APPROVED: John T. Ishiyama, Major Professor Marijke Breuning, Committee Member T. David Mason, Committee Member J. Michael Greig, Committee Member and Chair of the Department of Political Science Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School ELECTORAL RULES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PEACE DURATION IN POST- CONFLICT STATES Tatyana Tuba Kelman Kisin, B.A., M.A. Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS December 2014
Transcript
APPROVED: John T. Ishiyama, Major Professor Marijke Breuning, Committee Member T. David Mason, Committee Member J. Michael Greig, Committee Member and Chair
of the Department of Political Science Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate
School
ELECTORAL RULES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PEACE DURATION IN POST-
CONFLICT STATES
Tatyana Tuba Kelman Kisin, B.A., M.A.
Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS
December 2014
Kisin, Tatyana Tuba Kelman. Electoral Rules, Political Parties, and Peace Duration in
Post-Conflict States. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), December 2014, 161 pp., 13
tables, 4 figures, references, 185 titles.
This dissertation examines the following research question: Which types of electoral
rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon
other factors? I argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist
in the post-conflict environment. Although this explanation is contrary to scholars that speak of
political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate the choice of
electoral system. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties play an important role in the
negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. I argue that the effects of
electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is broad
(nonexclusive) or narrow (exclusive). I develop a theoretical model that led to three hypotheses
focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral
rules on peace duration. To test these hypotheses, I use the Cox proportional hazard model on 57
post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The empirical results show
support for the main argument of this study. First, the findings show that electoral rules alone do
not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when interacting with the degree to
which political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant effect on the outbreak of civil
war. Second, the results show that post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems
(closed list PR system) are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the
parliament are controlled by broad-based parties. In addition, I conduct a comparative case study
analysis of two post-conflict states, Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), using
the most similar systems (MSS) research design.
Copyright 2014
by
Tatyana Tuba Kelman Kisin
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my dissertation committee for their guidance and support: John T.
Ishiyama, Marijke Breuning, J. Michael Greig, and T. David Mason. From my first day in
graduate school, they have always been available to answer my questions, have provided helpful
feedback on papers written in their classes, and have truly been supportive in my graduate career.
They have continued to provide support during my dissertation writing stage and I would not
have accomplished my dream without their help. I would like to mention John T. Ishiyama who
has been my advisor from the first day I started the program. I have learned so much from him
and I greatly appreciate his time in reviewing my drafts and providing suggestions that have truly
helped me succeed. I would also like to thank all other faculty members at the Department of
Political Science at University of North Texas for their support.
In addition, I would like to thank my family for their love and encouragement. My
parents, Izya and Inna, for instilling in me the thirst for knowledge and the importance of higher
education. I would not be the person I am today without their support. I would like to thank my
sister, Alla, for being a role model and a friend. My biggest thanks goes to my husband, Mikhail,
who has morally encouraged me and asked everyday how close I am to finishing my chapters.
Your persistence has paid off, and I would not have finished in time without you. I would also
like to acknowledge the Hast Family for their involvement and guidance in my education. Most
importantly, I would like to thank G-d for giving me the strength to accomplish my dream.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER 5 A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE ......................................................................................................................... 100
6.2 Summary of Main Findings ......................................................................................... 134
6.3 Theoretical Contributions and Policy Implications ...................................................... 139
6.4 Future Research ............................................................................................................ 140
APPENDIX LIST OF COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PARTIES PER COMPETITIVE ELECTION YEAR ......................................................................................... 142
Table 1.1 List of Post-Conflict States in the Dataset, 1990-2009 ............................................... 18
Table 4.1 Structure of the Dataset for Algeria, 1990-2009 ......................................................... 67
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics for All Variables ......................................................................... 83
Table 4.3 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration without Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009......................................................... 86
Table 4.4 Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics for Duration of Post-Conflict Peace, 1990 to 2009 for Model 1 ........................................................................................................ 87
Table 4.5 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration with Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009......................................................... 89
Table 4.6 Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics for Duration of Post-Conflict Peace, 1990 to 2009 for Model 2 ........................................................................................................ 90
Table 4.7 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration with Interaction Terms and Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009 ............................. 91
Table 4.8 Predicted Survival Probabilities at Different Levels of Broad Control under a Closed List PR System ............................................................................................................ 97
Table 5.1 Historical Background Characteristics of Angola and Mozambique ....................... 110
Table 5.2 Characteristics of the Civil Wars .............................................................................. 121
Table 5.3 Characteristics of the Post-Conflict Environment .................................................... 123
Table 5.4 Summary of Analysis................................................................................................ 131
and Mehler 2013; Mukherjee 2006; Regan and Wallensteen 2013). This extensive literature on
post-conflict peace building has examined the design of political institutions like electoral
systems, federalism, political parties, and parliamentary versus presidential systems, and the
impact these institutions have on peace and conflict recurrence. Although there is no agreement
in this literature on which types of political institutions in combination or by themselves can help
prevent conflict, there is a common understanding that the choice of institutions matters. As
noted by Matthijs Bogaards (2013), "it is rare these days to read work that simply denies any
relevance to institutional design in post-conflict societies" (81). Yet, the empirical and qualitative
research has produced inconclusive results, which suggests that more research on institutional
design and conflict prevention is needed. The puzzle is then which institutions best promote
peace?
In post-conflict states, the design of political institutions is negotiated either during the
constitution making process or during peace talks. In general, the process of designing political
institutions is complicated. Some institutions are chosen by political parties and third parties
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specifically out of self-interest (Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Horowitz 2008, 1228). There is
also pressure from the international community to design institutions quickly and get agreements
faster even if they are imperfect (Horowitz 2008). It is not surprising, then, that early elections
are quite common in countries emerging out of civil war. Additionally, many individuals that are
involved in selecting institutions do not know which options are most appropriate for reducing
conflict (Horowitz 2008). This also suggests that more research on the design of political
intuitions is needed.
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to this growing literature by taking a
closer look at the relationship between the choice of electoral rules and peace duration. The
research question that I examine in this study is: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-
conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? I am
going to argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist in the
post-conflict environment.
1.2 What are Electoral Rules?
First, however, it is necessary to define some key concepts that are at the heart of this
study. So, first of all, what are "electoral rules"?
Electoral rules, by definition, are formulas that determine how votes for candidates are
translated into legislative seats. There are many kinds of electoral formulas used around the
world, but they can be grouped into "three broad families": plurality/majority, proportional
representation, and mixed systems (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 27). These three broad
families are differentiated between "how proportional they are" in terms of the "votes-to-seats
relationship" (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 27). For example, the plurality or majority
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formula also known as first past the post (FPTP) is where only one candidate in a single-member
district is elected by a plurality or majority of the votes (Ishiyama 2012; Lijphart 1999;
Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 27). Variations of this formula produces four more electoral
rules:
When this system is used in multi-member districts it produces the Block Vote. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the highest-polling candidates fill the positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they achieve. This system--with the change that voters vote for party lists instead of individual candidates--becomes the Party Block Vote. Majoritarian systems, such as the Alternative Vote and the Two-Round System, try to ensure that the winning candidate receives an absolute majority (i.e. over 50 percent). Each system in essence makes use of voters' second preferences to produce a winner with an absolute majority if one does not emerge from the first round of voting. (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 28) Countries such as the United States, India, United Kingdom, Canada, Pakistan, Uganda,
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Laos, Republic of Congo, etc. use the plurality or majority
formula in their legislative elections. The Two-Round System (TRS) is used for presidential
elections in France, Russia, Poland, and Argentina when there is no winner selected in the first
round of elections (Ishiyama 2012).
The proportional representation formula (PR), on the other hand, allows for more than
one candidate to be elected from a district with the goal to ensure that the share of votes a party
receives is proportional to the share of seats received in the legislature (Ishiyama 2012; Lijphart
1999). For example, "if a major party wins 40 percent of the votes, it should win approximately
40 per cent of the seats, and a minor party with 10 percent of the votes should also gain 10
percent of the legislative seats" (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 29). Under a PR formula,
"political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national or regional basis"
(Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 29). There are two types of party lists: open list and closed list.
Voters can select candidates via a closed list PR system where voters cast votes directly for a
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party and an open list PR system where voters vote for an individual candidate on the party list
(Lijphart 1999). Another variation of the PR formula is the Single Transferable Vote. Under this
type of formula "voters rank-order candidates in multi-member districts" (Reynolds, Reilly, and
Ellis 2005, 29). Countries such as Brazil, Latvia, South Africa, Guinea-Bissau, Angola,
Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Peru, and Colombia utilize this type of electoral formula in
their legislative elections.
The third type are the mixed systems which combine the plurality or majority formula
with the PR formula. For example, the mixed member proportional (MMP) system uses "two
elements (one of which is a PR system), with the difference that the PR element compensates for
any disproportionality arising under the plurality/majority or other system" (Reynolds, Reilly,
and Ellis 2005, 29)1. Countries such as Germany, Senegal, and Venezuela utilize this type of
formula in their legislative elections.
There are also positive and negative aspects of plurality/majority and PR formulas that
are worth mentioning. Maurice Duverger, a French sociologist, in 1954 proposed in his seminal
book titled Political Parties: Their Organizations and Activity in the Modern State that the
choice of electoral rules determine the number of political parties in the political system2.
Before further exploring Duverger’s law, it is best to define what is meant by “political
party.” Scholars such as Sartori (1976) in his well cited book, Parties and Party System: A
Framework for Analysis, defined a political party as “any political group that presents at
elections and is capable of placing through election candidates for office” (64). Another scholar
1 For a detailed discussion on electoral system families please refer to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2005 handbook at: http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/upload/idea_esd_full.pdf 2 The idea of the choice of institutions was initially proposed by Duverger (1954). Although Duverger (1954) primarily analyzed the effects of electoral systems on the political system (i.e. number of political parties), he also proposed that electoral systems are outcomes of the political system. The idea of electoral rules as outcomes was not fully explored until the 1970s by David Quintal. For more information on the opposite causal relationship between electoral laws and the number of political parties, please see “The Theory of Electoral Systems” by David Quintal.
Lijphart (1969), Brass (1991), and Horowitz (1985) in particular argue that electoral system
choices are crucial in promoting accommodation in societies that are deeply divided along
cultural lines (although they all advocate very different systems).
More recently, there has been an increasing amount of work that has examined the
origins and purported effects of electoral rules in post-conflict societies (Kadima 2003; Joshi
2013; Theuerkauf 2010). Post-conflict states are known to be weak and fragile, and hence, or so
the argument goes, the institutional choices should greatly impact what happens after a conflict
ends. Indeed, electoral rules define who is to be included in the political game and become the
primary shapers of the post-conflict political order, influences the behavior of leaders once in
office, and are, the most "specifically manipulable aspects of politics" (Sartori 1968; Taagepera
and Shugart 1989). Given their importance in the comparative politics literature, it is remarkable
then that there has been limited research that focuses on the effects of institutional choices that
accompany these power sharing arrangements on peace duration, especially since a considerable
amount of attention in the literature has been devoted to post-conflict power sharing and the
3 Przeworski et al. (1996) examined new democracies and showed that there is a relationship between institutional choices and survivability of democracy. Przeworski et al. (1996) tested Linz (1990) argument, who argues that parliamentary systems are more durable, and finds support for Linz (1990).
8
promotion of durable peace (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie,
and Rothchild 2001; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mukherjee 2006; Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002).
What is even more surprising is that only a few scholars studying post-conflict peace
building have empirically tested the effects of electoral rules on the durability of peace (Cammett
and Malesky 2012; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006). Among the factors that are known to affect
peace duration in post-conflict states, such as: the outcome of the civil war (i.e. rebel victory,
government victory, negotiated settlement), the characteristics of the civil war (i.e. duration of
conflict, fatalities, size of the government's army, and type of conflict), the characteristics of the
post-conflict environment (i.e. economic development), and more recently the effects of political
institutions such as whether presidentialism or parliamentarism influences peace duration,
electoral rules in comparison are the most practical and easiest to change. Electoral rules are
considered to be the easiest to manipulate and change "than most other features of a political
system" (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 5; Sartori 1968; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 2-5). A
change to an electoral rule usually involves only the passing of a new legislation rather than an
overhaul of the constitution (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 5). Thus, it is surprising that little
empirical research has been done that focuses on the choice of electoral rules in post-conflict
states. This is especially surprising also because electoral rules are one of the most commonly
analyzed set of institutional choices in the democratization literature (Cheibub 2007; Horowitz
1990; Huntington 1968; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Lane and Ersson 2000; Lijphart 1999; Linz
1990; Przeworski et al. 1996; Sartori 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993).
1.4 The Choice of Electoral Rules in Post-Conflict States
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The kinds of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states, such as plurality/majority, PR,
and mixed systems, influences not only the outcome of an election but also the behavior of
political actors in the post-election environment. Consider the following example: what if the
electoral rules chosen during the 1992 parliamentary elections in Angola were based on a
plurality/majority system rather than a PR formula. Would the election results have given the
UNITA party more participation in the government? Would the election results have prevented a
recurrence of a civil war if a different type of electoral rule was used instead?4 Election violence
is not uncommon in post-conflict states and can result if the losing party views the rules of
competition as rigged or limiting their participation in the government (Hoglund 2009; Mansfield
and Snyder 2005; Reilly 2002). The above example illustrates that the kinds of electoral rules
chosen in post-conflict states affects whether or not peace will last. In sum, "electoral systems
can be seen not only as ways to constitute governing bodies but also as a tool of conflict
management within a society" (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 10).
Much of the debate surrounding the most appropriate electoral rules for ethnically
divided societies and post-conflict states has been between the choice of plurality/majority and
PR formula. For example, scholars studying ethnically divided societies have either argued that
the list PR system is a better choice since it allows representation in the government for many
political parties, or that the list PR system is not a good choice since the system produces many
parties that could eventually make coalitions harder to achieve and hence, make the political
system unstable (Horowitz 1985; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Lijphart 1999). There is an extensive
literature that has looked at whether inclusive political institutions promote stability and
democracy (Joshi 2013; Theuerkauf 2010) and whether they promote conflict (Wimmer,
4 For a detailed discussion of Angola's 1992 parliamentary election, please see (Kramer et al. 2002, 2) and Golder and Wantchekon (2004).
10
Cederman, and Min 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). The theoretical argument behind
inclusive political institutions, such as the PR formula is that: "the more inclusive the new
parliament and government, the lower the number of excluded, disgruntled, and potentially
dangerous parties and interests" (Bogaards 2013, 74). In other words, inclusion leads to more
participation and hence, representation and accommodation of different ethnic groups in the
society. Hartzell (1999) argued that there is a security dilemma and credible commitment
problem that exists between warring parties. Hartzell (1999) highlights that political parties are
concerned about "any one party becoming dominant and exercising central authority" (6). This is
a great concern among political parties that are of different ethnic backgrounds. Hartzell (1999)
further argued that security concerns can be best addressed with the creation of power sharing
institutions (i.e. inclusive institutions). Power sharing institutions foster "a sense of security
among former enemies and encourages conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace" (Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003, 318). To manage conflict in divided and conflict prone states, power sharing
has been "increasingly recommended and implemented" (Binningsbo 2013, 108). Overall, power
sharing has become a common solution by scholars and policymakers designing institutions in
post-conflict states (Binningsbo 2013). In societies emerging out of a civil war, especially in
ethnically divided societies, there is a trend toward designing political institutions that emphasize
inclusiveness and participation in the government which is thought to promote trust and peace
among warring parties (Simonsen 2005). Perhaps this can explain why the choice of PR electoral
rule has been the most "favorite electoral system of scholars and policymakers" in charge of
designing political institutions (Bogaards 2013, 71).
An analysis of electoral formulas that are included as part of peace agreements, reveals
that the PR formula is generally always chosen (whether by itself or as part of mixed systems)
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and has resulted in peace but not democracy (Bogaards 2013, 82). For the most part, empirical
research on electoral rules in post-conflict states has been inconclusive, which suggests that more
research on the relationship between electoral rules and conflict is needed, and especially more
research on electoral rules designed outside of peace agreements. As Bogaards (2013) noted:
Research on power sharing regularly incorporates the electoral system, but rarely singles it out for special attention. This makes the results difficult to interpret. It is striking, though, that despite the obvious popularity of PR, it has been hard to prove--even for its supporters--- that it has a positive impact on peace and democracy, especially in the context of post-conflict societies. Even more problematic is that recent empirical research casts doubt on the causal mechanism of inclusion. This is part of a more general trend in the literature. (82) Several scholars studying democracies in ethnically divided societies have suggested that
electoral systems that highlight individual competition (i.e. candidate centered systems) as
opposed to group competition (i.e. party centered systems) are more likely to reduce the
occurrence of conflict than electoral rules that emphasize group competition (Brass 1991;
Ishiyama 2000). Electoral rules that emphasize individual competition, such as plurality/majority
and open list PR formula, allows voters to directly vote for their candidates. This encourages
candidates to appeal to voters outside their ethnic group and promotes broad policies. In
particular, Brass (1991) and Horowitz (1985) have suggested that these types of electoral rules
are better at diffusing conflicts particularly in ethnically divided societies since they discourage
the formation of parties based on ethnicity. The reason for this is perhaps that competition is now
on an individual basis rather than on group basis. It can be said that electoral rules based on
individual competition:
Encourage[s] parties to make inclusive appeals for electoral support outside their own core vote base......Thus, the party's platform would become less divisive and exclusionary, and more unifying and inclusive. Similar electoral system incentives might make parties less ethnically, regionally, linguistically or ideologically exclusive. (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 10)
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On the other hand, electoral rules that encourage parties to compete against each other,
such as party centered systems (i.e. closed list PR formula), allows voters to directly vote for
parties. As a result, candidates under this system would become more dependent on the parties
for participation in the legislature. In other words, candidates are less linked to voters and parties
are more concentrated on specific segments of society for gaining votes. This promotes political
parties to be focused less on policy issues and instead more on divisions and ethnic appeals. It
can be said that the more ethnically divisive the party system becomes, the less trust exists
between the parties themselves.
In the following section, I present a brief overview of the central argument of this
dissertation. I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration in post-conflict states are
conditional upon the types of political parties that exist. Specifically, how broad or narrow the
political parties are in the party system. I define broad-based parties as nonexclusive parties that
do not exclude any groups in the society from representation based on descent-based categories
and seek to appeal to the whole population. This definition is based Chandra’s (2011) definition
of ethnic versus multi-ethnic parties (154). Her distinction is grounded in the concept of ethnic
exclusion that fits perfectly into my argument that the extent to which a political party excludes
or includes conditions the effects of electoral rules on peace duration5. On the other hand,
narrow-based parties are exclusive parties that seek to exclude some group(s) from
representation based on descent-based attributes. I propose that the more seats in the parliament
that are controlled by broad-based parties, the more inclusive the party system becomes and this
helps address the security concerns that political parties have. Additionally, if the political parties
are themselves inclusive and broad, they are more willing to join coalitions and hence, this also
5Differences between broad-based and narrow-based parties will be discussed further in chapter 3.
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creates stability. In sum, the type of electoral formula chosen plus the kinds of political parties
that already exist in the post-conflict environment matters a great deal for who wins, how they
win, and for the durability of peace.
1.5 Core Argument
There are only a handful of studies that have examined the relationship between electoral
rules and peace duration (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006). In this
dissertation, I contribute to this limited research by arguing that the effects of electoral formulas
are mitigated by the kinds of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. The new
wrinkle that this dissertation brings to this emerging research is the missed independent role that
political parties play in post-conflict states (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968).
First, I propose that political parties in post-conflict states are not only shaped by the
electoral rules chosen but by other factors in the political system. In other words, political parties
already exist in the post-conflict states and are not solely a development of the electoral system.
This is certainly implied by scholars studying party development in post-conflict states, which
indicate political actors play an important role in the negotiation process and hence, in the design
of the political institutions (Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011a).
Second, I argue that whether or not peace is maintained depends on the extent to which
the majority of seats in the parliament are controlled by broad (i.e. inclusive) or narrow (i.e.
exclusive) parties. Scholars studying ethnically divided societies have advocated for broad-based
parties to manage conflict (Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1968; Reilly 2006; Reilly and Norlund
2008). As stated clearly in the IDEA handbook:
While it is important for party systems to be as representative as possible, most experts favor systems which encourage the development of parties based on broad political values and ideologies and specific policy programs, rather than narrow ethnic, racial or regional concerns. As well as reducing the threat of societal conflict, parties which are
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based on these broad 'cross-cutting cleavages' are more likely to reflect national opinion than those that are based predominantly on sectarian or regional concerns. (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 149) I develop a theoretical model that builds on Moser (1999) and Sartori (1968), in which I
argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the kinds of political
parties that populate the post-conflict environment. Under electoral rules that emphasize group
competition/party centered systems (i.e. closed list PR formula), political parties compete against
each other and voters directly vote for parties instead of candidates. This forces candidates to be
dependent on political parties for participation in the legislature. Not only do these electoral rules
keep their candidates "in line," but also create ethnic (i.e. exclusive) parties that can lead to peace
failure. I theorize that under party centered systems when more seats in the legislature are
controlled by broad-based parties, the more moderate and inclusive the party system becomes,
and this helps promote a more durable peace. Suggesting that to manage conflict under party
centered systems, the more broad the party system needs to be.
On the other hand, under electoral rules that emphasize individual competition/candidate
centered systems (i.e. open list PR and district based systems), voters choose candidates directly.
This forces candidates to broaden their policies and focus less on cleavages. As such, I theorize,
that under candidate centered systems, there is less likelihood of peace failure. Indicating that
features of the party system play an important role in promoting peace after conflict, and impacts
the expected effects of electoral rules. In other words, not only does the effect of one type of
institution impact peace, but one institution may impact the effects of another institution on
peace, depending upon the kinds of parties that populate the political system. Certainly, Moser
(1999) and Sartori (1968) building on Duverger’s law have argued that the impact of electoral
systems on the number of parties is powerfully mitigated by the types of parties that populate the
15
competitive space. Organized and structured parties can act as "gatekeepers" that keep other
competitors out, whereas weak parties are unable to act as gatekeepers, and hence the reductive
effect of plurality electoral laws is minimized. Thus, drawing upon this literature and integrating
with the literature on peace duration in post-conflict states, this study finds that the design of
electoral rules in post-conflict states on peace duration matters only when the kinds of political
parties that exist are considered together. This dissertation makes a significant contribution
toward a better understanding of the relationship between political institutions and peace
duration after a conflict ends. As such, the findings have implications for both scholars and
policymakers engaged in designing institutions for ethnically divided societies and post-conflict
states.
To accomplish this, I examine all countries that have experienced a civil conflict and had
competitive elections, for the period 1990 to 2009. I created a dataset that utilizes the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2011 which defines conflict as: " a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between
two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2011; Themner 2011, 1). In doing so
and using this dataset, I am able to analyze more countries that experienced both minor conflicts
(i.e. civil conflicts, with at least 25 battle related deaths per year) and high intensity conflicts (i.e.
outbreak of civil wars, where there are more than 1000 battle related deaths per year). I focus on
these types of conflicts since they are the most common types of armed conflicts in the world
today. As Mason and Quinn (2006) note, since World War II “the predominant form of armed
conflict has been civil wars (revolution, secession, ethnic conflict)” whereas conflicts between
16
nations has been rare (13). Moreover, Mason and Quinn (2006) state that most of civil wars
have primarily occurred in the Third World (i.e. Asia, Africa, and Latin America) (13).
In my dataset, there are 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 (see Table 1.1). I
examine this time frame since more countries emerged in the post-communist era, there were
more available data, there were more countries that had elections involving multiple parties, and
there was an increase in the number of ethnic conflicts in the world (Meernik and Mason 2006,
2). Prior to the 1990s, there was a trend of single party rule. It is important to note that not all
countries entered the dataset in 1990. Since I am interested in the effects of electoral rules on
peace duration, the year of multiparty elections guided when countries entered the dataset. There
are two ways that a country entered the dataset. First, if a county for example had a multiparty
election in 1985, the country entered the dataset in 1990. Second, if a country for example had a
multiparty election in 1996, the county entered the dataset in 1996. I also refer to other datasets
on political institutions to incorporate the needed information on elections and electoral rules6. In
order to examine which electoral rules are most appropriate for different post-war environments,
I control for those factors that are known to affect democratic survival and also those factors that
affect peace duration.
6 A detailed discussion of the data and sources used in this study is described in chapter 4.
17
TABLE 1.1 List of Post-Conflict States in the Dataset, 1990-2009 Afghanistan Georgia Nigeria Algeria Guatemala Pakistan Angola Guinea Papua New Guinea Azerbaijan Guinea-Bissau Peru Bangladesh Haiti Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Rwanda Burundi Iran Senegal Cambodia Iraq Serbia Central African Republic Laos Sierra Leone Chad Lebanon Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Colombia Liberia Sudan Comoros Macedonia Tajikistan Congo Mali Thailand Cote D’Ivoire Mexico Uganda Croatia Moldova Uzbekistan Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) Mozambique Venezuela Djibouti Myanmar Yemen Egypt Nepal El Salvador Nicaragua Ethiopia Niger
1.6 Trends in Post-Conflict States, 1990-2009
The data that I use in the empirical chapter of this dissertation reveal several trends that
are worth describing. Since the 1990s, the overall trend has been a slow decline in the number of
civil conflicts in the world. However, since 2003, there has been a slight rise in both minor
conflicts and high intensity conflicts (civil wars) (see Figure 1.1). Perhaps the civil conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to this trend.
18
FIGURE 1.1 Civil Conflicts, 1990-2009
Out of the 57 post-conflict states in the dataset, 16 states had altered their electoral rules
at least once during this time period. Moreover, two of the post-conflict states (i.e. Liberia and
Sierra Leone) had switched electoral rules twice. Scholars that study the choice of electoral rules
have argued that political parties are rational actors and will choose electoral rules solely for the
reason of maximizing their own representation in the legislature (Benoit 2007; Benoit and
relationship between electoral rules and the number of parties, and argued that "political elites
have a stake in this process and the selection of an electoral law is bound to be deliberative"
(Quintal 1970, 372). In other words, political parties will choose those electoral rules that will
favor them the most. It is not surprising to see from the dataset that political parties would switch
electoral rules toward those that will favor them the most from one election cycle to the next.
In Figure 1.2, I illustrate the percentage of post-conflict states that have implemented a
closed list PR system versus an open list PR and district based systems (plurality/majority) from
1990 to 2009. Interestingly, the figure shows that overall there has been an increase in the
percentage of post-conflict states choosing closed list PR system rather than open list PR and
19
district based systems. However, a closer look at the figure suggests that since 1997 there has
been an almost even split in the percentage of post-conflict states choosing either system. In
2009, 48.21% of post-conflict states used a closed list PR system and 51.79% used the open list
PR and district based systems. This confirms empirical research that no consensus exists among
scholars and policymakers on the most appropriate electoral rules for post-conflict states, and
suggests that more research is needed.
FIGURE 1.2 Percent of Post-Conflict States by Electoral Rule Type, 1990-2009
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds as follows: in chapter 1, I introduce the research question and
the puzzle of the study. The research question that I examine is: Which types of electoral rules
chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other
factors? In the first chapter, I discuss why scholars continue to consider electoral rules to be one
of the most important political institutions in comparative politics literature, and why the
research question of this study is important to examine. In this chapter, I provide a brief
20
argument of this study, discuss the contributions of this research, and explore the recent trends in
post-conflict states since 1990.
In chapter 2, I review the existing literature on peace duration in post-conflict states, the
literature on political institutions, and the literature on party development in conflict prone states.
I discuss the shortcomings of the existing literature and the contributions this study makes to the
comparative politics field.
In chapter 3, I develop a theoretical model building on Moser (1999) and Sartori (1968)
and I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the types of
political parties that populate the post-conflict environment. I further argue that whether or not
peace is maintained depends on the extent to which the majority of seats in the parliament are
controlled by broad (inclusive) or narrow (exclusive) parties. Based on my theoretical model, I
derive several empirical hypotheses.
In chapter 4, I test these hypotheses using a survival model, specifically the Cox
proportional hazard model to obtain a hazard rate for peace failure. The Cox proportional hazard
model estimates the risk of failure, in this case the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. I
utilize the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2011 for civil conflicts that have
occurred between 1990 and 2009, and other sources on political institutions to create my own
dataset. I look at all countries (N = 57) from 1990 to 2009 that have experienced civil conflict,
with at least 25 battle related deaths per year, and had elections.
In chapter 5, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of Angola and Mozambique.
The question that I examine is: Why was Mozambique successful in sustaining its peace after
elections but not Angola. Specifically, why among so many similarities up to their first multi-
party election, was Mozambique able to sustain its peace after elections but Angola had a
21
recurrence of civil war? I found that the origins and emergence of narrow (exclusive) parties in
Angola had contributed to the recurrence of civil war. Taking a closer look at the origins of the
political parties in Angola, reveals that the political parties have long been fighting on issues
related to identity stemming from their colonial history as independence movements and from
their civil war. I found that the type of civil war created the basis for the emergence of ethnic
parties in Angola. In Mozambique, on the other hand, the party system was broad-based
(inclusive). Even though both countries experienced long civil wars and used the same electoral
formula, the ethnic divisions in Angola's political parties contributed to a lack of trust between
the political parties and hence, a recurrence of civil war.
In chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation with a discussion on the theoretical contributions
and policy implications this study has for both scholars and politicians engaged in designing
institutions for post-conflict states.
In this dissertation, I show that not only does the effect of one type of institution impact
peace, but one institution may impact the effects of another institution on peace depending upon
the kinds of parties that populate the party system. The findings of this dissertation suggest that
the design of electoral rules in post-conflict states matters only when the kinds of political parties
that exist are taken into consideration. In other words, the effects of electoral rules on peace
duration are conditional upon the kinds of political parties that populate the post-conflict
environment. The empirical findings of this study provide scholars and policymakers with a
better understanding of which types of political institutions enhance the prospect for peace to
endure.
22
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Peace Duration in Post-Conflict States
In this chapter, I review the existing literature on peace duration in post-conflict states,
the literature on political institutions, and the literature on party development in conflict prone
states. It is important to examine prior efforts of scholars to better understand where the current
literature stands and what it has missed. The research question that I examine in this dissertation
is: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are
those effects conditional upon other factors?
There is a common concern among scholars studying civil wars that once a nation
experiences a civil war it is highly likely to experience another one (Bellamy 2007; Mason 2007;
Meernik and Mason 2006; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). As noted by Quinn, Mason, and
Gurses (2007), that while most of the work on civil wars has been on identifying the risk factors
that make the onset of civil wars more likely, there is still much more research needed to
examine why countries that have experienced a civil war are more likely to experience another
one (171). In addition, "every widely used data set on civil wars indicates that once a civil war
ends in a nation, that nation is at risk of experiencing another one at a later date" (Mason 2007,
vii).
Societies that emerge out of a civil war are weak and fragile, and feelings of hatred and
hostility continue to exist between groups that fought each other. Hence, the focus on civil wars
has turned toward examining not only why civil wars occur but more on those factors that help
sustain peace longer in post-conflict states. To explain the recurrence of civil wars, empirical
research has shown that: 1) the outcome of the civil war, 2) the characteristics of the civil war,
23
and 3) the characteristics of the post-conflict environment, and more recently 4) the effects of
political institutions influence peace duration. Below I review the factors that have been shown
to impact peace duration in post-conflict states and highlight what the literature has missed, and
that is the independent role played by political parties (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968). By
examining political parties, this study makes a significant contribution to our understanding of
the true effects of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states on peace duration.
2.1.1 Civil War Outcomes
Work by Wagner (1993), Licklider (1995), Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007), and Mason
et al. (2011) have argued that the outcome of the civil war matters for whether or not warring
parties will take arms and fight each other. These scholars have empirically shown that whether
the civil war ended in a negotiated settlement, rebel or government victory, influences peace
duration in post-conflict states.
Wagner (1993) and Mason et al. (2011) found that civil wars that ended in a negotiated
settlement are more likely to start again than in those nations where the civil war ended in a
decisive victory. Wagner (1993) argued that under a negotiated settlement there is no decisive
victory and negotiated settlements are thus more likely to break down since they "often preserve
elements of dual sovereignty and thereby leave the nation more susceptible to a resumption of
armed conflict" (176). With no clear victory, a negotiated settlement reflects a post-conflict
environment where both sides “retain the organizational capacity to resume combat in the future
(Wagner 1993, 255). Wagner (1993) further argued that a decisive victory weakens one side and
this prevents a resumption of war. Similarly, Licklider (1995) empirically showed that negotiated
settlements are more likely to breakdown than military victories. Licklider’s (1995) data also
24
points out that military victories might not be a preferred outcome since “military victories may
be more likely to result in genocide or politicide after the war" (687). Indeed, governments that
win might want to use any means necessary to sustain their power and destroy the opposition.
These arguments focus primarily on the concept of dual sovereignty where both government and
opposition have exclusive mutual claims to authority (Tilly 1978; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses
2007). This scenario of dual sovereignty exists under a negotiated settlement and makes civil
war more likely to occur since “both protagonists (government and rebels) retain their
organization autonomy after the conflict ends, dual sovereignty can be said to persist into the
post-conflict environment making renewed civil war possible” (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007,
173). These scholars emphasize that dual sovereignty ends with a decisive victory, either with a
rebel or government victory, and is a better outcome to have for post-conflict societies.
Since not all decisive victories are the same, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) and
Mason et al. (2011) took a closer look and found that civil wars that ended in a negotiated
settlement are still more likely to experience a recurrence of civil war than the ones that ended
with a government or a rebel victory. Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) posit that "the same
logic of dual sovereignty suggests that rebel victories should produce a more durable peace than
government’s victories because rebel victories more thoroughly dismantle the conditions of dual
sovereignty. Defeated governments are less able than defeated rebels to blend into the population
and rebuild their strength for the purpose of overthrowing the regime established by their
adversaries" (177).
Scholars such as Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007) pointed out that not all negotiated
settlements break down leading them to examine the question of why some negotiated
settlements break down and others do not. They concluded that not all negotiated settlements are
25
alike and that the number of power-sharing provisions included in a negotiated settlement can
help explain their question. They found support that the higher the number of power-sharing
provisions, such as political, territorial, military, and economic, the higher the likelihood that
peace in post-conflict states can be sustained. The authors posit that power sharing institutions
"address security concerns" between warring parties and "assures contending groups that they are
in the position to influence decision-making processes in the future" (319). They further note that
"power sharing serves as the mechanism that offers this protection by guaranteeing all groups a
share of state power" (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 319). Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007)
borrowed the concept of power sharing from the democratization literature that examined how
power sharing institutions can help make democracies more stable with divided societies
(Lijphart 1969; 2004).
Lijphart (1969; 2004) examined ethnically divided societies and called for a
consociational form of democracy where there is a deliberate joint effort by the elites of different
ethnic groups in the government to help stabilize the political system. He provided four
requirements that are necessary for a successful consociational form of democracy: “1) elites
have the ability to accommodate the divergent interest and demands of the subcultures; 2) elites
have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival
subcultures; 3) elites have the commitment to maintenance of the system and to the improvement
of its cohesion and stability; and 4) elites understand the perils of political fragmentation”
(Lijphart 1969, 216). For example, Lijphart (1969) states that "coalition cabinet or some kind of
a coalition between the elites of subcultures is appropriate for fragmented societies" (215). The
contribution that Lijphart (1969; 2004) makes is highlighting the importance of power sharing
institutions in ethnically divided societies since it allows for participation and representation of
26
all significant groups in the political decision making process. The unique aspect of power
sharing is that it is a nonviolent means of solving disputes between warring parties, while a
government's response to opposition is conducted with the use of repression (Lijphart 2004). In
more recent work, Mukherjee (2006) found that power sharing agreements can promote peace
only when they are offered after a decisive victory. He showed that it is not decisive victory
alone that promotes peace, but the interaction of political power-sharing agreements with
government victory or rebel victory that positively affects the duration of peace in post-conflict
states.
On the other hand, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) advocated that power-dividing
institutions are more likely to prevent conflict in ethnically divided societies rather than power-
sharing institution. They argued that power sharing institutions do not allow the participation of
all groups in the society, and thereby can exclude minority population from participation. The
reason is that not all groups that fought each other are part of the negotiated settlement, and
hence are not part of the power sharing government. Thus, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) posit
that power sharing institutions "privileges a specific configuration of majority and minorities in
the design of the government" (2005, 61). Roeder and Rothchild (2005) place importance on
power dividing institutions instead and state that "divided-power strategy empowers individual
citizens at the expense of the state, empowers multiple majorities with a common-state
governments to address diverse policy issues, and makes it more difficult for any majority to take
rights away from minorities by balancing the powers of one government organ (and its majority)
against other organs (and their majorities) within a common-state" (61). An example of power
dividing institutions that Roeder and Rothchild (2005) discuss is in the United States where there
is majority that is represented in one branch of the government, such as in the legislature, and
27
another majority represented in another branch, such as in the executive (61). They further
discuss the importance of check and balances between the branches of government and that this
configuration "avoids assigning vetoes to identified ethnic minorities within the common-states
or alienating some of the state's decision making rights to separate ethnic homelands" (Roeder
and Rothchild 2005, 61). Under power sharing arrangements, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) state
that "rather than privileging one configuration of majority and minorities through predetermined
governmental formulas, the multiple-majorities strategy seeks to create conditions under which
citizens can sort themselves into various, alternative configurations of majorities and minorities
in civil society and in separate, independent governmental organs” (61). Interestingly, scholars
on both sides of the debate have not taken a closer look at the effects of the political institutions
(i.e. electoral rules) that accompany these power sharing arrangements on peace duration. This is
an important gap in the literature where only a handful of scholars have begun to examine
(Bogaards 2013; Cammett and Malesky 2012; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006).
2.1.2 Third Party Enforcers
A related body of literature has observed that negotiated settlements followed by the
presence of peacekeeping forces can decrease the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Doyle and
Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Walter 1999; 2002). This set of
literature suggests that even though negotiated settlements suffer from credible commitment
problem between warring parties, the likelihood of civil war recurring can be decreased by the
presence of peacekeeping forces. Peacekeeping forces, such as the United Nations (UN) and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), can enforce the provisions of the peace agreement
and reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Walter (1999) suggested that third party
28
enforcers can solve the commitment problems between the regime and its opponents and
therefore is needed to guarantee terms of agreement between warring parties. Quinn, Mason, and
Gurses (2007) found that peacekeeping forces help sustain peace following a peace agreement.
Moreover, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) also showed that civil wars that end in a rebel
victory or in peace agreements that are supported by peacekeeping forces, decreases the
probability of civil war recurrence. Other scholars such as Fortna (2004) and Doyle and
Sambanis (2000), have argued similarly that the presence of peacekeeping forces decreases the
"probability of civil war recurring and increases the duration of the peace following a civil war"
(Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 177). The argument follows that peacekeepers help "dismantle
the condition of dual sovereignty and thereby enhance the prospect of peace" (Quinn, Mason,
and Gurses 2007, 177).
Since the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number
of peacekeeping missions around the world (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Fortna (2004) showed
that when peacekeepers are deployed in post-conflict states, the risk of another civil war
decreases. Also, regardless of the type of peacekeeping missions (i.e. traditional peacekeeping,
observer missions, multidimensional, and enforcement missions) they all help decrease the risk
of civil war resumption. Her empirical analysis shows that peacekeeping helps maintain peace
and that it works (Fortna 2004, 285). In general, peacekeeping forces are sent to areas that are
difficult to maintain, where the end to a conflict is not decisive, and they are less likely to be sent
when a peace treaty is signed. Yet, as Fortna (2004) has noted that "the presence of international
personnel is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guarantee lasting peace in every case, but it
does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer" (288).
29
There have been many cases where peacekeeping has been successful, such as in
Nicaragua, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia, and Bosnia, and there are other cases
where peacekeeping has not been successful. The purpose of allowing third party mediators to
interfere is that they can help create trust between warring parties and hence, can help stabilize
the situation. Even though scholars such as Edward Luttwak (1999) have argued that
peacekeeping missions, those not followed by peace accords, are actually counter effective since
an imposed "cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute
and rearm their forces" (36). Instead, he argues that wars should run their course, and eventually
war will bring peace. He recommends that policymakers should resist the temptation to interfere
in conflicts so peace can occur. Looking at third party mediators, Gurses, Rost, and McLeod
(2008) showed that the presence of mediators and international community leads to a longer
peace, but mediated agreement attempts shorten peace. In short, Gurses, Rost, and McLeod
(2008) note that "although we find mediated agreements to reduce the duration of peace
following a civil war, it is obvious that the international community should continue to provide
resources to mediation attempts rather than letting the adversaries fight it out by themselves"
(152).
Mason (2007) pointed out that not only is it difficult for warring parties to come together
and negotiate, it is also hard to make them agree to the negotiations (54). Greig and Regan
(2008) analyzed mediated negotiations in their study. Greig and Regan (2008) took a closer look
at mediators and examined two questions: “under what conditions do states and international
organizations act as third parties and offer mediation,” and “under what conditions do warring
parties accept such offers” (760). First, they emphasize that for mediators to be successful they
30
must appear credible so that trust can be generated with the conflicting parties (760). Greig and
Regan (2008) define mediation as:
Mediation, and the broader framework of negotiations in which it is embedded, involves a process of using an outside party to help antagonists find what purports to be a small set of possible solutions among an otherwise wide range of unacceptable alternatives. Like negotiations, mediation is built around the aim of compromise between the conflicting parties...Mediation is voluntary, requiring both the willingness of one party to offer to bring the warring parties together and the agreement of all warring parties to participate. Absent this voluntary acceptance, mediation will not take place. (761) In their study, Greig and Regan (2008) identified the following conditions under which
mediation is offered and accepted: “1) mediation is offered when tied to the interests and
linkages of third party; historical interactions between the two countries (i.e. neighboring states);
and security concerns; 2) mediation is accepted is based on the reputation of the third party, the
costs of the conflict, the leverage of the third party, and the presence of historical ties between
the third party and warring parties” (776). Interestingly, they find that historical links do not
promote acceptance of mediation and instead reduce it (776). The authors conclude that the
longer the duration of a civil war rather than the number of casualties makes leaders more likely
to accept mediation. In other words, mediation is more accepted when there are higher costs to
the conflict. Yet, Greig and Regan (2008) argue that this is not linear, and "offers of mediation
are more likely to be rejected in the earliest and latest stages of the civil war" (Greig and Regan
2008, 776). Also, history of previous third party intervention also matters whether that mediation
will be offered again. This study brings important insights and contribution on who the third
party mediators should be. In sum, this set of literature shows that the outcome of a civil war
matters for whether or not another civil war will recur again.
On the other hand, Walter (1999) clearly states that "the ultimate challenge facing civil
war opponents at the negotiating table therefore is not simply how to stop the fighting, but how
31
to design a settlement that convinces the groups to shed individual defenses and submit to the
rules of a new political game at a time when no government or police force can either protect
them or guarantee compliance" (134). Her work suggests that the design of the political
institutions in post-conflict states is important for sustaining peace.
2.1.3 Characteristics of Civil Wars
Other work has examined the characteristics of the civil war on the risk of peace failure,
such as: the duration of the conflict, fatalities, the size of the government’s army, and the type of
conflict (Fortna 2004; Mason et al. 2011; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Walter 2004).
Scholars such as Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) have shown that "the previous civil war does
condition the post-civil war environment in ways that make a post-civil war nation more
susceptible to experience a relapse into civil war than a nation that has not experienced any civil
war is to have its first civil war, even for a given level of economic well-being and democracy"
(172). Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) argued that there is a war weariness effect with longer
duration of civil war. For example, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) found that the longer the
duration of the previous war, the less likely it is to be followed by another civil war (179). The
argument goes that since longer wars decrease rebel's estimates of winning, the longer the
duration of the previous war provides less incentives that rebels "have to resume armed conflict
in search of military victory" (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 185). Similarly, Walter (2004)
found that longer wars lead to less likelihood that another civil war would resume which
confirms to other scholars such as Mason and Fett (1996) and Sambanis (2000) that showed that
longer wars lead to less recurrence.
32
Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) also examined the effects of higher casualties in the
previous war on the probability of civil war recurrence. Although Quinn, Mason, and Gurses
(2007) expected the same war weariness effect and instead found higher fatalities increases the
probability of civil war recurrence. In other words, "the deadliness of the previous conflict makes
a nation more likely to experience a relapse into civil war" (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007,
185). Mason et al. (2011) similarly found support "that higher casualties harden the hostility and
distrust between former protagonists, making them more likely to resume conflict at a later date”
(186). On the other hand, Walter (2004) found that high costs of war (i.e. fatalities) had no effect
on the likelihood of reemergence of civil war. She found that only duration was significantly
related to emergence of civil war.
The size of the government's army has also been shown to influence peace duration.
Scholars such as Mason et al. (1999) and Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) have argued that the
larger the size of the government's army, the more likely rebels will feel weak and this deters
them against fighting the government. Building on the scholars such as Mason, Weingarten, and
Fett (1999), Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) further found that the larger the size of the
government's army the less likely another civil war will occur (185).
Factors such as the type of conflict has also been shown to affect the recurrence of civil
war (Fortna 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Walter 2004). Scholars that focus on ethnic
conflicts, have argued that ethnic conflicts are harder to resolve than other types of conflicts
(Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 1995). For Kaufmann (1996) the only way to resolve an ethnic
conflict is to partition the state among the groups. Walter (2004) empirical findings contrasted
with Kaufmann's (1996) theory that partition of a previous conflict does not promote peace and
instead "more likely to face additional wars" (Walter 2004, 379). Licklider (1995) argued that
33
ethnic civil wars (i.e. identity civil wars) are more difficult to end through negotiated settlements,
since ethnic divisions are clearly visible and ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, Fortna (2004)
and Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) demonstrated that identity conflicts are not significantly
related to recurrence of civil wars. Walter (2004) also found that wars fought between ethnic
groups are "no more likely to recur than wars fought over less demanding issues, or between the
same ethnic groups (380). This literature has shown that the characteristics of civil wars also
matter for peace duration, yet the empirical research in this area is also inconclusive.
2.1.4 Characteristics of the Post-Conflict Environment
In addition, certain characteristics of the post-conflict environment have also been shown
to influence whether civil wars are more or less likely to recur (Collier et al. 2003; Doyle and
Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Fortna and Howard 2008; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Walter
2004). Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) and Collier et al. (2003) have found that economic
development reduces the probability of civil war recurrence. Moreover, they argued that policies
that promote economic development, investment, and even foreign aid, are vital for peace
duration. Similarly, Walter (2004) and Collier et al. (2003) argued that economic development in
post-conflict society increases the opportunity costs of rebellion and hence, negatively impacts
recruitment efforts by rebel organizations. In addition, scholars analyzing peacekeeping forces in
the aftermath of a civil war, have demonstrated that peacekeeping forces, such as the UN
intervention, helps sustain peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Fortna and Howard
2008).
Scholars studying post-conflict peace have looked at the idea of adopting democratic
institutions (i.e. elections) to analyze peace duration in post conflict states (Gurses and Mason
34
2008; Fortna and Huang 2012; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Joshi 2010). In fact, scholars studying civil
war onset have looked toward the democratic peace literature and showed that the survivability
of a regime also depends upon adopting democratic institutions (Hegre et al. 2001; Krain and
Myers 1997). Hegre et al. (2001) argued that since democratic regimes have institutions that
allow for the opposition to voice their opinion, this decreases the probability of civil war onset.
Hegre et al. (2001) argued that authoritarian regimes have the ability to oppress dissent and this
also prevents the onset of a civil war. Hegre et al. (2001) finds that intermediate regimes are the
ones that are the most prone to civil war, since intermediate regimes are less stable than
autocracies and democracies. She further posits that intermediate regimes, as the name suggests,
do both: “1) they repress which leads to grievances and induces groups to take action, and 2)
they have openness that allows groups to organize and engage in activities against the regime
and this is linked to civil conflict” (Hegre et al. 2001, 33). Additionally, Hegre et al. (2001)
argued that only the regimes that are weak and fragile (i.e. in transition, new democracies) lack
the democratic institutions needed to “defuse opposition violence and coercive capacity to
repress” and are the ones at risk of civil war onset (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 170). Thus,
regimes that are weak and fragile are the most prone to civil war onset. Yet, we know that not all
countries emerging out of civil war democratize and literature on post-conflict democratization
has provided mixed findings for why some states do and other states do not democratize (Fortna
and Huang 2012). For example, factors that have been shown to affect peace duration in post-
conflict states (i.e. outcome, duration, intensity, etc.) are not consistent with the studies analyzing
post war democratization (Fortna and Huang 2012). Moreover, economic development has been
shown to have no positive effect on democratization after civil war (Fortna and Huang 2012).
35
A recent article by Fortna and Huang (2012) on democracy after civil war, has tried to
improve on previous studies by providing a new measure of democratization.7 In their article,
Fortna and Huang (2012) found that factors that affect democratization in general fare better than
factors that have been shown to affect post-war democratization (7). Consequently, many of their
findings (i.e. characteristics of the war, characteristics of the nation, etc.) run contrary to
previous findings (Fortna and Huang 2012, 7). Perhaps, the mixed findings that affect post-
conflict democratization are a product of the way in which democracy has been conceptualized
(i.e. democratic vs. nondemocratic). Indeed, rather than measuring democracy vs. non-
democracy or the level of democracy (i.e. polity score) for democratization, perhaps it is the
institutional form that democratic experiments take (i.e. institutional design) that can better
explain regime survivability and peace duration. Simply put, perhaps it is better to look at the
existence of democratic institutions and how a given institutional choice (i.e. electoral rules)
affects peace duration in post-conflict states.
2.1.5 The Effects of Political Institutions
Among the factors discussed above that are known to affect peace duration (i.e. outcome
of the civil war, presence of third party enforcers, characteristics of the civil war, and
characteristics of the post-conflict environment) in post-conflict states, not one of them is as
practical to change and alter as the design of electoral rules. Within the emerging research
agenda on peace building, scholars have recently begun to focus on the design of political
institutions, like electoral systems, federalism, political parties, and parliamentary versus
7 Fortna and Huang (2012) defined democratization as moving “along a continuum toward democracy” (1). They used the polity score measured at the end of the civil war to calculate the democracy score at 2, 5, 10, and 20 years. It has been argued that there is an endogeneity problem since the polity score calculated at the end of civil war is also affected by the civil war itself.
36
presidential systems to sustain peace in post-conflict states (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Joshi
2013; Mukherjee 2006). Although, there is no agreement among individuals involved in
designing institutions in post-conflict states on the most appropriate political institutions for
reducing conflict. As stated in the 2005 Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA
Handbook published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance:
Political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practiced, and it is often argued that the easiest political institution to manipulate, for good or for bad, is the electoral system.... While many aspects of a country's political framework are often specified in the constitution and can thus be difficult to amend, electoral system change often only involves new legislation. (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 5) Suggesting, that electoral rules are the easiest to manipulate of all political institutions.
Cammett and Malesky (2012), Mukherjee (2006), and Joshi (2013) identify and point out that
electoral rules matters in post-conflict states, but what these studies are missing is the
independent role played by political parties in the post-conflict environment (Moser 1999;
Sartori 1968). As political actors in the post-conflict states, the kinds of political parties that
populate the post-conflict environment matters for the expected effects of the electoral rules. In
this study, I seek to contribute to this limited research by taking a closer look at the relationship
between electoral rules, political parties, and peace duration.
2.2 Political Institutions and Post-Conflict States
Most of the literature examining institutional choices has appeared in the literature on
democratization (Cheibub 2007; Lane and Ersson 2000; Lijphart 1969; 1992; 2004; Linz 1990;
Przeworski et al. 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992). Although there is a disagreement among
scholars on which types of political institutions make democracies stable, they are "in agreement
that the choices made by democratic constitutional engineers can have a far-reaching effects on
37
how well the democratic system operates" (Lijphart 1992, 207). For example, scholars studying
political institutions have shown that institutional choices make a difference in the survival of
existing democracies and the stability of new democracy.
For example, scholars such as Riggs (1988), Linz (1990), Stepan and Skatch (1993), and
Przeworski et al. (1996) have argued that the choice of parliamentary vs. presidential system (i.e.
the separation between the executive and legislature) affects the survival of democracy.
Presidential and parliamentary systems are types of democratic political systems that vary in
terms of how the executive is selected and the relationship between the executive and legislative
components of the government (Ishiyama 2012). In a presidential system, the president is
popularly elected for a fixed term in office (Ishiyama 2012, 179). The president's tenure in office
does not depend on legislative support, but president can be impeached for misconduct (Ishiyama
2012, 179). The presidential system is also characterized by the separation of the legislative and
executive branches of government. The roles of each branch are separate and are not fused
together. The president also has the power to form and direct his own cabinet, which is part of
the executive branch (Lane and Ersson 2000; Shugart and Carey 1992). In a presidential system,
the president acts as the head of state and government, where he or she also performs ceremonial
duties (Shugart and Carey 1992). On the other hand, in a parliamentary system, the prime
minister and the cabinet are both selected by the parliament. Thus, the executive and legislative
components of government are fused together (Ishiyama 2012, 178). In a parliamentary system,
the head of state has ceremonial duties and the prime minister is the head of government
(Ishiyama 2012, 180). There are no fixed terms in office and the prime minister serves until he or
she loses support of the legislature (Ishiyama 2012). The establishment and formation of the
government in a parliamentary system involves coalition making if there is no majority party
38
from which the prime minister and cabinet members are selected (Ishiyama 2012). Since the
prime minister and cabinet members are selected by the parliament, the prime minister's
authority is dependent on the legislature (Ishiyama 2012).
Scholars have argued that parliamentary systems make democracies more durable (i.e.
last longer) (Linz 1990; Przeworski et al. 1996; Riggs 1988; Stepan and Skatch 1993). On the
other hand, Cheibub (2007) argued that it is not the executive design (i.e. structure of the system)
but rather the conditions under which the system exists that leads to instability of the system.
Cheibub (20007) showed that presidential systems are not flawed but they "tend to exist in
societies where democracies of any type are likely to be unstable," such as experience with
dictatorship (24). Critics of presidential systems, have argued that parliamentary systems and not
presidential systems are better for the development of stable democracies in societies with deep
political cleavages and many parties (Linz 1990). Linz (1990) argued that in a presidential
system there is a greater chance for political crisis and slowness in making policy decisions
(Shugart and Carey 1992). Especially, since the executive and legislative branches of
government are separate and the cooperation between these branches is not urgent, creates
deadlocks on policy agreements (Linz 1990; Shugart and Carey 1992). Linz (1990) argued that
parliamentary systems are more conducive for development of stable democracies in societies
with deep political cleavages and many parties. Nevertheless, the effects of presidential vs.
parliamentary system on democratic stability is still inconclusive (Horowitz 1990; Stepan and
Skatch 1993).
Mukherjee (2006) and Joshi (2013) are some of the few scholars that have looked at the
choice of presidential vs. parliamentary systems on recurrence of civil war. Mukherjee (2006)
argued that the coalition aspect of parliamentary system encourages power-sharing and coalition
39
building across ethnic groups, and reduces incentives for groups to rebel against the government
(409). Moreover, considering the debate between presidential vs. parliamentary systems,
Mukherjee (2006) tested both arguments and found that both parliamentary and presidential
systems are statistically significant. Yet, he found that parliamentary systems significantly
reduce peace failure by a greater percentage than presidential systems. Joshi (2013) focused on
the concept of inclusive institutions, and argued that inclusive institutions such as parliamentary
systems can help sustain peace in post-civil war states that are transitioning toward democracy.
He posit that "the fear of constant marginalization in the political processes as well as fear of
being repressed might create incentives for the defeated party to return to civil war.....suggesting
that former rivals would support democratic transition if they were confident that inclusive
institutions ensure that they could achieve their political interests through the democratic
process" (743). Although he measured failure in terms of democracy score, he finds that
parliamentary systems decrease the likelihood of both authoritarianism and recurrence of civil
war because of its inclusive characteristic. Yet these studies show that that research testing the
effects of parliamentary versus presidential systems is still inconclusive. Other scholars have
argued that perhaps it is the electoral system that affects democratic survivability rather than the
type of democratic system (Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Sartori 1976).
Specifically, the debate between Lijphart (1969; 2004) and Horowitz (1985) has focused
on the effects of electoral rules on democratic stability in divided societies. Lijphart argued that
proportional representation (PR) formula is better for deeply divided societies since it allows for
power sharing configuration (i.e. consociationalism) and group autonomy. He further argued that
since PR formula aims for inclusion of both majority and minority parties, and it is the most
appropriate electoral formula for the stability of democracies with deeply divided societies. On
40
the other hand, Horowitz (1985) argued that power sharing is detrimental for the stability of
democracy with divided societies since it produces political parties that represent subgroups.
Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2002) instead argued that preferential electoral systems, such as
Alternative Vote (AV) and Single Transferable Vote (STV) are better for democracies with
deeply divided societies. They emphasized that these preferential electoral systems discourage
the formation of parties based on cleavages and instead encourages candidates to seek support
across different groups where voters vote based on issues rather than divisions (Reilly 2002,
157). However, there is a consensus among most scholars that electoral systems that emphasize
power sharing are needed to sustain democracies in deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1969;
2004). Although Lijphart (1969; 2004) did not look at post-conflict societies, he argued that
power sharing is the key for sustaining democracy in deeply divided societies and is based on the
idea of power sharing between elites of different groups in society. In other words, Lijphart
(1969) emphasized that for deeply divided societies participation of representatives from all
significant groups in political decision making is needed and advocated for a PR formula.
As such, the concept of power sharing has been central to the arguments made by
scholars studying post-conflict peace building. As mentioned in the previous section, Hartzell
(1999) incorporated the concept of power sharing into the literature on peace building to help
explain the stability of negotiated settlements in post-conflict states. Hartzell (1999) argued that
since there is a security dilemma that exists between parties to a negotiated settlement and in
order to prevent “any one party from becoming dominant and exercising central authority,” the
“negotiated settlement should provide institutional guarantees that create a balance of power
between groups to the agreement” (6). Thus, political institutions that reflect power sharing
between parties are the most appropriate for societies emerging out of civil conflicts. Hartzell
41
(1999) argued that PR formula is the most appropriate electoral rule for post-civil conflict states
since it “ensures no concentration of power in the hands of majority, and ensures minority
survival and protection” (9).
There are few scholars who have analyzed the effects of electoral rules chosen in post-
conflict states on peace duration (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006).
These scholars emphasize the importance of electoral system design in post-conflict states.
Mukherjee (2006) analyzed the impact of electoral system (PR vs. plurality/majority formula) on
the durability of peace after a civil war has ended. He empirically showed that PR formula
decreases the likelihood of peace failure (more so than district based plurality systems) in post-
civil war states. He argued that in contrast to the majority/plurality system, PR system provides
opportunities for minority group representation (i.e. rebel groups, ethnic groups) in the
government’s decision making process since the number of seats in the legislature is proportional
to the number of votes received (411). Mukherjee (2006) further argued that the PR formula
“minimizes commitment problems” among groups since it promotes trust via participation and
thus, helps sustain peace (411). Joshi (2013) also showed that PR formula helps sustain peace in
post-conflict states that are transitioning toward democracy.
In a more recent work, Cammett and Malesky (2012) took a step further and opened up
the PR system to analyze how open vs. closed list PR systems impact peace duration after a civil
war has ended. In an open list PR system, they argued that voters select individual candidates
from a list provided by each political party and individual candidates are elected according to a
popular vote (Electoral Reform Society 2014). In contrast, in a closed list PR system, “voters
vote for the party and therefore the list as a whole” and “candidates are selected in the order they
appear on the list (as decided by the party) until all the seats have been filled” (Electoral Reform
42
Society 2014). Cammett and Malesky (2012) argued that since the closed list PR system creates
parties that are more disciplined and coherent, the choice between closed list PR and open list PR
system is important for the stability of the government.8 They emphasized that since there is less
personal voting under a closed list PR system where candidates rely on parties and not on voters,
candidates are more loyal to their party. Their empirical analysis shows that the choice of closed
list PR system rather than open list PR system, leads toward longer peace duration after a civil
war.
Although Cammett and Malesky (2012) suggested that a closed list PR system promotes
peace because it promotes strong parties, I argue that it is unlikely that these effects are
immediate after a civil conflict ends. I posit that in societies emerging out of a civil war, political
parties already exist in the political system and are independent of the electoral system chosen.
This is especially so, because, political parties play an important role in the post-conflict
negotiations (i.e. designing institutions) (Ishiyama and Batta 2011a). It stands to reason that
political parties in post-conflict states are not solely a development of electoral rules and can be
shaped by other factors. Indeed as Douglas Rae (1967) and Maurice Duverger (1954) and many
others have long argued that the organizational effects of electoral systems are one of the “distal
effects” of such systems. In other words, I argue that it is very unlikely that one would see the
organizational strengthening effects of electoral systems in the crucial first years after a civil
conflict ends. I agree with Mukherjee (2006) and Cammett and Malesky (2012) that political
parties play a crucial role in promoting peace duration, yet what this set of literature has missed
is the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules. In
other words, the kinds of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment matters for
8 Lijphart (2004) also argued that closed list PR electoral system “encourage[s] [the] formation and maintenance of strong cohesive political parties” (100).
43
the expected effects of electoral rules on peace duration (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968). The core
argument of this study is further discussed in chapter 3.
2.3 Party Development and Post-Conflict States
Several scholars have argued that the effects of institutional choices on democratic
development are also shaped by the kinds of political actors that populate the competitive scene
(Ishiyama 1997; Moser 1999; Sartori 1968).
Moser (1999) examined whether electoral rules in post communists states (i.e. new
democracies) have the same effect on the number of parties as in consolidated democracies. The
effect of electoral rules on number of parties has primarily been examined in new democracies,
and hence Moser (1999) wanted to see if Duverger's law still holds for new democracies.
Specifically, he focused on the "effect of PR and single member district elections in five post-
communist states to ascertain the effects of electoral systems in the post-communist context"
(360).
Building on Mainwaring's (1998) examination of party institutionalization and Cox's
(1997) arguments regarding strategic voting, Moser (1999) argued that the party systems in
consolidated democracies and in new democracies are different and hence, in new democracies
political parties are not institutionalized. The logic is that parties in new democracies are not well
established and voters have less information on how to vote strategically. Moser (1999) further
argued that weak established parties (weak institutionalized) prevents voters to act strategically,
and hence, in the absence of party identification, he argued voters' votes are based instead on
personal characteristics of candidates patronage (Moser 1999, 364). Without voters acting
strategically, Moser (1999) summarizes that:
44
Without one or two large parties to benefit from strategic voting or disproportionalize, single member district elections fail to constrain the number of candidates per district. Rather, single-member districts produce their own proliferation of partisan and nonpartisan candidates and allow individual candidates with name recognition and financial resources to find success regardless of party affiliation. (377) Moser (1999) highlights that party institutionalization as an intervening variable
influences the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties" (383)9. As noted
by Sartori (1997) the "effects of electoral system cannot be correctly assessed without assessing
at the same time the manipulative and channeling properties of the party system" (37).
Suggesting that more independent candidates instead would flourish in the political system.
Sartori (1968) early on argued that structured parties (those that are ideologically coherent and
have internal discipline, which help them act as “gatekeepers” that help reduce the number of
effective competitors) are likely to assist the reductive effect of plurality/majority formula (and
help prevent the explosion of the number of parties in a proportional representation system).
Moser (1999) in his analysis of the effects of district based electoral systems in post-communist
states, contends that unless there are fairly structured parties, plurality/majority systems will not
have the reductive effect that Duverger had posited—indeed it is likely to have a multiplying
effect on the number of regional or single district parties (and independents). Hence "it is not
only the electoral system, but also the party system that condition" how the voter votes (Sartori
1997, 36). Moser (1999) builds on the work of Sartori (1968), Mainwaring (1998), and Cox
(1997) to argue that "the constraining effects of electoral systems on the number of parties will
9 Institutionalization as defined by Scott Mainwaring is a "process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientation, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future. In politics institutions means that political actors have clear, and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors" (Moser 1999, 360-361). For more information on party institutionalization, please see Mainwaring (1998), Huntington (1965), and Janda (1980). Mainwaring (1998) measured party institutionalization according to continuity of party organization, control over candidate nominations, and the volatility of elector support of parties.
45
be mitigated by the institutionalization of the party system" (360). Suggesting that the types of
parties that populate the political system affect the intended outcomes of electoral rules.
More recently, some scholars have also looked at the organizational role of rebel groups
in promoting the peace after the end of a civil conflict (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012;
Weinstein 2005). Looking at organization of rebel groups, Ishiyama and Batta (2011a) argued
that rebel organizations that are coherent are better able to stick to negotiated agreements than
those organizations that “do not have a history of coherence” (455). They find that more
“institutionalized” rebel groups (or those that have experienced more leadership transitions and
which are not beset by internal violent conflicts) are associated with longer episodes of peace
duration than less institutionalized rebel groups.
A related literature has examined how rebel groups have transformed themselves into
political parties and how their organizational characteristics have shaped post conflict political
environments (Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011b; Manning 2007; Reilly and
Norlund 2008). This literature has been based on realization that the creation of durable peace
settlements requires the active involvement and cooperative engagement of these political
groups. In particular, the focus has been on the transformation of rebel groups into political
parties, a process that provides channels for both interest articulation and political process
engagement for former rebels, thus contributing to a sustainable peace, stability, and democracy
(Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011b; Manning 2007).
Literature on political parties in conflict prone states argued that the type of parties that
populate the post-conflict environment matters for whether or not conflict recurs (Reilly 2006;
Reilly and Norlund 2008). Although focusing on conflict in ethnically divided societies rather
than on peace duration, Reilly (2006) and Reilly and Norlund (2008) argued that there is a link
46
between type of political parties and conflict. One of the ways to help manage conflict in
ethnically divided societies they argued is to implement electoral rules that encourage the
development of political parties to be broad and cross-regional. Although, since political parties
already exist in the political system, it is highly unlikely they will be shaped by the electoral
rules that they created. Reilly (2006) argued that parties that are multi-ethnic are "capable of
making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of policy options to the
electorate" and thus, making themselves less ethnic (816). Additionally, scholars such as
Horowitz (1985) and Huntington (1968) also advocated for broad-based parties for democracies
with ethnically divided and conflict prone societies.
2.4 Summary
The above literature indicates that not only is the outcome of the civil war, the
characteristics of the civil war, the characteristics of the post-conflict environment, and more
recently the effects of political institutions matters for peace duration, but also the kinds of
political organizations that populate the post-conflict environment also matter. There is a
common agreement among scholars studying peace duration that electoral rules matters. Even
scholars such as Giovanni Sartori in Comparative Constitutional Engineering put forth the
following questions: "If electoral systems were of little consequences why on earth would
politicians’ fights so bitterly about them? And why would reformers fight so persistently to have
them changed?" (1997, 27). Indeed, the design of electoral rules continues to be an important
topic for both scholars and policymakers. Yet, the literature on peace-building has missed the
independent role that political parties play in promoting peace in post-conflict states. The
literature indicates that political parties involved in the post-conflict environment are also
47
important to consider in the study on peace building. This includes the organizational
characteristics of the rebel groups (turned parties) or the characteristics of parties associated with
the government as well. The combination of the existing literature on peace duration with the
literature on political institutions and party development in post-conflict prone states, represents
a promising new venue for future research.
48
CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model to address the research question posed
above: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are
those effects conditional upon other factors? Building on the literature discussed in the previous
chapter, I propose that the answer depends upon the kinds of political parties that populate the
party system. Specifically, the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the
types of political parties that populate the post-conflict environment.
As defined in the previous chapter, electoral rules determine how votes are translated into
seats. Electoral rules are important to look at since the choice of electoral rules influences the
representation of certain political parties in the legislature (Reilly 2006). Work on political
engineering and party development has emphasized that since many new democracies are also
ethnically plural societies, they "face the twin challenge of opening up the space for political
competition while restricting the politicization of ethnicity" (Reilly and Norlund 2008, 21). As
such, many post-conflict states have moved to not only regulating formal constitutional rules but
also regulating parties to manage division and to consolidate parties (Reilly and Norlund 2008).
A recent focus among scholars on designing institutions has been on electoral rules that allow
more parties to participate in the legislature but at the same time de-emphasize ethnicity (Reilly
and Norlund 2008). In this dissertation, I make a contribution to previous studies that have
examined the relationship between electoral rules and peace duration (i.e. Cammett and Malesky
2012; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006) by introducing the role political parties play in managing
conflict.
49
Work by Reilly (2006) and Reilly and Norlund (2008) emphasizes that the type of parties
that populate the post-conflict environment matters for whether or not conflict recurs. Although
they focus on conflict in ethnically divided societies rather than on peace duration, they argued
that there is a link between the types of political parties exist and conflict. One of the ways to
help manage conflict, in ethnically divided societies, they argue is to implement electoral rules
that encourage the development of political parties to be broad and cross-regional (Reilly 2006;
Reilly and Norlund 2008). Especially since "...parties often form around the very same cleavages
that provoked the original fighting, leading to the continuation of the former conflict through the
electoral process" (Reilly and Norlund 2008, 17). Reilly (2006) and Reilly and Norlund (2008)
argued that parties that are multi-ethnic are "capable of making cross ethnic appeals and
presenting a complex and divers range of policy options to the electorate" and thus, making
themselves less ethnic (Reilly 2006, 816). Suggesting that parties need to be broad.
Other scholars have also advocated for broad-based parties in democracies with
ethnically divided societies and conflict prone states. Horowitz (1991) argued that to manage
conflict parties must be "broad multi-ethnic" and Huntington (1991) posit that ethnically
exclusive parties are bad for democracies (see Reilly 2006). Suggesting that the type of parties
involved in the post-conflict environment are also important to consider in the study on peace
duration. Additionally, as previously discussed, work by Moser (1999) in his study of electoral
rules and political parties in post-communist states, argued that the types of political parties that
populate the political system affect the intended outcomes of the electoral system. Also
suggesting that the types of political parties mitigates the effects of electoral rules. Although
Lijphart (1969; 2004) would agree that ethnic parties are not bad, most other scholars have
supported the idea that broad-based parties are better at managing conflict, since broad-based
50
parties encourage candidates to reach out to other ethnic groups (Brass 1991; Horowitz 1991;
Huntington 1991).
3.2 Theory
To begin, I first propose that political parties are not only affected by electoral rules but
are also shaped by other factors in the political environment. Although this assumption is
contrary to scholars such as Cammett and Malesky (2012), Duverger (1954), Horowitz (1985;
1991), Lijphart (1969; 2004), Mukherjee (2006), Reilly (2006), and Reilly and Norlund (2008)
that speak of political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate
the choice of electoral systems. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties indeed play an
important role in the negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. As
Ishiyama and Batta (2011b) argued that political parties after the end of a civil war are involved
in the negotiations of the "conditions of the settlement and compete for elections" and "the
creation of durable peace settlements [that] requires the active involvement and cooperative
engagement of these political parties" (Ishiyama and Batta 2011b, 369-70). I argue that since
political parties in post-conflict states are at the forefront of designing political institutions, they
are not solely the product of the development of electoral rules because they already exist in the
political system. Building on Duverger (1954) and Rae (1967), as stated previously, it is unlikely
that one would see the organizational strengthening effects of electoral system in the crucial first
years after a civil conflict ends. Thus political parties in post-conflict states can be expected to
have independent effects on peace, quite apart from the effects of the electoral system,
particularly in the short run after the end of a civil war. As Moser (1999) in his analysis of new
democracies and Sartori (1968) early on have argued that political parties exist apart from
51
electoral rules. Moreover, political parties in post-conflict states are also the development of
rebel movements turned into political parties (Clapham 1998; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009). Such
as, the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) party in Angola, the
RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) party in Mozambique, and the FMLN (Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front) party in El Salvador are all examples of rebel groups that were
transformed into political parties.
Second, building on Moser (1999) and Sartori (1968), I argue that the effects of electoral
rules (open list proportional representation (PR), district based, and closed list proportional
representation (PR) systems) on peace duration are mitigated by how broad or narrow the party
system is. I define broad-based parties in comparison to narrow-based parties according to
Chandra’s (2011) definition of ethnic versus multi-ethnic parties. Chandra (2011) defines an
ethnic party “as a party that is the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or
set of categories” and a multi-ethnic party as “one that champions the interests of all significant
ethnic categories in a society without excluding any” (155). Her definition is grounded on an
important concept of ethnic group exclusion, where ethnic is “an umbrella term for a number of
identities” and an ethnic group is a subset of descent-based categories that “includes only identity
categories based on the region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan,
tribe or nationality of one’s own parents or ancestors, or one’s own physical features” (Chandra
2011, 154-155). Since an ethnic party may represent more than one group in the society, as
argued by Horowitz (1985), she focuses on ethnic exclusion to make a distinction between these
The main distinction between an ethnic and a multi-ethnic party according to the definition proposed here lies not in the number of categories that each attempts to include, but in whether or not there is a category that each attempts to exclude. An ethnic party, regardless of how many categories it claims to speak for, speaks for particular
52
interests…..A multi-ethnic party, while also invoking ethnic identities, does not exclude any groups on the salient dimension(s) of identity. (157) In other words, the only way to determine if the party is ethnic or multi-ethnic, she states,
is not by how many groups are represented, but if any ethnic groups are excluded based on the
above descent based categories. Multi-ethnic parties do not exclude, while ethnic parties do
(157). Ethnic parties are in essence narrow-based parties that seek to exclude some groups based
on certain descent-based attributes, and multi-ethnic parties are in essence broad-based parties
that are integrative and inclusive parties which seek to represent all ethnic groups in the society.
For example, a religious political party that excludes at least one group from membership based
on certain descent-based attributes is a narrow-based party. However, a political party that differs
based on ideology and does not exclude any group from representation based on descent-based
attributes would be considered broad-based in this study.
To examine the degree to which broad and narrow-based parties exist in the party system,
I focus on the percentage of seats in the legislature that are controlled by broad or narrow parties.
Although Chandra (2011) provides eight indicators to classify ethnic parties (i.e. name,
categories advocated by party in campaign message, groups who vote for party, the composition
of the party’s votes, the composition of its leadership and its arena of contestation), there are
other indicators such as symbols and the context of the society that can be taken into
consideration when parties are classified as ethnic or multi-ethnic (157). In this study, for
example, an Islamic party in a Christian predominant society would be considered narrow.
Keeping the context of the society in mind, a Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD) in
Moldova would be considered broad. Hence, focusing solely on the name of the party or symbols
is not sufficient in identifying the percentage of seats that are controlled by broad or narrow-
53
based parties in the parliament. In chapter 4, I further discuss the operationalization of broad
versus narrow parties.
In post-conflict societies, feelings of hatred and hostility continue to exist between groups
that fought with each other. It is not surprising then that low trust exists between groups that
fought each other (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie
2003). As Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) note, in ethnically divided societies, parties are formed
along ethnic lines and gain support based on ethnic divisions rather than political issues. In post-
conflict states, political groups that emerge are based on pre-existing ethnic divisions and
cleavages, and have fought based on those divisions (Reilly and Norlund 2008). It stands to
reason that the existence of ethnic divisions among political groups creates a lack of trust among
political parties.
As mentioned previously, Reilly and Norlund (2008) argued that electoral rules that
encourage the development of political parties that are broad and cross-regional help manage
conflict in ethnically divided societies. This is also suggested by Cammett and Malesky (2012) in
their study on peace duration by empirically showing that closed list PR systems promote peace
because such systems promote strong and disciplined parties. In other words, they argued that
electoral rules affect party development. Mukherjee (2006) in the same manner argued that
electoral rules affect party development, by empirically showing that list PR systems decrease
the likelihood of peace failure by allowing more parties to participate in the legislature. Instead, I
argue that political parties are not only shaped by electoral rules and whether or not peace is
maintained depends on the extent to which the majority of seats in the parliament are controlled
by broad (i.e. multi-ethnic) or narrow (i.e. ethnic) parties.
54
Given this, under closed list PR systems where voters vote for parties directly, I propose
that the more seats in the parliament that are controlled by broad-based political parties, the more
inclusive and moderate the party system becomes and this helps address the security concerns
that political parties have. Moreover, broad-based political parties are more willing to join
coalitions, and this can help create stability in the government under a closed list PR system. In
this dissertation, I defined political parties as "...any group, however loosely organized, seeking
to elect governmental office holders under a given label" according to the minimalist definition
by Leon Epstein. Since I am interested in post-conflict parliamentary elections, I examine
political parties that have gained seats in the parliament.
3.2.1 Effects of Electoral Rules
Early on, scholars analyzing electoral rules, have looked at the link between electoral
rules and the number of political parties in the system. Duverger (1954) proposed that electoral
rules have both mechanical and psychological effects. The mechanical effect is how votes are
translated into seats (i.e. the vote-seat relationship) and the psychological effect involves voter's
behavior and participation. Duverger (1954) argued that district based systems
(plurality/majority system) favor two-party system since the candidate with the most votes wins
the election. Hence, candidates under this electoral system must appeal to as many voters as
possible, to broaden their base. He further argued that list PR systems encourages multipartism
since voters cast ballots for parties, and parties with the most votes choose candidates from their
party list (Duverger 1954). In other words, he argued that plurality/majority systems have a
reductionist affect and the list PR system allows the emergence of many parties. The
psychological effect is where voters under the plurality/majority formula would realize that large
55
parties are the ones that win, and would thus vote for the "lesser evil of the two" (Lijphart 1999).
In short, electoral rules shape the party system.
Although, Lijphart's (1969; 2004) concept of consociationalism did not address post-
conflict societies and instead focused more on democratic stability in divided societies and less
on securing peace, some scholars continue to view this form of power sharing as a solution to
managing conflict. His approach has been applied to managing conflict in both ethnically divided
societies and post-conflict societies with a focus on securing peace. Under consociationalism, all
ethnic groups would have the same opportunity for inclusion and political parties could "define
themselves into ethnically based parties and thereby gain representation in the parliament in
proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole" (Reilly 2002, 157). Lijphart (1969;
2004) argued that preventing the participation of all parties and exclusion of groups by district
based systems can actually lead to conflict. In sum, his approach focuses on ensuring that all
groups are included in the government. In other words, he advocated for the list PR system (open
versus closed list PR system) where multiple candidates can win in a district and the goal is to
ensure that the share of votes received is proportional to the share of seats received in the
legislature (Ishiyama 2012; Lijphart 1999). Moreover in countries with list PR systems, some
scholars have argued that citizens are more satisfied with the political system, because there are
more parties and coalitions in the system (Ishiyama 2012, 171).
Focusing on ethnically divided societies, Horowitz (1985) instead argued that exclusion
of radical groups from participating in the legislature is better for divided societies. His
preferential system approach focused on allowing "voters to rank order their choices among
different parties or candidates on the ballot paper" (Reilly 2002, 157). This electoral formula
would: first, de-emphasize ethnicity; second, allow voters to select candidates that would in turn
56
force candidates to seek support across different groups; third, voters would base their choice of
candidates based on issues and not ethnicity; and fourth, candidates would "depend on votes
from groups other than their own" (Reilly 2002, 157). Preferential electoral systems, such as
Alternative Vote and Single Transferable Vote, would "enable electors to indicate how they
would vote if their favored candidate was defeated and they had to choose among those
remaining" (Reilly 2002, 157).
Horowitz (1985) argued that implementation of closed list PR system would freeze ethnic
cleavages and this would lead toward stalemates in the legislature and recurrence of conflict.
Moreover, with closed list PR system, he argued voters are not voting for candidates directly
which promotes parties based on cleavages, and this provides "no incentives to moderate a
party's position on anything" (Ishiyama 2012, 164). In other words, he argued that list PR system
reinforces the cleavages that political groups had fought previously on. Currently, only Australia
and Papua New Guinea use Alternative Vote and only Ireland and Malta use Single Transferable
Vote. Interestingly, no post-conflict country use either electoral rule in parliamentary elections.
The reason Horowitz and Reilly support such systems is that candidates seek support from other
ethnic groups, and "may adopt more conciliatory or moderate stances on ethnically divisive
issues” (Ishiyama 2012, 171). Horowitz proposed that such systems lead to the creation of inter-
ethnic coalitions and an "alternative vote is workable solution for promoting interethnic
accommodations" (Ishiyama 2012, 171). Parties become more moderate and gravitate toward the
center (Ishiyama 2012, 171). In reality, more post-conflict states have chosen list PR electoral
system for their divided societies.
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3.2.2 Role of Political Parties
As Moser (1999) argued in his study on electoral rules and political parties in post-
communist states, the types of political parties that populate the political system affect the
intended outcomes of the electoral system. His analysis of the effects of district based electoral
systems in post-communist states showed that unless there are fairly structured parties, district
based systems will not have the reductive effect that Duverger had posited--indeed it is likely to
have a multiplying effect on the number of regional or single district parties (and independents).
Suggesting that the type of parties mitigates the effects of electoral rules.
Statistics have shown that more post-conflict states continue to embrace list PR electoral
systems and yet, there are recurrences of civil wars. This suggests that more research is needed
on electoral rules and peace duration. Cammett and Malesky (2012) took a step further to
analyze how open list PR versus closed list PR systems affect peace duration and governance.
They found that closed list PR system leads to a longer duration of peace since it creates parties
that are strong and disciplined, and creates less defection. Although, electoral rules do shape
political parties, in post-conflict states political parties already exist and it is the type of political
parties under closed list PR system that affects the outcome of electoral rules on peace duration.
Regarding the impact of electoral formula, several scholars have suggested that electoral
systems that highlight individual competition as opposed to group competition are more likely to
reduce the likelihood of conflict than systems that emphasize “group competition” (Ishiyama
2000). In particular Brass (1991) as well as Horowitz (1985) have suggested that district based
formula that emphasize individual candidate competition is better at diffusing conflicts
particularly in ethnically divided societies.
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Open list PR system allows more parties to participate (no exclusion) and allows voters to
choose candidates directly. I predict then that open list PR system rather than closed list PR
system is better for post-conflict states. I believe it is the ideal type of electoral system that
combines the views of both Lijphart (1969; 2004) and Horowitz (1985; 1991). Under open list
PR system, candidates must appeal to all voters and will therefore broaden their policies and
focus less on divisions. District based systems should behave like open list PR system because
they lessen party control over candidates and generally have less discipline. District based
systems and open list PR systems are candidates based systems since they both emphasize
individual competition.
Under a closed list PR system, the order of candidates on the list is determined by
incumbency and seniority. Voters vote for party directly rather than candidates. This forces
candidates to be dependent on political parties for participation in the legislature. Political
parties act as gate keepers, impede party formation, and become cohesive and disciplined
(Cammett and Malesky 2012). In post-conflict states, parties already emerge as ethnic
(exclusive) parties, since they evolved from political actors that fought with each other based on
those cleavages. Not only do these electoral rules keep their candidates "in line," but also creates
ethnic (exclusive) parties which can lead to peace failure. In sum, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war than post-conflict states with candidate centered systems (i.e. open list PR/district based systems). Scholars such as Reilly and Horowitz have argued that broad-based parties are better for
managing conflict. Although the majority of work on party engineering and political institutions
has been descriptive, more empirical research is needed on party development. I define broad-
based parties as those political parties that do not exclude any ethnic group(s) according to
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Chandra’s (2011) definition of ethnic and multi-ethnic parties. Drawing on this reasoning,
perhaps the solution for the debate on the best electoral rules for divided societies and post-
conflict societies is grounded on the kinds of parties that populate the party system. Under a
closed list PR system, I predict that the more seats in the legislature that are controlled by broad
parties, the more moderate and inclusive the party system becomes, and this helps promote a
more durable peace. Suggesting that to manage conflict under party centered systems, the more
broad political parties need to be.
I propose that party centered systems which create disciplined and ethnic parties, would
increase the hazard rate of peace failure, yet when interacted with broad-based (i.e. inclusive)
parties would reduce the likelihood of peace failure. I suggest that peace can be sustained in
post-conflict states with a closed list PR system only when broad (i.e. inclusive) parties win more
seats in the parliament. I predict that under a party centered system (i.e. closed list PR system),
post-conflict states are less likely to have a recurrence of civil war as more seats in the legislature
are controlled by broad-based parties than party centered systems without this interaction. Broad
parties appeal to all with the goal of getting as many votes as possible. Work by Anthony Downs
termed this as "median voter" where political parties would appeal to all voters but and at the
same time not appeal to extremist or ethnically based views (Ishiyama 2012, 160). More
specifically, the party centered systems with broad-based parties force parties to moderate their
stance, and appeal to as many voters as possible. Based on the above framework, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system) interacting with an increased percent of legislature seats controlled by broad parties, are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war. Hypothesis 3: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the legislature are controlled by narrow parties than controlled by broad parties.
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3.3 Summary
To summarize, trust between warring parties can be created when there are less ethnic
divisions between them and when parties compete against each other based on policies rather
than ethnic divisions. Scholars such as Brass (1991), Huntington (1991), Horowitz (1991), and
Reilly (2006) have all advocated for broad multi-ethnic parties to manage conflict in divided
societies. The key for sustaining peace in post-conflict states under closed list PR system is for
parties to appeal to other groups in the society and hence, become broad. For example, countries
such as Turkey and Nigeria use tactics to promote parties to appeal to other ethnic groups in the
society. Reilly (2006) emphasized there are four approaches that can lead to the development of
"centrist, aggregative, and multi-ethnic political parties of coalitions of parties that are capable of
making cross ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of policy options to the
electorate" (816). Such as: “1) cross-national party formation rules which require parties to
demonstrate a broad organization base; 2) design of electoral rules to reshape the party system;
3) build greater internal party discipline and organization capacity; and 4) international
intervention to influence party formation” (816). The above suggests that political parties are not
solely the consequence of electoral rules, but shaped by other factors in the society. Hence,
political parties play an important independent role in managing conflict in post-conflict
societies.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I developed a theoretical model to analyze which types of
electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace. I also check whether those
effects are conditional upon other factors. The theory led to three hypotheses focusing on the
independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace
duration (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968). To summarize, the main argument of this study is that the
effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is
narrow or broad. The hypotheses were formed on the basis of the following two assumptions:
first, political parties are not simply the product of electoral rules since they are at the forefront
of designing political institutions and hence, already exist in the party system. Second, whether
or not peace is maintained depends on the extent to which the majority of seats in the parliament
are controlled by broad (inclusive) or narrow (exclusive) parties.
From this theoretical framework, I derived the following three hypotheses:
• First, post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list
proportional representation (PR) system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war
than post-conflict states with candidate centered systems (i.e. open list PR/district based
systems).
• Second, post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR
system) interacting with an increased percent of legislature seats controlled by broad
parties, are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war.
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• Third, post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system)
are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the legislature are
controlled by narrow parties than controlled by broad parties.
In this chapter, I empirically test these hypotheses using proportional hazard analysis (i.e.
survival analysis) on a sample of post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009. The results of my
analysis support Hypotheses 2 and 3, which are consistent with the main argument of this study
that political parties play an important role in the relationship between political institutions and
peace duration after a conflict ends. I find that post-conflict states that employ closed list PR
system in comparison to other electoral rules is unrelated to whether or not there is an outbreak
of civil war. Yet, the findings show that the degree to which a party system is narrow or broad
matters for peace. Suggesting that peace can be sustained in post-conflict states with party
centered systems (i.e. closed list PR system) only when broad (i.e. integrative) parties win more
seats in the parliament, thereby forcing parties to moderate their stance, and appeal to as many
voters as possible. This chapter shows that the greater the extent to which the majority of seats in
the parliament are controlled by broad parties, the more likely the risk of an outbreak of civil war
will diminish under a closed list PR system.
I begin this chapter with the description of the dataset and a discussion of the empirical
model that I use to conduct the statistical analysis of this study. Second, I describe and discuss
how I measure and operationalize the dependent, independent, and control variables of this
study. Third, I conduct several statistical analysis to empirically examine these hypotheses. I
conclude this chapter with a discussion highlighting the implications of the findings for scholars
studying post-conflict peace duration in the field of comparative politics.
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4.2 The Dataset
To empirically examine the hypotheses, I created a dataset using the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset for civil wars that occurred between 1990 and 200910. The UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al.
2002; Themner 2011; Themner and Wallensteen 2011). There are four types of conflicts that the
dataset defines: extrasystemic armed conflict (i.e. conflicts that occur between a state and a non-
state group outside its own territory); interstate armed conflict (i.e. conflicts that occur between
two or more states); internal armed conflict (i.e. conflicts that occur between the government of a
state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states); and
internationalized internal armed conflict (i.e. conflicts that occur between the government of a
state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states on one or
both sides) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner 2011; Themner and Wallensteen 2011). Given that I
am interested in examining the outbreak of civil war, I examine all countries that have
experienced internal armed conflicts and internationalized internal armed conflicts between 1990
and 2009. As such, I exclude extrasystemic armed conflicts and interstate armed conflicts from
the dataset.
Among a number of other datasets on armed conflicts, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset is the only one with a low fatality threshold for inclusion of a conflict in the dataset. As
10 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset provides data on armed conflicts since 1946. This dataset is a joint project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Additional information on the dataset and codebook are available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/
such, this makes the dataset more useful when examining the outbreak of a civil war as the
dependent variable (Eck 2005, 11). For example, the Correlates of War (COW) project "employs
the high fatality threshold of 1,000 annual fatalities for inclusion of a conflict in the dataset "and
hence thereby excluding "well-known conflicts that do not meet the threshold of 1,000 in a
single year" (Eck 2005, 11; Gleditsch et al. 2002)11. By utilizing this dataset, I am able to
analyze more countries that have experienced both minor and high intensity conflicts (i.e.
outbreak of civil war). According to this dataset, a minor armed conflict is defined as "at least 25
battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths" and a civil war is
defined by a high intensity level of "at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year"
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner 2011; Themner and Wallensteen 2011).
Most datasets that examine the onset and occurrence of civil war employ country-year as
the unit of analysis (Eck 2005). A unit of analysis is the level of analysis that is to be studied and
in this study is country-year. Country-year data structure is where "each observation period is set
up so that all countries are included for all years of observation" (Eck 2005, 13). There are 1,051
country-year observations in the dataset
As previously mentioned, not all countries entered the dataset in 1990. Since I am
interested in analyzing which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promotes
peace, the year of multiparty elections guided when countries entered the dataset. For example, if
a county had a multiparty election in 1985, the country entered the dataset in 1990. If a country
for example had a multiparty election in 1996, the county entered the dataset in 1996.
Additionally, countries that did not have legislative elections before 1990, and between 1990 and
11 The Correlates of War project (COW) and UCDP/Armed Conflict Dataset are most widely used datasets on civil wars. COW is the seminal conflict dataset that employs an annual fatality threshold of 1,000 (Eck 2005). COW was the "predominant conflict dataset until quite recently when other conflict data projects were established, in part as a reaction to perceived drawbacks with COW's definitions" (Eck 2005, 5).
65
2009 were excluded from the dataset. I define an election as the process of multiparty
competition. As such, country-years where voters voted for an approved list of preselected
candidates were also removed from the dataset (i.e. Angola in 1990 and in 1991). I examine this
time period since more countries emerged in the post-communist era, more available data, and
had an increase in the number of elections involving multiple parties. Countries that are very
democratic were also excluded from the dataset since these countries are unlikely candidates to
experience an outbreak of civil war and including such countries can lead to biased conclusions
(Geddes 2003, 70)12. Countries that were excluded from the dataset are: Eritrea, India, Israel,
Philippines, Somalia, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States. As such, there are 57 post-conflict states in the dataset (please see Table 1.1 in chapter 1
for a list of all countries included in the dataset).
Additionally, for those countries that did not have legislative elections in 1990, I looked
10 years prior to determine which kinds of electoral rules were chosen. Since the dataset is
structured as country-year, the values for electoral rules prior to 1990 were used for the 1990
observation and for the following years until the next election year. In other words, there is a lag
effect between elections for each country-year observation. This strategy was also used to collect
data for party system characteristics control variables. In Table 4.1, the data structure is
illustrated for selected variables for Algeria. The headings of the columns reflect the selected
variables where the “avgagepartiestopfive” is a control variable for the average age of the top
five parties in the legislature and “percentbroad” refers to the percent of seats in the legislature
controlled by broad parties.
12 Countries that scored consistently an 8 or above on the Polity2 were excluded since they are not likely candidates to have an outbreak of civil war. Please see Geddes (2003) for a detailed discussion on selection of cases.
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TABLE 4.1 Structure of the Dataset for Algeria, 1990-2009 country
To analyze the data, I employ a stratified Cox proportional hazard model to examine the
relationship between electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states and the outbreak of a civil war.
The Cox model is appropriate in this study since it assesses the risk of peace failure (i.e. outbreak
of civil war). The Cox model is a statistical method that produces a hazard rate that reflects "the
risk an object incurs at any given moment in time, given an event has not occurred" (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1419). By estimating this model, I obtain a hazard rate of peace
failure (i.e. outbreak of civil war) for a given choice of an electoral rule controlling for other
factors that may affect peace duration. An increase in the hazard rate suggests that there is an
67
increase in the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war and a decrease in the hazard rate suggests
there is a decrease in the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war.
The Cox model is a non-parametric model which means it does not require an assumption
about the form of the baseline hazard rate. In other words, the baseline hazard rate is not time
dependent. Additionally, the model assumes that the "relative hazards over different covariate
values are proportional," meaning that "the effect of any covariate" has "a proportional and
constant effect that is invariant to when in the process the values of the covariate changes" (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1433; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). Parametric models,
such as the Weibull regression, also assume proportional hazards13. However, parametric models
"are not widely used outside the social sciences as is the Cox model, as a result, tests, and
remedies for nonproportional in the parametric context are largely nonexistent" (Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2003, 35-40). It has been argued that "estimation of proportional hazards
models when hazards are, in fact, nonproportional can result in biased estimates, incorrect
standard errors, and faulty inferences about the substantive impact of independent variables
(Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001, 972). Scholars in political science "prefer the Cox model to
parametric models due to its less restrictive assumptions" (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn
2003, 40). Therefore, I employ the Cox model to "relax the parametric assumption of the
Weibull Model" and conduct "tests for the [proportional hazard] assumption" (Box-
Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003, 40). As the following analysis will show, the test for
nonproportional hazard assumption is conducted for each model in the analysis.
13 The Weibull model is a parametric model, where the baseline hazard rate is time dependent. If the shape of the hazard function is not known, choosing the wrong shape can have a "substantial impact on the inferences one makes about the process" and "estimating an event history model without having to specify or parameterize time-dependency would be useful" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1432). The Cox proportional hazard model, on the other hand, does this. It is widely used in social sciences and does not require an assumption about the form of hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).
68
Since some of the countries in the dataset have not experienced a failure (i.e. an outbreak
of civil war) after 2009, they were not included as a failure. In effect, the data is right censored,
and the last case for each country is right-censored. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) have
argued that "if a unit does not experience an event by the time the last observation period ends,
the unit is right censored" (1421). I corrected for this using the stset command in Stata 13.
Additionally, scholars studying civil wars have argued that once a nation experiences a
civil war it is highly likely to experience another one (Mason et al. 2011; Quinn, Mason, and
Gurses 2007). Suggesting that repeated events matter and can increase the hazard rate of future
conflicts. Following Mason et al. (20011) and Ishiyama and Breuning (2012), I created a simple
count variable called "Count Civil Wars Before" to stratify the Cox analysis to address this
problem. I stratified the Cox model by this variable to "allow each strata to have its own baseline
hazard rate while coefficients are restricted to be the same across strata" (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 160; Ishiyama and Breuning 2012, 71).
I estimate each model in the analysis by clustered standard errors. Since each observation
in the dataset "consist[s] of repeated observations of the same country over time, it is reasonable
to expect observations within each country may be temporarily dependent" (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones 2004, 115). In other words, there can be temporal dependency among observations
within each country. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) suggest that if this is not fixed, "the
estimated standard errors will be incorrect" and "usually be smaller when clustering is not
accounted for" (114-116). The solution is to use robust standard errors clustered on country to
account for time dependence among observations within a country which produced 55 clusters
by country (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cleves et al. 2008, 157-158; Lin and Wei 1989).
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4.4 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is civil war recurrence. I define civil war recurrence as an
outbreak of civil war where the intensity level of a conflict has reached at least 1,000 battle-
related deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002). As mentioned previously, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
dataset differentiates between low intensity conflicts (i.e. minor conflicts) and high intensity
conflicts (i.e. outbreak of civil wars). The dataset defines a minor conflict as "at least 25 battle-
related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths" and a civil war is defined by a
high intensity level of "at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year" (Gleditsch et al. 2002;
(Themner 2011; Themner and Wallensteen 2011).
An outbreak of civil war in this study is the incidence of failure when there has been at
least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given country-year. In survival analysis, the "dependent
variable is an indicator variable denoting whether or not an event occurred. At each observation
point, an individual is coded either a "0" denoting no event occurred, or a "1" denoting the
occurrence of an event. Therefore, there are as many 0 and 1 codings in the dataset as there are
person-period observations" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1423). Hence, the dependent
variable in this study is a dichotomous variable coded as "1" for country-years in which a civil
war (at least 1,000 battle deaths) occurred and "0" for country-years where a minor conflict or no
conflicts occurred. In total, there are 57 post-conflict states and 1,051 observations in the dataset.
4.5 Independent Variables
The independent variable in this study is the kinds of electoral rules chosen in post-
conflict states. I choose to examine the following commonly analyzed electoral rules: party
centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) and candidate centered electoral systems
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(i.e. open list PR and district based systems). Since I am interested in examining whether voters
directly vote for parties instead of candidates and the extent to which the candidate selection
process is party controlled, it is intuitive to code this variable as a dichotomous variable where
"1" is coded for closed list PR systems and "0" for open list PR/district based systems for each
country-year. In addition, coding electoral rules as a dichotomous variable rather than average
district magnitude (i.e. where more candidates in a district that win indicate the more PR the
system is) is also used by Cammett and Malesky (2012). In this study, countries that have mixed
systems were coded as having either a closed list PR or an open list PR component. It has been
argued that the "PR element" in mixed systems is usually included to "compensate for any
disproportionality that arises under the plurality/majority or other system" (Reynolds et al. 2005,
29). I rely on the 2012 Database of Political Institutions, Matt Golder’s Democratic Electoral
Systems (DES) 2005 dataset, and PARLINE Database on National Parliaments for data on
electoral systems from 1990 to 200914.
Other scholars, such as Cammett and Malesky (2012), have also relied on Database of
Political Institutions for data on electoral rules in their research. I expect that post-conflict states
with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an
outbreak of civil war than conflict states with candidate centered systems (i.e. open list
PR/district based systems) (Hypothesis 1). This argument contradicts Cammett and Malesky
(2012) that have previously argued that closed list PR system are less likely to resume conflict
(994).
There is also an interaction variable, broad control, which I created to measure the extent
to which the percent of seats in the legislature are controlled by broad parties (inclusive) and
14 The World Bank's Database of Political Institutions was created in part by Phillip Keefer at the World Bank and has data on political institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
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narrow (exclusive) parties. I define broad parties based on Chandra's (2011) definition as those
political parties that do not exclude any ethnic groups and instead seek to appeal to all ethnic
groups in the society. Chandra (2011) argues that ethnic parties are the "champion of the
particular interest of one ethnic category or set of categories" and a multi-ethnic parties are the
ones that "champions the interests of all significant ethnic categories in a society without
excluding any" (Chandra 2011, 155).
Thus, ethnic parties are those that exclude and multi-ethnic parties are those that do not
exclude at least one ethnic group (i.e. broad) based on a descent-based attributes. I relied on the
2012 Database of Political Institutions, PARLINE Database on National Parliaments, the 2012
Political Handbook of the World, the 2005 Political Parties of the World, and other sources
online, such as the Election Results Archive from the Center on Democratic Performance at
Binghamton University to determine if political parties seek support from one group or all
groups in the society. These databases combined helped provide the names of all political parties
participating in the legislative elections between 1990 and 2009, and their basic background
information (i.e. age of party, number of seats held in the parliament, how they formed, who they
represent and exclude, their ideology, etc.). These sources combined were very helpful especially
for political parties whose mission statements were not available.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, besides the name of the party and the symbols the parties use,
the context of the society and their origin is taken into consideration when parties are labeled as
broad or narrow. Narrow parties are those that exclude segment(s) of a society based on identity
categories such as “region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or
nationality” (Chandra 2011, 154). In other words, parties that make cross ethnic appeals and de-
emphasize ethnicity are broad-based parties. For example, political parties that emphasize
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religion would be regarded as narrow parties and those that seek to promote social causes (i.e.
economic development) would be considered as broad. I look only at political parties that are
relevant (i.e. effective parties). I define effective parties as those that have won seats in a
parliamentary election. Based on the sources, I looked to see if the five biggest parties are
ethnically based, such as identity or religious parties, and whether they seek to exclude some
groups in the society and make a narrow appeal to the public. The procedure that I use to
calculate the percent broad party control is as follows: first, based on Chandra's (2011)
definition, I determined which political parties are broad and which ones are narrow. Second, I
divided the total number of seats the narrow parties held by the total number of parliamentary
seats to get a percent of how many seats the narrow parties control. I then subtracted this percent
from 100 to get the percent of seats broad parties control in the parliament:
Percent Broad Party Control= 100 − �Total Number of Narrow Party Seats
Total Number of Parliamentary Seats� ∗ 100
This produces a continuous measure of broad control for each country-year observation.
This is an interaction variable that is interacted with the closed list PR system variable to
examine Hypothesis 2. I expect that post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e.
closed list PR system) interacting with an increased percent of legislature seats controlled by
broad parties, are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war (Hypothesis 2). Additionally, I
expect party centered electoral systems are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war when
most seats in the legislature are controlled by narrow parties that when all seats are controlled by
broad parties (Hypothesis 3).
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4.6 Control Variables
It is often argued that "in order to establish definitive relations among the phenomena
observed, it may not be sufficient to specify only independent and dependent variables"
(Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, 50). Thus, to avoid spurious relationship between the dependent
and independent variables, I control for other factors that are known to affect civil war
recurrence (i.e. outbreak of civil war). A spurious relation is where "a relation between the
independent and dependent variables that appear to be valid but is actually explained by
variables other than those stated in the hypothesis" (Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, 50, 387).
Moreover, if "the researcher can eliminate (or control for) the influence of all the other possible
variables and still obtain an empirical relation between the independent and dependent variables,
the relation is nonspurious" (Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, 50-51).
Hence, I also consider a number of control variables that have been shown to affect
recurrence of civil wars in post-conflict states, such as: characteristics of the civil war (i.e.
duration of previous conflict, intensity of previous conflict); characteristics of the post-conflict
polarization, geographical location, presence of elections, directly elected president); outcome of
civil war (presence of peace agreement, inclusion of electoral rules in the peace agreement); and
party system characteristics (i.e. total number of parties, average age of parties).
4.6.1 Conflict Control Variables
Several scholars have argued that the characteristics of the previous conflict can impact
the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses
2007). Studies have shown that the longer the duration of conflict, the lower is the risk of civil
74
war recurrence due to a war weariness effect (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). As such, I
control for the duration of previous conflict where I measure this variable in terms of number of
years of the previous conflict for a given country-year (i.e. where conflict is defined as over 25
battle related deaths). I refer to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset for this information.
Additionally, I also include the intensity level of the previous conflict as a control variable to
examine whether greater casualties lead to a recurrence of civil war. Some scholars have argued
that greater fatalities can lead to greater probability of civil war. On the other hand, some
scholars have argued it can lead to exhaustion and less likely to restart a civil war. I refer to the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset measure "INT" (i.e. intensity of conflict). I recoded the
INT measure so that a previous conflict was coded as “0” for no battle deaths or less than 25, “1”
for low intensity conflicts (25-999 deaths), and “2” for where fighting reached a high intensity
level of a civil war (at least 1,000 battle deaths).
4.6.2 Country Level Control Variables
Another control variable that I include is the Polity2 score to measure democracy. Studies
have suggested that weak and fragile regimes lack democratic institutions to "defuse opposition
violence and coercive capacity to repress" and are the ones at risk of civil war onset (Hegre et al.
2001; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 170). As such, I refer to the Polity2 score to measure
regime type. Polity2 measure provides a score ranging from -10 to 10, where higher values
represent stronger democracies. I recoded the Polity2 score for countries that had a Polity2 score
above 5 as "1" for democratic regimes and "0" for those countries that had a Polity2 score below
5 for nondemocracies to distinguish between "democratic and autocratic regimes in terms of
conflict reinitiating" (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012, 69). Countries whose Polity2 score did not
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vary between 1990 and 2009, and were at the extreme side of democracy, were removed from
the dataset since they are not capable of explaining variation of civil war recurrence. As
mentioned previously, very democratic countries are unlikely candidates to experience an
outbreak of civil war and including such countries can lead to biased conclusions (Geddes 2003,
70).
I also control for economic development in post-conflict states. Studies have shown that
poverty in a society can condition the risk of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003). On the
other hand, economic growth has been argued to reduce economic grievances and provide strong
incentives for rebels not to engage in rebellion and hence act as a powerful deterrent to the
resumption of conflict. As such, I refer to the data from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators to measure economic development as the logged GDP per capita.15 The logged scale
is commonly used to examine per capita data.
There are two other control variables that I include to capture the ethnic nature of a
conflict: ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization. Horowitz (1985) suggests that the
"relationship between ethnic diversity and civil wars is not monotonic" and that there is actually
less violence in “highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more conflict in
societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority" (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
2005, 797). As such, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's (2005) work suggests that a new measure to
capture ethnic diversity as an index of polarization is needed and "should capture better the
likelihood of conflicts, or the intensity of potential conflict, than an index of fractionalization"
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 797). For robustness check, I employ both measures to
15 World Bank defines GDP per capita as the "sum of gross value added by all resident produces in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources". http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
examine how ethnically divided a post-conflict state is. The Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's
(2005) index of ethnic polarization (EP) is:
1 −��1/2 − πi
1/2�2
πi
N
i=1
"where πi is the proportion of each ethnic group and N is the number of ethnic groups.
Ethnic polarization is highest when there are two equally sized groups. The value diminishes as
the number of groups increase, but also as the percentage share of the population of the largest
group increases" (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012, 69; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).
Ethnic fractionalization is used as an indicator of ethnic heterogeneity. The formula is:
1 −�πi2N
i=1
where πi is the proportion of each ethnic group and N is the number of ethnic groups. Ethnic
fractionalization can be defined "as the probability that two people at random selected will not
belong to the same ethnic group" (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 798). Ethnic
fractionalization was created by Russian demographers in the 1960s to measure the relationship
between ethnicity and economic development of African nations. Ethnic fractionalization claims
that the more ethnic groups exist in society, the higher is the probability of a conflict (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol 2005). I relied on the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook for
ethnic diversity information to calculate missing scores for both ethnic polarization and ethnic
fractionalization.
The geographic location of a country is also important to consider in studies on conflict
recurrence. Scholars have argued that there is something unique and different about Africa in
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terms of civil war occurrence than other regions of the world. First, "Africa has the highest
incidence of civil war, especially the incidence of war in SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) and North
Africa (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 249). Second, “wars in Africa are on average relatively
short and tend to be among the bloodiest" and they are thus, "the most intense civil wars (in
terms of casualties per unit of time)" (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 249). Third, "Africa
(especially SSA) includes the most ethnically diverse countries in the world" (Elbadawi and
Sambanis 2000, 250). Additionally, compared to other regions, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have
argued that "Africa has indeed experienced a rising trend of conflict" due to “its economies
[which] have performed so poorly both absolutely and relative to other regions" (2). Following
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Collier (1999), I control for Africa by creating a dichotomous
variable where “1” is coded for Africa and “0” represents all other regions. This coding allows
me to control for social characteristics that are unique to Africa that may affect an outbreak of
civil war.
The other country level control variable that I look at is the presence of elections to
account for electoral violence (Hoglund 2009). There is a growing literature that has looked at
the causes and types of electoral violence (Hoglund 2009) and the relationship between timing of
elections and conflict recurrence (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Paris 1997), suggesting that the
presence of elections in post-conflicts states can lead to recurrence of civil war. Especially, when
the outcome of election is not liked, when voters view election results as rigged, or creation of
mistrust between warring parties (Hoglund 2009; Flores and Nooruddin 2012). Since elections
can be followed by large violence and electoral violence can occur during the election period, I
control for the presence of elections (Hoglund 2009). This is a dichotomous variable that was
coded “1” for each country year where an election occurred and for the following year to account
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for election processes that extend beyond the first election year, and “0” otherwise. Moreover,
the consequences of electoral violence can have "wide reaching" effects on peacebuilding,
democratization, and conflict management (Hoglund 2009, 417).
I also included a variable controlling for how a president is elected. It can be argued that
whether a president is popularly elected or not can have an effect on peace duration. For
example, presidents elected by the people in post-conflict rather than selected by a coalition of
parties, would appear more legitimate since voters know who they are voting for. Such
presidents would also appear to be liked by the people, are independent from other branches of
government (i.e. military), and have their own agenda for holding onto their power. I expect that
popularly elected presidents will lead to less likelihood of peace failure. I control for whether the
president is popularly elected as a dichotomous variable where "1" indicates a president is
popularly elected and "0" indicates other means of selection. I refer to the 2012 Political
Handbook of the World and other sources for information on how presidents are elected in post-
conflict countries from 1990 to 2009. Although, there are other data source that have coded for
executive elections, the measure that I use is simple and appropriate since I am only interested in
if the leader of the country is popularly elected or not.
4.6.3 Outcome of Civil War Control Variables
Another factor that has been cited to affect peace duration is presence of peace
agreements. Scholars have argued how a civil war ends matters for peace duration (Licklider
1995; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Wagner 1993) The data was utilized from the Uppsala
Conflict Dataset (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset that "covers all peace agreements signed
between at least 2 opposing primary parties in an armed conflict" (Hogbladh 2011). As
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mentioned previously in this chapter, UCDP defines a conflict as "a contested incompatibility
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner 2011; Themner and Wallensteen 2011).
I refer to the UCDP Agreement Dataset that provides data for all peace agreements that
have occurred in post-conflict states since 1975. The presence of peace agreement variable is a
dichotomous variable that is coded as "1" for a given country-year a peace agreement exists and
"0" for a given country-year when there is no peace agreement or the peace agreement has ended.
I refer to the "duration of years" in the dataset for the duration-date for when the peace
agreement has ended. According to this dataset, a peace agreement ends "when a party states the
agreements is annulled or the date when the violence clearly shows that the parties have left the
agreement" (Hogbladh 2011).
Additionally, I control for the presence of electoral rules in the peace agreement. In post-
conflict states, political parties are at the forefront of designing political institutions and hence
will create electoral rules for their own benefit (i.e. those political institutions that they think will
win them more seats) (Benoit 2007). As such, it is likely that perhaps peace duration is not an
outcome of the kinds of electoral rules chosen, but by the fact that political parties commit to
peace because they signed on to peace agreements with the mention of the electoral rules that
they think will benefit them. In other words, it could be the case that political parties agree to
abide by the peace agreement because of the political advantage they think the electoral rules
will give them. As such, the fact that political parties signed on to the agreement creates peace
and not the kinds of electoral rules that are chosen. On the other hand, the fact that political
parties signed on to a peace agreement with the belief that the electoral rules will benefit them
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when in reality do not, can also lead to resumption of civil war. As such, to avoid this
endogeneity problem, I control for the presence of electoral rules mentioned in the peace
agreement.
I refer to Bogaards (2013) dataset on presence of electoral rules in peace agreements. His
dataset includes "all peace agreements after civil war that concluded between 1975 and 2011,
[and] as found in the [UCDP Agreement Dataset] which contains specific information on the
electoral systems to be used for parliamentary elections" (77). Building on UCDP Peace
Agreement Dataset, Bogaards (2013) dataset includes only those peace agreements that mention
electoral rules (2013, 77-78). Using this information, I code this variable as a dichotomous
variable where "1" is coded for country-year if electoral rules are stated in the agreement and "0"
otherwise.
4.6.4 Party System Characteristics Control Variables
In addition, I include party system characteristics as control variables to measure the
extent to which political systems are institutionalized: the average age of the top five parties and
the total number of political parties (see Appendix). It can be argued that institutionalized parties
(i.e. older parties) can help promote peace because they best manage internal conflicts that can
jeopardize peace (Janda 1980; Huntington 1965)16. Additionally, more parties in the system can
create a more inclusive and thus, more stable political system. Especially, in post-conflict states
where the political system is weak and fragile. It has been argued that political institutions that
are more inclusive, allow parties more participation and hence can create stable coalitions
16 Huntington (1965) was the first to define institutionalization as a "process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (394). An institutionalized organization is viewed as one that is adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent (Huntington 1965, 394).
81
(Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). I refer to the 2012 Database of Political Institutions, PARLINE
Database on National Parliaments, the 2012 Political Handbook of the World, the 2005 Political
Parties of the World and other source such as the Election Results Archive from the Center on
Democratic Performance at Binghamton University.
These databases combined helped provide the names of all political parties participating
in legislative elections and basic information on political parties to calculate the average age of
the top five political parties in the legislature and the total number of political parties in the
legislature. I look only at political parties that are relevant (i.e. effective parties). I define
effective parties as those that have won seats in a parliamentary election. I took an average age of
the top five parties in the legislature for the average age variable.
In the below Table 4.2, I provide descriptive statistics for all of the variables in this study.
In the next section, I conduct several statistical analysis to empirically examine the hypotheses of
this study.
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TABLE 4.2 Summary Statistics for All Variables Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation Civil War (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.1084 0.3111 Closed List PR System (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.4681 0.4992 Duration of Previous Conflict 1051 0 45 4.9048 7.6680 Intensity of Previous Conflict 1051 0 2 1.0856 0.6356 Democracy (1 is where Polity2>=5) (dummy)
1015 0 1 0.3960 0.4893
GDP per capita (logged) 1004 4.1644 9.6656 6.5929 1.0744 Ethnic Polarization 1051 0.06 0.95 0.5684 0.2033 Ethnic Fractionalization 1051 0.03 0.93 0.5370 0.2510 Africa (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.4024 0.4906 Election Year (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.4062 0.4913 President Directly Elected (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.7469 0.4349 Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement (dummy)
1051 0 1 0.0627 0.2427
Legacy of Peace Agreement (dummy) 1051 0 1 0.3653 0.4817 Total Number of Political Parties 1051 0 71 7.7316 7.4395 Average Age of Top Five Parties 1051 0 100 16.2494 13.3514 Broad Control (percent) 1022 0 100 86.1925 27.9935 Closed List PR System × Broad Control 1022 0 100 41.9334 47.2925 Count Civil Wars Before 1051 0 35 4.8705 7.3743
Note: The summary statistics includes data on all variables examined in this study. The Civil War variable is the dependent variable for the outbreak of civil war where there is at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. The stratified variable is the Count Civil Wars Before variable. 4.7 Analysis
To analyze the hypotheses, I use a stratified Cox proportional hazard model to examine
the following questions: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best
promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? The statistical results
provide support for the main argument of this study that the effects of electoral rules on peace
duration are mitigated by the kinds of political parties that populate the post-conflict society
(Hypotheses 2 and 3). Contrary to my expectation, the models show that electoral rules by
themselves have no significant effect on peace duration, unless taken into consideration for how
broad the political parties are in the legislature (Hypothesis 1). In other words, the results
83
indicate that whether or not peace is maintained depends on the extent to which the majority of
seats in the parliament are controlled by broad (inclusive) or narrow (exclusive) parties. The
findings show support for only Hypotheses 2 and 3.
In all the models, I present hazard ratios rather than coefficients since I am interested in
understanding the actual rate of failure17. Hazard ratio is defined as the percent change which
"assesses the impact a covariate has on increasing or decreasing the hazard rate" (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 60). If the hazard ratio is less than one, than the risk (or hazard)
decreases with "a one unit increase in a covariate" and if the hazard ratio is greater than one
suggests that the risk increases with a "one unit increase in a covariate" (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 60). Furthermore, if the hazard ratio is close to one, this indicates that the hazard is
"essentially invariant to changes to the covariate--that is, the coefficient has no effect on
increasing (or decreasing) the hazard" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 63).
In Table 4.3, I report the results (hazard ratios) of Model 1. Model 1 is the basic model
that examines the relationship between party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR
system) versus candidate centered electoral systems (i.e. open list PR/district based systems) and
the outbreak of civil war without controlling for party system characteristics. Model 2 in Table
4.5 and Model 3 in Table 4.7 introduce party system characteristics control variables. The
dependent variable in all the models is the outbreak of civil war (i.e. at least 1,000 battle deaths).
As described previously, "since the Cox model assumes proportional hazards," it is important to
"test for the presence of non-proportional hazards" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1433;
17 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) indicate that "coefficient estimates from the Cox proportional hazard model reveal information regarding the hazard rate" where "positive coefficients imply the hazard is increasing, or 'rising', with changes in the covariate, and negatively signed coefficients imply the hazard is decreasing or 'falling' with changes in the covariate. Hence, positive coefficients imply shorter survival times; negative coefficients imply longer survival times" (59).
84
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Ishiyama and Breuning 2012, 70). Testing this assumption
involves "specifying a particular functional form of interaction effects between a covariate and
time" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1433). In other words, according to Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) the stratified Cox model must be estimated as18:
An interaction effect between the offending covariate(s) and some function (often the natural logarithm) of time. Thus, to test if covariate X has a non-proportional effect, one would include in the model an additional variable Xi × ln (time). (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1433)
Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn (2003) emphasized that "through the use of tests for
[Proportional Hazards] and by interacting the covariates with time, we can test whether the
covariate effect changes over time; this in turn, allows a more nuanced understanding of the
process under study" (35). The Schoenfeld residual-based test is recommended to test for the
presence of non-proportional hazards (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003, 35). I
conducted the test for non-proportionality for Model 1 via Stata 13 to determine which variables
violate the proportionality assumption. The p-values for each covariate and global test are
presented in Table 4.4. The p-value for the global test is 0.9451 and the p-value for the covariates
is also not significant suggesting that the assumption that the hazard rates are proportional is not
violated (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
18 As a robustness check, I ran a Weibull model across all the models in the study and found that the shape parameter was not significant. This indicates that the Weibull model is not the right fit and estimating the Cox model in this study is appropriate.
85
TABLE 4.3 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration without Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009 Variable Model 1:
Hazard Ratios (Robust SE)
Closed List PR System 1.070 (0.4323)
Duration of Previous Conflict 0.9530 (0.0699)
Intensity of Previous Conflict 0.6168 (0.2373)
Democracy 0.7480 (0.3246)
GDP per capita (logged) 0.7081* (0.1427)
Ethnic Polarization 13.3291** (14.6632)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.7827 (0.6020)
Africa 1.2811 (0.6189)
Election Year 1.1051 (0.2565)
President Directly Elected 1.6912 (1.0466)
Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement 1.2248 (1.0549)
Legacy of Peace Agreement 0.2836 (0.1177)
Number of Subjects 55 Number of Observations 969 Number of Failures 94 Log Likelihood -70.5448 Probability>X2 0.0093
Note: Hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors clustered on country are shown in the parentheses. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are below 3 for all variables. *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01, ****p ≤ 0.001
86
TABLE 4.4 Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics for Duration of Post-Conflict Peace, 1990 to 2009 for Model 1 Variable Rho X2 Prob>X2
Closed List PR System 0.08169 0.32 0.5725 Duration of Previous Conflict 0.02074 0.04 0.8507 Intensity of Previous Conflict -0.10313 0.66 0.4176 Democracy -0.09423 0.22 0.6396 GDP per capita (logged) -0.07364 0.38 0.5355 Ethnic Polarization -0.00792 0.01 0.9290 Ethnic Fractionalization 0.11572 0.76 0.3849 Africa -0.10163 0.61 0.4361 Election Year -0.09072 0.73 0.3939 President Directly Elected -0.00556 0.00 0.9526 Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement -0.03596 0.14 0.7065 Legacy of Peace Agreement 0.03935 0.19 0.6629 Global Test 5.35 0.9451
The results in Model 1 in Table 4.3, indicate that closed list PR electoral system (i.e.
party centered systems) has no significant effect on peace duration (i.e. risk of failure).
Moreover, the findings suggest that electoral rules by themselves do not matter for promoting
peace in post-conflict states and seem to neither increase nor decrease the risk of an outbreak of
civil war. The findings from this model are not consistent with my expectation that post-conflict
states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an
outbreak of civil war than candidate centered electoral systems (i.e. open list PR/district based
system). Moreover, the findings are also not consistent with scholars such as Cammett and
Malesky that have argued that closed list PR electoral system promotes peace19. According to
these results, it can be said that there is no relationship between the kinds of electoral rules
designed in post-conflict states and peace duration.
19 Cammett and Malesky (2012) found that "countries that adopt closed-list PR electoral systems tend to have superior governance outcome, and as a results experience more enduring periods of post-conflict peace and stability" (984). Moreover, there are other differences between their research and this study: first, their research focuses more on the quality of governance and regime stability, as opposed to conflict recurrence and had a much longer time frame; second, they looked only at a subset of civil wars (following Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) where negotiated settlements are reached; third, they only compared closed list PR vs. open list RR and not district based systems; and fourth, their dependent variable is measured in months until failure and not whether there is an outbreak of civil war.
87
In terms of the control variables, GDP per capita (logged) and ethnic polarization are
statistically significant. GDP per capita (logged) is negatively related to the risk of civil war
outbreak, where an increase in economic growth decreases the risk of an outbreak of civil war by
30%. Ethnic polarization is positively related to the risk of civil war outbreak, suggesting that
when there are two equally sized groups in the post-conflict state, the risk of peace failure
increases by over 1,000%.
In Table 4.5, I report the results of Model 2. Model 2 includes party system
characteristics variables as controls and the interaction term between closed list PR system and
broad control variable. I also conducted the test for non-proportionality for Model 2 and the
results are presented in Table 4.6.
In Table 4.6, the p-value for the global test is 0.0192 and this suggests that the assumption that
hazard rates are proportional is violated. Taking a closer look at the Schoenfeld residual test
indicates a significant p-value for the following variables: closed list PR system, duration of
previous conflict, intensity of previous conflict, democracy, election year, president directly
elected, presence of electoral rules in peace agreement, legacy of peace agreement, total number
of political parties, and the average age of top five parties in the legislature. This means that the
variables violate the proportionality assumption. As suggested by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
(2004) and Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn (2003), I interacted each of these variables with
the natural logarithm of time and included these interactions along with the other covariates in
Model 3 in Table 4.7. This allows "the influence of a variable on the hazard to vary
monotonically over time; that is, the variable's effect may increase or decrease over the duration
under the study" (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003, 37).
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Note: Hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors clustered on country are shown in the parentheses. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are below 3 for all variables except the interaction variables. *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01, ****p ≤ 0.001
TABLE 4.5 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration with Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009 Variable Model 2:
Hazard Ratios (Robust SE)
Closed List PR System 15.5502** (16.8675)
Duration of Previous Conflict 0.6669** (0.1066)
Intensity of Previous Conflict 1.7359 (0.8866)
Democracy 0.5733 (0.2785)
GDP per capita (logged) 0.6675* (0.1624)
Ethnic Polarization 8.5355 (12.0173)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.4384 (0.4539)
Africa 1.2200 (0.7602)
Election Year 0.8197 (0.2831)
President Directly Elected 0.5087 (0.4455)
Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement 2.3135 (3.6615)
Legacy of Peace Agreement 0.2496* (0.1792)
Total Number of Political Parties 1.0832*** (0.0305)
Average Age of Top Five Parties 1.0199 (0.0201)
Broad Control (percent) 1.0236** (0.0095)
Closed List PR System × Broad Control 0.9698** (0.0120)
Number of Subjects 55 Number of Observations 941 Number of Failures 81 Log Likelihood -55.717461 Probability>X2 0.0000
89
In the below Table 4.7, Model 3 reports the results of the stratified Cox model correcting
for the violation of the proportional hazard assumption by interacting the variables that violate
this assumption with the natural log of time (i.e. ln(time)).
Although the main independent variable (i.e. closed list PR system) is significant in
Model 2, correcting for non-proportionality with time interaction variable in Model 3 indicates
that closed list PR system continues to be insignificant even when interacting with party system
characteristics. The results suggest that there is no difference between closed list PR system (i.e.
party centered electoral systems) versus district based/open list PR systems (i.e. candidate
centered system) with respect to an outbreak of civil war. However, the results support
TABLE 4.6 Nonproportional Hazard Diagnostics for Duration of Post-Conflict Peace, 1990 to 2009 for Model 2 Variable Rho X2 Prob>X2
Closed List PR System 0.27970 4.59 0.0321 Duration of Previous Conflict 0.24279 28.93 0.0000 Intensity of Previous Conflict -0.25120 15.96 0.0001 Democracy 0.27508 10.76 0.0010 GDP per capita (logged) 0.02254 0.05 0.8310 Ethnic Polarization -0.01993 0.05 0.8242 Ethnic Fractionalization 0.11687 1.39 0.2382 Africa -0.09810 1.02 0.3114 Election Year -0.17316 7.07 0.0079 President Directly Elected 0.20240 7.25 0.0071 Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement -0.23481 19.40 0.0000 Legacy of Peace Agreement 0.14207 7.31 0.0069 Total Number of Political Parties -0.16511 3.42 0.0643 Average Age of Top Five Parties -0.24647 28.36 0.0000 Broad Control (percent) -0.07574 0.82 0.3640 Closed List PR System × Broad Control
-0.20277 2.18 0.1396
Global Test 29.77 0.0192
90
TABLE 4.7 Stratified Cox Regression Results for Post-Conflict Peace Duration with Interaction Terms and Party System Characteristics Variables, 1990 to 2009 Variable Model 3:
Hazard Ratios (Robust SE)
ln(T) Interactions Closed List PR System 0.5915
(2.1132) Closed List PR System × ln(time) 16.2399*
(26.3770) Duration of Previous Conflict 0.0398**
(0.0617) Duration of Previous Conflict × ln(time) 2.7219*
(1.5209) Intensity of Previous Conflict 75.3259*
(197.4165) Intensity of Previous Conflict × ln(time) 0.2725
(0.2830) Democracy 1.45E-07****
(6.02E-07) Democracy × ln(time) 542.572****
(920.7458) GDP per capita (logged) 0.3991**
(0.1524) Ethnic Polarization 204.0558*
(587.0129) Ethnic Fractionalization .4220
(0.9815) Africa 0.7185
(0.6172) Election Year 15.5842**
(18.4414) Election Year × ln(time) 0.2557**
(0.1653) President Directly Elected 0.0890
(0.3598) President Directly Elected × ln(time) 1.6402
(2.5160) Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement 1.59E+13****
(1.04E+14) Electoral Rules in Peace Agreement × ln(time) 5.07E-06****
(1.27E-05) Legacy of Peace Agreement 8.53E-05**
(3.843E-04)
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Note: Hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors clustered on country are shown in the parentheses. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are below 3 for all variables except interaction variables. *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01, ****p ≤ 0.001 Hypothesis 2. To better understand the interaction effect, I provide a graph of predicted survival
curves in Figure 4.1 and discuss further below Hypotheses 2 and 3.
In terms of control variables, ethnic fractionalization, Africa, and president directly
elected variables are not statistically significant. The results indicate that these variables do not
increase or decrease the hazard rate, and are unrelated to whether or not peace fails.
For conflict control variables, the longer the duration of previous conflict the less likely
there is risk of peace failure (i.e. outbreak of civil war). Suggesting that there is a war weariness
effect (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). On the other hand, the intensity of previous conflict
increases the hazard rate, suggesting that greater casualties leads to a recurrence of civil war. For
the country level control variables, the Polity 2 score and GDP per capita (logged) decrease the
probability of an outbreak of civil war. The results confirm previous literature that the more
Legacy of Peace Agreement × ln(time) 17.3635 (30.7489)
Total Number of Political Parties 2.6076**** (0.5328)
Total Number of Political Parties × ln(time) 0.7193**** (0.0541)
Average Age of Top Five Parties 1.7380**** (0.1676)
Average Age of Top Five Parties × ln(time) 0.8006**** (0.0314)
Broad Control (percent) 1.0501*** (0.0191)
Closed List PR System × Broad Control 0.9371*** (0.0232)
Number of Subjects 55 Number of Observations 941 Number of Failures 81 Log Likelihood -40.6133 Probability>X2 0.0000
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democratic a country is, the less likely it will experience an outbreak of civil war. Furthermore,
an increase in economic growth, the less likely there will be an outbreak of civil war. As
previous literature has argued, higher economic growth reduces economic grievances and
provides strong incentives for rebels not to engage in rebellion. On the other hand, ethnic
polarization and presence of an election in a given year significantly increase the hazard rate of
peace failure. The results confirm previous literature that argued there is a relationship between
ethnic diversity and civil wars (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Suggesting that when there
are two equally sized groups in society, there is a higher risk of an outbreak of civil war.
For the outcome of civil war control variables, only the legacy of peace agreement
decreases the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. This implies that how a civil war ends
matters. Suggesting that if a conflict ends in a peace agreement rather than a decisive victory, the
probability of peace failure will decrease. Furthermore, the presence of an electoral system in a
peace agreement increases the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. By controlling for the
endogeneity problem, the results indicate that the inclusion of electoral rules in a peace
agreement does not imply that parties will abide by the agreement even if they created the rules
themselves. This suggests that the kinds of electoral rules designed in post-conflict states by
themselves does not matter for peace duration. On the other hand, it can also be argued that if
peace agreements are specific such as those that include the wording of electoral rules, political
parties may feel constrained and hence, will be less likely to abide by the peace agreement.
Perhaps the less specific and more general the agreements are, the more likely parties will
commit to the peace agreement. Although there has been plenty of research that focuses on the
relationship between the kinds of power sharing provisions selected in negotiated settlement and
peace duration, it is my understanding that research on the degree to which peace agreements are
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specific or broad on peace duration has not been examined. This represents a new area for future
research to explore.
Additionally, the total number of parties and the average age of parties variables increase
the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. The results show that more parties in the legislature
increases the hazard rate by 160% and average age of parties increases the hazard by 73%.
These results are contrary to the literature that argued that a proportional representation system
(i.e. which allows more parties to participate) promotes stability (Lijphart 1969). Instead, the
results supports arguments by Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2006) that argued that many parties
in the system (i.e. proportional representation) increases conflict since more parties in the system
promotes parties to become fixated on divisions rather than on issues or personality. My findings
show that the greater the number of older parties in the legislature, the greater the likelihood of
an outbreak of civil war. Perhaps, older parties represent the cleavages that resulted in the war,
and newer parties represent a greater willingness to rebuild a stable society. These results
contradict the idea that older parties are more institutionalized and hence are more stable in the
society and will decrease the likelihood of peace failure (Janda 1980; Huntington 1965).
Additionally, the Broad Control variable by itself increases the hazard rate of peace failure,
indicating that the more broad the political system is the greater is the probability of peace
failure. This suggests that the only way for broad parties to decrease the hazard rate is when they
operate under a disciplined electoral system (i.e. party centered electoral system/closed list PR
system) and act as gatekeepers that prevent independent candidates from defecting.
The above analysis examines which kinds of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states
best promote peace, and if those effects are conditional upon other factors. The main results of
the study show that electoral rules by themselves have no significant effect on peace duration
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unless the degree to which the party system in the legislature is broad or narrow is taken into
consideration. To better understand the interaction effect and how the effects of electoral rules on
peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is narrow or broad, I provide
a graphical representation in Figure 4.1.
FIGURE 4.1 Predicted Survival Function
The above Figure 4.1 shows the baseline predicted survival functions (i.e. survival
curves) at different levels of broad control. The y-axis represents the survival rate (i.e.
percentage) and the x-axis represents the time in terms of years. The survival curves show the
predicted survival percentages of post-conflict states under a closed list PR systems at three
different levels of broad control (0%, 50%, and 100%), while holding other variables at their
mean. Figure 4.1 shows that the broader the party system becomes and the closer it gets to
100%, the higher is the survival rate. Suggesting that as the broad variable varies from 0% to
100%, the survival rate decreases slowly, where a legislature with 100% broad party control has
0.2
.4.6
.81
Sur
viva
l Rat
e
0 5 10 15 20Time (Years)
Closed List PR System=1 Broad Control=0%Closed List PR System=1 Broad Control=50%Closed List PR System=1 Broad Control=100%
Predicted Survival Function
95
a higher probability of survival rate over time than a legislature with a party system that is closer
to 0% (i.e. narrow control). The solid green line, represents the closed list PR system at 100%
broad control, is shown to always be less likely to have a failure of civil war over time than the
other curves (i.e. dashed red line and dotted blue line). This confirms Hypothesis 3 that predicts
post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are more
likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the legislature are controlled by
narrow parties controlled by broad parties. In addition, the small distance between the curves
indicates that the type of electoral rule does not matter which confirms Hypothesis 2.
Taking a closer look at the actual survival estimates reveals that at 10 years, when all
parties are narrow under a closed list PR system, the survival estimate is 54% while the survival
estimate for when all parties are broad is 63%. This suggests that under a closed list PR electoral
system (i.e. party centered electoral systems) the survival rate decreases slowly when more
parties in the legislature are broad (i.e. inclusive). Broad parties appeal to all groups in the
society and do not represent the interests of any one ethnic group over the other. Hence, the
survival curves in Figure 4.1 support Hypothesis 3 and shows that post-conflict states with party
centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil
war when all seats in the legislature are controlled by narrow parties (0%) than when all seats are
controlled by broad parties (100%). The survival estimates are presented in the below Table 4.8.
Additionally, I also checked for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity addresses the
relationship between independent variables and whether or not there is a linear relationship
between them. Presence of multicollinearity can lead to a larger standard error since there is no
variation between the independent variables (Wooldridge 2008). To examine whether there is
presence of multicollinearity, I produce the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores for all
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variables except the interaction variables. The VIF is under 3 for all models indicating that this
assumption is not violated.
4.8 Summary
This chapter empirically examined the following research question: which types of
electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace, and if those effects are
conditional upon other factors. The theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 produced three
hypotheses focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of
electoral rules on peace duration (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968). Although the analysis indicates that
electoral rules alone do not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when
interacted with the degree to which the political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant
effect on the outbreak of civil war. Specifically, there is a reductive effect on the risk of an
TABLE 4.8 Predicted Survival Probabilities at Different Levels of Broad Control under a Closed List PR System
outbreak of civil war when closed list PR system (i.e. party centered electoral system) is
interacted with a higher percentage of broad parties in the legislature. Suggesting that the impact
of electoral rules is mitigated by the kinds of parties that exist (Moser 1999; Sartori 1968). Given
that previous literature on post-conflict peace building has missed the independent role that
political parties play in managing conflict, the results of the study represent a promising new
venue for future research.
As discussed previously, electoral rules that emphasize group competition (i.e. party
centered systems-closed list PR), political parties compete against each other and voters directly
vote for parties instead of candidates. Additionally, candidates are forced to be dependent on
political parties for participation in the legislature. These electoral rules keep candidates "in
line," but also create (exclusive) parties which can lead to peace failure. Thus, under a party
centered system, the more seats in the legislature that are controlled by broad parties, the more
moderate and inclusive (i.e. appeal to all/integrative) the party system becomes, and this helps
promote a more durable peace. On the other hand, when parties are narrow (i.e. exclusive) under
a disciplined electoral system such as closed list PR electoral system, makes the political system
more fragile and there is a greater likelihood for conflict to occur.
The results suggest that to manage conflict under a party centered system, the more broad
political parties need to be. To rephrase, the key for sustaining peace in post-conflict states is for
parties to appeal to all ethnic groups in society, and hence to become de-ethnicized (Brass 1991;
Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2006). Trust between warring parties can be created when there are less
ethnic divisions between them and when parties compete against each other based on policies
rather than ethnic divisions.
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Hence, in this study, I propose that the more seats in the parliament that are controlled by
broad parties, the more inclusive the party system becomes and this helps address the security
concerns that political parties have. Additionally, if the political parties are themselves inclusive
and broad, they are more willing to join coalitions and hence, this also creates stability. In sum,
the type of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states, matters a great deal for who wins, how
they win, and for the durability of peace.
In sum, this chapter empirically shows that electoral rules by themselves have no
significant impact on peace duration in post-conflict states and they only matter when party
system characteristics are taken into consideration. Additionally, the results of the study suggest
that the greater the extent to which the majority of seats in the parliament are controlled by broad
parties, the more likely the risk of an outburst of civil war will diminish under a closed list PR
system. Based on the results, it can be argued that to manage conflict under a party centered
electoral system, the more broad political parties need to be. In the next chapter, I examine these
hypotheses through a comparative case study analysis on Angola and Mozambique.
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CHAPTER 5
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 4, the empirical analysis provided strong support for the main argument of this
study that the effects of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states on peace duration are
conditional upon the kinds of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. The
findings showed that electoral rules by themselves do not significantly impact peace and that
political parties play an important independent role in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on
peace duration.
In the previous chapters, I argued the following: 1) political parties already exist in the
post-conflict environment, and 2) political parties in post-conflict states are not solely a
development of the electoral system. Building on arguments made by Sartori (1968) and Moser
(1999), I further argued that peace can be sustained in post-conflict states under a closed list
proportional representation (PR) system when an increased percent of the seats in the legislature
are controlled by broad-based parties (i.e. multi-ethnic). To summarize, electoral rules that
emphasize party competition, such as closed list PR system, encourages parties to compete
against each other for votes and forces candidates to be dependent on parties for participation in
the legislature. Although, these party centered systems keep candidates "in line" (i.e. not defect),
they in essence form parties to be exclusive and ethnically oriented which can lead to peace
failure. The results in this study suggest that under a closed list PR system, post-conflict states
with more moderate and inclusive political parties (i.e. broad-based) in the legislature are less
likely to have an outbreak of civil war.
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In this chapter, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of two post-conflict states,
Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), to examine in more detail the theory and
hypotheses presented in the previous chapters. Angola and Mozambique are both countries that
experienced a long and costly civil war. Both countries are part of the 57 post-conflict states that
I quantitatively examined in chapter 4, and of all the cases included, Angola and Mozambique
are the perfect cases to compare, as I will explain shortly. This chapter focuses on the time
period from their independence until their first post-conflict multi-party elections.
Among the countries located in the Sub-Saharan region, Mozambique is considered to be
“one of a few successful cases” to have achieved peace after a long civil war (Quinn 2007, 523).
Unlike Mozambique, Angola's civil war did not end with its first multi-party election, and
instead resumed until its civil war officially ended in 2002. After almost 27 years, the conflict
continued until the opposition leader, Jonas Savimbi, of the UNITA opposition party was killed
in 2002. The multi-party elections in Angola (1992) and in Mozambique (1994) were negotiated
as part of the provisions of their signed peace agreements and their new constitutions that were
adopted in an attempt to create a lasting peace. Yet, Mozambique was able to sustain its peace
after elections, but Angola continued to experience fighting and a recurrence of its civil war.
Although the outcome of their first post-conflict multi-party elections were different (i.e.
recurrence of civil war), Angola and Mozambique are similar in many respects that make them
perfect cases to compare in order to explain their different outcomes.
First, Angola and Mozambique are similar on many factors that affect peace duration,
such as the characteristics of their civil war and characteristics of their post-conflict environment
(i.e. multi-party elections and institutional arrangements). Second, both countries share a legacy
of Portugal colonialism, which makes them even more perfect cases to compare. Among their
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many shared similarities, the question that I examine in this chapter is: Why was Mozambique
successful in sustaining its peace after elections but not Angola?
In this chapter, the comparative case study analysis allows an in-depth qualitative
comparison of a few cases that experienced a civil war. To conduct the comparative case study
analysis, I utilize the most similar systems (MSS) research design. The MSS research design is
"based on the belief that systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as
possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry" (Przeworski and Teune 1970,
32). Thus, the choice of the MSS research design is appropriate in this chapter to compare why
Angola experienced a recurrence of civil war after its first multi-party election and Mozambique
did not among their many shared characteristics. The MSS research design allows one to control
those factors that are similar between cases in order to identify the main difference which can
help explain their different outcomes (i.e. recurrence of civil war). As noted by Przeworski and
Teune (1970), "this type of design is a 'maximim' strategy. It is anticipated that if some important
differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors
attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those
differences alone" (32). Furthermore, they state that "if such differences is found among the
systems studied, the following theoretical implications follow: 1) The factors that are common to
the countries are irrelevant in determining the behavior being explained since different patterns
of behavior are observed among systems sharing these factors; 2) Any set of variables that
differentiates these systems in a manner corresponding to the observed differences of behavior
(or any interaction among these differences) can be considered as explaining these patterns of
behavior" (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 34). The focus of this chapter is to closely examine these
similarities and differences between Angola and Mozambique to explain why Mozambique was
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successful in sustaining its peace after elections and Angola was not. I refer to sources such as
the 2012 Political Handbook of the World, the 2005 Political Parties of the World, the Civil
Wars of the World, the World Bank Development Indicators, the Central Intelligence Agency’s
World Factbook, newspaper articles and other sources for information to qualitatively conduct
such an analysis.
In the below qualitative analysis of Angola and Mozambique, I control for their many
similarities (i.e. factors that are known to affect peace duration), and show that the one factor that
stands out as the main difference is the kind of political parties that emerged in their post-conflict
environment. Specifically, the independence movements and in particular, the civil wars
themselves created the basis for the kinds of political parties that emerged in both countries. I
qualitatively compare and show that the exclusive (ethnic) nature of the political parties that
emerged in Angola had contributed toward its recurrence of civil war in contrast to
Mozambique’s political parties that were more ideological and hence, inclusive of other ethnic
groups.
Utilizing Chandra’s (2011) definition, ethnic parties are those that exclude and multi-
ethnic parties are those that do not exclude at least one ethnic group. Specifically, multi-ethnic
parties appeal to all groups in the society and do not represent the interests of any group over the
other. Multi-ethnic groups, hence, are those that “champions the interests of all significant ethnic
categories in society without excluding any” ethnic group based on descent-based attributes
(Chandra 2011, 155). Based on Chandra’s definition and as discussed in the previous chapters,
broad-based parties are in essence multi-ethnic parties (Chandra 2011). To summarize, I define
broad-based parties in comparison to narrow based parties as those parties that do not exclude
any ethnic groups from participation and representation (Chandra 2011).
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I show that how broad or narrow the political parties were in Angola and Mozambique,
explains the differences in outcomes when comparing the two cases. Moreover, although both
countries experienced long civil wars, implemented peace agreements, adopted democratic
institutions such as multi-party elections with the same electoral formula, the ethnic identity
divisions in Angola's political parties contributed to a lack of trust between the political parties
and hence, a recurrence of civil war. The analysis confirms the main argument of this study and
correctly predicts that the kinds of parties that populate a post-conflict environment play an
important role in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration.
This chapter is organized as follows: first, I discuss the historical background of Angola
and Mozambique, including their legacy of colonialism and emergence of independence
movements. Second, I compare the factors that are known to affect peace duration in post-
conflict states, such as the characteristics of their civil wars and post-conflict environment,
including their multi-party elections and institutional arrangements. Third, I analyze and discuss
the main differences between Angola and Mozambique, and conclude this chapter by
highlighting the importance of political parties as a mitigating factor.
5.2 Historical Background
5.2.1 Legacy of Colonialism Angola and Mozambique are both countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure
5.1). The Portuguese were the earliest European settlers in Africa and settled in Angola and
Mozambique during the 15th century (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 39-50, 980-88).
The ideal geographic location near major waters, made them an important trade route for
Portugal. Hence, for the next 500 years, Angola and Mozambique became important centers for
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slave trade and agriculture (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 39-50, 980-88). With the
abolition of the slave trade during the 19th century in all Portugal colonies and with an expansion
of European powers into Africa, trade in the form of agriculture in both countries took over
(BBC News 2013; BBC News 2014). Slave labor was still used to produce agriculture and
cultivate the land for trade, however this led to the rise of resistance movements in both countries
against Portugal’s occupation (BBC News 2013; BBC News 2014). Angola and Mozambique
both witnessed the emergence of armed resistance movements and struggles for independence.
Independence movements continued to play an important role in both countries until 1974 when
Portugal experienced a military coup that led to the emergence of a new government that
"supporte[d] the autonomy for [its] colonies" in Africa (BBC News 2013; BBC News 2014). In
1975, with the signing of the Alvor Agreement in Angola and the Lusaka Accord in
Mozambique with Portugal, both countries were granted independence.
FIGURE 5.1 Map of Angola (left) and Mozambique (right)
Source: Political Handbook of the World (2012, 40, 980). One of the shared legacies left by Portugal in Angola and Mozambique was the
Portuguese language. The Portuguese language continues to be the official language in both
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countries, but many inhabitants continue to speak their tribal languages (Political Handbook of
the World 2012, 39, 980). Religion was also influenced by Portugal. As Turner (2001) notes that
in Angola, "it is no coincidence that each of the first generation of nationalist leaders--Neto,
Roberto, and Savimbi--came from Protestant mission schools" (22). For example, Jonas Savimbi,
leader of UNITA opposition movement, was the son of a Protestant preacher (AP News Archive
1989). The Portuguese themselves were Catholic and hence, with the arrival of missionary work
and migration due to colonialism, many of the indigenous people were converted to Catholicism
or Protestant (Browne 2001). According to the CIA World Factbook, 38% of the population in
Angola today are Roman Catholics and 15% are Protestants. In Mozambique, according to the
CIA World Factbook, Roman Catholics comprise 28.4% of the population and Protestants
comprise 12.2% (see Table 5.1). The Portuguese in Mozambique taught the indigenous people
how "to speak [in] Portuguese and on converting them to Catholicism" (Browne 2001, 180).
Browne (2001) describes that there was this idea by the indigenous people that if they learned the
Portuguese language, adopted the religion, and education, they could rise in their economic
standing and would have more opportunities of advancement available for them (180-181).
However, with money woes, many could not attend schools, so a rift between expectations and
actual achievements was a main contribution to the growth of independence movements against
the Portuguese colonization (Browne 2001). Especially, as Browne (2001) notes, that in both
Mozambique and Angola, the "Portuguese colonialism produced little economic
development"(180).
In both countries, Portugal was more interested in its own economic development in
terms of exporting agriculture and commodities for money, and less on the actual economic
development. As clearly noted in the Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia, the Portuguese used
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slave labor to exploit Mozambique’s natural resources (2014). Until the late 1960s, the
Portuguese continued to occupy land in Mozambique for self-enrichment and used forced labor
(Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia 2014). The side effect of such occupation and forced
labor encouraged laws that forbade Mozambicans from trading or even running their own
businesses (Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia 2014). Another example of how Portugal left
a legacy of economic downturn in both countries, is that in Mozambique, “most airports,
telephone lines, roads, dams, ports, and power lines supported export-oriented industries that
primarily profited the tiny Portuguese minority who ruled Mozambique” (Browne 2001, 181).
Specifically, “not a single railroad or road linked north and south Mozambique” and “no effort
was made to link the country internally and to foster national development” (Browne 2001, 181).
It is not surprising then that the economic underdevelopment and inequality among the
populations in Angola and Mozambique had contributed to the development of the resistance
movements against Portugal and economic problems in future years.
Additionally, in comparison to other European countries which "began to grant
independence to their colonies after World War II, Portugal maintained its overseas possessions
and emigration to them increased. This [also] provoked growing calls within Mozambique for
independence" (Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia 2014). Moreover, after the war of
independence in 1975, "the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese settlers left no
trained replacements in key economic positions" and Mozambique's economy at this time "was
heavily dependent on exporting labour" (Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia 2014). The early
statistics show that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 1985 in both countries was
low. For example, according to the World Bank Development Indicators, the GDP per capita in
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Angola was $751 and in Mozambique it was $334. In sum, it is clearly visible that both Angola
and Mozambique inherited weak economies from Portugal’s colonialization.
As presented in Table 5.1, there are also many ethnic groups that exist in both Angola
and Mozambique. Specifically, in Angola, "there are dozens of ethnic groups speaking distinct
languages, but just three groups account for about three-fourths of the population" (Turner 2001,
10). The three major ethnic groups in Angola are all part of the Bantu ethnic group that migrated
to Angola from Congo prior to Portuguese arrival (BBC News 2013). These three major groups
in Angola are: Ovimbundu, located in central Angola, the Mbundu (aka Kimbundu) located in
western Angola, and the Kongo (aka Bakongo) located in the northwestern corner of Angola
(Turner 2001, 10). In Mozambique, just like in Angola, most people are Bantu, who are further
divided into "other tribal groups that speak distinct local languages and dialects" (Political
Handbook of the World 2012, 980). For the most part, these ethnic groups are related to the main
Bantu ethnic group who speak different types of Bantu languages.
In Angola, unlike in Mozambique, the ethnic groups during colonialism identified
themselves according to their economic status in the community. In Mozambique, there were no
such ethnic divisions among the tribal groups. As a result, in Angola, there was no unified
independence movement and instead there were multiple movements. Especially, as noted in an
article published in The Harvard Crimson that "all attempts to conciliate the three groups [in
Angola], even those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have failed" suggesting that
perhaps the onset of the civil war was not a surprise (Zeitlin 1975). A significant effect of
Portuguese colonialism on ethnic groups was that "ethnic divisions [in Angola] were made larger
through increase economic differences" between the groups (Turner 2001, 9). For example, the
small Mestico population (mixed European and native African) “were developed by Portuguese
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rulers as elite and were intermediaries in the slave trade" (Turner 2001, 9). The Kongo and
Ovimbundu "were more frequently agricultural laborers" (Turner 2001, 9). As a result of
economic differences, the ethnic groups in Angola not only differed by the region where they
were located or tribal language, but also by their economic status.
The article in The Harvard Crimson suggests that the reason why there was no such
unified independence movement in Angola was that the "Mozambican Portuguese economic
penetration was restricted to the coastal cities, leaving agrarian interior relatively untouched.
Frelimo was therefore able to mobilize the entire peasantry against Portuguese rule, creating
alternative political institutions during the colonial war itself. So when independence came,
Frelimo already controlled most of the population and was ready to take power immediately with
a coherent plan for socialist development” (Zeitlin 1975). In Angola, on the other hand, the
article points out that Angola was “among the most industrialized countries in black Africa” at
that time “so that Portuguese rule disrupted traditional social life, accentuating regional and tribal
antagonisms. Thus, no unified liberation movement could emerge there" (Zeitlin 1975).
In sum, it can be said that the Portuguese colonialism in essence had actually reinforced
the ethnic divisions in Angola. As such, Portuguese colonialism did not only affect the kinds of
independence movements that emerged, but also the type of civil wars that occurred and hence,
became the basis for the kinds of political parties that eventually emerged in Angola and
Mozambique (as will be discussed below). In the below Table 5.1, I summarize the main
historical background characteristics shared by Angola and Mozambique.
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TABLE 5.1 Historical Background Characteristics of Angola and Mozambique Angola Mozambique Independence (year) 1975 1975 Colonial Legacy Portugal Portugal Region Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Area (sq km) 1,246,700 799,380 Religion Roman Catholic (38%)
Roman Catholic (28.4%) Muslim (17.9%) Zionist Christian (15.5%) Protestant (12.2%) Other (6.7%) None (18.7%)
Language Portuguese (official) Bantu and other African languages
Portuguese (official) Emakhuwa, Xichangana, Cisena, Elomwe, Echuwabo, and other Mozambican languages.
Ethnic groups (%) Ovimbundu (37%) Kimbundu (25%) Bakongo (13%) Mestico (mixed European and native African) 2% European (1%) Other (22%)
African (99.66%) (Including the Makhuwa, Tsonga, Lomwe, Sena, and other groups) European (0.06%) Euro-Africans (0.2%) Indians (0.08%)
Source: The World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html 5.2.2 Independence Movements
In the early 1950s, Portugal had officially designated the status of Angola and
Mozambique as "overseas territories" (BBC News 2013; BBC News 2014). As such, during this
time and in early 1960s, independence movements emerged in Angola and Mozambique (BBC
News 2013; BBC News 2014). Although the goals of the independence movements were similar
in terms of liberation from Portugal, the origins of the movements by way of their ethnic
differences had a great influence on the type of civil wars that emerged and hence, the kinds of
political parties that existed. In this section, I discuss the emergence of the independence
In Angola, the three main independence movements were: the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Political Handbook of the
World 2012; Political Parties of the World 2005). Since the 1960s, these three main
independence movements corresponded to the three main ethnic groups that "make up about
three quarters of Angola's population" (Turner 2001, 21). For example, the "FNLA was
predominantly Kongo, the MPLA was predominantly Mbundu and Creole or Mestico, and
UNITA was predominantly Ovimbundu" (Turner 2001, 21). As noted earlier, the Mbundu were
located in the west part of Angola, the Ovimbundu in the central part of Angola and the Kongo
in the northwest part of Angola (Turner 2001, 10). It is important to note that these movements
not only fought against Portugal but also against each other (Turner 2001). For example, the
MPLA and UNITA groups were "bitter rivals even before the country gained independence" in
1975 (BBC News 2013).
The MPLA was created in 1956 as a movement that originated in Northern Congo (BBC
News 2013). During a 1961 peasant resistance to forced labor, the MPLA's "opposition to
colonial rule broke out" and "continued until 1975 for 13 years, despite a sizable Portugal
military presence" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 40; Dougherty 1997, 126). The
MPLA perhaps because of support from Cuba and Russia, earlier on proclaimed itself as a
"Marxist organization rooted in communism" (Turner 2001, 23). The MPLA was supported by
the Mbundu near the capital of Luanda and were comprised of "African and mixed-race
intellectuals" (Turner 2001, 11). The MPLA "backed by Soviet Union and led by Dr. Agostinho
Neto, controlled central Angola including [the] Cabinda [region]" (Political Handbook of the
World 2012, 41). Yet, the FNLA and UNITA neither proclaimed themselves to be Communist
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movements (Turner 2001, 23). The FNLA, on the other hand, because of Portugal repressive
tactics against resistance, operated in exile in Democratic Republic of Congo and "controlled
much of the north" areas of Angola under the guidance of Holden Roberto (Political Handbook
of the World 2012, 41). The FNLA tried to move "beyond its ethnic origins in 1961 by recruiting
Jonas Savimbi from the Ovimbundu ethnic community of central Angola" (Turner 2001, 11).
However, Savimbi defected in 1962, and organized his own group, called the UNITA. The
UNITA movement "operated in eastern and southern Angola" under Savimbi's leadership
(Political Handbook of the World 2012, 41). The Ovimbundu supported the UNITA movement
and were characterized as "poor, uneducated, and neglected at the bottom of a highly stratified
social order" (Turner 2001, 22).
In Mozambique, however, there was only one main nationalist movement that existed
prior to independence led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (aka Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique) (Frelimo) from 1964 until 1974 (Quinn 2007, 509; Political Parties of the World
2005, 423). In 1964, Frelimo led a "decade-long struggle against Portuguese rule in
Mozambique" (Quinn 2007, 523). In contrast to Angola, the anticolonial insurgency in
Mozambique was under one anti-colonial movement (i.e. Frelimo) and hence all ethnic groups
identified and gave support to this movement. Frelimo was founded in 1962 "by a union of three
nationalist parties and led by Dr. Eduardo Mondlane until his death in 1969" (Political Handbook
of the World 2012, 984). In 1969, Mondlane was assassinated by the Portuguese forces and the
movement was then led by Samora Machel who became the movement’s next president and
Joaquim Chissano as the Prime Minister (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 980;
Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia 2014). In 1975, the Frelimo movement became the
governing party of Mozambique after its independence. The Lusaka Accord was signed by both
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Portugal and Frelimo that ended the 400 year rule by Portugal and established a transitional
government (Quinn 2007, 523). The government of Mozambique was under Frelimo as a
"Marxist-Leninist one-party state" which aligned itself with Soviet Union and Cuba, nationalized
industries, outlawed private property, and "created a state run collective farms and communal
villages" (Quinn 2007, 510, 523). The new constitution in 1975, declared that Frelimo was
"empowered to guide the operations of the government at all levels" (Political Handbook of the
World 2012, 984). In a speech given by Machel announced that "Mozambique would be Africa's
first Marxist state" (Quinn 2007, 510).
Only later in the 1980s, Frelimo's ideology began to change. For example, it’s "economic
philosophy began to shift toward the encouragement of free-market activity" (Political Handbook
of the World 2012, 984). A few years after independence, a counterrevolutionary insurgency in
Mozambique emerged called the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) (Political Parties
of the World 2005, 423-424; Quinn 2007, 509). Renamo was an anti-Frelimo resistance
movement that was created by the white Rhodesian officers who were members of the Rhodesian
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (Quinn 2007, 72). It was created "primarily as an
intelligence network within Mozambique for the white Rhodesian government of Ian Smith"
(Political Handbook of the World 2012, 984). During the civil war, Renamo fought against the
Zimbabwean insurgents and the Frelimo government (Quinn 2007, 72).
Like Mozambique, Angola's independence from Portugal was not the outcome of
winning an actual war, but because of a military coup in Portugal that relinquished all of its
colonies. By pressure from neighboring states, in 1975, all three movements in Angola signed
the Alvor Agreement with Portugal "calling for an independence of Angola" (Political Handbook
of the World 2012, 41; Turner 2001, 12). Similarly to the Lusaka Accord in Mozambique, the
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Alvor agreement provided for an "interim government" (Political Handbook of the World 2012,
41). After Angola's independence, MPLA proclaimed itself as the "governing party" since it
controlled the capital (Luanda) (Turner 2007, 23). Additionally, the declaration by MPLA "as a
Marxist-Leninist party was not merely taken to please external donors and to launch a "socialist"
development program. It was an attempt to make a clear distinction between the MPLA and its
competitors" (Turner 2007, 23). On November 10, 1975, Agostinho Neto of the MPLA
movement declared the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola (Political Handbook of
the World 2012, 41). Neither one of the other two major parties were in agreement with this
arrangement. For them, it seemed that the MPLA took the initial control of the government
solely because of its control of the capital. An increase in involvement of foreign countries at this
time also occurred in both countries. Involvement was more in support of in defiance of
communism, influences in the area. It was one of the reasons that during the independence war,
the United States did not support MPLA since it’s "leaders seemed communist" and so supported
the side that was non-communist (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 41).
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the ethnic differences between the
independence movements in Angola and ideological difference between the opposition
movements in Mozambique contributed to the type of civil wars that emerged in both countries,
and as well as the kinds of political parties that emerged in their post-conflict environments.
5.3 Characteristics of the Civil Wars
Prior to their first multi-party elections, the Bicesse Accord (1991) in Angola and the
General Peace Accord (1992) in Mozambique were signed by warring parties in hopes of ending
their long civil wars. As history clearly shows, the outcome of the peace agreements and, hence,
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elections were different. Mozambique was able to sustain its peace after elections and Angola
had a recurrence of its civil war. In this section, I take a closer look at the characteristics of their
civil wars, such as the type of conflict, duration, fatalities, and third party involvement.
First, the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique both began after Portugal ended its
colonial rule in 1975. For approximately the next 16 years, the fighting among the former
independence groups in Angola, and opposition groups in Mozambique continued until their first
post-conflict multiparty elections. The conflicts in Angola and Mozambique were different.
Taking a closer look at the issues at hand reveals that the civil war in Angola was based on
ethnic divisions and in Mozambique was based on ideological issues. In Angola, as previously
mentioned, the three independence movements corresponded to the three main ethnic groups. As
Zeitlin (1975) in The Harvard Crimson states that “each of the three movements” ran “its sector
as if it were a separate country.” It is not surprising that these three independence movements
were responsible for the civil war and hence, comprised the main political parties in Angola.
Moreover, the type of civil war that emerged in Angola (i.e. ethnic) and Mozambique (i.e.
ideological) created the basis for the kinds of political parties that developed.
In Angola, the ethnic tensions between these groups continued into their elections.
Although other small political parties won seats in the legislature, the resumption of hostilities in
Angola were brought upon by the main rivals. For example, although the UN officials had
monitored the elections in Angola and "most of the 800 international observers who covered the
vote said it was generally free and fair," violence continued between the political parties after
elections (AP News Archive 1992b). The sentiments of the public mimicked these tensions.
According to another newspaper article in 1992 by the Associated Press, highlighted that "many
citizens fear[ed] a return to war if the loser in the presidential race does not accept the outcome
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of the voting..." (AP News Archive 1992a). Even the United States "which was UNITA's main
arms supplier in his fight against the MPLA, appealed to Savimbi to respect the election results"
(AP News Archive 1992a). Herman Cohen, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for African Affairs,
stated to Savimbi:
Now is the time to think of the Angolan people... you will be a great statesman if you accept the results of this election and work together...to bring about a wealthy new Angola. (AP News Archive 1992a)
The above statement shows that no longer was the conflict a proxy war or a war of
resources, but an in-depth look shows that the conflict in Angola became more about ethnic
differences and less about issues related to politics, such as the economy. In other words, the
ethnic divisions in Angola were reinforced by the proxy wars.
In Mozambique, the conflict between the parties was more about ideology and issues
related to the structure of the government. Renamo has always based its struggle with Frelimo on
opposition to one-party Marxist rule (Lyman 1990). According to an article in the New York
Times written in 1994, Frelimo government party is characterized as a political party that "has
presided over the country since independence in 1975, evolving from a doctrine Marxist-Leninist
party to a lethargic free-market Government marred by corruption and inefficiency" (Keller
1994). Renamo, on the other hand, was seen by the public for "its army of kidnapped children
and its scorched-earth style of guerilla warfare" (Keller 1994). Moreover, "with $19 million of
party-grooming aid from the West" Renamo opposition party had "moved from bush camps to
city offices and recast itself as a buttoned-down, right-of-center underdog, offering a program
virtually identical to Frelimo'" (Keller 1994).
Second, the civil wars in both countries produced high fatalities. For example, by the
early 1990s, there was an estimated one million deaths, with four million people displaced
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"living in refugee camps inside Mozambique or in neighboring Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, or
South Africa" (Quinn 2007, 509). Similarly in Angola, from 1975 until 1991, approximately
more than 100,000 people died. Other figures estimate that during the conflict in Angola more
than 300,000 people died from 1975 until late 1980s, and approximately 1.5 million people were
displaced (Dougherty 2007, 41).
Third, the civil wars had the involvement of foreign countries and UN peacekeepers.
Early on, the anti-communist ideologies of the opposition movements in both Angola and
Mozambique created a proxy like war between Western countries and the Soviet Union. Foreign
countries provided military and monetary aid to those warring parties they supported in the
conflict. In Angola and Mozambique, the presence of the United States, Russia, and South Africa
was clearly seen. In Angola, for example, the United States, South Africa and Zaire provided
money and equipment to the FNLA and UNITA opposition movements, and on the other hand,
Cuba and Soviet Union supported the MPLA government party (Dougherty 2007, 126).
Although this may have helped the civil wars last longer in both countries, it does not fully
explain why after elections in the 1990s, Mozambique was successful in sustaining its peace and
Angola was not. Prior to 1984, however, the passage of the Clark Amendment prevented the
United States from supplying aid to rebel groups. South Africa and Zaire continued to support
UNITA, but the United States had to "cut assistance" which was later restored in 1985 by the
repeal of the Clark Amendment (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 44; Dougherty 2007,
126).
In Mozambique, the Frelimo government party early on identified itself as a Marxist
oriented political party and was a "beneficiary of economic, technical, and security support from
Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, and other Moscow Line states" (Political Handbook of the
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World 2012, 982). In the 1980s, the relationship between Frelimo and the United States
improved, as well as with the UK and Brazil governments. For example, President Machel in
1985 and President Chissano in 1990, secured aid from the United States which "promised aid
for reconstruction and development" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 982). Focusing on
the economy, in 1984, the government in Mozambique was "admitted to IMP and World Bank"
(Political Handbook of the World 2012, 982). Compared to Angola, it can be said that the leaders
of Mozambique, were more concerned with issues related to the country's economic well-being
(Political Handbook of the World 2012, 982). Even relations with South Africa improved.
Mozambique maintained economic links with South Africa in which many Mozambicans were
employed in South African mines and "considerable revenue derived from cooperation in
transport and hydroelectric power" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 983). An agreement
in 1984 between Angola and South Africa was signed ending South African support of the
opposition party, Renamo, and ending Mozambican support for the ANC in South Africa (Quinn
2007, 523-524).
However, closer to the end of the Cold War, involvement by foreign countries in the civil
wars changed in scope. From supporting the rebels in terms of monetary and military aid toward
helping warring sides end their civil wars. At the end of the Cold War, both Russian and the
United States' goals aligned and there was no need to sustain a proxy war in Angola and
Mozambique. For example, in Angola, there was a retraction of aid to rebel groups by the United
States and Soviet Union during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, the civil wars in both
countries continued, suggesting that assistance by the super powers was not the main reason for
why the civil wars had lasted so long.
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The involvement of the international community continued in terms of restoring peace in
war torn Angola and Mozambique. For example, in Angola, "with the involvement of US and
Soviet Union, a peace settlement was signed in Washington in June 1, 1991 which provided for
multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections in late 1992" and a new constitution was
drafted (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 41-43). There were 11 presidential parties and 18
political parties competing against each other. The results produced MPLA as the winner by
winning "more legislature seats than UNITA by 2-1" (Political Handbook of the World 2012,
41). In addition, a "commission composed of Portuguese, US, USSR, MPLA-PT20, UNITA
representatives, and also 600 member United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)"
was "established to assist the government of Angola and the UNITA in restoring peace and
achieving national reconciliation....." (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 41). In the
presidential election, "dos Santos won 49.57 percent and Savimbi won 40.07 percent. Yet, the
second round of elections did not happen as Savimbi "returned to fighting" (Political Handbook
of the World 2012, 41).
Likewise, in Mozambique, the international community became more involved in trying
to end the conflict by involving religious officials, leaders from Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South
Africa (Quinn 2007, 523-524). In 1990, peace talks between the government party and the
opposition movement continued. That same year, the president of Mozambique, Joaquim
Chissano, announced constitutional reforms and new elections (Quinn 2007, 523-524). In
November of that year, a new liberal constitution was adopted thereby allowing multi-party
elections in Mozambique (Quinn 2007, 523-524). After talks returned in 1991, the rebels
"agreed to halt armed activity, to drop demand for a UN transitional Government, and to
20 MPLA had changed its name to MPLA-PT in 1979 as the MPLA-Labor Party (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 41).
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recognize the government's authority" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 981). The
government, likewise, agreed to recognize Renamo as a political party only if "following formal
cease fire" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 981). It can be said that at this time,
"Renamo was no longer intent on overthrowing the government but was seeking instead a peace
settlement under which it could participate as a recognized 'political force' in free elections
resulting from constitutional revision" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 984).
In 1992, a peace accord was signed by President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, leader
of the Renamo opposition movement (BBC News 2014; Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia
2014). The "General Peace Agreement" was signed in Rome and included provisions for "cease
fire, multi-party elections within a year, the establishment of 30,000 member army composed
equally from each existing forces, political amnesty, and Western financed repatriation of
refugees" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 981; Quinn 2007, 523-524). Similar to
Angola, the agreement made Mozambique a multiparty state where the government party and the
opposition movement competing against each other in new elections as major political parties
(Quinn 2007, 523-524).
In the below Table 5.2, I summarize the main characteristics of the civil wars in Angola
and Mozambique.
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TABLE 5.2 Characteristics of the Civil Wars Angolan Civil War
(1975-1991) Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992)
Duration (year) 16 15 Fatalities (number of deaths)a
Over 100,000 deaths Over 100,000 deaths
Third Party Intervention
US Soviet Union Cuba South Africa China
US Soviet Union South Africa Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) China
Peace Agreementsb Bicesse Accord (1991)
General Peace Accord (1992)
Type of Conflict Ethnic Ideological
Foreign Aid Yes Yes
Sources: Political Handbook of the World (2012, 39-50, 980-88). Note: a The below sources were also looked at to approximate the above number of deaths: http://www.timelines.ws/countries/ANGOLA.HTML estimated 350,000 casualties for Angola (1975-1988). http://articles.latimes.com/1987-08-18/news/mn-2190_1_unita estimated 60,000 casualties for Angola (1975-1987). http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html estimated 500,000 casualties for Angola (1975-2002) and 900,000 for Mozambique (1976-1993). b UN sponsored these negotiations, and monitored their elections.
Despite the many similar characteristics of the civil wars shared by Angola and
Mozambique, the type of conflict differed. The civil war in Angola was based on ethnic
identities and in Mozambique based on ideological issues. I argue that the type of war in Angola
and Mozambique created the basis for the kinds of political parties that populated their post-
conflict environment. In contrast to ethnic civil wars, civil wars that are based on ideology create
an atmosphere were trust can occur and peace is possible, and where divisions between groups
are not as visible. Licklider (1995) also argued that peace agreements to end ethnic civil wars
(i.e. identity civil wars) are more difficult to reach through negotiated settlements, since ethnic
5.4 Characteristics of the Post-Conflict Environment
Angola and Mozambique also share many characteristics of their post-conflict societies.
In the below Table 5.3, I summarize the main institutional similarities between Angola and
Mozambique which are known to affect peace duration in post-conflict states.
Angola in 1992 and Mozambique in 1994 held their first post-conflict multi-party
elections for both legislative and parliamentary seats. The new constitutions drafted in both
countries designated a proportional representation system to select members of the legislature.
Specifically, the closed list PR system was selected in both countries. To summarize, the closed
list PR system is a type of proportional representation formula where more than one candidate is
elected from a district with the goal to ensure that the share of votes a party receives is
proportional to the share of seats received in the legislature (Ishiyama 2012; Lijphart 1999).
Specifically, the closed list PR system is where voters cast votes directly for a party rather than
an open list PR system where voters vote for an individual candidate on the party list. A total of
18 parties in Angola and 15 parties in Mozambique competed for legislative seats. On average,
the age of the parties were similar with 18.8 years old in Angola and 17.3 years old in
Mozambique.
Among these similarities, the outcome of the legislative and presidential elections were
also similar in terms of the percentage of votes the government party and the opposition party
received. First, it is important to mention that the size of the parliaments are similar, with 223
seats in Angola and 250 seats in Mozambique. The MPLA government party in Angola won
53.74% (129 seats) and Frelimo government party in Mozambique won 44.33% (129 seats) of
votes. The opposition party in Angola, UNITA, won 34.10% (70 seats) and the opposition party
in Mozambique, Renamo, won 37.78% (112 seats) of votes. The below results indicate that
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Sources: PARLINE Database on National Parliaments (1992, 1994) Political Handbook of the World (2012, 39-50, 980-88) Political Parties of the World (2005, 18-23, 423-25) ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network at http://aceproject.org/ Polity IV database (Polity 2 score ranging between and including -5 and +5 are anocracies, above 5 are democracies and under -5 are authoritarian regimes): http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html World Bank Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD a Three seats are reserved to represent Angolans overseas (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 43).
TABLE 5.3 Characteristics of the Post-Conflict Environment Angola Mozambique Multi-Party Elections (year)
1992 1994
Electoral Rule Closed List PR Closed List PR Number of Parties or Coalitions Competing
Structure of Parliament Unicameral Unicameral Results: Vote Percentages
MPLA (53.74%) UNITA (34.10%)
FRELIMO (44.33%) RENAMO (37.78%)
Results: Number of Seats MPLA (129) UNITA (70)
FRELIMO (129) RENAMO (112)
Democratic System Presidential Presidential President Elected Direct Universal Suffrage Direct Universal Suffrage Presidential Electoral Rule Two-Round System Two-Round System Results: Vote Percentages Dos Santos (49.57%)
the rival parties were similarly represented in both Angola and Mozambique. Hence, the
argument for lack of representation in the legislature by the opposition parties is highly unlikely
to explain the recurrence of civil war in Angola, especially since UNITA and Renamo were
similarly represented.
Both countries also have a presidential system where the president is directly elected by
the people in a two-round system for five years with an opportunity for reelection on consecutive
term. The results of the presidential election shows that the presidential candidates in Angola and
Mozambique also received fairly similar results. The results for the presidential elections in
Mozambique produced Joaquim Chissano of Frelimo as the winning candidate with 53.7% of the
votes, and the opposition candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, of the Renamo party winning 33.7% of
the votes. In Angola, dos Santos won 49.57% of the votes as a presidential candidate for MPLA
and Savimbi won 40.07% as a presidential candidate for UNITA party. Although Renamo did
not gain a majority of the seats and lost the presidency in Mozambique, unlike the UNITA
opposition party in Angola, the losing party did not seek to overthrow the government. Although,
Renamo alleged the results were fraudulent just like UNITA did in Angola, Renamo did not
resume conflict.
In both elections, the UN monitored the election processes and concluded them to be free
and fair. For example, voting in Mozambique was monitored "by some 2500 (mainly UN)
international observers" (PARLINE Database on National Parliaments 1994). Representatives
from the UN concluded the "elections to have been free and fair despite some irregularities
(complained about by Renamo)” (PARLINE Database on National Parliaments 1994).
Another characteristic that is similar between Angola and Mozambique, is their level of
democracy prior to and during their election year. I refer to the Polity2 scores for Angola and
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Mozambique to measure their regime type. The Polity2 measure provides a score ranging from -
10 to 10, where higher values represent stronger democracies. Although the democracy score for
Angola fell after the country became embroiled in the civil war in 1993, the scores overall
indicate that both countries were becoming more democratic. Taking a closer look at their levels
of democracy shows their Polity scores jumped dramatically. Angola scored a -3 in 1991 and a 0
during the election year in 1992. In Mozambique, the Polity2 score in 1993 was -6 and during
elections in 1994 was 5. Additionally, the above scores indicate that Angola and Mozambique
were both "anocracies” up to and during their election years.
In addition, taking a closer look at their economic development around their time of
elections reveals that Angola's economy was actually doing better than Mozambique. For
example, according to the World Bank Development Indicators, the GDP per capita for Angola
in 1991 was $1,145, in 1992 it was $525, and in 1993 it was $465. In contrast, the GDP per
capita for Mozambique in 1993 was $136, in 1994 was $140 and in 1995 was $141.
Additionally, in contrast to previous scholars who have argued that economic development
positively affects peace duration, it seems in this comparison, that although Angola was doing
better than Mozambique, the country still fell back into a civil war.
5.5 Why Was Mozambique Successful But Not Angola?
Controlling for the many factors that are similar between Angola and Mozambique,
especially those factors that are known to affect peace duration, the main factor on which both
countries differ is the kinds of political parties that emerged in their post-conflict society.
Taking a closer look at the origins of the political parties, from their colonial history,
reveals that the political parties in Angola were narrow (ethnic) and in Mozambique they were
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broad (multi-ethnic). As I discuss below, political parties in Mozambique were ideologically
different and more accommodating of many ethnic groups. However, the political parties in
Angola focused primarily on certain ethnic groups for support and were in essence exclusive in
their memberships. To summarize, ethnic parties are those that exclude a certain group from
membership or representation (Chandra 2011). Multi-ethnic groups on the other hand are those
that appeal to all ethnic groups in the society and do not represent the interests of any groups
over others. I refer to newspaper articles (i.e. speeches, quotes, etc.) to gain a greater insight of
how accommodating (i.e. inclusive) the parties are. A leader’s rhetoric can be helpful in
identifying how positive or negative leaders regard each another. In other words, how exclusive
and inclusive the political parties are can be better examined through leader’s rhetoric. First, I
discuss the political parties in Angola, and then incorporate my analysis of Mozambique's
political parties into the discussion.
In Angola, the origins of the political parties stem from Angola’s colonial background.
As mentioned previously, the three main independence movements in Angola corresponded to
the three main ethnic groups. Ethnic divisions among the groups were even further deepened by
Portugal. These three independents movements not only fought against each other during
Angola’s civil war, but became the main political parties during Angola’s first post-conflict
multiparty election. For example, an article in the Baltimore Sun in 1993 stated that "tribal
warfare has been a rarity in Angolan history" and that Angola like "other white settler colonies in
Africa where Europeans tended to concentrate in the capital…had disproportionate influence on
the ethnic group that traditionally inhabited this area" (Patricio 1993). In other words, this quote
emphasizes that Portugal colonialism further deepened the ethnic differences between the ethnic
groups that comprised the main political parties in Angola.
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The ethnic tensions between the ethnic groups continued further into elections. For
example, after the presidential multi-party elections in Angola, Savimbi "fell short of the 50%
needed to avoid a run-off in the presidential elections," and his party received only 70 seats
compared to 129 for MPLA (PARLINE Database on National Parliaments 1992). The UNITA
officials immediately called out the results as fraudulent and distrust between the groups was
clearly seen as one UNITA official declared the following: "The situation is so grave we cannot
imagine the publication of such fraudulent results because this will mean immediate war" (AP
News Archive 1992b). In return, the MPLA officials "accused UNITA of staging the shootout to
raise tension" (AP News Archive 1992b). Although dos Santos promised that the election results
would not be published until investigation into fraudulent claims are fully investigated
(Economist 1992). This indicates that dos Santos, unlike Savimbi, was willing to compromise.
Savimbi, on other hand, "cried fraud, threatened to return his fighters to the bush and withdrew
his top generals from the newly armed forces" (Economist 1992). An MPLA official, Joao
Lourenco, was quoted saying in an article in 1992 that UNITA were "waving the specter of war"
(AP News Archive 1992b). The above statements provide a good example of how both of these
rivals continued to distrust each other.
During a meeting between Savimbi and South Africa’s foreign minister, Mr. Botha,
Savimbi declared the following: "I can listen to you because you have been my friend and have
not betrayed me like others have" (Economist 1992). Suggesting how distrustful Savimbi
regarded the government party, MPLA. Even before the signing of the Bicesse Accord in 1991,
talks between the rivals showed hatred. In the New York Times article written in 1989, Savimbi
referred to MPLA as "criminal" and that "our army was not defeated and is not going to be
defeated" as his response to idea of accepting amnesty, clemency, or integration with MPLA
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(Noble 1989). Gene Sharp in 1973 wrote in the Politics of Nonviolent Action about what it takes
to stop violence between groups, and stated the following: "At one extreme, if members of the
nonviolent group are not even regarded as fellow human beings, the changes of achieving
conversion by nonviolent suffering are likely to be nil. This barrier needs to be examined" (Sharp
1973, 261). With deep ethnic divisions that divided the political parties in Angola, no such
accommodation or appreciation of the other's life existed. Sharp emphasized that the first step
between groups to stop fighting is to appreciate and refer to each other as human beings.
A recent radio address by Savimbi in 1993 clearly shows how exclusive (i.e. ethnically
oriented), the UNITA opposition party was:
No one is saying that Creoles should not have their own culture, that Creoles should not live the way they live. All we are saying is that we are not Creoles. All we want to say is that we belong to the Bantu origin, and we are Afrikans. We cannot abdicate and cannot compromise on the defense of these values... I am launching a general appeal to all UNITA armed forces wherever they might be in order to gather together in their old areas. We have uniforms, arms, ammunition, bombs, and food. Come, but do not leave for assembly points. You should leave for your old areas, and we will immediately organize to collect you. We will immediately order the reorganization of your units in order to continue with the battles for the sake of bringing dignity to the Bantu people in their land of origin. Come quickly, I know that you will trust my word. (Patricio 1993)
Similarly, Roland Paris in At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict wrote that
rather than the elections in 1992 leading to peace, Angola had violence. He reiterated what other
scholars have said that even "during the campaign period, both Savimbi and (to a lesser degree)
dos Santos used rhetoric that played upon Angola's existing social and political divisions,
including urban-rural and ethnic-tribal differences, in order to generate popular fear of the other's
party intentions" (Heywood 2000, 216-218; Paris 2004, 68-69; Wesley 1997, 102).
The sentiments between the public in Angola and Mozambique were similar, as many did
not imagine that an end to such a conflict was possible, and many stated that "they hope that the
two-day elections will secure their peace and prosperity but who do not entirely believe it yet"
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(Keller 1994). In Mozambique, the public viewed the government party and opposition
movement as "two main parties [that] are the same rivals that crushed the country between them,
leaving up to one million dead, most of them civilians" (Keller 1994).
The composition of Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique became more inclusive over
time. In the initial stages of the civil war, Machel of Frelimo as president of Mozambique was
quoted as saying regarding Renamo that he would "wipe them out and that day is not far off"
(Quinn 2007, 523-524). By 1989, Frelimo is "further from Marxist doctrine" and "terming itself
the vanguard of the Mozambican people rather than worker-peasant alliance," and the "party
opened its membership to many formerly excluded groups, such as private property owners, the
business community, Christians, Muslims, and traditionalists" (Political Handbook of the World
2012, 984).
The government party also called for a “negotiated settlement with Renamo, bureaucratic
reforms, and an emphasis on family farming rather than state agriculture" (Political Handbook of
the World 2012, 984). Even the leader of Renamo, President Dhlakama, said in an interview
"Our aim is not to win the war military....but to force Frelimo to accept negotiations for a
democratically elected government" (Quinn 2007, 514; Finnegan 1992, 79). In the 1980s,
Frelimo abandoned its Marxist ideology and embraced what Renamo fought for and that was
"multiparty elections, freedom of religion and associations, and an elected executive" (Quinn
2007, 518). Overtime, Frelimo in essence became more inclusive and multi-ethnic over the
course of its civil war. Renamo, on the other hand, continued as anti-Frelimo, specifically as a
"widespread anti-Frelimo insurgency, relying on financial support from Portuguese expatriated,
and until the early 1990s substantial military aid from South Africa" (Political Handbook of the
World 2012, 984). The composition of the Renamo was primarily of "Portuguese and other
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mercenaries, Frelimo defectors, and numerous recruits from the Shona-speaking Ndau ethnic
group, operated mainly in rural areas, where it interdicted transport corridors and sabotaged food
production" (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 984). Hence, both Renamo and Frelimo
were inclusive and had members from different ethnic groups. In other words, these rivals did
not appeal to any one type of ethnic group. Their policies were not tailored to a specific ethnic
group. Leading up to the negotiations in 1990 and elections in 1994, Renamo stated that it "was
no longer intent on overthrowing the government but was seeking instead a peace settlement
under which it could participate as a recognized political force in free elections resulting for
constitutional revision (Political Handbook of the World 2012, 984).
Unlike in Angola, Mozambique’s elections were not rushed and actually were delayed by
two years with the intervention by the UN. Although however true this is, the "two years of
peace have not [possible] erased the fear of war, and many worry what will happen when the
foreign peacekeepers pullout..." (Keller 1994). As such, this does not fully explain why
Mozambique was successful in sustaining its peace after its first-multiparty elections especially
once the peacekeepers left.
A comparison of Renamo and UNITA as political parties based on the above information
indicates that Renamo’s goal has been to be part of the government. Earlier on in 1984, Frelimo
offered "first amnesty programs to the rebels in exchange for peace" but did not initially agree
"to multiparty system and top government positions for Renamo leaders" (Quinn 2007, 523-524).
Suggesting that Renamo already demanded inclusion in the government rather than domination.
Hence, the kinds of political parties that emerged overtime in Angola up to their first
post-conflict elections were ethnically based (i.e. narrow) and in Mozambique the political
parties were multi-ethnic (i.e. broad). The independence movements and more specifically the
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civil wars themselves in Angola were based on ethnic identities and in Mozambique on
ideological issues. The type of civil war in both countries created the basis for the kinds of
political parties that emerged in both countries.
In the below Table 5.4, I summarize the similarities and differences between Angola and
Mozambique.
TABLE 5.4 Summary of Analysis Factors Angola Mozambique Legacy of Colonialism Portugal Portugal Duration of Civil War 16 15 Intensity of Civil War Over 100,000 Over 100,000 Type of Civil War Ethnic Ideological Elections Multiparty Multiparty Similar Elector Rule Closed List PR Closed List PR Type of Democratic System Presidential Presidential Types of Political Parties Narrow (ethnic) Broad (multi-ethnic) Outcome Recurrence of Civil War Peace
As the above table shows, the explanation for why Mozambique was successful in
sustaining its peace after elections lays in the kinds of political parties that populated the post-
conflict environment. As most scholars that study post-conflict peace building have argued that
exclusion leads to conflict. The above analysis shows that the origins and existence of narrow
parties in Angola had contributed to its recurrence of civil war. In Mozambique, however, the
party system was broad-based. The ethnic divisions in Angola's political parties contributed to
the lack of trust between the rival political parties and hence, recurrence of civil war
Specifically, the above analysis showed that the origins of the political parties in Angola
and Mozambique stemmed not only from their legacy of colonialism, but also from the type of
civil wars that occurred and hence, became the basis for the kinds of political parties that
eventually emerged. This analysis suggests and also confirms the main argument of this study
that political parties play an important role in post-conflict states, and the effects of electoral
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rules on peace duration are conditional on the kinds of political parties that exist in the post-
conflict environment.
5.6 Summary
The focus of this chapter is to examine the following question: Why was Mozambique
successful in sustaining its peace after elections but not Angola. By utilizing the MSS approach,
I compared the similarities between Angola and Mozambique from their independence to their
first post-conflict multi-party elections. After controlling for all factors that are similar, including
the characteristics of their elections, I found that the main factor that differentiates both countries
during this time are the kinds of political parties that populated their post-conflict environment.
Scholars such as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) have noted that in ethnically divided societies,
parties are formed along ethnic lines and gain support based on ethnic divisions rather than
political issues. When parties emerge from such societies they are already formed based on those
ethnic divisions on which they have fought. In Angola, I found that the political parties were
exclusive (i.e. ethnic). Although both Angola and Mozambique utilized the same electoral rule
(i.e. closed list PR system), Angola had a recurrence of civil war. Peace was not possible under a
closed list PR system when political parties exclude other groups even though closed list PR
system keeps candidates "in line." It can be said from the analysis that under a closed list PR
system, Mozambique was able to sustain its peace after elections with broad-based parties. This
difference helps explain why Mozambique was successful in sustaining its peace after elections
and Angola was not.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
Once a country has experienced civil war, the threat of more conflict is elevated. The risk of a subsequent war for countries that have experienced war is estimated to be two to four times higher than the risk for new states. (Bellamy 2007, 14)
The above quote clearly illustrates how deadly and complex civil wars are, and how hard
it is to resolve and prevent them from recurring. The two main questions that are fundamental to
scholars that study civil wars, are: first, how do civil wars end and, second, how to sustain peace
after a civil war ends (Meernik and Mason 2006). This dissertation contributes to the second
fundamental question and seeks to provide a better understanding of those factors that help
sustain peace after a civil war ends. There have been numerous cases of civil wars that ended in
either a negotiated settlement, and yet resulted in an outbreak of another civil war. For example,
as witnessed in Angola, Iraq, and Sudan. As such, there is a common concern and empirical
evidence has shown that once a nation experiences a civil war it is highly likely to experience
another one (Mason 2007; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). Perhaps, "one reason for this high
risk is that the same factors causing the initial war often remain" (Bellamy 2007, 14; Collier et al.
2003, 83). Suggesting that the underlying issues among warring parties are not resolved and
continue to be the source of future conflicts. How then can parties to a conflict that have
developed deep hatred for each other commit to peace? Hence, the focus on civil wars in the
literature on peace-building has turned toward examining not only why civil wars occur but more
on those factors that help sustain peace longer in post-conflict states.
The main focus of this dissertation has been to provide scholars and policymakers a better
understanding of those factors that help sustain peace in post-conflict states. Among the factors
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that are known to affect peace duration, the design of political institutions as a way to help
prevent conflict in post-conflict states is part of a recent research agenda. The purpose of this
dissertation is to contribute to this emerging research by focusing on the relationship between
electoral rules and peace duration. This dissertation addresses an interesting and important
question for peace research and for the political science field more generally. Specifically, the
question that I examined in this study is: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict
states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors?
In this chapter, I review the main findings of this study, discuss the theoretical
contributions and policy implications of this research, and provide recommendations for future
research.
6.2 Summary of Main Findings
Electoral rules are formulas that determine how votes for candidates are translated into
legislative seats. I examined electoral rules for the following important reasons: first, electoral
rules are the most commonly analyzed set of institutional choices in the democratization
literature; second, electoral rules affect how states function and constrain behavior of parties
involved in the policy decision making process; and third, the outcome of an election depends on
the electoral system that is chosen. Taking a closer look at electoral rules, reveals that
proportional representation (PR) electoral rule has been the predominant choice in societies
emerging out of a civil war (Bogaards 2013). Although, the empirical results are mixed on
whether this promotes peace in post-conflict states, suggests that more research on electoral rules
and peace duration is needed (Bogaards 2013). As noted by Bogaards (2013), "despite the
obvious popularity of PR, it has been hard to prove--even for its most ardent advocates--that PR
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has a positive impact on peace and democracy, especially in the context of post-conflict
societies" (75). To summarize, the main argument of this study has centered on the importance of
political parties in promoting peace after a conflict ends. I argued that what has generally been
missing from the discussion of the effects of political institutions (such as different types of
electoral systems) on peace duration and conflict restart in general, are the kinds of political
parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. As discussed previously, political parties are
important for political development since they allow the public to participate and exchange
dialogue. Building on scholars such as Sartori (1968) and Moser (1999), I proposed that the
kinds of political parties that populate the post-conflict environment matters for the expected
effects of political institutions. In other words, I argued that this emerging research has missed
the independent role that political parties play in the post-conflict environment.
There are only a handful of scholars that have empirically examined the effects of
electoral rules on peace duration (Bogaards 2013; Cammett and Malesky 2012; Joshi 2013;
Mukherjee 2006). In this dissertation, I contribute to this emerging research by arguing that the
effects of electoral rules are mitigated by the kinds of political parties that exist in the post-
conflict environment. I suggested that the features of the party system play an important role in
promoting peace after a conflict ends, and impacts the expected effects of electoral rules. In other
words, not only does the effect of one type of institution impact peace, but one institution may
impact the effects of another institution on peace, depending upon the kinds of parties that
populate the political system.
In the previous chapters, I developed and tested three hypotheses based on the following
two assumptions: first, I proposed that political parties in post-conflict states are not shaped
solely by the electoral rules chosen in the post-conflict environment but by other factors in the
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political system. For example, in Angola and Mozambique, the type of civil war and colonial
history created the basis for the kinds of political parties that emerged in the post-conflict
society. In sum, the political parties in Angola and Mozambique were not a development of the
electoral rules. Second, I proposed that whether or not peace is maintained depends on the extent
to which the majority of seats in the parliament are controlled by broad (i.e. nonexclusive) or
narrow (i.e. exclusive) parties. In the case of Angola, political parties differed according to their
ethnic backgrounds stemming from their colonial history and hence, fought on issues related to
their differences (i.e. ethnic identity) rather than on policy issues, as was in Mozambique.
As chapter 5 describes, under a closed list PR system Mozambique, unlike Angola, was
able to sustain its peace after elections with its broad and integrative political parties. Under a
closed list PR system, not only do these electoral rules keep candidates "in line," but also create
ethnic (i.e. exclusive) parties which can lead to peace failure. In post-conflict states, parties
already emerge based on those differences on which these political actors had fought during the
civil war. When parties are divided by certain cleavages, they no longer trust each other, and
hence conflict arises. In sum, the more broad-based the political parties are in the parliament, the
more inclusive and moderate the party system becomes, the more likely they are willing to join
coalitions, and hence, leads to a higher likelihood of peace.
The theoretical framework led to three hypotheses focusing on the important independent
role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration:
Hypothesis 1: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war than post-conflict states with candidate centered systems (i.e. open list PR/district based systems). Hypothesis 2: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system) interacting with an increased percent of legislature seats controlled by broad parties, are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war.
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Hypothesis 3: Post-conflict states with party centered electoral system (i.e. closed list PR system) are more likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the legislature are controlled by narrow parties than controlled by broad parties.
In chapter 4, I empirically tested the above hypotheses using a proportional hazard
analysis on 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The
empirical results showed strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. The models showed that closed
list PR electoral system (i.e. party centered systems) did not have a significant effect on peace
duration (i.e. risk of failure). Suggesting that electoral rules by themselves have no significant
impact on promoting peace in post-conflict states. Specifically, electoral rules neither increased
nor decreased the risk of an outbreak of civil war. The findings are also not consistent with
scholars such as Cammett and Malesky (2013) that had argued that closed list PR system
promote peace. Their argument was based on the assumption that since political parties become
stronger and more disciplined under a closed list PR system, they prevent defection and hence,
produce less conflict. However, the findings from the models indicate that electoral rules do not
matter for peace. In other words, the design of electoral rules has no impact on whether conflict
recurs or not, and does not explain civil war recurrence.
The empirical analysis confirmed Hypotheses 2 and 3. The results showed that post-
conflict states with party centered electoral systems (i.e. closed list PR system) are less likely to
have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the parliament are controlled by broad-based
parties. Specifically, the interaction between electoral rules with the extent to which the majority
of parties in the legislature are broad has an effect in reducing civil war recurrence.
In sum, the empirical results support the main argument of the study that the more seats
in the legislature that are controlled by broad-based parties under a party centered electoral
system, the more moderate and inclusive the party system becomes, and this helps promote a
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more durable peace. Most importantly, to rephrase, the results support the arguments made by
Sartori (1968) and Moser (1999) that argued that the types of parties mitigate the intended effects
of electoral rules (i.e. parties exist apart from electoral rules). Although their argument focused
on the stability of new democracies, it also applies to post-conflict states. Additionally, not only
do electoral rules by themselves have no impact on peace duration, but broad parties by
themselves do not decrease the hazard rate of peace failure. The only way for broad parties to
decrease the hazard rate of peace failure is when they operate under disciplined electoral systems
(i.e. party centered/closed list PR electoral system) and act as gatekeepers which prevent
independent candidates from defecting.
In chapter 5, I conducted a comparative case study analysis on Angola and Mozambique.
The question that I examined was: Why was Mozambique successful in sustaining its peace after
elections but not Angola? Or, in other words, why among so many similarities up to their first
multi-party election, was Mozambique able to sustain its peace after elections but Angola had a
recurrence of civil war? I found that among their many similarities, including their same
electoral rules (i.e. closed list PR system), the exclusive (i.e. ethnic) nature of the political parties
in Angola had contributed toward its recurrence of civil war. In contrast, Mozambique's political
parties were ideologically differentiated and hence, more inclusive and integrative (i.e. multi-
ethnic) of other ethnic groups. A closer look at the origins of the political parties in Angola
reveals that the political parties have long been fighting over issues related to identity stemming
from their colonial history as independence movements and from their civil war. The political
parties also reflected the main ethnic groups in the society. In Mozambique, there was only one
independence movement, and during its civil war, the government political party and the
opposition party fought over issues related to ideology and the structure of the government.
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There were no ethnic divisions between these political movements in Mozambique and hence, no
ethnic divisions divided the political parties. The qualitative analysis confirms the main
argument of this dissertation and suggest that the kinds of political parties that populate the post-
conflict environment matter for peace and mitigates the effects of electoral rules on peace
duration. The comparative case study analysis has helped in explaining why Mozambique was
more successful in sustaining its peace after elections and Angola was not.
6.3 Theoretical Contributions and Policy Implications
This dissertation makes three important contributions for both scholars and policymakers
engaged in designing institutions for post-conflict societies. First, the results found in the
previous chapters provide a better understanding of the importance of designing institutions for
managing conflict. Specifically, the idea that certain institutions can be designed to foster peace,
creates the hope that peace is possible in ethnically divided and conflict prone societies. Second,
the results confirm that electoral rules alone do not impact peace duration, and instead political
parties play an important independent role in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace
duration. These are significant results that contradict previous scholars that argued that the
design of electoral rules alone matters for peace and political parties are a development of the
electoral system (Cammett and Malesky 2013; Joshi 2013; Mukherjee 2006). In sum, features of
the party system play an important role in promoting peace after conflict, and impacts the
expected effects of electoral rules. The above suggests that what has been missing in the
literature on post-conflict peace building is the independent role of political parties. Moreover,
the results suggest that to manage conflict under a party centered system, the more broad
political parties need to be. In other words, as mentioned previously, the key for sustaining peace
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in post-conflict states is for political parties to appeal to all ethnic groups in society, and hence to
become de-ethnicized as argued by scholars such as Brass 1991, Horowitz 1985, and Reilly
2006. Third, this dissertation sits at the cross section between the literature on political
institutions and the literature on peace duration. Combining these existing literatures with the
literature on party development in conflict prone states represents other opportunities for
research.
6.4 Future Research
This dissertation not only examined how the effects of one type of institutional choice
impacts peace, but how institutions interacted with each other and their effect on the success or
failure of peace. This combination of institutions, shows another promising new venue for future
research. As noted by Horowitz (2008), the main reason for why we do not know which
institutions are most appropriate, is because when we select rules, we select some rules over
others and not complete packages, and as such, he emphasizes that the mixed results we get is
due to other rules that exist that might do nothing to reduce conflict or can counteract the effects
of others (1225-1226). This is an excellent comment that suggests where future research on
political institutions should head. In other words, future research should examine the impact of
how institutions interact with each other on peace duration. In similar manner, Kurtenbach and
Mehler (2013) emphasize that "when dealing with questions of the effect of institution design on
the prospect of peace," one of the challenges they mention (which this research has already
addressed) is: "scholars typically focus on one type of institution instead of engaging in
integrative analyses of the interaction of the whole set of institutions, and there is little exchange
between specialists on various institutions and their impact" (1). Kurtenbach and Mehler (2013)
140
further note that "while institutional reform may pave the way for war termination and a political
opening, their effects on the incremental processes of building peace beyond war termination is
less evident" (5). Specifically, they emphasize that future research should focus more on the
relationship between political institutions and peace duration.
This research has provided some promising results, which suggests that peace is possible
to sustain in ethnically divided and post-conflict states. There are also some limitations that
should be addressed. First, the measurement of how broad or narrow the political parties are in
chapter 4 could be measured with an alternative method. Second, the comparative case study
analysis in chapter 5 compared only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola and
Mozambique. It would be interesting to apply the MSS research approach introduced in chapter
5 to other countries to see if the results of the empirical analysis holds true in other cases.
In this dissertation, the main focus has been to provide scholars and policymakers a better
understanding of the effects of electoral rules on peace duration. This dissertation has shown that
context matters and the choice of electoral rules should fit the post-conflict environment (i.e.
kinds of political parties that already exist). In sum, more research is still needed to examine
which types of political institutions are the most appropriate for managing conflict in post-
conflict states. For example, which democratic political institutions should peacekeeping forces
establish in post-conflict states and how the theory applies to new democracies. It is the hope that
this research has provided the necessary foundation for future research that examines political
institutions as a tool of conflict management.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PARTIES PER COMPETITIVE
ELECTION YEAR
142
Country Election Year Number of Parties Afghanistan 1988 6
2005 0 Algeria 1987 1
1997 10 2002 9 2007 22
Angola 1992 12 2008 5
Azerbaijan 1995 9 2000 11 2005 15
Bangladesh 1988 6 1991 12 1996 6 2001 8 2008 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 7 1998 10 2000 13 2002 15 2006 12
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