Elías Palti - The Return of the Subject

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The "Return of the Subject" as a Historico-Intellectual ProblemAuthor(s): Elías PaltiSource: History and Theory, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 57-82Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University

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2/27

History

and

Theory

43

(February

2004),

57-82 C

Wesleyan University

2004 ISSN:

0018-2656

THE

RETURNOF

THE

SUBJECT AS

A

HISTORICO-INTELLECTUALROBLEMI

ELIAS

PALTI

ABSTRACT

Recently,

a

call for the return f the

subject

has

gained increasing

influence. The

power

of

this call is

intimately

linked

to the

assumption

that there is a

necessary

connection

between the

subject

and

politics

(and

ultimately, history).

Without a

subject,

it is

alleged,

there can be no

agency,

and therefore no

emancipatoryprojects-and,

thus,

no

history.

This

paper

discusses the

precise epistemological

foundations

for this claim. It

shows that the idea of a

necessary

link

between the

subject

and

agency,

and

therefore

between the

subject

and

politics

(and

history)

is

only

one

among many

different

ones that

appeared

n the

course of the four centuries that

modernityspans.

It has

precise

historico-

intellectual

premises,

ones that cannot be traced back in

time before the

end of the nine-

teenth

century.Failing

to observe the

historicity

of the notion of

the

subject,

and

project-

ing

it as a kindof universal

category,

results,

as we shall

see,

in serious

ncongruence

and

anachronisms.

The

essay

outlines

a

definite view of intellectual

history

aimed at

recover-

ing

the

radically

contingent

natureof

conceptual

formations,

which,

it

alleges,

is the still-

valid core of Foucault's

archeological

project. Regardless

of the

inconsistencies

in

his

own

archeological

endeavors,

his

archeological approach

ntended

to establish in

intel-

lectual

history

a

principle

of

temporal rreversibility

mmanent n

it.

Following

his

lead,

the

essay attempts

to discern the

different

meanings

the

category

of the

subject

has his-

torically acquired,referring

hem back to the

broader

pistemic reconfigurations

hathave

occurred

n Western

hought.

This

reveals

a

richness of

meanings

in this

category

that

are

obliteratedunder the

general

label of the

modern

subject ;

at the same

time,

it illumi-

nates some of the methodologicalproblemsthat mar currentdebates on the topic.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The

emergence

of

postmodernity

s

commonly

identified

by

both its

supporters

and its detractorsas the

period

in

which

the

(modem)

idea of the

subject

dis-

solved. Such a

dissolution

allegedly

has

both theoretical and

practical implica-

tions.

Without a

subject,

it is

claimed,

no

history

or ethics is

conceivable: sub-

ject, history,

and

politics

are

supposedly

tied

in

a

non-contingent

fashion.

As

ElizabethErmarth ecently put it:

Along

with he

modemrn

ndividual

ubject,

whatvanishes ntothe

discursive onditions

the entire

apparatus

of

infinities,

objectifiers,

and common denominators

upon

which

so

much has

depended, including representationalpolitics.

The consensus

apparatuses

of

representational

rt,

of democratic

systems,

and even

history

are

in

doubt

....

Funeral

1.

This

article

s a

part

f

a

larger

work,

A

BriefHistory f

theModern

ubject.

thank wo

editors

of this

ournal,

than

Kleinberg

ndBrian

Fay,

or

veryhelpful

omments

n a

previous

ersion f it.


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3/27

58

ELIAS

PALTI

laments,

attacks on

postmodernity,

and

other

expressions

of

grief

are understandable

enough, given

what

is at stake.2

For

Ermarth,

the

collapse

of

the

subject

is linked

to

the

linguistic

turn. When

everything

has become discourse, she

says,

societies

appear

as self-enclosed

and

self-regulated

systems

of

relationships only

within which can actions

of

the

subject

take

place:

Emphasis

on discursive

conditionhas

taught

us

to

search

for

code rather

han

for

struc-

ture :

a

shift

with substantial

mplications

for

subjectivity.

Once

everything

has become

discourse,

and

subjectivity

becomes

a

function of

systems

of differential

relationships,

what becomes

of that

wonderful windowless monad known as free and

in-dividual

agent:

the

one

who

carries

the

ethical

responsibilities

of freedom?3

If this

were

the

case,

we

would

be

fatally

trapped

in

the

iron

cage

that Max

Weber talked

about.

All

transcendent

drives,

all

emancipating projects,

would be

mere

illusions.

However,

this view cannot be

consistently

held;

many

have

pointed

out

that

it

leads to

insurmountable

contradictions.

A

case

in

point

is the

unsustainability

of

Michel

Foucault's

famous announcement

of the death of Man. In

an

interest-

ing essay

on

agency,

Michael

Fitzhugh

and William Leckie note

that,

by

elimi-

nating

the

subject,

Foucault

was

theoretically

prevented

from

elaborating

a

con-

cept

of

change.

However,

his

conception

of

history

still

presupposes

change,4

and this

forces

him to re-introduce the idea of some

type

of

agency:

lacking

out-

side

stimuli,

conceiving

of

any

manner

in

which humans could create

new

terms

or

even

combine

their old

linguistic

elements

in a new

way

becomes

difficult

without

resorting

to a

philosophical

deus ex machina. 5

The

same

point

can be

made

in

terms

of Foucault's

politics:

Even Michel

Foucaultcherished

resistance,

and

while it is unclear

how

this

fit

into

his

the-

ory

and

historiographical ractice,

t

raises

the

question

of how

independent

resistance s

possible.

What

exerted this

control and

sought

this

resistance,

and how? Whatever

he sta-

bility

of the

self,

the

question

of its

ability

to act

meaningfully

and to

change

meanings-

and, therefore,

history

has remainedan

open

question.6

An

increasingly

greater

number

of authors have

thus

converged

on

the

conclu-

sion

that the

postmodern

project

of

eliminating

the

subject

is

doomed

to fail. As

long

as the

subject

constitutes

the

premise

of

ethics,

politics,

and

history,

it can

never

completely

disappear;

sooner or

later

it

must

always

return:

For

most

people,

however,

including

historians,

agency

remains a

vibrant

f difficult

pres-

ence,

a datum

of

importance,

and one

of the

vestiges

of

modem

life

that

postmodernists

2.

Elizabeth

Deeds

Ermarth,

Agency

in

the Discursive

Condition,

History

and

Theory,

Theme

Issue 40 (2001), 51.

3.

Ibid.,

44.

4. As

he

states in

his

preface

to the

English

version of

The

Order

of Things:

It has

been

said that

this work denies

the

very possibility

of

change.

And

yet

my

main concern

has

been

with

changes

(Michel

Foucault,

The Order

of

Things:

An

Archeology

of

Human Sciences

[New

York:

Vintage,

1970],

xii).

5.

Ermarth,

Agency

in

the

Discursive

Condition,

63.

6. David

Gary

Shaw,

Happy

in

Our Chains?

Agency

and

Language

in

the Postmodern

Age,

History

and

Theory,

Theme

Issue

40

(2001),

4.




4/27

THE

RETURNOF THE

SUBJECT

59

feel

as much as

any.

It is not

easy

to

put

it

away.

Thus

regardless

of its

relativetheoretical

eclipse,

the

agent

remains

common and

prominent

n

much

historiographical

work.7

Manfred Frank is

probably

the most remarkable

spokesman

for this

growing

current call for the return of the subject. In Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing, an

Absurdity

[Unding]?

Frank

argues

that Foucault's idea is

theoretically

unten-

able,

a

mere theoretical fashion

that, moreover,

is

today

losing

its

former attrac-

tion

among

intellectuals:

For a while the thesis of the deathof the

subject

became fashionable.

Like all

fashions,

it is

already awaiting

its

replacementby

a

change

in

contemporary

nterest.

Nietzsche,

Heidegger,

and their French followers

treated the

subject

as the final

offshoot of the

Western

repression

of

being

and as the source of the will

to

power.

Let us

suppose

there

is

something

o

this thesis. Then we

must still

say

the

following:

whoever attacks he

inju-

rious effects of the basic

tendency

of

Western

philosophy

that

culminates

in

the self-

empowerment

of

subjectivity

can do so

sensibly only

in

the interest

of

the

preservation

of

subjects.

Who else but a

subject

is

to be assaulted and

repressed

by

the

regimentation

of discourse or

the

dispositions

of

power expressed

by

Foucault's

powerful

incanta-

tions?

A

C-fiber

n

the braincannot suffer a crisis

of

meaning,

or the

simple

reason that

only

subjects

can

recognize

something

like a

meaning.8

At this

point,

however,

we must

note

a crucial

conceptual

distinction. Here we

actually

have

two different

questions.

One is that

regarding

agency

in

history;

the

other,

very

different one

is that

regarding

the

subject.

An observation

by

Reinhart

Koselleck

may help

us to

perceive

this

distinction. Koselleck writes:

Men are

responsible

for the histories

they

are involved

in,

whether or not

they

are

guilty

of

the

consequences

of their

action. Men have to be accountable

or the

incommensura-

bility

of intention and outcome.... There

always

occurs

in

history

more or

less than is

contained

n the

given

conditions. Behind this more or less

are to be found men.9

The

question regarding agency

in

history

refers

strictly

to that

gap

indicat-

ed

by

Koselleck,

the more or less

separating

a

given, consequent

situation from

its antecedent one. That

question

can be

formulated as follows:

if

a

state

B

nec-

essarily emerges

out of

a

state

A,

and

if

we discard the

idea of

any

transcen-

dent intervention, how can there be something in B that was not somehow

already present

in

A ? This

gap

serves,

in

short,

as the index

to

contingency

in

history.

Now,

from the actual

occurrence of such a

gap

we

should not necessari-

ly

infer the hidden

presence

of

a

sub-ject underlying

it.

Koselleck's affirmation

-

that behind

or

beyond

the 'more or less' are to be

found men

(that

is,

the sub-

ject)

-is

only

one

of

the diverse

possi-ble

answers to the

question

of

agency.

More

specifically,

as we shall

see,

it is a

typically

neo-Kantian-phenomenologi-

cal

answer,

according

to which

the

subject

is not

only

the mark but also the

source of

change

in

history.

In

fact,

the notion that the

subject

is the

source of

change in history appeared only at the end of the nineteenth century, and pre-

7.

Ibid.,

3.

8. Manfred

Frank,

Is

Subjectivity

a

Non-Thing,

an

Absurdity[Unding]?

On Some Difficulties in

NaturalisticReductions of

Self-Consciousness,

n

The Modern

Subject: Conceptions of

the

Self

in

Classical German

Philosophy,

ed. Karl

Ameriks

and

Dieter Sturma

Albany:

State

University

of

New

York

Press,

1995),

178.

9.

Reinhart

Koselleck,

Futures

Past: On

the

Semantics

of

Historical Time

Cambridge,

Mass.: MIT

Press,

1985),

211-212.




5/27

60

ELIAS

PALTI

cisely

from the

crisis of the

concept

of

Subject

Foucault

spoke

about.

A his-

torical

review

of the diverse

concepts

of

subject

and

its

relationship

to

agency

that

emerged

in

the last two centuries

would

allow

us

to

uncover the

richness anddiversityof the meaningsof the categoriesat stake here.

Indeed,

in the

following

pages,

I

will describe two

conceptual

ruptures

and

limn the outlines

of a

third,

currently

n

progress),

only

one

of which Foucault

analyzed.

These

ruptures separate

different

epistemic

fields,

within which the

very interrogation

egarding

the

question

of

agency

and

subjectivity

in

history

has

been

formulated.

The

identificationof these

epistemological

thresholds

will

help

to avoid

many

confusions, inconsistencies,

and anachronisms

besmirching

currentdebates

regarding

he notions of

subject

and

agency

in

history

(a

goal

that

was,

ultimately,

he

object

behind Foucault's

archeologicalenterprise,

at

least

as

I understandt).

The

basic

point

of all of this is

quite simple.

Current alls for the

return

f the

subject presuppose

the

assumption

hat

agency

requires

a

subject.

Hence,

with

no

subject,

there

would

be

no

history

(or

politics),

and,

conversely,

provided

there

are

things

that

change

over time and

that

purposeful

actions

exist,

the sub-

ject

should

be

behind those

changes

and actions.

However,

notions of

both

agency

and

subject

have

changed significantly

over the

past

four

hundred

years.

The

idea

of

a

necessary

link

between these

two

categories

makes sense

only

within the frameworkof

a

particular

historical

episteme,

that

is,

it entails a

defi-

nite conceptof temporality,a given view of natureandhistory,andso on, whose

origins

and

crisis

can

be

precisely

determined.As

we

shall

see,

the

above-men-

tioned

presupposition

hat

associates

agency

with

subject

rests

on a

number

of

conceptual premises

that have

currently

become untenable.

In

fact,

not even

those who

nowadays

call for

the

return

of

the

subject

can endorse

them,

inas-

much

as

the

epistemological

conditions

for

these

conceptual

premises

have

his-

torically

disappeared.

Such a call

is

credible

only

underthe condition

of

system-

atically overlooking

the set

of

presuppositions

and

conceptual

implications

intrinsic to that

call.

Ultimately,

such a

call

bespeaks

an ahistorical

reading

of

intellectualhistory.

II.

FROM

THE AGE

OF REPRESENTATION

O THE AGE OF HISTORY

As

we

have

seen,

an

increasing

numberof authors

oday

affirm as

necessary

the

return

f

the

subject.

However,

when

they try

to

specify just

exactly

what this

subject

is that

should

return,

agreement

mmediately

proves

to be

illusory.

Fitzhugh

and

Leckie,

for

example,

conclude

in

their

above-cited

article

that

recent

developments

in the

field of the naturalsciences

are

opening

the

way

to

finally solve the issue of the subject.As they state, conveniently,neuroscience

and

linguistics

(as

well as

computer

science,

psychology, analytic philosophy,

and some social

sciences)

have now combined in a massive

interdisciplinary

endeavor called

'cognitive

science' which seeks

to

settle

the

majorquestions

of

human

epistemology. 'o10odemrn

ognitive

theories have

supposedly

succeeded

10.

Fitzhugh

and

Leckie,

Agency,

Postmodernism,

and the Causes of

Change,

75.




6/27

THE

RETURN F

THE

SUBJECT

61

in

locating

an instance of the

constitutionof

meanings

that is

prior

to

linguistic

structures,

one

linked

immediately

to the

perceptualsystem

(that

s,

a

subject ).

Cognitive

science has

demonstrated,

hey

state,

that

the neural control

system

enablingphysical movement can performabstractreasoningabout the structure

of

events. 11

n

short,

neuroscience

allegedly

has

solved the old

philosophical

dilemma about the

relationship

between mind and

body,

a

succedaneum of

Descartes's

pineal gland

(the

supposed

contact-point

between

the

physical

and

the

psychic).

Yet,

in

order to

ground representations

on

an

objective

field it is

also

necessary

for these

pre-linguistic

and

pre-discursivecognitive

structures

o

remain unalterable

hroughout

imes and

cultures,

to

constitute

a kind

of eternal

substratum f

human

nature;

n

sum,

a

transhistorical

subject.

There are

good

reasons,

conclude

Fitzhugh

and

Leckie,

to

reject

the idea that we

cognize

only

in language,to accept languageitself as developing at least partlyfrom the bio-

logical, trans-temporal

as

opposed

to a

wholly

localized,

culturally

constructed)

body. l2

Neuroscience would

thus

finally provide

these authorsthe deus

ex

machina,

the

subject

of

change

which,

they

claim,

Foucaulthad to invoke but was

not able

to define.

Yet we meet here a

paradox:

hat what

begins

as a search

for

an

expla-

nation

and

a final

foundationfor historical

change only

concludes

in

finding

an

assumedly

eternal

essence immutable

by

nature.The

problem

this

raises

never

tackled

by

these

authors--is

how

change

in

history

could

emerge

out of that

which is its very denial,how the new could emanatefroman immutablesubject.

Fitzhugh

and Leckie should

affirm

thatthis transhistorical

ubject

has thatwhich

language

allegedly

lacks:

an

immanent drive to

development,

an

inherent

impulse propelling

it to

change.

That

is,

this claim

requires

a

typically

nine-

teenth-century eleological premise,

of

an

idealistic

matrix,

which

they

them-

selves could not

really accept. Ultimately,

that

premise

throws

us

back to the

primitive

dilemmas of historical

philosophy--those

Fitzhugh

and

Leckie triedto

avoid

by

means of their

appeal

to

neurobiology.

As the other

advocate for the

returnof the

subject

we

mentioned,

Manfred

Frank,observes,

the answerto these

questions escape by definition the reach of the experimentalsciences:

While

neurobiology

makes

breathtakingrogress

n the

comprehension

f functions f

our

brain,

we

areas before

confronted

y

the

question

f the

experimentalhysiologist

Du

Bois-Reymond:

hat ontributionaneventhebest

physical heory

make o

fathom-

ing

the

peculiarity

f

familiarity

i.e.,self-consciousness].

ecan

observe he

physical

or

infer t from he

physical

ffects

and

control t

adequatelyhrough

heoretical

erms)

but

not

themental. .. Thismusthave

consequences

ortheformof

philosophy

s a

theory

in its demarcationrom

henatural

ciences.

n

philosophy,

heconcerns f

subjectivity

s

such,

unabbreviated,

ustcome to

expression.13

The

split

between science

and

philosophy

is

intimately

associated,

for

Frank,

with the

postulate

that the

subject,

as

such,

cannot

be

objectified

(this

is

exactly

the

meaning

of the German

expression

Unding

n the title of Frank's

article),

but,

yet,

its existence cannot be denied without

falling

into self-contradiction.As

11.

Ibid.,

77.

12.

Ibid.,

79.

13.

Frank,

Is

Subjectivity Non-Thing,

n

Absurdity

Unding]?,

89.




7/27

62

ELIAS

PALTI

Descartes

had

already

discovered,

the

cogito

represents

he

a

priori

of

every phi-

losophy

and

every

knowledge;

in

short,

it

constitutes

a

self-evident

instance,

something immediately

given

to

consciousness,

prior

to

any

reflection or

cogni-

tion, since it constitutestheirpremise.

However,

Frank,

as a

leading

student

of

Romanticism,

knows that

the

affir-

mation that the

subject

is self-evident

for transcendental

consciousness is

not

itself

self-evident;

indeed,

it

actually

is a historical

construction,

a

culturally

determined

notion,

and,

as

a

consequence, plausible only

on the basis

of

a num-

ber of

assumptions.14

ltimately,

his

affirmationbecomes

intelligible

only

with-

in the framework

of

a

particular

discursive

apparatus.

n

any

case,

this affirma-

tion

certainly

contradicts

Fitzhugh

and Leckie's

perspective

(what

for

Fitzhugh

and Leckie defines

a

subject

is

precisely

what

for

Frank

he

subject

is

not,

that

which representsits very denial). This contradictioninevitably gives rise to

doubts

regarding

he existence of

such a

thing

as a

subject,

and

nourishes the

suspicion

that

under

he common

label

of

subject,

or

indeed

modem

subject,

is

actually

hidden

a

diversity

of different

and even

contradictory

deas

about t.

It

is

ironic that Foucault

himself

is,

in

part, responsible

for

many

of

the

pres-

ent

misunderstandings irculating

around he

category

of

subject,

nsofar

as

he

intended

probably,

n

a

purposely

provocative

fashion

to work out

the

intrin-

sic

plurivocality

of

the

term.

Such a

plurivocality

s

tightly

linked,

in

turn,

to the

ambiguities

proper

o

the other

concept

with which the idea

of

the

subject

s com-

monly associated:modernity.The unavoidablepointof referencehere is Martin

Heidegger,

who

provided

the

canonical definition

allowing

all

subsequent

authors o associate

subject

with

modernity.

In

The

Age

of the

World

Picture

1938),

Heidegger

elaboratedon the

ety-

mological

root of

the

term

subjectum.

This

term,

he

states,

is

the

Latin

transla-

tion of the Greek word

hypokeimenon,

o

which

Aristotle

refers in his

Physics

and

Metaphysics.

The

subjectum

indicates the substratum

of

predication

(that

which

underlies

and

holds

together

all

its

predicates),

the function of

which

is

analogous

to matter

(hyle),

which

persists throughout

the

changes

of

form

(morphi)which areimposeduponit. Inprinciple, any thingorbeing aboutwhich

we

can

predicatesomething

is a

subject. '15

ut in the modernera the notion of

the

subject

narrowed

ts

reference;

the

identificationof

the

subject

with the

I

or

self,

initiated

by

Descartes,

is

precisely

the

starting

point

of

modem

thinking.16

14.

In

Frank's

argumentagainst

the

physicalist

reduction

of

psychic

life

we

find

the echoes of

Leibniz's

notion

of intellectus

ipso.

However,

Leibniz

associated self-evident

truths with the

state-

ments whose

opposite

ones were

self-contradictory.

His

concept

of

the a

priori

was thus

founded on

a

logical

consideration,

with no connection whatsoever with factual

situations,

such

as

the

natural

constitutionof

the

human mind.

As

we will

see,

the

simultaneous

necessity-impossibility

of

having

an

insight

into the

subject,

understood

as the transcendental

ynthesis

of all

perceptions,

was the

point of fissure by which the Enlightenment'sphilosophyof knowledgewould eventually collapse,

paving

the

way

to Romanticism and

the

postulate

of two

different forms

of human

cognition,

one

addressedto the

objective

world,

another to the

subject

itself

(which

is also the

startingpoint

for

Frank's

argument).

15. The

English

use

of

the term

subject

o mean

subject-matter

ears the

vestiges

of

its

origi-

nal

meaning.

16.

Man

becomes the relational

center of

that

which is as

such.

But this

is

possible

only

when the

comprehension

of what is as a whole

changes

(Martin

Heidegger,

The

Age

of the

World

Picture,

in The

Question

Concerning

Technology

and

Other

Essays,

transl.William

Lovitt

[New

York:

Harper




8/27

THE

RETURNOF

THE

SUBJECT

63

Man

thus

now

appears

as

the

last

ground

for the

intelligibility

of

the

world,

which is

thus reduced

to the status

of

mere matter

or

human

activity.

As

Heidegger

affirmed,

this

narrowing

of

the

reference of the

notion of the

subjectentaileda fundamental onceptualbreak.Man,once turned nto the sub-

ject,

becomes

the one who

re-presents

he

world,

the

one

who confers a

meaning

upon

it.

There thus

emerged

the notion of

a

world

picture,

which defines

modernity

as

an

age:

The

expressions

'world

picture

of the

modern

age'

and

'modern

world

picture',

he

states,

both

mean

the same

thing,

and

both assume

something

that could not have been

before,

namely

a medieval

and

an ancient

world

picture. 17

In the Middle

Ages,

man and

world were

mere

phases

in

the

plan

of

Creation;

hey

were

parts

of the

system

of mutual

correspondences

ink-

ing things

and

beings,

and

referring

all of them back

to

their ultimate

Cause.

In

ancienttimes, the world was not somethingthat humansrepresented,either: on

the

contrary,

t

was

something

that

presented

tself,

that showed itself

to the

sub-

ject,

thus

constituting

he

subject

as

such in the

very

act of

dis-covering

itself.

In

sum,

both

man and world

belonged together

in

the

re-praesentatio

(etymologi-

cally,

to

become

present)

of the

totality

of

beings

(Seienden).18

Only

insofar as

man

is

conceived

as the one

who

represents

the

world-pictures

it

and

thereby

gives

it

meaning--can

one

speak

of

a world

picture.

This

occurs

only

with the

coming

of

modernity.

In

The Order

of

Things,

Foucault

follows,

and,

at

the

same

time,

questions,

Heidegger's conception, introducing in it a fundamental distinction. What

Foucault calls the

classical

episteme

(one

that

precedes

and is

radically

different

from the modern

episteme) sprang

from

the

collapse

of the order of

correspon-

dences. In

the

regime

of

knowledge

that stretches

out

until the

sixteenth

century,

all

existing things, including language,

were

visible

marks

of

the

hidden

power

that

ordered

and made them visible. The

space

of

analogies

constitutedan entire

system

of

signaturescontaining

the clues for the

revelation of the hidden

plan

of

Creation.

As

Heidegger

said,

within such

a

regime

of

knowledge,

the

world was

&

Row,

1977],

128.

[ Der

Mensch wird zur

Bezugsmitte

des Seienden als

solchen.

Das ist abernuch

mijglich,

wenn die

Auffassung

des Seienden

im

Ganzen sich

wandelt,

Heidegger,

Die

Zeit des

Weltbildes,

Holzwege. Gesamtausgabe,

Band 5

(Frankfurt

m Main:

Vittorio

Klostermann,

1977),

88].

17.

Ibid.,

130

[ Die

Redewendungen

'Weltbild

der Neuzeit' und 'neuzeitliches

Weltbild'

sagen

zeimal

dasselbe

und unterstellen

etwas,

was es nie

zuvor

geben

konnte,

nimlich

ein

mittelalterliches

und

ein

antikes

Weltbild

Heidegger,

Die

Zeit des

Weltbildes, 5,

90)].

18.

Thatwhich is does

not

come into

being

at all

through

he fact that man

first

looks at

upon

it,

in

the

sense

that

representing

hat

has the characterof

subjective

perception.

Rather,

man

is

the one

who

looked

upon

by

that

which

is;

he is the one who

is--in

company

with

itself--gathered

toward

presencing,by

that

which

opens

itself. To be beheld

by

what

is,

to be included and

maintained

with-

in its

openness

and

in

that

way

to be borne

along by

it,

to be driven

about

by

its

oppositions

and

marked

by

its discord-that

is

the essence of

man in the

great

age

of the Greeks

(ibid.,

131).

[ Das

Seiende

wir nicht seiend

dadurch,

daBerst

der Mensch es

anschaut

m

Sinne

gar

des

Vorstellensvon

derArt

der

subjektiven

Perception.

Vielmehr

st der Mensch

der

vom

Seienden

Angeschaute,

von

dem

Sichtiffnenden

auf das Anwesen bei

ihm

Versammelte.Vom

Seienden

angeschaut,

n

dessen Offenes

einbezogen

und einbehalten

und

so von

ihm

getragen,

in

seinen

Gegensditzen

mgetrieben

und

von

seinem

Zwiespalt gezeichnet

sein: das ist das Wesen des Menschen

in

der

groBengriechischen

Zeit

(Heidegger,

Die Zeit

des

Weltbildes,

90-91).




9/27

64

ELIAS

PALTI

that which showed

itself-- all

that remained was

to

decipher

it. 19

By

the sev-

enteenth

century,

when

the natural inks

by

means of

which the visible

surfaces

of

things

were related

to

their

ultimate

source were

broken,

words became dis-

tancedfromthings. Languagethus turned nto an artifice to articulate he whole

out of

the

dispersed

ragments

on the

surface of visible forms. From then

on,

the

subject

would be

in

charge

of

reconstructing

he

logic

of

their

dispersion.

The

Age

of

Representation

was

thus born. The

representing ubject

came

to

stand before the

represented

object

as the one who

invests

it with

meaning, pro-

viding unity

and coherence

to the world's outer

chaos of

forms and

figures.20

Yet

to avoid

its

continuous

dispersion,

he

possibly

infinite

play

of

mutualreferences

had,

at the same

time,

to be forced into a closed

system

that left

nothing

outside.

This meant that even

the

representing

subject

itself had to be included in this

Order too. In the framework of the classical episteme (which, as we said,

Foucault

sharply

distinguishes

from the modern

episteme),

the

subject

did not

escape

the realm of

representation;

he

subject

of the

Enlightenment

would

be

simultaneouslyrepresenting

and

represented.

We find

here a

paradox

ntrinsic

to

this

particular ype

of

discourse,

whose

emergence

would

eventually

make it

explode,

thus

paving

the

way,

at the

end of the

eighteenth century,

for the con-

ception

of

the

Subject

(with

a

capital

S )

that

Foucault

spoke

about.

Although

Foucault

never states

it

explicitly,

it is

clear

that he

takes

the delib-

erately ambiguous

term

subject

rom the

expression

with which

Hegel opens

his Phenomenology of Spirit: the point is to think the Absolute not as a

Substance

but as a

Subject

as

well. 21

The

subject

here

at

stake,

which is

no

longer merely

a

substance,

is a

reflexive

entity,

an

in

itself

and

for itself,

the

very process

of

positing

itself or the mediation of its

becoming

anotherone. 22

Only

then

can we

speak properly

of

a

modern

Subject

(and

ultimately,

of a mod-

ern

episteme),

in

the sense

Foucault

gives

to

the

term:

a

being

to which

History

comes

from

within.

Time now

becomes

an immanentdimension

in

it,23

since

it

contains

within

itself the

principle

of its own

transformation

actually,

this was

for

nineteenth-century

evolutionary thinking

the

definite

attribute of

living

19.

Foucault,

The Order

of Things,

35.

20.

The

consciousness,

characteristic

of

the

classical

episteme,

of the

artificiality

of

language,

of

the

system

of

the

representation,

would allow the

emergence

of

subjectivism,

but

also

of its

contrary,

objectivism.

As

Foucault

points

out,

an

archeological analysis

must transcend

such

an

opposition

to

find

out

the

epistemological

conditions

that made it

possible:

If

one

wishes to undertakean

archeo-

logical

analysis

of

knowledge

itself,

it is

not these celebrated

controversies

that

ought

to

be used

as

the

guidelines

and

articulation

f

such

a

project.

One

must

reconstitute he

general system

of

thought

whose

network,

in its

positivity,

renders an

interplay

of

simultaneousand

apparentlycontradictory

opinions possible

(ibid.,

75).

21.

Hegel,

Fenomenologia

del

espfritu

(Mexico:

Fondo de Cultura

Econ6mica,

1985),

15.

22.

Ibid.,

15-16.

23. Duringthe classical (early modern) period, temporalityappearedas a dimension external to

beings,

something

that comes to them

from their

exterior,

from

the

external

circumstances

which

lie

beyond

their

control,

the bleaknesses.

As

Foucault affirmed: The eras of

naturedo not

prescribe

the natural ime of

beings

and their

continuity;

hey

dictate the

bleaknesses

that have

constantly

dis-

persed

them,

destroyed

them,

mingled

them,

separated

hem,

and

interwoven

them. There is

not and

cannot

be even the

suspicion

of an evolutionism or a transformism n Classical

thought;

or time is

never conceived

as a

principle

of

development

or

living

beings

in

their

nternal

organization;

t

is

per-

ceived

only

as

the

possible

bearer

of

a

revolution n the external

space

in which

they

live

(Foucault,

The Order

of

Things,

150).




10/27

THE

RETURN

OF

THE

SUBJECT

65

organisms,

namely,

their

capacity

for

self-generation

and

self-transformation).

The

point

here is

that the

emergence

of this

conception

of the

Subject

marked

a

conceptual

rupture

as crucial

as the one

produced

two centuriesearlier

with

the

break of the system of correspondences.This second rupture inally permitted

the

idea of

subjectivity

as

an

Unding

(literally,

non-thing)

to become

conceiv-

able,

according

to the

expression

coined

by

Schelling

and

reproducedby

Frank

in

the

title of

the above-cited

article.

For

Romanticism,

the affirmation

that the

subject

is

a

non-thing

(Unding),

something

that cannot

be reduced to

an

object,

actually

came to

have a

double

meaning,

simultaneously epistemological

and

practical.

It

meant,

on the one

hand,

that

the

subject

could

not be

represented

as such.

As

Friedrich

Jacobi stat-

ed

in his criticism of

Kant's

Critiqueof

Pure

Reason,

the Kantian

ranscendental

subject,understoodas the synthesisof all its representations, ould not become

itself

an

object

of

representation.

This demolished

Kant's

entire

system,

for it

implied

that

it was founded on

a

premise--the

unity

of the

transcendental

pper-

ception-that

was

external

to

it,

and

by

definition

beyond

the realm of

possible

knowledge;

in

short,

that

Kant's whole theoretical

system

was based on

a

mere

belief

(Glaube)

that could not

be accounted for from

within that

very system.24

We are

thus led back to

Heidegger's

remark

dentifying modernity

as the

age

in

which the

subject

becomes

the

substratumof

representation.

However,

the dis-

tance of

the

subject

so

conceived

from the Cartesian

project-which

for

Heidegger providesthe definitive model of the modem form of consciousness

could not

be more

radical. The

Subject

would now

found,

yet

at the

same

time

break,

the

system

of

representation,

adically frustrating

he

possibility

of rea-

son's

sovereign

self-foundation.

The

coming

of the

Age

of

History

entailedthe

end of

the

Age

of

Representation.

This

ruptureyields

the crucial

aspect

that,

to

Frank,

really gives

birth to the

concept

of modem

subjectivity:

ts ethical dimension.

The fact that the

subject

s

a

non-thing

(Unding),

that

it

cannot

become

an

object, ultimately expresses

for

Romanticism

that

to

be

truly

a

subject

one

cannot be conditioned

by anything

externalto oneself. The idea of the subjecttherebybecame linked to the ideal of

self-determination,

he

defining property

of

a

free

agent.

If

the

subject

were

merely

one more element

placed

side

by

side with other elements

aligned

with-

in a

regular,

objective

order-if

it were

just

the

expression

of

a

deterministic,

objective

law -it

would

become

reducedto the statusof

a

mere

thing

(Ding),

just

a

particular

kind of natural

object.

In

sum,

the modem

subject,

in

Foucault's

sense,

is that

entity

which is no

longer merely

the

substratum f

representation--the

premise

on which the

clas-

sical

episteme

is

founded-but

an

Unding,

that which does not lend

itself

to

rep-

resentation, hereby becomingthe groundfor

morality.25

However,

the

fact that the

subject

escapes representation,

hat

it

lies

beyond

the field of the visible forms

and

of

positive

norms,

did not mean for the

24. FriedrichH.

Jacobi,

Zu

'Jacobi

an

Fichte',

n

Werke

Leipzig:

Fleischer,

1812-1825),

V,

357-

363.

25.

In the classical

episteme,

ethics related to

purely

objective, inherently

human

norms--a

deon-

tology;

the

subject

was the

place

in which values became

actualized,

but

not

yet

their

oundation.




11/27

66

ELIAS PALTI

Romantics

that it was

not

an

objective

phenomenon.

In

effect,

in

the

context

of

Foucault's

modern

egime

of

knowledge,

the

Subject

is,

like

life,

language,

and

labor,

an

objective

transcendental,

he

underlyinggenerative

force,

the hid-

den principlethat makes things be whatthey are.

Labor,ife,

and

anguage ppear

s so

many

transcendentals

hichmake

possible

he

objective

nowledge

f

living beings,

of the aws of

production,

nd

of

the formsof

lan-

guage.

n

their

being, hey

areoutside

nowledge,

ut

by

that

very

act

hey

are

conditions

of

knowledge;

hey

correspond

o Kant's

discovery

f

a

transcendental

ield

and

yet

they

differ rom t

in

two essential

points:

hey

are situatedwith the

object,

and,

n a

way,

beyond

t;

like the Idea

in

the transcendental

ialectic,

hey

totalize

phenomena

nd

express

he a

priori

coherence f

empiricalmultiplicities;

ut

they provide

hemwith a

foundation

n

the

formof a

being

whose

enigmatic

eality

onstitutes,

rior

o

all

knowl-

edge,

the order

andthe connection f what t has

to

know;

moreover,

hey

concern

he

domain f a posterioriruthsand heprinciplesf theirsynthesis--and otthe a priori

synthesis

f

all

possible xperience.26

What defines

the

modem

Subject

is,

precisely,

its

paradoxical

nature,

he fact

of

being

a

doublet,

simultaneously empirical

and transcendental.

This

entailed

the

complete

reconfiguration

of the

regime

of

knowledge. Knowing

would

no

longer

consist

of

traversing

he

surface of

phenomena

to

reconstruct,

out

of

the

play

of their

analogies

and

differences,

he Order hat

arranges

hem

in

their suc-

cession. What

matters now

is

transcending

he

manifest

appearance

of

objects

and

grasping

the

hidden

principle

of

their

formation,

that which makes them

whatthey are and how they are(withwhich we are led back,in a fashion,to the

old

system

of the

signatures).27

Certainly,

his

is

not the

kind

of

Subject-the

assumedbasis

of

ethics,

politics,

and

history-

that

many

thinkers

today

try

to restore or recover. The debate

between

modernity

nd

postmodernity

akes

place

on

a different

archeologi-

cal

ground,

one

that

emerged

precisely

out of

the

dislocation

of

the

modem

pis-

teme.

In

order o

understand

his last

transformation,

e

have

first to

go

back and

review how the

equations

of

subjectivity

and

agency

in

history

finally

took form.

III.

FROM THE AGE

OF

HISTORY TO THE

AGE OF FORM

As

we

said,

both

the modernistsand the

postmodernists

alike tend to

identify

the

ideas of

Subject, Modernity,

and

History.

However,

this

apparent

onsensus rests

on a number

of

conceptual

ambiguities,

an

example

of which

can

be found when

we

compare

Koselleck's

view with that of his

teacher,

Heidegger.

Koselleck's

affirmationmentioned

above,

that beneath

every

historical

change

lies

intention-

al

action,

might appear

to

continue

Heidegger's postulate

of

modernity

as

the

Age

in

which Man becomes conceived of as

subjectum.

Nevertheless,

if

we con-

sider Koselleck's affirmationcarefully, the modern subject mentioned in it

(which

is also the one

placed

at the core of the

dispute

between

modernity

and

26.

Foucault,

The Order

of Things,

244.

27.

Henceforth,

haracter

esumes its

former

role

as

a

visible

sign directing

us

towards a

buried

depth;

but what

it

indicates

is

not

a

secret

text,

a muffled

word,

or a

resemblance

oo

precious

to be

revealed;

t is the

coherent

totality

of an

organic

structure

hat weaves back into the

unique

fabric

of

its

sovereignty

both

the

visible and the

invisible

(Foucault,

The Order

of Things,

229).




12/27

THE

RETURNOF

THE

SUBJECT

67

postmodernity)

has

nothing

in common

with

the one

Heidegger

spoke

about.

Indeed,

it

actuallyrepresents

ts

complete

inversion. Koselleck's

subjectum

ceas-

es to be a uniform substratum

underlying

the

changes

of its external

configura-

tions and becomes the hidden sourceand origin of contingency.In sum, in the

context of

the new

episteme emerging

at the end of the nineteenth

century,

when

the

concept

of

subjectivity

hat Koselleck

retrospectively

attributes o

modernity

as a whole took

form,

the transcendental

ubject

ceased to be

the

coherent

basis

of intentional

action and

thereby

the

guarantee

of

order,

but

instead turned nto

that which

destroys

every

identity

n

history,

breaksthe

linearity

of

evolutionary

processes,

and makes

the

new,

the

unpredictable

n

the

present

space

of

experi-

ence,

emerge.

This

conceptual

reformulationof the

subject

finally

rendered

thinkable

hatwhich

was unthinkablenot

only

for the

Enlightenment

but

also for

nineteenth-century volutionarythinking: he radicallycontingentnatureof his-

torical and social

processes.

In

effect,

this

strong

notion of

temporal irreversibility,

of

the radical con-

structibility

of historical

processes,

far

from

being

an

Enlightenment-Romantic

legacy,

is

closely

associated

with

the

dislocation of

the

evolutionaryconcept

of

history produced

at

the end of the nineteenth

century

when the

concept

of

organ-

ism lost its

teleological

connotations.

This

process

culminated,

n

the field of

biology

in

1900

when

Hugo

de Vries deliveredthe final blow to

the holistic-func-

tionalist

concept

of

organism.

To

de

Vries,

evolutionaryphenomena

at a

phylo-

genetic level resultedfrom suddentransformations r randomglobal mutations.

According

to this

way

of

thinking,

change

became reduced

o

unpredictable ap-

penings

that,

though

internally

generated,

occurred with no

perceptible

aim

or

purpose.

Oneof

the most

importantdevelopments,

emarked

ErnestCassireras

early

as the

beginning

of the twentieth

century,

occurredwhen

biology

has

learnt

to

rigorouslyapply

the

point

of view of

totality,

without

being

thereby

pushed

on

the

path

of

teleological

considerationsor

accepting

final

causes. 28

The

Age

of

History

was then over and the

Age

of Form

began.

Each new

system

entailed

a

global

reconfiguration

f the

system

according

o a

unique

and

singulararrangement f its constituentelements. This revolutionn thought, as

Cassirercalled

it,

had its

startingpoint

in

the

ambit

of the

naturalsciences

in

the

turn

from

a

physics

of elements to a

physics

of fields:

The first undamental

urning oint

n

this shift

n

orientationsan

be found n the

con-

cept

of

electromagnetic

ield established

y Faraday

nd

Maxwell.

n

his

study

What

s

Matter?Hermann

Weylexposes

n detail

he

twist

from

he

old

theory

f substance

o

the new

theory

f

field.

According

o

him,

he truedifference

etween hese

wo theo-

ries,

the

only

one whichmattersrom he

point

of view of

knowledge,

ies

in

thefact hat

a field annotbe conceivedof as

merely

an

aggregated

hole or a

conglomerate

f

parts.

The

concept

f field

s

not

the

concept

f

thing

butof

relation;

t is not

formed

y

fragments,ut s a system,a totality f linesof force.29

The

general theory

of

relativity represented,

for

Cassirer,

the culmination in

physics

of this

process

of

conceptual

reconstitution,

nsofar

as itcollects all

par-

ticular

systematic

principles

into the

unity

of a

supremepostulate,

in

the

postu-

28. Ernst

Cassirer,

Las ciencias de la cultura

(Mexico:

F. C.

E.,

1982),

141.

29.

Ibid.,

139.




13/27

68

ELIAS

PALTI

late not

of

the

constancy

of

things,

but of the

invariance

of certain

magnitudes

and laws with

regard

to

all

transformations of the

system

of

reference. 30

It

pro-

vides the basis for

an

entirely

new

conceptual system,

gives

rise

to a new

sym-

bolic form that would completely rearticulate the order of knowledge, both in the

natural and in the human sciences:

The

recognition

of the

concepts

of

totality

and

structure

has not

deleted the difference

between culturaland natural

ciences.

Yet,

it has

pulled

down the barrier

hat used to

sep-

arate

hese

two kinds of science. Now culture

can

focus

on

the

study

of its

forms,

its

struc-

tures and manifestations more

freely

and

impartially

than

before,

insofar as the other

fields of

knowledge

have also focused on

their

own

particularproblems

of form.31

Gestalt-Psychologie

is an

instance of

this;

with

it,

Cassirer

says,

the

old

psy-

chology

of elements

becomes

structural

psychology. 32

This

common trend

in

the natural and the social sciences is highly symptomatic. In Foucault's terms,

this was not

merely

a

conceptual

transformation:

the

very way

of

being

of

things

then became

completely

altered;

the

ground

of

positivities

in

which the

new

regime

of

knowledge

plunged

its roots

had

suddenly

mutated.

The

form

thus becomes

the tie

keeping

together

words and

things.

Empirical

objects

are

downgraded

to

merely phenomenal

realities

in

order

to

discover,

behind

them,

not

the

principle

of their

formation,

but the

system

of

their rela-

tionships.

As in the classical

episteme,

order is now

placed

on

the

level of

repre-

sentation

(this

is

what

leads Foucault to

speak

of

a

return of

language ).

However, it is no longer the infinite space for the play of analogies and differ-

ences of visible

phenomena,

but

is

folded

upon

itself

to

meet the

constructive

principle

of its

own

representative

configuration

(thus

ultimately

revealing

the

contingent

nature not

only

of the

objects

of

knowledge

but

also of their

a

priori

conditions -for

example,

the

subject ).

The

Age

of

Form

becomes

indeed the

Age

of

Language ;

nevertheless,

this

is

no

longer

understood either

as

repre-

sentation

(taxonomy)

or

as

production (philology),

but

as a

system

(structure).

This

will

bring

about the

rebirth of

metaphysics.

Form,

unlike

Life,

is

no

longer

an

empirico-transcendental

force;

it indicates

a

second-order

( metaphenome-

nal ) plane of objectivity. As Cassirer put it:

Concerning

deal

relationsof

this

sort,

judgements

are

possible

that

do

not

need

to be

test-

ed

by

different

successive cases

in

order

to be

grasped

n

their

truth,

but which are

recog-

nized

once for all

by insight

into the

necessity

of the connections.

Along

with

the

empir-

ical

judgements concerning

objects

of

experience,

there

are thus a

priori

judgements

concerning

founded

objects.

While the

psychic phenomenon,

ike color

or

tone,

can

simply

be established

n

its occurrence

and

properties

as a

fact,

there

are

judgements

that

connect

metaphenomenal

bjects,

like

equality

and

similarity,

hat are

made

with

con-

sciousness

of timeless and

necessary validity.

In

place

of the

mere

establishmentof

a

fact,

there

appears

the

systematic

whole of

a

rational connection

with

elements that

recipro-

cally demand and condition each other ... In place of a succession,of a superordination

and

a subordination f

contents,

analysis

fixes a

relation of

strict

correlativity.

Just as

the

relation

requires

reference

to the

elements,

so the elements

no less

require

referenceto

a

form

of

relation,

in which alone

they gain

fixed and constant

meaning.33

30.

Cassirer,

Substance

and Function:

Einstein's

Theoryof

Relativity

New

York:

Dover,

1923),

404.

31.

Ernst

Cassirer,

Las

ciencias

de

la

cultura,

145.

32.

Ibid.,

145.

33.

Cassirer,

Substance and

Function,

338-339.




14/27

THE

RETURNOF

THE

SUBJECT

69

This has

profound mplications

or

the

way

the

subject

s

conceived. To

appre-

ciate

them,

considerhow

all

of

this

differsfrom both

the classical and

the modem

epistemai.

In the classical

episteme,

the

subject,

as a substratum f

representation,

was always already presupposed,was completely knowablethough not render-

able

thematically.

n

the

modem

episteme,

the

subject,

as a

principle

of formation

(life,

labor,

anguage)

becomes

something

unknowable,but, however,

is

perfectly

thematic,

like

any

other

phenomena

( because

he is an

empirico-transcendental

doublet,

man is also the locus of

misunderstanding

of

misunderstanding

hat

constantlyexposes

his

thought

o

the risk

of

being

swamped

by

his

own

being 34).

We find here

the

paradox

hat what

appeared

as

absolutely

robbed from knowl-

edge

at once

became,

for

the first

time,

the

object

of a

particular

cience,

the

so-

called

humansciences

(hence

their

ever-ambiguous pistemological

status).

The modem episteme did not tire of proclaimingthe end of metaphysics.

Life,

as well

as

production

and

language,

did not but

point

to its own

objective

field of

knowledge;

it

was a

thing,

lined

up

with

other

things,

and,

at

the same

time,

the

ultimatefoundationof

all

of them. The

breakup

of the modern

episteme

at the end of

the nineteenth

century

initiated a double movement: it introduced

again

a

gap

between the

empirical

and

the

transcendental

orders

(the

objective

and the

subjective

realms,

world

and

life,

respectively),

and it

also

reduplicated

the

regime

of

representation

o fold

it back

on

its

own constructivemechanisms.

This

implies

the destruction and

dispersion

of the notion of

subject,

which

becomes contingenton the pluralityof systematic relationshipswithin which its

very being

is articulated.

A

new

paradigm

of

temporality

then

emerges.

Time

becomes

diversified,

but-and

this is

the

main

point-it

is

no

longer

a

function

of

a

determined

kind of

being,

a

Subject,

but is an element

in

a

particular

on-

figuration

of

a

particularplace-time.

As

Cassirer

points

out

in

connection

with

the

theory

of

relativity:

Is there not found

in this last

expression

he

characteristic

nd

decisive

opposition

between he

theory

of

space

and

imeof

critical dealismand he

theory

of

relativity?

s

not the essential

esultof this

theoryprecisely

he destructionf the

unity

of

space

and

timedemanded

y

Kant?

f all

measurementf time

s

dependent

n the stateof motion

of

the

system

romwhich t is

made,

here eemto result

only infinitelymany

and nfi-

nitely

diverse

place-times,

hich,however,

ever ombine nto he

unity

of the ime.

...

The oldness

nd he

highphilosophicalignificance

f Einstein's

octrine

onsists,

we

read,

.g.,

in the

work

of

Laue,

in

hat t clears

away

he

traditional

rejudice

f one

timevalid or all

systems. 35

In

this

case,

the

subject

(and

the same

can

be said of

language)

is no

longer

a

natural

entity

that creates itself

through

its own

self-constitution,

but

instead

becomes

a

function of

the

given

representative onfiguration

the

theory

of rel-

ativity

shows with

especial

distinctness

how,

in

particular,

he

thought

of func-

tion is effective as a

necessary

motive in each

spatio-temporal

etermination. 36)

The

development

of non-Euclidean

geometry put

an end to the idea that

there

s

only

one

possible

way

of

conceiving

of

physical space;

space

is

no

longer

some-

34.

Foucault,

The Order

of Things,

323.

35.

Cassirer,

Substance

and

Function,

414.

36.

Ibid.,

420.




15/27

70

ELIAS

PALTI

thing

always presupposed

in

knowledge

(one

of

the

a

priori

of

intuition),

with-

out

thereby becoming

an

object

constructed

by

a

subject,

insofar

as

both the

object

and the

subject

are now

placed

in the interior of a

particular

Form;

both

are functions in a system. Moreover, these contingently articulated Forms are

radically

discontinuous with each

other;

they

do

not

respond

to

any

genetic pat-

tern of

successive formation. None

of these forms

can be

simply

reduced

to,

or

derived

from,

the

others;

each of

them

designates

a

particular

approach,

in

which

and

through

which

it

constitutes its own

aspect

of

'reality, '

Cassirer had

already

stated

long

before

structuralism

arose

(although contemporaneously

to

Saussure).37

At this

point,

the

Age

of

History

had ended:

What

constantly

comes to

obstruct

and

delay

the

recognition

of the

pluri-dimensionality

of

knowledge

is the circumstance hat it seems to be destructiveof the

principle

of evo-

lution.Actually,no evolution exists, which, in a continuoussuccession, leads from one

dimension

to another.

We must

accept

the

existence,

at

any given point,

of a

generic

dif-

ference,

which

can

be

establishedbut not

explained.

It is also

obvious that

today

this

prob-

lem has lost

much

of

its

gravity.

Nor in

biology

do

we understand

volution

in

the sense

that

every

new form comes

up

from

the formerone

by

the

simple

accumulation

of a series

of accidental

changes.

.

.

. This has introduceda

very

essential

limitation

to the

principle

Natura non

facit

saltus.

The

problematic

aspect

of this

principle

has been

shown,

in

the

field of

physics,

by

the

theory

of

quanta,

and,

in

the

field

of

organic

nature,

by

the theo-

ry

of mutation.

Also

in

the circle of

organic

ife

would

evolution

be at last

a vain word

if we understand

t as the

unfolding

of

something alreadygiven

and

pre-existent.38

The notion of totality (structure) thus became detached from that of finali-

ty,

dissociating,

at the same

time,

necessity

from

contingency.

The

category

of

totality

(the

realm

of

necessity)

refers now to

self-integrated systems

whose

immanent

dynamics

tends to the

preservation

of

their

inner

balance

(homeosta-

sis)

and their

own

self-reproduction.

Historicity

therefore could come to

sys-

tems

only

from outside

them;

it indicated the

action

of an

intentional

agent

(the

realm of

contingency),

one therefore external to structures.

We

find here

the

second

conceptual

turn,

on which the

regress

to

metaphysics

will

hinge.

The

metaphysics

of

Forms,

as we have

seen,

points

to a field of

sec-

ond-order realities, at once a priori and contingent; they cannot be objectified

from within

their

own field of

knowledge,

since

they

constitute its

premises,

even

though

they

are

immediately graspable.

However,

beyond

or below

these

ideal

objects

there

still underlies the

primary

act

of institution

by

which

any

given

field is

articulated.

This

institutive act

is

normally

referred to with

the

name of

Life.

To

put

it

in

the words that the

young

Lukaics

addressed

to

Kierkegaard

in his

text,

Form Breaks

Up

When

Crashing

against

Life

(includ-

ed

in The

Soul

and

the

Forms):

Life never takes the form of

a

logical system

of

ideas;

from

this

perspective,

the

starting

point

of the

system

is

always arbitrary,

ndits outcome is self-enclosed, merelyrelative

from the

point

of view

of

life,

only

one

possibility among

others. There is no

system

for

life. In

life,

only

the

singular,

he

concrete,

exists.

To

exist

is

to be different.39

37.

Cassirer,

The

Philosophy

of Symbolic

Forms. Volume

1:

Language

(New

Haven:

Yale

University

Press,

1977),

78.

38.

Cassirer,

Las

ciencias de

la

cultura,

152-153.

39.

Lukaics,

El alma

y

las

formas:

Teoria

de

la novela

(Barcelona:

Grijalbo,

1985),

60.




16/27

THE

RETURN

OF

THE SUBJECT

71

Referring

he founded

order

of

Forms,

of which

the

subject

s a

function,

back

to

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