Completion Report

Project Number: 34541 Loan Number: 1824 January 2006

Cambodia: Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTSCurrency Unit – riel (KR)

At Appraisal At Project Completion 6 October 2000 30 June 2004

KR1.00 = $0.0002621 $0.0002488 $1.00 = KR3,815 KR4,020

For the purposes of this report, a rate of $1.00 = KR4,100 was used. This was the rate generally prevailing at project completion.

ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank BME – benefit monitoring and evaluation EFRP – Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project FA – force account FWUC – farmer water user community IA – implementing agency ICB – international competitive bidding IRC – Inter-ministerial Resettlement Committee IDC – Interest during construction LCB – local competitive bidding MEF – Ministry of Economy and Finance MOEYS – Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport MOH – Ministry of Health MOP – Ministry of Planning MOWRAM – Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology MPP – Municipality of Phnom Penh MPWT – Ministry of Public Works and Transport MRD – Ministry of Rural Development NGO – nongovernment organization PAP – project-affected person PCC – project coordination committee PCR – project completion report PIU – project implementation unit PMCU – project monitoring and coordination unit RAP – resettlement action plan RIIP – Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project SDR – special drawing rights WFP – World Food Programme

NOTEIn this report, "$" refers to US dollars.

ice President L. Jin, Operations Group 1 Director General R. Nag, Mekong Department Director S. Bajpai, Cambodia Resident Mission (CARM) Team leader A. Goffeau, Project Implementation Specialist, CARM Team members N. Ouk, Project Implementation Officer, CARM

P. Im, Project Implementation Officer, CARM C. Ouch, Project Implementation Officer, CARM

CONTENTS

Page

BASIC DATA i

MAPS vi

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1

II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2A. Relevance of Design and Formulation 2B. Project Outputs 3C. Project Costs 4D. Disbursments 5E. Project Schedule 6F. Implementation Arrangements 6G. Conditions and Covenants 7H. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 7I. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers 8J. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency 9K. Performance of Asian Development Bank 10

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 10A. Relevance 10B. Efficacy in Achievement of Purpose 10C. Efficiency in Achievement of Outputs and Purpose 11D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 11E. Environmental, Sociocultural, and Other Impacts 12

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13A. Overall Assessment 13B. Lessons Learned 13C. Recommendations 14

APPENDIXES 1. Project Framework 162. Project Physical Achievements 193. Project Costs 304. Loan Allocation, Cancellation, and Disbursements 315. Subproject Selection Criteria 326. Status of Compliance with Loan Covenants 337. Consultant Inputs 368. Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation 379. Implementation of the Resettlement Plans 4110. Overall Project Rating 48

BASIC DATA

A. Loan Identification

1. Country 2. Loan Number 3. Project Title 4. Borrower 5. Executing Agency 6. Amount of Loan 7. Project Completion Report Number

Kingdom of Cambodia 1824–CAM (SF) Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project Ministry of Economy and Finance Ministry of Planning SDR42,741,000.00

936-CAM

B. Loan Data 1. Appraisal – Date Started – Date Completed

2. Loan Negotiations – Date Started – Date Completed

3. Date of Board Approval

4. Date of Loan Agreement

5. Date of Loan Effectiveness – In Loan Agreement – Actual

6. Closing Date – In Loan Agreement – Actual

7. Terms of Loan – Interest Rate – Maturity (number of years) – Grace Period (number of years)

8. Terms of Relending (if any)

2 November 2000 9 November 2000

23 November 2000 23 November 2000

21 December 2000

22 December 2000

22 December 2000 22 December 2000

30 June 2004 30 June 2004

1.0% during grace period and 1.5% thereafter 32 years 8 years

9. Disbursements a. Dates

Initial Disbursement

2 January 2001

Final Disbursement

17 January 2006

Time Interval

60 months

Effective Date

22 December 2000

Original Closing Date

30 June 2004

Time Interval

42 months

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b. Amount (SDR)

Category Original Amount Latest Net Amount Undisbursed

Allocation Canceleda Revised Available Disbursed Balance Allocationb

Part A Transport - MPWT

01 22,974,000 01A Civil Works 18,004,000 18,004,000 17,978,820 25,180 02A Non-civil Works 3,576,456 3,576,456 3,573,141 3,315

Part B Irrigation MOWRAM

04 Mixed 8,359,000 4,753,239 4,753,239 4,753,239 0 01B Civil Works 3,358,540 3,358,540 3,417,018 (58,478) 02B Non-civil Works 165,877 165,877 159,007 5,880

Part C Rural Infrastructure - MRD03 Mixed 4,798,000 284,122 284,122 284,122 0 01C Civil Works 3,524,612 3,524,612 3,402,363 122,249 02C Non-civil Works 1,134,619 1,134,619 1,134,619 0

Part D Education - MOEYS 4,625,000 01D Civil Works 3,287,646 3,287,646 3,241,352 46,294 02D Non-civil Works 897,998 897,998 897,998 0

Part E Health - MOH 870,000 01E Civil Works 745,628 745,628 745,628 0 02E Non-civil Works 275,055 275,055 275,055 0

Part F PMCU 715,000 05 713,208 713,208 711,262 1,946

Interest During Construction 06 400,000 400,000 400,000 400,000 0.0

Total 42,741,000 1,620,000a 41,121,000 41,121,000 40,974,614 146,386

MOEYS = Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, MOH = Ministry of Health, MOWRAM = Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, MPWT = Ministry of Public Works and Transport, MRD = Ministry of Rural Development, PMCU = project monitoring and coordination unit. a The sum of SDR 1,620,000 was canceled from the loan amount but not allocated to the respective loan categories. b The revision reflects the differentiation between civil works and non-civil works approved in October 2001 and the

cancellation (SDR 1,620,000) approved in September 2004.

10. Local Project Costs (ADB-financed) - Amount ($) $14.6 million - Percent of Local Project Costs 71 - Percent of Total Project Cost 26

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C. Project Data

1. Project Cost ($ million)

Cost Appraisal Estimate Actual

Foreign Exchange Cost 47.0 46.8 Local Currency Cost 36.0 26.7 Total 83.0 73.5

2. Financing Plan ($ million)

Cost Appraisal Estimate Actual

Implementation Costs Borrower Financed 13.5 8.7 Loan Reallocationa 12.5 8.0 ADB Financed 55.0 55.1 WFP Grant 2.0 1.1 Total 83.0 72.9 IDC Costs Borrower Financed 0.0 0.0 ADB Financed 0.0 0.6

Total 83.0 73.5 ADB = Asian Development Bank, IDC = interest during construction, WFP = World Food Programme. Note: Figures may not add due to rounding. a The amounts of $10.5 million from Loan 1659-CAM(SF) (ADB. 1998. Report and Recommendation of the President

to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project. Manila) and $2.0 million from Loan 1385-CAM(SF) (ADB. 1995. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project. Manila) were reallocated within the respective loans to be used for flood rehabilitation purposes. These reallocated loan funds appear in the overall financing plan and project costs for Loan 1824-CAM(SF) (ADB. 2000. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project. Manila) for comparison with appraisal estimates. However, the civil works that were funded from this source are considered under the project completion reports relating to the respective source loans.

3. Cost Breakdown by Project Component ($ million)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual

Part A - National Transport Network 30.9 30.1 Part B - Flood Control and Irrigation 10.8 10.8 Part C - Rural Infrastructure 6.2 6.4 Part D - Education 5.8 5.5 Part E - Health 1.3 1.3 Part F - Support to PMCU – 1.0 Interest During Construction – 0.6 Loan 1659 and Loan 1385 Reallocation 12.5 8.0 Borrower Financed 13.5 8.7 World Food Programme Grant 2.0 1.1

Total 83.0 73.5 PMCU = project monitoring and coordination unit.

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4. Project Schedule

Item Appraisal Estimate Actual

Date of Contract with Consultants Part A (Project Implementation Unit 1) 4 June 2001 Part A (Project Implementation Unit 2) 15 March 2001 Part B 12 March 2001 Part C 15 March 2001 Part D 1 March 2001 Part E 5 March 2001 Part F 1 February 2001 Civil Works Contractsa - First Date of Award - January 2001 Last Date of Completion of Work - December 2003 a In total, more that 600 contracts were awarded by the five implementing agencies between January 2001 and

December 2003. The details are in Appendix 2.

5. Project Performance Report Ratings

Ratings Implementation Period Development

Objectives Implementation

ProgressFrom 22 December 2000 to 31 December 2000 S S From 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001 S S/HSaFrom 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002 S S/HSaFrom 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003 S S/HSaFrom 1 January 2004 to 30 June 2004 S S/HSaHS = highly satisfactory, S = satisfactory. a Progress of parts A (National Transport Network), C (Rural Infrastructure) and F (Support to Project Monitoring and

Coordination) were noted as satisfactory throughout project implementation. Implementation progress for Part B (Flood Control and Irrigation) and parts D and E (Education and Health) were recorded as highly satisfactory as from 2001 and 2002, respectively.

D. Data on Asian Development Bank Missions

Name of Mission Date No. of PersonsNo. of

Person-Days Specialization of Membersa

Identification/reconnaissance 2–6 October 2000 3 15 a, b, c Appraisal 2–9 November 2000 7 28 a, b, c, e, f, g Pre-inception mission 16–18 January 2001 2 6 a, j Inception mission 26 February–3 March 2001 2 12 a, d Mid-term review mission 8–31 May 2002 5 60 a, c, d, f, h, i

Part A - MPWT Review mission 1 14–16 June 2001 2 6 b, i Review mission 2 13 March–2 April 2002 2 18 f, i Review mission 3 13–30 September 2002 2 8 f, j Review mission 4 3–11 April 2003 2 14 f, j Review mission 5 6–15 October 2003 2 10 f, i Review mission 6 6–21 May 2004 2 8 f, i

Part B - MOWRAM Review mission 1 1–6 December 2001 1 6 c

Part C - MRD

Review mission 1 15–23 November 2001 1 9 f

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Name of Mission Date No. of PersonsNo. of

Person-DaysSpecialization of Membersa

Part D - MOEYS Review mission 1 11–20 July 2001 2 8 a, d Review mission 2 8–14 September 2001 2 12 a, i Review mission 3 27–29 August 2003 2 6 a, i

Part E - MOH Review mission 1 18–27 September 2001 2 18 f, k Review mission 2 22–30 November 2001 1 8 kReview mission 3 16–24 March 2002 2 16 d, k

Project Completion Reviewb 23 July–19 August 2005 5 45 f, i, j

MOEYS = Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, MOH = Ministry of Health, MOWRAM = Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, MPWT = Ministry of Public Works and Transport, MRD = Ministry of Rural Development, PMCU = project monitoring and coordination unit.

a a - program officer, b - transport economist, c - irrigation engineer, d - project analyst, e - poverty reduction specialist, f - project specialist, g - counsel, h - consulting services specialist, i – Cambodia Resident Mission staff, j - project economist consultant, k - health specialist.

b The Mission consisted of A. Goffeau, project implementation specialist/mission leader; N. Ouk, national project/program officer; P. Van Im, national project/program officer; C. Ouch, national program officer, Cambodia Resident Mission; and a staff consultant.

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I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. The 2000 floods caused unprecedented damage due to the extent and duration of inundation that covered more than 50% of Cambodia. The Mekong River exceeded the established emergency level during 2–26 September 2000 and reached a peak of 0.6 m above emergency levels around 17 September 2000. This incident, combined with the residual impact from the 1996 floods, seriously damaged infrastructure and caused extensive human suffering (186 deaths) due to displacement, food shortage, interruption to economic livelihoods, and disease outbreaks. The Royal Government of Cambodia (the Government) requested Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other donors1 to provide emergency assistance in order to rehabilitate key flood-damaged infrastructure to pre-flood conditions in the affected provinces. The Project rehabilitated facilities in five sectors identified as those being (i) the highest priorities of the Government, (ii) ones in which ADB had experience and current involvement, (iii) where the damage threatened the outcomes of ongoing or completed ADB projects, (iv) where impact on economic and social welfare of the community would be greatest, and (v) where there was a clear division of responsibilities with other agencies.

2. The Project had six components:

(i) Part A: National Transport Network. Consisted of urgently needed repair (function restoration - phase I) and rehabilitation (phase II) of the flood-damaged national road network, including bridges and culverts that had been damaged or washed away, and repair of railway embankments and railway bridges.

(ii) Part B: Flood Control and Irrigation. Included rehabilitation of a major flood control dike protecting residential and agricultural areas of Phnom Penh and small to medium-scale irrigation facilities, including embankments, water control structures, and delivery and drainage canals.

(iii) Part C: Rural Infrastructure. Included rehabilitation of flood-damaged rural infrastructure, including rural roads, bridges, and culverts within close proximity of ADB-financed projects and projects executed by World Food Programme (WFP).

(iv) Part D: Education. Comprised rehabilitation of education facilities (repairs to classroom floors, roofing and walls) and replacement of furniture and equipment.

(v) Part E: Health. Included repair of health centers and referral hospital facilities, half of which had been constructed under an ongoing ADB funded project.2

(vi) Part F: Support to Project Monitoring and Coordination Unit. Included operation of a project monitoring and coordination unit (PMCU) established within the Ministry of Planning (MOP), the Executing Agency, to provide consulting services, equipment, supplies, and incremental administrative and personnel costs.

1 World Bank approved in February 2001 a Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project for $35 million. World Food

Programme approved in December 2000 an in-kind contribution of $2 million to support food-for-work activities for rehabilitating some rural road alignments associated with the two emergency flood rehabilitation projects.

2 ADB. 1996. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Basic Health Services Project. Manila (Loan 1447-CAM[SF])

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3. The respective implementing agencies3 (lAs) identified eligible subprojects based on criteria outlined in Schedule 5, para. 8 of the Loan Agreement, together with additional criteria developed by the IAs and approved by the PMCU and ADB. Implementation adopted a sector approach, with subprojects selected during implementation to provide a rapid response and maximum flexibility within the agreed criteria. The existence of ongoing ADB-funded projects in each sector facilitated a rapid response to the emergency through timely access to international and local consultants for design, contract preparation and administration, and construction supervision.

4. The loan became effective on 22 December 2000. The original date for physical completion was 31 December 2003 and the closing date of the loan was 30 June 2004. The final amount of the loan utilized was $55.8 million, or SDR 41.1 million.

II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Relevance of Design and Formulation

5. The Project responded to an emergency request of the Government at a time when economic and livelihood activities had been interrupted by the worst floods in 70 years. It was highly relevant, as the Government had neither the resources to finance nor the capacity to implement the vast rehabilitation program that was a necessary prerequisite for resuming livelihood activities and to restore the functioning of transport routes, flood protection and irrigation facilities, and the operation of public education and health services. While emergency rehabilitation does not form part of the Government’s strategic development plans, failure to address the flood damage would have threatened anticipated outcomes from the Government’s strategic development objectives4 that identify infrastructure rehabilitation as a means to achieve poverty reduction and improve access to social services.

6. The Project adhered to ADB policy for emergency assistance5 in force at appraisal and was aligned with ADB's Country Assistance Plan.6 The Project framework is in Appendix 1.

7. At appraisal, the Project was aimed to restore damaged facilities to their pre-flood conditions to permit early restoration of economic and social activity, especially for the rural poor. Project cost estimates were based on that premise. During implementation, ADB granted approval for replacement, in some instances, with new structures that resulted in upgraded facilities, but these were fewer in number than had been wished due to the higher construction costs for rehabilitation. Given the Project’s urgent nature, the formulation process was conducted efficiently between October and November 2000 and subproject selection and detailed design were left for implementation, hence the “sector” modality. This more flexible approach was appropriate and effective given the need for rehabilitation works to commence immediately with the ensuing dry season. The design process depended heavily on national ministries and provincial agencies for information on the extent of damage, and there was real ownership of the Project as well as effective consultation with the National Committee for Disaster Management,

3 Part A - Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), Part B - Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology

(MOWRAM), Part C - Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), Part D - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS), and Part E - Ministry of Health (MOH).

4 Ministry of Planning. 1994. National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia. Phnom Penh. Also, Ministry of Planning. 2001. Socio-economic Development Plan II (2001–2005). Phnom Penh.

5 ADB. 1989. Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy. Manila. 6 ADB. 2000. Country Assistance Plan (2001–2003). Manila (p. 12, para. 53).

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senior government officials, nongovernment organizations, and international agencies involved in relief and rehabilitation work coordinated by the United Nations Disaster Management Team.

B. Project Outputs

Table 1: Project Outputs

Appraisal Target Output Realized

Part A - Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) Rehabilitation of national primary and secondary roads and Royal Railways of Cambodia infrastructure to pre-2000 flood conditions or marginally higher standard as considered appropriate and cost-effective.

The extent of the works was not quantified at appraisal although the total cost was budgeted at $43.7 million.

Project Implementation Unit (PIU) 1 completed 18 subprojects with 19 contracts on national routes NR1, NR2, NR11, and NR21 including: (i) road rehabilitation (145.6 km), minor repairs (81.7 km); (ii) bridge replacements (9), rehabilitations (9) and minor repairs (16).

PIU2 completed 8 subprojects with 17 contracts on NR5, NR6, and NR71, plus rehabilitation of damaged sections on the northern and southern railway lines resulting in: (i) rehabilitation of 266 km of primary roads (NR5, NR6 and NR71); (ii) rehabilitation of 34 km of secondary roads; (iii) rehabilitation of 35 km of track along southern and northern railway lines; (iv) rehabilitation of four railway bridges and 12 culverts along southern and

northern lines; and (v) rehabilitation of 2.1 km of damaged drainage along the southern line.

Part B - Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM) Rehabilitation of 7 km section of Kab Srov dike to protect Phnom Penh, with relocation of 40–50 households.

Rehabilitation of Prek Thnot Flood Control and Irrigation System in Kandal Province.

Rehabilitation of 7 medium-scale irrigation projects.

Rehabilitation of up to 100 small-scale irrigation projects.

Establishment of farmer water user communities (FWUCs) to operate and maintain all subprojects.

Kab Srov dike was rehabilitated (7 km), raising the embankment by 1.5 m in places and installing upstream slope protection. Eight contracts were involved in material supply, earthworks and structures. Some 378 households were relocated to two nearby service sites.

Rehabilitation involved constructing left- and right-bank flood protection dikes, constructing Prek Thnot off-take structure and developing an associated flood relief channel with drainage structures. Seven contracts were involved in earthworks and construction. Some 198 households have been identified for compensation in the ADB-approved resettlement plan.

Ten medium-scale irrigation or flood protection projects rehabilitated (>$100,000).

Four small-scale irrigation or flood protection projects rehabilitated (

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Appraisal Target Output Realized

(iv) 300 culverts. (v) 66 bridge scouring protection constructed; (vi) 6 Provincial Department of Rural Development office buildings

constructed; and (vii) 6 other structures constructed including bridges, culverts and bridge

protection.

Part D - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS) Rehabilitation of primary schools, including furniture: (i) 105 classrooms in 24 urban schools, (ii) 952 classrooms in 206 rural schools, and (iii) 321 classrooms in 102 remote schools. Rehabilitation of secondary schools, including furniture: 211 classrooms in 35 schools.

New primary schools were established instead of rehabilitating flood-damaged ones, thereby increasing student capacity and standards of facilities: (i) 202 new school buildings and 2 repaired buildings resulting in 837 new classrooms and 11 repaired ones; (ii) 676 toilet cubicles, 123 water wells; and (iii) 837 sets of classroom furniture were provided.

Three secondary schools were included in the rehabilitation.

Part E - Ministry of Health (MOH) Rehabilitation of health center and referral hospital buildings, furniture, beds, wells, and latrines. Replacement (with new concrete buildings) of destroyed health centers and referral hospitals.

No physical estimates were included at appraisal but the allocation was $1.5 million.

Rehabilitation of rural health facilities (including furniture, beds, wells, latrines, wards, and kitchen facilities) in 8 provinces of Kandal, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Kampong Cham, Takeo, and Kompot, and involving 8 contracts. Facilities rehabilitated include: (i) 35 health centers (six new and 29 repaired), (ii) 9 facilities rehabilitated in referral hospitals (1 new and 8 repaired), and (iii) backfilling on 3 sites for flood protection.

Part F - Ministry of Planning (MOP) Two long-term international consultants to assist in project implementation (36 person-months) and coordination (36 person-months).

Implementation specialist - 36 person-months. Finance and accounts specialist – 38 person-months.

a Prakas 306 is a ministerial decree that establishes the conditions under which responsibility for operation and maintenance of irrigation schemes are to be shared between the Government and beneficiary FWUCs.

Source: project reports.

8. In view of the Project’s emergency nature, precise outputs were not established at appraisal but were developed during implementation under the sector modality. Notable differences occurred in the number of small-scale irrigation facilities rehabilitated and the number of classrooms rehabilitated because the unit cost of rehabilitating such infrastructure was higher than foreseen. However, this did not have a detrimental effect on the impact of project interventions. Physical achievements of the Project are detailed in Appendix 2.

C. Project Costs

9. Total cost of the Project was estimated during appraisal at $83 million, of which foreign costs were $47 million (57%) and local costs were equivalent to $36 million. ADB was to provide a loan of $55 million to cover foreign exchange costs of $35.5 million and $19.5 million equivalent of local costs, excluding taxes and duties. The Government was to provide counterpart funding of $13.5 million equivalent to fund local costs, including taxes and duties

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($11.5 million) and a counterpart contribution of $2 million for agricultural support generated from proceeds of the Agriculture Program Loan.7 WFP was to provide $2 million in kind as food for work. Originally, $12.5 million ($11 million foreign and $1.5 million local) was reallocated from savings under ongoing loans,8 but that was subsequently reduced to $10.5 million due to increased needs of the Phnom Penh—Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project. In October 2001, ADB approved the Government’s request to finance 8% of civil works under Part A (MPWT) and 5% of civil works for all other components. Apart from some reallocations to accommodate the additional loan categories, an amount of SDR1.62 million, equivalent to $2.4 million, was canceled from the loan in September 2004 in response to a request at the 2004 Asian Development Fund donor replenishment meeting to cancel $200 million in unutilized loans.

10. Actual costs were $73.5 million, of which an estimated 64% comprised foreign costs and the remaining $26.7 million comprised local costs, including counterpart contributions to works, implementation of the resettlement plans, support for agricultural development, local support costs, and taxes and duties foregone.9 The ADB-financed $55.7 million consisted of $41 million in foreign exchange costs and $14.6 million of local costs, while WFP financed $1.1 million as food for work. A summary of actual project costs is presented in Appendix 3.

D. Disbursements

11. Disbursement of loan funds started quickly, as emergency rehabilitation to restore functions of the transport network and the flood protection dikes was required and retrospective financing was approved for emergency works after 9 November 2000. A total of $55.8 million was disbursed from the loan account (Appendix 4) through the seven imprest accounts established by the IAs and executing agency and by direct payment to contractors, consultants, and suppliers in accordance with Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) financial regulations and ADB Guidelines on Imprest Fund and Statement of Expenditure Procedures. The first and last disbursements were made in January 2001 and September 2004, respectively. The pattern of disbursement was similar to that anticipated from IA work plans, as no schedule was prepared during appraisal. There were disbursement delays due to slow processing of interim payment certificates by IAs and MEF as well as from delays associated with terminating four contracts (with one contractor) by the PIU2 of MPWT that were subsequently completed using force account. Disbursement of counterpart funds was more problematic and suffered considerable delays at MEF. Counterpart funds were not made available until May 2002. Their release was often delayed by up to 6 months, causing considerable concern for contractors. This is a recurrent problem with all projects and is due partly to lengthy internal government procedures and partly to a lack of available cash. The issue is being addressed within the country portfolio performance review process, and dialogue with the Government is ongoing.

12. The IAs were familiar with disbursement procedures, as each had previous experience with ADB statements of expenditure, imprest accounts, and withdrawal applications. They were ably supported by the consultant financial specialist appointed to the PMCU. Some confusion occurred with the reallocation of loan categories that took place in October 2001 and

7 ADB. 1990. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the

Kingdom of Cambodia for the Agriculture Sector Program. Manila (Loan No.1445-CAM[SF]) 8 ADB. 1998. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the

Kingdom of Cambodia for the Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project. Manila (Loan1659-CAM[SF]); ADB. 1995. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project. Manila (Loan 385-CAM[SF])

9 The Government forewent taxes and duties estimated at $0.7 million for duty-free import of vehicles procured under the Project.

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necessitated to accommodate the counterpart contribution of the Government The limited ceiling of the project imprest account under Part A’s PIU2 restricted payment to civil work contracts that were carried out under force account procedures (para. 11), and that resulted in delayed replenishment of the imprest account and some slowdown of the work program.

E. Project Schedule

13. The Project was to be implemented during December 2000 to June 2004, a period of 42 months. Physical completion was achieved under most contracts by December 2003, except that PIU2 (para. 12) was finished in 2004’s first quarter. Additional works to raise embankments, increase protection at bridge and riverside embankments, and improve drainage to mitigate damage from future floods were undertaken under Part A utilizing savings from previous Part A contracts. Several dangerously narrow structures on national routes NR5 and NR6 were also replaced using these savings and resulting in completion of works by June 2004. School rehabilitation was substantially completed by December 2003, except for one small subproject that was completed in early 2004. Health facility rehabilitation was completed within 8 months of commencement. Works programs under parts B and C were completed on schedule.

F. Implementation Arrangements

14. The Project was prepared hastily and implemented by implementation units of existing ADB-funded projects and assisted by consultants already engaged. The Project followed the same implementation arrangements, practices, and procedures to expedite start-up and make for efficient implementation. Coordination of project activities between sectors and other donors10 was provided by the PMCU at the Ministry of Planning (MOP). The implementation arrangements were generally satisfactory and worked effectively, as envisaged at appraisal.

1. Executing and Implementing Agencies

15. The lAs had responsibility and were accountable for management and decision making relating to subproject identification, design, and implementation. The PMCU was responsible for (i) endorsing and submitting subprojects to ADB for approval, (ii) full-time monitoring and coordination of project implementation, (iii) regular reporting to the project coordination committee and ADB on implementation progress, (iv) monitoring and coordinating procurement and managing disbursements, (v) consolidating the project accounts and maintaining imprest accounts, (vi) guiding and assisting the lAs on ADB’s procedures and all other project implementation matters, and (vii) all matters concerning donor coordination in order to ensure consistency and synergy while avoiding overlap with other rehabilitation assistance. The PMCU conducted regular monthly project implementation meetings (28 in total) that were effective in dealing with implementation issues. Following the mid-term review (July 2002), it was agreed that the PMCU would act on behalf of the project coordination committee and that the latter would only meet as required to resolve problems that could not be addressed by the PMCU.

2. Selection Criteria

16. As the Project was to be implemented using a sector approach, criteria for selecting eligible subprojects were outlined in Schedule 5, paras. 8–9 of the Loan Agreement. In addition,

10 The PMCU at the MOP was common to both the ADB-financed Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project and the

World Bank-financed Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project. The PMCU also coordinated operations with the World Fund Programme interventions associated with both emergency projects.

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IAs developed sector-specific criteria that were used to screen and prioritize subprojects for funding. The Ministry of Health (MOH), for example, required new health centers to be established rather than rehabilitating existing structures if water levels in flood-affected centers had exceeded 1.5 m above the existing floor level, as these would be subject to future flood damage. Subprojects exceeding $250,000 were referred to the PMCU for endorsement and ADB for review and approval in compliance with Schedule 5, para. 9. While the agreed criteria were generally followed (Appendix 5), there were instances when external influences were brought to bear on the prioritization of proposed subprojects, to the extent that one road alignment was rehabilitated (and significantly upgraded) that was outside the flood-affected area and not in full conformity with the agreed selection criteria (see also para. 27).

G. Conditions and Covenants

17. Recognizing the emergency nature of the Project, no special conditions were required before the loan became effective. All major loan covenants were generally met but two partial compliances are noted. The first (timely availability of counterpart funds) had an impact on the implementation schedule. Contractors’ interim payment certificates were not always met in a timely manner. That impacted on the financial resources of the financially less secure contractors and delayed their works programs. The second (provision of maintenance) has not been undertaken. That will reduce the effective life of facilities, particularly for national and rural roads but also for head works of irrigation facilities. Without provisions for routine and periodic maintenance of rehabilitated facilities, the value of the asset to economic activity will decline prematurely and thereby reduce the potential economic return on the investment.

18. External auditors appointed by MEF under procedures and terms acceptable to ADB carried out annual audits of the accounts of each component (two in the case of national transport routes for the two PIUs). No special issues were reported. Reporting requirements were substantially met, with the PMCU generating regular quarterly progress reports and one comprehensive government project completion report (PCR) that included subsector reports from each IA and provided much of the data used in preparing this PCR. No loan covenants were modified, suspended or waived. Appendix 6 summarizes the compliance status of the loan covenants.

H. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement

19. Direct engagement of consultants was provided for in the Loan Agreement by extending the scope of consultants engaged under ongoing ADB-funded projects with IAs for parts A, C and E. ADB approved advance action for recruiting consultants under parts B, D and F, and direct selection was according to arrangements agreed with ADB. Recruitment was conducted in a timely and open manner and in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants.

20. At appraisal, it was estimated that the Project would require a total of 343 person-months of international and 700 person-months of domestic consulting services. Some five contracts were awarded through firms under negotiated contracts and nine were awarded to individuals for parts E and F that resulted in 394 person-months of international and 770 person-months of domestic consulting services. Additional consulting services were needed, especially for Part A, to maintain supervision of construction standards and ensure that ADB procedures for procurement and loan disbursements were followed. A summary of consulting services is given in Appendix 7.

21. All civil works were procured in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines for Procurementthrough local competitive bidding (LCB) and force account to deal with emergency situations as provided for in the Loan Agreement. Some contracts that would have resulted in international

8

competitive bidding procurement procedures (i.e., exceeding $2.5 million) were split with ADB’s approval to qualify for LCB procedures. While this expedited commencement of works and provided local contractors better opportunity to participate, it inhibited access to international contractors, especially when some of these split contracts were eventually awarded to a single contractor. For contracts less than $2.5 million, the Loan Agreement allowed a single-stage, two-envelope procedure with a reduced 21-day bidding period to expedite procurement of civil works. This procedure was effective for the timely procurement of large civil works contracts under Part A. Some 643 civil works contract packages were procured, comprising 40 contracts for Part A, 31 contracts for Part B, 295 contracts for Part C, 267 contracts for Part D, and 10 contracts for Part E. Initially, the ceiling for force account works was $3 million, of which $2.5 million was earmarked for Part B (urgent repair of Kab Srov protection dike). Later, ADB approved an increase in the ceiling of the imprest account from $1 million to $2.5 million to complete, through force account procedures, four terminated contracts for national routes NR5 and NR6 and to improve drainage structures and replace narrow (dangerous) structures with addition of culverts, funding for which became evident towards the end of the Project. Furniture for Part D was procured in packages through LCB included in civil works contracts. Some delays in procurement of civil works occurred in Part A due to the Government’s time-consuming evaluation and approval process, compounded by three changes in the consultant team leader of PIU1 when tender documents were being prepared and bid evaluation was being undertaken.

I. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers

22. Consultants’ performance was generally satisfactory given the number of contracts and the geographically dispersed subproject sites. IAs appreciated the contribution of consultants in technical design, construction supervision, and contract administration as well as in providing impartiality and objectivity during bid evaluation and works certification. The replacement of consultant team leaders for both Part A PIUs was expedited efficiently as the need arose.11

23. Except for four contracts for the rehabilitation of NR5 and NR6, contractors performed satisfactorily in all components, even though there were some delays in rehabilitating the national routes. Most of those extensions were justified because of changes in the scope of works due to the limited time available for survey and investigation during contract preparation. The phasing of works under Part D allowed the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS) to screen contractors from 52 to 19 based on performance. Most local contractors lacked management and organizational skills as well as financial resources to meet cash flow requirements and relied, in reality, on regular settlement of interim certificates. Close supervision by consultants and counterparts was essential to ensure the quality of works in accordance with specifications, both on site for in situ concrete structures and construction of prefabricated structures away from the site. Foreign civil works contractors engaged for rehabilitating national roads experienced difficulties in locating materials and timely importing of construction equipment, which resulted in delays. Two contractors under Part A had their contracts terminated due to lack of performance. One of these had already completed the majority of works, while in the other case substantial works needed to be completed using force account.

11 Two successive team leaders for Part A PIU1 resigned because of incompatibility with the work requirements. The

team leader for Part A PIU2 was replaced for reason of incompetence.

9

J. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency

24. Considering the urgent nature, short implementation period, participation of five sectors and five IAs, and the use of proceeds from three loans plus donated food-for-work, the Government was successful in implementing the Project. The PMCU was established early after loan appraisal, handling coordination and monitoring of implementation issues in a timely manner. Monthly progress meetings were an important feature to identify implementation constraints and to determine mitigating measures.

25. Performances of MOWRAM (Part B), MOEYS (Part D), and MOH (Part E) are considered highly satisfactory. MOWRAM responded quickly to the emergency, mobilizing resources and completing the works program on Kab Srob dike before the 2001 wet season, during which another significant flood occurred. Similarly, MOH promptly issued and evaluated LCB tenders using approved procedures, completing rehabilitation of 48 health facilities by August 2001. The quality of works completed by MOWRAM, MOEYS, and MOH was satisfactory and their selection, procurement, contract administration, and reporting procedures were efficiently executed, even though MOEYS had some delays in bidding and contract award procedures.

26. Performances of MPWT-PIU1 (Part A) and MRD (Part C) are considered satisfactory. In spite of early problems with the consultant team leader, PIU1 substantially completed all subprojects by the contract completion dates and carried out additional works for embankment protection, line marking, and signage utilizing savings from the works contracts it supervised. MRD achieved physical completion of rural road rehabilitation by 31 December 2003, even though several identified subprojects were canceled due to over commitment of funds.

27. Even though all rehabilitation works contemplated under the management of the MPWT’s PIU2 (Part A) were eventually completed by the end of the project, PIU2 experienced delays in determining the demarcation of project scope, as the flood-hit sections on national roads NR5 and NR6 were also targeted under the ongoing Primary Road Restoration Project12. PIU2 was also slow to initiate termination of four nonperforming contracts that had been awarded to the same contractor. PIU2 recovered advance payments by negotiation on two of the failed contracts and also withheld retention payments and refused to honor interim payment certificates to recover advances on the remaining two. It attempted, but failed, to recover the performance bond to cover additional costs associated with termination. PIU2 suffered from external influence when selecting eligible subprojects for financing under the loan. For example, the NR71 road alignment is outside the flood-affected area and was upgraded under the Project without appropriate justification, even though the PMCU’s endorsement and ADB’s approval were granted based on the subproject proposal report prepared by the PIU with endorsement of the consultant. While other aspects of PIU2’s operations regarding loan utilization, contract administration, supervision and reporting were handled in a satisfactory manner, its performance is considered partly satisfactory.

28. Whether the institutional (technical and management) capacity of the IAs was adequate (para. 25) or showed some weakness (para. 26), the consultant inputs were necessary (i) to cope with the volume of work in expediting commencement of rehabilitation, (ii) to meet the time constraints, and (iii) to achieve the standards of construction.

12 ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendations of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the

Kingdom of Cambodia for the Primary Road Restoration Project. Manila (Loan 1697-CAM [SF])

10

K. Performance of Asian Development Bank

29. ADB responded promptly to the Government’s request for emergency assistance, processing the loan within 2 months of the first mission after the floods. The project design took into account the lessons learned from the first special rehabilitation loan that ADB had provided to rehabilitate essential infrastructure damaged by decades of war and neglect.13Implementation arrangements, and particularly procurement requirements, were appropriate for the emergency situation that required immediate action to restore functionality to road and rail infrastructure (para. 26). ADB approved advance action for procuring civil works under force account procedures, recruiting consultants, and providing for retroactive financing to meet the emergency. Arrangements for drawing loan funds were rather oversimplified, with only five loan categories in the Loan Agreement, one for each part. That had to be modified in October 2001 to allow for different reimbursement rates for civil and non-civil works, and for effective counterpart contributions from the Government (para. 41). ADB recognized that delays in approving documents was hindering implementation progress and transferred the administration of Part A to Cambodia Resident Mission in July 2001, parts D and E in August 2001, and parts B and C were transferred in October and June 2002, respectively. ADB was flexible in approving an increased ceiling for the PIU2 imprest account that permitted timely completion of works under four terminated contracts using force account as the loan was approaching closure. ADB approved awarded contracts, disbursement and reallocation of funds, variation orders, and increased contract amounts as appropriate and in a timely manner. However, in its endeavor to respond rapidly, ADB was, occasionally, not sufficiently thorough in screening proposed subprojects. ADB fielded 17 project review missions for all parts (some concurrently) during implementation. ADB’s overall performance is considered satisfactory.

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

A. Relevance

30. The project design’s relevance is obvious, as it addressed a critical situation to facilitate the return of economic activity to flood-affected areas around the Mekong River and Tonle Sap. The Project conformed to the Government’s development strategy of promoting economic development by improving infrastructure. It was consistent with ADB's Country Operational Strategy, aimed at poverty reduction through economic development.14 The Project was designed to rehabilitate infrastructure essential for economic growth. Implemented with a “sector” modality, implementation brought no major design changes and the design is considered highly relevant.

B. Efficacy in Achievement of Purpose

31. The Project was one of several donor-financed projects to accelerate recovery from damage caused by the exceptional floods of 2000. ADB provided support to those sectors in which it had existing loans and therefore had insight into each sector’s needs. Rehabilitation of both essential and other infrastructure was carried out in a timely manner through subprojects generally (paras. 12 and 27) selected according to Government and ADB criteria and priorities. Large sections of the transportation network, including roads, bridges and railway lines, were rehabilitated to restore access between farms and provincial and district markets. Rehabilitated irrigation and flood protection activities allowed the return of economic activity and protected

13 ADB. 1992. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the

Kingdom of Cambodia for the Special Rehabilitation Assistance Project. Manila (Loan 1199–CAM[SF])14 ADB. 2000. Country Operational Strategy: Enabling a Socioeconomic Renaissance. Manila.

11

against future flood damage and disruption, while rehabilitation of schools and health facilities enabled the Government to continue its efforts to improve the socioeconomic conditions in flood-affected areas. The Project was efficacious in achieving its intended purpose.

C. Efficiency in Achievement of Outputs and Purpose

32. In conformity with the operations manual enforced at the time, no economic analysis was undertaken at appraisal and none has been completed for the PCR. Benefit monitoring and evaluation activities were conducted with mixed success under parts C, D and E and are summarized in Appendix 8. Based on field inspections during the PCR Mission, incremental benefits from most investments would be expected to generate high rates of return, as unit road construction costs were well within established norms ($44,000/km for primary roads and $11,000/km for rural roads), new classroom costs were about $5,600 per room, and renovations of health facilities were minimal to achieve essential functionality of affected health centers and referral hospitals. Furthermore, most of the national routes and secondary roads rehabilitated comprised alignments that carried significant traffic volumes, where impact from rehabilitation would be greatest. Flood control and irrigation rehabilitation were carried out using options having the lowest costs per hectare to achieve the desired result.

33. Efficiency of project implementation is considered high given the complex nature of the multisector activities and large number of small contracts to be administered and supervised MOEYS worked closely with local school committees to supervise construction and make payments to contractors that proved efficient throughout the dispersed geographical area. The consulting services contributed significantly to overall efficiency and played a critical role in ensuring the quality of works programs. Rapid mobilization of experienced consultants and staff by each of the IAs, along with coordination by the PMCU, contributed to the Project’s efficient implementation. The Project is rated as efficient.

D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability

34. Project sustainability is determined by the ability of the IAs to preserve assets created or restored in good condition through appropriate operations and maintenance. While rehabilitation focused on restoring facilities to their pre-flood conditions, in many instances facilities were upgraded to a higher level as it was uneconomic to restore them to their former states. As such, the Government has significantly improved its asset base. The challenge is to retain operational efficiency and preserve the value of the assets through an appropriate maintenance programs. Rehabilitation designs recognized resource limitations and incorporated low maintenance structures and road surfaces as appropriate. But this does not negate the need for maintenance. For the laterite and earthen roads, routine and periodic maintenance are necessary to keep rural transport routes in usable condition, particularly where the combination of wet roads and heavy loads associated with narrow-wheeled vehicles can cause damage. With paved surfaces, there is protection from water penetration but traffic volumes and axle loads are usually greater. On rehabilitated alignments visited during the PCR Mission, indications are that routine maintenance—gravel on shoulders, stabilizing embankments and repairing potholes—should be carried out as soon as possible. Rural road maintenance is discussed in the PCR for the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project.15 The Government is aware of the issue of road maintenance and has established a dedicated fund for repair and road maintenance financed by surcharges on fuel. That fund, however, cannot meet the road

15 ADB.1995. Report and Recommendations of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the

Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project. Manila (Loan 1385-CAM[SF])

12

maintenance requirements because of (i) low volume of traffic that does not generate enough funds, and (ii) the lack of capacity at central and provincial levels in maintenance planning and management, which hinders appropriate prioritization of available funds. Although ADB has assisted16 Cambodia in policies and technical standards for road maintenance management to address the issue, more assistance and a higher level of commitment from the Government to implement the recommendations is still required to significantly improve the situation.17

35. In the case of flood protection dikes, there are indications that routine maintenance is not being carried out. Responsibility for maintaining the Kab Srov dike, for example, remains with MOWRAM although ownership was transferred to the Municipality of Phnom Penh after the works guarantee period. Rights-of-way are not respected, as opportunist land grabbing to take advantage of rising land values has become common, and that further adds to the difficulties of implementing a routine maintenance program. In the case of irrigation rehabilitation, maintenance of major structures rehabilitated under the Project is being partially addressed. MOWRAM has performed routine maintenance of flood gates, motors, and lifting screws, but it has paid less attention to embankments adjoining structures,18 where weaknesses are developing from the mobility of fine particulate matter through the earthen structures. If these are not repaired, embankments are likely to fail. Maintenance of lower-level delivery canals and drains and on-farm water management structures was to be undertaken by farmer water user communities (FWUCs) and supported by the provincial departments of water resources and meteorology. Loan funds were used to establish FWUC meeting facilities at each irrigation facility. The condition of delivery canals inspected during the PCR Mission suggests the FWUCs are not functioning as originally intended, even though water user fees were reported to have been collected.

36. Maintenance on buildings (schools, health centers, and referral hospitals) is less critical but still an important consideration to achieve the greatest effective life of the facilities. No maintenance had been undertaken on the rehabilitated and newly constructed school and health facilities.

37. The lack of routine maintenance to date on roads, flood prevention structures, and irrigation facilities would suggest that the assets rehabilitated under the Project will not remain in a condition that will generate benefits that otherwise might be achieved. Without further long-term and regular allocation for maintenance, the sustainability of investment is considered less likely.

E. Environmental, Sociocultural, and Other Impacts

38. Interventions under the Project did not interfere with existing ecosystems, as almost all the activities were restorative. Flooding is an annual phenomenon (although to a lesser extent than occurred in 2000) to which local communities and economic activity have adapted. Project works have generally improved the quality of life in rural communities, which were and continue to be the principal beneficiaries. The restoration works allowed normal activities to be resumed while providing

16 ADB. 1999. Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for Strengthening the Maintenance Planning and

Management Capacities at the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Manila (TA 3257–CAM); ADB. 2001. Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Transport Sector Study. Manila (TA 3651–CAM).

17 The Government of Japan is currently financing a study on Road Network Development that includes a component addressing road maintenance issues. ADB is preparing (approval due in 2006) the Transport Infrastructure Development and Maintenance Project, which will initiate rehabilitation of the network of secondary national roads. It will ensure a sustainable maintenance works program by developing an approach to effectively utilize the fund for repair and road maintenance and strengthening the institutional structure for planning and delivery of road maintenance services.

18 Under the ministerial decree Prakas 306, the size of the irrigation facility will determine the extent to which FWUCs can assume maintenance responsibilities. The larger structures generally will require budgetary allocations for their maintenance while for smaller earthen structures; FWUCs can provide the resources using local labor.

13

better access to markets, medical facilities, and schools. The flood-affected people returned home with greater assurance that the physical infrastructure is now better placed to cope with future floods.

39. Rehabilitating protection dikes, constructing flood-relief channels, and raising several road alignments required resettling a small number of affected persons (estimated at 700). The approved resettlement plans were satisfactorily implemented, and most project-affected persons have been adequately compensated for any asset loss and disturbance and their livelihoods restored to at least pre-flood levels (Appendix 9). One resettlement site was less successful and the poorest households in that particular location are being closely monitored to identify opportunities for further support (para. 47). The Project impacts are rated as significant.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment

40. The Project followed a sector approach, as was proposed in the original design. This suited the emergency situation, permitted rapid processing of the loan proposal in parallel with detailed needs assessment, and allowed a flexible response within the selection criteria agreed with the Government. All initial subprojects identified at appraisal and a few additional ones were completed by the revised loan closing date of 30 June 2004. The quality of works was, on average, acceptable. While there were implementation difficulties with two contractors under Part A, the outcomes of the Project overall were as anticipated. In conclusion, overall performance of the Project is rated as successful.19

B. Lessons Learned

41. With the benefit of previous emergency loan experience, ADB prepared a highly relevant project that was implemented in an expedient manner. However, the element of immediacy arising from extensive and widespread flood damage created a different set of challenges than those experienced when the country was recovering from an extended period of civil unrest. Lessons have therefore been learned in two areas, those being in design and implementation.

1. Design Considerations

42. The emergency demanded a rapid response. Short-term expedience to accelerate processing was necessary but had some repercussions on the operational efficiency of loan disbursement. Accepting disbursement arrangements in the original design that incorporated neither interest during construction nor PMCU operating costs was an oversight. It loosely grouped disbursement accounts (loan categories) into one for each part (component), covering all items from those with predominantly foreign exchange costs to those that were mainly local costs. Insufficient attention to such details during the design stage has resulted in considerable confusion among the IAs and their management units, as well as for project analysts within ADB and MEF. This has resulted in the Government’s eventually making a reduced contribution to the cost of civil works than was envisaged at appraisal. The Government made no counterpart contributions in the first 12 months of implementation. While this did not slow the rate of progress (it may in fact have helped, as counterpart funds were slow to be released), it was clearly not the intention when the Loan Agreement was negotiated.

19 This PCR is part of a sample of PCRs independently reviewed by the Operations Evaluation Department. The

review has validated the methodology used and the rating given.

14

43. The second aspect relates to design of structures and civil works. While the Government is understandably reluctant to spend loan funds on foreign consultants, depending exclusively on domestic specialists would have significant repercussions for engineering design (particularly in complex areas of hydrology where limited reliable data is available) and in the supervising works. During consultations with the PCR Mission, the IAs, without exception, considered international consultant inputs as a necessary part of the Project on both counts. While good technical expertise is being developed in the line agencies and the emerging private sector in each of these fields, technical skills require further development. In terms of quality assurance, the IAs also recognize that the position of government monitors, especially junior staff, is easily weakened by influential contractors. The impartiality international specialists brought to contract administration and quality assurance greatly assisted in achieving desired outcomes.

2. Implementation Issues

44. Implementation lessons learned are summarized as follows: (i) Given the complex multisector context and sector modality of implementation, the

Project benefited from PMCU’s efficient monitoring and coordination within MOP. (ii) Close monitoring and quality control of construction by an independent individual

or organization is needed if design quality standards are to be achieved. (iii) Close monitoring of adherence to selection criteria for subprojects is necessary

to ensure that resources are channeled appropriately. (iv) Even if standard designs for common structures (roads, buildings, and irrigation)

have already been established, each new project tends to promote its own design. Efficiencies are available through standardizing certain designs, and the Government should assess the relative merits of the available alternatives.

(v) Procedures for prequalifying contractors can take as long as 6 months (including ADB approvals). In an emergency, it is expedient to draw on short-listed contractors from ongoing or recently completed internationally funded projects with a similar scope of works to avoid selecting contractors by bid price alone. Post-qualification procedures might be used to speed up procurement.

(vi) Technical capacity building initiatives were not part of the design, but counterpart staff benefited significantly from working alongside international specialists.

(vii) Civil works projects generally require associated capacity building within IAs for contract administration and addressing ADB procurement and disbursement procedures. In that respect, consultants greatly assisted management units to achieve timely completion of works, submission of withdrawal applications, and liquidation of imprest accounts.

(viii) When unnecessarily lengthy and complex, procedures for the endorsement of interim payment certificates and payment of counterpart funds can provide opportunities for individuals to seek advantage from the system.

C. Recommendations

1. Project Related

45. Future Monitoring. As maintenance is central to assure an asset’s effective life, future monitoring activities should focus on the incidence of maintenance undertaken and the budgetary allocations to same. ADB has considerably assisted the Government to recognize the importance of maintenance in MPWT, MRD, and MOWRAM. Units have been established within these ministries to develop and monitor maintenance programs. It is recommended that ADB support should adopt a greater focus on the maintenance aspect of infrastructure rather than

15

invest further resources in new infrastructure that without appropriate maintenance will diminish in value, as will the associated benefits. Streamlining of functions, establishing maintenance programs, and monitoring budgetary allocations should be institutionalized within the agencies.

46. Covenants. The covenants agreed were appropriate. That partially fulfilled concerning maintenance needs to be addressed by the Government to ensure full benefits will be achieved from rehabilitation works. Beneficiaries can share in maintenance responsibilities under certain circumstances (small-scale irrigation facilities and rural roads), but this must be complemented with budgetary allocations for routine and periodic maintenance of public investments.

47. Follow-Up on Resettlement. With the recent awareness that some 40 households relocated from the Kab Srov protection dike site may be worse off than prior to relocation, further investigations have been undertaken to determine the most appropriate measures to restore their livelihoods. It is recommended that the Inter-ministerial Resettlement Committee and Municipality of Phnom Penh report the agreed actions to assist those households.

48. Technical Standardization. The Government should consider reviewing the various alternative engineering designs for common and easily replicable structures (bridges, culverts, spillways, etc.) developed during several preceding projects and currently available in the concerned line agencies. Future support in rehabilitating land transport and irrigation facilities should incorporate hydrological data collection that will assist the Government in progressively building its records to facilitate more appropriate designs with better assessment of risk.

49. Timing of the Project Performance Audit Report. A project performance audit report should be scheduled for the first half of 2007. By then, all infrastructure will have been in use for at least 3 years and impacts of the Government’s maintenance program can best be assessed.

2. General

50. Even though emergencies demand immediate action, greater care should be taken to establish mechanisms to provide for counterpart fund contributions and achieve appropriate controls for applying loan funds to both foreign and local expenses. This directly concerns loan disbursement arrangements. The roles of consultants should be clear in design documents. Responsibilities within each IA of engineering designers, contract preparation specialists, contract administrators, or quality-assurance personnel should be clarified. The role of an external and impartial engineer under contracts following established standards prescribed by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers is to confirm quantities and sign off on quality standards used during construction. Given prevailing conditions in Cambodia in terms of technical capacity, governance, and political influence, there is advantage in engaging external consultants to ensure adherence to quality standards and contract administration as prescribed in International Federation of Consulting Engineers contracts.

51. Given the complex and protracted approval procedures of IAs and MEF, advance action for procuring equipment, materials, and consultants, as well as for retroactive financing, as provided for under the Project, should be replicated in future emergency assistance projects funded by ADB. Also, the provision to use force account provided needed flexibility to complete terminated contracts and gain maximum use of the loan funds without incurring higher unit costs for works.

52. To overcome capacity constraints of line agencies identified during implementation, ADB should continue to provide training on project implementation, procurement procedures, and loan disbursement to management unit staff on a regular basis.

16 Appendix 1

PROJECT FRAMEWORKa

DesignSummary

Performance Indicators/Targets

MonitoringMechanisms

Assumptionsand Risks

GoalComplement Government initiatives for the early restoration of economic and social activity—and especially for the rural poor—that resulted from the damage following the 2000 floods.

Return of livelihood activities of rural inhabitants to pre-flood levels.

Return of commercial activity to pre-flood levels.

Household surveys of flood effected areas.

Provincial production statistics.

National economic growth statistics.

Donors’ activities are coordinated effectively.

Facilities are maintained to ensure their future functional operation.

Purpose(i) To restore essential

national road infrastructure.

(ii) To restore essential flood protection dikes and irrigation schemes.

(iii) To rehabilitate essential rural roads.

(iv) To rehabilitate or replace education facilities.

(v) To rehabilitate or replace health facilities.

Distance of national routes rehabilitated. Number of bridges rehabilitated.

Protection dikes rehabilitated.

Number of irrigation schemes rehabilitated and farmer water user communities (FWUCs) operational.

Distance of rural roads rehabilitatedDistance of earthen roads repaired.

Schools in flood affected areas are functioning. Pupil attendance.

Health services in flood-affected areas are functioning. Health center visits and regional hospital referrals.

Project reports.

Project reports.

Project reports.

Project reports FWUC meetings and water service fees collected for maintenance.

Project reports.

Surveys conducted by Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.

Surveys conducted by Ministry of Health.

Priority identification and selection process are administered objectively.

Government rehabilitation process is adequately executed. Funds for significant head-works maintenance are made available by the Government.

Funds are made available for routine and periodic maintenance.

Government budget is not available for their routine operations.

Government budget is not available for their routine operations.

OutputsRoads rehabilitated

Flood control and irrigation rehabilitated

The extent of the works was not quantified at appraisal although the total cost was budgeted at $43.7 million.

Rehabilitation of a 7 km section of the Kab Srov

Interim payment certificates approved.

Interim payment certificates approved.

Suitable roads identified that conform with criteria.

Government budget for major repairs to structures is

Appendix 1 17

DesignSummary

Performance Indicators/Targets

MonitoringMechanisms

Assumptionsand Risks

Rural roads

Education facilities

dike to protect Phnom Penh, including relocation of 40–50 households.

Rehabilitation of Prek Thnot Flood Control and Irrigation System in Kandal Province.

Rehabilitation of seven medium-scale irrigation projects.

Rehabilitation of up to 100 small-scale irrigation projects.

Establishment of FWUCs to carry out operation and maintenance activities on all subprojects.

Rehabilitation of flood-affected rural road alignments that are responsibility of Ministry of Rural Development, including: (i) damaged

sections along 600 km of laterite roads,

(ii) damaged sections along 300–500 km of earth roads,

(iii) 40 bridges, and (iv) 300 culverts.

Rehabilitation of primary schools including furniture: (i) 105 classrooms

in 24 urban schools,

(ii) 952 classrooms in 206 rural schools, and

(iii) 321 classrooms in 102 remote schools.

Interim payment certificates approved.

Interim payment certificates approved.

Interim payment certificates approved.

FWUCs’ annual progress reports of fees collected.

Interim payment certificates approved.

Labor days for rehabilitation of rural roads.

Interim payment certificates approved.

provided after rehabilitation.

Provinces assist in allocating maintenance funds to Provincial Departments of Rural Development.

18 Appendix 1

DesignSummary

Performance Indicators/Targets

MonitoringMechanisms

Assumptionsand Risks

Health facilities

Rehabilitation of secondary schools including furniture: 211 classrooms in 35 schools.

Rehabilitation of health center and referral hospital buildings, furniture, beds, wells, and latrines.

Replacement (with new concrete buildings) of destroyed health centers and referral hospitals.

No physical estimates were included at appraisal but the allocation was $1.5 million.

Interim payment certificates approved.

FWUC = farmer water user community a At appraisal, a project framework was not incorporated in the report and recommendation of the President. The material

presented herein reports what such a document might have been.

Appendix 2

19

PROJECT PHYSICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

Table A2.1: Civil Works Completed by Project Implementation Unit 1 Ministry of Public Works and Transport - Part A

Subproject Contract No. National Road Description Contract Costs ($'000s)

Original Final Change

S-01/01a R11a-1/2 NR 11 Emergency works to restore access NR 11 295.0 285.0 (10.0)

S-02 R1a NR 1 Rehabilitation of NR 1 section VAMI Pk63–Pk64 151.0 145.0 (6.0)

S-03 R1b NR 1 Protection to bailey bridges on NR 1 355.0 303.0 (52.0)

S-04 R2a NR 2 Rehabilitation Pk119–Pk125 on NR 2 356.0 208.0 (148.0)

S-05 R1d NR 1 Rehabilitation Pk24–Pk60 in NR 1 1,510.0 915.0 (595.0)

S-06 R2b NR 2 Rehabilitation Pk11–Pk78 on NR 2 1,277.0 1,051.0 (226.0)

S-07 R11c-1 NR 11 Rehabilitation Pk61–Pk79 on NR 11 2,267.0 1,979.0 (288.0)

S-08 R11c-2 NR 11 Rehabilitation Pk79–Pk91 on NR 11 2,228.0 2,210.0 (18.0)

S-09 R11c-3 NR 11 Rehabilitation Pk91–Pk126 on NR 11 1,822.0 2,211.0 389.0

S-10 R11c-4 NR 11 Rehabilitation Pk126–Pk151 on NR 11 2,177.0 2,014.0 (163.0)

S-11 R11b NR 11 Rehabilitation of bridges on NR 11 1,770.0 1,655.0 (115.0)

S-12 R1e NR 1 Replacement of Trabek Bridges on NR 1 750.0 720.0 (30.0)

S-13 R21 NR 21 Rehabilitation of Pk18.5–Pk45 on NR 21 1,535.0 2,234.0 699.0

S-14 R1f NR 1 Repairs to bailey bridges on NR 1 5.0 5.0 0.0

S-15 R2c NR 2 Replacement of bridge at Pk18 on NR 1 380.0 380.0 0.0

S-16 R21b NR 21 Repairs to bridges on NR 1 50.0 50.0 0.0

S-17 R21c NR 21 Widening and resealing Pk15–Pk18.5 on NR 1 96.0 96.0 0.0

S-18 R1g NR 1 Further repairs Pk24–Pk60 on NR 1 249.0 279.0 30.0

Total all contracts 17,273.0 16,740.0 (533.0) NR = national road; Pk = point kilometer measured from Phnom Penh along the road alignment. Sources: project reports and MPWT

20Appendix 2

Table A2.2: Civil Works Completed by Project Implementation Unit 2 Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) – Part A

Final Amount ($ million) No. Sector Name

EstimatedADB Cost June ‘01 ($ million)

DateApproved by ADB

Approved Value

ADB+Gvt

Procurement Procedure

ADB Gvt Total 5AF2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 between Phnom Penh and

Krakor. 7.300 31 Jul 01 7.515 ICB 5A1F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north from Kampong Chhnang

(Pk91.0 to Pk109.3). 13 Sep 01 1.973 LCB 1.576 0.137 1.714 5A2F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north of Kampong Chhnang

(Pk109.3 to Pk128.6). 13 Sep 01 2.095 LCB 1.863 0.162 2.025 5A3F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north of Kampong Chhnang

(Pk128.6 to Pk147.2). 13 Sep 01 1.819 LCB 1.548 0.135 1.682 5A4F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north of Kampong Chhnang

(Pk147.2 to Pk171.0). 7.300 13 Sep 01 1.615 LCB 1.455 0.127 1.582 5DF2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 between Battambang and

Sisophon. 1.953 LCB 5D1F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north of Battambang (Pk304 to

Pk325). 10 Aug 01 1.557 LCB 0.136 0.012 0.148 5D2F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 south of Sisophon (Pk325 to

Pk359). 3.000 10 Aug 01 1.815 LCB 0.101 0.009 0.110 5D1F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 north of Battambang (Pk304 to

Pk325). 25 Mar 03 FA 1.401 0.122 1.522 5D2F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 5 south of Sisophon (Pk325 to

Pk359). 25 Mar 03 FA 1.940 0.169 2.109 6AF2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 6 between Skun and Kampong

Thom. 1.700 LCB 6A1F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 6 between Skun and Tiang

Krasang. 3 Aug 01 1.772 LCB 0.521 0.045 0.567 6A2F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 6 between Tiang Krasang and

Kampong Thom. 4.000 3 Aug 01 2.193 LCB 0.252 0.022 0.274 6A1F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 6 between Skun and Tiang

Krasang. 2 Dec 03 FA 1.403 0.122 1.525 6A2F2 Road Rehabilitation of NR 6 between Tiang Krasang and

Kampong Thom 2 Dec 03 FA 1.595 0.139 1.734 D1F2 Road Repair of drainage system on NR 5 through Kampong

Chhnang township. 0.050 16 Aug 01 0.039 FA 0.035 0.003 0.038 D2F2 Road Repair of drainage system on NR 5 through

Battambang township. 9 May 02 0.381 NLS 0.330 0.029 0.359 6F2-1 Road Repairs to flood-damaged pavement on NR 6 between

Phnom Penh and Skun. 0.035 16 Aug 01 0.035 FA 0.035 0.000 0.035 6F2-2 Road Additional pavement repairs on NR 6 between Phnom

Penh and Pk45. 15 Jan 02 0.030 FA 0.025 0.002 0.028

Appendix 2

21

Final Amount ($ million) No. Sector Name

EstimatedADB Cost June ‘01 ($ million)

DateApproved by ADB

Approved Value

ADB+Gvt

Procurement Procedure

ADB Gvt Total 57F2 Road Restoration of NR 57 including bridges between

Battambang and Pailin. 0.160 0.000 LCB 68F2 Road Restoration of NR 68 including bridges between

Kralanh and Samroang. 0.150 0.000 LCB 160F2 Road Restoration of NR 160 including bridges between

Chamkar Chek and Pailin. 0.100 0.000 LCB 2129F2 Road Restoration of NR 129 including bridges between

Odong and Kampong Speu. 0.098 0.000 LCB 130F2 Road Restoration of NR 130 including bridges between

Odong and Prek Phnou. 0.150 0.000 LCB 70F2 Road Restoration of NR 70 including bridges between Prey

Totueng and Peam Chi Kang. 0.130 0.000 LCB 71AF2 Road Restoration of NR 71 including bridges between Prey

Traueng and Chamkar Leu. 4 Jul 02 2.351 LCB 1.572 0.137 1.709 71BF2 Road Restoration of NR 71 including bridges between

Chamkar Leu and Kampong Thmor. 0.130 LCB 222F2 Road Restoration of NR 222 including bridges between

Boeung Chek Prey and Preak Kak. 0.100 0.000 LCB 223F2 Road Restoration of NR 223 including bridges between

PeamChikang and Preak Kak. 0.130 0.000 LCB R1F2 Rail Rehabilitation of damaged sections of rail track on

Northern Line. 0.742 7 Jun 01 0.742 LCB 1.096 0.095 1.191 R2F2 Rail Rehabilitation of damaged bridges on the Northern and

Southern lines. 0.517 9 May 01 0.517 LCB 0.361 0.031 0.392 R3F2 Rail Rehabilitation and replacement of damaged culverts on

the Northern and Southern lines. 0.330 7 Jun 01 0.330 LCB R4F2-1 Rail Rehabilitation of damaged section of drainage on the

Southern Line. 0.090 27 Apr 01 0.090 FA 0.088 0.000 0.088 R4F2-2 Rail Additional drainage rehabilitation at Pk262+074 on the

Southern Line. 13 Dec 01 0.030 FA 0.027 0.002 0.029 Total for Subprojects 17.212 19.383 17.361 1.499 18.860

ADB = Asian Development Bank, Gvt = Government, FA = force account, ICB = international competitive bidding, LCB = local competitive bidding, Pk = point kilometer measured from Phnom Penh along the road alignment. Sources: project reports and MPWT.

22Appendix 2

Table A2.3: Civil Works Completed by Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology – Part B

Sub-project

Contract No. Description Contract Costs ($'000) Contract Dates

Original Final Change

% ADB Financed

Contract Start Finish

1 EFRP/001 Rehabilitation of Kab Srov Dike - Package I - Earthworks 1,592.5 1,472.8 (119.7) 100 14 Feb 01 14 Feb 01 3 Mar 01

2 EFRP/003 Prek Thnot Flood Dike Rehabilitation - Package I - Right Bank and Emergency Earthworks 488.9 477.3 (11.6) 100 2 May 01 2 May 01 20 Dec 01

3 EFRP/004 Prek Thnot Flood Dike Rehabilitation - Package II - Left Bank and Emergency Earthworks 156.8 155.2 (1.6) 100 17 May 01 17 May 01 22 Apr 01

4 EFRP/005 Kab Srov Embankment Protection Works 246.7 246.7 0.0 100 30 May 01 30 May 01 2 Dec 01

5 EFRP/006 Rehabilitation of Gate Structures and Replacement of Gates 91.3 91.3 0.0 100 7 Jul 01 7 Jul 01 15 Nov 01

6 EFRP/007 Kab Srov Embankment Protection and Structure Works 1,235.3 1,136.1 (99.2) 95 12 Dec 01 18 Dec 01 12 Jul 02

7 EFRP/008 Rehabilitation of Prokeoun Reservoir and Irrigation Scheme 177.2 170.3 (6.9) 100 27 Jul 01 27 Jul 01 17 Jul 02

8 EFRP/009 Rehabilitation of Boeng Trongal Reservoir and Irrigation Scheme 145.2 171.3 26.2 95 9 Jul 01 9 Jul 01 3 Jul 03

9 EFRP/010 Rehabilitation of Sopha Pump Station and Irrigation Scheme 81.7 81.7 0.0 100 5 Jul 01 5 Jul 01 26 Oct 01

10 EFRP/011 Mekong River Bank Protection Works 219.2 217.9 (1.2) 100 30 Jul 01 30 Jul 01 4 Oct 01

11 EFRP/012 Rehabilitation of Kom Pong Toul Embankment and Concrete Works 66.3 62.3 (4.1) 100 25 Jul 01 25 Jul 01 25 Oct 01

12 EFRP/013 Rehabilitation of Svay Khom Dike and Structure 68.5 62.7 (5.8) 100 6 Aug 01 6 Aug 01 16 Oct 01

13 EFRP/014 Rehabilitation of Koy Trabek Canal 119.8 109.0 (10.8) 100 12 Aug 01 12 Aug 01 22 Mar 02

14 EFRP/015 Rehabilitation of Chhroy Samrong Dike and Structure 137.9 134.9 (3.0) 100 12 Aug 01 12 Aug 01 6 May 02

15 EFRP/016 Rehabilitation of Kab She Dike 55.2 50.6 (4.6) 100 12 Aug 01 12 Aug 01 18 Jan 02

16 EFRP/017 Rehabilitation of Phdau Chum Dike - Emergency Earthworks 219.8 202.0 (17.8) 100 28 Aug 01 28 Aug 01 13 Feb 02

17 EFRP/018 Supply of Steel Bar for Kab Srov Dike 99.1 99.1 0.0 100 20 May 01 20 May 01 17 Jul 01

18 EFRP/019 Supply of Geo-textiles and PVC for Kab Srov Dike 24.7 24.7 0.0 100 15 May 01 15 May 01 17 Jul 01

Appendix 2

23

Sub-project

Contract No. Description Contract Costs ($'000) Contract Dates

Original Final Change

% ADB Financed

Contract Start Finish

19 EFRP/020 Supply of Gravel, Rock and Sand for Kab Srov Dike 97.1 97.1 0.0 100 15 May 01 15 May 01 17 Jul 01

20 EFRP/021 Supply Ready Mixed Concrete for Kab Srov Dike 99.7 99.7 0.0 100 15 May 01 15 May 01 26 Oct 01

21 EFRP/022 Supply of Construction Material for Kab Srov Dike 99.7 99.7 0.0 100 27 Jun 01 27 Jun 01 12 Nov 01

22 EFRP/023 Rehabilitation of Tamao Dike 112.5 106.2 (6.3) 95 4 Jan 02 14 Jan 02 7 Aug 02

23 EFRP/024 Rehabilitation of Pau Tanaun 95.2 93.3 (1.9) 95 4 Jan 02 9 Jan 02 26 Jul 02

24 EFRP/025 Phnom Damrey Reservoir 247.9 247.1 (0.8) 95 14 Dec 01 20 Dec 01 19 Jul 02

25 EFRP/026 Rehabilitation of Roleang Chraey Cross Regulator 129.7 137.6 7.9 95 8 Jan 02 10 Jan 02 27 Sep 02

26 EFRP/027 Rehabilitation of Roleang Chraey South Canal, Head Regulator and Flood Protection Dike 169.9 194.5 24.5 95 8 Jan 02 10 Jan 02 31 Jul 02

27 EFRP/028 Rehabilitation of Phdau Chum Flood Protection Dike 1,155.7 992.1 (163.6) 95 12 Apr 02 12 Apr 02 12 Aug 02

28 EFRP/029 Raising of the Prek Thnot Right Bank, Road No. 38 and Extend Protalang 589.6 588.3 (1.3) 95 12 Apr 02 12 Apr 02 12 Aug 02

29 EFRP/030 Prek Thnot Relief Channel Off-Take Structure 597.0 753.8 156.7 95 3 May 02 3 May 02 2 Nov 03

30 EFRP/031 Prek Thnot Flood Relief Channel 1,163.6 1,154.1 (9.6) 95 28 Nov 02 28 Nov 02 25 Nov 03

31 EFRP/032 River Mekong Erosion Protection Works 2002 295.2 289.8 (5.4) 95 28 Jun 02 28 Jun 02 10 Jul 02

Total Works Program 10,079.2 9,819.2 (259.9)

ADB = Asian Development Bank, EFRP = emergency floodway rehabilitation project. Sources: project reports and MOWRAM.

24Appendix 2

Table A2.4: Tertiary Rural Roads Completed Under Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project Ministry of Rural Development – Part C

(km)

2001 2002 2003 Total

Province Earthwork Laterite Earthwork Laterite Earthwork Laterite Earthwork Laterite

Banteay Meanchey 25.83 25.5 7.20 33.03 25.50

Battambang 49.71 43.21 4.50 3.00 54.21 46.21

Kampong Cham 5.10 12.62 35.53 23.89 5.50 0.20 46.13 36.71

Kampong Chhnang 23.94 22.70 34.16 31.63 1.55 5.34 59.67 59.67

Kampong Speu 30.52 29.31 8.40 1.20 38.92 30.51

Kampong Thom 20.41 7.78 36.02 36.93 4.47 56.44 49.17

Kampot 7.98 8.40 18.75 21.08 10.00 2.65 36.73 32.13

Kandal 19.36 3.30 17.74 22.6 12.60 37.10 38.50

Kratie 12.50 17.79 25.65 30.29 25.65

Phnom Penh 11.80 11.80 11.80 11.80

Prey Veng 14.35 12.23 50.55 43.67 0.50 64.90 56.40

Pursat 45.16 34.36 14.6 10.20 59.76 44.56

Siem Reap 29.11 22.76 22.3 4.35 51.41 27.11

Sihanoukville 7.1 7.1 7.10 7.10

Svay Rieng 8.27 2.26 33.16 25.58 4.08 41.43 31.92

Takeo 19.47 19.47 26.32 15.62 45.79 35.09

Total 674.71 558.04

Sources: project reports and MRD.

Appendix 2

25

Table A2.5: Bridges and Culverts on Tertiary Roads Rehabilitated Under Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project

Ministry of Rural Development – Part C

2001 2002 2003 Total

Province Bridge Culvert Bridge Culvert Bridge Culvert Bridge Culvert

Banteay Meanchey 6 2 3 9 9 11 Battambang 1 38 16 1 54 Kampong Cham 5 2 5 57 18 10 77 Kampong Chhnang 4 26 5 30 1 14 10 70 Kampong Speu 3 33 1 13 4 46 Kampong Thom 5 16 2 50 2 8 9 74 Kampot 13 18 8 31 21 49 Kandal 1 10 1 10 2 20 Kratie 1 8 1 16 12 2 36 Phnom Penh 14 14 Prey Veng 2 9 2 9 Pursat 2 19 5 2 24 Siem Reap 2 22 3 18 5 40 Sihanoukville 6 6 Svay Rieng 5 21 26 Takeo 2 14 2 27 4 41

Total 81 597 Sources: project reports and MRD.

26Appendix 2

Table A2.6: School Buildings Completed Under Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport – Part D

Description Numberof Schools Classrooms Date Started Date

CompletedContract

ValueTotal

Payment Contract Balance

Phase 1

Kampong Cham 6 28 8 Jun 01 29 Oct 01 131,494.53 131,494.53 0.00

Kampot 4 18 8 Jun 01 8 Oct 01 83,434.19 80,244.48 3,189.71

Prey Veng 8 34 8 Jun 01 17 Oct 01 160,699.45 156,104.93 4,594.52

Pursat 4 18 8 Jun 01 29 Oct 01 83,673.99 83,673.99 0.00

Ratanakiri 1 3 12 Jun 01 24 Sep 01 16,521.20 16,099.40 421.80

Siam Reap 2 7 8 Jun 01 8 Oct 01 30,622.87 29,894.00 728.87

Stung Treng 1 4 8 Jun 01 6 Sep 01 21,632.85 21,632.85 0.00

Svay Rieng 6 22 8 Jun 01 29 Oct 01 100,376.42 100,376.49 0.00

To