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ELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicasalimentaráelmundo.

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Juststandards:internationalregulatoryinstrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplex

resourceconflicts

JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraParkPaper#83

Apirila–Abril–April24,25,262017

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Juststandards:internationalregulatoryinstrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplexresource

conflicts

JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraPark

NOTE:THISISAFORTHCOMINGARTICLEINCANADIANJOURNALOFDEVELOPMENTSTUDIES2017

Abstract

Climatechangemitigationandlandgrabbingaredistinctbutnotisolatedphenomena.Thereisevidencethattheirintersectionandinteractioncontributetorapidagrariantransformationswithdiresocialandecologicalspillover,includingtheonsetandaggravationofconflicts.Severalexistinghumanrightsinstrumentsareapplicabletosuchspilloversituationsandarepreferabletootherkindsofregulation,astheytendtobeseenasmorelegitimatebythoseadverselyaffected.WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperarguesforarecalibrationofanalysisandactiononclimatechangemitigationandlandgrabsthatmovesbeyondregulationineachisolatedcaseandtowardintegratedsolutions.KEYWORDS:Climatechange;agrariantransformation;landgrabbing;conflicttransformation;regulation

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Theenvironmental,socialandgenderimpactsofclimatechangemitigationstrategies(biofuels,REDD+(ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradation)andhydropowerprojectsportrayedasrenewableenergy)andoflandgrabbingcontinuetocapturetheattentionofscholars,practitioners,governmentandcivilsocietyactors.Relevantresearchofteninvestigatestheseprocessesseparatelyandconfinedwithindiscretetemporalandspatialboundaries(suchasaparticularlandholding)wheredispossessionorcompetinglandclaimsoccur.Yet,evidencefromthegroundincreasinglypointstotheneedforawideranalyticlens,suchaslandscapeorregion.Itistheintersectionandinteractionofthesephenomenathatcanproducesocialandecologicalspill-overeffects,chainreactionsandigniteneworaggravateoldsetsofcompetingclaimsandconflictsoverresourceswithinawiderarea.Whenclimatemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlap,competeorruninparallel,theydosonotjustspatiallyortemporally,butalsoinstitutionally,intermsofpolicies,landclaims,communitysocialdynamicsandmechanismsforsettlingdisputes.Futureconflictandcooperationoutcomes,particularlygenderedones,willdependonintersectingstrugglesofpowerandmeaningintheconstructionofnarrativesandcontestationsaroundthegrabbingofoneresourceoranother(land,forest,water,fisheriesoraquaticresources,orsomecombinationofthese).Understandingspecificconflictsinaparticularmomentintimerequiresanalysingthewiderspatial,social-ecologicalandhistorical-institutionalconditionsandcircumstancesinwhichtheyarise.Onlythencanwecontemplateappropriateinterventionsforinfluencingtheirtrajectoriesinthedirectionofgreatersocialjustice.Forthoseinterestedinpromotingsocialjustice-basedsolutionsinthesesituations,somekindofregulatorymechanismmayberelevantandusefulundercertainconditions.Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processesandbodiesareavailabletorespondtoissuesarisingfromtherelatedongoingagrariantransformations.Broadlyreferredtohereasinternationalregulatoryinstruments,isuchmechanismsareincreasinglyconsideredaspotentialsolutionstomanyoftoday’snaturalresourcerelatedproblems.However,fromasocialjusticeandpoliticallegitimacyperspective,acleardistinctionmustbemadebetweeninternationalinstrumentsadoptedbystates,suchasthehumanrightstreaties,andthoseinstrumentsthatareestablishedbycorporationsfortheostensiblepurposeofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Theformeraregroundedininternationalhumanrightslawandwithinthestatesystem,whilethelatterareessentiallyattunedtocorporateinterests(seeCoumans2017).After2008,followingthe(re)new(ed)globalattentiontolandgrabbing,anumberofinitiativesemerged–rangingfromintergovernmentalguidelines(PrinciplesforResponsibleAgriculturalInvestmentsjointlydevelopedbyUNCTAD,IFAD,FAOandWorldBank)tocorporate-ledself-regulation(forexample,Bonsucro,whichisamulti-stakeholdermembershipbasedorganizationwhichpromotes‘responsible’sugarproductionincludingthroughcertificationofstandards,andwhosemembersincludebigcorporationsalongsidefarmers,endusersandcivilsociety)–ostensiblytoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationtosocialandenvironmentalconcerns.iiWhilepotentiallyuseful,thereisatendencytoapplyregulatoryinstrumentsaccordingtotheprojectparametersofaninvestmentor

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initiativeinisolationandwithinasinglelandholding,asifthisishowsuchprocessesactuallyunfoldinreality.Whileinsomeinstances,a1:1correspondenceratiomayberelevant,thisisnotthecaseinothers.Often,thesephenomenaintersectandinteracttoproducecomplicatedsituationswithsocialandecologicaleffectsthatspillovertheinitialprojectparameters.Evenifaninterveningactor–beitacompanyorthestate–iswillingtoapplyorusehumanrightsinregulatinganintervention,inpracticetheirsenseofobligationmightstillstopatthephysicalortimeboundariesoftheirproject,whichwouldeffectivelyindicateadifferentlogicatworkthanhumanrights.WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperproblematisesthecomplexrealitycurrentlyunfoldinginSoutheastAsia,andcallsforrecalibrationofanalysisofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsandaction,includingmovingbeyonda1:1applicationofregulationtoasinglecaseinisolation.Assumingthatinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanhelpavoidconflictordirectconflictdynamicstowardsmoresociallyjustoutcomes,itisarguedthattheireffectivenessdependsnotonlyontheunderlyinglegitimacyoftheinstrumentdeployedbutonotherfactorssuchasinterpretation,contextandstrategy.

Background

CambodiaandMyanmarpresentsimilaryetdifferentcontexts,opportunitiesandchallengesforthedeploymentofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentswithregardtotheintersectionofclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbing(andtheconflictsthesemightignite).Bothcountrieshaveallowed,andsometimesproactivelypromoted,theexploitationandextractionofvaluefromlandandforestresourcesbyelite,militaryandprivatecompanies.Agribusinessdevelopmenthastakentheformoflargescaleflexcropandtreemonoculturesandhasoftenentaileddisplacementorevictionoflocalcommunities.Climatechangemitigationactivitiesarealsoongoinginbothcountries,albeitmoreevidentlylabeledassuchinCambodiawherethediscourseandrhetoricisbeingusedtojustifylargescaleforestryplantations,forinstance(ScheidelandWork2015).CambodiaisalsoaREDD+readycountry,meaningthatconcreteprojectsexistontheground,thoughthecollectionofcarboncreditsisyettostart.InMyanmarREDD+plansexistbuttherearenoprojectsattimeofwriting,althoughhydropowerprojectsareincreasingly(re)framedasclimatechangemitigation(Borrasetal.2015).Bothcountrieshaveembracedambitioussocio-economicandpoliticalreformagendas,althoughmuchearlierinCambodia(1992)thaninMyanmar(2011).Thistimelapsemeansthat,forinstance,Myanmarhasnotaccessedandratifiedmosthumanrightsinstruments(seetable1below),whereasCambodiaratifiedmostofthemfrom1983onwards,includingtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen.Theinstitutionalsetupandframework,aswellasinstitutionalcapacity,ismuchmoreestablishedinCambodiathanitisinMyanmar.Forinstance,inCambodia,the2001LandLawsetstheframeworkfortenurerightsinthecountry,includingintermsofindigenouspeople’saccesstocommunallandtitles.ThereiscurrentlynoequivalentcomprehensivepieceoflegislationinMyanmar,but

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existinglegislationdoesnotrecognisecustomarylandrightsorcommunallandsandinsteadseestheseareasas“vacant,fallowandvirgin”landandearmarksthemforlarge-scale(foreign)investment.iiiINSERTTABLE1HERE:StatusofratificationofhumanrightsinstrumentsinCambodiaandMyanmarRealityonthegroundinbothcountriesismarkedbymultiple,discreteland-basedinterventionsandinitiatives–eitherinmoreorlessthesameplace(butdifferenthistoricalperiods),atmoreorlessthesametime(butindifferentspaces),orbothinthesameplaceandatthesametime.Asinmanysocietieswherelandandwatergrabbingisoccurring,thetwocountriesexhibitanoverallfailuretoaddressland-basedconflict(Deininger2011;CollierandHoeffler2005).Meanwhile,theregulatorylandscapesinwhichtheseinterventionsoverlapandinteractarecharacterisedhereas“plurallegal”,withnumerousregulatoryfieldscompetingforstandingonthegroundandthestatelawbeingjustoneofthese.Toillustrate,inCambodia’sPreyLangForest,aonce-massivecontiguousforestarea,conservationandexploitationisoccurringinacontestedfieldofpoweroccupiedbyprivatecompanies,conservationorganisations,governmentministriesandthecommunitieswhohaveinhabitedandusedtheterritoryforgenerations.Eachactorinthelandscapeisattemptingtoassertitsownunderstandingofwhohaswhichrights,towhichland,forhowlongandforwhatpurpose;eachattemptstoperformthisallocationofnaturalresourcesinsociety.Likewise,inMyanmar’sNorthernShanStatesub-region,inadditiontothestatemilitaryandnumerousethnicarmedgroups,otheractorsarerecastingthelandscapeandexistingpatternsofsocialrelationsthrough:miningconcessions,illegallogging,treeplantationsbilledas“conservation”,agribusinesslinkingflexcropproductiontoprocessingplantsneartheborder,hydropowerdamprojectsandChina’sopiumsubstitutionprogrambeingusedbyentrepreneursasasteppingstonetoamasslargelandholdings.Inbothoftheserapidlychanginglandscapes,statelawisjustoneactor,amongmany,andveryoftenisnotthemostauthoritativeactorontheground,whilelocalisedcustomarylawsystemscontinuetooperatesimultaneously.Plural-legalsettingscanvaryfromoneplaceandtimetoanother,andthusplayavariableroleinstructuringlimitsandopportunitiesforcompetingrightsclaimsandinshapingresourcerelatedconflicts(Franco,2011).However,institutionsandprocessesthatcouldcontributetopreventingortransformingcomplexresourceconflictsmaybeweakorabsentintheveryplacesandatthescalewheretheyareprobablymostneeded.Inthecaseofcomplexresourceconflicts(involvingintersectionandinterplayofmultipleinitiativesandgrabs),forexample,theissueofscaleisimportant.Villagelevelcustomarypracticesareoftenveryrelevantandappropriateforhandlingsocialconflictwithinavillageandbetweenpartiesofrelativelyequalstatus.Butthesameinstitutionsmaynotbegearedtowardaddressingconflictsthatspillovervillageboundariestoinvolvemultiplevillagesatatime.Theymaynotbecapableofhandlingconflictswhereonepartyisrelativelymorepowerfulthananother.Institutionalstrengthispartlyaboutcapacityandpartlyaboutautonomyvis-a-vispowerfulactors/interestsinsociety(Fox1994).“Institutionalcapture”andthe

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vetopoweroflandlordshelptoexplainwhy,historically,inpredominantlyagrariansocietiesmarkedbyinequality,democratisingthedistributionofland(throughtitlingprograms,throughredistributivereformorthroughlandrestitution)isextremelydifficult.Similarly,thenotionthat“waterflowstopower”resonatesbecauseitdrawsalinkbetweendecisionmakingcontrolandpoliticalpowerandwaterallocationoutcomes(Roth,Boelens,andZwarteveen2005,2).

Recalibrationofanalysisandaction

InbothCambodiaandMyanmar,oneclusterofincreasinglyprominentland-basedinterventionsandinitiativesinvolvesgenericlandgrabbingontheonehand,andclimatechangemitigationontheotherhand.Whenithitstheground,eithersortofactivitymayengageexistingstructuralandinstitutionalfault-lines,potentiallyreignitingoldconflictsortensionsortriggeringnewones.Butthemorecomplicatedandpotentiallyexplosivesituationiswhenlandgrabbingandland-basedclimatechangemitigationstarttooverlap,interactwithandreshapeoneanother(Hunsbergeretal.2017).InthePreyLangForest,villagersarebeingsqueezedbetweenexpandinggovernment-awardedeconomiclandconcessionsontheonehand,andinitiativeslabeledasclimatechangemitigationactivities,suchasforestconservation,ontheotherhand(seeScheidelandWork2015).MembersofthegrassrootsPreyLangCommunityNetwork(PLCN)seekingtoprotecttheforestanddefendtheirplaceinitagainstillegallogginganddeforestationbycompanieshavesufferedviolentattacksbyarmedassailants.ivIntheTanintharyiRegioninMyanmar,governmentforestpreservationforcarbonsequestrationinitiativesandinternationalenvironmentalNGO-drivenmarine,forestandwildlifeconservationprojectsareaccommodatinglarge-scaleland-takingsthatareconsumingforestandforestcommunities:anexpansiveNavyconfiscationareaeatingupvillagers’long-standingcasheworchardsandcommunityforests,numerousminingconcessionscontaminatingtraditionallocalwatersources,asprawlingSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ)andamajorhighwayslashingthroughkilometersofold-growthforesttoconnectThailandtotheAndamanSea,andexpandingoilpalmandrubberconcessions(andthelucrativelarge-scaleloggingthatprecedesthem).Villagersareespeciallyvulnerablewhenconcessionsandconservationneedthelandbutnotthepeopleonit,asLi(2011)putsit.

Inadditiontorecastingthewaylandisused,inbothCambodiaandMyanmar,thisconvergenceofeconomiclandconcessionsandforestconservation-as-climatechangemitigationbuildonportrayalsofvillagers’customarywaysoflifeandproductionasdestructiveand/orinefficient(Borrasetal.2017),therefore(re)producingnarrativesthatcanmakethenewarrangementsseemmoreacceptableaspartoftheprocessoftakingcontrolofthelandawayfromthevillagers(ScheidelandWork2015).InMyanmar,portrayalsofshiftingcultivatorsasforestdestroyersoriginateinnineteenthcenturycolonialrulewhen,“asColonialforestdepartmentsenteredintocompetitionwithswiddenersforcontrolofland,theybegantocharacterizeswiddencultivatorsasprimitive,unproductive,even‘pre-agricultural’incontrasttoforester’sso-called‘modern’,‘scientific’management’”.vFast-forwardingtotoday,accordingtoonecloseobserver,“[m]anyofthe[resulting]policies,andthehostileassumptionsandattitudeson

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whichtheyarebased,persisttothisday.Eventhoughtheyarerarelybasedonmorethansubjectivepreference,theyhavebeenselectivelyemployedtounfairlyde-legitimatecultivators’rightsinwaysthatwouldbeinacceptableforlowlandcultivators.”viAsonestudynotes,whilethedebateonthepersistenceordemiseofswiddencultivationhasneverceasedamongstgovernmentsandacademics:

FromtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangein1992

totheKyotoProtocolin1997,thepoliciesofinter-governmentalorganizationhaveimmenselypromotedresearchontherelationshipsamongswiddenagricultureandforestdegradationandglobalwarming[…]NegativeperceptionsfromgovernmentstowardsswiddeningingeneralinSEAhaveacceleratedthedemiseofthistraditionalswiddensystem.(Lietal.2014,1656,1658)

Insuchsettings,nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,or

companyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymayseektopromoteoneoranotherinternationalregulatoryinstrumentasapotentialsolution,ofteninthenameofconflictmitigationorconflictresolution.Buttoooftendeploymentofsuchmeasures,whenitoccurs,failstotakeintoaccounttheinteractionofmultipleresourcegrabs,hencetheneedforrecalibrationofanalysisandaction.Similarly,evaluatingrule-of-lawandjusticereforminitiativesintheearly2000s,Carothers(2003)foundthemsufferingfromaprofoundknowledgedeficitwithmuchtobelearnedandunlearned,atatimewhensuchinitiativeswerestillhighonofficialdevelopmentaidagendas.Heobservedthatthenatureandconsequencesofproposedrule-of-lawchangesofteneludedlegalreformers,andthatthefieldofrule-of-lawpromotionwasslowtoscaleupempiricalknowledgegainedinpracticeintolessonslearned.Hedrewattentiontothe“embeddedobstaclestotheaccumulationofknowledge[that]existbelowthesurface”suchas:(1)thecomplexityanddiversityofsocietiesandofhowlawfunctionsandoperatesand(2)theweakimpulsesofaidorganisationsandlawyerstoundertakesystematic“ruleoflawinsociety”knowledge-accumulation(Carothers2003,14–15).Theresultingknowledgedeficitendedupreinforcingexistingtendenciestowardtop-down,technicalreforms(Decker,Sage,andStefanova2005).

Fromaregulatoryperspective,andwithinsightfromCarothers,perhapsitwarrants

askingthefollowing:Iswhatisperceivedasoneproblem,infactaclusterofproblems?Arethetoolsofanalysisandactionbeingbroughttobear–includingrelevantinternationalregulatoryinstruments–moresuitedtodealingwithasingle(typeof)initiative/interventionatatime,andtowhatextentcantheydealwithaclusterofproblems?Climatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingincidentseachhavethepotentialtoreviveoldconflictsandsparknewconflicts.Whentheyariseatthesametimeorspilloverintothesamelandscape,theirintersectionandinterplaymayturnseeminglydiscreteconflictsintoa“conflictcocktail".Howtoaddressthesecomplexsituationswithdifferentpossibleaggravatedconflictscenariosisnotobvious.

Regulatoryinitiativesdonotnecessarilyorautomaticallydetecttheseinteractions,

nordotheynecessarilyorautomaticallyadjusttotheinterplayevenifdetected.Would-beregulatorsofconflict,whethertheyarefromthegovernment,theprivatesectororthecivilsocietysphere,maysimplyfinditeasiertofocusonjust

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oneproblem,ratherthanaclusterofproblems.Agivenregulatoryinterventionmaybeprogrammedtofocusonjustonetypeofsituation,andtheimplementersofthatprogramsimplyunabletoadjustevenifaclusterofproblemsisdetected.Towhatextentdoesfocusingonjustoneproblem,forwhateverreason,havethepotentialtoaggravateratherthanregulateconflict?Meanwhile,notallregulatoryinterventionsarethesameeither.Therealmofregulatoryinterventionsandof(inter)nationalgovernanceinstrumentsisalsohighlydifferentiated.Forexample,today,thereareverysharpdifferencesinhowtheUSGovernmentandmanyindigenouspeoplesmovementsintheworldunderstandandusetheprincipleofFee,Prior,andInformedConsent(FPIC),andwhenthesedifferentunderstandingsaredeployedintheformofaparticularregulatoryinitiative,itismoreasanassertionofwhichparticularunderstandingshouldprevailoverandagainstanother,thanasanexpressionofauniversallyagreedunderstanding.Giventhatalackofconsensussurroundingthemeaningandpurposeofdifferentinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsisindeedpartoftheregulatorylandscapetoday,whichunderstandingofwhich“standard”oughttoapplyinagivensituation?Andequallyimportant,whataretheimplicationsandconsequencesofusingoneunderstandingandstandardoveranother?

Withthesequestionsinmind,thisarticleaimstolaysomeanalyticalfoundationsfor

exploringtheideathatrecalibrationofanalysisandactiondescribedearliermustalsoproblematisetheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments.Thepointisnottocriticiseusingthemingeneral,oranyoneinstrumentinparticular,butrathertoputforwardsomepreliminarytheoreticalreflectionsonthefollowingquestion:wherediscreteprocessesoflandconcessionsandland-basedclimatechangemitigation/adaptationandconservationoverlap,interactwith,andreshapeoneanother,underwhatconditionscanwhichinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscontributetotransformingconflictinthedirectionofgreatersocialjustice?

Regulatingandtransformingconflict

Aplural-legalapproach(vonBenda-Beckmann2001)combinedwithBourdieu’s(1987)conceptof“fieldsofaction”allowsrurallandscapestobeviewedasregulatedbutdynamicspaces,markedbytheco-existenceofseveralfieldsofsocialregulation,wherestatelawisjustoneamongseveralcompetingforstanding.viiThisanthropologicalviewoflawemphasisesthesocial,political,economicandintellectualcontextofenforceablenorms,andtheroleofstateandnon-stateactorsinmakingthemauthoritativeinsociety.Suchanapproachallows“Inquiries[…]intothewaynormsaregenerated,howmandatorinessiscreated,andhowregularitiesaremaintained”(Moore2005,1).Forinstance,untilrecentlyinWesternsocieties,avarietyofsocialregulation,includingreligiouslaw,localcustomarylawandpersonallaw,historicallycoexistedandcompetedwithstatelaw.Theinterplayofvariousregulatorysystemsdeterminedwhichregulatoryfieldheldgreaterswayrelativetotheothers,andtheoutcomescouldvaryovertimeandfromonelocaletoanother.Bytheendofthelastcentury,neither“increasingcentralisationofauthority”nor“increasingimportanceofinternationalandtransnationallegalobligationsandinstitutions”haserasednon-statelawfieldsorunderminedthe“complexarrayofjurisdictions”theyentail(Cotterrell1992,28).

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LegalpluralismcharacterisesmanycountriesinSoutheastAsiatoday,anditisnotunusualtofindShari’asystemsexistingalongside(diverse)customarysystems,andbothoftheseexistingalongsidenationalConstitutionsandstatutorysystems–whatBourdieu(1987)callsthe“juridicalfield”comprisingtheensembleofnationalofficialinstitutions,agents,legalinstrumentsandnormsparticulartoagivennationalterritory.Thisjuridicalfieldisconstitutiveofthestate,butnotcoterminouswithit,sinceitisreproducedbytheactionsnotonlyofstateagenciesandjudges,butalsolawyers,lawfirms,professionalassociations,non-governmentallawreformorganisationsandcivilsocietyrights-advocacygroups(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Thejuridicalfieldmaybecentraltostatelawmaking,butitisnotnecessarilyorautomaticallycentralto“makinglawmatter”insociety(Crook2001).Instead,itisjustoneofseveralfieldsofactionwherepeoplemayactuallyendupgoingtoregulateconflictandgetredressandprotection.Anotheriscustomarylaw,whereface-to-facedisputeprocessingbyordinarypeopleatthevillagelevelmayinvolvedirectnegotiation,informalmediation,retaliationandothercustomarypracticestoaddresstheirgrievances.viiiCustomarylawpracticeshaveraisedconcernsoverhowso-called“traditionalauthority”andcustomarylawallowsinjusticetocreepin,tothedetrimentofwomenandthelandlessruralpoor(Agarwal1994).Itisrelevanttonotethatvillagersmaysometimesresolveaconflictsimplyby“lumpingit”inordertorestoresocialharmony(Galanter1981).InsightsfromAfricasuggestthatbecausebothstate-juridicalsystemsandcustomarysystemscanproduceunjustoutcomes,thequestionforresearchishowdifferentpeopleorgroupsofpeoplenegotiatesuchplurallegalcontextsintheireffortstoclaimrightsandgetjustice(Ikdahletal.2005).

Usingalegalpluralismlensdoesnotassumethattheco-existenceofdifferent

regulatorysystemsisnecessarilysmoothorunproblematicorevenalwaysvisibletoeveryactororobserver.Theremaybecompetitionand/orcomplementationbetweenwhatColchesterandChao(2011)call“diversepathstojustice”,andmorelocalisedregulatorypathsmayormaynotmeshwellwithregulatorypressuresandinstrumentsoriginatingfrom“outside”.Suchanapproach,however,makespossiblebetterdetectionofdiverseandpossiblycompetingunderstandingsofjusticethatdifferentpartiestoaconflictmaybringtobear.“Makinglawmatterinsociety”canthenbeseenasaprocessthatextendstoandispartlycontingentupontheperceptionsandchoices,andactionsandinteractions,ofindividualsorgroupswhomaybeseekingjusticeorlookingtoresolveadisputeortoaddressagrievance.Intheory,aggrievedindividualsandgroupsonthegroundcontributetodeterminingwhereandwhenconflictsemergeoutintheopen,whichregulatoryorder(s)areactivatedinresponse,andwhetherandhowtheseconflictsgetresolvedortransformed.Butexactlyhowandhowmuchtheycontributeisanempiricalquestionthatinvitesfurtherinvestigation.

Resolvingortransformingconflictincreasinglyinvokesapplication/useof

internationalregulatoryinstrumentsbydifferentactors,butisnotnecessarilyorautomaticallydeterminedbythesealone.Increasedinterestinusinginternationalregulatoryinstrumentstoaddressconflictinplaceswhereclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingisoccurringhasbeendriveninpartbyaperceived“weakness”ofstate/juridicalinstitutionsinhandlingtheresulting

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conflicts.Thisispartofthedeclaredlogic,forinstance,behindincreasedcorporateinterestinusinginternationalgovernancemechanismstoregulatenaturalresourceallocationanduseinrelationtotheso-called“globallandrush”inrecentyears.Buttheunderstandingsoftheassociatedconflictsandtheinstrumentschosentoregulatethemcanvaryconsiderably,ascanthelegalreformmeasuresprescribedtoaddressperceivedunderlyinginstitutionalweaknesses.Forinstance,“…the[World]Bank’slegalreformfocusisontheabilityoflegalsystemstofacilitatemarkettransactionsbydefiningpropertyrights,guaranteeingtheenforcementofcontractsandmaintaininglawandorder”.ixBycontrast,somecriticsoftheWorldBankhavearguedthatwomen’sindividuallandrightshavebeenusedasatrojanhorseforneoliberalagriculturalandlandmaskingcommodificationandprivatisationoflandrightsunderhumanrightslanguagewhileobscuringtheneedtostrengthenwomen’sdistinctrighttolandindifferenttenuresystems(O’Laughin2009;Monsalve2006).Forsome,“[i]ndependentjudiciariesandfunctioningcourtsystemsareclearlyimportanttoolsforhumanrightsprotection”(Harris2007,1),whileforothers,itismoreaboutprotectingpropertyrights.

statejusticeinstitutionsmaybe(1)vulnerabletoelitecaptureand(2)inaccessible

either“becausetheyareincompatiblewithlocalnormsandcustomsandtheyarephysicallyoreconomicallyinaccessible,orbecausepeoplelacktheknowledgeorcapacitytonavigatethesystem”.x“[I]nstitutionalsafeguards,transparency,andtheexistenceofacivilconstituency”maythusbeseenasrelevantmeasuresneededtoboostjudicialindependenceandaccountability.xiAllthismayseemlogicalandappropriateatfirst.Yetthewayforwardstillremainsobscured.Forexample,howexactlydoesincreasedtransparencyboostpublicaccountability?AsFox(2007,350–351)hasnoted,transparencydoesnotnecessarilyorautomaticallyproduceaccountability;andonlycertaintypesoftransparencymightdoso,andthenonlyundercertainconditions.Toooften,globalprescriptionsrelyonanalyticalframeworksthatignorethewiderregulatoryfield,institutionalisedinequalitiesandtheagencyofdifferentactorsthatinhabitthegroundwheretheyareintroduced,whilealsoignoringcomplexprocess-to-outcomepathways,whichcanthenimpedeaccesstojusticeandleavewhatsomeaggrievedpartiesperceiveastherealconflictstofesterunresolved.

Analytically,bringinginternationalregulatoryinstrumentstobearinsituationsmarkedbynaturalresourceconflictorclusterofconflictsisperhapsbestunderstoodasacontingent,dynamic–andpotentiallycontentious–politicalprocessthatunfoldsinthe“shadowofthelaw”(Cooter,MarksandMnookin1982),where“law”inageneralsensecomprisestheentiretyofwhatGalanter(1981,6)referstoasthe“backgroundofnormsandproceduresagainstwhichnegotiationsandregulationsinbothprivateandgovernmentsettingstakeplace”.Howthisprocessunfoldscanvaryacrosstimeandplace,sincenolaworregulatoryinstrumentisself-interpretingorself-implementing.Instead,lawsandregulatorymeasuresareinterpretedandimplementedinspecifichistorical-institutionalcontextsbyreal“flesh-and-blood”peoplewhoseperceptions,interests,politicalcalculationsandpowerresourcesarevariablyshapedbypersonalexperiencesandby“structuresinheritedfromthepast”(HoutzagerandFranco2003;Franco2011,2014).Theperceptions,interests,meaningsandpurposesthatgetactivatedbyorenduptappingintotheseprocessescanalso

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influencewhetherandhowanygiveninternationalregulatoryinstrumentistakenupandwhereitmightlead.

Problematisingtheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments

Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processesandbodieshaveemergedandarebeingusedinresponsetoissuesarisinginaneraof“globallandgrabbing”andrelatedfalloutintermsofagrariantransformation.Numerousinternationalinitiatives,fromintergovernmentalguidelinestocorporate-ledself-regulation,aspiretoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationtosocialandenvironmentalconcerns.Suchmechanismsareincreasinglytakenforgrantedaspotentialsolutionsorpartofasolutiontomanyoftoday’snaturalresourcerelatedproblems.Internationalgovernanceisoftenapproachedasamatterofapplyingcertainfit-for-purposeproceduralinstrumentsortechnicaltoolsinordertoobtainmoreorlessanticipatedresults,orimplicitlymakesone-size-fits-allassumptionsaboutwheretheyarerelevantorappropriate.Itisincreasinglytakenforgrantedthatdifferentinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsareonequalfootingintermsoftheiroriginsandlegitimacy.Theseassumptionsareproblematic.Anysituationthatisdeemedillegitimatebythosewhoareaffectedislikelytobeworsenediftheregulatoryresponseislikewisedeemedillegitimate.Inthefollowingsections,wereflectontheseissuesandputforwardfourpropositionsforamorecalibratedapproachtointernationalgovernancethatpromotessocialjusticeoutcomes

Proposition1–interpretation“Makinglaw”isacoreprocessinsocietythatincludes,butalsogoesbeyondwhat

happensinnationallegislaturesandcourts,toinvolvestrugglesbetweendifferentactors(stateandnon-state)tomaketheirpreferredinterpretationsofregulatorynormsandrulesauthoritativeinsociety(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Competinginterpretationsofwhatcountsasgoodgovernance,deployedorperformedbydifferentactorsinthefield,arealsofactorsinshapinghownaturalresourcesarebeingallocated,usedandmanaged.Relatedly,differentformsanddegreesoflegitimacymayshapetheinterpretationandenforceabilityofdifferentinstruments,forinstancehumanrightstreatiesvs.corporate-ledinstruments.Itisthusimportanttoproblematisetheveryconceptof“goodgovernance”inthecontextoftheinternationalpoliticaleconomyinwhichthedifferentinitiativesarise(Margulis,McKeonandBorras2014).

InterpretationanduseoftheinternationalhumanrightsprincipleofFreePrior

InformedConsent(FPIC)xiiisillustrative(Franco,2014).UseofFPICoritsfunctionalequivalents(“communityengagement”)isontheriseinlandandnaturalresourcegovernanceinitiativesgloballyxiiifollowingcallsforgreatertransparencyandfulldisclosureinbiglanddeals.Yetverydifferentactorswithverydifferentpurposesinmindandindifferentsettingstranslatetheprincipleintopracticeverydifferently.Forsome,FPICisabasicdemocraticprinciplethatincludestherighttoveto.Forothers,FPICenablesoutcomeswherebothcommunitiesandcompaniesbenefit,evenifsuchsharingofresourcesandbenefitsofuseisnotautomaticallyornecessarilypromotingsocialjustice(IIED2012).Forstillothers,FPICisatoolforavertingsocialconflict,whileproviding

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sociallicensefordealstoproceed(minusthesocialconflictanditsdisruptionsandcoststodevelopers).

Theexampleraisesseveralissues.First,whoisinitiatingwhichinstrumentforwhat

purpose?Second,howcanoneknowwhenagivenstandard(whetherFPICorsomeother)hasbeentrulymet?Achievingconsent,forexample,isnotnecessarilythesameaspeoplehavinghadarealchoicetobeginwith,andinmanylandgrabbinghotspotsinMyanmar,forinstance,toooftenthechoiceofferedtovillagerswhentheirconsentissoughtisbetweenquittingtheirlandwithcompensationorwithout.Third,towhatextentcanconsentbetreatedasaone-time,isolatedandfixedoutcomewheninactualitycommunitiesaredifferentiated,projectsarefluidandimpactsareexperiencedwithinalarger,livinglandscape?Somevillagersmayresistatthestartandlaterswitchtoacceptance,whileothersmayendupwithdrawinginitialacceptance.Or,somevillagesthatwerenotaffectedinitially,maygetdrawninduetospilloverorchain-reactioneffects,suchaswhenvillagersdisplacedbyahydropowerdamprojectmove,oraremoved,ontolandinadjacentvillages.Fourth,whoismakinglawonnaturalresources,andfromwhichgenderperspectivespecifically,whetherintermsofformulatingregulatoryresponsesincorporateofficesorstatecorridors,orintermsofinterpretingtheminthefield?xivWhatarethevariedwaysinwhichgenderisconsideredandmanifestedinregulatorymechanismsaroundnaturalresources?Whataretherisksofexclusionofwomenfromtheassociatedprocesses,andconversely,whichkindsofprocessesmightfavorwomen’sinclusion?Relatedly,inwhatwaysistheperceivedlegitimacyofagivenregulatoryinstrumentgendered,therebyshapingitsuseorreceptioninthefield?

Finally,ifthereareopportunities,therearealsolimitstointerpretation,andsoanalysismustconsiderthatbydesignsomeinstrumentsmaybelessopentointerpretation(includingsocialjusticeinterpretations)thanothers.

Proposition2–(pro-socialjustice)design

Here,differentspecificinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbesituatedalongacontinuum–forexample,ashoveringsomewherebetweenamore“pro-business”poleandamore“pro-socialjustice”pole,usingcriteriatolocatetheminitiallyandtotrackchangesintheircharacterovertime(visionandprocessofdevelopment,whoparticipates,arethehumanrightsbased,dotheypromotesocialjustice,genderequality)asillustratedinFigure1below.INSERTFIGURE1HERE:ThecontinuumofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsWhilesomeinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaybemorepro-socialjusticebydesign,designalonemaynotimpedeorpromotesocialjusticeinpractice.Alsorelevantistheinclusivenessoftheprocessbywhichagiveninstrumentisdeveloped,aswellasitsrelationtohumanrights.Evenwhenaregulatoryresponseostensiblyis,byprovenanceanddesign,pro-socialjustice,thisdoesnotnecessarilyorautomaticallymakeitsoinpractice.TheCFSTenureGuidelines(TGs),forinstance,weredraftedthroughwhatiswidelyconsideredahighlyparticipatoryprocess–consultationswithmorethan1000peoplefromgovernments,CSOs,privatesector,academiaandinternationalorganisations,

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fromnearly150countries.TheTGsareexplicitlyhumanrightsbasedandincludeamongtheprinciplesforimplementationnon-discrimination,equityandjustice,genderequalityandaccountability,amongothers.Althoughtheyareasoftlawinstrument(incontrasttotheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESCR),forinstance,whichislegallybindingonceaccessedbythestates),xvsincetheiradoptionin2012,onecanfindtheTGsbeingdeployedbyawiderangeofactors,inavarietyofways,includingforpurposesthatcouldbesaidtounderminesomeactors’visionsofsocialjustice.Accessibilityisanotherbasisonwhichtoassesstheextenttowhichagivenregulatoryinstrumentispro-socialjustice.Forinstance,theRoundtableonSustainableBiomaterialscertificationschemedoeshaveazero-tolerancepolicyforinvoluntaryresettlementandgrievancemechanismstoaddressconflict.Yettheprocessforpresentingagrievanceiscomplexandnoteasilyaccessible,particularlyforindividuals,andpresentslimitationsintermsoftime(past12months),numberofappeals(onlyoneallowed)andtypeofgrievances(thosefallingoutsidethepredeterminedtypologyareconsideredinadmissible).Inanotherexample,theIFCPerformanceStandardsonEnvironmentalandSocialSustainabilitystatethatlandacquisitionandinvoluntaryresettlement(bothphysicalandeconomicdisplacement)aretobeavoidedorminimised,withcompensationbeingprovidedifdisplacementcannotbeavoided.ButthedefinitionofFPICiswatereddowntoa‘goodfaithnegotiationbetweentheclientandtheAffectedCommunitiesofIndigenousPeoples’,whichdoesnotnecessarilyrequireunanimityandmaybeachievedevenwhenindividualsorgroupswithinthecommunityexplicitlydisagree.

Tosupportpro-socialjusticeanalysisandaction,itmakessensetoprivilegeinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsthatcomeoutofmoreinclusiveprocesses,aswellasthosethatareexplicitintheirhumanrightsfoundations,whilebeingattentivetotheirpluralinterpretations,discoursesanduses.Butwheremultiplelandgrabbingandland-basedclimatechangemitigationinitiativesoverlap,interactwithandreshapeoneanother,asinMyanmarandCambodia,attentionmustbegiventocompetinginterpretationsacrossmultiple,intersectinginitiativesandhowthesemayundermineorreinforceeachother.

Proposition3–contextInternationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaytakeonvariedmeaningsandoperationalcharacteristicsdependingonthehistorical-institutionalcontext,includingthelocally-specificassemblageofrulesandprocedures(informalandformal)thathavebeensociallyconstructedandreconstructedovertime.Forinstance,inCambodia,theHunSengovernmenthasdismissedtheTGscompletelyonthegroundsthatthecountryalreadyhasawell-establishedlegalandpolicyframeworkaroundlandandnaturalresourcemanagementandadministration–andarguingthatitisonlytheimplementationwhichposesproblems.Thegovernment’sstance,inturn,hasmeantthatCambodiancivilsocietyorganisationshavealsolargelychosentonotrefertotheTGsintheiradvocacyandpoliticalworkoncasesoflandgrabs–atleastfornow.Bycontrast,somecivilsocietyorganisationsinMyanmarhavebegunexperimentingwithusing

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theTGsintheirorganisingandadvocacywork.ThecaseofTGuptakeinMyanmarshowshowchangesinagivencontext,howeversmallandseeminglyinsignificant,canpresentnewopportunitiestoinfluencelawmaking.There,untilrecently,fewobserverscouldhaveimaginedanofficialpublicconsultationonanewnationallandusepolicy,orthatitcouldbeanythingmorethanademonstrationconsultation–heldunderhighlycontrolledconditionsandaimedatmerelysignalingratherthanactingingoodfaithtointernationaldonors,governments,andinvestors.xviYetinOctober2014theTheinSeingovernmentinitiatedsuchaprocedureandprogrammedittostartandfinishintwomonths.Whatevertheintentionsbehindit,theofficialprocessunexpectedlylastedfarlongerandwentfardeeperthanoriginallyplanned,aspreviouslyexcludedsocialactorsespeciallyfrom“below”mobilisedtopoliticallyengageandregistertheirconcernsandproposals,andasmoderatepoliticalcurrentsonthe“inside”workedtoaccommodatethesenewvoices.Exploitingthegovernment’sopeninguptointernationalstandards(afterdecadesofisolation),somecivilsocietyorganisationsandgrassrootsgroupsusedtheTGstoframetheircriticismsandrecommendations,whichperhapscontributedtoreshapingthepolicyinsignificantwaysandpushingitinarelativelymoreacceptabledirection.Takentogether,theexamplesfromCambodiaandMyanmarshowhowtheexistinghistorical-institutionalcontext–includingchangesinthiscontext–caninfluencethepoliticalperceptionsandcalculationsofkeyactors–includinggovernmentauthoritiesandcivilsocietygroups–onwhetherandhowtotakeupwhichregulatoryideas,framingsandtoolsthatmayoriginatefromtheinternationalarena.Proposition4–politicalstrategy

Insituationswherepowerfulactorsareconvergingtoreallocatelandandrelatednaturalresourcesawayfromruralworkingpeople,internationalregulatoryinstrumentsarelikelytobeperceivedaslegitimatebythose(potentially)adverselyaffectedifthesearegroundedexplicitlyinhumanrightsprinciplesandprovisionsbecauseofthelatter’scoreconcernforremedyingsocialinjustice.Suchinstrumentsarelikelytobemostrelevantifusedinawaythatopensuppoliticalspaceforaffectedpeopleandpeoplestoorganiseandmobilisetoputpressureonespeciallystateauthoritiestoactintheirfavor.Withthisinmind,internationalhumanrightsinstrumentscanbeenvisionedashavingatleastfourtacticalandstrategicuses.

First,theycanbeusedtoinformandframesocialmovements’andotheractors’

understandingsofthenaturalresourcerelatedproblemsthataffecttheirlivesandlivelihoods,aswellasthepossiblesolutionstotheseproblems.xviiThewayinwhichsomeCSOsandgrassrootssocialactorsusedtheTGstohighlighttheproblemoflandgrabbingwhilevalidatingtheirownresponsestoitduringthepublicconsultationonadraftnationallandusepolicyinMyanmarisagoodexample.Second,theycanbeusedtomake(more)visiblegenderdimensionsoftheseconflicts,andtoputforwardmoregenderequitablesocialjusticeplatforms.Again,recentexperienceinMyanmarprovidesanexample:there,softlawandhardlawhumanrightsinstruments(CEDAW,theRighttoFood,andtheTGs)weredeployedbyCSOstoexposeseriousweaknessesinthegovernment’shandlingofwomen’slandrightsinthedraftnationallandusepolicy,andtoputforward

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alternativepolicyproposals,manyofwhichwereeventuallyaccepted.Third,multipleinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbeusedtoidentifyarangeof(potential)institutionalleveragepointstobetargetedbyadvocacyandcollectiveactioncampaignsatdifferentscales.Fourth,specificinstrumentscanbeusedtodevelop“verticallyintegrated”strategies(Fox2001),wherestateauthorityistargetedatdifferentlevelssimultaneouslyinordertominimiseaversionofresponsibilitythroughdisplacement(or“passingthebuck”).

Conclusion

InCambodiaandMyanmar,bothclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbinginterventionsarerecastingthewaylandisused,whileenflamingoldorsparkingnewconflicts.Nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,orcompanyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymaybetemptedtolaunchtheirowninterventionsinthesesimmeringcomplexsituations,bypromotingoneoranotherregulatoryresponseasasolution.Towhatextentsuchinterventionsareaddressing–andcapableofaddressing–notoneproblem,buttheclusterofproblems(theoverlap,intersectionandinterplayofactivitiesthatareeachintheirownwayrecastinglandrightsandlanduse)remainsanopenquestion.

Inlightoftheabovepropositions,andinthecontextofcomplexlandscapeswhere

climatechangemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlapandintersectsuchasCambodiaandMyanmar,itmakessensetoprivilegetheCFSTenureGuidelines,forbothanalysisandaction.Thisdoesnotmeandiscardingotherinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsasinappropriateorirrelevant,butthattherearecompellingreasonstoemphasisethisparticularinternationalstandardininanalysisandactiononthisspecificproject.Thereasonsareasfollows:

First,theTGsalonewereformulatedtoaddressandanswertheunderlying“land

question”whichisattheheartofcomplexresourceconflicts,namely:Whoshouldhavewhatrightstowhichnaturalresources(land,fisheriesandforests),forhowlongandforwhatpurposes,andwhogetstodecide?

Second,theTGsareuniqueamongthearrayofregulatoryinstrumentsmost

commonlybeingappliedintoday’sresourceconflictsgloballyinexplicitlyanchoringthemselvesininternationalhumanrightslaw.Notonlydotheymakereferencetovariousotherspecificinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,butbasichumanrightsprincipleshavebeendirectlyintegratedinspecificprovisionsaswellasgloballythroughoutthedocument.

Third,theTGsareunprecedentedinthedegreetowhichtheyareimbuedwith

politicallegitimacy.Theseguidelines,incontrasttootherinstrumentscurrentlyinuse,aretheofficialproductofalengthyandinclusiveintergovernmentalnegotiationandagreement,whichuniquelyinvolvedthedirectparticipationinthedebates(butnotinthefinaldecision)ofcivilsocietyactors,specificallyNGOs,humanrightsorganisationsandsocialmovementrepresentatives,andwasbuiltuponarelativelyextensiveandintensiveandinclusiveformalconsultationprocess.

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Fourth,theTGshaveimmediatesocialrelevanceincomplexresourceconflict

settings:theirparticularcharacter(describedabove)meansnotonlythatstateshaveanobligationtoimplementtheseguidelines,butalsothatcivilsocietyorganisationsandgrassrootssocialactorsneednotwaitforthistohappenandcaninsteadimmediatelymakeuseoftheprinciplesandprovisionscontainedintheseguidelinesto(re)frametheiranalysesandactions,includingassessingtheirownsituations,monitoringandevaluatinggovernmentandcompanyinitiatives,anddevelopingawarenessraising,organisingandmobilisingstrategies.

Finally,asaresultoftheirparticularorientationandcharacter,theTGshaveawide-

rangingapplicabilitythatisintrinsictotheirpurpose.Ratherthanbeingbuilttobeusedinrelationtoaspecificprojectorinitiative,theycanbeusedformultipletypesofinterventionsandinitiativesthatcutacrosspolicyarenasandissueareas.TheTGs’built-in,wide-rangingapplicabilityisespeciallyrelevantforsituationssuchasthefocusofourpaper–whereclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingimpulsesoverlap,intersectandinteract.

Acknowledgements

Thispaperisinformedbyinsightsfromtheproject“MOSAICClimatechangemitigationpolicies,landgrabbingandconflictinfragilestates:understandingintersections,exploringtransformationsinMyanmarandCambodia”,2014-2018,fundedbyNWOandDFID.Forinformationvisittheprojectwebsiteathttps://www.iss.nl/research/research_programmes/political_economy_of_resources_environment_and_population_per/networks/mosaic/

NotesoncontributorsJenniferFrancoisaresearcheractivistwiththeTransnationalInstitute.After

receivingaPhDinpoliticsin1997intheUS,shebeganworkingwiththePhilippinesolidaritygroupintheNetherlands,andwithlocalpeasantorganizations,ruralcommunityorganizingandhumanrightsgroups.Since2012shehasbeenleadingresearchonruralpoliticsandlandgovernanceinMyanmar.JennyisalsoadjunctfacultywiththeCollegeofHumanitiesandDevelopment(COHD)attheChinaAgriculturalUniversityinBeijing.

ClaraMiYoungParkisaPhDcandidateattheInternationalInstituteofSocialStudies

inTheHague,Netherlands.Herresearchfocusesonthegenderedand‘generationed’politicaleconomyofclimatechangeandresourcegrabbinginMyanmar.ClaraisRegionalGenderRuralandSocialDevelopmentOfficerwiththeAsiaPacificRegionalOfficeoftheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsinBangkok.

RomanHerreholdsaM.A.ingeography(minoringinethnology)fromWestfälische

Wilhelms-UniversitätMünster.Heisseniorpolicyadviserlandandagriculture2007-presentwiththehumanrightsorganizationFIANGermany.Hismainactivitiesincludecaseworkonselectedcasesoflandconflicts,humanrightsexpertiseonlandissuesandpolicydevelopment.Heisalsopartofnationaland

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internationalnetworking,researchinrurallandrelatedconflicts,consultationofgovernmentsandNGOs,educationalwork,lectures.

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i Here, we refer to international regulatory instruments, processes and monitoring

mechanisms, tools and entities collectively as international regulatory instruments.

However, these instruments vary considerably in terms of legitimacy, ownership,

accountability and enforceability. For instance, “corporate-led” instruments are developed

by private sector actors, sometimes together with civil society actors, as self-regulatory

tools and can be sector-wide or company-specific. ii Margulis, McKeon, and Borras (2013, 5) highlight “the rapid elevation of land grabbing

onto the global governance agenda and a flurry of global rule-making projects at various

scales involving a multiplicity of actors to regulate land-grabbing.”

iii See TNI 2016. “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Policymaking n

Myanmar: A response to the draft National Land Use Policy”. 13 (Accessed 5 April 2016).

https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_challenge_of_democratic_and_inclusive_land_poli

cymaking_in_myanmar.pdf.

iv See http://iphrdefenders.net/cambodia-prey-lang-community-network-plcn-press-release-

attempted-murdered-plcn-activist/

v Springate-Baginski, Oliver 2013.

vi Scheidel and Work 2015.

vii Bourdieu (1987) differentiates between diverse fields of social regulation to illuminate

different individual actors and groups of actors embedded in field-specific institutions and

forms of stratification. Their unique combination of bases of power, institutions and forms

of stratification give fields a particular logic and coherence of their own, and therefore, a

degree of autonomy from each other. viii Such practices are a basic feature of many societies, whether they originate in pre-

colonial cultures, or with European Christian missionaries seeking to spread a “harmony

legal model” (Nader 1990; 2001, 21). As von Benda-Beckmann (2001, 52) argues, “Even

if one’s main orientation is to accept the inevitable primacy of the state and state law as the

means for change, one nevertheless has to take into account the overall constellation of

normative and institutional orders in which the state apparatus, its institutions and

regulations, are only one part.” In recognition of customary law, many official legal and

judicial reform initiatives include “non-state justice” components as a way to expand

access to justice without further burdening regular courts. ix Harris 2007, 1. x Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 156. xi Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 157.

xii FPIC refers to the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social,

and cultural development. It is clearly articulated in the United Nations Declaration on the

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Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from

their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed

consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair

compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.” (Article 10)

xiii FPIC is appearing in initiatives “…ranging from the safeguard policies of the

multilateral financial institutions; practices of extractive industries; water and energy

development; natural resources management; access to genetic resources and associated

traditional knowledge and benefit sharing arrangements; scientific and medical research;

and indigenous cultural heritage” (as noted by Antoanella-Julia Motoc and the Tebtebba

Foundation in a legal commentary submitted to the Commission on Human Rights Sub-

Commission on the Promotion and Prosecution of Human Rights, Working Group on

Indigenous Populations, at the twenty third Session, 18–22 July 2005). xiv While it is safe to assume that most international regulatory instruments will address

gender, it is important to remember that gender equality is a contested notion, including in

Asia (Roces 2010), which can lead to different constructions of meanings and politics. The

evidence indicates that overall, women are disproportionately affected vis-a-vis men by

land dispossession (Doss, Summerfield and Tsikata 2014, 3) due to existing hierarchical

structures and patriarchal norms. Conflicts, shocks and competition over scarce resources

can exacerbate existing gender and social disparities and further marginalise those who are

most vulnerable.

xv There are ten core international human rights instruments. For each there is a committee

of experts to monitor implementation of the treaty provisions by its states parties. xvi The term “demonstration” is used here conceptually, as in Herman and Brodhead

(1984). xvii On the “framing” function of social movements, see McAdam, McArthy, and Zald

(1996).

Elfu

turodelaalim

entació

nylaAgricu

lturaenelSigloXXI.

21

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InternationalColloquiumTHEFUTUREOFFOODANDCHALLENGESFORAGRICULTUREINTHE21stCENTURY:

Debatesaboutwho,howandwithwhatsocial,economicandecologicalimplicationswewillfeedtheworld.

April24th-26th.EuropaCongressPalace.VitoriaGasteiz.Álava.BasqueCountry/Europe

ColoquioInternacionalELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:

Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicasalimentaráelmundo.

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LAGUNTZAEKONOMIKOA/APOYAN/WITHSUPPORTFROM

2017koapirilaren24/26.EuropaBiltzarJauregia.Vitoria-Gasteiz.Araba.EuskalHerria.Europa.