ONTOLOGY�

OR

The Signification of Philosophical Terms

Annotations by

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG

Translated and Edited by

ALFRED ACTON� Late Professor of Theology in the�

Academy of the New Church�

Swedenborg Scientific Association� Bryn Athyn. Pennsylvania�

1964�

Pub1ished by Massachusetts New-Church Union

Boston, Mas s., 1901

Reproduced in 1964 by Swedenborg Scientific As sociation

100 copies

Photo Offset Printing by University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

PREFACE.

IN the first catalogue of Sweden borg's manuscripts, which was that prepared by his heirs in 1772 at the time they consigned the manuscripts to the Royal Academy of Sciences of Stockholm, we find, under the heading "Philosophical Works," the following en­try: "Several larger and smaller fragments written in various styles of handwriting, yet apparently by Swe­den borg himself; they seem to belong to his Oeconomz'a Naturalis (sz"c) and to his Regnum Animale.*' In a later catalogue, prepared by Chastanier, in 1785, after a great number of the manuscripts had been bound, these "larger and smaller fragments" with the addition of one or two other manuscripts are described as "pre­cious fragments of the Oeconomia Regni Animalis and the Regnum Animale." t Two years later, at the in­stance of the Exegetic and Philanthropie Society, of Stockholm, the Swedenborg manuscripts were, for the first time, catalogued separately, each being classified according to the size of the manuscript page. In that catalogue we find one of these "fragments," a manu­script of 256 pages, entered under the class of small oblong folios, as Codex 54, Pltysiologz'ca et Metaphysica.{ The same entry is found in the official catalogue of Swedenborg's writings in the library of the Royal Academy of Sciences, made sorne years later,§ and also in the official manuscript catalogue of the same

• Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. II., p. 784. t Ibid.,

p. 793. t Ibid., p. 796. § Ibid., p. 799·

IV PREFACE

library.* Dntil the year 1845, there is no record of any endeavor having been made to ascertain and de­scribe the exact contents of this Codex, and for up­wards of fifty years it was known only as Codex 54, Physz'ologica et Metaphysica. It was under this vague title that the treatise on the" Soul," and the Ontologia, were so long neglected and unknown.

The first indication of the existence of these works, was given in 1845 by Dr. Svedbom, the Librarian of the Royal Academy of Sciences. in a memoir communi­cated to the London Swedenborg Society. In this me­moir, which is published as an appendix to the English translation of the" Economy of the Animal Kingdom," Dr. Svedbom says: "Among these [unpublished phys­iological and philosophical manuscripts of Swedenborg preserved in the Library of the Royal Academy] the first place appears to me to belong to a volume which 1 will now endeavor to describe a little particularly. This book, which is in Swedenborg's own handwriting, contains 130 leavesjol. max. On the back it has the title, printed by the binder, Pflysiologica et Metaphys­z'ca, and it bears the same title also in the old manu­script catalogue of our library. On the first page, without any title preceding it, we have the word prae­jatùmcula. ..." Then follows a very complete de­scription of the work now known as " The Soul," which fills jols. t 1-1 17; Dr. Svedbom then continues: "The remainder of this book, from jol. 118-127 (pp. xx.), is occupied by a dissertation which has the title Onto­

,. Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Appendix.

t It must be noted that the manuscript is counted by ieaves, not by pages.

v PREFACE

logia prefixed to it at the head of fol. 118." After describing this work, the memoir continues: "Like many other things contained in Swedenborg's manu­scripts, this 'Ontology' is not complete, being only a sketch which the author proposed to develop after­wards. The whole book is closely written, and in sorne parts in a cramped hand, and will be difficult to read and decipher."

Thus, more than a hundred years after they were written (1742), the work on the "Soul" and the On­tologia were at last discovered un der the binder's am­biguous title, Physiologica et Metaphysica, and their existence publicly announced.

But the discovery did not lead to any immediate practical result so far as the latter work was concerned. The Swedenborg Association, founded in 1845, ob· tainecl from the Academy of Sciences the loan of the manuscript which had been so fully described by Dr. Svedbom; and, under the auspices of the Association, Dr. Immanuel Tafel published fols. 1-117, under the title, De Anima (Tubingen, (849). In his preface to this work, Dr. Tafel, after quoting from Dr. Svedbom's description of fols. (18-127, arJds: "According to the wishes of the Swedenborg Association, I have for the present omitted the treatise inscribed Ontologz'a, fols. II8-127, which is contained at the end of the manu­script. The titles of the chapters of this work are," etc.

We hear no more about the" Ontology" for twenty years after the publication of the first part of Codex 54. But in 1869 the last twenty pages of the Codex, being the oft-mentionedfols. 118-127, were photolithographed by Dr. R. L. Tafel, and published in Vol. VI. of the

VI PREFACE

Photolithographed Manuscripts, where they may be found on pages 323-342.

From this copy, the Rev. Philip B. Cabell, at that time Professor of Ancient Languages in Urbana Uni­versity, prepared both a Latin transcription and an English translation. In 188o, the translation was pub­lished by Messrs. J. B. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia, Pa., this publication being the first appearance of the " Ontology" in print - 138 years after it had been written by the author.

When the limited edition of ML Cabell's translation was exhausted, an offer was made by the Massachusetts New-Church Union to republish the work. Accepting this offer, Mr. CabeH after carefully revising his tran­scription of the Latin text, prepared an emended trans· lation which he submitted to the Union with the re­quest that independent criticism be invited for the sake of further revision. Upon the receipt of this re­quest, Dr. Whiston, the Manager of the Union, invited the present translator to undertake the work.

In accepting the invitation, I had proposed to do nothing more than to suggest to ML Cabell such changes in his translation as seemed necessary or de­sirable; but as the work proceeded, it became apparent that this plan would not be productive of the best re­sults. Especially was this found to be the case in respect to the quotations made by our author, many of which are so elliptical as to be hardly intelligible. When he made his translation, and also his revision, Mr. Cabell did not have the opportunity of comparing these quotations with the original passages, as the works in which these occur are quite rare. After Sorne

PREFACE Vll

enquiry, 1 was fortunate enough ta secure access to these works.· Reference to them showed the neces­sity of making very material alterations in the quota­tions, not only as translated, but also as originally made by our author; moreover, in several cases, light was thrown on Swedenborg's own remarks. The work of revision was, therefore, gradually abandoned, and with Mr. Cabell's concurrence, an entirely new translation was undertaken. The result of this undertaking is now laid before the reader.

The Latin transcription prepared by Mr. Cabell has been carefully compared with the photolithographed copy of the original manuscript, and a few slight changes have been made. The handwriting of the original is very difficult to read, being in some places almost illegible, and it is with pleasure that 1 take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to Mr. Cabell for his careful and painstaking transcription. 1 am also indebted to him for various suggestions and criticisms, and for his assistance in reading the proofs.

Nor must 1 omit to mention the valuable suggestions contained in Dr. R. L. Tafel's review of the first edi­tion of the "Ontology."t These suggestions have, for the most part, been adopted in the present trans­lation.

In editing the work, 1 have endeavored to confine myself to such changes as will, 1 hope, make the "Ontology" more easy for reading and study; a few

• Wolff's Ontologia and Cosmologja are preserved in the Library of the Academy of the New Church, Huntingdon Valley, Pa.; Dupleix's Corps de Philosophie, at the Columbia University Library, New York, N. Y.; and Baron's Metaphysica Generalis, at the Ridgway Library, Philadelphia, Pa.

t Words for the New Church, Vol. II., p. 352.

Vlll PREFACE

explanatory footnotes have been added to the text, but of these l have been very sparing. To the simple title "Ontology," which is the only title given in the

original manuscript, has been added a descriptive sub­title taken from one of the prospectuses mentioned below. The paragraphs have been numbered, several of the original paragraphs having been subdivided for the purpose of facilitating reference to the work. Ref­erences have been supplied to th~ quotations and sub­quotations, and ail the former and many of the latter have been verified. These changes will be found noted in the appendix to the translation. In the appendix l have also added critical notes on the Latin text. These, though somewhat unusual in a translation, seem desirable in the present case, both because of the many changés which have been made, and because the Latin, being accessible only in the original manuscript or the photolithographed copy, is not easy of reference to the majority of readers. An index to the work has been prepared, which, it is hoped, will be found useful in enabling the reader to get a more extended view of Swedenborg's philosophy than can be obtained by a mere perusal of a work professing to be nothing more than a definition of philosophical terms.

The" Ontology," which was written by Swedenborg in the year 1742, is one of those numerous small trea­tises which marked his progress in the search for the soul. These separate treatises or studies were sub­sequently to be inc1uded, according to a definite plan, in one grand work of several volumes, in which, as the end of the labor, "the crown of all human wisdom,"* the soul was to be discovered in the body.

.. Photolithographed Manu'scripts, Vol. VI., p. 351, Pra~.latio.

ix PREFACE

Swedenborg made seven prospectuses or outlines of this great work. The seventh, or final prospectus, was prefixed to the first volume of the" Animal Kingdom," published in 1744; the remaining six may be found in the Photolithographed Manuscripts, Vol. VI., pp. 349­353. In the published prospectus, the projected work, of which the" Animal Kingdom" constituted the be­ginning, is divided into seventeen "Parts" which are enumerated; in four of the six manuscript prospec­tuses - which differ but slightly from each other - it is divided into four" Tomes" or volumes, the proposed contents of which are given in detail; while in the remaining two manuscript prospectuses, which likewise substantially agree with each other, it is divided into six "Transactions," of which the last four only are enumerated and their proposed contents given.

According to these two "transaction" prospectuses, it appears to have been Swedenborg's first intention to continue the series of the" Economy of the Animal Kingdom." Neither of the prospectuses makes any mention of Transactions I. and II., and since the term " transaction" is used by Swedenborg to refer to the "Economy of the Animal Kingdom," it is evident that the two published volumes of that work consti­tu te the first two transactions of the proposed larger work. The subjects to be treated in the four transac­tions that were to complete the work, are. given in the prospectuses referred to, as follows : -

Trans. III. The cerebrum. Trans. IV. The cere­bellum, etc.; diseases of the head. Trans. V. Intro­duction to rational psychology. Trans. V 1. Rational psychology.

x PREFACE

Instead, however, of fol1owing this plan, Swedenborg prepared a new plan, in which he proposes to begin his investigations, not from the blood, as in the" Econ­orny of the Animal Kingdom," but from the organs of the body. This new plan wasl sketched in the four " tome" prospectuses. According to these prospec­tuses, the work was to be contained in four" Tomes," or volumes, the proposed contents of which are: ­

Tome l. The anatomy of the body; the generative organs; the organs of the senses. Tome Il. The anatomyof the brain; diseases of the head. Tome Ill. Introduction to rational psychology. Tome IV. Rational psychology.

The position assigned to the "Ontology," in both the" transaction" and the" tome" prospectuses, is as the concJuding part or chapter of the" Introduction to rational psychology," which constitutes Transaction V. of the first plan and Tome Ill. of the second. The plan of this Introduction, as given in one of the two prospectuses of Transaction V., is as follows : ­

INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. 1. The cortex. 2. The medul1ary and nerve fibre. 3. The arachnoid tunic. 4. The doctrine of order, degrees, and society. S. The doctrine of forms. 6. The doc­trine of correspondences and representations. 7. On­tology or First philosophy." 8. (Added at a later time) The doctrine of modifications.

The other prospectus of this transaction omits parts 3 and 8, and gives part 7 as simply "Ontology."

In the four "fome" prospectuses, the Introduction

• This is the complete title of Wolff's " Ontology," which was written as a preparation to his " Cosmology," and" Rational Psychology."

XI PREFACE

to rational psychology is planned somewhat differently. The most complete of these prospectuses is as fol­lows :­

INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. I. The doctrine of forms and modifications. 2. The doctrine of order, degrees, and society. 3. The doctrine of representations. 4. The cortex. 5. The medullary and nerve fibre. 6. The arachnoid tunic. 7. The motor fibre. 8. (Added at a later time.) The signifi­cation of philosophical terms, or Ontology.

The three other " tome" prospectuses omit several of these parts, and none of them mentions" Ontology." They are not, however, put in the form of prospectuses, but are rather general statements in narrative form, of the author's intentions. That which we have quoted seems to be the last written of the "tome" prospec­tuses.

From what has been said, it will be seen that our author first designed the" Ontology" to be a treatise on First Philosophy, that is, to contain the primary principles and notions which enter into our reasoning, for so "First Philosophy" is defined by Wolff.· Later, however, he narrowed the ground to be covered by the «Ontology," for in the later prospectus he gives as its design, "the definition of philosophical terms."t When this prospectus was written Swedenborg evidently in­tended, before proceeding to the rational psychology itself, to clearly define, both to himself and to his

• Ontologia, § 1.

tAs this is the latest prospectus in which " Ontology" is mentioned, this title has been adopted in the present translation. It fullYdescribes the nature of the treatise.

Xli PREFACE

readers, the terms and hence the phiJosophical ideas which would enter into the crowning work of the series. But when he wrote the final prospectus (that published in the "Animal Kingdom") in which the whole work is divîded into seventeen "Parts," he had given up the idea of writing a separate treatise on the definition of philosophical terms, deeming, perhaps, that the In troduction to rational psychology would of itself sufficiently define his terms. According to this pro­spectus, that Introduction, which is to constitute Part 12, was to treat of the doctrines of forms, order and degrees, series and society, influx, correspondences, and modification. There is no mention of "Ontology."

When, in 1743, Swedenborg began the "Animal Kingdom," he had already written smaU or large treat­ises on almost every subject that was to be incorpo­rated in that work. His plan was to write on whatever subject had been occupying his thought, and on which he had reached some definite conclusion. For we read in an address to the reader prefixed to one of these preliminary treatises: "I have long been in doubt whether to comprise aU that l have meditated about the soul and the body ... in one volume, or to divide them into numbers and parts, and publish each sepa­rately.... To exhibit the soul and its state ... is a labor of some years, and must extend over several volumes. And sin ce l suspected and foresaw that so vast a work could never be accomplished at one time, and as it were with one effort and intention of the mind ... therefore, after deliberation, l have decided to distribute the work into treatises and tracts, and to tJ.ke up my pen at short intervals." The author then

PREFACE Xlll

states that he will publish these treatises probably "not less than five or six times a year." *

Either at the time he wrote these works, or subse­quently, our author intended to rewrite them, bringing to bear on each the knowledge the study of the whole had brought him. In one case he actually did this, for in 1744 he wrote, apparently for publication, a treatise on the senses, which he subsequently rewrote, and published as Volume III. of the" Animal King­dom" ; and in the preliminary work he plainly implies an intention of rewriting a treatise on the blood, al­though this had already been treated of in the" Econ­omy of the Animal Kingdom," published three years previously·t

As was said before, among these preliminary works written as a preparation for the great work, is to be inc1uded the" Ontology." And though none of them was published by Swedenborg. it is c1ear from the ad­dress to the reader prefixed to one, from the preface to another (The Soul), and from an index added to a third (Hieroglyphic Key), that sorne, if not ail of them, were written with a view to publication. Indeed, sev­eral were public1y announced by the author, as about to be published.:j:

Whether this was the case with the" Ontology" is not c1ear. It is c1ear, however, that the manuscript of that work which we have, is little more than a sketch and was written more or less hurriedly. This is evi­dent both from the handwriting, which is perhaps the

.. De anima d ejus et corporis ha,.monia, in Opuscula Philosophica, p. 91. t Regnum Animale, Pars IV., § 3.

t Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. L, p. 585.

XIV PREFACE

most difficult to read of ail the specimens of Sweden­borg's writing which we have, and by the frequent ellipses not only in the quotations, but also in the subject matter, especially towards the end of the manuscript.

The work appears to have been suddenly dropped, the last chapter containing only quotations without any remarks by the author. In view of the fact that these quotations end at the bottom of the manuscript page, it may be that investigation will bring to light the continuation of the work, though if this be the case, the missing page or pages must have been lost prior to r845, as our manuscript contains ail the pages mentioned by Dr. Svedbom in that year. It is not im­probable, however, that Swedenborg purposely stopped at the doctrine of modification because that doctrine was to form the subject of a separate work.

The" Ontology" was written immediately after the work on the "Soul," the two works being written in the same manuscript volume in that order. It is the last of Swedenborg's purely philosophical works setting forth his final views respecting the soul and the rela­tion of spirit to matter. In this work he went as far as philosophy unaided by revelation could take him, and he failed to reach his goal. By pursuing his meta­physical studies he could have obtained no further light, and might, perchance, have come into greater obscurity. He himself seems to have seen lhis, for immediately after writing the "Ontology" he girded up his loins afresh, and entered upon a new journey in search of the soul. He began this time from the lips, the outermost gate to the body, intending to pur­

PREFACE xv

sue the course through the viscera to the blood and the brain and thence to the soul itself. But he was not permitted to go far on this new journey. After pub­lishing (1744-1745) three "parts" of the "Animal Kingdom," in which he treats of the viscera and of the senses, his ripened mind was turned to the consid­eration of other subjects. In 1745 he wrote the "Wor­ship and Love of God"; this was followed by the Adversaria, the Index Biblicus, and these, after his illu­mination, by the Arcana Cœ!estia.

In the "Ontology," the last of the philosophical works, we may, therefore, expect to find much light thrown on the development of Swedenborg's mind, ever soaring to the causes of things, by which he was prepared to enter into the world of causes, and ration­ally receive the truths of revelation. And this indi­cates one of the uses which the New-Church reader will derive from a perusal and study of this work. With our author's theological writings before us, we cannot go to his philosophical works for instruction in spiritual subjects, but we can in those works follow the development of his mind, and see the graduaI growth of those natural ideas which prepared him for his mis­sion. Though before his illumination, Swedenborg did not see the truth respecting spiritual causes, yet it is evident that he had clear basic philosophical ideas which brought him to an. obscure perception of higher things, and prepared him to receive them later. And we may surely take it for granted that that which thus prepared Swedenborg, when studied by us in the light of revela­tion, will establish spiritual truth more clearly in our minds, by affording us invaluable illustrative and con· firmatory ideas.

XVI PREFACE

But what is, doubtless, a more obvious use of the "Ontology," is indicated in the sub·title. It is a Defi­nition of Philosophical Terms - terms which occur not only in the scientific but also in the theological v/orks, particularly in the" Divine Love and Wisdom," and a study of the definitions here given cannot but contri­bute to a clearer understanding of the passages, even those in the theological writings, in which the terms defined occur. To quote from the preface to the former edition of this work: "Although it was written at a period prior to the author's illumination, it seems reasonable to infer that the meaning of those terms remained essentially the same in his theological works."

ALFRED ACTON.

HUNTINGDON VALLEY, PA.

AUGUST, 1901.

sc":' 1'" 0''''-_

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

The following particulars respecting Dupleix and Baron may be of interest to the reader; Christian Wolff, the philosopher (1679-1754), is too well known to need any further mention.

SCIPIO DUPLEIX (I569-166I) was "Historiographer of France" and one of the Counsellors of State. He was for sorne time under the protection of Marguerite de Valois, who brought him to Paris in 1605, and made him her Master of Requests. His more important works are, Corps de Philosopllie, containing la Logique, la Pllysiq/ll!, la Metapllysique, and l'Etllique (1607, reprinted 1626), written for his pupi!, Antoine de Bourbon, and notable as being the tirst treatise on philosophy to be published in the French language; Memo;"es des Caules (1619), long highly esteemed on account of the facts contained in them; and Histoire Cazeral dl! Frartce(5 vols., 1621-1643). He also wrote a history of Rome, a disputation on the purity of the French language, and a history of the Gallican Church. The manuscript of the last·named work, when presented to the Chancellor Seguier for permis­sion to print, was thrown by him into the tire. This so affected the old man that he died soon afterwards, at the age of ninety-two years. Dupleix's works are said to be methodical in narration, but ponderous and defective in style. He is praised for his habit of constantly citing the sources of his information.

ROBERT BARON (I 593 ?-1639), a learned Scotch divine who served the Presbyterian Church both as minister and as Professor of lJivinity. In 1638, when he was minister in Aberdeen, he participated in the famous debate against the Covenanting Commissioners. supporting the episcopal form of government which Charles l. attempted to force upon the church in Scotland. He was nominated by Charles to the See of Orkney, but was never consecrated, for when Montrose, at the head of the Covenanters, entered Aberdeen in March, 1639, he Red to England, and in the following August he died at Berwick, when on his return to Scotland. Among other works he published Pltilosophia Theologiae Ancillans (162[), De Scripturae Sacrae Divina et Cmzonica Auctoritate ([627), and De vero discrimine peccati mortalis et venialis (1633)' He also left several works in manuscript, among which was the Metaphysica Cmeralis, published at Leyden, in 1657, nearly twenty years after his death, and reprinted in Cambridge, in 1685. It was very highly esteemed by eminent scholars on the Continent.

It may be added that, so far as is known, the" Ontology" is the only work by Swedenborg in which any reference is made to these tw.o authors.

ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER 1.

FüRM. FüRMAL CAUSE.

1. ROBERT BARON. Form is divided into external and in­tu'nal. External or extrinsz"c form is not 1. that which is out­side the essence of a substance, for then every accidentaI form might be called an external form; but by extrinsic form we un­derstand the exemplary cause or idea, according to the likeness of which the effect is formed. hztrinsic form is that which constitutes the thing formed, whether that thing be substantial or accidenta!. Accidentai z'ntrz'nsz'c form is that which exists in substance, whether the substance be spiritual or material, and which, together with that substance in which it exists, constitutes an accidentaI compound. Substantz"al z'ntrz'nsic form is either form z'nforming or form assistz"ng. Form ùiformùzg is regarded either as the other of the two parts of a physical compound, when it is called the form of a part; or as the whole quiddity of any substance, when it is called the form of the whole. In the latter sense, the whole essence of the natural body is called form. Form z'nformz'ng, regarded as the other of the two parts of a physical compound, is divided into form sejJarable and form in­sejJarable.' There is only one form sejJarable from matter, namely, the rational sou!. Form z'nsejJarable is that which is so bound to matter, that it cannot exist or operate outside of matter. (Baron also divides form informing 3 into generz"c and sjJecijic forms.) Form assistz"ng is that which does not actuate or inform its matter, but only assists it, contributing motion and operation to it. Form, in the general acceptation of the term, is divided into metajJhysz'cal and jJhysz'cal. MetajJhysz"cal form, regarded as essence, is the whole essence of a substantial thing, or, accord­ing to others, its entire nature. (MetajJhysz'ca, Sect. X.)

• Figures indicate references to the Appendix.

2 ONTOLOGY.

2. ROBERT BAROX. No form constitutes a compound ex­cept with sorne matter. Sorne have asserted that the form pre­exists. in matter, before the generation of the thing. Others have said that forms are actually in matter before things are generated, and that nevertheless they do not appear, but lie hid in the po­tenc)' of matter, as it were in confusion, and that they are made manifest by generation; as for instance, a plant in the matter of its seed.- Others have asserted that form has an actual existence in matter before generation, imperfect indeed and as it were in­choate, but that by generation it begins to be in matter as a per­fect existence. Sorne have said that ail substantial forms come into existence de novo by creation. The peripatetic philosophers taught that, of substantial forms, some are spiritual and inde­pendent of matter although they truly inform it; while others are material, so cleaving ta matter that they depend on it, both in their creation and in their existence; of the former kind are human souls alone. (MetajJhysica, Sect. X.)

3. DUPLEIX. Form is incomplete and imperfect substance, or half-substance, but joined to matter, it becomes entire sub­stance. (Form is described by Dupleix as being the second be­ginning, the second part, and the second ingredient of natural things,t which regards the act but not the potency; it being matter that regards the potency.4) Aristotle says that matter desires form 5 as the female desires the male.t Form is that which not only gives existence ta things, but also makes them diverse and distinguishes them one from the other. (De la Phy­sique, Liv. IL, Ch. 6.)

4. WOLFF. Essential determinations are what is commonly called form, and also formai cause. Thus, he understands the form of the human body, who understands, not only its structure

- The illustration is quoted elliptically. The full illustration as given by Baron is as follows: "Before a plant can come from the seed of a plant, they say that the form of the plant exists actually in the matter of that seed, and, together with it, infinite other forms; but by genera­tion that one form cornes to the light above ail the others."

t Matter being the first beginning, etc. See n. 39. tPhysica, Lib. 1., Cap. 9.

3 FüRM. FüRMAL CAUSE.

and hence the figures of its organic parts and the manner in which they are interjoined, but also the combination of the similar parts whence the organic parts are composed. In like manner, he clearly sees the form of a stone who knows how the particles are produced by combinations, and how these again are inter­joined so as to produce the mass of the stone. That an ens is of a given genus or species and that it is distinguishèd fram others, is from its form. That it can act in a given manner, is also from its form. Form must be classed among the causes of things; for by means of its form, we understand why an ens is what it is, rather than something else, and why it is fitted to act in a given manner. Consequently in its form is contained the reason for these things. Form, therefore, is the beginning of the ens upon which depends the existence of such an ens; hence it is a cause of the ens. 1n this respect essential determinations are called form. Form is, therefore, the beginning of the actuality of the ens, upon which the existence of such an ens certainly depends. Thus form and essence, although they are both con­stituted by essential determinations, are yet distinguished from each other by the diverse respect which they have to the ens. (Ontologia, Pars. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

S, Form is the entire construction of a body; namely, the composition, coordination, subordination, and determination of the parts, both integral and in­dividual, in a compound, whence that compound de­rives, not only its essence, but also the quality of that essence; for it is from its form that an ens is what it is taken to be. Therefore, from a knowledge of the form, there follows a knowledge of the quality and es­sence of any given body, as also of its dependence and relation; since a knowledge of the form involves a knowledge of the connection, the position, the order, the fluxion, and many other things which cause the body to be what it is rather than something else.

6. In compounds and bodies, matters, or things

4 Û!'TÛLÛGY.

which flow from matters, are what determine the form; for, in corporeal things, form without matter is an ens ratio1lis, or an idea which does not reallyexist. Hence, by sorne, ail that is called matter, by which form is de­termined, so that where form is, there is matter; for the existence of form must be drawn from matter. Therefore three beginnings are established, namely, matter, form, and the privation of form. Ali that is matter, from which is form. But the material, as op­posed to the spiritual, is another thing.

7. Spiritual form, on the other hand, cannot be called a construction, composition, and ,determination of parts; for ail these terms are such as apply to forms pure!y material and corporeal. But in spiritual forms a certain determination must be understood, yea also, an ordination of cntia and of forces flowing therefrom, which bear an analogy and a certain correspondence to those which exist in bodies. For spiritual forms, and their operations, exceed al! ideas that are mate rial or that are joined to material things, consequently, the very words by which such ideas are expressed ; for they are most eminent analogies, which are too unlimited and too indefinite [to be expressed by such words]. \Vith spiritual forms it is the same as with other forms, namely, thaÎ: spirits derive from their form, that they are what they are taken to be. And this is the reaSOn why there is so great a variety of spirits, or of spiritual forms.

8. Further, simple forms, or forms considered simply, are superior and inferior. Sorne or ail of th.ese may occur in a compound form ; as in the animal body, in which are contained ail forms considered simply. And,

5 FORM. FORMAL CAUSE.

because we cannot understand what corporcal form can be, without an understanding of simple forms, therefore these latter must be explained.

9. The term external form is regarded in two ways. First: As denoting inferior form. Second: As the external construction and determination of a body.6 1. As denoting z"nferior form. For the inferior is al­ways exterior, and the superior is always interior. Thus the rational mind is an internai form, while the body is an external form. Or, the cause is the internai form, and the effect is the external form; that is, so long as the effect reproduces in an image its cause. II. Tite externat construction and determinati01l of a body, from which is comeliness, deformity, a bcautiful form, a lovely form, and so forth, is also called external form. This external form is likewise an image of the internai form; for, as form has its determinations, so also it must have its terminatiolls, namely, such as cor· respond to the internai determination. For example: Every circular form must consist of perpetuai circles as its parts, while the common circle itself by its own determination indicates the quality of its internai form. Thus internai form and external form must correspond to each other.

10. On the other hand, the angular form may ex­trinsically assume the circular, and even the spiral form; not, however, from itself and its own nature, but artificially; for, from its very hardness, coldnes!>, and resistance, it is evident that the form itself is angular. It must therefore be seen whether the internai form produces the external naturally, thus whether they cor­respond to each other; or whether a more perfect form

6 ONTOLOGY.

has been superinduced, as in the case of the human form impressed upon wax or engraved on marble or brass. That the form may be truly human, the human, or the human soul, must be inspired in every least part of it.

l 1. Ali things must have their own form in order that there may be anything. From form is derived actuality or essence, the quiddity of the ancients, qual­ity, causality, and the faculty itself of acting and being acted upon. Thus a thing without form is an atom without a beginning, that is, nothing. Every thing, mode, sense, or force has its own form. Every body, viscus, or part, whether solid or liquid, as the parts of the blood or of the animal spirit, has its own form; yea, the soul has its own form. Every society, least and greatest, has its own form of government, its de­pendence and relation, its order, laws, and many other things which are determined simultaneously with its form.

7 FIGURE.

CHAPTER II.

FIGURE.

12. WOLFF. In a compound not continuous, the single parts have a determined position in respect to each other. The boun­dary of an extent is called figure. A terminated compound ens is endowed with a certain figure. A compound ens designates, in the imaginary space in which it is supposed to exist, a figure corresponding to its own - plane if its own be plane, concave if its own be convex, and convex if its own be concave. If, in a compound ens, sorne parts be added, or taken away, or trans­posed, and in the boundary of its extension anything occurs which was before different, the figure of the ens is changed; but if nothing then occurs which was not apprehended in the same manner in the former boundary, the figure of the ens is not changed. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. iii.)

13. WOLFF. Figure is an accident, because it is not a modifi­able ens. For, since figure is the boundary of an extent, we can conceive of no other change in it than that it be taken away and sorne other figure succeed in its place. We can by no means conceive of it as possessing intrinsic determinations, of which sorne are changed into others, while others remain the same; nor, consequently, as being a subject capable of diverse determina­tions, for such a subject is the extent which is bounded, but not the boundary of the extent. Figure, therefore, is an accident. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

14. It appears as if figure meant externai form, but there is a difference between them. Externai form refers itself ta internaI form as ta its continuum; as the expression of the face, actions, and speech ta the mind. Thus the face itself, sa far as it is regarded as the externat form of the human head, and ref~rs itse!f

8 ONTOLOGY.

to the internaI form thereof, cannot be called a figure. But when it is regarded separately from that form, and indeed as a surface which belongs to planometry, it can be so called. Therefore we have the figure of the face, the figure of the mouth, the figure of the nose, the figure of the eye; but the form [of the face] in­volves ail these figures together.

15. Figure differs from form, as, in geometry, a plane differs from a cube; and the property of figure in respect to the property of form, is like the property of figure, geometrically considered, in respect to the entire construction, and hence resulting nature, of a compound.'" Thus we recede from figure the more we elevate our attention to the higher powers, as to the cubes of the square of a cube,t and so forth; for these are more removed from planometry.

16. So also with superior forms. These at last can­not be called figured forms, because they are not termi­nated by space within themselves, but only by imaginary space outside themselves. For, that they may include space within themselves, there must be reference ta a centre, a surface, a diameter, and many other things; these perish when there are such determinations, and with them perishes also the idea of space, of which there is none in the form itself, but which can be con­ceived of as being outside the form. Such form is also void of figure, because void of space and extent.

• Figura a .forma in geometricis diffat sicuti planum a cubo,. et jig'l4rœ proprietas sicuti ji/l'urœ geometria considerata ad integram construc­tionem et inde resultantem naturam compositi.

t The cube of the square of a cube can be expressed algebraically, thus : ( (X3)2)3; but neither planometry nor geometry affords any figure corresponding to this higher power.

9 FIGURE.

Hence it is without any limitation. Thus superior forms always recede from the idea of space and figure, the more highly they are elevated. Therefore, as de­terminations regarded in space, constitute form, so ter11li­?lations to be regarded as lf outside tllat space, constitute figure. But in a form of which there are no termina­tions, except such as are to be regarded as continuous forms, figure itself must be ideally conceiveo of as being outside the form, and not as adjoined to it. For a form which occupies no space, regarded as such in itself, cannot be said to be terminated; but the termi­nus, or ail that termination, must be conceived of as occupying space outside the form.

10 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER III.

ORGAN. STRUCTURE.

17. WOLFF. An organic body, by virtue of its composition, is suited to a peculiar action. A simple organic body is one that is composed of no other organic parts; the reverse is true of a compound organic body. The essence of an organic body con­sists in its structure. The reason for those things which apper­tain to an organic body, in that it is organic, whether they are in it actually, or only as to possibility, is contained in its struc­ture. In its structure must also be contained the sufficient reason why the organic body is suited to action of a peculiar kind. If the parts of an organic body consist of mixed matter, and the mixture of that matter be in any manner dissolved, the organic body perishes. (Cosmologz"a, Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)

18. Structure is the same as form; but only in compounds considered physically and mechanically, and to which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass, size, matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like. Form, however, is something more universal than structure, and is in more simple things, yea, in the most simple. Still structure corresponds to it. For we must conceive that such things, as those mentioned just above, are within every single form, although they themselves are not in the form, but only their ana­106"ues and eminents, which cannot be called by the same name, or, to which such predicates do not apply.

19. An organ is an instrument, and supposes sorne beginning, or sorne primitive cause, by which it is ac­tuated. Thus it does not possess of itself the begin­ning of acting, except as it derives this from a cause

II ORGAN. STRUCTURE.

holding the place of beginning. Our body is purely organic; the soul- the beginning - is its active. Thus the body consists of perpetuaI organs or instru­ments of the active sou!.

20. The term organic is properly used when speak­ing of parts of the animal kingdom; the term instru­ment, when speaking of inanimate things.

12 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE. CHANGES OF STATE.

2r. WOLFF. From the determination of the mutable proper­ties of a thing, arises its state; so that state is the coexistence of mutable properties with always the same fixed properties. If the state of a thing is constituted by intrinsic mutable properties, namely by modes, it is called internai; but if by extrinsic muta· ble properties, such as the relations of the thing to other things, it is called external. If, in two things, A and B, the mutable properties are the same, the state of those things is the same; if the mutable properties are diverse, the state is diverse. If the mutable properties that are predicated of a thing do not remain the same, the state of that thing is changed. The internai state of a thing is changed, if its modes do not remain the same; its external state is changed, if its relations to other things do not remain the same. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2., Cap. ii.)

22. WOLFF. A finite ens can have different states succéssively, but not ail at the same time. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

23. State is the coexistence of the determinations zn any given form,o as, in the circ1e, of the determinations of the diameters from the circumference towards the centre. The state of a circ1e is not changed so long as the circle remains a circle. When the circle is expanded or contracted, its state is not then changed, but its forces are varied and modified; or, there is a variation and modification of its forces, from which variation and modification new forms and new states are wont to be formed, the essence of the circle re­maining always the same. From such variation, in the animal body, vital actions are produced; and in

STATE. CHANGES OF STATE. 13

the atmospheric world, modifications, which, in the sensory organs, become sensations.

24. Changes of state are changes of the determina­tions in any given form, with respect to their coexist­ence; as, in circular forms, with respect to the co­existence of the determinations, that is, of the radii, to the centre. Thus, when the determination of the centre is changed, the state of the circle is changed; as when it is raised to an ellipse, a cycloid, a conoid, a parabola, and other figures. So also in ail other forms ; except the angular, where no change of form can occur without destruction and privation thereof, change of figure alone being possible.

25. These changes of state are called changes of modes; for the very changes produce among them­selves new forms, which are properly called modifica­tions, and, in the animal body, sensations. By means of such changes, imaginations are effected, these being so many ideas which are reproduced by similar changes of state. For this reason, modifications correspond to sensations, since changes are either changes of forces, or changes of modes.

26. The perfection of superior forms consists in the mutability of their state or states. For the soul, from every change of any organic form in its body, under­stands the state, and what it signifies, since without sorne change, there is no sensation nor perception, still less any action.

27. From changes of state or variation of modes, new forms exist. Thus they exist successively before they exist simultaneously, or before they coexist. For there can be common states unùer which are contained

OKTOLOGY.!4

many particular states; universal states under which are singular states; and general states under which are specifie and individual states. The common and universal state is formed from the particular and singu­lar states. They are like equations which are built up successively from ratios and analogies. Thus, in finite entia there can be many states simultaneously, not, however, from themselves; but in superior forms there are infinitely more.

15 SUBSTANCE.

CHAPTER V.

SUBSTANCE.

28. WOLFF. Substance is a subject, durable and modifiable; or, Substance is the subject of intrinsic determinations, both constant and variable; or, Substance is a subject in which essen· tials and attributes are the same, while the modes are successively varied. According to the Aristotelico-scholastic philosophy,7 it is an ens which subsists jJer se, and sustains accidents. Leibnitz, for a notion of substance, requires action as its genuine charac­teristic j- so that he agrees that substance is distinguished from accidents by the power of acting. Descartes defines substance as being that which so exists that it has need of nothing else for its existence; thus by substance, he understands God.t Clauberg defines it as being that which so exists that it has no need of any subject for its existence; and ils opposite, accident, he defines as being that which exists in something else as its subject, or, whose esse is ùzesse.t Thus, according to the Schoolmen, God is not in predicates, but above predicates. Locke adheres to the corn mon notion of substance, nor does he advance beyond it, since he calls it the substratum or support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us, and which are com­monly called accidents. Il (01/1., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

29. WOLFF. The common notion of substance is an imagin­ary one. The state of substance can be changed; and therefore substances are endowed with force. In substances whose state is actually changed, there is a continuai conatus to action. Acci­dents cannot subsist without ·substances. In a compound ens there is nothing substantial except the simple entia. There are no substances except simple substances; and compound entia are the aggregates of these. Therefore simple substance is that which is properly called substance; and compound substance is

- A da E rudi/orum, A 11. 1694, p. Il 1. t Principia Philosophiœ, Pars. 1., § SI. tll1etaph)'sica de Ente, § 44. Il Human {/nderstanding, Bk. 11., ch. xxiii., § 2.

16 ONTOLOGY.

that which is the aggregate of simple substances, or, that which, on account of the simple substances entering into a compound ens, is called substance; 8 for it is according ta usage ta cali com­pound entia in the material world, substances. Robert Green, an Englishman, defends the notion of Leibnitz,9 that substance differs from accident by its active force.- If there is force in a compound subs~~nce, it must result from the forces of simple substances. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. H.)

30 . WOLFF. In the modifications of things, nothing substan­tial is either destroyed or produced. (Ont., P. Ir., Sect. 2, Cap.

iii.)

3 1 . DUPLEIX. Substance is that which subsists and has its being by means of itself. Primary substances are individual things and singular substances, t called primarily, properly, and principaHy substance, because they are as the foundation of ail things that are in them, or are predicated of them. ID Secondary substances are universal substances, as are the genera and spe­cies.t For example: Socrates, Rome, this book, this cane, are primary substances; and man, city, book, cane, are secondary substances." (Dupleix divides substances into most universal, universal, generic, specifie, and individual. He maintains that ail accidents are in primary substances.)" There are spiritual and incorporeal substances, as angels and souls. (De la Logique, Liv. 111., Ch. 6.)

32 . WOLFF. That subject in which are ail those properties that we observe ta belong ta a thing, we cali substance i and when we reflect as ta its quality, we are able ta attribute nothing ta it, since, in fact, we remove ail qualities from it, and refer them to accidents. (Wolff adds, that therefore the substantial of things is unknown.) Thus the notion of substance is an imaginary one; and consequently, substance itself, as we commonly imagine it, is an imaginary ens. Descartes has weil observed that we can­nat conceive of substance except by a certain primary determina­tion to which ail other determinations are referred.t But he has

- p,..incipia Phi/osophiœ de vi etc., Lib. V., Cap. 8. t Cf. § 84, Du­pleix on the predicables. t Principia PI"Josoplliœ, Pars. L, § 53.

17 SUBSTANCE.

not progressed so far as to discover i~, since he holds extension to be that which constitutes corporeal substance, and thought that which constitutes incorporeal substance;· for there is some­thing more universal than these. If the sta te of substances is changed, it necessarily fol1ows that they are endowed with force. For, let us suppose that only one substance exists, and that its state is changed. There must be in that substance, a sufficient reason for such change j and thus there must be action. Where­fore, since it must be admitted that there is something in the agent which contains in itself the sufficient reason for the actual­ity of the action, and therefore a certain force, it fol1ows that that substance must be endowed with force. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

33. Substances, like forms, are simple and com­pound, prior and posterior, superior and inferior. But primarily and properly, there are no substances except the simple, first, and supreme, which at the same time are the most perfecto Yet posterior and compound substances cannot be called non-substances, seeing that forms, attributes, forces, modes, accidents, and qualities bel9ng to them. Therefore, every form distinct from another is a substance, since it is a subject in which is form together with its adjuncts and predicates. Thus substance remains substance even though the state of its form is changed; for nothing substantial is either destroyed or produced by variation of form or modification. In this way, ail the definitions can be made to agree. But to give a single definition which shaH exhaust the subject, 1 scarcely believe possible. That ail the definitions agree, can be dem­onstrated. In superior substances, predicates, acci­dents, and qualities have no place; for superior sub­stances are above every notion belonging to predicates.

• Principia Pki/osophiœ, Pars. L, § 53.

18 ONTOLOGY.

34. That substances be substances, they must be modifiable and able to change their state. Thus they must be endowed with force. The modifications them­selves, which are changes of state or variations of forces, although they are forms, still cannot be called substances, but only the operations of substance. For these modifications, regarded in themselves, are not modifiable nor can they change "their state, and the re­fore they are only the operations of substances, which do change their state. Thus thought cannot be called substance, nor can sensation; for it is the sensory organs that are the very substance of the sensations. That is to say, the eye is the organic substance of the sensation of sight; the ear, of hearing; the tongue, of taste; the brain, of all the sensations; the cortical glands are the organic substances of the imagination, and, together with the pure intellectories,* of the thought.

The sensories, therefore, and not the sensations, are substances, because they are organic for ms. The

• As the term sensory is used to signify the seat of the sensations, so our author uses the term intellectory or pure intellectory to signify the seat or organ of the pure intellect. In his work De Anima, he teaches that the intellectory is composed of the pure cortex within the cortical glands j this is barn of the soul and is the origin of the simple fibre. The cortical glands themselves from which proceed the com­pound or medullary fibres, constitute what he calls the internal unso­

rio/um which is the organ of the imagination. Thought or the human intellect is intermediate between the pure intellect and the imagination, being the result of the operation of the one upon the other. Thought, therefore, draws its essence from bath the pure intellect and the im­agination, or, as it is stated.in the present work, the organ of thought is " the corticJ.1 glands ... together with the pure intellectories," that is, the pure cortex. (See De Anima, pp. 57 seq. English translation, n. 123 seq.)

19 SUBSTANCE.

whole body is a substance composed of aIl organic substances; the soul is a substance whose operations are spiritual, for it is a form, and indeed a spiritual form; and so with other things.

35. We must conceive of active and motive force, and also of nature, after the manner of substance; but they are not substance, they only so appear.

20 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER VI.

MATTER. THE MATERIAL.

36. WOLFF. Ali matter is in continuai motion. If matter does not change its place, its motion '3 is resisted by contiguous things. The active force in a body must be conceived of after the manner of a durable thing, just as we conceive of matter. (Cosmol., Sect. Ir., Cap. I.)

37. WOLFF. Matter and active force are not substances. In the elements are contained the ultimate reasons for everything that is observed in material things. Consequently, in simple sub­stances is contained the ultimate reason why matter and active force appear like two substances diverse from each other. (Cos­mol., Sect. II., Cap. 2.)

38. WOLFF. That which is determined in a compound ens is called matter j whence a compound ens is said to consist of matter. The word matter is commonly taken in a wider sense, to mean the substantial which is made specifie by essential deter­minations so that this particular ens cornes forth, and no other. But from this loose signification we very properly abstain, lest, while attributing matter in a transcendental sense to simple sub­stances, we appear to attribute it in a physical sense j which lat­ter obtains in common speech and is involved in the definition. Matter is often called matter out of which [ex qua], to distinguish it from the subject, which is called matter in which [in qua], and from the object which is called matter about which [circa quam]. (Ont., P. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

39. DUPLEIX. Matter is considered in three ways: 1. As the subject and seat of form and accidents. Thus the human body is the seat of the rational soul, which is its form, and also of manyaccidents. 2. In so far as anything is made out of it, as out of stone,14 wood, and so forth. 3. As the subject of an agent. Thus wood is the subject of fire. Thus we have matter

MATTER. THE MATERIAL. 21

in which [ill qua), matter out of which [ex qua], and matter through which '5 [pel' quam). Primary matter is the first begin­ning of natural things, and the first part which enters into their building and composition. N evertheless, it is considered as being without form or accident;·6 sa that it is a thing entirely mental. But, in nature, matter is never actually without form or accident; it is, as it were, before form, and is the su bject of form and acci­dent. Secondary matter is, in effect, the same as primary matter, but joined ta its form.'l If we speak of matter as the beginning of natural things,18 we understand only primary matter. (De la Pl/ys., Liv. 11., Ch. 3.)

40. DUPLEIX. Primary matter is abstruse and obscure of consideration. Many great philosophers '9 have said that it was not known, nor, in the nature of things, could be known; except, sa Plata teaches, by an indirect and faulty conception;· and, ac­cording ta Aristotle, by sorne analogyand similitude.t It must be considered as being without form or accidents, Iike the light by which we perceive the existence of things. zo Aristotle says that matter is the first subject out of which, because it endures, ail things are barn, of themselves primitively and not by means of another; t and that it is the last part into which things are dis­solved and terminated.§ If we hold that there is an arder in the creation of the world, we must of necessity conceive of the exist­ence of matter before form, as the subject and suppositum out of which, by alternations and series, forms corne forth. This is what the Physicists teach, who say that form is derived from the po­tency of matter j that is, from the faculty, potency, disposition, and natural aptitude which is in matter, for successively receiving

• Timatus. tPhysica, Lib. L, Cap. 7. t Aristotties dieil, quod materia sit primum sub/utum, lX quo sub­

sistant, omnlS res "': st naseantur princi/Jalitlr lt non plr mldium ahus. The original French is as follows: La matièrl, dit It Philosophl, c'est Ù prlmier sub/d, duquti, ln tant qu'il dlmeure, toutes chous naisunt

dl soy,principaltm;nt lt non par It mOYln d'autray. This is a para­phrase of the words of Aristotle (lac. cit.), which, literally translated, are: lIfateriam lnim voco primum cU/USqul rli sub/tctum, lX quo nas­

citur ali'luid, non plr aeeidlnJ. § Physiea, Lib. L, Cap. 9.

22 ONTOLOGY.

diverse forms. The human form alone, they say, does not result from rnatter,u Aristotle also recognized that the human form cornes from sorne other source than from matter.* (Dupleix adds, that primary matter is separate from ail Jorm, and that from it results every form.) (De la Phys., Liv. 1L, Ch. 4.)

41. WOLFF. Matter is extent endowed with the force of in­ertia. Matter is modified by variation of figure. (Cosmol., Sect. 1L, Cap. 1.)

42. WOLFF. A substantiated phenomenon t is a phenomenon which, in appearance, is like substance. Matter and motive force are substantiated phenomena. Motive force and matter must, in appearance, be diverse substances. (Cosmol., Sect. 1L, Cap. 3.)

43. WOLFF. Although the Schoolmen held that the multiple is a composition in things, yet in the opposition of material and immaterial substance, they defined the simple as being that which is not cornposed of quantitative parts; as wh en they said that the soul was a simple." (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. L)

44. DUPLEIX. A unit is not a number; it is only the com­mencement of numbers.2 3 (De la Log., Liv. IlL, Ch. 7.)

45. That is called matter, which is determined that there may be form, or, from which is form. For with­out matter there can be no determinations, and hence no form. So that if from form you take away matter, nothing remains, and substance falls into nothing; as, if from the body you take away the viscera, or from a building the stones, which are therefore caUed mate­rials. The word matter was used in this sense by the ancients, and is also used in the same way by modern philosophers, though they have no desire to confound it with the substantial.

46. The material, however, according to aU modern

• De Animalium Generatione, Lib. II., Cap. 3. t See § 52 ad Jin.

23 MATTER. THE MATERIAL.

usage of the word, is that which is heavy, endowed with the force of inertia, and in space. It is used in this sense, from stones, marble, wood, and the like, which are called materials. And, inasmuch as these are inanimate and gross, the same word can never apply to simples, such as spiritual and other substances are. Therefore, philosophers, that they may avoid in­consistencies and confliction, distinguish between first elements and substances. This is the reason why such substances are called immaterial, that is, not heavy or inert, nor partaking of motion, part, or extent. But that the confliction may be removed, it is abso­lutely necessary to define what matter is, and also what the material is according to common understand­ing and received usage.

47. Matter, understood philosophically, may be at­tributed even to spiritual forms. For matter is that out of which form is, whether you call it substance or element. No form can ever exist, without matter out of which, just as there can be no sensation without an object; for matter is the subject itself which is deter­mined. Yea, we also speak of a matter of dispute, but the matter of the dispute is not therefore any­thing material; thus we have philosophical matter, psychological matter, and theological matter. Matter, therefore, considered philosophically, is not taken to be heavy, inert, or corporeal, but it is taken as the beginning of existence,'" and as that without which there is no determination and no form ; for that some­thing which is determined, is called matter.

48. Physical matter, on the other hand, or the ma­

• See note to No. 77.

24 ONTOLOGY.

terial, is that which is found only in the lowest forms, especially in the angular form, and on the earth. This material begins ta be put off by superior forms; for the less a thing is finited, the less material does it become. Therefore the soul is not material, because it is void of part, extent, figure, and gravity. But it does not cease ta be matter, that is, the Beginning from [ex] which is the body; nor does it cease ta exist and subsist from [ex] its matter or beginning; since it is a form, and form without matter is a non-entity, a thing undetermined and, still more, undeterminable. But we must not conceive of that matter, according to the common acceptation of the term and in a grossly physical sense, as being material.

49. From these things it is evident, what confusion mere criticism and the signification of a word inevita­bly produce. All such things are puerile, insignifi­cant, and trifling, nor are they becoming to men.

25 EXTENT. EXTENSION.

CHAPTER VII.

EXTENT. EXTENSION. THE CONTINUOUS.

THE CONTIGUOUS. PART.

50. WOLFF. If we represent to ourselves several things di­verse from each other, and therefore existing outside each other, as being in one, the notion of extension arises. Thus extension is the coexistence in one, of many diverse things, or, if you pre­fer, of many things existing outside each other; and it is consti­tuted by the union of these. Therefore, for the notion of exten­sion, it is requisite, not only that there be many diverse things, but 24 also that these be united to each other, and thus make a one. Since in an extent there are many things which, taken together, are the same as the extent regarded as a one, and which indeed constitute it, therefore every extent has parts, each existing outside the other; and these parts are united to each other. That which has parts, each existing outside ,the other but mutually united, is an extent. Jung defint:s extension as that, on account of which corporeal substance has part outside part.­Clauberg defines body or extent, which with the Cartesians are synonymous terms, as that which has part placed outside parq They make no mention of the union of the parts; yet they tacitly suppose it, since they conceive of extension as being in a body, where, surely, the parts are united to each other. The intermi­nate parts of an extent, regarded as an extent in the abstract, do not differ except in number. To a straight !ine we do not attribute extension, unless extension be regarded in the abstract; but the parts of the !ine do Ilot differ except in number. The case is the same in solids or in mathematical bodies. But, in the nature of things, there is no such extent. A, B, and C, in whatsoever way they be assumed in an extent which is regarded in the abstract, differ as to none of their qualities, nor are there

- Logica Hamburgensis, Lib. 1., Cap. 5, § 5. t Physica Contracta, § 34.

26 ONTOLOGY.

in them any diverse intrinsic determinations, except that each has its own proper existence. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. ii.)

5r. WOLFF. Things contiguous are not continuous. Contin­uity excludes the possibility of the existence of a diverse inter­mediate part between two given parts which are in proximity to each other. Interruption or non-conti nuity 25 supposes the actual or possible existence of a diverse part between the two given parts. Two terminated extents are called contiguous. whose sur­faces mutually touch each other so that they remain two, in no way making a single extent. Contiguity, therefore, excludes the actual existence of an intermediate third. N othing prevents the interposition of a third extent between two contiguous ones. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l, Cap. ii.)

52. WOLFF. The elements of material things exist outside each other j and are united among themselves. Aggregates of elements are extended j they are also continuous. Every body arises from that which is not extended; nevertheless, it itself is extended; for the elements themselves of material things are 110t extended. We perceive extension and continuity in a body,only in a confused way. Extension and continuity are phenomena; for everything obvious to sense which we perceive confusedly, is called a phenomenon. (Cosmol., Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)

53. WOLFF. An actual part is one that is contained within its own proper limits. A possible part is one to which limits may be assigned at pleasure. In the continuum, regarded in the ab­stract, the parts are only possible, not actual. But in a continu­ous series of contiguous things the parts are actual. Contiguous parts do not 26 constitute the continuum. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. l,

Cap. ii.)

54. An extent is defined as that which has parts outside parts, and which is thus a united whole.* It is commonly believed that there can be no form which does not consist of parts outside parts; for there must

,. Extensum definitur per id quod habet partes extra partes, ac sic unitum sit [est? J.

27 EXTENT. EXTENSION.

be something that shaH be determined, in order that form may exist, and this something we conceive of as a part. But let us see what that extent must be, of which it must be said that it consists of parts; and what that, of which it must be said that it is void of parts.

55. In every inferior and more imperfect form, is an extent that consists of parts, or a mate rial extent; or, what amounts to the same thing, an extension of matter; hence bodies are such extents. But extension cannot be denied to superior forms, so long as there is form, and so long as there are essential determina­tions, and so long also as the form is actual and not ideal, in the concrete [and not in the abstract]. To say that such a farm is void of extent, would be saying that it is non-existent, or that it is an ens not possible in nature. Such an extent cannot be said to consist of parts; nor of parts outside parts; nor can it be said to be consistent with the idea of breadth, length, and thickness. Hence It is not corporeal. 1. 5uch an extent does not consist of parts. For parts, if they are contained within their own boundaries, are figured, elementary, heavy, inert, terres trial forms. Therefore, in an extent not material, there are no such parts; but there are either substances or forms, or, if you would so express it, things which are determined. These things, forms, or substances have no figure or gravity, or, they have no material predicate. 2. Nor does such an extent consist of parts outside parts. For that which is outside must be either above, below, or at the sides; and there, it must be given a position either towards the centre or towards the surface, or

2R ONTOLOGY.

somewhere. When in a form such a relation has per­ished, as for instance in the circle [nothing can be said to be above, or below, or at the sides]. Who shall say that any point of a circle is above or below any other ?'" So it is in every superior form. 3. Hence tlze zdea of breadtll, lengtll, and thz'ckness jJerishes. The idea of these as being in the form, perishes; thus also the idea of an extent such as has been described. But the idea of space, and thus of extent, outside the form does not perish; for whatever is in the form is void of place within itself; it is Ilot, however, void of place in the universe, but outside itself.

56. Every [superior] form, therefore, is extended, even the supreme and spiritual. It does not, however, consist of parts such as terrestrial parts are, angular, heavy, and inert forms, and the elements of material things. But superior forms consist of substances or forms which are determined ; for there must be some­thing determinable and determined that shall be the analogue of part.

57. Therefore, such an extent is not material, seeing that a mate rial extent is described as consisting of parts which are heavy and inert. It is rather to be called a pure or substantial extent, for bodies are aggre­gates of substances.

58. The substances themselves, considered as parts in such forms, are without any idea of place, or of tendency towards centre or circumference, upwards or downwards. Thus the idea of breadth, length, [and

• .. et ibi dabitur locus versus centrum vel superficiem, vel alicubi, quando in forma talis respectus perierit, uti in circulo, quis dicet punc­tum aliquod circuli esse supra vel infra alterum.

29 EXTENT. EXTENSION.

thickness,] such as is proper to every [material] ex­tent, perishes.

59. This non-material extent of which we are speak­ing, cannot be said to occupy space within itself, though the extent outside it is said to occupy· space. For, while within itself there is no respect of centre and place, still it occupies space in the universe.

60. Part, signifies that which is of an angular, ter­restrial, and figured form; thus the elements of mate­rial things are parts. And, because angular forms can put on a superior appearance, and, superficially, a supe­rior form, such as the circular and spiral, therefore a circular [or spiral] part is aJso called part. But if it were purely circular or spiral, it would at once cease to be such part.

• Our author here has occupasse which seems to be a mistake for oc­cuparc.

ONTOLOGY.3°

CHAPTER VIII.

BODY. CORPOREAL THINGS.

61. WOLFF. Primitive corpuscles are those in which the reason for the composition can be assigned only in the elements. Derivative corpuscles are those in which the reason for the com­position is in lesser corpuscles. Ali visible bodies consist of derivative corpuscles. The reason for the things that belong to visible bodies, is contained in the qualities of the derivative cor­puscles, and in the manner in which those corpuscles are joined together. (Cosmo/., Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)

62. WOLFF. Bodies are compound substances. (Cosmo/., Sect. II., Cap. 2.)

63. DUPLEIX. The word body has several meanings. (1) It signifies quantity; and in mathematics, it stands for the three dimensions of a natural body conjoined or united together, but considered as abstracted from ail solidity and matter. 27 (2) 1t signifies corporeal substance, as man, tree, stone, and so forth, which is its signification in physics. This is distinguished into 28 artificial bodies, such as houses and statues, or ail works which are of art and not of nature; and natural bodies. (3) When ap­plied to artificial bodies, it is matter joined to its form, and thus an entire body. (4) When applied to natural bodies, it is primary matter, the subject of natural form, which, of itself, is without form, but is, nevertheless, susceptible of many and diverse forms successively.29 N atural bodies are sub-divided into simple and compound or mixed. The simple are those which are not com­pounded or mixed with the matter of any other body. (De /a Pitys. Liv. 1., Ch. 7-)

64. Material bodies are al! those that arise from the elements of material things; or, from so many most minute triangular and square particles. Thus they are al! angular forms, whatsoever be their figure and com­

3 1 BODY. CORPOREAL THINGS.

position. For those triangular and square particles are the primitive corpuscles, yea, the very elements, from the aggregates of which material bodies arise and are derived.

65. But aU animate bodies are compound substances, and forms derived and thus compounded in order, from the first to the ultimate natural. Onlyone substantial, however, reigns in the whole of an animate body, namely, the soul; and, except this substantial, there is nothing living in such body. Animate bodies, there­fore, are compound substances; or, it is mere simple substance which is their soul, that forms its body by way of derivation. What body is, has been indicated above.

66. Every body has its own soul, which is whoUy present in its every part, and which has formed the body after its own image. AU other things which are adjoined, are taken from the mineraI kingdom.

32 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER IX.

ESSEl\CE. ESSENTIALS.

67. WOLFF. Essence is distinguished from ail the other things that are in an ens, by the fact that it has no intrinsic reason why it should befong to the ens, but must be posited at first, while ail other things that are in or can be in the ens, have their reason in its essence. Essence, therefore, may be dcfined as that which is first conceived about an ens, and in which is contained the suffi­cient reason why the other things are in it, whether actually or as to possibility. Suarez says that the essence of a thing is that which is first and radical, the inmost beginning of ail the· actions and properties that belong to the thing; and he adds, that it is that which we conceive of as first belonging to a thing, and as being first constituted in the existence of the thing, and in its quality. He says further, that real essence is the beginning or root of real operations or effects.* Descartes, defining essence, says: "In every substance there is one leading property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which ail the other properties are referred."t And Clauberg: " Of aIl that we attrib­ute to any given thing, there is one which we are accustomed to consider as the first, the chief, and the inmost of that thing, em­bracing in a manner ail the rest, or being as it were their very root and foundation. This one, we cali the essence of the thing; and, with respect to the properties and operations resulting from it, we cali it also the nature of the thing." t But these philoso­phers confound the notions of essence and nature. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

68. WOLFF. Those things in an ens which are not mutually repugnant, nor yet are determined by each other, are called its essentials, and they constitute the essence of the ens. For ex­

• Disputationu Mdapl'ysicae, Tom. L, Dis. 2, Sect. 4, § 5. t Principia Philosophiae, Pars 1., § 53.

t Mdaphysica de Ente, § 56.

33 ESSENCE. ESSENTIALS.

ample: The number three and equality of sides, are the essentials of an equilateral triangle. In morals likewise, tbe essentials are not mutually repugnant. For example: Action conformable to naturallaw, proceeds from a habit of the will; but these two, namely, the conformity of the action with natural law, and the habit of the will, are by no means determined by each other; consequently, they are the essentials of virtue and constitute its essence. 3° Essence is the first thing that is conceived about an ens, and without it an ens cannot be. Anything that is deter­mined by the essentials of an ens, must be in the ens constantly. Anything that is not determined by the essentials of an ens and yet is not repugnant to them, may be in the ens, even though it be not actually in it. If, however, it is repugnant to the essen­tials, it cannot be in the ens. For example: Because a tri­angle has been constructed, it does not follow that there is a straight line drawn from its vertex to its base, and yet such a line may be so drawn; but it is repugnant to an obtuse-angled tri­angle that one of its angles be a right angle, and therefore it can have no such angleY Again, it is not repugnant to a stone that it become hot, but it is repugnant to it that it be lighter than air. (That which is not repugnant to essentials, and yet is in no way determined by essentials, is called by Wolff, mode; by the Schoolmen, predicable accident.) Whatever is in an ens cornes under the head of essentials, attributes, or modes. Those things which are constantly in an ens, and are not determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are essentials. But those things which are constantly in an ens, and are determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. By reason of essence, ens is possible. We understand the essence of an ens, as soon as we understand the mode by which it can come into existence; consequently by a genetic definition. Tbere is no intrinsic reason why the essentials are in an ens. For they are the first thing that is posited in the ens, and, therefore, we can conceive of nothing therein as being prior to them,3 2 from which it can be understood why they are in it; as, for instance, why an equilateral triangle has three sides. In the essence of an ens is contained the reason for those things which, besides itself, are either constantly in the ens, or can be in h. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

34 ONTOLOGY.

69. WOLFF. Ali similar things have the same essence; and the essentials are similar if the essence is similar. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. i.)

70. WOLFF. The essences of things are like integral rational, or common numbers. For every such number is a combination of units, and these, while they may be so combined, still are not so necessarily: yet, despite this, no unit can be taken from or added to a number without the loss of that number. ln like manner, essences of things are immutable ; so that if one essen­tial be taken away, or if one be added, the essence is no longer the essence of the same ens as before, but is changed into the essence of a different ens. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. iv.)

71. WOLFF. Essences of things are immutable. A necessity t1:lat arises from the essence of an ens is an absolute necessity; while one that proceeds from any other source is only a hypothet­ical necessity. Essences of things are absolutely necessary. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. iii.)

72. WOLFF. Essentials are qualities; consequently, genera and species are determined by qualities. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. v.)

73. WOLFF. Singulars have the same essentials, in that they are contained under the same species; and species and inferior genera likewise, in that the former are contained under the same genus, and the latter under the same superior genus. Species and inferior genera differ by those essentials which can be diversely determined, the others always remaining the same. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

74. WOLFF. Essentials and attributes are constant intrinsic determinations; modes are variable intrinsic determinations. (Ollt., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

75. Essence is in al! things as the most common thing. For this reason, it can hardly be defined; for that which ail men perceive in single cases, as it were most clearly, becomes very obscure when defined, nor can it be presented in a single definition which shaH

35 ESSENCE. ESSENTIALS.

inc1ude the whole of it as it is in every particular case. We must, therefore, proceed by another way, and ar· rive at the understanding of essence and the like, sQlely by examples, that afterwards, we may be able to form distinct definitions which cau be brought together so as to be seen in one corn mon definition.

76. The most general definition of essence is, that essence is essence, or, it is what it is. Nothing can be defined by means of itself, except essence; for there is nothing else in a subject, which properly is, and thus ail else is nothing.

77. It is seen that in every ens there is its existence,* its essence and its essential; also, that one proceeds from the other, or, one supposes the other. 1. The existence of form, considered universally, is matter; the essential of form is determination ; and the essence is the forill' itself. 2. The things which constitute the essence of a circle are circumference, diameters, and centre. Without these there is no circ1e, and, there­

* The Latin ward thus translated is esse. This ward is used by our author in the sense of actual being or existence. For example: he defines matter as the" beginning of existence" (principium esse)ldi)

(n. 47), and in this number, he calls it the" existence (esse) of form," distinguishing it from the essence of form, which, he says, is the form itself. This is the ordinary meaning of the ward esse as used by the philosophers. Thus Baron says that "form has an actual existence (esse actualt) in matter before generation," alld that "by generation it begins ta be in matter as a perfect existence (esse.perfectum)" (n. 2,

sup.); and he quotes the Peripatetic philosophers as teaching that material forms depend on matter "bath in their creation (jieri) and in their existence (esse)." It is a formula of the Schoolmen, that form gives existence (esse) ta a thing and distinguishes it from other things (forma dat esse rei, dat distingui) (cfn. 3). Our author uses the ward esse in a very different sense in his theological writings, a sense which, in the present work, seems ta be included under the term essence, which he defines as the only thing in a subject, that properly is (n. 76).

36 ONTOLOGY.

fore, if they are not in it actual!y, they are ta be as­sumed as being in it. 3. The essence of a triangle is, that it consists of three sides and three angles. 4. But the essence of a form is within the single forms as a universal, nor does it recede therefrom. Thus every principal essence is deduced fram that which is first or supreme, or from that which is universal. 5. Animal essence is, that the animal enjoys a soul and a body. This essence remains present in all genera and species of animaIs. 6. The human essence, be­skIes what was said above, is, specifically, that man rejoices in a rational mincI; otherwise he is not a man. 7. The universal essence in every body is the soul, whence the body; this reigns in al! the single things of the body. Essences, therefore, are like differences, specifie and singular. Thus we say that sa and sa is the essence of a thing, or its soul ; if the soul or es­sence recedes, the thing is destroyed. 8. The essen­tials of a muscle are its fibres; specifical!y, they are the fibres sa determined, or, the form. Thus essence and form must agree.

78. The ruling essence, therefore, in al! things is cal!ed their soul, which is in them from their very be­ginning, and, indeed, is that beginning itself; all the other things which depend on the soul, are its body. The essence of a body, however, is its form, which is constituted of pure essential determinations, or, of de­terminations of the soul. The essence of a special form is expressed in the very ward, or the name of that form; as, a triangle, a quadrangle, a rational animal or man, and sa forth. Provided only, that the name spe­cifically designates the quality, namely, gives the genus, and in apposition ta it, the specifie difference.

37 ATTRIBUTE.

CHAPTER X.

ATTRIBUTE.

79. WOLFF. Anything that is determined by the essentials of an ens, must be in the ens constantly. Those things that are determined by essentials are called attributes; $uch as are de· termined by ail the essentials taken together, being called proper attributes, and such as are determined by some only of the essentials, common attributes. Thus, in an equilateral triangle, the three equal33 sides are the essentials; there being three angles, is a corn mon attribute; while those angles being equal to each other, is a proper attribute. Whatever is in an ens cornes under the head of essentials, attributes, or modes. Attributes are in an ens constantly j modes may or may not be in it. Those things which are constantly in an ens, and are not determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are essentials; but those things which are constantly in an ens, and are determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. For, if in our idea we comprise ail the things that are in an ens, we will observe that sorne are determined by others which are in the ens at the same time; and, enquiring what these are that thus serve for determining the rest, we will then see that certain of the things in the ens are to be put in the first place; such, namely, as are not mutually repugnant, nor yet are determined by other things which are in the ens at the same time. The suffi­cient reason for the attributes in an ens, is contained in its essen­tials; the sufficient reason for the corn mon attributes being con· tained in sorne of the essentials, and the sufficient reason for the proper attributes, in ail of them. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

80. WOLFF. Those things which are of the same species, have the same attributes and the same proximate possibilities of modes; they have also the same remote possibilities of modes, given the same conditions. Things which are of the same genus, have the same common attributes, and the same possibilities of

38 ONTOLOGY.

modes such as are like common attributes. Things which have the same proper attributes and the same possibilities of modes such as are like proper attributes, are of the same species. Things which have the same corn mon attributes or the same possibilities of modes such as are like corn mon attributes, are referred to a common genus. (Ont., P. I., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

81. WOLFF. Essences of things are absolutely necessary; likewise, attributes of things; and also the proximate possibility of mode. The attributes of things and the proximate possibilities of modes, are in themselves immutable. (Ont., P. I., Sect. 3, Cap. iii.)

82. WOLFF. Attributes and modes, excluding guantity, are qualities. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. v.) They are also accidents. Attributes are not modifiable, but they are immutable, and there­fore incapable of receiving other determinations successively; thus they are accidents. (Ont., P. 1L, Sect. 2., Cap. ii.)

83. WOLFF. The possibility of those modes, the reason for which is contained in essentials, must be included among attri­butes. For example: The divisibility of a parallelogram by its diagonal into two equal parts, is determined by the parallelism and number of its sides; therefore it is an attribute of the par­allelogram. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

84. DUPLEIX. The predicable or attributive words are five. [. Genus - comprising the supreme and most general genus which is always genus; and the subaltern genus, which, in differ­ent respects, is either genus or species. 2. Species - comprising the lowest and most special species' which is always species being attributed immediately to the individuals j and subaltern species, which, in different respects, is either genus or species. 3. Differ­ence -essential when constituting part of the definition or essence of the thing; and accidentai when not partaking of the essence of the thing. 4. Proper.ty -(a) which belopgs generally to a whole subject but nat to it alone, as the possession of two feet, which is proper to all men but not to men alone; or (b) which belongs to one subject alone but not generally to the whole of it, as the

39 ATTRIllUTE.

being a musician or doctor, which is proper to man alone but not to ail men; or (c) which belongs to the whole of one subject and to it alone but not always, as hoariness, which belongs to man alone and to every man, but only in old age; or (d) which belongs to the whole of one subject and to it alone and always, as the faculty of laughiog. 5. Accident, which is common - compri­sing accident separable from its subject in effect; and accident inseparable from its sllbject except by perception.34 (De la Log., Uv. 1L, Chap. 7-)

85. There are many things required in an ens be­sides essentials, for these do not so constitute it that it is what it is. That it is a form, it derives from essen­tials; that it is such a form, from determinations; and that it can be such a form, both from essentials and from attributes. That an ens can be what it is, is an attribute; that its essence is everywhere in it, is an at­tribute, and consequently an accident.

86. The essentials of a muscle are its motor fibres; the attributes are, that the motor fibres are held to­gether in limits by their bonds, are surrounded by a common membrane, and are thus adapted to produce a certain action. It is an attribute, in that the muscle is determined to a special action, that it should have a tendon, and should be attached to sorne part of a bone, or to a movable and an immovable part. The cornmon membrane itself, the tendons, and the other things, have their own essentials; but still, to the muscle, they are attributes. The essentials of the eye are its fibres, vessels, and humors; its attributes are, the pos­sibilities of the modes of receiving the phenomena of sight, and thus the form itself and the things accessory to its essentials.

87. The attribute of the angular form is, that it is

40 O!'\TOLOGY.

hard, heavy, and angular; and this attribute reigns uni­versally in ail the species and individuals [of the form]. The essentials are the elements whence are the essen­tial determinations, which are continually opposite and repugnant, thus contrary, to each other; from this comes their gravity.

88. The attribute of the circular form is. that it can be expanded and compressed, the greatest hardness being concentrated in the centre, and mobility in the circumference outside the centre, motion and rest, or liberty and compulsion, being thus together in one body; that it can revolve about its axis; can resist and yielc1; can undergo change of state ; can be the mea­sure of aU angles; and can furnish their sines.

89. We cannot know what any form, organ, or body is, or what any subject is, unless we know its attri­butes. For example, - We cannot know what the cir­cular form is, unless we know its attributes,* which are that it can be compressed and expanded; can yield and resist; can revolve about its axis, and at the same time reverse the directions of its revolutions; that ail motion can be referred to the centre, and ail rest dif­fused to the circumference; that every triangular form can be measured by it; that, respectively to what is angular, it can have a perpetuai something; that in it there is no angle, no plane, no opposite direction ex­cept in one place, namely, the centre where direction is absolu te. These attributes are, by some, called predicates because they are determined by essentials; but they are proper [to the circular form], so that we

• Non scire jJossumus quid sil aliqua forma, . . . nisi sciamus e.fus attriiJuta, sicuti formœ ârcu/aris attriiJuta quod possit comprimi. etc.

4 1 ATTRIBUTE.

must distinguish between things praper, and things camman.*

90. That attribute is praper [ta a subject] which can be attributed ta it alane, and nat ta any ather; an attribute is camman, which can be attributed ta supe­riar [subjects] and reigns everywhere.

• Bau a quibusdam vocantur praedicata, quia detcrmina>ltu,- ab es­sentia!ibus sed s,mt propria, ideo ut propria, communia SU>lt distin·

..,"·ucnda.

42 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER XI.

PREDICATE.

91. WOLFF. Absolute predicates are such as are attributed to a subject absolutely, without any condition being added. Hy­pothetical predicates occur only under a given condition; they are assum~d as possible, but still as being only in potency.35 (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. i.)

92. Whatever is in an ens, or whatever can be therein, can be predicated of it and is called a predi­cate. Thus predicate is a universal term embracing all essentials, attributes, accidents, and modes.

93. From the predicates which belong to an ens, and from those which do not belong or which are re­pugnant to it, we can recognize what the ens is, and what its quality. For an ens is described by mere predicates, these being so many its characteristics and marks. Predicat es are also set forth by means of types and representations, in order that, when the whole of an essence and nature cannot be described, this may still be done by similitudes.

SUBJECT. 43

CHAPTER XII.

SUBJECT.

94. That is called a subject, in which all those predi­cates and adjuncts treated of above, are. Every sub­stance is a subject of determinations, that is, a subject of which something is predicated; and that which is described and defined, is a subject.

44 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER XIII.

AFFECTION.

95. WOLFF says that affection comprehends bath attributes and modes, that is, bath intrinsic and extrinsic predicates. Renee, he says, predications are the same as affections. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. i.)

96. But every affection supposes in the ens an active and a passive, that which acts and that which reacts, that which gives and that which receives; also, form, possibility of modes, and hence essentials, thus things determined, and hence mutability of state; whether ail this be in one subject, in which we must consider that there are, as it were, many subjects, or whcther it be among several subjects. In order, therefore, that there may be affection, there must be that which affects and that which is affected. What thence results, is called affection. A subject is not always affected when there are affecting states; but an intermediate something arises which is indeed affected in two opposite ways, for there is an application of the modes on both sides, which causes the due affection to result. - The inter­naI sensory is affected by the eye by means of its sight, but the quaiity of the affection is according ta the quality of the internai sensory and of the inter­mediate conductor ; yea, the intellect contributes to it. There arc three things that are affected. Every affec­

• Non semper a.f1icitur cum sunt status a.f1icientes, sed intermedium quoddam exsurgit, et quidem contrario modo a.f1icitur, est enim applicatilJ modorum alterius, quae .facit, ut ajfectio debeta inde resultet.

45 AFFECTION.

tian, in ail bodies, proceeds even ta the first substantial. 31<

• By the" intermediate" mentioned in this chapter, our author seems to mean that medium by which that which is affected and that which affects are brought together. For example: Reat is one of the affec­tions of a stone, and in order that this affection may be produced, there must be not only the stone, but also that which gives the heat (e. g. the sun); but that which gives the heat mayexist as an "affecting state ,. without the affection of heat being produced in the stone, for before this can be effected the receiver and the giver, or the active and the passive, must be brought together, that is to say, there must be some intermediate which shall bring them together; this intermediate may be a man, an animal, or the forces of nature. In the case of ail inanimate things, as in this case of the stone, we must, as our author intimates, consider the active, the passive, and the intermediate, as so many .. several subjects," ail of which contribute to produce the result­ant affection; but in the case of animaIs, and especially in the case of man, we must view them as being "in one subject, in which we must consider that there are, as it were, many subjects." In man it is the extemal senses that affect, and the internai sensory, or the imagina­tion that is affected; or, in a higher series, it is the in ternal sensory that affects, and the intellect that is affected. The" affecting states" may exist in the external senses, while yet no affection is produced, as when we look upon a scene, hear a sound, read a book, etc., without being affected by what we see, hear, or read, that is, without taking notice. Before the affecting states can produce in us an affection, there must be an application or direction of the will, which, by causing us to .. take notice," shaH conjoin that which affects with that which is affected. This application of the will seems, therefore, to be, in man, that "intermediate something" of which our author speaks. This in­termediate is affected in .. two opposite ways," or, on two sides; for the application which we give to anything, or the resulting notice which we take of it, is affected by the state of our imagination (in the higher series, of our intellect), and it is also affected by that which we see, hear, read, etc. Thus there are three things that are affected, namely, the internai, the intermediate, and the external, the latter being affe·cted from without.

46

S",,1,·yp~ S-t�

ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER XIV.

ACCIDENTS.

97. WOLFF. That which is not modifiable is an accident. In a stone, heaviness is an attribute; but color, for instance the whiteness of marble, is an accident. Quantity, size, figure, situ­ation, space, place, time, duration, are ail accidents j as also are attributes and modes. The essence of a compound ens consists of nothing but mere accidents. Accidents are intrinsic and ex­trinsic. Substance is not an accident; but accidents cannot exist without substance.35 (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

98. DUPLEIX. The presence or absence of accidents dero­gates nothing from an ens.36 (De la Log., Liv. l L, Cap. 7-)

99. Accidents, therefore, are aU those things which are not substances and thus sl1..bje~ts; for accidents are of substances.

100. Intrinsic accidents are such as are within sub­stance, since substance is taken as being a subject in whi~h is form ~~which belong modes. ~t there can be no accidents in primary su~ce, since they proceed from it; unless, indeed, you wish to make ac­cidents prior to substance.

lOI. Substance,t'h;refore, is the very subject of ac­cidents. F'Or'i~ compound substance the-;:-e is nothing but accidents.

47 CONTINGENTS.

CHAPTER Xv.

CONTINGENTS.

102. WOLFF. A contingent is that which may or may not be, or, which is not necessary; as heat in a stone, learning in a man. It is therefore mutable. Nor does it have in its essence, a suffi­cient reason for its existence.37 Its existence is only hypothet­ically necessary. A contingent ens has the sufficient reason for its existence,37 in sorne other ens outside itself. There is a series of contingents. (Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. iii.)

I03. Contingents indeed happen from a cause not necessary, which yet, to us, appears necessary; as in the case of Providence. Ail matters of chance appear as contingent, which spring from necessary causes unknown to us; as the slaughter of the infants by Herod; or, as our future deeds, which have their nec­essary cause in the state of the sou!. Divine Provi­dence always proceeds by mere contingencies, as in the case of Joseph, and in similar cases; so that, to us, it appears to be necessary, although it is only necessary, given a certain state. There is nothing in physics that is purely necessary, but it becomes necessary, certain things being granted or supposed. Thus things con­tingent might be said to be the causes of things nec­essary, and things necessary the causes of things con­tingent; and therefore the two may be confounded. Among contingents there may be that which is most highly necessary, but we do not so perceive it.

4R O:-iTOLOGY.

CHAPTER XVI.

~lODES. ~IODIFICATIOiS"S.

10'+. \VOLFF. Eve~y change of an enduring thing consists in the variation of its modes. Variation and succession of modes is modification. Ail modes are variable. (Modes and determi­nations are almost the same thing [according ta Wolff]). The soul is modifiable, because il can have different perceptions and appetites: a stone is modifiable, because it can be made hot, cold, dry, weUs (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2., Cap. ii.)

105. \VOLFF. Every mode consists in limits or limitations. If it consist in one limit only, it is a simple mode.38 (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

[Here the manuscript ends.]

49 ~OTES DY THE TRA~SLATOK CRITICAL NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE following numbers of the present translation represent those single paragraphs of the photolithographie manuseript whieh haye been subdivided by the translator. For example: Nos. 1-2 of the transla­tion are, in the photolithographie manuseript, a single paragraph; so, likewise, nos. 5-6, and so forth.

1-2 [9-10 3G-38 Gr-G2

5-6 21-22 39-40 67-74 9-10 24-27 41-44 75-76

12-13 28-30 ·47-49 79-83 14-16 34-35 54-55 97-98

The greater part of the referenees to the quotations made by our author, have been supplied by the translator. The referenees as found in the photolithographie manllseript are as follows :-

To nos. 1-2, "Rob. Baronii Metaphysica."

To nos. 12-13, 50, 5l, G7-74, " \\' olffii Onth." To n. 52, "Wolffii Cosmo!." To ail the other qllotations, excepting those noted in notes 23, 35,

36, and 38 below, the reference is merely to the author quoted, without any mention of the speeific work from which the qllotation is taken.

1. (n. l, " not.") This word is omitted by our author, though it is evident from the context that the omission was unintentiona!.

2. (n. 1.) This sentence has been supplied from Baron, loc. cit.

3: (n. 1, "form informing.") These words have been added from Baron, loc. cit. Our author's words are: Facit etiam Formas Couricas

et Formas Specificas. 4. (n. 3,) The words of Dupleix are: La forme c'est . .. le second

ingredient des choses uaturelles qui ressent l'acte et non pas la puissance, ... La matiue ressent la puissance. Our author paraphrases this: Describitur quodfOr1J1.a si! ... secundum ingrediens 1'erum naluralium J

quae concernunt ac!um, non vo'o potentiam, id ex materia habet (it is deseribed that form is the second ingredient of natura! things which concern the act and not the potency; its potency it [that is, form] has from matter), translating ressent as if it were a verb plural with les

choses naturelles as its subject; whereas it is a verb singular, its subject being la forme. Swedenborg was no doubt misled by the ending ent.

• Including also the last sentence of n. 46.

50 ONTOLOGY.

In the latter part of the sentence our author, having Dupleix before him, probably understood res or res naturalis as the subject of habet; but his language is very obscure.

5. (n.]," matter desires form.") Our author in his quotation has transposed the words " matter" and" form," his language being: quod forma appetat materiam, pro"t foemina marem. This, however, is in agreement neither with Dupleix nor Aristotle, loc. cit.

6. (n.9.) For the convenience of the reader the second of these two definitions has been numbered, and both of them have been re­peated from lower down in the paragraph. The original Latin is as follows: Forma externa duplici modo sumitur, primum pro forma i11­jeriore, inferior t'lir'l semper est ~xürior. . . . Forma ~xterna etia1l1

dicitur coltstructio et determinatio corporis externa, etc. 7. (n. 28, "Aristotelico-scholastic philosophy.") Our author has

Aristote/es, est ens quod per se subsistit, etc. (according to Aristotle,'it is an ens, etc.). This is not, however, in agreement with Wolff,loc, cit.

8. (n. 29.) The sentence between the semicolons is omitted byour author, but the omission is evidentlya lapsus calami, since otherwise the latter part of the quotation as made by Swedenborg is a non seq­"itur. It will be observed that the last word preceding the omission, that is, "substance," is also the last word of the part omitted. Our author probably copied up to the first "substance," and then, inadvert­ently omitting a sentence, resumed his copying from the following "substance." The quotation as made by him is as follows: Ergo sub­stantia simplex est proprie substantia: usu enim receptum est, ut entia composita in mundo materiali substantiae dical/tur.

9. (n. 29," of Leibnitz.") These words are omitted by our author. 10. (n. 31.) The words "subsists and," "called," and" because they

are," have been supplied from Dupleix, loc. cit. II. (n. ]1.) Our author quotes Dupleix's definition of secondary

substances so elliptically as to make that definition exceedingly difficult of comprehension. The original French is as follows: .l'appe/le se­condes suhtances les universelles substances comme SOllt les genres et especes. Par exemple, etc.; which Swedenborg renders: Secundae sub­stantiae universales, sunt gel/era et species. In the present translation the original French has been followed, and the examples given by Dupleix, which are omitted by our author, have, for the sake of greater clearness, been included in the quotation.

12. (n.31.) The words of our author are, Ponit primas substantias accidentia (he states that primary substances are accidents). This, however, is by no means what Dupleix asserts; indeed the opposite is the case, since he calls primary substances "the foundation of ail

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR 5 l

things that are in them or are predicated of them," that is, of ail acci­dents. His words, which immediately foJ1ow the definition just given, are: car tous les accidens sont es premieres substances, et les secondes

substances se disent d'elles (ail accidents are in primary substance, etc.). Our author, in a hurried translation perhaps, read, les premieres sub­stances, instead of, es [en les] prn1tieres substances.

13. (n. 36, "its motion.") These words are omitted by our author. 14. (n. 39, "stone.") This word is omitted by our author. 1 S. (n. 39.) The words " through which " are, in the original French,

envers laquelle, which our author translates by per quam. This seems to be a mistranslation, as envers d~s not have the meaning of pero

But the phrase, " matter towards which," is very unusual, the ordinary term used by the Schoolmen being "matter through which" (per

quam), and this is undoubtedly what Dupleix meant to express by envers laquelle. That he intended to use the ordinary terms is evi­denced by his giving the definitions as those in general use by the philosophers. Ces trois sortes de matiere, he S2.ys, sont appellees des philosophes en termes fort propres et artificiels Matiere en laquelle, de

laquelle et envers laquelle. This, no doubt, is the reason why our author renders envers laquelle as per quam, a rendering which has been followed in the present translation.

16. (n.39.) The Latin of our author here is: Materia prima inter­dum s'int forma et accidentt considera/ur, estque tune l1untalis;' sed

materia naturalis nunquam est sine forma. In the original French, the passage quoted reads: La matiere premieu est le premier principe des choses naturelles et la premiere piece qui entre au bastiment et com­

position d'icelles consideree toutesfois SIlns forme ny accident quelconque,

de maniere que c'est une cI,ose t,Jute mentale et intellectuelle. Car en e(fcet la matiere ne se peut trouver en la natu,-e sanS quelque forme et sans "ccidens. Here, as elsewhere in his excerpts from Dupleix, our author translates toutesfois as interdum (sometimes) cf note 27. In the present passage this makes Dupleix teach that primary matter is sometimes (that is, not always) considered as being without form or accident. But this is not whar Dupleix says. The word toutesfois means, "however," "still," u yet," "nevertheless," and never has the meaning of "sometimes." Therefore, what Dupleix teaches in the present passage, is that primary matter, although it is the very begin­ning of natural things, is yet considered as being without form and accident. In order therefore to translate our author's quotation from Dupleix agreeably to the meaning of that philosopher, it became nec­essary either to omit the word illterdunl (or, as it should be, tamen),

rendering the passage" Pl;mary matter is considered," etc.; or, retain­

52 ONTOLOGY.

ing the int,'rdlfm (tamOl), to supply that part of the elefinition which is omitteel by Sweelenborg, but which is requireel by the use of tamen. The latter course has been chosen, both as giving a clearer ielea of Dupleix's elefinition of primary matter, anel as illustrating his eloctrine of form quoteel in n. 3 of the present work. Our author gives a curious renelition of the worels, la matiere lU s" ptut trom'cr en la nature sans qudq1le .form, (in nature matter cannot be founel without any form), which he translates, 1Jlattria 1latltralis 1lUJltjltll1n est sine jor1na. The phrase, "natural matter," is one which woulel harelly be intelligible to a reaeler not having access to the original French.

'7· (n. 39·) The words of our author are, SeczlIlda materia est 'f­.feetus prima: .forma: jUJlt/a (Seconelary matter is the effect of primary matter, being joincd to form). The original French, which has been followed in the translation, is, La mati""" saonde c'est en effect la mesme

que ?tous avons aPi'tl!ec premiere joi1ltc 1u:antllloins a sa forme. Swe­denborg seems to have mistaken en eJleet for un 4lect.

,8. (n. 39, "natural things.") The French of Dupleix is principe

des ehos,;s naturelles, which has been followed in the present translation. Our author, however, renders this, principium causarum naturalium.

'9. (n. 40.) Our author has veteri philosophi,o the French, however, is, Plusieurs grands philosophes, and of these philosophers, Plato, Aris­totle, St. Augustine, and Aegidius are quoted.

20. (n. 40.) According to the Latin of our author the opinion ex­pressed in this sentence is ascribed to Aristotle, though, judging from the fact that Aristotle is quoteel by name immediately afterwards, this was not Swedenborg's unelerstanding of the matter. His worels are: Dixrre phzlosophi vderts, quod non cssd, nec posset esse {agnita iil natura

rerum, nisi fer 1Zotitiam ùbliquam sinistratll, ut Plata; Ari.rtoteles fer

a na/agiam. et siTni/itudinem, qUa? consideranda est sille Jonna et a{(:idcll­

tibus, tanquam lumen, etc. The French of Dupleix is as follows: Les plus clair-voyans [des grands Philosophes] ont asseure qu'elle ne pouvoit

estre cognuc que d'une cognoissancc oblique gauche et bastarde comlllC

disoit Platon: 011 qudque analogie, raport et ressemblanCè ainsi qu' Aris­

totl,; mesm,; a confesse. Then follow the opinions on this subject of St. Augustine and Aegidius, after which Dupleix, commencing a new paragraph, resumes as follows: Ainsi est-il de la matiCl'e premiere la­quelle il faut c01lsidere1~ sans aucune forme 1lY accidens J" qui son·t comme

la clarte, etc. That this last, which is original with Dupleix, appears by our author to be ascribed to Aristotle, is the result of the elliptical nature of his q uotation.

2 I. (n. 40.) Our author makes a curious addition to Dupleix here. The words of the latter are: Il est 7Jray que la .forme du seul homme en

53 NOTES DV THE TRANSLATOR.

,'st exuptee, d'autant qu'elle ne resulte point de cete facu!t/! ou aptitl/de materielle [naturelle! J, which our author renders as follows: Hominem

.coll/m diclmt, ejusque formam non resultare de materia. The addition by Swedenborg of hominem solu1tl seems to be tautological, and is doubtless unintentional.

22. (n.43.) Our author here quo tes Wolff so elliptically that it is weH-nigh impossible to understand him. His words are: Scholastici

"lu/tipliee"l statuerallt ill apposi/jone t(["zen substalltiœ 1Ila/criaiis et Z,1l­lnateriafis, vide/ieet ClHIt animant dixere siJnpliccm, Si1llPll'x appt.:llantll!,

quod non compositum est ex partibus quantitativis. The Latin of \Volff, which has been followed in the translation, is as follows: Licet Scholas­tici mu!tiplicem statuerant in rebus compositionem, ill oppositione {amell, etc.

23· (n, 44.) This quotation from Dupleix is, in the photolitho­graphie manuscript, the conc1uding sentence of the paragraph which in the present translation is numbered 43, and no indication is given that it is quoted from any other source than that from which the preceding portion of the paragraph is drawn, namely from the works of Wolff. It cannot, however, be found in anyof Wolff's works, though essen­tially the same opinion is expressed in his 01ltologia, but in very differ­ent language. The quotation is without doubt made from Dupleix who says, loc. cit. .' Et faut remarquer que l'unite n'est point nombre mais

seulement commellcement et partie du nombre. The words of our author are, Unitas non est numerus sed prillcipium 1Zumerorum.

24. (n. 50.) The words, " not 'only that there be many diverse things but," are omitted by our author.

25. (n. SI.) Our author has interruptu", vel non-contilluum instead of interruptio z'e! non-continuatio. The mistake is evidently uninten­tional, the result of elliptical quotation, as will be seen from the original passage in \Volff which is as foHows: Ex adverso interruptum ve! 1I0n­

continu!tm appeffarnus, si partes in composito co ordi1le ju.xta se -l1l'vicent

co!!ocentur, ut aliae illter ipsos ordine alio illterponantur ve! interponi

possint. Interrupti" adeo ponit existelltiam etc. Swedenborg evidently took the first words, fnterrl/ptum ve! non-continuum, and then, omitting the intermediate !ines, quoted the definition of interruptio.

26. (n. 53.) The word "not" has been supplied by the translator in order to convey the evident meaning of Wolff. The quotation as made by our author is correct, so far as the words are concerned, but, because the sentence with which Wolff follows it, is omitted, Wolff is represented as saying exactly the opposite of what he intended. He is proving the proposition that in the continuous regarded in the abstract, the parts are only possible not actual, and, using the argument reductio ad ab­

54 ONTOLOGY.

surdum. he says, Suppose the parts were actual; they would then con­stitute separate extents, and be contiguous to each other. "There­fore," he continues," contiguous parts constitute the continuum; and since this is an absurdity" (Partes adeo contiguœ constitttunt co,,­tillllum,. quod cum sit absurdum) - here he refers to the proposition quoted by our author in n. 51, "Things contiguous are not continuo us," - therefore the supposition cannot stand. The words of the quotation are, Partes contiguœ constituunt co"tinuum.

27· (n. 63.) The Latin of our author gives a somewhat different meaning here, the result of his translating toutcifois (however, yet) by iltte"dum (sometimes), if. note 16 and also note 29. As given by Dupleix the passage is as follows : Ce mot corps est homonyme et signifie ... quantite lois qu'il se prend a la facon des matltematiciens pour les trois dimensio"s du corps naturel joi"tes et unies e"semble, touteifois con­siderees avec abstraction et comme retirees de toute solidite et matiere (considered, however, as abstracted from ail solidity, etc.). This our author renders Corpus est vox homonyma, sigmficat I. Quantitatem , matlumatice pro tribus dimensionibus corporis con/uncti vel uniti, et interdum abstracti ab omni soliditate, etc. (sometimes abstracted from ail solidity, etc.).

28. (n. 63, "This is distinguished into.") These words have been added by the translator to better convey the meaning of Dupleix. It seemed better to fill out our author's quotation in this way, rather than by a verbatim addition from Dupleix, as the latter course would have necessitated quite a lengthyaddition. It may be mentioned that the passages in n. 63 marked l, 2, 3, and 4 are paraphrases rather than translations of that author.

29. (n. 63.) Our author here wrongly interprets Dupleix by trans­lating touteifois (nevertheless) by plerumque (for the most part); cf. notes 16 and 27. The original French is as follows: La subjet de la forme naturelle c'est la matiere premiere qui est informe de soy, touteifois susceptible, etc. (but nevertheless susceptible, etc.); which our author renders Naturalium, est materia prima seu subjectum formœ naturalis, quœ est ilt./ormis eX ·se, sed plerumque susceptibilis, etc. (but is for the most part susceptible, etc.).

30. (n. 68.) The greater part of this illustration is omitted byour author, with the result that the point of the illustration is rendered very obscure. As made by him the quotation reads, .In moralibus non sibi repugnant, ut aetio legi naturali conformis ex habitu voltmtatis pro­ficiscatur. As given by Wolff the illustration is as follows: Similiter in moralibus demonstratur, non repu/i.,tare [esuntialia entis] , ut actio Legi 'taturali cO't./ormis ex habitu voluntatis proficiscatur, ,·onformitas

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR. ss tama. actionis cum lege naturali et habitus voluntatis per se invieem minime determinantur, consequenter essentialia virtutis sunt, et virtutis essentiam constituunt.

31. (n. 68, "and therefore it can have no such angle.") These words have been added from Wolff, loc cit.

32. (n. 68.) The words between and including "for" and "them" are omitted by our author, evidently without intention, as without them there is a useless tautology. Our author's words are, Cur essentialia enti insint ratio intrinseea nulla datur, unde intelligatur cur eadem ei insint.

33. (n. 79, "equal.") This word is omitted by our author. 34. (n. 84.) This quotation is, in Dupleix, a table or schectule in

which brackets are used to indicate the subdivisions. This table fol· lows and is a summaryof five chapters devoted respectively to the five predicables. Our au thor simply quotes the words of the table, representing the brackets by the word velo This renders the passage rather obscure to those not familiar with the Catagories or predicables, as the following illustration will show: ­

DUPLEIX.

( Supreme, Generalissime, Predieament 1 ou Catagorie, tousiours Genre.

GenTe Subalterne, qui a di7Jers respect est

Genre ou Espece. 1SWEDENBORG.

1. Genus supremum, generalissum, semper genus ve! subal· ternum, quod certo respcetu est genus aut species.

In the present translation the brackets of Dupleix are represented by the word "comprising." In the definition of Property, the letters a b

c and d have been inserted by the translator to indicate the subdivi­sions of the definition; and, on account of the fine distinctions made between these subdivisions, he has also introduced the illustrations used by Dupleix in his chapter on Property.

35. (n. 91, 97.) No indication is given in the photolithographie manuscript, that this paragraph is a quotation either from Wolff or any other author.

36. (n.98.) In the photolithographie manuscript this paragraph is the concluding sentence of the paragraph numbered 97 in the present translation, and there is no indication in the original paragraph to show that the matter contained therein is quoted. The first part of the paragraph (n. 97 of the translation) is, however, found practicaJly ver· batim in Wolff, loe. ât. ; the latter part (n. 98 of the translation) cannot

56 ONTOLOGY.

be found in an y of W olff's works, but seems to be part of a passage in Dupleix, loc. àt. The Latin, as given by our author. is Accidentia nihi! derogant,o while the passage in Dupleix to which we have referred, reads, Si bien que la presence ou absC1tcc de leur accidells ne derogc aucunement a icdle.

37. (n. 102, "for its existence.") These words are omitted by our author.

38. (n. 104.) In the photolithographie manuscript nos. 104 and 105

constitutc a single paragraph, and there is no indication to show that this paragraph is a quotation. The whole of it, however, is found verbatim in Wolff's Ontologia. loc. cit., with the exception of the sen­tence in n. 104 which has been put in parentheses by the translator. To this sentence the translator hasalso added the words, " according to ,\\'olff." It seems c1ear, both from its place in the paragraph and also from its substance, that this sentence is intended by our author to give Wolff's teaching; and an examination of that author's Onto!ogia shows that according to him modes and determinations are" almost the same thing;" mode being defined as " that which is not repugnant to essentials and yet is by no means determined by them" (Pars " Sect. 2, Cap. 3, § 148); and determinations as "the things assumed in any subject which are determined in a certain relation." (.Ibid.,

Cap. 2, § 122.)

INDEX

The letters preceding the references indicate the authors whose opinions are referred to. The followiog are the contractions used: ­A.' Aristolle. G. Green. Il. Ilaron. J. Jung. C. Clauberg. Lei. Leibnitz. Des. Descartes. Lo. Locke. D. Dupleix. Pero The Peripatetic Philosophers.

Phy. Th. Physieists. Pl. Plato. Su. Suarez. S. Swedenborg. Seh. The Sehoolmen.

W.

def. defined. des. deseribed.

ACCIDENT. def., Lei., C., Lo. 28, D. 84 W. 97 ill., S. 99 j extrinsic and intrin.sic, W. 97, cleL, S. 100; derogates nothmg, D. Q8; enumerated, W. 13, 97, S. 101. Predicable A:, Seh. 68. A: and Substance. See under Sub· .stance.

ACTIONS, how produced, S. 23, 26. AF."CTlON, def. W. 95, S. 96 ill. ANGELS are incorporeal substances, D. 3 [

(cfS.8). ANGULAR FOR MS, the origin of material

bodies, S. 64; cao assume higher farms, S. 10 il!., 60 i can change their figure but not their state, S. 24 j attributes and es­sentials 01, S. 87 (cl S. '0, 77, w. 79); gnvity 01, S. 87 (cl 55).

ANIMA L E~SBNCE, S. 77.

ATTRIBUT.S, dei., W. 68, 79 ill. (cl ~Z)~

des., W.]4, 79, 81-83,11. S. 86-89' t., proper and common, def. W. 79 ül., S. 90; are accidents, W. 82,97. S. Ss j neeessily 01 knowing, S. 89 ül. (cl 93). A: and Pr~dicatu, dis., S. 8q, 92. A: and E ssentials rnake the possibility 01 lorm, S. 85-SB ill.

BODY J def. 1 D. 63 ill. ; a compound sub· stance, W. 62 (cf 29); a material extenl, S. 55 (cl W. 61) ; is 01 the minerai king­dom, S. 66 (cl 65); soul everywhere present in, S. ?6; universal essence of, S. 77, 78; specIfie essence 01, S. 78. A nl1na/ B:. cantains aIl forms, S. 8. A nimaie B:, def., S. 65. Huma" B:, an external form, S. 9 ill. 10 i continuous with ils internai form, S. 10; an organic substance, 5.34 i CODsists of organs of the soul, S. 19; the seat of the soul, its fonn, D. 39; farm of, W. 4.

CAUSB, an internaI form, B. l, S. 9 (cf Il). CHANCt:, is not contingent, S. 1°3. CHANGE, (see Staie) def., W. 104, S. 25. CIRCULAR FOR M, essence of, S. 77; deter·

minations and terminations of, S. 9; attributes of, S. 88, 89; state of, S. 23 ; can change its state, S. 24 l'Il.

CONTIGUITY, def., W 5' (ill., 53). CONTINGENTS, def. W. 102, S. J03 iiI. CONTINUITV, (see Interruption) def., W.

5' (ill. 53).

Wolff.

dis. distinguished. ill. iIIustraled.

CORPUSCLHS, (see E'emln~s) primitive, def., W. 61, S. 64 i denvatlve, def., W.61.

DETERMINATIONS, S. 94 i make quality of forro, S. 85 j constitute form, S. 16, 78 (cr. w. 4); are the essentials 01 lorm, ~. 77 ill. D: and Motks, W. J04.

EFFBCT, an external form, B. l, S. 9. El.BMENTS, (see Material) are figured, S.

60 ; and angular, S. 60, 64 i are not ex~

tended, W. 52; des., W. S2; the reason for aH material things, W. 37, S. 64. E: and SU/JSlance, S. 46,47.

ENS, possible by reason of essence, W. 68; the beginnings 01, W 4, S. 6; how constituted, W. 68, 79, S. 77. 85 j must have extent, S. 5S: quality "f, how known, S. 93 (cl ~9).

ESSENe., (see Essmlials) diffieult to de­fine, S. 75 j Reneral definition, S. 76 \ill. 17'78)t75; dei., W. 67,7° ,ll., Su., Des., .,67 j the ooly real thing in a subjeet, S. 76 (cl 77); des., W. 70, 7', 81, S. 77; how constituted, W. 68 t'II., S. 5; the 80ul 01 a body, S. 77,78; uni­versaI and specific, S. 78. E : and Farm, dis. W. 4; agree, S. 77 (cl 78).

ESSBNTIA LS, def., W. 68 ül.) 79 lïi.; des., W. 68 ül., 74, 79; are qualities, W. Tl; constitute essence, W. 68 ill. j do not wholly constitute an ens, S. 85. Esunce and E :, dis, S. 77 ill. E:, and At/ributes, dis., S. 8s ill.,86 ill., 87 ill. (cr 89).

EXTENT, EXTBNSION, (see Material)def., Des., 32, W., J., C., 50, S. 54; arises from non-extension, W. 52. lI1aüria/ E: dei.. S. 55,57,58. /mmaierialor Superior E:, S. S5 ill. 56, a pure or substanlial E:, does not consist of parts, S. 55, 56 has no space within itself, S. 55, 58~ 59,16, S. 57,56; the analogue 01 E:, S. ,8.

FIGURE, def., W. 12: an accident, W. 13 ill.; how constituted, S. .6; how conceived of in superior for:ns, S. 16, ~8.

F: and Exiernal Form, diS.) S. 14 :lI. F: and Form, dis., S. 15 ül., 16.

58 INDEX

FORM, deI., D. 3, W. 4 ill., S. 5 ill; clas­sification of B. 1 ; the essence of a body, S. 78 i is superior and inferior, S. 8, (see below)., how constituted, S. 16; generation of, B. 2~ D,40; arises from variation of forces, S. 23 il!.; and chan~e'i of state, S. 25.27; a beginning of thtnJ::s, W. 4, S. 6; propeTties coo­ferred by, D. 3, W. 4, S. 5, II j neces­sary for existence, S. Il lil. (cf. 34); an attribute, S. 86 il!.; determinations and terminatians of, S. 9 il!. , 16; essence, and essentials of, S. 77 (see belowd F: and Matter)., being, quality, an p05sibility of, S. 85, 86 ill. 87 ill. External F:, (see A nplar F:) deI., Il. 1; denotes inferior F:, S. 9 ill. (cf 8) denote:s external construction, S. 9 ill ; the continuous of internai li':, S. [4 iU., 16; to which it corresponds, S. 9 ill., 10 il!. ; and figure, see under Fig-ure. Inümal F:, (see Circular F :, Super w

ior F :) deI., B. 1 (ill. S. 6) ; extemal F: corresponds with S. 9 il!., 10 il!. Human F:, essence of, S. 77, loi does notcome from matter, D.,A., Phy., 40 (cf Per., 2). F: and Esunu, See under Essence. F: and Figur~, see under Figur~.

F: and SubstanL~, F: not aS:, S. 34; S: the subject of F:, S. 33,100. (See below.) F: and Matt~r. F: determined by M:, S. 6, 45 ill., 47 (see Substance); M: the sllbject of F:, D. 39 ill., 40, S. 47 ill; M: the being of F:, S. 77, 47 (cf 6) ; F: cannot exist without M:, B. 2, D. 40, S. 6,45.47. 48 ill. (cf 55); F: and M: make entire substance, D. 3, 63 j M: deslres F :, A. 3; M: is before F: and i ... that from which F: cornes forth, A. D.40, Phy. D. 63. F: and Structure, dis., S. 18. Privation of F:, a beginning of things, S.6.

FOR MAL CAUSE, deI., W. 4 (cf S. 6). FORCE, not a substance, W. 37, 36,42, S.

35; effect of variations of, S. 23. GENUS,def., D. 84; des., W. 72,73, 80. GOD, the onlYSubstantia~ Des., 28 j above

predieaments, Seh. 28 \cf S. 33). GRAVITY, no, in superior forms, S. 55. HUMAN ESSENCE, S. 77, la. IMAGINATION, cleL, S. 25; how effected,

S. 25; Cortical glands the substance of, S. 34.

INFERIOR, The, is always ex.terior, S. 9. INSTRUMENT, and organ, dis., S. 20.

INTERRUPTION or non-continuity, deL, W. St.

MATERIAL, The, def., S. 46, 48; why sa called, S. 46 (cf 45) ; is angular, S. 64, 48 il!. (see Elunents) ; not to be con~

founded with Matter, S. 48 ill.; put off by superior forms, S. 48, 7; the terni cannot be applied to spiritual substance, S. 46, 6.

MATTER, def., W. 38,41, D. 39, S. 6,45. 47; analogue of, in superior forms, S,

18 j in co.tinual motion, W. 36 j how moditied, W. 41, Pltysical M:. is the Material (q. v.) S. 48. Primary M:, def., D. 39, 40. Pl., A., 40; without form or accidents, D. 39, 40, ill., 63 ; does not actually exist, D. 39; difficult to understand, D. 40. Secondary M:, deL, D. 39. M: and Form. See- under Form. M: Forllt, and Privation of Form, the three beginnings of things, S. 6. M: and Substance. M: not aS: \V. 37,38,42; M: necessary to S:, S. 45 ; M: not to be eonfounded with the Ma­terial, S. 48 t·ll. (cf 46) ; since il includes S: and Element, S. 47 ; and hence ap~

plies both to the Spiritual and the Ma­terial, S. 6. 48 ill.

1\loDH (see belo......:) def., W. 68, 74, 79,1°4; is accident and quality, W. 82 j changes of, S. 25,27.

MODIF1CATIQNS, def., W. 104 il!. S.34 il!.; l1either produce nor destroy, \\'. 30, S·33· /YI: and Sensations, dis., S. 25, 23; how produced, S. 23.

NATURB (see Essence), def., C., 67. NATURE, not a substance, S. 3>. NECESS .... RY (see below), nothmg purely,

S. 103; the, and the contingent, S. 1°3. NECESSITY, absolute, def., W. 71 i hypo­

thetical, cleL, W. 7I (il!. 8I, I02). ORGANIC BODY, def. and des., W 17; an

instrument, S. J9; human body purely 0: S. 19.34 ill. a: B: and Instrument, dis., S. 20.

PARTS, def., S. 54, 55, 60, W. 53 ; con­stitute an extent, W. 50, S. 55. P: in Sup~rior Forms, S. 54 i an ana~

logue of part, S. T8, 55. 56,60. PERCEPTION (see S ~nsation L S. z6. PHHNOMENON, W. 42; def., W. 52. PLACE (see Space). PRHDICABLES, the five, def., D. 84 ill. PREDICABLE ACCIDENT, Sch. 68. PREDICATl!S, deL, W. 91, S. 92; ells

known Irom, S. 93 (cf 89) ; set lorth by types, S. 93. P: a1zd attri/mt/s, dis., S. 89,92.

PRIVATION OF FORM, a beginning of things, S. 6.

PROVIDENCE, S. 103. QUIDDITY, B. l, S. 11. RATIONAL MIND. See Soul (Human). SENSATIONS, how produced, S. 23, 26;

correspond to modifications, S. 25; are not substances, S. 34 ill.

SOUL, The, of bodies, is mere simple sub~

stance, S. 65; the beginning of aIl bodies, S. 78, 48; and their univer~al

essence, S. 77, 78 (cf 76) j present in their every part, S. 66 (cf 77) ; the only substantial a.nd IivinJt thing in animate bodies, S. 65; forros ils body by deriva­tion, S. 65; and in it~own image, S. 66.

Human S., TJu, or Rational 1l1ùld, a spiritual and incorporeal substance. D. 31 i its operations are spiritual, S.

59 INDEX

H; a simple, Sch. 43; modifiable, W. 104' the beginning of the body, S. 48 (cf 78) ; and ilS active, S. 19; is human essence, S. 77; is matter (i. e. substance, see 47), but Dot material, S. 48; subsists from its matter, S. 48; has form, S. Il; is a spiritual or internaI form, Pero 2, S. 34; a farm separate frorn matter, B. I, Pero 2 (cf A., D., Phy. 40); is the form of the body, D. 39; presence of, in the body, S. 26.

SVACF., no, in superior forros, S. 16,55,58, 59; but ooly its analogue, S. 18.

SPP.CIES, deL, D. 84; des' J W. 72,73, Bo. SPIHITUAL, The, S. 6 (cf 48). SPIRITUAL FOR:'otS. See Superior F. STATB, classification of, S. 27; def., W.

21 ill., S. 23 ill.; mutahility of, makes perfection, S. 26 ill., 27. C/ul1lgt! 0/ S: W. 21, 22. 32, S. 23,34 j def., S. 24 ill. ; called ch.an~e of mode, S. 25 i new forms exist from, S. 25, 27.

STRUCTURE, W. 17, S. 18. S: and Form, dis' J S. 18 ili.

SUBJECT, deI., S. 94. SUBSTANCE, cla9sificatioD, D. 31. S. 33 ;

def. D. 31, Lei., Des., C., Lo., 28, Sch. 28, W. 28, 32 (cf S. 94) S. 33, 56, 'OC'; no single definition possible, S. 33 i no­tion of. imaginary, W. 29,32 ill. (cf D. 39); how to conceive of, Des. 32; must be endowed ..... ith force, W. 29, 32 ill., S. 34; neither destroyed nor produced by modifications, W. 30, S. 33 (cf D. 98); God, the only S:, Des.•8; soul, the 0111y substantial in bodies, S. 65· Superior or Spiritual S: is immaterial, S. 46; above predicaments, S. 33 (cf Des. 28) ; has no accidents, S. 33. 100

(cf D. 31).

S"mpu S:, W. 37; the only suœtance, W. 29, S. 33; the soul of bodies, S.�

65; endowed with fo\·ce, W. 29.� Primary S:, det., D. 31; seat of aU� accidents, D. 3' (cf S. 33, 100); olti.� mate seat of all affections, S. 96.� Materialor CorporeaJ S :, Des. 32, D.� 63 "Il.� Compo,,,,d S :, def. W. 29, S. 33 (cf� 34, 65) j not non-substances, S. 33 (cf� W. 29) i nothing but accidents in, S. lOI.

Suondary S:, def., D. 31. S: and A ccilunt, dis., Lei., 28, 29, C., 28, G., 29, S. 9CTIOI i S; Dot an A:, W. 97, S. 99 (cf W. 29).S : a.,ui Form. See under Furm. S : and Matter. See under MatJer.

SUPERIOR. The, is interior, S, 9. SUPRHIOR OR SPIRITUAL F'ORMS, are

substantial, S. 56; exceed aU material ideas, S. 7 (cf 48, 55, Per. 2) ; to be considered as corresponding to lower forms, S. 7 j have no pans except by analogy, S. S6 (cf 55); space, only out· side of, S. 16, 55, ~8, 59 i are void of figure, which is outslde them, S. 16, 18; terminations of, are continuous forros, S. 16 (cf 14) i have exten... ion, S. 55, 56; in what the perfection of, consists, S. 26, ill. S. 27; variety of, S 7; proper~

ties conferred by, S. 7. TRRMINATlONS, CODsÜtute hgure, W. 12,

13. S. 16; correspond'to determiniiltions, S. 9 il!.

TRRMS, confusion from mere. S. 49. THOUGHT, an incorporeal substance, Des.

32; not a substance, S. 34; the subject of, S. 34.

UNIT, not a number, D ......