bloc, made
up of Maliki’s Dawa party and
other Shia pares.
• The Sadrist movement, headed
by Muqtada al-Sadr.
• The Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq, headed by Ammar al-
Hakim.
The Iraqiyya bloc which garnered
most support in the previous
elecons, has since fragmented
and the number of pares run-
ning under the coalion’s um-
brella is uncertain. The fact that
the coalion could not agree
on a government aer the 2010
elecons also backs the view
that Iraqiyya forms a strategic al-
liance rather than an ideological
one, and their secular rhetoric
appears only aimed at draw-
ing votes from both Sunni and
Shia constuencies. A credible
cross-sectarian alternave has
yet to emerge, and increased
polarisaon in society is likely to
be reected in the system.
Both Sadr and Hakim have ruled
out the prospect of entering an
alliance with Maliki’s bloc, and
they have been very vocal in crit-
icising the government’s policies
towards the insurgency and the
economy. Depending on elecon
results, a coalion could form
between Sadr and Hakim in or-der to counter Maliki, although
both pares arculate dierent
ideologies.
Final results will also depend on
each bloc’s ability to co-opt Sun-
ni pares. While the largest of
them (Iraqi Islamic Party) is part
of the State of Law coalion, dis-
content with the regime and the
more appealing stance of Sadrtowards Sunnis could prompt a
shi of alliances.
EXTERNAL ACTORS
Forming a Shia axis in the Mid-
dle East together with Syria and
Iran, Iraq has been naturally
vulnerable to events unfolding
in both countries. The conictin Syria has emboldened Sunni
insurgents, whilst Iran has argu-
ably lled the polical vacuum
le by the U.S. in order to ex-
pand its inuence in the region.
Tehran has notably inuenced
the negoaons assuring Ma-
liki of a second term in oce.
Washington’s interference is
ed to energy security and ithas been relavely absent from
Iraqi polics since their troop
withdrawal in 2011. The regional
power struggle waged between
Saudi Arabia and Sunni powers
with Iran is another key element
fuelling the insurgency in Iraq.
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7VIOLENCE THREATENS THE 2014 ELECTIONS
While domesc polics remainsuncertain, any government will
have to contend with transna-
onal forces which will undoubt-
edly connue to aect Iraq’s sta-
bility and security environment.
The conict in Syria is unlikely to
reach an end and will therefore
remain an important factor in
the escalaon of violence in the
country. Potenal Shia retali-aon to the Sunni insurgency
will mostly depend on Iran. As
Rouhani’s policies are currently
focused on alleviang interna-
onal sancons, interference in
Iraqi aairs could be viewed as a
sign of non-compliance with in-
ternaonal norms. However, the
recent visit of Maliki to Tehran
illustrates the connuing author-
ity that Iran has amongst Iraqi
Shias. Isolated in the region,
Iran will most certainly insist on
exerng its inuence, especially
as Syria is arguably disintegrat-
ing. Whilst the regional environ-
ment undoubtedly impacts on
Iraq’s security situaon, external
powers are merely lling a vac-
uum and the seeds of instability
remain located within the Iraqisociety.
PREELECTION VIOLENCE
Pre-elecon violence is likely to
see an increase as crucial re-
forms will not be implemented
in the coming months. Sunni
milias will seek to undermine
the current government throughaacks involving assassinaons
and bombings against civilians,
infrastructure and ISF elements.
This violence will likely manifestfrom various insurgent groups
including the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the
neo-Baathist JRTN movement,
and other autonomous Sunni
milias. Whilst Shia elements
will remain the focus of insur-
gents, moderate Sunnis accept-
ing the government will also
certainly be targeted throughassassinaons of local leaders or
inuenal gures. In the lead-up
to the elecons, incident levels
and intra-Sunni violence are
therefore expected to peak in all
Sunni-dominated provinces.
As Shia facons compete for
power, Shia armed groups
aliated with polical pares
could seek to undermine each
other through aacks against
their polical opponents. As
tensions rise in the polical
sphere, intra-Shia violence is
therefore expected to increase
and could manifest in incidents
against rival party members or
local policians in the southern
Shia-dominated provinces.
Sunni militant aacks could also
trigger the mobilisaon of Shia
milias and retaliatory acons
against Sunni targets, especially
as Iran’s involvement grows.
One of the most probable
scenarios in the lead-up to the
elecons has manifested in the
recent and ongoing unrest inAnbar, sparked by the break-up
of a Sunni protest camp by the
Iraqi army in December 2013.
In a bid to garner Shia support,
the government may indeed
crack down on Sunni protests to
appear to eciently tackle the
insurgency. This was especial-
ly true in Anbar as the protest
camp dismantled by the ISF had
been termed a “headquarters
for al-Qaeda” by Maliki. This
tacc is counter-producve and
fuels the cycle of violence with
an escalaon and radicalisaon
of protests, ulmately increasing
incident levels.
Whilst these clashes are indica-
ve of the government’s strate-
gy, they also highlight the dan-
gerous game Maliki seems to be
playing to consolidate his power
base. Although the polical will
to defeat ISIL is present, the
security forces lack the capacity
to eecvely control Iraq’s enre
territory.
2010 Parliamentary Elecon results by
main alliances
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8POSTELECTION SCENARIOS
In light of the structure of the
polical system and current
violence levels, four dierent
scenarios are likely to emerge.
As already occurred in 2013 for
the provincial elecons, votes
could be delayed in several gov-
ernorates due to high levels of
violence. Although delays seem
an increasing possibility, security
measures will be considerably
heightened due to the impor-
tance of the elecons.
If elecons do take place, the
three most likely outcomes are
as follows:
Maliki is re-elected: Whilst Ma-
liki ocially denies he intends
to run for a third term, severalsigns point to the likelihood of
this possibility, including his
recent trip to Tehran. Although
cricism has been voiced from
his own coalion, no other
gure has emerged from the
Dawa party to challenge Maliki’s
leadership, and the State of Law
coalion will probably have to
back Maliki to remain in power.
If this scenario materialises, it
would arguably be the worst of
all possible polical outcomes,
as Sunni violence would inevi-
tably increase and disappointed
Shia facons would hardly toler-
ate Maliki’s grip on power for a
third term.
Another Shia coalion forms
the government and elects a
Shia representave ed to a Shia
power base. No maer which
coalion emerges, it will be ed
to its Shia constuencies and
bold policies are therefore un-
likely, especially with violence at
such high levels diminishing the
appete for polical concessions
to the Sunnis.
A cross-sectarian plaorm is
elected. Though it is by far theleast probable of all outcomes,
such a result could allow for im-
portant legislaon to be consid-
ered. Even if the polical will ex-
ists, opposion pares will likely
oppose important reforms which
are suscepble to be rejected by
the Shia majority. These reforms
would only be accepted if a
change in society occurs, and across-sectarian party in power
could at least be benecial in
that it could orient Iraq towards
reconciliaon rather than fur-
ther divisions.
Even if this opmisc scenario
unfolds, me will be needed for
reforms to impact on levels of vi-
olence, and even a government
elected on such an ambious
agenda will be tempted to fall
into populist pialls if security
deteriorates.
Most probable scenarios will
either result in connuity or a
deterioraon of the security
environment. Given the weak-
ness of naonal unity, Iraqis will
connue to vote along sectarian
lines. Furthermore, increased
violence against Shias will give
addional incenves for themto elect Shia representaves,
while Sunni frustraons will
foster a parallel approach to
the elecons. The fact that the
polical system is designed aer
sectarian fragmentaon rather
than naonal unity, with pares
dening themselves according to
their religious belonging, further
enhances the likelihood of aclear-cut distribuon of seats in
favour of Shia representaves.
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9
The conguraon having the
most negave impact on the se-
curity situaon would be a repe-
on of the previous elecons –
an event tainted with allegaons
of fraud and long negoaonsresulng in a polical status quo,
with the appointment of leaders
similar to the ones currently in
power. This would be especially
true if Maliki were to be selected
for a third term, as this would
neither sasfy the Sunnis nor
large segments of the Shia pop-
ulaon. Maliki is also perceived
as clinging to power by rivalpolicians, and increasingly seen
as incompetent by a majority of
Iraqis.
In the event a more consensual
leader is elected, the new coali-
on could benet from relavely
high levels of popularity, which
would create momentum for re-
forms and a window of opportu-
nity allowing for cross-sectarian
policies to be enacted. This tra-
jectory has more probability to
materialise if a Shia gure, also
appreciated by an important
proporon of moderate Sunnis,
was chosen. If not seized, this
window would quickly close and
the new leadership will fall into
the same pialls as the Malikiadministraon.
Muqtada al-Sadr may be trying
to ll this gap. Although a prom-
inent Shia religious gure with
es to Iran and remembered
for his acve role in Iraq’s civil
war, he has progressively sof -
tened his stance towards Sunnis,
backing protesters in Anbar and
denouncing the acons of the
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Shia milia the
leadership of which now forms a
rival party. Sadr has emerged as
Maliki’s most serious opponent
and is able to derive cross-sec-
tarian legimacy from his an-
-American stance.
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10THE MOST IMPORTANT REFORMS
If the establishment of a
cross-sectarian ruling coalion
with an appete for reform is
a signicant challenge, push-
ing through reforms to address
Iraq’s most entrenched polical
disputes is arguably an even
greater one. While it is acknowl-
edged that the reforms required
to drive real progress towards
stability in Iraq are numerous
and that each one requires con-
dions currently unforeseeable
in the short term, the key sck-
ing points are too linked to the
grievances and hurdles to pro-
gress to not be discussed as part
of Iraq’s future landscape.
Priorising the numerous sig-
nicant reforms required to
ensure an improved level of
polical stability and security is
controversial in itself. Beyond
the re-structuring of the process
by which governments and theiropposions are formed and a
naonal conversaon on how
Iraq’s polical classes will lead a
change in polical culture, there
are a number of issues which
must be considered to a future
unied and stable Iraq.
Condions must be set for
progress along the series of ini-
aves laid out in Iraq’s Cons-
tuonal Arcle 140. Democrat-
ically resolving Kirkuk’s status
alongside the other disputed
territories will be crucial to the
future stability of northern Iraq
and therefore the autonomous
region of Kurdistan. Ethnic, na-
onal and religious dierencesas well as the issue of Kirkuk’s oil
have been used for too long as
excuses to avoid progress.
Ulmately the current stagna-
on surrounding Arcle 140 is
the cause of too much harm for
any serious group to veto mod-
erate progressive reforms which
must build on President Tala-bani’s work prior to his illness.
The passing of the long-awaited
amended oil and gas law which
would establish clear revenue
sharing agreements is also re-
quired to sele disputes cur-
rently caused by the Iraqi con-
stuon and ensure improved
relaons between Kurdistan and
Iraq. It would also increase rev-
enues crucial to Iraq’s economic
development.
Perhaps the most important
reform which must be made in
order for Iraq to progress to-
wards naonal reconciliaon is
the reform to the accountability
and jusce law beer knownas the de-baathicaon law.
The revisions which the cabinet
agreed in April which would
see former-regime ocials able
to serve in government again,
currently represents the best
opportunity for the Iraqi parlia-
ment to come to a cross-sectari-
an agreement and may therefore
set a precedent for cross-sec-tarian polical progress which
in turn might encourage further
progress.
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11THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN 2014
Although there is a consensus
on the reforms which need to be
implemented, the opportunity
to impose these changes is more
uncertain and their acceptance
will ulmately depend on social
changes which will make mean-
ingful polical acons legimate.
From this perspecve, the April
2014 elecons are unlikely to
provoke drasc and immedi-
ate changes, but they have the
potenal to either trigger a
deterioraon of the security and
polical environments, or set
Iraq on a more posive but slow
course towards stability.
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Author:
Anne-Laure Barbosa
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