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Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class andPolitical PreferencesAuthor(s): Richard J. WalterSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 595-624Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2513342Accessed: 11-06-2015 19:37 UTC
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8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…
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Hispanic American Historical Review
58(4), 1978, 595-624
Copyright
( 1978
by Duke University Press
Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during
the
First
Yrigoyen Administration: Social
Class
and Political Preferences
RICHARD
J.
WALTER
IN
recent
years
a
growing number
of scholars
have sought
to
analyze Argentine elections to determine the socio-
economic
bases
of
political party support
in
that
country. Many
have focused on the post-World War
II
period, espe-
cially the dramatic
presidential victory of Juan Peron in 1946.1 Others
have studied the early part of the twentieth century and a few the late
nineteenth century.2
An important contribution to these efforts was the the publication
in 1968 of Darfo
Canton's
two-volume compilation of national presi-
dential and congressional election results.3 Using Canton's data, social
scientists have
correlated election returns with a variety of information
drawn from
municipal, provincial, and national censuses. Although
these
censuses contain a wealth of information, they also pose several
major problems.
They appear irregularly, making
the
development
of
socioeconomic
indicators over an
extended
period difficult.
The cate-
gories employed
and the
completeness
of
coverage vary greatly
from
one
census to another.
Moreover,
most census material
describes
general
characteristics
of
voting districts, but
not
necessarily
of
the
voters themselves.
*
The
author is Chairman of the Department of History at
Washington
Uni-
versity. He wislhes o
acknowledge
the
invaluable assistance
of
Mr.
Michael Wolfe
in
preparationof the article.
1.
The best known
of
these
is
Peter H. Smith,
"The
Social Base of Peronism,"
HAHR, 52
(Feb. 1972), 55-73. See also Gino Germani'scritique of
Smith's
work
and
his own
analysis
in "El
surgimiento
del
peronismo:
El rol
de los
obreros
y
de
los migrantes internos," Desarrollo
Economico, 3 (Oct.-Dec. 1973), 435-488.
2. For
example, Dario Canton,
Elecciones y partidospoliticos en la Argentina:
Historia,
interpretaciony balance, 1910-1966
(Buenos Aires,
1973);
Oscar Corn-
blit, "La opcion conservadoraen la politica argentina,' DesarrolloEcono6mico, 4
(Jan.-Mar.
1975), 599-640; and, Ezequiel Gallo and Silvia
Sigal, "La formacion
de los partidos
politicos contempor'aneos:
La
U.C.R.,
1890-1916,"
in
Torcuato
S.
Di Tella
et al., Argentina,
sociedladlle masas
(Buenos Aires,
1966).
3. Darlo
Canton,
Materiales
para
el estudio
de
la
sociologia politica
en
la
Argentina,
2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1968).
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596 HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD J.
WALTER
In
1955, sociologist Gino Germani called attention to these de-
ficiencies in his own study of elections in the 1940s.4 He suggested that
more meaningful analyses could be derived from data taken directly
from voter registries. Several scholars have begun to use these registries
for
the city of Buenos Aires. Their work to date is suggestive but frag-
mentary, based primarily on sample precincts rather than the city as a
whole.5
With
these
considerations
in
mind,
this
study proposes to examine
congressional and municipal elections in the city of Buenos Aires during
the
first
administration
of Radical President
Hip6lito
Yrigoyen (1916-
1922).
The results of these
elections, by party and by
circurnscripcion
(ward), compiled from Canton, newspapers, and reports of the national
ministry of the interior, will be correlated with occupational data taken
directly
from
the
actual
list of
registered voters for the entire city
of
Buenos Aires for the year 1918. These correlations will provide a statisti-
cal indication of the class bases of support for the main parties in these
contests, the Union Civica Radical (UCR), or Radical party, the
Partido Socialista (PS), or Socialist party, and the Partido Dem6crata
Progresista (PDP) or Democratic Progressive party. In addition, using
the
same
data,
each
election
will
be examined
and
described
in
detail to
determine the particular issues, personalities, and conditions of the
moment
which might
have
affected party performance.
Aside
from
the
availability
of
data,
a concentration
on
the
years
1916
to 1922
can be
justified
in
other
ways.
For one
thing,
it
was
a
period
in which
a
new
political party,
the
Radical,
controlled the
national executive
for
the first time in
the twentieth
century.
It was
also
an important
and
formative
period
for
Argentina's "experiment
with
democracy,"
an
experiment
which
eventually
would
end
in failure.
As will be noted below, under Yrigoyen, and unlike the case with most
previous administrations,
elections
in
the
capital were
honest and
valid
reflections
of
popular
sentiment.
Also, during
these
years
the
electorate
expanded significantly.
With
this
expansion,
new social
groups, par-
ticularly
the
urban
working
and middle
classes, markedly
increased
their weight and value within
the
electorate. Yrigoyen's Radicals, and
their
competitors, sought
to
represent
the
interests of these
new
groups
and
aimed
their
appeals
to attract their
support. Basically,
the
Radicals
4. Gino Germani, Estructura social de la Argentiina: Analisis estadistico
(Buenos Aires, 1955), p.
251.
5. Peter G. Snow, "The Class Basis
of
Argentine Political Parties," American
Political Science Review, 63 (Mar. 1969), 163-167 and Walter Little, "Electoral
Aspects of Peronism, 1946-1954," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World
Affairs, 15 (Aug. 1973), 267-284.
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ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
597
claimed to champion
the
middle classes,
the
Socialists
the working
classes. However, as will be seen, in these years political
parties at-
tempted to move beyond single class support and develop a multiclass
constituency, establishing
a tradition which would persist
throughout
the twentieth century. One
of the main objectives of this study, there-
fore,
will
be
not
only
to determine the basic class backing of the major
parties, but also to gauge their successes and failures
in trying to de-
velop a broader base
of
support.
Using the federal capital of Buenos Aires as a
focus provides ad-
vantages and disadvantages.
A major advantage is
that in contrast
with many
elections
held
outside
the
capital during this
period,
those
in
Buenos Aires were generally regular and free from fraud and violence.6
However, the capital was a very special case, and voting
patterns there
should be used with
care when generalizing
for
the
entire republic.
First,
Buenos Aires was exceptional
in
that
it
was
home for both the
elite of the country and Argentina's greatest concentrations
of middle
class, urban working class,
and immigrant groups.7 Also, as a group,
the
electorate
of
Buenos
Aires
was probably the most
politically aware
and politically active
of
any
in
the
republic.
Most
major
parties located
their national headquarters and published their principal
propaganda
organs in the capital city. In addition, the
portefio,
living in Latin
America's major publishing center, enjoyed easy
access to a wide
range of general newspapers, periodicals, and books,
which covered
many political subjects,
both domestic and foreign. Moreover,
the
voters
of the
capital
were
by
far
the
most
literate
in
the
republic,
the
third national census
gauging
the
literacy
rate of registered voters
in
the
capital
at
just over
ninety-six percent, well above the
national
average
of
about fifty percent.8
Finally, capital
turnout
in
congres-
sional and presidential elections was consistently fifteen to twenty
percent higher
than
the
average for
the
republic as a whole.9
Another notable characteristic was the rapid growth
of the
city
and
the related
growth
of the electorate.
Between 1895 and
1914, the popu-
lation of
the capital
more than
doubled,
from
663,854 persons
to
6. For a catalog of congressional debates
on
fraudulent elections, see
Canton,
Materiales,I, 3-29.
7. By 1914, the capital had the highest number and percentage of foreign-born
persons
of
any city
in
the
republic. Although few foreigners became Argentine
citizens and hence eligible to vote in these years, it should be noted that more
than half
of
those
naturalized
by
1914
(18,450
of
33,219) lived
in
tlle
city of
Buenos Aires. Repu'blica Argentina,
Tercer
cen.so naciontal, 1914 (Buenos Aires,
1916), II, 403-417.
8. Ibid., IV, 480-494.
9.
Canton,
Materiales,I, 83-91.
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598
HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD
J. WALTER
1,576,597,10
and by
1936,
it had reached
2,415,142.1" Between
1914
and
1922, the number
of registered
capital
voters,
representing
about
twenty
percent
of
the national
total, grew
from 147,689
to 246,567,
the
number of
actual
voters from 109,461
to
174,940 (see
Table I).
These
increases
were attributable
not
only to general
population
growth but
also
to the effects
of the
Saenz
Pefia electoral
reform
of 1912,
which
made voting
in national
elections
secret
and obligatory
for all
Argentine
males
over
the age of eighteen.
It should be noted,
however,
that even
with
these
increases
the number of
registered
voters
in
these
years
represented
only a
little more than
ten
percent of the
total population.
This relatively small
electorate can be explained
by the fact that
women
and foreigners were not allowed to vote in national elections. Foreign
males
were permitted
to vote in municipal
elections,
but only
under
very
limited conditions.
These factors,
then, describe
a well-informed,
active,
and
growing
electorate
in
Buenos
Aires. Moreover,
these voters
were
probably
less
influenced
or intimidated
by political
bosses than
their country
cousins.
Also, they
were free
from the consequences
of federal
intervention,
an
instrument
by which
the national
executive
often controlled
politics
and
government
outside of the capital.
Although additional
compari-
sons must await further investigation of politics in the provinces, it
can be
assumed
that party
leaders were
cognizant
of
the
special
nature
of the
capital
voter and
devised strategies
and articulated
programs
which
would
appeal
directly
to these qualities.
Undoubtedly, they
also
were aware
of the
significance
of the
capital
vote,
both
in
terms
of actual
numbers
and
the
psychological
impact
of
victories
or
defeats
in
this
prestigious
arena.
Although,
as Table I indicates,
many
parties participated
in
national
and municipal elections in Buenos Aires,
the
two main competitors
for
the
votes
of this
sophisticated
and growing
electorate were
the Radical
and
Socialist
parties.12
These
two
parties
will be
the
center
of
attention
for this
study. However,
the
position
and
performance
of
the
Demo-
cratic Progressive
party,
generally
a
less
frequent
and less
successful
competitor,
also will be considered
when relevant.
The differences
between
the Socialists and
Radicals
were
numerous.
10. Tercer censo
nacional,
II, 115.
11. Repu6blica rgentina,Municipalidadde la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Cuarto
censo general,
1936
(Buenos Aires,
1939), II,
12.
12. The
following analyses
of tlhe
Radicaland Socialist
parties come essentially
from David
Rock,
Politics in Argentina,
1890-1930:
The
Rise and Fall
of Radi-
calism (Cambridge,
1975) and
Richard J.
Walter, The
Socialist Party
of
Argentina,
1890-1930
(Austin,
1977).
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ELECTIONS DURING
TMIE
FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
599
The
Socialist party, organized in the 1890s, was patterned on European
models, professed an internationalist view and connections, presented
a
detailed program for social and economic change, and preferred
evolution, gradualism, and reform to violent revolution. The party
participated
in
every capital
election from
1896 and saw its membership
in the city grow from about 100 in the 1890s to almost 3,000 in 1918.
Nevertheless, the membership figure represented only a small fraction
of the
total votes which the party received in capital elections, indicat-
ing its appeal to many independent voters.
In contrast with the Socialists,
the Radicals, also formed in the
1890s, professed to be a purely Argentine, criollo party. Unlike the
Socialists, the Radicals presented little in the way of a program beyond
support for free suffrage, efficient and honest public administration,
and
respect
for
provincial autonomy. During the 1896 to 1912 period,
the Radicals refused to participate in the electoral process until reforms
were made
to
assure
honest
voting.
Although agreeing
with
some as-
pects of
the
Socialist program, the Radicals rejected the Socialists'
analysis
of
Argentine development along
the
lines of class conflict and
instead argued that they represented a broad, national consensus of
various
groups
which
sought
to harmonize social
differences.
The
Radicals particularly stressed their nationalism in contrast to socialism's
internationalism and defended creole values
of
idealism, Catholicism,
and
federalism against
what
they perceived to be
the
materialism,
anticlericalism,
and
centralism
of
the
Socialists.
Finally,
the
number
of
persons
who
belonged actively
to the
UCR,
at least
in the
capital,
far
outstripped
the number
of
Socialists.
According
to David
Rock,
in
Yrigoyen's
first term the number of
Radicals participating
in
internal
party
affairs
in
the
city grew
from
20,000
to
30,000.13
Although extensive data on the class composition of the two parties
are
not readily available,
the extant information does
indicate
certain
contrasts.
The
Socialist
leadership
came
predominantly
from
urban,
professional,
middle-class
backgrounds. However, party
directors
and
congressmen
also
included
some
working-class representatives.
The
rank and
file
of
the
party generally approximated
the
composition
of
the
capital electorate overall, mostly
skilled
working
class and white-
collar middle class.14 Radical
committee
members and
congressional
candidates also
came from middle-class
backgrounds but,
in
some
instances, from what Peter Smith has called the upper-class "aristo-
13. David Rock,
"Machine Politics
in
Buenos Aires and the
Argentine
Radical
Party,"Journalof LatinAmerican Studies,
4 (Nov. 1972), 251.
14. Walter,
The Socialist
Party, pp.
174-176.
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I
NOVEMBER
I
IRICHAR
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ELECTIONS
DURING
TH
FIRST
YRIGOYEN
ADMINIfSTRATION
601
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602
HAHI
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD J. WALTER
cratic" sector.15
In
1916,
for
example, of
the UCR's seven candidates
for
congress
from the
capital,
three
belonged
to the Sociedad Rural Argen-
tina,
the
nation's
leading defender of the interests of wealthy landown-
ing groups."6
Few, if any, from the working class served as Radical
deputies
or held
important party positions.
General impressions of
rank-and-file Radicals
also indicate little active working-class
repre-
sentation. Most
Radical party members
in the capital probably were
public employees, directly dependent for
their livelihood upon
Radical
control of the national
government.17
The
basic organization
of both parties in the capital exhibited
cer-
tain similarities.
Both established committees in each of
the city's
twenty circunscripciones and most of its circuitos (precincts). A cen-
tral committee oversaw and coordinated
the activities of these
smaller
groups which distributed
propaganda,
provided information on elec-
toral procedures,
organized rallies, and got voters to the polls.
In terms
of
function, the Radical organization
depended to a much greater
extent on the dispensation
of material
rewards to its actual and po-
tential adherents than
did the Socialists. These rewards included
gifts
of
food, clothing,
sometimes money,
and, most importantly, employ-
ment, either within
the party structure or more commonly in
the Radi-
cal-controlled municipal or national government.
The
general pattern
of campaigning for both parties was
essentially
the
same. Active
electioneering began
one
to two
months
before
the
actual
balloting.
Party
leaders
and
candidates gave frequent speeches
(conferencias) throughout
the
city,
sometimes
in
open squares,
some-
times
in
meeting
halls
or
theaters. Party
newspapers,
La
Vanguardia
for the Socialists and
La
Epoca
for the
Radicals,
were
important
propa-
ganda
instruments. All
parties plastered posters
on the
city's
walls and
distributed thousands of printed leaflets. Several days before the elec-
tion
the
parties
organized
massive
rallies
for
the final
presentation
of
candidates.
These
rallies, attracting
tens
of
thousands
of
people, usually
began
at
night
in
one
of the
city's
main
plazas. There,
the
assembly
heard fiery speeches extolling
the virtues of the
party holding
the
meeting and condemning
the
vices
of
the
opposition.
Following
these
speeches, partisans
marched
down one
of
the central
avenues,
accom-
panied by
banners, torches, appropriate
music,
and
displaying
certain
15.
Peter H. Smith,Argentina
and the
Failure of
Democracy:
Conflict Among
Political Elites,
1904-1955
(Madison, 1974), pp. 23-40.
16. Walter,
The Socialist Party, pp.
136-137.
17. Rock, "Machine
Politics,"passim.
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ELECTIONS DURING THE
FIRST
YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
603
symbols; for the Radicals, the white beret; for the Socialists, the red
flag or armband.18
Party unity was an important factor in determining campaign
effectiveness. During this period both the Socialists and the Radicals
were
subject to violent internal disagreement and resultant fragmenta-
tion which weakened campaign efforts. The Socialists suffered three
major schisms, in
1915,
1918, and 1921, producing three new parties
led
by
former
Socialists and competing for Socialist votes. During the
same period, the Radicals, while not experiencing formal
schisms,
were
wracked by internal dissension which severely affected their per-
formance at the polls.
Although party leaders in their campaigning probably did not have
as
precise an idea of the occupational profile of the
city's
voters
as
provided
in
this article, the results of the third national
census
did tell
them something about the composition of the electorate
overall. From
this data, it could be determined that eligible voters were
rather evenly
distributed between working class and middle class. Significant groups
earmarked in the census were 55,169 Argentine males
over fourteen
years of age in industries and manual arts (of 197,990
total), 36,551
in
public administration, 26,181 in commerce, 14,229 in
education (includ-
ing students), and 13,135 in transportation.19
The census data did not provide occupational breakdowns by
circunscripcion, but
by 1916, party leaders had gained
a
reasonably
sophisticated understanding
of the
socioeconomic distribution
of
the
electorate throughout
the
capital. Reviews of campaign
literature
indicate that parties tailored their speakers and their
appeals to the
particular composition
of
individual districts.
Moreover, politicians
were
keenly
aware
of
the
relationship
between
public
policies,
the
concentration of certain kinds of voters in certain
districts,
and
party
performance.
For
example, during a September 12,
1919
congressional
debate
on
budget allocations
for
postal employees
in
the
capital,
con-
servative
critics observed
that
the
passage
of increased
sums
would
benefit
directly
the Radical
party
in
circunscripciones
12 and
13,
both
with
large concentrations
of
public employees.20
Before
turning
to the elections
themselves,
some
further
introduc-
18.
A
useful description of
campaigning during this period
is
Donato Chaque-
sien,
Los
partidosporteiios en
la
vta pu'blica(Buenos Aires, 1919).
19. Tercer censo nacional, IV, 201-212.
20.
Repu'blicaArgentina,
Diario de
sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, aiio
1919 (Buenos Aires, 1920), IV,
601-622.
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604 HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
IRICHARD
J.
WALTER
tory comments are in order. First, the occupations
listed in the voter
registry for 1918 have been grouped according to the
classification sug-
gested by Mark D.
Szuchman
and Eugene F.
Sofer and ranked
in
absolute and percentage terms for each of the city's
wards (see Table
II).21
The eight principal subgroups were also
aggregated for totals of
blue collars
(working class), nonmanuals (middle
class), and profes-
sionals (upper class
).22
The two largest subgroups, skilled
workers
(with blacksmiths, bricklayers, carpenters,
conductors, electricians, me-
chanics,
and
painters the largest groups represented) and low non-
manuals
composed 63.2 percent of all voters. Of
the 50,673 low
non-
manuals, 42,754 were white-collar employees,
two-thirds of whom
were
probably government employees.23 Of the 17,028 in the middle non-
manual category, 16,704 were
comerciantes,
or mostly small business-
men. Except for students, the remaining subgroups
were more diversi-
fied, without heavy concentrations of any single occupation.
The distribution of voters by occupational groups, as described
in
Table II, corresponds roughly to what one would
expect from general
descriptions of
the city.24
Blue-collar voters were concentrated pri-
marily
in
the southern districts (1-4, 6-8) and the large outlying
cir-
cuiscripciones
(15-18). Nonmanual voters were found in largest pro-
portion
in
central districts (8-14, 3,
5
and 20).
Professionals
clustered
in central and near northern wards (10, 11, 13, 14,
19 and 20), areas
including and immediately surrounding the city's
main governmental
and
commercial
heart.
Students
also could be
found
in greatest pro-
portion
in
roughly
these same
districts.
21.
Mark
D.
Szuchman and Eugene
F.
Sofer, "The State
of
Occupational
Stratification Studies in Argentina," Latin American Research Review, 11:1
(
1976),
159-172. I would like to thank these authors for kindly providing me with their
complete occupational dictionary.
22. Students, who because
of
their importance and size within the capital
electorate were placed
in
a separate category, were not included
in
these totals.
Moreover, several of the Szuchman-Sofer categories-rural occupations, unskilled
and menial,
miscellaneous and unknown-were
not
used
because their numbers
for
the
city
were
negligible. It
should also be noted that the total
number of
voters in Table
II
(154,325) differs considerably from the total registered
(196,385) in Table
I. This
difference can be explained
in
part by difficulties
in
transcription
from tlhe
registries wherein
it
was often impossible to determine who
remained and who had been eliminated from the rolls. Moreover, with literally
hundreds of occupations listed, it was necessary to include only those with signifi-
cant
numbers in
the final tallies.
23. Walter, The Socialist Party, p. 240.
24. CharlesS.
Sargent,
The
Spatial Evolutiotnof Greater Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina,
1870-1930
(Tempe, Arizona, 1974), pp. 59-66 and James R. Scobie, Buenos
Aires: Plaza to
Subturb,
1870-1910 (New York, 1974), pp. 13-36.
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ELECTIONS DURING
THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION 605
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I
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ELECTIONS DURING
THE
FIRST YRIGOYEN
ADMINISTRATION
607
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608
HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD
J.
WALTER
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ELECTIONS
DIJRING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
609
No circunscripciones
were
pure
in terms of class composition. Even
aristocratic 19
and
20, where James
Scobie has noted "the
striking
con-
trasts of slums and
mansions," had significant percentages of
working-
class
voters.25
Many districts (3, 6-8,
17-18) were almost
evenly
bal-
anced between blue-collar and
nonmanual. Certain wards,
however,
did exhibit striking class concentrations.
District 4,
for
example,
had
the highest percentage of blue-collar workers
in the city. This
district
was a stronghold
of the Socialist party
until 1946. On the other hand,
sections
5
and 12 through
14 had the highest percentages of
nonmanuals
in
the capital and
ranked at the bottom in terms of blue-collar
voters.
During the period under consideration,
these districts regularly
turned
in large margins for the UCR over the Socialists, although on occasion
conservative parties captured 14, the district
with
the
second
highest
percentage and number of professionals
in Buenos
Aires. Circunscrip-
cion
5, in particular, was considered the
strongest Radical
district
in
the city. It should be noted that 5, along
with 12 through 14,
contained
the
highest percentage
of low nonmanuals, presumably representing
mostly governmental
employees (see Table
II).
The
relationship between social class
and party performances,
as
described
in
Tables III-V,
was determined
by correlating percentages
of each occupational group with the percentage of the total of regis-
tered
voters gained by the principal competing
parties in each
circun-
scripcicin.26
The formula used was Pearson's
r, with a .05 significance
level
=
+,
-.45. Although other methods
might have been
employed,
Pearson's r was considered
most appropriate for the data, which
provide
essentially only two
variables, class composition and voting percentages.
This method
gives
a
clear
and
straightforward
measure
of the
strength
or
weakness of the relationship between
these two variables.
It should
be
noted
that
although
the election data
used covers
an
eight-year span, the occupational data
is only for
the
year
1918.
Ideally, of course, we should have
an occupational profile
for each
election year, particularly
for outlying districts
such as
1,
15 and 16,
which
experienced
extremely rapid growth
at this time. However,
since this information is not presently
available, we must assume
that
25. Ibid., p. 32.
26.
The percent of total registered was employed since ticket-splitting in
national elections often produced a greater number of total votes than total voters.
It was felt that determining these percentages on the base of registered
voters
would provide a more accurate measure of the true level of support for
each party.
Due to space limitations, the party percentages for each district in each election
were
not
included
in
tlhis presentation. These and all other data used lhave
been
stored on computer tape and are available upon request.
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610
HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD
J.
WALTER
TABLEIII: Pearson's r
Coefficients for Occupational
Groups and
Radical Party Proportion
of Registered Voters.
Occupa-
tional Mar.
Apr. Mar. Oct. Mar. Mar. Nov. Apr.
Group
1914
1916
1918 1918
1919
1920
1920 1922
Semiskilled
-.42
-.73
-.45
-.07
-.34
-.22
-.11
.04
Skilled -.73 -.79 -.27
.08 -.38 -.13
-.06 .14
Low
Nonmanuals
.55
.48
.45 .50
.71
.61 .59 .47
Middle
Nonmanuals
.56 .64
.54
.03
.39 .27 .10
.13
High Nonmanuals
.41
.62
.01 -.34
.00 -.21
-.34
-.54
Low Professionals
.25
.53
.31 -.19
.13 .00
-.09
-.05
High Professionals .43
.59
-.05
-.37
-.03 .24
-.31
-.56
Students .58
.70
.09
-.19
.15
-.07
-.03
-.33
Total Blue Collar
-.72
-.85 -.35 .03
-.41 -.18
-.10
.13
Total Nonmanual .76
.81
.59 .26 .68 .50 .36
.24
Total Professional .44 .65
.04 -.37
.00
-.20
-.29
-.50
the basic social composition of each district remained
approximately
the
same.
Certain impressionistic observations suggest
that this was
the
case, but
the
need for more specific evidence remains.27
Finally,
the
discussion of the particular elections which
follows will
concentrate
primarily on major issues and trends. Each contest is
worthy of much greater
attention
and
undoubtedly occurred within
more
varied and complex
circumstances than can be
described
in a
few paragraphs. Practical
limitations dictate a summary
approach.
Also, it would be
burdensome to discuss all party
relationships with all
groups
in
all elections.
Instead, only those issues considered most im-
portant
will
be
noted.
The
tables, however, can be used by the reader
to
answer many overlooked
questions.
TheElections of April 2, 1916
The
1916
congressional elections
in
the
capital
occurred simulta-
lieously with the presidential contest and were
overshadowed by
the
national
competition
for
the
chief executive office.
Nevertheless,
Radicals and Socialists considered
the
Chamber of
Deputy positions
important and campaigned hard to win them.
The Socialists
chose
their
candidates
in
convention two
months
prior
to election
day
and
began
active
campaigning shortly
thereafter. The
Socialist program sought to reach both working-class and middle-class
voters. It
stressed
the
elimination
of
repressive legislation, general
political reforms, increased
state aid to
secular
education,
separation
of
27. See Scobie, Buenos Aires, p.
255.
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ELECTIONS DURING
THE FIRST YRIGOYEN
ADMINISTRATION
611
TABLE
IV: Pearson's r Coefficients
for Occupational
Groups and
Socialist Party Proportion
of Registered Voters.
Occupa-
tional
Mar.
Apr.
Mar. Oct. Mar. Mar.
Nov. Apr.
Group
1914 1916 1918 1918 1919 1920 1920
1922
Semiskilled
.66 .61
.48
.46 .52
.58
.62
.53
Skilled
.74 .63 .52 .73
.55 .87 .86
.65
Low
Nonmanuals
-.28
-.22
-.24
-.16
-.32
-.24
-.25
-.14
Middle Nonmanuals
-.50 -.59 -.48 -.50 -.53
-.56
-.54 -.32
High
Nonmanuals
-.71
-.55 -.45 -.72
-.44
-.82 -.83
-.81
Low Professionals
-.55
-.56
-.51 -.48 -.45 -.56
-.59
-.39
High
Professionals -.69
-.53 -.40 -.69 -.40 -.81 -.82
-.75
Students
-.70 -.56 -.40
-.61 -.41
-.79
-.80 -.62
TotalBlue Collar .78 .68 .55 .70 .59 .85 .86 .67
TI tal Nonmanual
-.62
-.60 -.52
-.55
-.60 -.66 -.66
-.46
Total Professional
-.74
-.61
-.48
-.73 -.47
-.85 -.86
-.75
church and
state,
tax
reform,
and social
legislation.28
But
specific
programmatic
issues remained less prominent than severe
partisan
criticism
of the
Radicals and their
leader
and presidential
candidate,
Hipolito Yrigoyen.
The
Socialists
took
particular aim at
the Radicals'
programmatic vagueness, the few differences they perceived between
Radicals and conservatives, and
what they considered
the excessive
personalism
of
Yrigoyen.29
The Radicals,
for their part, chose deputy candidates
in convention
about
one month prior
to the election. These
candidates
then appeared
daily
and
nightly throughout
the
city, relaying
the Radical message to
the voters. The
message was a diffuse one, basically a repetition
of the
main themes
of the
Radical
presidential
campaign.
Those themes had
been
decided
at the UCR
presidential
nominating
convention
on
March
22,
where a detailed and specific forty-point program had been
rejected
in
favor
of
a
general promise
to
adhere to
the
principles of
constitutional
government.
A
March 31
"manifesto
to
the
people" from
the
Radical National
Committee assured the
electorate
that a
UCR
administration
would
bring
the
country a "profound renovation of its
ethical
values"
and a "fundamental reconstitution of its
moral and
material
structure."30
Beyond this
fanciful
rhetoric, the Radicals made
their first
serious
bid
for the
working-class
vote
with generous dispen-
sations of material favors and sharp attacks on the Socialist opposition,
28. La Vanguardia,
Feb. 7, 1916, p. 1.
29. For example,
La Vanguardia,
Mar. 4, 1916, p. 1.
30. La Prentsa, Mar. 31, 1916, p. 11.
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612
HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD
J.
WALTER
TABLE
V: Pearson's r Coefficients for Occupational Groups and
Democratic Progressive Party Proportion of Registered Voters.
Occupational Apr. Mar. Mar. Nov. Apr.
Group 1916 1918 1920 1920 1922
Semiskilled -.61 -.71 -.67 -.60 -.41
Skilled
-.67
-.78 -.81 -.73 -.31
Low Nonmanuals -.10
.01
.05 -.11 -.32
Middle Nonmanuals .36 .49 .48 .49 .31
High Nonmanuals .86 .91 .93 .86 .41
Low
Professionals
.56 .61
.68 .65 .63
High Professionals .85 .91 .90 .84 .39
Students
.82 .91
.90 .85 .49
TotalBlueCollar -.71 -.84 -.85 -.76 -.35
Total Nonmanual .34
.49
.52 .40
.06
Total Professional
.88 .95
.96 .90 .50
which
up
to 1914 had
strong support
in
proletarian
districts.31 (See
the
results
for 1914 in
Table VI.)
Intense
maneuvering accompanied
the
presidential contest as con-
servative
forces
sought
to
deny Yrigoyen
the
victory.
In
the
capital,
the
Democratic
Progressive party,
at that time
a
conservative coalition,
urged its adherents to support the Socialist presidential ticket, osten-
sibly
because
the
Socialist
and
Democratic
program coincided
on
many points.32 This
last-minute
ploy did not work.
The
Radical slate
of
presidential
electors
comfortably
defeated the Socialist slate
by a
vote
of
61,550
to
52,898.
Nor
did
this
strategy
have much
influence on
the
congressional contest,
where
the Democrats
ran
their own slate.
The Socialist
deputy
candidates ran
about
10,000
votes behind
their
presidential ticket,
the Radicals
about 2,500 behind.33
The Radical
victory
in the
capital congressional
contest was
spec-
tacular and definitive. The leading UCR candidate bested the leading
Socialist by 17,310 votes,
a
dramatic reversal
from 1914
when
the
Socialists
had defeated
the
Radicals
by 5,750
tallies
(see
Table
I).
Moreover,
the
UCR
swept eighteen
of
the
capital's twenty voting
dis-
tricts.
The
Socialists,
who
fell
about
1,500
votes
and almost nine
per-
centage points
from their
previous effort, probably
were hurt
by
the
defection
in
1915 of
former
Socialist
congressman
Alfredo
L.
Palacios
and his
participation
at
the
head of
the
ticket
of the
recently
formed
31. Rock, Politics
in
Argentina,
pp. 121-122. The sharp Radical attacks
on
the Partido
Socialista can be found
throughout
the pages of La Epoca for the entire
month
of March.
32.
La
Prensa,
Mar. 30, 1916, p. 12.
33. La Prensa, Apr. 14, 1916, p. 11.
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ELECTIONS
DURING
THE
FIRST YRIGOYEN
ADMINISTRATION
613
TABLE VI: Elections
in the
City
of Buenos
Aires,
1914-1922:
Winning
Parties*
by Circunscripcion.
a
b c
d
e
f
g
h
Mar.
Apr. Mar.
Oct.
Mar.
Mar. Nov.
Apr.
22,
2,
3,
6,
23,
7,
21,
2,
1914
1916 1918
1918
1919 1920
1920
1922
1
S R
R R
R R
S
R
2
S
S
R S
S
S
S
S
3
S
R
R
S
S
S
S
S
4
5
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
5
R
R
R
R
R
R
R R
6
S R
R
S
S S
R
R
7
S
R
R S
S
S
S
S
8 S R R S S S S S
9
S
R
R
S
S
R R
S
10 S
R R
S
S R
R R
11
R
R R
S
S
PDP
R
R
12
R R
R
R
R R
R
R
13
R
R R
R R
R
R
R
14
R
R
R
R
R
PDP
R
R
15 S
R
R
S
S
S S
R
16
S
R
R
R R
R
R
R
17
S
R
R
R R
R
R
R
18
S
R
R
S S R
R
R
19
R
R
R
R
S
PDP
R R
20
R
R
R
R
S PDP
R
R
*
Key:
R
=
Union
Clvica Radical (Radical
party),
S
=
Partido
Socialista
(So-
cialist
party),
PDP
=
Partido
Democrata
Progresista
(Democratic
Progressive
party).
Sources:
a.
Canton
Materiales,
II,
7.
b.
Ibid.,
p. 17.
c.
Ibid., p.
35.
d.
La
Vanguardia,
Oct.
22-Nov.
1,
1918.
e.
Repu'blica
Argentina,
Memoria
del Ministerio
dcel
Interior,
1918-1919
(Buenos
Aires,
1919), p.
22.
f.
Canton,
Materiales,
II,
49.
g. La
Vanguardia,
Nov.
22-Dec.
4,
1920.
It. La Prensa, Apr. 21, 1922, p.
10.
Partido
Socialista
Argentino.34
However,
even
without
this
schism
it
is
doubtful
that the
Socialists could have
bested
the Radicals
in this
election.35 The
Democratic
Progressives
finished
with
less than
ten
percent
of the
total vote.
34.
For details
of
the
Palacios
dlefection,see Walter,
ThteSocialist Party,
pp.
130-133.
35. David Rock, Politics in Argentina, p. 122, downplays the significance of
the Radical victory
in the
capital
in
1916. He notes
that
the Radical vote
there
"increased rom 33%
in 1914
to over 40%
(in 1916)
.
.
.
still a
minority."
He
credits
the
victory primarily
to conservative
disintegration
and the Socialist schism
of 1915. "The two
Socialist
parties, led by
Justo and
Palacios,"he
observes,
"won
on
50%
of
the
vote,
a
proportion
considerablyhigher
than
in 1914." However, it
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614
HAHR
I
NOVEMBER
I
RICHARD J.
WALTER
In terms
of support from particular occupational
groups,
the So-
cialists suffered
a slight decline
in their backing from blue-collar dis-
tricts from a coefficient of .78
in 1914 to one
of .68 in 1916. Socialist
attempts to
expand their class
base came to naught, as the relationship
of their votes
with nonmanuals
(-.60), professionals (-.61),
and stu-
dents (-.56)
were strongly
negative. The Radicals, for their
part,
showed strong correlations
among
the
very
groups with whom the
Socialists
did poorly (.81 for
nonmanuals, .65 for professionals,
.70 for
students),
and
a
strong negative correlation
(-.85) with blue
collars.
The Democratic
Progressive
vote, as was the case throughout
this
period, showed
strong correlations with high
nonmanuals
(.86), stu-
dents (.82), and professionals (.88). (See Tables III, IV, V.)
The Elections
of March
3,
1918
The first
two years of the Yrigoyen administration
provided
the
Radical party a wide range
of political opportunities
and problems.
Many of these were related,
directly and indirectly,
to
World
War
I,
which
had serious
consequences
for the
Argentine
economy.
The
war
disrupted
the
flow
of
exports
and
imports
and
prompted
unem-
ployment, rising prices, and labor agitation. At the same time, as Ger-
man submarines
attacked ships carrying
Argentine goods,
pressure
mounted
on Yrigoyen to abandon diplomatic
neutrality
and
enter the
conflict on
the side of
the
Allies.
All of
these
matters were felt
most
keenly
in
the
federal
capital,
the
Argentine
city
most
closely
tied
to international
affairs.
Yrigoyen
responded to the
various war-related crises with
a num-
ber
of economic measures intended to
alleviate
pressures on
the Argen-
tine consumer. With
regard
to the conflict itself, he steadfastly
pur-
sued
a course
of strict
neutrality.
The Radicals' political strategy
duiing
this
period
was to
hold
on to the
middle-class
vote, already
should be noted that
the
Radical percentage
of
the capital
vote
in the presidential
contest was 48.8 percent (Canton, Materiales, I, 86) and in the congressional, when
calculated as a percentage
of
total
registered voters, 47.1 percent, both figures
very close to the majority
50
percent. Moreover, Palacios, who received 33,683
votes, ran well ahead
of
his
ticket, which rang;
d
between 7,461 and 9,802 (La
Prensa, Apr. 14, 1916, p. 11). Votes reported
by
Canton, from whom Rock took
his data, are for leading vote-getters, not party averages. Therefore, it distorts
Socialist strength to add the Palacios total
with those of the regular party.
Finally, Rock also errs
in
citing the
1916
victory
as the first for the UCR in the
city of Buenos Aires.
In
1912, the Radicals captured
eight of the twelve national
deputy seats in congressional elections
in
April
of that year. La Prensa, Apr.
23,
1912, p.
.12.
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ELECTIONS
DURING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
615
reasonably secure, and to cut into
the Socialists'
apparent hold on the
working class. Accordingly, the president intervened actively on the
side of labor during a number of
important strikes and
evidenced more
sympathy for the trade union movement
than any previous
executive.36
As the 1918
congressional elections
approached, the Socialists led
a growing chorus of criticism of the
Yrigoyen administration.
The first
two articles of their program underscored
what they considered the
inadequLaciesof
Yrigoyen's response to current economic
difficulties.
They called for an end to taxes on
basic necessities and
the imposition
of a
progressive
tax on land, the
nation's greatest source of wealth.
Unlike
the president,
the Socialist
leadership favored active support of
the Allies and advocated an end to secret diplomacy and the direction
of
foreign relations
by congress.37 In addition, articles
in La Vanguardia
attacked the administration's protectionist
tariff policy and sought to
shake loose
Radical
strength
among public employees by noting that
UCR senators had voted against
a proposal to establish
a minimum
wage
for
state workers.38 Finally,
the Socialists labeled Yrigoyen's
apparent sympathy
for the working class as demagogic,
insincere, and
concocted only for
political purposes.39
Without
survey
data
on
the
political
opinions
of the
city's voters,
it
is difficult to determine the precise impact of these issues on tl-he lec-
tion of 1918.
Moreover, while the above-noted items
were the most
frequently debated
in the campaign, other matters, such
as provincial
interventions and nascent
economic nationalism, also
might have
in-
fluenced the outcome.
Nevertheless, the results of this
contest indicate
general support
for
Yrigoyen's policies.
The
Radical
candidates,
who
still eschewed a formal
program
but ran
clearly
on
the
basis
of
what
they claimed to be
the
accomplishments
of
their national
administra-
tion,
defeated
the Socialists
by
almost
25,000
votes.
In the
process,
they captured
every capital
circunscripcion except
the
faithful
So-
cialist
four. The Socialists
blamed
their
defeat on
the
patronage
policies
of
the Radical government
and
the
demoralizing
attacks of
those who
had
left
the
parent
party
to
form
rival organizations.
Alfredo
L.
36. For
more information
on the first two years
of the
Yrigoyen administration,
see Gabriel
del Mazo,
El Radicalismo:
Ensayo sobre sU historia
y
doctrina
(Buenos
Aires,
1957), I, 162-307;
Felix Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires,
1964), pp.
196-287;
and Rock, Politics in Argentina, pp. 107-156.
37. La Vanguardia,
Jan.
21, 1918,
p.
1.
38. La Vanguar-dia,
Jan. 28, 1918, p.
1 and Feb. 9, 1918, p.
1.
See also
Carl
Solberg,
"The Tariff and
Politics in
Argentina,
1916-1930,"
HAHR,
53 (May
1973), 260-284.
39. La
Vangitardia, Jan.
31,
1918, p. 1.
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616
HAHR
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RICHARD J.
WALTER
Palacios did register
35,281 votes
in
this contest, but
ran well ahead
of
the rest
of the Partido Socialista Argentino ticket,
which
ranged
be-
tween 4,173
and 5,111
tallies.40
The Partido Socialista
Internacional,
formed
by those who opposed
the
older party's
stand on
the
war,
polled
only 2,753
votes (see Table I).
In terms
of
votes,
then, the competition
from
these two factions
was only a
minor factor affecting Socialist
per-
formance; of much
greater
significance
was the
burgeoning
Radical
hold on the general
electorate
and what appeared
to be
the
UCR's
growing
strength in working-class
areas.
The magnitude of
the
Radical
victory
in
1918,
as
in
1916,
was im-
pressive,
but should not be overstated.
Although
the Radicals increased
their absolute vote significantly from the previous contest, their pro-
portion
of the total grew by
only 3.3 percent.
The
Socialists
also
im-
proved
in absolute
terms and retained about
the same
percentage
of
the
total
vote (see Table I).
Looking at the
relationship between occupational
groups and party
performance,
the
correlation between blue
collars
and Socialists in
1918 was .55,
as
compared with
.68
in 1916, suggesting some slippage
in this base
of support.
The Radicals' correlation
with
their main base,
nonmanuals,
dropped from .81
in
1916 to
.59 in 1918. Among students
and professionals, it was .09 and .04 in 1918, as compared with .70 and
.65 respectively
in 1916. The correlation between
UCR
votes and blue
collars
in
1918, was -.35, as compared
with
-.85
in
1916. This
result
would
suggest that the party did
less
poorly
among these voters than
it
had previously and
indicates some moderate
success
for the Radical
prolabor
strategy.
The Elections of October
6, 1918
The
municipal
elections of October 6,
1918, the first held
for the
capital's city
council, provided
the most
dramatic
reversal of
Radical
fortunes
in
any
contest
during
the first
Yrigoyen
administration.
The
elections
occurred
at a
time of
great
internal
dissension
within Radical
ranks.
The
underlying
division
was between
the
more conservative,
upper-class,
officeholding
wing
of the
party,
the
so-called
Azul or
Blue faction which
opposed
many
of
Yrigoyen's
methods
and
policies,
and
those
persons,
mostly
middle-class and
holding
secondary positions
of
leadership,
who
firmly supported
the
president.41
40. La Prensa,
Mar. 23,
1918, p.
8.
41. Rock, Politics in
Argentina, pp.
111-112.
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ELECTIONS
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617
The
split
revealed itself
openly
in
the elections of local UCR com-
mittee
officers in the capital and in the selection of council
candidates.
These
selection procedures were marked by delay,
confrontation, and
resignations
throughout the month
of September as each faction sought
to
control
the internal party apparatus and the candidate
list. Active
campaigning began late
in
September, but up to a few days before the
election, there were rumors
that
members
of one
faction would
cross
out the
names of representatives
of another on
the
ballot to indicate
their
displeasure with the party's choices. As late as
October 3, La
Prensa reported that the UCR
was consideiing
abstaining from
the
contest
altogether because of its
internal difficulties.42
One of the major points of criticism from the Azul faction was the
party's lack of a program.
Accordingly, in this contest the
Radicals pub-
lished a nine-point platform
which promised gradual
elimination
of
taxes
on
basic necessities, municipalization of public services
and utili-
ties,
amplification
of
various free services and benefits for the
working
class, construction
of
inexpensive
public housing,
and
appointment
of
municipal
employees by merit only.43 Radical
candidates stressed
various
aspects of the program,
emphasizing particularly
measures
to
improve public health,
working
and
living conditions
in the
city's
poorer districts, and legislation to lower the cost of living.44
The
Socialists,
free
for
the
moment from
any important internal
differences, prepared
for
the
municipal
contest
with
characteristic
efficiency.
In
late
August, they
produced
an
extensive program which
called
for
a
minimum
wage
and improved
working
conditions for city
employees, regulation
of
hygiene
in
low-cost
housing, municipalization
of all
markets, price
controls
on
consumables,
restrictions
on the sale
of
alcoholic
beverages, and revenue reform.45
The party chose its candi-
dates
on
September
2
and
campaigned energetically
throughout
the
month.
Socialist spokesmen stressed
the
role
the
party had played
in
implementing
the
municipal
election
reform,
the
importance
of
a
popularly elected
council
to
counterbalance the
influence
of
the
federal
government
which appointed
the
city's mayor, and
the need
to clean
up
notorious
corruption
at
the
local
level.46
In the
balloting
the Socialists notched
a
surprising
victory, edging
42. La Prensa, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 11.
43. La Epoca, Sept.
21, 1918, p. 5.
44. La Epoca, Sept.
23, 1918, p. 3; Sept. 25,
1918, p. 4; Sept. 27, 1918, p. 5;
and
Oct.
3, 1918, p.
5.
45. La Van
guardia,
Aug. 29, 1918, p. 1.
46.
La
Prensa,
Oct. 3, 1918, p.
11.
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the Radicals by 838 votes (see Table I). The Socialists regained
the
advantage
in
wards with significant working-class groups, such as 2
through 4, 15 and 18, districts lost to the Radicals
only a few months
earlier. As Table IV indicates, the Socialists enjoyed renewed support
among blue collars, with the correlation between Socialist votes and
this category rising
from
.55 in 1918 to .70 in October
of that year. The
correlation between
Socialist
votes and skilled workers,
in particular,
increased from .52 to .73 for the same period.
However, what was most significant in this election
was not Social-
ist gains, but rather Radical losses. The Socialists, indeed,
declined by
some
1,389 votes between March and
October. The Radicals, however,
dropped 27,061 votes between the two contests. The losses, as Table III
reveals, did not occur with blue-collar
voters,
where
the correlation
with
Radical
performance changed from -.35 to .03 between
March
and October, but rather among nonmanuals (from .59
to
.26), pro-
fessionals (.04 to -.37), and students (.09 to -.19).
These findings are
consistent
with an interpretation which emphasizes
the importance of
the internal party dispute in explaining the Radical
debacle since
nonmanuals composed the rank and file of party
membership most
affected by these dissensions.47
The Elections of March23,1919
The
elections of March 23, 1919, to fill one senate seat and two
deputy positions, found the Radicals
under
heavy
fire from several
fronts. The internal disputes continued unabated.
Following the
municipal election defeat of October 1918, leaders of
the Azul faction,
charged with analyzing
the
reasons for
the
UCR loss, published
a
re-
port
which
severely criticized
the directors of
the
party
in the
capital
and reiterated
objections
to
Yrigoyen's personalistic
style
of administra-
tion.48
In
January 1919, the dissidents managed to force the resignation
47. Rock,
in
discussing this election,
which
he mistakenly places in November
and
in
which he claims
that "the
Radicals
were
soundly defeated by the Socialists"
(emphasis mine), implies that foreign policy was a major consideration
in
this local
contest
and
that
the UCR defeat "was
widely regarded as
a
condemnation
of
Yrigoyen's
neutralist
position."
Politics in
Argentinau, p. 174. However, an exami-
nation of newspaper coverage
of
the campaign and post-election analyses reveals
little attention to the war issue by candidates of any party and much more concern
with
specific municipal
matters.
The same
reading
also reveals the
great disarray
within the UCR at
this
time, resulting
in
weak organization, late and sporadic
campaigning,
and
dissident
abstention from the contest.
48.
Reprinted as
"Programa
y
accion
del
partido radical,"
Revista
Argentina
de Ciencias Politicas, 17 (1918), 484-487.
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8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…
26/31
ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST
YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION
619
of
the
pro-Yrigoyen members of the capital committee, and
in
early
February, succeeded in capturing
the top committee
posts for them-
selves.49 The first order of business
for the new
directors was to select
candidates for
the upcoming elections, but this
process was delayed
until the end
of February, due to difficulties in
assembling the nomi-
nating convention.
These
internal party maneuvers
took place within the context
of
a
major labor disturbance, the famous
Semana
Tragica
of January 1919.
The nationwide general strike
and resultant violence
of this week had
the greatest impact on the federal
capital. Yrigoyen
who was slow
to
respond to the
crisis lost support
from all sides. Labor objected
to
the harsh measures used to quell the disturbance. Middle-class and
upper-class elements criticized
the president both
for his past prolabor
sympathies
which, they
believed,
encouraged the outbreak
and
his
failure
to react more firmly once
the series of strikes
began. Following
the "tragic
week," Yrigoyen,
fearing possible
military
intervention
against his
own government, moved cautiously
to rebuild
his
bridges
with the
working
class and at the same
time
to reass