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EMBEDDED SYSTEMS SECURITY - CSE at UNT•There is always a trade-off between security and energy...

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  • EMBEDDED SYSTEMS SECURITY

    SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Presented By,

    Satyajeet Nimgaonkar Email: [email protected]

    1 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    mailto:[email protected]

  • Agenda

    • What are Embedded Systems ?

    • Security issues in embedded systems.

    • Security solutions.

    • Hardware Security Architectures.

    • Embedded system constraints.

    • Motivation

    • Proposed Energy Efficient Security Mechanism.

    • State-of-the-Art.

    • Summary & Conclusions.

    2 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • What are Embedded systems ???

    • Dedicated system designed to serve a specific sub-task within a

    larger system.

    Characteristics :

    • High performance systems, flexible enough to perform a variety of

    computing tasks in a cost effective manner.

    • Modern day embedded devices are often miniaturized, portable and highly

    interconnected.

    • Capable of tracking, storing information and even transmitting essential data

    over the Internet.

    3 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • • Embedded systems have become ubiquitous in this era of computing.

    • They access, store and communicate sensitive information like secret passwords,

    credit card numbers and bank account numbers etc.

    • Hence security is essential.

    4 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Internet

  • Security issues in embedded systems

    • The operating environment allows the adversary to have complete control of

    the computing node - supervisory privileges along with complete physical

    and architectural object observational capabilities.

    • Also vulnerable to software based and network based attacks.

    5 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • Current Security Scenario

    • Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (2010).

    286M+ Threats.

    93% increase in Web Attacks.

    260,000 Identities exposed per data breach.

    42% more vulnerabilities in Mobile.

    $0.07 to $100 price range for each stolen credit card number.

    • Mobile and Smart Device Security Survey (2011)

    65% corporate personnel require a regular attention from their I.T Staff

    for non-PC based device attacks.

    • Wall Street Journal Report (2008) –

    Cyberspies have recently penetrated the U.S. electrical grid system and left

    behind software that could be used to disrupt it at a future date.

    6 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • • Software Security Solutions

    Software Obfuscation.

    Software Watermarking

    • Pros

    Easy to build.

    Flexible to modify.

    • Cons

    Huge code-base.

    No root of trust.

    7

    Possible security solutions

    • Hardware Security Solutions

    TPM.

    Security Architectures etc.

    • Pros

    Better reliability.

    Trustworthy root-of-trust.

    • Cons

    Difficult to test and build.

    Difficult to modify.

    Costly.

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • Example: AEGIS Hardware Security Architecture

    8

    Secure Architectures

    Reference: Suh, G.E.; O'Donnell, C.W.; Devadas, S.; , "Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor," Design & Test of Computers, IEEE ,

    vol.24, no.6, pp.570-580, Nov.-Dec. 2007 , doi: 10.1109/MDT.2007.179

    URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

  • Encryption/Decryption

    • Process of transforming information to make it unreadable to unwanted

    entities.

    • C = Ek(M) and M = DK(C)

    • Provides confidentiality to data.

    • Common algorithms – AES, DES, RC2 etc.

    9

    Security mechanisms

    Reference: Suh, G.E.; O'Donnell, C.W.; Devadas, S.; , "Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor," Design &

    Test of Computers, IEEE , vol.24, no.6, pp.570-580, Nov.-Dec. 2007 , doi: 10.1109/MDT.2007.179

    URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

  • Memory Integrity Verification

    • Achieved with Merkle Hash Trees.

    • Data is located at leaves.

    • Internal nodes = Hash(concatenation

    of its children).

    • Root is stored in secure memory where

    it cannot be tampered.

    10

    Security mechanisms cont…

    Reference: Suh, G.E.; O'Donnell, C.W.; Devadas, S.; , "Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor," Design & Test of Computers,

    IEEE , vol.24, no.6, pp.570-580, Nov.-Dec. 2007 , doi: 10.1109/MDT.2007.179

    URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4397182&isnumber=4397167

  • • Severe constraints on energy consumption, area, performance, speed and lifetime.

    • Hardware security mechanisms are computationally intensive and account for excessive energy consumption.

    11

    Embedded system constraints

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Reference: N. R. Potlapally, S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, N. K. Jha, Analyzing the energy consumption of security protocol, ISLPED.

  • • Concentrate on Memory Integrity Verification (MIV) mechanism and design

    novel schemes to make them energy efficient.

    • Proposed Novel energy efficient MIV mechanism for embedded systems,

    based on sensors.

    • Published in proceeding of International Symposium on Electronic System

    Design (ISED), 2011

    12

    Motivation

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • • Embedded systems typically employ several sensors to interact with its

    environment.

    • [1], [2] and [3] deploy hardware sensors to measure power dissipation and

    thermal dissipation in the CPU.

    • Similarly, [3] makes use of a current Sensor Module to predict the power

    consumption of their architecture.

    • The intuition is to use these sensors to detect any physical attack on the memory.

    • Integrity verification is performed only when an attack is detected.

    13

    Proposed mechanism

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    References:

    [1]. Dongkeun Oh, Nam Sung Kim, Charlie Chung Ping Chen, Azadeh Davoodi, and Yu Hen Hu. Runtime temperature-based

    power estimation for optimizing throughput of thermal-constrained multi-core processors. Proceedings of the 2010 Asia and South

    Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASPDAC’10), 2010.

    [2]. Rich McGowen, Christopher A. Poirier, Chris Bostak, Jim Ignowski, Mark Millican,Warren H. Parks, and Samuel Naffziger.

    Power and temperature control on a 90-nm itanium family processor. IEEE JOURNAL OF SOLID-STATE CIRCUITS, 41(1),

    2006.

    [3]. Lide Zhang, Lan S. Bai, Robert P. Dick, Li Shang, and Russ Joseph. Process variation characterization of chip-level

    multiprocessors. DAC’09, 2009.

    [4]. R. Muresan, Y. Zhanrong H. Vahedi, and S. Gregori. Power-smart system-on-chip architecture for embedded cryptosystems.

    CODES+ISSS, 2005.

  • 14

    Proposed Architecture

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • 15

    Proposed architecture cont…

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Write Operation Read Operation

  • 16

    Proposed architecture cont…

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    • This Detect and Protect mechanism creates multiple hash trees for

    verification.

    • The verification terminates once the memory block’s hash is verified.

    • This creates multiple Disjoint Hash Trees in the memory.

  • 17

    Energy Consumption Model

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    • We propose a probabilistic model to estimate average number of hash

    invocations.

    • Based on whether the hash of a block of memory is present in the cache or

    not.

    • This probability is called as a cache hit or cache miss.

  • 18

    Results and Analysis

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Simulation Framework

    • Based on Simplescalar Tool Set, configured to execute Alpha binaries.

    • Simulations were performed using a cache based simulator - sim-cache on

    Spec2k benchmarks.

    Cache Configurations

    • Modeled behind ARM cache configurations.

    • L1-D Cache: 8KB, 2-way, 32B Line

    • L1-I Cache: 16KB, 2-way, 32B Line

    • L2-D Cache & L2-I: None

  • 19

    Experimental Setup

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    • Identified two false positives based on the working of MIV and sensor -

    Random block to predict the infected memory block and Window size to

    predict the number of memory accesses required for the MIV to function.

    • Random block size - 16, 20 and 24 bits & Window size - 2000, 8000 and

    15000 memory accesses.

    • Random attack seed of same size of block size is embedded.

    • Number of disjoint trees represent the number of secrets that can be stored

    on-chip. Varied for 3 values - 16, 64 and 128.

    • Simulations conducted for all 27 possible combinations.

  • 20

    Simulation Algorithm

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    • Inputs: Random block size, Window size, No. of Disjoint trees.

    • Sensor monitors the system to detect an attack.

    • if Random attack seed == Random Block. (There is an anomaly)

    • Invoke MIV for given Window size; Generate disjoint trees.

    • During this keep repeating steps 2 & 3.

    • If there is match again. (The anomaly persists)

    • Extend the Window size; keep generating disjoint trees.

    • Else anomaly has subsided.

    • De-couple the MIV.

    • Keep repeating step 2.

  • 21

    Results

    04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Base case Results Average Energy Saved in % for 16 Disjoint Trees

    Average Energy Saved in % for 128 Disjoint Trees Average Energy Saved in % for 64 Disjoint Trees

  • State-of-the-art

    22 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Authors Proposed Limitations

    Shi et al. Authentication Speculative Execution to

    authenticate shared memory.

    5% energy degradation.

    Catherine et al. Model for key masking 2.5% overhead savings

    Muresan et al. Power-Smart System-On-Chip

    Architecture

    Overhead of 12% of the

    total power.

    Roger et al. Protect integrity of softwares by signing

    each instruction block

    5% performance

    overhead and 12.5%

    memory overhead.

    Gelbart et al. Architectural approach to address

    memory spoofing attacks.

    Performance overhead

    ranging between 4.5%

    and 26%.

    Architectural Approaches

  • State-of-the-art cont…

    23 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    Authors Proposed Limitations

    Gassend et al. CHash and LHash with varying cache

    block sizes

    Increases memory

    Bandwidth

    requirements; high

    overhead.

    Roger et al. Address Independent Seed Encryption

    (AISE) is proposed along with Bonsai

    Merkle Trees (BMT)

    only 12% to 2%

    overhead savings.

    Gordon-Ross et al. Low overhead encryption algorithms

    and cache level tuning

    53% energy savings.

    Yan et al. Split-counter scheme for memory

    encryption and authentication

    20% overhead

    improvement.

    Memory Encryption and Authentication Approaches

  • Summary and Conclusions

    • There is always a trade-off between security and energy consumption in Embedded

    Systems.

    • Embedded devices are typically fast, miniaturized and specific to their application

    and hence often pose severe energy constraints.

    • As they now handle a lot of critical information, security is of utmost importance in

    them.

    • Therefore the need arises to design new security mechanisms so that their energy

    consumption is minimal while still preserving the security of the system.

    • With this motivation, we specifically focus on reducing the energy consumption of

    Memory Integrity Verification mechanisms in embedded systems and propose an

    energy efficient mechanism based on sensors that achieves energy saving in the range

    of 88% - 99%.

    24 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

  • Thank You

    Any Questions?

    Can email me at

    [email protected]

    25 04/09/2012 UNT CSCE SoMiC Workshop 2012

    mailto:[email protected]

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