Emergency Management, Recovery, andReconstruction Following the 2002Molise, Italy, Earthquake
Barbara Fostera) and Sandro Kodamab)
The Molise earthquake received widespread attention within Italy be-cause of its devastating impact on the residents and on the economy of thesparsely populated regions of Molise and Puglia. Overall, 91 municipalitiesrequested government assistance, including 65 in the province of Cam-pobasso and 26 in the province of Foggia. The most extensive damage was tothe village of San Giuliano di Puglia, where 27 children and one teacher werekilled in a collapse of the primary school and the entire town has been relo-cated to a temporary village for an estimated two years. The disaster servedas a catalyst for immediate changes to Italy’s seismic law and regulations.This paper explores some of the challenges that confronted emergency man-agers, planners and victims during the response phase, and summarizes theeconomic impacts and recovery and reconstruction efforts.[DOI: 10.1193/1.1768543]
INTRODUCTION
Molise is a relatively remote, mountainous, and economically depressed region insoutheast Italy, with an economy based primarily on agriculture and small, service-related businesses. Over the last four decades, the population has declined by 20% anda lack of economic opportunity has continued a trend of out-migration by the youngerpopulation to more prosperous regions in northern Italy. Currently, more than 20% of thepopulation is over age 65 (Shin 2004, this issue).
Agriculture is of significant economic importance, although it is an impoverishedsector that includes subsistence farming, and is characterized by large numbers of smallholdings. The industrial sector is relatively underdeveloped. There is an industrializedarea near Termoli, outside the zone of earthquake damage, with auto, textile, foodstuff,furniture, and building materials factories, but elsewhere, firms are small textile, wood-working, food processing and building materials operations.
The Molise earthquake sequence began at 11:32 on October 31, 2002, with an Mw
5.7 shock. The earthquake affected a population of 370,000 in 91 towns, including 65 inthe Molise region and 26 in the Puglia region (Figure 1). The extent of damage variedamong the impacted municipalities, with the most extensive damage, all 30 fatalities,and 61 of the total 173 serious injuries sustained immediately following the initial shock
a) Emergency Management Consultant, Barbara Foster Associates, 14 Liberty Dock, Sausalito, CA 94965b) Project Engineer, Quantum Consulting Engineers, LLC, 1511 3rd Avenue, Ste. 323, Seattle, WA 98101
in the small village of San Giuliano di Puglia (population 1,163). The collapse of theprimary school killed one teacher and 27 children, and a few blocks away, two elderlywomen were also killed in building collapses.
At 16:08 on November 1, a Mw 5.7 aftershock significantly worsened existing dam-age, causing several already weakened structures to collapse. In San Giuliano, the after-shock threatened rescuers and resulted in the mayor ordering the evacuation and closureof the entire town. The November 1 aftershock, together with the fear of further after-shocks, more than tripled the number of displaced persons needing emergency shelter.The number of shelter seekers increased from an estimated 1,100 on October 31, to3,325 on November 1. The number of displaced increased to almost 12,000 by the end ofthe first week. Emergency shelter operations continued for more than ten weeks, with thelast shelter closing on January 15, 2003 (DPC 2003).
The earthquake struck an area not previously classified as a seismic zone, despite asuggestion made by a working group comprised of representatives from national geol-ogy and seismology organizations to do so in 1998 (INGV 2002). In the absence of aseismic classification, local building codes did not require structures to be engineered towithstand seismic forces. These facts, together with poor quality construction materialsand practices, resulted in extensive damage and collapses (Valensise et al. 2004, thisissue).
Figure 1. Map of affected area (courtesy of the Laboratorio Grafica & Immagini of INGV).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S325
OVERVIEW OF DAMAGE
The damage was greatest in San Giuliano di Puglia (Figure 2). The towns surround-ing San Giuliano di Puglia also suffered varying degrees of damage, but no fatalities andrelatively few injuries. Historic and culturally significant structures also suffered sub-stantial damage throughout the affected region.
With the exception of damage to the local gas distribution system in San Giuliano diPuglia, the only gas-related problems consisted of a few small gas fires from severeddwelling connections. Minor damage to local power lines caused short-term power out-ages and a crack in the water storage tank in San Giuliano resulted in a loss of localstorage capacity. Minor damage to the landline telephone system caused scattered ser-vice disruptions that were quickly restored, and volunteer amateur radio operators wereactivated to replace cellular communications that were disrupted by congestion.
Cracks were reported in roadways and some elevated viaducts. A number of smalllandslides followed the earthquake, but none caused any significant damage or impairedvehicle access (Rasulo et al. 2004, this issue). All hospitals remained operational, de-spite a widening in some pre-existing cracks in beams in one facility (Nuti et al. 2004,this issue).
Overall, 91 municipalities requested government assistance, 65 from the province ofCampobasso and 26 from the province of Foggia (IDCP 2002). With 20 different townhall buildings being declared inaccessible, and a significant number of city employeesleft homeless, the daily operations of certain towns were brought to a standstill.
Figure 2. Example of damage in San Giuliano di Puglia.
S326 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN ITALY
DISASTER PLANNING
Geopolitically, Italy is divided into 20 administrative regions, each of which is di-vided into provinces. Each province is comprised of numerous municipalities. Italy’s Di-partimento della Protezione Civile (Civil Protection Department [DPC]) was created byLaw No. 225 in 1992. The DPC was established to develop and implement a nationalprogram of disaster preparedness and response. Regions are responsible for adoptingregulations consistent with national guidelines, to ensure that civil protection activitiesare implemented at the local government (e.g., province and municipality) level. Eachprovince has a designated prefect who represents the national government and is respon-sible for disaster planning, response, and recovery for the province including all munici-palities.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
Italy’s emergency management organization (EMO) includes three levels of re-sponse: municipal, regional/provincial, and state/national (Figure 3). During a disaster,the mayor serves as the municipal civil protection authority responsible for direction andcoordination of emergency response. A Centro Operativo Comunale (COC) may be es-tablished in each affected town to direct local response activities and to serve as a centralpoint of coordination and communication with other towns and levels of the emergencymanagement organization.
When warranted by the magnitude and scope of the event, the mayor requests assis-tance from the prefect who declares a local emergency, and serves as the delegate of theCabinet President or Minister of Civil Protection. A Comitato Operativo Misto (COM) isestablished to direct emergency response activities within the province and to provide acentral point of coordination and communication with the DPC at the state/national level(Figure 3). For events in which more than one COM is activated, the DPC designates aprimary COM which assumes responsibility for overall coordination and emergencymanagement of the event.
The emergency management approach employed by the DPC establishes 14 supportfunctions within the COM and nine within the COC (Table 1). Those functions requiredto respond to the immediate emergency are activated initially, with the remaining func-tions activated as conditions warrant and personnel are available to staff each function.
As is the practice of emergency operations in the United States, only those supportfunctions required to address the emergency situation are activated in the COM andCOC. The organization may be expanded or contracted, based on the extent of the event.In addition, one person may be assigned to manage more than one function when a lim-ited number of trained personnel are available.
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
In Italy, voluntary organizations are an integral part of the EMO at every level ofresponse. Law No. 266 (August 1991) requires disaster planning and response regula-tions adopted by each region to address the activation and deployment of recognized vol-
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S327
untary associations. Voluntary associations are typically connected to local civil protec-tion offices, and employers are reimbursed for the time employees take off from work tovolunteer during declared disasters.
Volunteers are divided into four categories:
• Research groups, including the Rescue Dogs Training Society;
• Technical rescue groups, such as the National Corps of Mountain and Speleo-logical Rescue and Volunteer Fire Departments;
• Medical rescue groups, including the Red Cross and Misericordie; and
• Technical logistic function groups, such as the Radio Emergency Group.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
While foreshocks (Md 3.2 and 3.5) during the early morning hours of October 31were felt widely and created concern, no earthquake warning was issued. Some localauthorities argued that a warning from the DPC would have closed public buildings andcould have prevented the deaths of the schoolteacher and children (Valensise et al.2004). On the other hand, dozens of small earthquakes such as these occur every year inItaly, and they are not followed by larger magnitude main shocks.
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
The emergency response phase began immediately following the initial Mw 5.7shock on October 31 and continued for nearly three months, when the primary COM
Figure 3. Italian emergency management organization.
S328 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
was deactivated on January 24, 2003. In addition to the Mw 5.7 aftershock, around 200smaller shocks (M 2.5 to 3.5) occurred over the first 60 hours following the initial event(EU 2003). As a result, rescue operations and damage inspections were interrupted.Continuing aftershocks over the next several months required reinspection of manystructures, and many of the displaced were prevented from returning to damaged homes.
As is often the case following an earthquake, response to the event was both plannedand emergent. Automatic response protocols were implemented by DPC and essentialservice personnel were assigned at every level of the emergency organization. Ambu-lances were dispatched to the affected area and local hospitals prepared to receive theinjured. Fire Brigades initiated search and rescue and emergency shoring operations,State Police secured access into the impact area for emergency vehicles, and municipaltechnicians began damage inspections. At the collapsed primary school in San Giulianodi Puglia, bystanders dug through the rubble by hand, searching for survivors until theFire Brigade and canine search and rescue teams arrived.
While the closest emergency response agencies responded initially, the Minister ofInterior did not direct teams outside the affected regions to respond until the aftershockoccurred on November 1 (DPC 2003). An estimated 3,100 emergency responders and
Table 1. COM/COC emergency management functions
No. COM Function COC
1 Technical and Planning Support x
2 Health and Social Assistance, Veterinary Assistance x
3 Mass Media and Information
4 Volunteers x
5 Materials and Resources (Logistics) x
6 Transportation and Traffic Control
7 Telecommunications x
8 Lifelines and Schools Assistance x
9 Damage Assessment x
10 Search and Rescue
11 Assistance to Local Authorities
12 Dangerous Materials
13 Population Logistics x
14 Operational Coordination
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S329
volunteers responded within 24 hours of the event. The total number of response per-sonnel peaked at almost 5,000 between the first and second weeks (Table 2), and gradu-ally declined thereafter (EU 2003).
Response agencies included military personnel (Army, Air Force and Naval Force)who distributed emergency supply containers and pharmaceuticals, provided generators,lighting towers, and heavy machinery, and assisted the Italian Red Cross in setting upoutdoor emergency shelters. Police agencies (Carabinieri, Polizia di Stato, and Guardiadi Finanza) provided traffic and access control and escorted heavy equipment into im-pacted towns. Rangers from the Corpo Forestale Italiano assisted police agencies androad maintenance technicians (Ente Nazionale Strade—ANAS), inspected roads, andbridges. The Italian Red Cross established and managed emergency shelters and a fieldhospital. Voluntaries Misericordie provided advanced mobile medical units, and amateurradio operators provided supplemental communications.
Emergency supplies and equipment were immediately available from stockpilesmaintained throughout the country by the Interior Ministry. Chemical toilets, portableshowers, and heavy equipment were provided by private firms under contract to theDPC, and private trucking companies assisted government agencies in transporting ma-terial resources to the impacted towns.
OPERATIVE CENTERS
Within five hours of the earthquake, staff from the national DPC office in Rome (270km away) arrived in Molise and activated the primary COM at a pre-designated locationin Larino. The national DPC Chief of Volunteers and International Liaison became thedesignated Chief of this COM, which also served as the COC for the town of Larino. Asecond COM was established in Molise in a gymnasium on the outskirts of San Giulianodi Puglia to support intensive response and recovery operations in the extensively dam-aged town. This COM also provided logistical support to four nearby towns and servedas the COC for the town of San Giuliano.
A local emergency was declared in the two impacted regions by the DPC chief onNovember 1 and was ratified by Law 245 on November 4. One week following the initial
earthquake, a COM was activated at Casalnuovo Monterotaro to provide logistical sup-port to the impacted towns in Puglia. By November 12, a total of nine COCs were ac-tivated in towns with significant damage and emergency shelters. In addition to theCOCs in Larino and San Giuliano, COCs were established in Bonefro, Casacalenda,Colletorto, Ripabottoni, Provvidenti, San Martino di Pensilis, and Toro, where eachmayor served as the COC Chief.
Upon activation, the Larino COM implemented initial support functions, includingTechnical and Planning Support (F-1), Health and Social Assistance (F-2) and DamageAssessment (F-9). Consistent with the Augustus Method of emergency management, ad-ditional support functions were activated over the first few days and, in addition to the 14pre-designated support functions, a Cultural/Historical function was established to over-see inspection and restoration of damage to churches and monuments. Limited supportfunctions were implemented in the COCs, based on the needs of each affected town.
The need to sustain emergency management operations on a 24-hour basis for almostthree months would challenge any emergency management organization. In this case, adearth of local emergency management expertise increased the reliance on national DPCstaff based in Rome, a three-hour drive from the impact area. Consequently, DPC staffassigned to the COMs and COCs worked extended hours for several days and stayed inlocal hotels. Over the prolonged emergency response phase, long work hours and sepa-ration from homes and families, added to the challenges confronting emergency manag-ers.
DAMAGE INSPECTIONS
Immediately following the main shock, local technicians (equivalent to nonengineerbuilding inspection personnel) conducted initial safety inspections to determine thescope and extent of damage and to identify structures that required a detailed engineer-ing assessment. Fire Brigades performed emergency shoring of damaged public and pri-vate structures that posed a risk to public safety (Figure 4), and engineers from theDPC’s National Seismic Survey (NSS) inspected roads and bridges in route to the LarinoCOM for emergency assignments.
In Italy, requests for assessment of damaged structures are made through the mayorto the local technical office (equivalent to a building department), which refers thosestructures requiring a detailed engineering assessment to the COM. The Damage Assess-ent support function in the COM assigns technicians and engineers to assess specificgroups of structures. Damage is divided into five degrees of severity and those structuresthat are considered uninhabitable for any reason are termed ‘‘inaccessible.’’ The mayororders evacuation or limited use of damaged structures, based on a recommendationfrom technicians or engineers. This responsibility added to the many challenges faced bythe mayors.
Around 23,000 requests for structural damage inspections were received by theLarino COM. Fourteen percent of the total number of public buildings and 23% of pri-vate buildings were determined to be inaccessible immediately following the earthquake(Table 3). Another 5% required reinspection before accessibility could be determined.Inaccessibility was due either to direct damage or to risk of collapse from an adjacent
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S331
structure (Goretti and Di Pasquale 2004, this issue). Although some of the displacedstayed with family or friends outside the impact area, the majority was housed in localemergency shelters.
All schools in the region were closed following the earthquake for damage inspec-tions and seismic evaluations, and remained closed for more than two weeks. Of theschools evaluated, 80% were found to have little or no damage (Augenti et al. 2004).Although 15 schools were determined to be unsafe for occupancy and would remainclosed until repairs or seismic retrofitting could be completed, the remaining schoolswere authorized to reopen on Day 18 following the earthquake. Nonetheless, many par-ents continued to be concerned about the safety of the school buildings and were reluc-tant to allow their children to return to school. Therefore, in addition to locating tempo-
Figure 4. Shoring for unstable buildings in Bonefro.
Table 3. Percent of damaged public and private structures
Category
Degree of Damage
A B C D E F
Public 65% 15% 3% 3% 13% 1%
Private 60% 11% 4% 2% 20% 3%
A—Safe and habitableB—Partially or totally uninhabitable; habitable with limited counter measuresC—Partially habitableD—To be reinspectedE—Unsafe—uninhabitable—to be demolishedF—Unsafe—uninhabitable due to risk of collapse of adjacent structure(s)
S332 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
rary sites for the schools that were closed, emergency managers arranged for DPC staffand mental health counselors to be available at each school to conduct crisis incidentstress debriefings and to reassure parents and students.
EMERGENCY SHELTER
A sequence of significant aftershocks (M 3.8 to M 4.2) over the first four days(Valensise et al. 2004) necessitated re-inspection of a number of damaged structures anddramatically increased the number of displaced persons in need of emergency shelter(Table 4). Over time, people afraid to return to their lightly damaged homes posed anongoing challenge to emergency managers, who were attempting to return lightly ormoderately damaged villages to normal operations.
Most of the emergency shelters were located in outdoor tent communities (tendopoli)comprised of large tents for meals and socializing, numerous smaller six-bed tents forsleeping, and portable toilets and showers. The elderly and disabled were housed in four-bed campers located in the tendopoli, or in hotels outside the impact area. In some cases,single tents were erected next to individual homes so worried owners could protect theirproperty and belongings. Additionally, as observed in other disasters throughout theworld, some of the displaced chose to stay in hotels or with families and friends ratherthan in shelters. Ultimately, 31 tendopoli were established and a surplus of beds wasavailable.
Although the tendopoli were relatively comfortable, with lighting, heating, and tele-vision powered by emergency generators, the advance of winter and the need to providetransitional housing for those whose homes were destroyed presented yet another chal-lenge for emergency managers. While continuing to provide logistical support to theshelters, planning for some form of transitional housing had to be undertaken before re-
Table 4. Shelter population in relation to aftershocks
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S333
covery could commence. For San Giuliano, where it will take two years to rebuild thedestroyed section of the town, an entire temporary village would need to be planned.
In addition to the challenge posed in conducting ongoing inspections and emergencyshoring, providing logistical support to emergency shelters, informing victims of the sta-tus of their homes and businesses, and planning for transitional housing and a temporaryvillage, emergency managers began the process of arranging for demolition of destroyedstructures and for debris clearance and disposal. Thus, the emergency response and re-covery phases overlapped to a much greater extent than is typical following a moderateearthquake, where demolition and debris clearance would usually not commence untilinspections and emergency shoring were completed.
RECOVERY
At the local government level in Italy, the mayor—with input from technicians andengineers—is responsible for decisions regarding demolishing, rebuilding, and reoccu-pying public and private structures. The central government finances demolition and de-bris clearance and provides some grant funds and tax relief for rebuilding. Each town,with financial support and direction from the region, is responsible for reconstruction(DPC 2003).
The central government provided those whose homes were destroyed or required ma-jor repairs with the option of living in prefabricated homes, or accepting C% 500 per
month to arrange for independent temporary housing. A total of 535 prefabricatedhomes were provided, 268 of which were constructed in the temporary village in SanGiuliano, and the remainder constructed in numerous villages throughout the damagedregion.
The recovery phase commenced during the second week following the earthquake.However, ongoing aftershocks interrupted damage inspections and emergency shoringand delayed repair, reoccupancy, and demolition of damaged structures. In San Giulianodi Puglia, which had been totally evacuated, the inability to clear debris required thecontinued activation of the COC and deployment of emergency personnel to provide 24-hour access control.
The decision to build a temporary village for San Giuliano was made by the mayorand Town Council on November 12, just short of two weeks following the earthquake.The temporary village, comprised of a primary school, town hall, market, pharmacy, andsocial center, is located approximately one kilometer from the damaged town. The sitewas chosen because it is less vulnerable to amplified ground shaking and providedenough space to keep the residents together as a community.
Given the deaths of two entire grades of school children; lost homes, businesses, andincome; and a fear of future earthquakes, it was thought that many residents would notchoose to stay in the village. Indeed, in past devastating earthquakes (Kobe 1995), manyresidents did not return to neighborhoods that had been destroyed and then rebuilt. How-ever, a survey of 120 residents conducted by sociologists in May 2003 (Arato and Pel-lizzato 2003) indicated that 79% wanted to return to the town (one person did not wantto return and three others did not respond to the question). Although 50% of respondents
S334 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
feared future earthquakes, 90% wanted to rebuild on the site of their original homes.Most respondents (93%) believed that new structures built to current seismic standardswould prevent the damage that occurred in the Molise earthquake.
The school and the first 30 of the planned 268 prefabricated homes in the temporaryvillage were opened on December 1. One month later, in January 2003, the first familieswere permitted to return to homes in town if they were either undamaged or repaired.The recovery process was delayed when a provisional debris disposal site was closed byCourt order in mid June 2003, due to potential environmental damage, but was reopenedat the end of June. In July 2003, 70 additional families returned to their original homes.Demolition and debris clearance were finally completed in August 2003, ten months fol-lowing the earthquake (Langenbach and Dusi 2004, this issue; DPC 2003).
At the time of the writing of this paper, plans are for the town to be rebuilt within theoriginal boundaries. Buildings that are located in areas that are known to have amplifiedground motion will be designed to resist amplified seismic forces. In certain areas,homes will not be rebuilt due to soil instability. The current timeline for reconstructionof the town is approximately two years (ASCA 2003).
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY COSTS
The immediate cost of shoring up public and private structures (Figure 4) and pro-viding emergency response was approximately C% 283 million ($356 million). The 535prefabricated wood homes provided to homeowners, including basic furniture, cost ap-proximately C% 50 million. The total cost of repairing and mitigating earthquake damageis estimated at C% 1.6 billion ($2 billion) (IDCP 2002), with a breakdown as follows:Private Buildings — C% 825.2 million; Public Buildings — C% 135.9 million; and Demo-lition Costs — C% 2.976 million.
Of the 565 historically significant structures damaged, 437 (84%) were churches.The range of damage varied, with 28% of the structures deemed inaccessible. The totalestimated damage to these structures is approximately C% 96.2 million, 60% in Moliseand 40% in Puglia (IDCP 2002).
There are 6,000 agriculture-related businesses in the affected area, and all had simi-lar types of damage to farm structures, warehouses, laborer residences, and food pro-cessing and storage facilities. The loss of labor, disruption to work, and distress to live-stock also added to the total damage costs, estimated at C% 100 million (IDCP 2002).
Business activity was also disrupted in the region, either because of direct damage orbecause small business owners and artisans chose to leave the damaged area and moveto other towns that have viable space. In all, lost revenue as a result of the earthquake, asquantified by public entities, is approximately C% 293.5 million (IDCP 2002).
A summary of damage is in Table 5 (IDCP 2002).
RECONSTRUCTION
The reconstruction process following a significant, destructive earthquake takes timeand requires community input. The process, undertaken in the context of an altered so-
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S335
cial environment, can be complicated by conflicting goals. Often, a desire for the reso-lution of pre-existing problems intensifies those problems. Nowhere was this more evi-dent than in San Giuliano di Puglia.
The collapse of the primary school and the death of the 27 children resulted in fi-nancial contributions for reconstruction from multiple sources, including the centralgovernment, the European Union, and private donors. Some of these funds will be usedto provide technical assistance to ensure that seismic retrofitting and building standardsare employed during reconstruction.
ECONOMIC RECOVERY EFFORTS
The goal of the recovery effort was to return the community to its pre-earthquakelevel with minimal financial burden to individuals, in order to avoid crippling an alreadyfloundering local economy. In addition, mitigation measures were taken to prevent simi-lar earthquake damage and disruption in future seismic events. Funding for the recoveryhas come from several sources ranging from the municipal level up to the EuropeanUnion.
Much of the reconstruction effort to private residences is taking place at a slower ratethan one might expect in the United States. Most homeowners in Molise do not havehomeowners insurance. In addition, earthquake insurance is not available in Italy and theresidents do not have the financial resources to pay for major earthquake repair work.Therefore, residents must wait for the government to take action to repair their homes.
The initial recovery compensation to earthquake victims was outlined by the presi-dent of the Molise region, Michele Iorio, on November 30, 2002, as follows (PCO2002):
• Up to C% 10,000 would be made available to private property owners to makeimmediate life-saving repairs. If the initial life-safety repairs did not exceedC% 10,000, proposals could be submitted to use the balance for repairs to cos-metic finishes that were damaged by the earthquake. A comparable program forrepair of school buildings would also be created with a cap set at C% 35,000 perschool.
Table 5. Molise earthquake damage summary (in Euros)
Damage to Private Structures C% 825,200,000Damage to Public Structures C% 135,900,000Demolition of Buildings C% 2,976,000Damage to Culturally Significant Structures C% 96,205,200Damage Due to Landslide, Liquefaction and Other Geologic Phenomena C% 13,876,500Temporary Housing and Emergency Response C% 83,309,944Damage to Roadways and Bridges C% 7,000,000Damage to Agricultural Activities C% 100,000,000Damage to Manufacturing and Small Businesses C% 293,512,000TOTAL: C% 1,557,979,644
S336 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
• A provision would be made for the economic support of small businesses, crafts-men, farmers, and general contractors for missed payments or loss of business asa result of the earthquake. The amount of compensation would be based on theprevious year’s income statements.
• An additional C% 4,000 would be made available to each damaged agriculture-related business.
• The mayor of each municipality would be responsible for arranging emergencyhousing for families or individuals. A maximum of C% 500 per month would beavailable to each family unit.
• In order to ensure that buildings were built to the latest seismic standards, fund-ing would be available to hire personnel to provide technical and administrativeservices at the regional, provincial, and municipal level for the entire reconstruc-tion phase.
• Because of the tragic deaths of the school children in San Giuliano di Puglia,and the need to assure the population that such a tragedy would not recur, a lawwas passed on November 19, 2002, requiring all public structures in Molise tobe structurally evaluated in the context of the latest seismic provisions (PMR 11-20-2002). The law focused on four principal areas:1. Within four months, the region of Molise would have a comprehensive and
precise matrix of the structural condition of all schools, from the elementarythrough high school levels. Once the structurally deficient schools wereidentified, a formal plan would be prepared for bringing them into compli-ance with the latest seismic design provisions for the specific area.
2. All schools in the region would undergo a vulnerability study of all struc-tures to indicate performance levels to seismic events of varying intensity.
3. All regional entities would work in conjunction with the National Earth-quake Defense Group (Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dai Terremoti) forpost-earthquake verification of all public buildings in the region, with prior-ity given to schools, to quantify the damage reported for individual build-ings and to verify their structural integrity.
4. A seismic microzonation of the entire regional territory would be conductedin collaboration with the regions of Marche, Umbria, Emilia Romagna,Toscana, Basilicata, and Abruzzo to include a detailed study to identify thecharacteristics of the subsoil throughout the region of Molise.
Through implementation of this law, the region of Molise will be one of the first inItaly to undergo such a rigorous and comprehensive seismic analysis.
EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE
The European Union has an established a Solidarity Fund to assist areas affected bymajor disasters. A ‘‘major disaster’’ is an event causing damage estimated over C% 3 bil-lion or more than 0.6 percent of the gross national income of the state concerned. Underexceptional circumstances, such as the Molise earthquake, a region can also benefit fromthe fund if it has experienced an extraordinary disaster, which affects a major part of thepopulation. On July 16, 2003, the European Union granted C% 30.8 million to finance the
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S337
cost of temporary accommodations, immediate restoration of the public infrastructure,and protection of cultural heritage structures in the affected areas in Molise (EU 2003).
The deaths of the school children had a marked effect on how the available fundswere used. On August 8, 2003, the president of the Molise region, Michele Iorio, madeavailable C% 2.135 million for the reconstruction, repair, and retrofit of school buildings,and for the purchase of prefabricated buildings for the towns of Sepino, Boiano, Colle-torto, and Petrella Tifernina in the region of Molise (PMR 8-8-2003). The funds werespecifically allocated for the following projects:
• C% 395,000 for construction of a preschool, elementary school, and middleschool out of prefabricated structures for the town of Sepino.
• C% 500,000 for reconstruction of the Monteverde Elementary School of Boiano.
• C% 100,000 for reconstruction of the roof of the middle school of Boiano.
• C% 350,000 for retrofit of the Castellone Elementary School building in Boiano.
• C% 250,000 for retrofit of the preschool building in Colletorto.
• C% 300,000 for restoration of the Petrella Tifernina Elementary School building.
• C% 240,000 for restoration of the preschool building in Petrella Tifernina.
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RECOVERY
The earthquake had devastating economic and social impacts on the population ofMolise and Puglia. Many families lost homes that had been in their families for genera-tions and were not insured. Some farmers lost both their homes and incomes. Still otherresidents lost businesses and their income and depleted their savings accounts. In almostevery case, new debts were incurred. The disruption to agriculture and small businessesbrought commerce to a virtual standstill and will likely result in significant, long-termharm to the regional economy.
The deaths of the children, an extended stay in temporary shelters (Figure 5), a pro-longed disruption to the activities of daily living, and the high level of stress caused byongoing aftershocks had a profound impact on the psychosocial well-being of all resi-dents in the affected towns. The uncertainty of not knowing when life might return tonormal caused additional stress for the residents of San Giuliano.
The Arato and Pellizato (2003) survey of 120 residents (10% of the population) ofSan Giuliano revealed that all respondents were directly or indirectly affected by thedeaths of the school children. The homes of 45 (38%) had been, or were scheduled to be,demolished, 43 (36%) had homes that were inaccessible due to direct damage, and 32(26%) had homes that were temporarily inaccessible due to external threats. During theone-to-one interviews, one or more respondents expressed feelings of resentment, anger,envy, and selfishness. Some acknowledged that these feelings were present before theearthquake, but were exacerbated by the effects of the event. The majority of respon-dents expressed a desire to be involved in decisions that would affect their future livesand said that such decisions should not be left solely in the hands of the Town Council.
The need for psychological recovery has been recognized by the Italian governmentas a critical component in the overall recovery of the region. In collaboration with the
S338 B. FOSTER AND S. KODAMA
Harris-Cohen Center for Trauma, located in Tel Aviv (PMR 12-18-2002), the TelefonoAzzurro (an Italian non-profit organization) implemented a project called the ‘‘Revital-ization of the Molisan Community Following the Earthquake.’’
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are indebted to staff members of the Department of Civil Protection inRome for providing data for this paper. In particular, Dr. Agostino Miozzo, chief of Vol-unteers and International Liaison, Fabio Brondi, geologist, and Marina Mucciarella, ar-chitect, are gratefully acknowledged for taking time from their respective duties in theLarino COM to meet with the authors during a field reconnaissance visit to Molise.Elvezio Galanti, Silvia Bernardini, Giacomo Di Paquale, and most importantly, AdrianoDe Sortis of the DPC are also gratefully acknowledged for providing updated data. Thephoto in Figure 5 is courtesy of Joe Maffei, a member of the Earthquake EngineeringResearch Institute Molise Reconnaissance Team.
REFERENCES
Arato, G. B., and Pellizzato, M., 2003. Sociological analysis of the victims of the town of SanGiuliano di Puglia, United Scientific Technician Protection and Development of the Environ-ment and Territory, Environmental Technologies, June (in Italian).
Asca-Quotidiano, Autonomie Locali, 2003. Newsletter April 1.Augenti, N., Cosenza, E., Dolce, M., Manfredi, G., Masi, A., and Samela, L., 2004. Perfor-
mance of school buildings during the 2002 Molise, Italy earthquake, Earthquake Spectra 20(Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earthquake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Baz-zurro and J. Maffei), S257–S270 (this issue), July.
DPC, Department of Civil Protection, Rome, Italy, 2003. Personal communication.European Union, 2003. EU Solidarity Fund: Commission Proposes EUR 47.6 Million for Ital-
ian Regions Hit by Natural Disasters, Brussels, 16 July 2003.Goretti, A., and Di Pasquale, G., 2004. Building inspection and damage data for the 2002 Mo-
Figure 5. Tendopoli in Montorio (Maffei).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING THE MOLISE EARTHQUAKE S339
lise, Italy, earthquake, Earthquake Spectra 20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earth-quake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Bazzurro and J. Maffei), S167–S190 (this issue),July.
INGV, Instituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia, La Sequenza sismica del Molise dell’Octtobre/Novembre 2002, http:www.mi.ingv.it/eq/021031/molise–class–sism–e.html.
Italian Department of Civil Protection (IDCP), 2002. Draft Report for the European Union onthe Seismic Events that Affected the Province of Campobasso and Foggia on October 31,2002.
Langenbach, R., and Dusi, A., 2004. On the cross of Sant’ Andrea: The response to the tragedyof San Giuliano di Puglia following the 2002 Molise, Italy, earthquake, Earthquake Spectra20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earthquake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Ba-zzurro and J. Maffei), S341–S358 (this issue), July.
Nuti, C., Santini, S., and Vanzi, I., 2004. Damage, vulnerability, and retrofitting strategies forthe Molise hospital system following the 2002 Molise, Italy, earthquake, Earthquake Spectra20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earthquake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Ba-zzurro and J. Maffei), S285–S299 (this issue), July.
Presidential Cabinet Ordinance (PCO) 2002. Article 2-Fund Utilization, No. 3253, Nov. 29.President of the Molise Region (PMR): Bureau of Publications, 2002. Communication Docu-
ment, Nov. 20.President of the Molise Region: Bureau of Publications, 2002. Communication Document, De-
cember 18.President of the Molise Region (PMR): Bureau of Publications, 2003. Communication Docu-
ment, August 8.Rasulo, A., Goretti, A., and Nuti, C., 2004. Performance of lifelines during the 2002
Molise, Italy, earthquake, Earthquake Spectra 20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earth-quake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Bazzurro and J. Maffei), S285–S299 (this issue),July.
Shin, M., 2004. Socio-geographic dimensions of recovery from the 2002 Molise, Italy, earth-quake, Earthquake Spectra 20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earthquake Reconnais-sance Report, edited by P. Bazzurro and J. Maffei), S315–S321 (this issue), July.
Valensise, G., Pantosti, D., and Basili, R., 2004. Seismology and Tectonic Setting of the 2002Molise, Italy, earthquake, Earthquake Spectra 20 (Special Issue 1, 2002 Molise, Italy, Earth-quake Reconnaissance Report, edited by P. Bazzurro and J. Maffei), S23–S37 (this issue),July.
(Received 30 October 2003; accepted 18 March 2004)
