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8/12/2019 Elder&Jaszczolt.geneva2013
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Conditional utterances and
conditional thoughts: Aradical contextualist account
Chi-Hé Elder & Kasia JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge
ICL19, Geneva
26 July 2013
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Conditional utterances in English
Conditional expressions are not theonly way to express conditionalthoughts
(1) Take one more step and I’
ll kill you(2) Your money or your life
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Conditional utterances in English
Conditional expressions can be usedfor other purposes other thanexpressing conditional thoughts
(3) If you wouldn’
t mind, could you closethe door?
(4) If that’
s a real diamond, I’
ll eat my hat!
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A cross-linguistic perspective
Guugu Yimithirr (Australian, QNL):no overt conditionals
(5) The dog might bark. The postman mightrun away.
(Evans & Levinson 2009: 443, after Haviland 1979)
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Outline
Classifying conditionalsConditionals and speakers
’
intentions
Recovering intended effects throughlinguistic cuesRadical contextualism
Representing conditional meaning inInteractive Semantics
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Theoretical assumption: Want a semanticsthat captures intuitive meanings
The diversity of ways of expressingconditional meaning, as well as thediversity of uses to which conditional if canbe put, are not a problem for a radicalcontextualist theory.
Radical contextualism . Logical form may be enriched or evenoverridden to give speaker
’
s intended meaning (Jaszczolt 2010,Default Semantics)
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Classifying conditionalsNo bi-unique correlation betweenconditional constructions and conditionalmeanings
Does not make sense to talk of a categoryof conditionals in terms of constructions
“
The history of the conditional is the storyof a syntactic mistake
”
(Kratzer 2012:106)
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Devising criteria for classification
Want to allow that conditionalmeaning may or may not bespeaker
’
s primary intended meaning
No conditional LFPrimary meaning is conditional
Conditional LFPrimary meaning is conditionalPrimary meaning is not conditional
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Criteria for classification
2 roles of the antecedent p :
indicates remoteness from the actualworldspeaker is not committed to its truth
is a suppositionrestricts situations in which main clauseholds
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Pilot study (ICE-GB, Elder 2012)
46% of conditional utterances use if
Narrowing scope to conditionalconstructionsWant to look at relation between formand content
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Conditionals and speech acts
(6) If you rang her now she’
d say yes(advice)
(7) If you hit me with it once more I’
llkill you (threat)
(8) Be great if you would do that(request)
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Experimental studies in‘
pragmaticconditionals
’
Interlocutors infer pragmatic effectsfrom particular aspects of the contentof conditional clauses (Bonnefon & Politzer2010)
What linguistic clues generate these
inferences?
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Speech acts: A disclaimerSpeech are not easily classifiable bygrammatical cues (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1975;Searle & Vanderveken 1985)
It’
s not a threat it’
s a promise. If you comenear my family once more I ’ ll kill you.
Speakers may not be aware of the speechact they are performing (cf. Sperber & Wilson1995)
Illocutionary forces may be derivedpragmaticallyLabels used are for exemplification only
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Example(9) If you drop the vase it will break
>> Don’
t drop the vase
Conditional warningMain message: Don
’
t do p
p qhearer
’
s action negative consequence
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Indicators of speech acts
Does p or q express volition? If so, ofwhom?
Does the outcome described in q have a positive/negative effect onsomeone? If so, on whom?
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Threat(10) If you do that one more time I
’
ll kill you
Main message: Don’
t do p
p q
hearer’
s action speaker’
s action
negative consequenceto hearer
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Conditional offer(11) If you
’
re hungry there are biscuits on thesideboard
>> If you’
re hungry there are biscuits whichyou may have on the sideboard
>> If you’
re hungry please help yourself tobiscuits on the sideboard
Issuing authority is speakerMain message: You may do q
p qhearer
’
s actionpositive consequence
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Discussion
Utterance may have conditional LFwith non-conditional primary meaning
LF may be overridden to give primarymeaningConstituent parts of conditionalconstruction may beenriched/overridden giving input tonon-conditional implicature
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No consequent?(12) Now if you
’
d like to put on your helmet…that
’
d be great?…you
’
ll be safe?
…the police won’
t catch you?>> put on your helmet
There need not be one single intendedconsequent recoverable from the contextAt the level of thoughts, there may notbe an intention of a consequent
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Now if you’
d like to put on yourhelmet…
p q (inferred)
hearer’
s action positive consequence
Conventionalised use of if
Main message: Do p
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Intermediary conclusionsSpeaker
’
s primary intended meaning mayarise at any level of pragmatic processThere are different degrees of intentionsassociated with conditional meaning
Why would we want to capture this varietyof meaning in semantics?How is it possible to capture this variety ofmeaning of conditionals in semantics?
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Conditionals in radicalcontextualism“
…while perhaps none of the logicalconnectives are universally lexicallyexpressed, there is no evidence thatlanguages differ in whether or notlogical connectives are present intheir logical forms .
”
(von Fintel & Matthewson 2008:170)
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Suppositions as primary orsecondary meanings
(12) Now if you’
d like to put on yourhelmet
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Conditionals in Default SemanticsK. M. Jaszczolt, 2005. DefaultSemantics: Foundations of aCompositional Theory of Acts ofCommunication . Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press
K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010.‘
DefaultSemantics
’
. In: B. Heine and H.Narrog (eds). The OxfordHandbook of Linguistic Analysis .Oxford: Oxford University Press,215-246.
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world knowledge (WK)
word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
situation of discourse (SD)
stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS)about society and culture (SC)
Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ
merger representation Σ
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Primary meaning:
combination of word meaningand sentence structure (WS)
conscious pragmatic inference pm (from situation of discourse, social and
social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and worldworld-knowledge defaults pm (SCWD pm) knowledge) (CPI pm)
Secondary meanings: Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults sm (SCWD sm) conscious pragmatic inference sm (CPI sm)
Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revisedversion of Default Semantics
merger representation Σ
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sources of information types of processes
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Mapping between sources andprocesses
WK SCWD or CPISC SCWD or CPIWS WS (logical form)
SD CPIIS CD
DS/IS makes use of the processing modeland it indexes the components of ∑ with asubscript standing for the type ofprocessing
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Representing conditional thought (twodimensions)1. p ? ∑,PM
‘
If you leave your tea on a wobbly table…’
2. p ? ∑, SM‘
If you’
d like to put your helmet on’
PM: Put your helmet on
3. p q WS, PM‘
If it rains we’
ll stay at home’
4. p q WS, SM‘
If you’
re hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard’
PM: Helpyourself to biscuits
5. ? p q ∑, PM ‘
Touch his iPad and he’
ll scream’
PM: If you touch his iPad he’
llscream
’
6. ? ? p q ∑, SM ‘
Please put your helmet on’
SM: If you put your helmet on,you ’ ll be safer ’
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Fig 3: ∑ for 2. p ? ∑, SM‘
If you’
d like to put your helmet on’
∑
x y e 1 e2
the addressee (x)helmet (y)
e1: [the speaker requests e 2]CD, CPIpm
e2: [x put on y] WS
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Fig 4: ∑ for 5. p q ∑, PM‘
Touch his iPad and he’
ll scream’
∑
x y z e 1 e2
the addressee (x)ipad (y)contextually salient male (z)
[e 1 → e 2]CD, CPIpm
[ACC tf e1] CD, CPIpm
[ACC rf e2]WS
e1: [x touch z’s y ]WS, CD, CPIpm e2: [z scream] WS
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ConclusionsConditional thought may constitute primary or secondarymeaning and may be expressed by a conditional or othersentence form ;
When conditional thought is adopted as the object ofstudy, the category of conditionals cannot be restrictedto specific constructions;
The diversity of (i) uses to which conditional if can beput and (ii) ways of expressing conditional meaning canbe represented in a radical contextualist account
(DS/IS);
DS/IS allows us to represent (i) the intended use ofconditional sentences, as well as (ii) conditionalmeaning expressed in a non-conditional form.
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ReferencesAustin, J. L. 1962. How To Do Things With Words . eds. J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisa.
Harvard University Press.Bonnefon, J.-F. & G. Politzer. 2010.
‘
Pragmatic conditional, conditional
pragmatics, and the pragmatic component of conditional reasoning’
. InCognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking , eds. M.Oaksford & N. Chater. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Elder, C-H. 2012.‘
The underlying conditionality of conditionals which do not useif
’
eds. J. Naruadol Chancharu, X. F. Hu & M. Mitrovic. CambridgeOccasional Papers in Linguistics 6.
Evans, N. & S. C. Levinson. 2009.‘
The myth of language universals: Languagediversity and its importance for cognitive science
’
. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 32 (05), 429 – 448.von Fintel, K. & L. Matthewson. 2008.‘
Universals in semantics’
. Linguisticreview 25 (1/2), 139.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theoryof Acts of Communication . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010.‘
Default Semantics’
. In The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis , eds. B. Heine & H. Narrog. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.193 – 221.
Jaszczolt, K. M. forthcoming. Interactive Semantics . Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.Kratzer, A. 1991.
‘
Conditionals’
. Reprinted in 2012, Modals and Conditionals .Oxford University Press, pp. 86-108.
Searle, J. R. 1975.‘
Indirect Speech Acts’
. Syntax and Semantics 3, 59 – 82.Searle, J. R. & D. Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of illocutionary logic .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition .
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing