EMERGING NEXUS BETWEEN SPACE WEAPONIZATION
AND MISSILE SHIELD: IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIAN
STRATEGIC STABILITY
A thesis submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations in
Partial fulfillment for the award of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
By
AHMED SAEED MINHAS Registration No 03131511006
SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
DECEMBER 2018
i
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF FIGURES xi
IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS xii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1
THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK
28
1.1 Significance of Military Power in International Relations’
Theoretical Perspectives
28
1.1.1 Realists’ Perspective about Military Power 29
1.1.2 Liberalist Perspective about Building Military
Power
30
1.1.3 Structural Realism/ Neo Realist Perspective on
Military Power
30
1.1.3.1 Offensive Realism 33
1.1.3.2 Defensive Realism 37
1.1.4 Significance of Military Power as per Realist
Paradigm’s Approaches
38
1.1.4.1 Balance of Power (BoP) 39
1.1.4.2 Balance of Terror (BoT) 40
1.1.4.3 Deterrence Theory 40
1.1.4.4 Military Preparedness through
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
43
1.2 Critiques on Realist Paradigm’s Arguments in Support of
Military Power
45
1.3 Application of Theory 49
CHAPTER 2
SPACE WEAPONIZATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
58
2.1 Outer Space: Kinds and Limits of Earth Orbits 58
2.1.1 Earth Orbits - Kinds and Limits 59
2.2 Space Weapons: A Debate 60
2.3 Outer Space – Efficacy of Global Common Narrative 62
2.4 Space Militarization vs. Space Weaponization 63
2.5 Yes and No Dilemma - Need for Having Space Weapons 64
2.6 An Account of Space-based Assets’ Support for
Terrestrial Military Operations
68
2.7 Outer Space Dominance by Destructive and Non-
Destructive Techniques
71
ii
2.7.1 Outer Space-based Destructive Technologies for
Space Negation
72
2.7.2 Terrestrial Based Destructive Technologies for
Space Negation
76
2.7.3 Outer Space and Terrestrial Based Non-
Destructive Technologies for Space Negation
77
2.8 Security Measures against Space Negation Efforts 79
2.9 An Analytical Debate about Probability of Space
Weaponization
81
2.10 Ramifications of Space Weaponization 87
2.11 Debris - Space Security Challenge for Long Term
Sustainability
90
2.11.1 Political and Technical Efforts for Mitigating
Space Debris
91
CHAPTER – 3
GOVERNING OUTER SPACE: A LEGALISTIC APPROACH
96
3.1 Evolution of Modern International and Space Law 97
3.2 Sources of the International Law and its Relevance to the
Space Law
98
3.3 Domestic Laws and their Bearing on Outer Space Issues 101
3.4 Outer Space Governance Issues in International Law
Perspective
101
3.5 Absence of Norms in Managing Outer Space
Sustainability
104
3.6 Building Blocks of Space Legal Frame Work Stressing
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
106
3.7 Cardinal for Administering Space Policy and Law 114
3.8 Challenges and Gaps in the Outer Space Legal Frame
Work
116
3.8.1 Leading Space Powers’ Monopoly 116
3.8.2 Gaps in the Outer Space Legal Frame Work to
Preempt Space Weaponization
117
3.9 Contemporary Non-Legally Binding Approaches towards
Addressing the Outer Space Legal Framework Gaps
122
3.9.1 Space Technical Confidence Building Measure
(TCBMs)
123
3.9.2 International Code of Conduct 123
3.9.3 Long Term Sustainability (LTS) of Outer Space 124
3.10 Roles and Achievements of International Institutions in
International Space Law Making
126
CHAPTER 4
LEADING SPACE FARING NATIONS QUEST FOR SPACE
WEAPONIZATION
128
4.1 Space Weaponization and Global Powers 128
4.2 United States 132
4.3 Russian Federation 134
iii
4.4 China 141
4.5 European Union (EU) 148
4.6 India 151
CHAPTER-5
THE NEXUS BETWEEN MISSILE SHIELD AND SPACE
WEAPONS
158
5.1 Space Weapons and Missile Shield Relationship 158
5.2 Nexus between Space Weaponization and Missile Shield:
Indicators
159
5.3 Space Weapons and Missile Shield Nexus: An Arms
Control Perspective
162
5.4 Ballistic Missile’s Fundamental Knowledge 164
5.4.1 Ballistic Missiles Basics 164
5.4.2 Ballistic Missiles Classifications and Ranges 165
5.4.3 Phases of Ballistic Missile Trajectory and Missile
Shield Efficacy
166
5.4.3.1 Boost Phase 167
5.4.3.2 Mid-Course Phase 169
5.4.3.3 Terminal Phase 169
5.5 BMD – Fundamental Concept 170
5.6 Evolution of the BMD System 171
5.6.1 1944-1955 172
5.6.2 1956 -1965 172
5.6.3 1966-1975 174
5.6.4 1976-1985 176
5.6.5 1986-1995 176
5.6.6 1996-2006 178
5.6.7 2007-2018 180
5.7 Significance of BMD Systems in Strategic Security
Calculus
183
5.7.1 BMD System – Supportive Arguments 183
5.7.2 BMD System – Challenges and Paradoxes 188
CHAPTER: 6
PROLIFERATION OF SPACE AND MISSILE
TECHNOLOGIES IN SOUTH ASIA
193
6.1 Indian Space Program and its Strategic Implications 194
6.2 Pakistan Space Program and its Strategic Ambitions 202
6.3 Existence of Space Law and National Space Policies in
South Asia
207
6.4 US Export Controls Approach towards South Asia 209
6.5 Indian Membership of Missile Technology Control
Regime
214
6.6 India & Pakistan: Missile and Outer Space Technologies’
Proliferation
218
6.6.1 Vertical Missile Proliferation 218
iv
6.6.2 MTCR Membership: Creating Options for
Missile Development
223
6.6.3 Space Technology Proliferation 224
CHAPTER 7
MISSILE SHIELD AND SPACE WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAN DETERRENCE
STABILITY
227
7.1 ASAT Weapons and BMD Systems 227
7.2 Counter Deterrence Weapons (CDWs) and Power Politics 228
7.3 Indian CDWs’ Development Program and Deterrence
Instability in South Asia
229
7.4 International Cooperation – Indian Missile Shield 232
7.4.1 Fast Paced Indian Missiles’ Development
Supported by Export Controls Relaxations
232
7.4.2 Indo-Israeli CDWs Development Cooperation 233
7.4.3 Indo-US CDWs Cooperation 234
7.4.4 Indo-Russian CDWs Cooperation 235
7.5 Indian Justifications behind Developing CDWs and
Pakistani Counter Narratives
236
7.6 Indian BMD and South Asian Deterrence Stability 242
7.7 Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue Process 249
7.8 Way Forward to Stabilize the Destabilizing South Asian
Deterrence Stability
253
CONCLUSION 260
v
ABSTRACT
Nuclear-armed India and Pakistan outstanding territorial disputes have been haunting
stability and peace in South Asia. Having fought three conventional wars and
indulged in routine border skirmishes, the two sides after their overt nuclearization in
1998 have shown restraint and did not let border skirmishes, Kargil border conflict
and acts of terrorism by the non-state actors to transform into major conflict or an all-
out war. India being the region’s core state with revisionist posture has an aim of
becoming great power, for which it has been maximizing its military power. New
Delhi’s hegemonic designs and increasing military capabilities pose existential threat
to Pakistan. Therefore, Islamabad has been struggling to maintain the full spectrum
deterrence capability.
Indeed, the prevalent status-quo due to strategic equilibrium in the region doesn’t gel
with Indian ambition of winning great power status and is thus, on a course to exploit
its outer space expertise as a tool to shift the Balance of Power (BoP) in her own
favor. The Indians capability of launching satellites through its state of the art Space
Launch Vehicles (SLVs) and development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) are
being manipulated not only for checkmating Pakistan’s missile based deterrence
credibility, but also for achieving space control - hegemony or supremacy in space.
Pakistan announced its Space Vision 2047 encompassing its developmental and
national security needs in December 2017. Foregoing in view, Pakistan could be
compelled to address a totally new kind of threat in the form of Indian probable space
weaponization and thus might build its own counter space-control capabilities (space
weapons) as a victim of yet another action- reaction syndrome. Ironically, there is no
bi-lateral legal treaty that exists between the two, to address the arms race dilemma.
India doesn’t want to be entangled at bi-lateral level and remains dismissive towards
Pakistan’s peace building offers. The evolving threat has to be addressed at political
and diplomatic levels so that to maintain peace and stability in South Asia.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am extremely thankful to Almighty who bestowed upon me his special blessings
and made me capable of writing this thesis. The experience of writing a PhD thesis
was demanding, full of inquisitiveness and above all amazing. Now when I look back
throughout the process of producing the thesis, I found that it was not me alone but
supportive company of teachers, family and friends who stood by me during my
pursuit of writing.
I have no words to thank my supervisor Professor Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, who has
always been encouraging and gave me the confidence. It would have been extremely
difficult for me to complete the thesis, if Dr Jaspal was not there. Being an
international known expert on strategic issues including the Ballistic Missile Defence
and space weapons, I am lucky to be academically grilled by him to meet his
standards.
I must acknowledge my father, better half (Humera Saeed), kids (Lt Nosherwan
Ehsun Minhas and daughter Shanzay Saeed) and siblings, who encouraged and
prayed for me to complete the thesis. I am extremely indebted to my wife. who
provided me relaxed environment at home to study and the kids who compromised
their excursion trips seeing me working day and night. Lastly, I know, my mother
from heavens must be proud of me, his son, to have touched the Summit of studies.
I am extremely thankful to Professor Dr Nazir Hussain, my mentor in International
Relations issues and a very loving teacher/ friend who has been constructive in
motivating me to write and finish the thesis in time. I must also acknowledge, Mr.
Khalid Banuri, Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Toby Dalton (Carnegie
Endowment ), Dr Jeffrey Knopf and Dr Sokov (CNS) to share their ideas. Moreover,
I am extremely lucky to have an extra-ordinary academically skilled and intelligent
colleague Dr Farhat Konain Shujahi, who remained instrumental in guiding me from
day one of thesis writing till the final binding. I also offer my gratitude to my
Personal Assistant Arshad Mehmood who kept me free of office routine work and
helped me in typing the thesis.
(Ahmed Saeed Minhas)
vii
LIST OF ABREVATIONS
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AG Australian Group
ASAT Ant-Satellite Technology
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
BP Brilliant Pebbles
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAS Central Asian States
CD Conference on Disarmament
CDWs Counter Deterrence Weapons
CSD Cold Strat Doctrine
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DEWs Direct Energy Weapons
DOD Department of Defense
DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization
EL Entity List
ESA European Space Agency
FMCT Fissile Material Cut off Treaty
FOBS Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
GEO Geostationary Orbit
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GSLV Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle
ICBM InterContinental Ballistic Missile
ICOC International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
IRNSS Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
IRS Indian Remote Sensing Satellite System
ISR Intelligent, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
viii
ISRO Indian Space Research Organization
KEW Kinetic Energy Weapons
LEO Low Earth Orbit
MEO Medium Earth Orbit
MIRV Multiple independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO Near-Earth Orbit
NPT Non Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
OST Outer Space Treaty
PAROS Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space
PPWT Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty
PSLV Polar Satellite Launching Vehicle
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty
R&D Research and Development
RNSS Regional Navigation Satellite System
RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I
SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
SLBMs Submarine Launch Ballistic Missiles
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
SLV Satellite Launch Vehicle
SSA Space Situational Awareness
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SUPARCO Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
TCBMS Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of Sea
ix
UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on Peaceful Use of Outer Space
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNOOSA United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UN-SPIDER United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster
Management and Emergency Response Programmer
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
WA Wassenaar Arrangement
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
x
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Earth Orbits 59
2.2 Debris Mitigating Techniques 92
3.1 Building Blocks of Space Legal Frame Work Stressing
Peaceful Uses of Space
107
4.1 Indicators of Russian Quest for Weaponizing Outer Space 137
5.1 Range Based Ballistic Missiles Classifications 166
6.1 Criteria Based Classification of States with Space
Technology
194
6.2 Data - Indian Missile Test Record (2010-2018) 221
6.3 Data - Pakistan Missile Test Record (2010-2018) 222
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Cycle of Balancing the Deterrence Equation 56
5.1 Ballistic Missile Trajectory Phases 167
5.2 Ballistic Missile Defence Engagement Process 171
6.1 Countries Wise Detail of Number of Entities on the US
Entity List
211
6.2 Percentage Wise Comparison of Addition/ Removal of
Entities from the US Entity List
212
6.3 Indian Missile Tests Record – 2016-2018 219
6.4 Pakistan Missile Tests Record – 2016-2018 220
xii
IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
Satellites: As per the US NASA definition, a satellite is an object that moves around
a larger object. But usually when someone says "satellite," they are talking about a
"man-made" satellite. Man-made satellites are machines made by people. These
machines are launched into space and orbit Earth or another body in space. There are
thousands of man-made satellites. Some take pictures of our planet. Some take
pictures of other planets, the sun and other objects. These pictures help scientists
learn about Earth, the solar system and the universe. Other satellites send TV signals
and phone calls around the world.1
Ballistic Missiles: A missile that has no wings or fins and that follows a ballistic
trajectory when its propulsive power is discontinued (Collins English Dictionary). As
per United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), missiles continue to
be a focus of increased international attention, discussion and activity. Their potential
to carry and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) payload quickly and
accurately makes missiles a qualitatively significant political and military issue. In
addition, the diversity of international views on matters related to missiles poses a
particular challenge for efforts to address the issue in multilateral fora. Currently,
there is no legally binding multilateral instrument dealing with the issue of missiles.
Presently, several other multilateral regimes exist which seek to prevent the
proliferation of missiles and related technology. These include, notably, the Hague
Code of Conduct (HCOC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).2
Missiles Defenses: Ballistic missile defenses constitute the strategic paradigm that
introduces new possibilities of evolving strategic defenses against ballistic missiles
1 NASA. “What is a Satellite.”
https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-is-a-satellite-k4.html. 2 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Missiles.”
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/missiles/
xiii
carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads, known as weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).3
Anti-Satellite (ASATs): An anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon destroys or interferes with
satellites, impeding a nation’s ability to collect intelligence or direct attacks. Such a
weapon can be air, land, or sea-based.4
3 Encyclopedia.com. “Ballistic Missile Defenses.”
https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ballistic-
missile-defenses. 4 Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test.
1
INTRODUCTION
The defense planning is imperative for the security of a state in an anarchical
international system. Therefore, the rulers accumulate maximum military capability
for the defense of their state. In the words of Michael Howard, ―Any sovereign state -
that is, any community which wishes to maintain a capacity for independent political
action - may have to use or indicate its capacity and readiness to use force - functional
and purposive violence - to protect itself against coercion by other states.‖1 In
addition to acquire indigenous defensive capability, therefore, the ruling elite also
constitute alliances with their like-minded nations. It is an established fact that the
primacy at the strategic chessboard enables the state to secure a strong negotiating
position by virtue of which, it could seek more and more diplomatic and political
advantages. Nevertheless, the ceaseless military buildup is a cause of security
dilemma puzzle in the inter-state relationship.
The economic strength, diplomatic skills, geography, people‘s rule index, military
capability, etc. are among various methods that are employed to determine state‘s
stature at the global political landscape. However, the dominant factor remains the
‗military might‘ and its global reach. Having identified the importance of hard power
for any state‘s status, it has certain strings and costs attached to it in terms of
paradoxes. It implies that when one state builds its security related muscles i.e. hard
power, its peer or neighboring states feel insecure and take appropriate measures for
balancing the power equation. The former state argues in response that its military
muscle is for defensive purposes only, but the claim remains intangible and intent
based which is hard to be believed amid security and survival based international
system. Being sovereign in nature, states do not let verification of their political
statements and expect to believe their rivals having suspicious discourses. The
preposition generally does not work and a vicious arms race circle kicks off. It further
gets highlighted when the states like India and Pakistan have a long history of
troublesome bilateral relations.
1 Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 85.
2
Pakistan - India relationship generally remains antagonistic based. The two states are
in perpetual state of conflict since their inception in 1947, mainly due to the
unresolved territorial disputes including Jammu and Kashmir. The two nuclear states
have been on the fringes of nuclear brinkmanship at number of occasions due to
which the global powers regard the South Asian Region as a probable nuclear flash
point. India is stronger than Pakistan in all power related manifestations i.e.
geographical size, human resource, population size, biggest democracy, high paced
economy and above all in terms of military might. India aims to be seen at
international level and does not want to be entangled at bi-lateral level with Pakistan
which it perceives to be against its regional power status. At the regional level,
smaller states on the eastern side of India also remain dependent on the Indian
policies being land locked and smaller in size. Such an arrangement further multiplies
Indian arrogance with respect to its neighbors. Pakistan, due to its existential threat
emanating from India has its guards on and does not let India to dominate whether
politically, diplomatically or militarily. This makes it a difficult state in the eyes of
India, which keeps the two sides often at odds.
India, by virtue of power, has the tangible potential of changing the hierarchical
layout of South Asian balance of power settings. In Pakistan, the hawks in policy and
opinion making circles perceive India to be revisionist state based on its well-known
rhetoric of Greater India. Although, perceiving India to be a revisionist state remains
debatable, however, Pakistani nationalists believe in it. They believe that being an
aspiring great power, India is utilizing all its potentials to accrue the strengths
required for it. However, a careful and realistic strategic analysis is earnestly needed
to list the probable fallouts of such developments. India being the evolving economy
is getting all possible technological cooperation from advanced states that seek to
have their share of pie out of Indian big market. International export control cartels
except Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which seek to address the menace of
proliferation in their respective areas of sensitive technologies have granted
memberships to India by virtue of which it has now an assured access to the advanced
technologies including missile and space technologies.
3
Pakistani ballistic missiles are the main delivery means for its strategic weapons.2
Any Indian effort supplemented by the international cooperation in building counter
response against Pakistani ballistic missiles would be troublesome and
counterproductive for strategic stability of South Asian strategic environment. The
Indians‘ perfecting of their indigenous missile shield or acquisitioning of the Ballistic
Missile Defence (BMD) systems through international cooperation needs to be
addressed appropriately by the global security managers. Similarly, Indian space
program is in advanced stages and has international confidence for launching their
precious satellites aboard Indian Satellite Launch Vehicles (SLVs). On the other hand
Pakistan‘s space program, which was initiated almost a decade in advance to the
Indian program, has much to achieve.3 It is subjected to additional licensing
requirements which act as kind of sanction, although, not deliberately stated as such.
Pakistan space agency i.e. Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO) has been mandated to achieve self-sufficiency by the
Pakistan‘s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) under its ‗Space Vision-2047‘.4
Details of the subject vision have yet to be made public. In this context, Indian logical
quest for having control over space amid it‘s growing stakes by developing offensive
space capabilities is going to be point of concern for Pakistan in times to come.
Outer space is going to be the future strategic turf for major and great powers‘
strategic competition. It is likely to contribute massively in balancing or outbalancing
the equation of deterrence as well as calculus of strategic stability. Contemporarily,
however, terrestrial based weapons are being developed. Till to-date, the efforts for
power projection through space include placement of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites besides satellites for battlefield communication and
guidance purposes for strategic weapons including precision guided munitions,
2 Andreas Katsouris and Daniel Gouré, ―Strategic Crossroads in South Asia: The Potential Roles for
Missile Defense,‖ Comparative Strategy, 18:2 (1999): 176. 3 Dhrubo Jyoti, ―Pakistan Began Space Programme 8 Years Before India, but ISRO is Galaxies Ahead
Now,‖ Hindustan Times, February 16, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistan-
started-space-programme-8-years-before-india-today-isro-is-galaxies-ahead/story-
uZW0NQG5Qmxa1o2QM8M8SL.html. 4 Press Release, Pakistan Prime Minister‘s Office. ―23rd Meeting of the National Command Authority
(NCA) was held under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi.‖
http://pmo.gov.pk/news_details.php?news_id=760.
4
against their inter-continental, intermediate and short range targets. However, the
physical placement of weapons in the outer space is yet to be actualized. The
common perception for inactivity with regard to actual positioning of weapons is
believed to be due to advanced space faring nations‘ technical and financial
incapacities besides lack of political, social and diplomatic will. Yet, the trend set by
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) does create an impression that the space-
based weapons are going to be there sooner or later.
Immense investments by the US and its allies in the Missile Defense System,
evolving innovated technologies/ RMA and opposition to treaties like ‗Prevention of
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)‘ at the Conference on Disarmament (CD),5
manifest vacuum for space getting physically weaponized.
There is a lot of technical space in outer space with regard to its weaponization,
which if not timely checked, might hang yet another sword on living beings besides
nuclear weapons. Space weaponization, if actualized, shall have an immense
unbalancing effect on global strategic stability. Over the past decade, there have been
tangible indicators of a potential space weaponization. For instance, the US and
Russia have been involved in action-reaction syndrome with regard to deployment of
BMD Systems. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) System test conducted by China in 2007,6
followed by a response test (although not claimed as an ASAT test by the US) by the
US in 2008, depicts potential notion of space weaponization. The concerns about
actual weaponization of space got further accentuated when the US President Trump
announced raising ‗space force‘ as the US 6th
branch of armed forces.7 Details have
yet to be released by the US; however, it accentuated the fears of space getting
extensively weaponized, if not physically at-least by the use of terrestrial based space
weapons.
5 Conference on Disarmament. CD/ 2078, September 16, 2017. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc
/UNDOC/GEN/G16/206/16/PDF/G1620616.pdf?OpenElement. 6 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ―China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, Unnerving the US,‖ The
New York Times, January 8, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18cnd-china.html. 7 Katie Rogers, ―Trump Orders Establishment of Space Force as Sixth Military Branch,‖ The New York
Times, June 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/trump-space-force-sixth-
military-branch.html.
5
Since independence, India has been struggling for its supremacy in South Asia. Being
the evolving economy, it is getting all possible technological cooperation from
technologically advanced states, which seek to have maximum out of Indian big
market. New Delhi‘s memberships of International export control cartels, including
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), facilitate in modernizing its military
industrial complex. India has been vigorously pursuing indigenous development of an
active BMD system with the help of the US, Israel and Russia.8 Introduction of
missile defense is likely to affect negatively upon already fragile strategic balance in
South Asia. Importantly, BMD system can alternatively be used as an ASAT weapon.
Thus, Pakistan‘s Space Vision of 2047 would remain under perpetual threat of Indian
BMD system as well. India is developing offensive space capabilities for space
control mainly for two purposes i.e. enhanced deterrence and diplomatic influence/
leverages for playing an important role in international decision making process. In
case of Islamabad‘s tit-for-tat acquisition of missile defense technology or by adding
qualitatively and quantitatively to the carriers fitted with nuclear or conventional
warheads might amplify lethal arms race between India and Pakistan.
India‘s indigenous development of BMD is expected to have a domino effect with
regard to power politics in South Asia. The US support for potential Indian
membership of NSG followed by permanent seat in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) might deteriorate the security situation in the region. International
support for Indian rise as a regional power could prove detrimental to the peace and
may air conflict between the nuclear powers.
Statement of the Problem
The South Asian Region has been subjected to destabilizing strategic competition
since the subcontinent‘s partition in 1947. The region is commonly known as
Pakistan and India specific; however, other states like the US and China are rightly
considered to be catalyst actors in the regional strategic environment due to their
tangent and crisscrossed political and strategic interests. Literature about the capacity
8 Qura Tul Ain Hafeez, ―India‘s Quest for Ballistic Missile Defense Shield,‖ Modern Diplomacy,
February 9, 2018, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/02/09/indias-quest-ballistic-missile-defense-
shield/.
6
of a smaller state to challenge a major emerging power in terms of power potential is
not very common. Pakistan, in this context, is the only state in region which
challenges India in her intent to dominate the region.
Pakistan, which had fought three conventional wars with India, is still subject to
coercion by the India. It has also been on disadvantageous side vis-à-vis India with
respect to International discriminatory technological, political and diplomatic favors.
Besides that, the US is strengthening the Indian military to check mate rising China.
The international discriminatory cooperation with India is likely to be counter-
productive for having peace in South Asia.
Indian leadership‘s mantra of ‗Greater India‘9 is well known in the regional and
global political landscape. Pakistan doesn‘t fit into this Indian preposition.
Notwithstanding, India is perceived by the hawks in Pakistan with tangible supporting
arguments that India does not miss any eventuality at political and diplomatic levels
to coerce Pakistan for surrendering to the Indian ascendency in the region. The
coercive means include blaming Pakistan as a ‗state that sponsors terrorism‘ at
multiple international fora including the United Nations (UN), tangibly supporting
separatist and ethnic elements in Balochistan province of Pakistan and Karachi
respectively and above all sponsoring terrorism inside Pakistan from Afghanistan and
Iranian soil. Besides the coercive attitude towards Pakistan, it is also gathering state
of the art military equipment coupled with offensive doctrines such as Cold Start and
pro-active doctrines. Although, Pakistan has responded to all Indian offensive acts in
tangible terms (for instance, Azm e Nau exercise vs. Indian Cold Start Doctrine),10
yet it can‘t match the Indian economic strength that can spare huge exchequer on
purchase of advanced weapon systems. Pakistan being vulnerable to its bigger
neighbor has been struggling for maintaining Balance of Power (BoP) in the region.
Notwithstanding, Pakistan has to be cautious of not allowing itself to get embroiled in
unnecessary defense spending that can negatively impact upon its economy.
9 Bhanu Dhamija, ―Dream of Greater India: Forget Akhand Bharat or Hindu Rashtra, Bharat
Mahasangh of Like-Minded Nations is a More Feasible Goal,‖ The Times of India, March 20, 2018,
https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/dream-of-greater-india-forget-akhand-bharat-
or-hindu-rashtra-bharat-mahasangh-of-like-minded-nations-is-a-more-feasible-goal/. 10
Ali Ahmed, ―India and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a Response to the Cold Start,‖ Institute for Peace
and Conflict Studies No. 4056, July 28, 2013, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4056.
7
India has a fast growing space program which is projected as a ‗peaceful program‘,
for the betterment of humans. Indian space program, rather every space program in
the world, has dual uses/ purposes. On one side, the remote sensing capabilities
through space sensors depict weather forecast etc. and on the other hand it could also
be used militarily for spying inside the enemy territory i.e. real time battle situational
awareness. Similarly, the Indian constellation of dedicated navigation satellites
provides it autonomy from dependence on international navigation setups like Global
Positioning System (GPS) etc. Moreover, the communication satellites can
alternatively be used for strategic communications.
Future warfare is, thus, not likely to be following the old way of battlefield
management i.e. theater-wise management rather it would be a net-centric way of
fighting. Advanced space faring nations including India, have been perfecting net-
centric warfare in their military exercises for which assured responses from space-
based assets would be essential. For the conduct of successful land operations in a
net-centric warfare, control over space is most aptly desired. Space control could only
be achieved through dominance in space i.e. having offensive space weapons or in
other words from a position of strength. India is thus expected to have tangible
offensive space capabilities so as to deter any offensive act against its outer space
assets. Placement of weapons physically in outer space is yet not a sellable idea;
however, terrestrial based weapons, are seeing the day light in the form of ASAT
weapon systems. Notwithstanding, the dilemma is that an ASAT and BMD system
belong to the same family of weapons which need only the change in intent and
some minor technical modifications, to be used alternatively. In South Asian context,
the acquisitioning of BMD system by India means a lot to the strategic environment
in negative terms. Indian BMD system means Indian ASAT capability and vice versa,
which could check Pakistan‘s space vision of 2047 and secondly discredit Pakistan‘s
nuclear capable missiles thereby undermining Pakistan‘s nuclear deterrence
credibility.
The statement of problem identified for the study is, ‗Indian military modernization
related to BMD and outer space could contribute in attaining the capability of
developing ASAT weapons. The preposition needs to be carefully studied from South
8
Asian strategic stability perspectives inter-alia regional peace and impact upon
bi/multi-lateral arms control.
Relevance / Legitimacy of the Research
Testing and gradual development of new weapons systems inter-alia destructive and
non-destructive ASAT weapons besides BMD systems, have led to destabilization
and waging direct threat to the sustainability of space environment. Such a RMA
would provide an asymmetric strategic advantage to the technologically advanced
states including those who are on course of attaining the status of technologically
advanced great power status. It indicates the potential aspiration of refuting freedom
in outer space.
Space that is known to be the common heritage of the mankind has to maintain the
status of a sanctuary. Any infringement in the space from weaponization perspective
would adversely affect this basic notion. The militarily advanced states that have the
status of major space-faring nation have to be vigilant. They are expected to evolve
viable, effective and verifiable mechanisms to address the ticking issue i.e. space
weaponization. Thus onus of any such weaponization would rest with advanced states
who should work for the common good of the human beings. Desires alone will not
work. There has to have a legally binding, multi-lateral and verifiable treaty to
address the inevitability of space getting weaponized. There is also a need to look into
the loop holes in legal value of Outer Space Treaty (OST) which remain exploitable
by the advanced space-faring states.
There is a continuous debate among space related experts regarding inevitability
thesis with regard to development of space weapons. Despite the fact that majority of
experts do not buy inevitability factor, yet the American, Chinese and Russians
visible actions in terms of space weapons‘ R&D projects do not substantiate the
majority‘s view; hence, merits a critical review, especially keeping normative and
political attitudes of great powers in the past. Given the political criticism and
diplomatic pressures, it is not likely that space based weapons would actualize in near
time frame; however, terrestrial based weapons meant to engage outer space-based
assets have seen the actualization for intended deterrence based space control. In
9
addition, space-faring states are not overtly subscribing to having ASATs and are
extra conscious of projecting them due to the fear of initiation of an unprecedented
arms race in space weapons category that could seriously hamper their space
dependent strategic deterrence and domestic daily life pattern.
Foregoing, such dual use technological development might result into security
dilemma. The research work shall make an endeavor to answer the query i.e. ‗Is the
inevitability factor lead to a discursive construction of space strategic security
dilemma which left little with states to assume that sooner or later space would be a
new zone of conflict and hence get involved in seeking response measures?‘
Moreover, albeit intangible but hard-core elements inter-alia prestige, power, norms,
politics, institutional interests, personalities at helm of affairs shall be critically
researched for their role in building favorable arguments in support of space weapons.
The MTCR membership in June 2016 has enabled India to have an access to the
controlled missile and space related technologies, thereby, exponentially increasing
the potential war-fighting capacities not only terrestrially but also in space. Although
China is well ahead of Indian space capability, yet Indian entry into MTCR would
step up its capacity attainment at a faster pace. The Chinese and Pakistani experts
have expressed their concerns; however, India has been quite successful in projecting
its dovish image to the strategic community. The alarming factor is that India has
precedence of using the dual-use technology for military purposes. For instance, India
diverted its civil nuclear technology and fuel for carrying out controversial ―Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion (PNE)‖ on May 18, 1974. Foregoing, an extensive research is
needed to assess the Indian designs behind acquiring BMD system which may pose
serious threat to the South Asian strategic stability.
Literature Review
A thematic oriented literature review is preferential to address the unanswered or
under-answered queries. Literature was amicably distributed in six to seven different
themes inter-alia, relevance of power with the state‘s global status, contribution of
space weapons in raising the power potential which could enhance a state‘s
international power stature, identification of legalistic approaches towards regulating
10
space activities in the realm of developing offensive capabilities, nexus between
BMD and space weapons and their implications on deterrence equation in South
Asian Region, challenges and implications associated to the advanced missile and
space technologies in South Asia and finally, a futuristic perspective about way
forward with regard to maintenance of peace and stability in South Asia.
While reviewing the existing literature, a sincere effort has been made to take into
account maximum possible diverging perspectives of authentic and relevant experts
from different regions; however, during the subject review, maximum literature was
found to be of Western origin. Moreover, the existing literature was found to be
pivoting around same kinds of thoughts, with very less divergences. There were two
main schools of thoughts found discussing the issue of space weaponization
perspectives. First school of thought, belongs to the arms control experts who believe
that space weaponization cannot see the day light in near future either due to
compulsions like lack of political will, technology access and requirement of an
extensive flow of exchequer for initial development of space offensive capacity and
later maintaining it to the desired operational level. While the second school of
thought maintains a tangent viewpoint and professes that space weaponization is
inevitable which would add to the reach and control of major powers desirous of
becoming great powers.
Michael Krepon in chapter Space and Nuclear Deterrence of edited book Anti-
Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations (2013)11
focuses
on the basics of space deterrence. Krepon opined that states with advanced space
technologies are pursuing the attainment of space offensive capability in an ‗indirect
way‘. The chapter acknowledges that although there are no active or dedicated
weapons placed in outer space but its indicators are there. Krepon is of the view that
the US is pushed towards space-based deterrence due to Chinese advancement in
space offensive capabilities. In Krepon‘s opinion, space-based deterrence assurance
can be achieved by three factors i.e. continued situational awareness, attribution
capability and resilient space assets. Krepon also suggests engaging in meaningful
11
Michael Krepon, ―Space and Nuclear Deterrence,‖ in Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-
American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al. (Washington DC: Stimson Press, 2013), 15-41.
11
dialogues and negotiations on various initiatives which could define and identify the
norms/ rules for state‘s behavior in space domain. In his chapter, Krepon highlights
the US‘s space policies and its quest for the acquisition of space-based weapons
capability. He supported US attainment of space-based offensive capability for
deterrence purpose, while denying the same to other states. He also did not support a
legally binding instrument like Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
pending at the CD; instead, he supported EU‘s proposed International Code of
Conduct (ICoC) as a solution to lay down norms and code to regulate states‘ behavior
in space. Linkage between space-based deterrence to the nuclear domain was also
established and feared that any US act of demonstrated capability of space weapons
could compel the Chines or Russian sides to advance their nuclear arsenal in terms of
quality and quantity amid their relative evolving space programs vis-à-vis the US.
Mearsheimer‘s classical work Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)12
has been the
most influential in building the study parameters. Mearsheimer in his book explained
the behavior of power aspiring states under his theory of offensive realism. His thesis
pivots around argument that great powers always remain in search of maximizing
their power so as to act aggressively in order to meet their political ends especially
the regional hegemony. He graded ‗military might‘ as the most important tool for
practicing power. A state without advanced military modernization may not have
great power status.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in his monograph Militarization and Weaponization of Space:
A critical Analysis,13
carried out a comprehensive analysis of trends that indicated
space getting weaponized by empirically quoting indicators from advanced space-
faring nations including the US, Russia, China, India and the European Union. To
build on to his argument he used the realist lens to substantiate his argument that
major space-faring nations would employ RMA for their military modernization so as
to have an increased global and regional influence and the outer space technology is
no different. The monograph explicitly covers the differences between space
12
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 5-75. 13
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space: A critical Analysis,‖ South Asian
Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI, London) Research Report No. 22 (December 2008).
12
weaponization and militarization trends and also reflects upon as to how the dual-use
space technology could alternatively be employed in military role. The monograph
also took an account of weak space related arms control regime and suggested to have
an effective outer space treaty for checking the likely trend of space weaponization.
The author cautioned that unless the trend of using space for military purposes is
checked, there would be a new form of arms race that might be detrimental to the
global peace and stability.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in his chapter The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in
South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability of edited book Nuclear Learning in
South Asia: The Next Decade14
concentrated on listing the repercussions of
introducing missile shield in South Asia. Jaspal opined in his chapter that the BMD
acquisitioning by the India would be a catalyst for an offensive-defensive arms race
in the South Asia. Action-reaction syndrome prone South Asia strategic environment
would exert a pull on Pakistan‘s strategic community for developing retaliatory
capability besides entering into alliances to counter Indian BMD capability thus an
arms race initiation would be natural. India visibly remains dismissive about
exercising strategic restraint and BMD capability acquisition is an indicator to it.
Jaspal highlighted that both India and Pakistan who are still in process of nuclear
learning from the past experience of Cold War, could face further steeper slope in
learning the impact of BMD introduction in context of deterrence equation. He
opined that arms race in the region is detrimental to economic development and might
add to the financial hardships on both sides, thus suggested to have a non-
confrontationist approach.
Karl P. Mueller in his chapter The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground:
Why Nuclear Deterrence and Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar – Yet
Profoundly Different of edited book Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-
American Space Relations (2013)15
covered possible analogies which could be related
14
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on
Strategic Stability,‖ in Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, ed. Feroz Hassan Khan et al.
(Monterey: Naval Post Graduate Scholl, 2014), 120-129. 15
Karl Mueller, ―The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear Deterrence and
Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar – Yet Profoundly Different,‖ in Anti-Satellite Weapons,
13
to the deterrence jutting out of two totally different domains. Mueller interestingly
raises the preposition that absence of nuclear wars since 1945 Hiroshima and
Nagasaki doesn‘t mean the absence of deterrence but ―absence of deterrence failure‖,
which means the deterrence prevails, albeit in an unseen way. The author
acknowledges that nuclear deterrence is much debated, deliberated and understood,
however; space-based deterrence is yet to be bought in totality. Author noted active
means to destroy satellites while relegating indirect means, for instance, cyber-attacks
or jamming etc. Author argued that space weapons contribute towards crises
instability and thus, the decision makers have to be rationale and need to have strong
nerves for taking any decision in compressed time frame especially when confronted
with situations like, ―use it or lose it‖. As a whole, the subject article by Mueller is all
about the US security. It did not cover the concerns of other regions nor did it address
the deterrence values given to space weaponization by the US‘s strategic competitors
in space for instance China and Russia.
James A. Lewis opines in his chapter Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyber
Space of edited book Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space
Relations (2013)16
that chances of deterring a potential adversary from attacking
satellites or network is remote. Lewis argued that even during peace time by using the
space borne capacities, less destructive and non-attributable attacks can be launched
which could cause immense losses in terms of finances, daily routine works etc. It‘s
like ―Low Intensity Conflict or Asymmetric Warfare‖ in a domain (space) other than
the terrestrial, which would enable a determined but comparatively technologically
less advanced adversary to effect a big power without letting nuclear threshold being
crossed. Lewis, foregoing this new approach, suggested the US to attain space war
fighting capability then trying to prevent war by having means of deterrence.
Bruce W. MacDonald in his chapter Deterrence and Crises Stability in Space and
Cyberspace of edited book Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American
Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al. (Washington DC: Stimson
Press, 2013), 41-61.
16
James A. Lewis, ―Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyber Space,‖ in Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al. (Washington DC: Stimson
Press, 2013), 61-80.
14
Space Relations (2013)17
highlighted the importance of communications, which is
essential for maintenance of deterrence and crises stability. Author warned that the
space-based weapons or the offensive counter-space capabilities are not all about ‗one
more weapon‘ in the arsenal but it has serious repercussions on the strategic stability
and the deterrence value.
Michael Nacht in his chapter The United States and China in Space: Cooperation,
Competition, or Both? of edited book Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-
American Space Relations (2013)18
raised the concerns about lack of precedence in
space war besides less understanding about the destructions which might come in way
of the space weapons users, making the things serious and worrisome. Nacht
suggested that instead of waiting for reaching on to a consensus based legally binding
treaty for instance Treaty for Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), it is
the need of time to enter into Outer Space International Code of Conduct (ICoC) on
space issues so as to at-least set norms to regulate states‘ behavior in space affairs.
Brian Weeden work titled US-China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities,
and Options of edited book Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American
Space Relations (2013)19
highlights emerging power struggle tug of war between the
US and China and suggests that China and the US have to have outer space
cooperation mechanism in place so that to reduce the chances of misunderstandings.
Albeit, Weeden in his writing suggested some measures to address the friction
between the two sides on space issues, for instance, information sharing, joint venture
(JV) projects and space policy dialogue, but these all were generalized in nature. He
projected the US vis-à-vis China in space technology. To support his claim, he
referred to Chinese opaque intents in space, which is generally the policy of the
weaker states in International Relations.
17
Bruce W. MacDonald, ―Deterrence and Crises Stability in Space and Cyberspace,‖ in Anti-Satellite
Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al. (Washington DC:
Stimson Press, 2013), 81-100. 18
Michael Nacht, ―The United States and China in Space: Cooperation, Competition, or Both?,‖ in
Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al.
(Washington DC: Stimson Press, 2013), 101-112. 19
Brian Weeden, ―US-China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities, and Options,‖ in Anti-
Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al.
(Washington DC: Stimson Press, 2013), 113-130.
15
Karl P. Mueller‘s Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate
(2003)20
touches upon debate between the arms controllers‘ community and the
realist family who profess more weapons as guarantor for peace and stability. Mueller
opined that space warriors and space worriers are at tangent to each other‘s thoughts.
He argued that space weaponization as a subject for strategic thinkers was never so
pronounced until the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) weapons and post-cold war related
debates got traction. Mueller highlighted that there were many reasons for this
emerging debate, out of which main reasons include, exuberant finances involved in
development and deployment of multi-purpose satellites, ABM realization as an
effective weapon to neutralize Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) during
their mid-course flight through the space domain and above all projection of space as
an important ingredient of the US defense and security policies. Mueller in his
chapter covered the arguments of idealists, internationalists and nationalists
approaches under the concept of ‗space as a sanctuary‘, while arguments of space
racers, space controllers and space hegemons were highlighted in support of pro-
weaponization concept. Mueller, while concluding his opinion, stated that the space
weapons controller treat any space weaponization initiative as an ‗absolute taboo‘ and
warn pro-space weapons supporters to remain rationale while supporting weapons in
space and do not remain fixated to their respective doctrinal faith.
Laura Delgado Lopez‘s Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions
for Space Arms Control (2012)21
pitches arguments from arms control perspective
against the reasoning of pro-space weaponization, who predicted that placement of
destructive weapons in outer space, is inevitable. She warned against any such move
for number of reasons to include, economic and political cost, fear of losing friends,
and initiation of an unwarranted outer space arms race. She is also of the opinion that
currently, there is condition of stability in space related issues including weapons in
space and none has the true appetite for having space weapons despite resources‘
20
Karl P. Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate,‖ in Space
Weapons Are They Needed?, ed. John M. Logsdon et al. (Washington DC: The George Washington
University Press, 2003). 21
Laura Delgado Lopez, ―Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space
Arms Control,‖ Astropolitics 10:1 (2012).
16
abundance. She also opined that changed strategic environment and individual level
restraints in the post-cold war scenario, makes pro-space weapons‘ proponents‘
arguments much substance-less. Lopez covered Everett Dolman theory of Astropolitik
which argues that the US should assume control of space and even withdraw from
current space regimes. Dolman believed that only a liberal hegemon like the US could
control the space, as it would bring peace and stability globally. Dolman supported
his argument by saying that once the US shall place weapons up in the space, it would
naturally reduce its spending on conventional weapons development due to the reach
it achieves, thus indirectly reducing its capability of occupying land physically. This
means that the other states will have a sense of security. Lopez buys these ideas on
the basis of realist theorists‘ approach of ‗rational actor behavior‘. Lopez believed
that the less number of spacefaring nations would ensure space environmental
security; hence space would remain available as common heritage for mankind in
times to come.
Columba Peoples in The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control
(2011)22
covered the current debate pivoting around space arms control and the
challenges it faces in reaching on to a tangible, mutually acceptable and universally
verified legal space arms control regime for addressing the threat from prospective
space weaponization. The article is worth analyzing the concepts of space
weaponization and militarization from the securitization lens. Peoples analyses the
shortcomings of OST of 1967 and ABM Treaty of 1972 which did not cover the
placement of conventional/ kinetic weapons in space; albeit, it addresses the
placement of nuclear weapons in space. Visualizing the actuality of space weapons
threat, the author suggested that if there is no consensus on having a legally binding
treaty on space regulation, option of adopting soft approach i.e. code of conduct be
pursued otherwise, the International Law will make its own course based on
normative approach. The author referred to Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver‘s
approaches i.e. security based Copenhagen school of thought while explaining
securitization of space. He also pointed out that process of space securitization is not
22
Columba Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖
Contemporary Security Policy 32:1 (2011).
17
a new phenomenon and it actually kicked off in 1957 when the USSR launched
Sputnik. Thereafter, as part of the real politick discourse, space has been one of the
tools to achieve and maintain national security objectives of major space faring
nations including the US, China, France, Russia and European Union (EU). The
author suggested the ‗positive securitization‘ as solution to control means of violence
i.e. states have to come out of their narrower approach of looking on to their own
security only; else, space is going to be weaponized very soon.
Patrick K. Gleeson‘s Perspective on Space Operations (2007)23
takes into account
concept of space militarization vis-à-vis space weaponization. He notes that the OST
imposes a few specific restrictions with regard to placements of weapons in space,
however, he doesn‘t explicitly deny military uses of space or complete space de-
weaponization. Gleeson very meticulously carried out a comparison of the OST
article by article especially the different divergent perspectives related to the terms
inter-alia peaceful purposes and the use of force in space. Besides that, he also carried
out a comparison of Antarctic Treaty that legally binds for the complete
demilitarization of the Antarctica Region vis-à-vis the OST which supports the same
purpose in space domain. He opined that since the existing space law does include
references to the International Law as well as the UN Charter also supports the use of
force in self-defense provides it normative lead to use offensive mode in self-defense.
In the end, the author suggested a few alternatives to the space weapons which could
contribute towards enhanced security of space-based assets.
Lawrence Cooper in his article The Strategy of Responsive Space (2003)24
made an
endeavor to look at the concept of responsive space through the lens of great
strategists like Mahan, Sun Tzu, Corbett and Johd Boyd. The article is useful for the
students of strategy-making which provides an opportunity to compare the concepts
of these great strategists with the evolving concept of responsive space. Responsive
space capacity is to address the space related affairs inter-alia mitigation of crises,
launching/ re-launching of space missions and responding to the impromptu
operational situations. The author implied that by operationalizing responsive space
23
Patrick K. Gleeson, ―Perspective on Space Operations,‖ Astropolitics 5:2 (2007). 24
Lawrence Cooper, ―The Strategy of Responsive Space,‖ Astropolitics 1:3(2003).
18
strategy, the US can ensure meeting its national security objectives without any
hindrance. Responsive space concept revolves around the capacity of having
increased numbers of satellites thereby achieving both redundancy as well as ubiquity
i.e. being every-where. The US can achieve ubiquity by making light weight, easy to
launch satellites, capable of being launched at short notice, instead of a few hardened
and expensive satellites to be launched through single source like the US‘s Columbia
space shuttle, etc. The author has been supportive of inexpensive outer space assets
built within 10-30 months instead of expensive satellites with construction time of 5-
15 years. This would reduce the vulnerability through redundancy factor. These small
and inexpensive satellites could be Nano and micro satellites on which research &
development (R&D) are in full swing.
Bruce M. Deblois in his article titled The Advent of Space Weapons (2003)25
took into
account space war and weapons proponents‘ arguments vis-a-vis those who want to
maintain space as ―Sanctuary‖. The author tried to be neutral and suggested way
forward to address the concerns of both schools of thoughts. Author opined that there
are commonalities between the two distinct poles, out of which one considers to
exercise maximum restraint in keeping the space environment free of military
competitions while the opponent pole supports space hegemony by only one actor i.e.
unilateral course adoption so as to monopolize the space politics as well as space
operations. However, the question about other major space faring nations‘ response to
the situation remains unanswered. Inevitable factor attached to the space weapons
keeps the realists theory proponents continuously follow phenomenon of ‗pushing –
forward‘ for acquiring and subsequently deployment of space weapons. Author is of
the opinion that since no definition has been crystallized for the space weapons so
very conveniently it can be concluded that till to-date space remains only militarized
and not weaponized. Author interestingly argued that since the evolution of space-
age, the world community has tacitly learnt to live with the fact of being watched
24/7 including adversaries through the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) space capabilities and don‘t consider it a threat. In the author‘s view, on-going
25
Bruce. M. Deblois, ―The Advent of Space Weapons,‖ Astropolitics 1:1 (2003).
19
debate about space weaponization‘s fear revolves around major power‘s ambiguous
policy intents.
Philip E. Coyle and John B. Rhinelander work on Space Weapons: Alternatives for
Today (2004)26
highlight that in the absence of any tangible threat to the US security
including from the states marked as ‗Axis of Evil‘, the US and the international
community should play a responsible role by following a comprehensive strategic
restraint policy. Yet, if the US opts for developing offensive space capability, it must
be ready to face competitors as its National Security Policy depicts intent of the same.
Hence, being the lead space faring state, the US has more to lose from making threats
or use of force in space. The authors also pointed out that the American BMD system
would be an initiator for placement of interceptors in space in order to engage an
incoming ICBM during its mid-course phase. The same interceptors could also be
used in an offensive role to destroy space assets of adversaries.
Vishnu Anantalmula‘s article US initiative to place weapons in space. The catalyst
for a Space-Based Arms Race with China and Russia (2003)27
opines that sooner or
later the US shall initiate space weaponization for protecting its space assets vital for
ensuring continued power projection and economic viability through dominating the
outer space. However, this would act as a catalyst to an unprecedented space arms
race especially by the US arch rivals Russians and the Chinese. Author, highlighted
that the space is of vital importance to the US strategic interests for which it needs to
assimilate threat. He cautioned the US planners that there would be three different
important aspects which are required to be kept in mind i.e. space is being
increasingly becoming competitive congested and contested. Out of these three
aspects, contest and competition form important part of space strategy as they pertain
to space weaponization. Author also highlighted Russians three pronged space
military strategy i.e. develop space weapons; deny the same capability to others and
to develop strategic offensive space capabilities to conduct space battle. This
26
Phillip Coyle and John Rhinelander, ―Space Weapons: Alternatives for Today,‖ Astropolitics 2:2
(2004). 27
Vishnu Anantatmula, ―U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space: The Catalyst for a Space-Based
Arms Race with China and Russia,‖ Astropolitics 11:3 (2003).
20
approach compelled the US to take necessary counter measures. The author also co-
related concepts of defense and deterrence. He opined that deterrence is must for
defense of space-based assets-critical for national security. He also emphasized that
the US has the most to lose in space if attacked, it should be able to deter by its
capabilities and resolve to refrain potential adversaries from damaging or jamming
the space-based assets. The author also recommended that the deterrence has to be
proportionate to keep its worth credible. However, US development of space weapons
could lead to strategic instability by the resultant increase in dilemma of ‗use it or
lose it‘, first strike, pre-emption, lowering of thresholds and an open-ended arms race.
Alam Steinberg in his work Weapon in Space: The Need to Protect Space Assets
(2012)28
highlighted the growing number of US space assets, their forced relative
dependency and the resultant tangible threats. Being critical, Steinberg did criticize
the US Government for not taking adequate protective measures against its space
assets despite identified them as a critical challenge by different US Presidents. He
opined that there could be either technological or policy solutions to the growing
threat faced by the US space assets. Being a social scientist, working on the faculty of
University of Houston Texas, his focus remained on the policy side of solution, which
mainly pivoted around suggestions inter-alia R&D for space-based weapons, re-
evaluation of existing space related arms control treaties and the status US inter-
agency cooperation. Steinberg pointed out the importance of space applications
without which the US can‘t think of going into a war, which would be net-centric.
Author also indicated that growing numbers of space faring nations would naturally
make space a future battlefield. The subject article is with a pre-fixated idea that the
space is going to be weaponized sooner or later and the US should take over vintage
position to control the space. Author is found to be more of a realist rather than
constructionist who did not find vitality of existing arms control treaties. For him an
arms race has already started and the US NASA must act proactively. He gave a
cursory touch to the major treaties and did not cover the suggested amendments.
28
Alan Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space : The Need to Protect Space Assets,‖ Astropolitics 10:3(2012).
21
Willian Spacy II in Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons (2003)29
debates about the broad utility of space weapons. Spacy identifies the likely utility of
space weapons (only the orbital weapons) i.e. in terms of controlling the space,
effective BMD system and force application. Author elaborately defined all possible
kinds of space-based weapons that could effectively be employed not only against the
satellites but also the hostile ballistic missiles especially during their boost phase of
parabolic trajectory. Besides identifying the space-based weapons, author also took an
account of counter measures by the space-based assets for protection against hostile
acts. The article by Spacy gives an insight to the new proposed era of weaponry in an
entirely new domain i.e. outer space. However, the work was found devoid of
different states priorities about acquisition of space weapons. The treaties that restrict
the space weaponization were given a cursory touch. The work by Spacy is good for
obtaining basic knowledge about kinds of space weapons and the various debatable
issues attached to them.
Michael Martindale in Evaluating State Willingness to Pursue Space Weapons
(2015)30
identifies as to how actually states behave while discharging their political
responsibilities. Michael concluded that it is a fine blend of real and liberal
approaches i.e. surviving in an anarchic system while ensuring maximum possible
restraint. Michael started by basic assumption of realist school of thought that states
maximize the power for survival and hence the space was no different. He recalled
that when Russian Sputnik was launched in 1957, there was a chain reaction by
various states as suggested by the realist approach. The article focused on the US,
USSR and China as case studies and shared their approaches and concern towards
developing space weapons. Michael also discussed formal (treaties) and normative
restraint efforts to keep space as sanctuary. Before concluding, Michael noted that
space behavior by states depends upon the level of perceived threat. A chronology of
events of action-reaction indicates the preposition. The article by Michael enlists the
motivating and de-motivating factors for developing space weapons. It does take
29
William. Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖ Astropolitics 1:3
(2003). 30
Michael Martindale, ―Evaluating State Willingness to Purse Space Weapons,‖ Defense & Security
Analysis 31:2 (2015).
22
account of US restraint in developing space weapons after cold-war termination;
however, remained wanting on the current denial mode of the US towards negotiating
a legal space treaty to avoid space weapons.
Bkarath Gopalswamy and Guurav Kampani in their article India and Space
Weaponization: Why Space Debris Trumps Kinetic Energy Anti Satellite Weapons as
the Principal Threat to Satellites (2014)31
took more of an internationalist approach
than the national one. They argued in favor of keeping the space as a sanctuary and
highlighted that contemporarily Indian satellites do not face threat from Kinetic
Energy (KE) ASATs or by the growing number of debris. The two authors in their
article listed policy interventions in anticipation. They believed that the ASAT
employment shall have an exponential increase in debris, resulting into unfavorable
environment for satellites operations. They admitted that since the ―First Space War‖
i.e. 2nd
Gulf War, Indian planners got further motivated and distributed their focus
from civilian space capability acquisition to the ―dual-use‖ and dedicated military
satellites. Statements by Indian Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO) officials substantiate it. Overall the work discretely identified the
motivations of Indian space weapons program and the resultant negative effects.
Clayton K.S Chun‘s Expanding the High Frontier: Space Weapons in History
(2004)32
investigates about the challenges which the space weapons aspirant states
faced while exploring the chances of operationalizing the weapons in dark world. The
author described in detail the drags like political compulsions, resource constraints,
inter-institutional rivalries, technological and operational limitations which did not let
the space-based weapons to be actualized. A good analytical effort that gives an
insight about limitations associated to the space-based weapons and hence terrestrial
based weapons were mastered in their lieu.
31
Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani, ―India and Space Weaponization: Why Space Debris
Trumps Kinetic Energy Antisatellite Weapons as the principal Threat to Satellites,‖ India Review 13:1
(2014). 32
Clayton K.S. Chun, ―Viewpoint: Expanding the High Frontier: Space Weapons in History,‖
Astropolitics 2:1(2004).
23
David B. Thomson in his accumulative work A Guide to the Nuclear Arms Control
Treaties (2001)33
carried out study of the political and technological discourses which
the related policy makers adopted to reach on to the arms control successes, inter-alia
NPT, SALT-I, START 1 & 2, ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, LTBT, PTBT and the
CTBT. The book provides a wholesome background, negotiations process and the
respective current status of existing non-proliferation regimes, which enabled arms
control researchers to find out sensitivities, acceptance thresholds and above all the
commons with regards to each successful arms control treaty. Overall the book
provides a comprehensive overview of the existing and former arms control treaties in
which author remained unbiased and made use of primary sources to bring
authenticity in his work. Since the book is ‗descriptive‘ in its research approach, it did
not suggest ways-forward to any impending treaties, among others Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the PAROS.
Alexei Arbator and Valdimit Dovrkin in their book Outer Space: Weapons,
Diplomacy and Security (2010)34
takes a review of the diplomatic, political, security
and technical issues attached to the most evolving global security concern i.e. Is the
space weaponization inevitable?, and if answer is in affirmation, then why it has not
been materialized in tangible terms rather being coated as theoretical concept even
after lapse of 50 years since the space age began by Sputnik launch in 1957. The book
mainly carries ‗Russian perspective‘ about space weapons‘ inevitability. Both the
experts took a critical review of the problems and their resultant drags being faced by
top treaty negotiators for concluding a consensus based arrangement or legal frame-
work to regulate space faring nation‘s behavior in outer space. Book‘s author opined
that any space weapons related move by the technologically advanced states shall
have severe negative impact on already slow paced arms control negotiations and
there are likely probabilities that a new kind of arms race shall unleash, thereby,
making world‘s strategic stability at extreme risk. While coating India and Pakistan,
33
David B. Thomson, A Guide to the Nuclear Arms Control Treaties(New Mexico: Los Alamos
Historical Society, 2001). 34
Alexei Arbator and Valdimit Dovrkin, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy and Security,
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).
24
authors opined that even these low GDP countries but rich in technical expertise,
would opt for space weapons development course.
Columba Peoples in his work Assuming the Inevitable: Overcoming the Inevitability
of Outer Space Weaponization and Conflict (2008)35
attended the basic question on
prospects of space weaponization. He argued that human nature is one of the major
factors for space weaponization, being selfish in nature- a realist paradigm. Secondly,
the technological advancement motivates the industrially advanced state to venture
for capture of strategic high ground for obvious strategic advantages. Thirdly, the
states with most expensive assets in space would naturally need space capable
weapons so as to deter any adventure against them. Lastly, as brought out earlier, it is
to seize the military advantage offered by the famously called, ―ultimate high
ground‖. Moreover, intangibly, elements of prestige, power and leverage attained
over a period of time by super powers, carry weight as favorable arguments in
support of space-based weapons.
Hypothesis
Indian quest to acquire BMD technology provides it with the capability of extending
the theater of war from land to outer space which would be instrumental in furthering
its aspiration to join the queue of great powers of the world. However, due to the
likely domino effect, the BMD systems could lead to the initiation of space
weaponization entailing destabilizing arms race in South Asia.
Research Questions
Based on the literature review gaps, following main research questions would be
enquired to validate or negate the hypothesis:
How and why India is modernizing its missile and space program and how
these could advance Indian quest of becoming great power?
Is the international space law viable to regulate the offensive space
capabilities in terms of its inevitability?
35
Columba Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable: Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space
Weaponization and Conflict,‖ Contemporary Security Policy 29:3(2008).
25
Are there any policy tools to address the outer space weapons‘ actualization in
South Asia inter-alia, law, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), arms
control initiatives?
What are the tangible indicators of the nexus between missile shield and space
weapons in South Asian perspective and how could it affect South Asian
strategic and deterrence stability?
Methodology
To have an objective study about space weapons and BMD systems followed by
establishing their nexus for strategic purposes, the research methodology would be a
mix of description, exploration and analysis. Quantitative and qualitative data
collection methods are used so as to analyze both synchronous and tangent arguments
for a purposeful, focused, unbiased and objective study. Mix method i.e. positivist
and post-positivist approaches are applied for gauging the data from empiricism
(quantitative approach) while rationalist understanding of the listed study‘s queries is
adopted for qualitative responses.
Each data or previously held study on the subject shall be dealt with un-biased
content analysis so as to focus only on the gaps existing in the literature. Online and
in-person interviews from international and national intellectual, scholars and related
experts would also be used for validating or negating the hypothesis.
Organization of Research
In order to sequentially answer the enquiries for comprehensive understanding by the
reader, the study has been divided into seven chapters. The first chapter critically
analyses the power acquisitioning by the states on the basis of status and security
consciousness as explained by different international relation theories. Offensive
realism has been the major theory around which the study revolves; however, alone it
would not have justified the research. Hence a mix of different power related IR
discourses would be dilated upon.
Chapter two enlists appraisal of space weapons so as to set a stage for their
inevitability debate. It also covers identification of space orbits, which house different
kinds of satellites. Space weapons probability factor would be focused upon so as to
26
identify whether space weapons are myth or reality. Destructive and non-destructive
space technologies would come under discussion being the main options with states
to exert themselves for offensive space control.
Chapter three dilates upon the legal values pertaining to regulating outer space
activities especially in the realm of developing offensive and defensive space
capabilities. The chapter would intricately debate on space related arms control
initiatives and regime that basically set the norms and obligations for space-faring
states. A detailed analysis of the existing and proposed outer space arms control
treaties and initiatives would be carried out to enlist their shortcomings and hurdles
they face in regulating the states‘ behavior with regard to outer space activities. Lastly
the role played by various organizations in keeping the outer space reserved for
peaceful activities would be analyzed in detail.
Chapter four traces the empirical or interpretative evidences pertaining to major space
faring nations‘ quest for having space weapons. In this chapter, outer space
capabilities of the major space-faring nations i.e. the US, Russia, China, India and
European Union would be listed so as to draw the inferences about their intent of
developing offensive space capabilities.
Chapter five makes a detailed inquiry into establishing nexus between BMD and
space weapons and also lists their perceived alternative employment besides the
implications for doing so. For comprehensive understanding of the BMD and space
weapons development, an account of ballistic missiles technology would be carried
out besides undertaking a comprehensive review of BMD evolutionary process as
well. It would set the stage for undertaking the debate about strategic implications
related to ballistic missiles, BMD systems and the space weapons, which all have
inter-relationship.
Chapter six studies the existing and futuristic trends of missile and space
technologies‘ proliferation in South Asia. It encompasses the Indian and Pakistani
space program‘s evolution and identifies the level of advancements and milestones
achieved by the respective program amid opportunities available to them through
international cooperation. An effort would also be made to mention the trend of
27
Indian and Pakistani offensive and defensive missile tests that resulted into missile
(horizontal/ vertical) and space technology proliferation trend in South Asia.
Lastly, the chapter seven would identify the implications of developing counter
deterrence weapons including the BMD and space weapons in conflict prone South
Asian region. The roles played by various state actors in supporting India for
developing BMD and space weapons would also be highlighted. An account of
composite dialogue process between India and Pakistan would also come under
discussion that remains stalemated since 2012 so that to develop an understanding
about Indo-Pak peace processes being hostage to the mistrust and unsettled territorial
disputes. An effort would be made to identify as to how the development of BMD and
space weapons could accentuate the hostile bi-lateral relations between the two
antagonist states i.e. India and Pakistan. In the end, a suggested way forward would
also be identified for peace and stability in the South Asia.
28
CHAPTER 1
THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK
The chapter unfolds mainstream discourses of international relations to explain the
rationale behind acquisition of military capabilities such as space weapons and their
persistent maximization. The study would primarily be seen through the prism of
realism theory as the main paradigm; however, in order to have a whole
encompassing view of the study titled ―Emerging Nexus between Space
Weaponization and Missile Shield: Impact on South Asian Strategic Stability‖ an
analytical ingress would also be made into other related international relations
paradigms as well. The chapter also theorizes a framework which interweaves
ideational and empirical explanations to study the phenomenon of space
weaponization with its nexus with missile shield that could have implications for
South Asian strategic stability.
1.1 Significance of Military Power in International Relations’ Theoretical
Perspectives
Power and interests are two very important domains of international politics which
regulate a state‘s behavior.36
In fact, realpolitik revolves around power politics and
struggle to pursue national interests.37
Power is wide and multidimensional.38
It
includes military power by virtue of having state of the art and cutting edge weapons
substantiated by economic and normative power.39
Military power has remained an
attractive choice for the realists in international system.40
The concepts of deterrence,
BoP, Balance of Terror (BoT) have become more relevant with improvised RMAs. At
the same time, due to the increased inter-dependency and globalization, the dynamics
36
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal Theories in Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law ed. Rudiger Wolfrom (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1,
https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.p
df.. 37
Barry Scott Zellen, The Realist Tradition in International Relation: The Foundation of Western
Order (California: Praeger, 2011), 64. 38
Talcott Parsons, ―On the Concept of Political Power,‖ Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, Vol. 107, No. 3 (1963): 258. 39
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ―Power in International Politics,‖ International Organization,
Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter, 2005): 50. 40
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.1, 63.
29
of power politics has shifted the nature of power from military to economic and
normative power. However, the dominant roles played by conventional or
unconventional deterrence, military power would remain an important tool of
pursuing coercive diplomacy in the future international power politics. In fact,
coercion is one of the important forms of power underlying BoP calculations.41
There
are multiple international relations paradigms that see military power pursuit with
their peculiar lenses, and are going to be thread bearded in following discussion.
1.1.1 Realists’ Perspective about Military Power
In the realist school of thought, classical realism sees power as ‗the variable‘ for
looking on to inter-state behaviors.42
Classical realism presents a pessimistic picture
of human nature and opines that struggle for power pursuit is ingrained in human
psyche.43
To be more focused, realist school of thought supports the notion of
increasing military power (weaponization both conventional and unconventional), so
as to increase one‘s security on zero-sum competition basis.44
Realists have lust for more and more power for dominance and hegemony in the
world.45
Machiavelli - an arch realist, in his book The Prince had advised Prince to
rise against King without considering any standard of morality less self-interest.46
Similarly, E.H Carr, opined that ―something is always guided by something‖ and
statesmen would always adopt empirical approach to politics.47
Overall, realist school
of thought is pragmatic and follow the empirical approach thereby remain obsessed
with hard facts. Therefore, realists believe that contest for military power and means
for balancing it, are the two major tasks of diplomacy and statesmen.48
41
Daniel Ellsberg, "Theory and Practice of Blackmail," RAND Paper P-3883 (Santa Monica.CA:
RAND Corporation, 1968), 3. 42
Martin Griffith, Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 3. 43
Ibid, 4-5. 44
Ibid, 74. 45
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 34. 46
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.3, 64. 47
E H Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1946), 16. 48
Vinay Kumar Maltiotra and Alexandera Sergounin, Thesis and Approaches to International
Relations (New Delhi: Anmol Publishers, 1998), 67.
30
1.1.2 Liberalist Perspective about Building Military Power
Liberals define power in terms of human liberty, an absence of war and increasing
interdependence. 49
The core assumptions of liberal paradigm posit, firstly, that states
are basic units and central actors in international system; that, secondly, the internal
dynamic of states vary substantially and these domestic characteristics affect state
behavior; and, thirdly, and that there is no need for calculations of power because
these are of secondary importance in determining a state‘s behavior. Liberals argue
that political and economic factors are more important than military power, and that
those states which maximize power at the expense of other states are misguided. For
liberalism, power is irrelevant in an ideal world.50
A ―Liberal Internationalist‖
believes in the interdependence and interconnectedness of states as a basis for
forming a liberal world order. They support multilateralism and those international
institutions which prevent vicious interests of states from stimulating them to indulge
in power politics.51
1.1.3 Structural Realism/ Neo Realist Perspective on Military Power
Structural realism that is also regarded as neorealism focuses on international system,
primarily aims at controlling actions of competitor states. It explains as to how the
great powers promote and legitimize their interests by creating norms.52
Structural
realism holds the notion that the anarchic nature of the international system coupled
with capabilities‘ distribution leads to the belief that there is no central authority to
govern the norms and every state in the international system is sovereign and has
equal rights to protect itself by taking suited decisions depending upon the security
environment.53
Supporters of the structural realism believe that whatever the structure of
international relations exist, it doesn‘t matter in outlining the security paradigm;
49
Ibid, 16 50
Ibid, 17-18 51
Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et.al, Theories of International Relations (NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 57-85. 52
Stephen M. Walt, ―International Relations: One World, Many Theories,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 110,
(Spring, 1998) :41. 53
Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkope, ―Theories of World Politics,‖ in World Politics:
Trends & Transformation (Washington: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2004), 35.
31
however; one can find the differences among the scholars too. They differ with regard
to objectives of maintaining substantial soft and hard powers and question; do the
states obtain power for their survival only in anarchic international system or else
they want to maximize their relative power in relation to their competitors? The
former concern is highlighted and affiliated with the ideas of Kenneth Waltz i.e.
defensive realism while later is associated with John Mearsheimer i.e. offensive
realism. Kenneth Waltz believed that international system has constraints thus
inhibits acquisition of (military) power for security to an absolute level;54
whereas,
Mearsheimer‘s led offensive realist school of thought opines that states continuously
struggle for more and more military power so as to gain security from a position of
domination and status of hegemon.55
Offensive realism would be discussed in detail
in the following discussion.
Primarily the anarchic nature of international system, realists argue, is the main
driving force behind states‘ behavior. Anarchy thus leads to consequences inter-alia,
states‘ self-centered approach, self-help56
for survival i.e. by increasing their own
military power besides poor man‘s choice of forming alliances and reduced chances
of ‗long term‘ cooperation due to evolving nature of suspicions and mistrust.57
In the absence of a central world government ‗anarchy‘ prevails which ultimately
leads to the security dilemma.58
For instance, anarchy based political system makes
the threatened state (State X) to build its military muscles for defensive purposes.
Correspondingly, other states (States Y and Z) in the same region start feeling
threatened by actions of state X and respond by following the suit. State X gets
suspicious of states Y and Z thereby decide to increase its military muscles a bit
further. This action-reaction syndrome results into ‗security dilemma‘ and a vicious
circle of arms race, hair trigger policies and accidental war kicks-off.59
The realist
54
Colin Elman, ―Realism,‖ in International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An
introduction, ed. Martin Griffiths (New York, Routledge, 2007), 17. 55
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 5. 56
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Philippines: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979), 111. 57
Kenneth N. Waltz, ―History The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,‖ The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring 1998): 619. 58
Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (New York, Routledge, 2007), 8. 59
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.3, xxxiv.
32
school of thought thus grades security dilemma and its resultant arms race as a child
of international anarchic system.60
The arms race thus needs a check through arms
control measures.
In an anarchic international system idea of complete disarmament is considered to be
naïve and as a result, arms control is believed to be a fallback position. Arms control
as a term was first used in United Nations‘ Charter. Arms control is an approach
falling under the domain of neo-realism. It basically meant setting rules and
guidelines regarding limiting the arms race mainly the nuclear weapons, however,
with the passage of time and its wide use in strategic calculus, it dovetailed many
related functions which were useful in bringing peace and stability by exercising
control over arms.
Main functions expected from an arms control effort include, freezing or banning test
and production of certain devastating weapons, preventing military activities of
certain magnitude in a specific area, regulating military men and material
employment, reducing risk of accidental wars, initiating transparency measures,
restraining use of a particular weapon for instance mines and introducing of
confidence building measure (CBMs).
Unlike disarmament, which is perceived to be without will and under duress after
losing war implemented through sanctions etc., arms control arrangements and
initiatives are arrived at with free will among sovereign States through a formal
process of inter-governmental negotiations.61
The Arms control agreements can be at multilateral or bilateral levels and can be in
form of treaties, protocols, conventions, Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs),
joint statements, outcome of conferences, guidelines etc. Multilateral arms control
arrangements can be for a particular region or zone. 62
60
John Herz, ‗Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma‘, World Politics, Vol. 2 (1950): 157. 61
Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations, 1. 62
Ibid, 2.
33
1.1.3.1 Offensive Realism
Offensive realism is an off-shoot of the structural theory, formulated by John. J.
Mearsheimer in his book ‗The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’. He constructed his
theory on the preliminary assumptions that the structure of international system is the
driving force behind a state‘s efforts to maximize its power.63
States increase military
power with an ultimate objective of seeking ‗hegemony‘. The best option for a great
power is to be a regional hegemon. Great powers look for opportunities to maximize
power at the expense of other states and this competition for power shapes their
behavior towards each other.64
The distributions of capabilities determine the stature
of a state in international hierarchical structure. The position of a great power is
determined by its large military capabilities which permit it to fight an all-out
conventional war with another powerful state, and have the capacity to engage the
other powerful state in war of attrition.65
On this basis, the theory focuses on great
power politics and the ways in which these have an impact on international politics.
Mearsheimer explored answers to six important questions, which became the building
blocks of his theory of offensive realism.66
(1) Why do great powers want power, and
what explains the states‘ competition for power? (2) How much power do states want
and how much is sufficient? (3) What is power and how can it be defined and
measured? (4) What strategies do states adopt to gain power and then to sustain it? (5)
What causes war and what factors intensify the competition for security and convert
this into conflict? (6) When do threatened states obtain balance against an adversary,
and when do they follow a ―buck-passing‖ strategy? If we take wholesome purview
of the answers to the above narrated questions, Mearsheimer viewed that the states
measure and acquire power in military terms to the maximum possible extent; albeit,
in relative terms with an aim to attainment of hegemony; thereby, ensuring that it
survives in an anarchic international political system.67
63
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 15. 64
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.3, xxi. 65
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 87. 66
Ibid, 12-13. 67
Ibid, 138.
34
States increase their relative military power by adopting mainly three different
strategies i.e. bait and bleed the enemy, bloodletting and above all by engaging in an
open all-out war under favorable conditions, whereas on the parallel, states employ
buck-passing and balancing strategies to deny the same to their peer competitors.68
While listing causes for war, Mearsheimer opined that inter-states power gap disturbs
security balance thus encourage war. Lastly, Mearsheimer believed that states opt for
balancing act rather than buck passing when level of threat is on higher trajectory due
to the close proximity of the threatening state duly substantiated by magnitude of its
relative military capabilities.69
Mearsheimer; however, maintains that the impetus behind the relentless and
aggressive behavior of states is the actual structure of the international system.
Anarchy holds sway over states and amplifies their security competition with other
power seeking states. The primary concern of any state is the retention of its position
in international system. Consequently, there are two types of states in international
relations; revisionist states and status quo powers.70
Revisionist
states are those attempting to alter the BoP in their own favor, by the use or threat of
use of force. Alternatively, a status quo state wants to maintain its place in the system,
although such states are rarely found because power politics create inducements for
them to look for opportunities to maximize gains over cost.71
Broadly one can claim that the ultimate objective of all states is to achieve the status
of hegemon in the international system. Offensive realists explain the underlying
assumptions that underpin justifications for states‘ desires to maximize power in
following ways72
:
68
Ibid, 139. 69
Ibid, 156-162. 70
Ibid, 168. 71
Ibid, 21. 72
Ibid, 3.
35
The international system is anarchical and great powers are the key actors who
operate in anarchy. A central authority to govern states is absent. ‗There is no
government over governments.‘73
Every state possesses military capability (power), which can wreak damage to
the other states. The range of offensive capabilities varies from state to state
and changes over time. The possession of sophisticated weapons confers
military power on a state over the other states but, without them, individuals
can also use simply manpower to launch an offensive.
States are uncertain about the intentions of other states. This lack of certainty
is inevitable. States therefore seek to undermine the resolve of other countries,
regardless of whether or not they intend to use offensive capabilities against
them or are satisfied with the amount of power they possess. Intensions are
subjective and cannot be quantified, so the element of uncertainty remains.
The foremost and ultimate objective of all states is ‗survival‘. They must maintain
their territorial integrity and the sovereignty of their domestic political order to ensure
their security, which is their most important goal. Great powers are rational actors,
and they devise sound strategies which augment the prospects of their survival in
anarchical world as the best way to have it is through attaining hegemony as it would
prevent adventurous elements from daring to threat.74
For Mearsheimer, as brought out earlier, the foremost objective of great powers is to
enhance security and ultimately achieve hegemony. Yet enhancing security on the
part of one party necessarily decreases the security of other potential rival states, and
this ‗zero-sum game‘ creates a ‗security dilemma‘.75
States thus, care more about
relative power than about absolute power. But the behavior of states struggling for
relative gains is entirely different from that of those which strive for absolute gains.
Distribution of material capabilities is the more attractive option for states seeking
relative gains. But states, which struggle for absolute gains, are less concerned about 73
Inis. L. Claude, Swords in to Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International
Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), 14. 74
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 3. 75
Kira Petersen Lewis & Clark College, ―Four Types of Power in International Relations: Coercive
Power, Bargaining Power, Concerted Power and Institutionalized Power,‖ Paper presented at IPSA,
XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, July 2012.
36
capabilities of other states and so forge a BoP strategy. Power is an end in itself for
such absolute power players.76
Due to lack of complete information about an adversary, states may make challenging
decisions with regard to attain and maintain military power. There are two important
dimensions involved in such situation. Firstly, it causes an adversary to ostensibly
misrepresent its own strengths and vulnerabilities, and hence keeps its true aims
hidden. Secondly, a state may exaggerate its military vulnerabilities or emphasize its
own peaceful aims in an effort to convince an intended victim not to build up its
military muscles. Otherwise, as Mearsheimer defines, ‗hegemonic state is the one that
is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system.‘ In other words: ‗No
other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it‘ so that
essentially, ‗a hegemon is the only great power in the system‘. Thus a ‗global
hegemon is one which dominates the world‘ while a regional hegemon will ‗dominate
a particular geographical area.‘77
India in case of regional hegemon is the best-suited
example with respect to the study in hand.
Offensive realism paradigm supports that generally, the best outcome a great power
can hope for is to become a regional hegemon and so control the contiguous regions
and accessible territories. Regional hegemons will seek to prevent other regional
powers from influencing the region and be disliked by their peers accordingly.
Because of its susceptibility of domination by potential competitors in its own
backyard, a regional hegemon keeps a watchful eye on other aspiring hegemons.78
Regional hegemon often acts as an ‗offshore balancer‘ as well, under the offshore
balancing strategy. Offshore balancing is a BoP (realist) strategy by which a super or
great power employs a favorite regional power to check mate rise of a potential
adversary.79
Thus the most ideal position for a great power is that of a regional
hegemon. Yet, states must place precise limits on their military budgets because
excessive military spending puts drain on to the economic growth. Thus, a military
76
Waltz, ―History the Origins of War,‖ 616. 77
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 40. 78
Ibid, 141-143. 79
Christopher Layne, ―From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,‖
International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997): 113.
37
and economic balance is essential. While two states may indulge in a security
competition and spend heavily on defense, the possession of wealthy allies may allow
one to spend less and yet make its rival spend more.80
1.1.3.2 Defensive Realism
The defensive realists believe that anarchy which is essential feature of international
system encourages states to adopt defensive, moderate, and restrained strategies. 81
For defensive realists, conflict sometimes becomes inevitable in the case of aggressor
states, when their security is threatened, when they are insecure, or when differences
are irreconcilable. Defensive realists maintain that states seek to maximize security,
preserve the existing distribution of power, are not inherently aggressive, and avoid
relative losses due to shifts in their relative position and ranking. Kenneth Waltz
argues that ―In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured, states
[then] safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power‖.82
According to defensive realists, there are four perils from aggression, expansion, and
conquest: Firstly, struggle to achieve hegemony is self-defeating for states because it
can make the state less secure and weaker as it provokes counterbalancing behavior
and aggression tends to meet resistance. Precisely, defensive realists initiate with the
assumption that balances of power intermittently form in the international system and
that periods of constant hegemony are not hard-wearing or stable. As Stephen Walt
notes, ―If balancing is more common than band-wagoning then states are more secure
because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore
avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and
defense policies.‖ Furthermore, Walt says, in addition to aggregate power, both
offensive capability and offensive intentions will provoke counterbalancing behavior
i.e. ―states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance‖
and ―states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance‖. 83
80
Sangit Sarita Dwivedi, ―Alliances in International Relations Theory,‖ International Journal of Social
Science & Interdisciplinary Research, Vol.1, Issue 8 (August 2012): 24-25. 81
Ibid, 126-128. 82
Kenneth. N Waltz, Theory of International Politics ( New York: Random House, 1979), 126. 83
S.M Walt, ―Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power‖ International Security, No. 9,
1985. 3-41.
38
Thus, as Snyder reminds us, ―the balance of power that arises out of international
anarchy punishes aggressors, it does not reward it.‖84
Secondly, the cost involved in
expansion generally surpasses the benefits; therefore, it is often determined by
domestic determinants of states. Thirdly, the offense–defense military balance often
goes in favors of defenders and the defense over the offensive. Finally, socialization
within international system and historical lessons teach states that the pursuit of
hegemony is often misguided because it provokes counterbalancing rather than band-
wagoning behavior.
On contrary to offensive realism, states are more secured than individual. As Robert
Jervis notes, ―one of the main reasons why international life is not more nasty,
brutish, and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature‖.85
Individuals may not exist but great powers live in the systems. The consequence, as
Jervis tells us, is that states that can afford to be cheated or that cannot be destroyed in
a surprise attack can more easily trust others, can afford to wait for unambiguous
signs of aggression, and do not need to engage in unbridled expansion for security.86
Additionally, defensive realists believe that conquest involves costly and therefore,
international system encourages moderation, discourages expansion and only under
specific circumstances, domestic constraints contribute to self-defeating behavior, and
cooperation becomes possible among states. Moreover, the status quo powers exhibit
their intentions to each other. Finally, concerns about relative gains and cheating are
the main barriers to cooperation among states. Defensive realists exaggerate the
restraint within international system on the major states.
1.1.4 Significance of Military Power as per Realist Paradigm’s Approaches
Having discussed the main realist paradigms i.e. classical and structural realism
(defensive and offensive realism), an overview of four approaches associated to the
realist paradigm i.e. classical realism‘s BoP approach and structural realism‘s,
84
, J. Snyder , Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell
University, 1991), 11. 85
R. Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma‖ World Politics, No. 30, 1978, 167–175. 86
Ibid, 190.
39
Balance of Terror (BoT), deterrence and military preparedness through RMA
approaches, would help in theoretical construct for the study.
1.1.4.1 Balance of Power (BoP)
Within the classical realist paradigm, BOP is an important and relevant approach that
defines the power politics in detail. Headley Bull defines BoP as ‗a state of affair,
where no one power is dominant and can lay down laws for other‘.87
Hans J.
Morgenthau argued that aspiration for power on part of several nations
simultaneously, for maintaining or over throwing the status quo is said to be an effort
of having BoP.88
Morgenthau also viewed politics as nothing but ‗struggle for power
and unilateral advantage‘, having its pivot on BoP.89
Realists view with strength that
the only approach and prescription for protracted peace is by ensuring sovereign
autonomy by deterring rival competitive actors through ‗military preparedness‘ and
alliances‘ formations.90
The notion of security dilemma is addressed by creating BoP‘.91
In other words, BoP
is acquired through attaining equilibrium between states with regard to distribution of
capabilities among them.92
For realist paradigm, structural anarchy is the major
source of concern and favor continual increase in national power, BoP and polarity.93
Variables for measuring BoP could be varying which may include essential elements
of national power, for instance, economy, population and military capabilities as well
as cooperation and alliances. BoP is an approach in which every state ensures that
other states should not get strengthened at its expense.94
87
Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkope, ―Theories of World Politics,‖ in World Politics:
Trends & Transformation (Washington: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2004), 33. 88
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1948), 125. 89
Richard N. Lebow, ‗Classical realism‘, in ed. Tim Dunne, et al., International Relations Theories:
Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 57. 90
Griffith, Realism, 89. 91
Martin Griffith, Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 21. 92
Joseph Franklin, International Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 119. 93
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.3, xxxix. 94
John J. Mearsheimer, ‗Structural Realism‘, in Tim Dunne, MiljaKurki and Steve Smith (eds),
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007),
74.
40
1.1.4.2 Balance of Terror (BoT)
On the nuclear side, the pivotal approach to address the security fears is through BoT.
The approach is usually regarded as a balance between two nuclear weapon states.95
Notwithstanding the offensive doctrines for using nuclear weapons and the huge
stock piles on the inventory of nuclear weapons haves,96
it was BoT which compelled
the haves to exercise restraint and enter into bi-lateral and multi-lateral confidence
building measures and arms control arrangements for peace and stability. Fear of
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) pushed nuclear haves to follow an inexpensive
and less dangerous course for preservation of BoT i.e. negotiating treaties for
reducing the chances of nuclear exchange. There have been instances in the past
where BoT worked and did not let crises to convert into conflict, for instance,
complete era of Cold War, Cuban Missile Crises and Indo-Pak Kargil Conflict etc.
BoT coined the term ‗strategic stability‘. Strategic stability is commonly perceived to
be ‗stability attained by the threat of use of nuclear weapons‘; however, it is also
interchangeably used for other strategic weapon systems, which directly affect
stability at various levels. In other words, strategic stability is induced by ‗Strategic
Weapons‘, including nuclear weapons. On the other hand, term stability implies, ‗a
state of balance between two adversaries even though there may not be parity
between them‘.97
Strategic Stability has a notion of deterrence attached to it.
1.1.4.3 Deterrence Theory
Deterrence is not a new concept and has been on strategic planners‘ cards since
medieval ages, and constantly been used to exploit own strength vis-à-vis adversary‘s
vulnerabilities so as to refrain from taking an offensive action for the fear of cost.
Being dynamic in nature, deterrence has been a difficult arena to completely
comprehend its maneuvers. Deterrence came on forefront with the advent of nuclear
95
Zellen, The Realist Tradition,Vol.2, 107. 96
‗Nuclear weapons haves‘ are those five States which were identified as Nuclear Weapons States in
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 97
Feroz Hassan Khan, ―Challenges to the Nuclear Stability in South Asia,‖ Arms Control Today,
Nuclear Non Proliferation Review (Spring 2003): 62.
41
weapons and enjoyed the sole superior and critical strategy during the Cold War,
which dissuaded the two super powers from brinksmanship.98
Deterrence means preventing or restraining an adversary from taking unwarranted
actions by using threat of massive retaliation,99
or to prevent war by confronting a
potential aggressor with the prospect that the response to his attack would bring
unacceptable damage upon himself.100
Morgan‘s definition of deterrence says,
―Deterrence is a theory, a tactics, a national security strategy, a larger defense policy
approach, and a critical component of security for the international system.‖101
The
essence of deterrence theory is as under:102
Severe conflict
The rationale behind deterrence
The concept of retaliatory threat
The concept of unacceptable damage
The notion of credibility
The notion of deterrence stability
Deterrence theory and its related strategies are two different approaches. Deterrence
strategies imply, ―specific military postures, threats, and ways of communication
(including signaling), a State adopts to deter‖ whereas deterrence theory encompasses
those principles on which strategy has to depend. Strategies pertaining to deterrence
could be in numbers but not theories. The deterrence theory has the assumptions like
nature of conflict i.e. in terms of severity, rationality, signaling of retaliation and its
credibility, deterrence or threat of unimaginable cost or damage and lastly the
deterrence stability.103
98
Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 99
Robert Powel, Theory of Deterrence: The Search for Credibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 155. 100
Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (London: The
Cromwell Press Ltd, 2003), xxxv. 101
Morgan, Deterrence Now, 4. 102
Patrick Morgan, ―Deterrence Now‖, in Buzan and Oleweaver, Regions and Powers: A Structure of
International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2003), 11. 103
Morgan, Deterrence Now, 8.
42
Deterrence is thus achieved by use of threat in order to manipulate adversary‘s
behavior to refrain from initiating an impending offensive action - ―the prevention
from action by fear of the consequences‖.104
Deterrence theory is parsimonious and a
useful policy making tool.105
Deterrence concentrates on fear of punishment, which may be so devastating and
unbearable that it would not leave any incentive for the political and military gains. It
seeks to deter by threatening severe reprisal, instead of denying military success to
the enemy. Nuclear deterrence has a dialectical dimension, deterring through the
threat of punishment - alongside the notion of defense.
Strategic weapons including the nuclear weapons have introduced an altogether new
perspective to the military power. Nuclear weapons not only exponentially increased
the military value but also changed the dynamics of statecraft i.e. dealing with other
states from a position of strength. However, the kind and level of destruction
associated to use of nuclear weapon forced the military strategists to amend their
approach towards achieving political objectives through military means and made
them admit that the previous objective of military establishments to win wars has to
be replaced with the approach of averting wars by effectively employing deterrence
strategy.106
Since the Brodie‘s assertion and its wide acknowledgment, strategists have been
engaged to further fine-tune the deterrence concept for its detailed comprehension by
the adversaries so that to maintain the fine BoT between them. In short, BoT based on
the credibility of deterrence between the two nuclear power adversaries overtook the
old concept of total war.107
Deterrence and compellance are interchangeably used; however, different in
connotation. Compellance is about pushing an adversary to freeze or discontinue an
act or perform an act which the adversary was not already doing. There is a notional
difference between the two concepts. Compellance is a difficult strategy to moderate
104
Ibid, 1-2. 105
T.V. Paul, ―Complex Deterrence: An Introduction,‖ in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in Global
Age, ed. T. V. Paul et al. (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3. 106
Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 76. 107
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), 377, 392.
43
state‘s behavior as the action has already taken place for an assumed advantage or
instead pushing to undertaking an act for which the other side has no appetite.
Compellance is hard to undertake as compared to deterrence and often employ actual
use of force.108
Ambiguity in nuclear strategies enhances stability. Cold War strategies, namely MAD
and flexible response were cross cutting each other. For instance MAD strategy
professed that nuclear weapons shall never be used and was assumed to be a suicidal
doctrine. On the other hand, flexible response strategy envisaged that nukes could be
used at various levels without leading to mutual annihilation. This risk of escalation
and ambiguity reinforced deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence is also associated with its much debated stability–instability
paradox, which suggests that despite the fact nuclear weapons do stabilize the
strategic environment; however, on the flip side they do cause instability as the
nuclear haves may get encourage to conduct low intensity conflicts under the nuclear
overhang, as long as vital interests are not at stake.109
The most important challenge is to keep deterrence credible for extended period. It
can be ensured by having an ability to survive first strike and respond by means of
second strike capability, have long ranged delivery vehicles, low on accident risks
including accidental use, redundancy in response options and finally deterrence
should be affordable and cost effective.
1.1.4.4 Military Preparedness through Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
In contemporary international political setup, the available empirical data reflects the
trend of consistent military modernization by the states leading to tough security
competition. Military modernization has also evolved the international system from
bi-polar to multi-polar system, which is conflict borne vis-à-vis bi-polar.110
In anarchical international system, in which survival is supreme interest, RMA has
led to invention of many dangerous weapons operable on ground, under the sea and
108
Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1. 109
Khan, ―Challenges to the Nuclear Stability, 64. 110
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 5.
44
air, while R&D is in hand to have one in oxygen devoid strategically important
sphere of outer space. RMA has been the hallmark of any modern armed forces,
which continuously keep evaluating nature of future threat and devise viable out of
the box response through developing state of the art weapon systems.
Historically, four main changes i.e. replacement of old vintage weapons, innovative
tactics, increased sizes of armies and finally the impact of war on society, dictated
transformation process of militaries.111
RMA in recent times is considered to be a
compulsory tool to achieve the war objectives.112
RMA involves putting together the complex pieces of tactical, societal, political, and
organizational or even technological changes (brought about by the military
revolution) into a new conceptual approach to war.113
RMAs consume notable time-
period to happen even during war time whereas it takes decades during peacetime.114
It is due to involvement of more than one actor (States), military commanders,
scientific community and politicians based in different regions.
Moreover, change is always resisted so as in the armed forces. RMA is technology
driven. Any new technology acts as catalyst to initiation of thinking process to make
optimal advantages out of it. However, technology alone cannot bring change. It has
to be coupled with doctrinal changes along with change in organization of forces so
as to effectively group required forces for effective utilization of the new
technology.115
Despite the technological innovations, militaries which are known for
their conservativeness do not welcome an immediate change, thereby prolonging
actualization of the revolution. To be précised, there are four basic elements, which
qualify a RMA, that include, ―technological changes, system development,
operational innovation and organizational adaptation‖.116
111
Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. 112
Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800,
2. 113
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (New York: Warner Books, 1993), 25. 114
Williamson Murray, ―Thinking About Revolution in Military Affairs,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly,
(Summer 1997): 5. 115
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (New York: Warner Books, 1993), 32. 116
Andrew Krepinevich, ―Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,‖ The National
Interest, No. 37, (Fall 1994): 30.
45
Unlike French Revolution when only the big armies could change strategic tides,
contemporarily, smaller armies equipped with state of the art weapon systems with
assured intelligence and information systems, could equally play a similar role in
setting the courses for strategic decisions.117
1.2 Critiques on Realist Paradigm’s Arguments in Support of Military Power
Critics of realism, define power in terms of human liberty, absence of war and
increasing interdependence.118
The core assumptions of liberal paradigm posit, firstly,
that states are basic units and central actors in international system; secondly, the
internal dynamic of states vary substantially and the domestic characteristics affect its
behavior; and, thirdly, there is no need for calculations of power because it is of
secondary importance in determining a state‘s behavior. Liberals in tangent trajectory
to realists‘ paradigm, argue that political and economic factors are more important
than military power, and that those states which maximize power at the expense of
other states are ‗misguided‘. For liberals, power is irrelevant in an ideal world.119
As a
whole, liberal internationalists believe in the interdependence and interconnectedness
of states as basis for establishing a liberal world order.120
They support
multilateralism and those international institutions, which prevent states from
stimulating them to indulge in power politics.121
Idealist school of thought led by theorists‘ inter-alia Immunel Kant, etc, does not
believe in inevitability of war and argue that war is an international problem which
can only be addressed at international level and not at the national level and hence,
the international society needs to be more proactive for doing-away with those
institutions which encourage war.122
Latently, institutions also religiously believe in
the argument that International Law comprised of norms and traditions is more
supreme than the power politics, thereby implying that international peace and
117
Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs , 24. 118
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 15. 119
T.V. Paul, ―Complex Deterrence: An Introduction,‖ in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in Global
Age, ed. T. V. Paul et al. (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16. 120
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 16-17. 121
Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et.al, Theories of International Relations (NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), 57-85. 122
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 16.
46
harmony can only be achieved by applying legal bindings on war. These legal
arrangements include regimes and treaties for avoidance of violence, as the idealists
also strongly argue in favor of ‗disarmament‘ i.e. complete elimination of weapons,
which could bring confidence among threatened states and hence peace perpetuates.
Being peace and tranquility proponents, idealists also argue in opposition to the
totalitarian forces, which they regard as source of insecurity. In simple words,
idealists are opposed to the absolute power and in favor of complete disarmament.123
After having noted the idealist‘s positions on military power and national power,
there is strong counter criticism on them too. Opponents of the idealist school of
thought argue that when national security or interests of a nation state are at stake, no
morality or International Law is taken into consideration, rather hard-core power is
employed for survival. Idealism‘s rivals also argue that universally acceptable norms,
ideals and common grounds on various issues have very less chances to be found out
mainly due to the multi-cultured, multi-ideologies and diverse economic status of
nation-states located in different regions; hence, regard the idealist paradigm being
utopian and least practical.124
Historically also, the idealist school of thought was the most accepted and followed
paradigm after the World War I. However idealism, soon after its celebrated position
was thrown out from its place by the practitioners (realists) who criticized it for being
naïve and also singularly focused on legal and institutional strengths, which did not
take into consideration the actually of practical happenings, in which the interests
stand superior to ethics.125
Kant led concept of utopianism can be described as ‗a persistent traditions of thought
about a perfect society where harmony prevails in terms of ideal social conditions
which include; among others, perpetual peace and harmony, completely satisfied
123
Walt, ―One World, Many Theories,‖ 32. 124
Colin Elman, ―Realism,‖ in International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An
introduction, ed. Martin Griffiths (New York, Routledge, 2007), 150. 125
Malhotra and Sergounin, Approaches to International Relations, 3.
47
members of society and none other but absolute equality without any discretionary
authority.126
Moreover, realists also criticize liberal notions for having failed in reducing the
chances of war. Realists argue that despite liberal‘s trumpeting of their peaceful and
novel approach towards the international politics, World War-II broke out with full
strength. E. H. Carr admitted that history won and utopians failed.127
History clearly
depicts that statesmen seek power and not only seek but continue to maximize it too.
E. H. Carr also opined that power supersedes morality.128
Rich realist traditions came
up front and thoughts of Kautilya, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbs and Ibn-e-
Khaldun continue dominating thinking faculties of statesmen in the contemporary
political scenario.
Having pitched the supportive (realism) and counter arguments (idealism) to the
attainment of military power, it is also pertinent to see as to how the constructivists
take military power building. The effort shall further smoothen process of theory
application on the study. Study of constructivist approach with respect to BMD and
space weapons is important so as to make the theoretical debate whole encompassing.
Constructivists define power in terms of social relation. They see social relations
between actors more significant than the material capability. They do not take into
account the material capabilities a state possesses and instead focuses on subjective
relations and norms attached to them. Constructivists recreate the definition of power
at systemic and agent level.129
According to M. Barnett and R. Duvall, ―power is the
production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of
actors to determine their circumstances and fate.‖130
Moreover, constructivists‘ approach towards military power professes that
assimilation of world politics discourses relies upon policy maker‘s social
construction or for that matter mental map formed on the basis of awareness level. A
126
Jill Steans et.al.An Introduction to International Relations Theory (Harlow: Pearson Education
Limited, 2010), 26-27. 127
J.D.B. Mill, ―E.H. Carr: The Realist's Realist,‖ The National Interest, No. 25 (Fall 1991): 65-66. 128
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 2. 129
Steans, An Introduction to International Relations Theory, 183-184. 130
Barnett and Duvall, Power in Global Governance, 3.
48
policy maker seek to simplify or exaggerate some features of a happening while
relegating some, to form a view point that is based purely on expectations and
images.131
These images built on researcher‘s expectations and awareness cause
distortion and limit the thinking faculties, hence constructivists are taken as ‗biased‘
in nature.
Despite being a biased approach of mental map-making, it is important to remain
abreast with it, as these mental maps contribute towards identifying attitudes, beliefs
and behaviors of state actors. Richard Ned Lebon stated that, ‗policy makers are
prone to distort reality in accord with their needs even in situations that appear
relatively ambiguous‘.132
Columba Peoples while taking note of US policy makers‘
efforts for securitizing space, opined that securitization process is about making a
non-issue into a security issue to seek justification for an intended objective which
might be hostile in nature.133
The securitization is an extreme version of security consciousness and being a
subjective phenomenon, is difficult to ascertain or measure. Securitization process
kicks off as soon as the referent object feels existential threat, which in turn initiates
all possible measures for its survival. While complying with the call of security
enhancement, securitization actor‘s normal politics transforms into emergency
politics so as to address the issue leaving aside conventional policy making
procedures. Security is a social and inter-subjective construction. In order to check
tendency to view all issues through the security lens, there could be three main steps
for securitizing an issue i.e. identification of existential threats, emergency actions
and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules. Existential threat implies
that if an action is not undertaken immediately, it would be too late.134
131
Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkope, ―Theories of World Politics,‖ in World Politics:
Trends & Transformation (Washington: Thomson and Wadsworth, 2004), 12. 132
Charles William Kegley, World Politics: Trends and Transformation (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011),
8. 133
Columba Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖
Contemporary Security Policy,32:1(2011):86. 134
Taureck, Rita, ―Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,‖ Journal of International
Relations and Development, Vol. 9 (2006): 54-55.
49
Notwithstanding, state actors securitize an issue depending upon their perceived
threat. It is but natural that the policy makers concentrate more on like-minded
information and data, which support their beliefs and norm so as to make self-suiting
policies about various issues.135
In other words, fixated perceptions by leaders and
their followers both domestically and internationally tend to relegate the ideas and
information which contest tangent to their interests; hence, leading to misperceptions.
If such misperceptions are between the two rival actors or entities, these contribute
negatively in terms of igniting the chances of conflict. This tendency of
objectification is commonly termed as, ―self-righteousness‖, which acts as a pull-back
factor in dispute resolutions mechanisms for protracted peace.136
Foregoing, the
acquisition of a dual use technology for instance civilian purposed space technology
by one, may ignite a sense of insecurity among the potential competitor and a vicious
cycle of power attainment and power balancing may begin.
1.3 Application of Theory
Contemporary international politics is hard power centric, interest based and
dominated by anarchy. An effort has been made to by discussing in detail major
international relations paradigms that exhibit alternative explanations on single
phenomenon i.e. attainment of great power status (hegemon) through military means.
In purview of the above-discussed paradigms, realist paradigm is found to be whole
encompassing to assist in explaining the study and within realist paradigm, offensive
realism and defensive realism sufficiently explains the puzzle of military buildup and
their ulterior motives.
Moreover, in social science research, descriptions of facts and subjectivity of the
research is challenging and thus reification becomes difficult. Therefore, the
objectivity is the prime duty of the researcher. Accordingly, elucidations in social
sciences are to certain degree hypothetical, and deductions always remain
challengeable. Constructivist approach with respect to the military power is subjected
to the process of reification that depends upon the pre-conceived assumptions thus is
135
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London:
Lynne Rienner, 1998),45. 136
Kegley, World Politics, 13.
50
tagged with biasness. The study in hand being objective in nature thus, has to be
discussed under established facts. Indian development of BMD system is well known
and there is no doubt that it is also maintaining and improving an established space
program. Thus, paradigm of offensive realism provides the best lens to look into the
Indian intent of modernizing its armed forces, military industrial complex besides
development of state of the art weapons with zero-sum aim including BMD and the
response options by its competitors to maintain deterrence or strategic stability.
The study seeks to construct theoretical foundation i.e. consolidate on the arguments
of the core assumptions of offensive realism while keeping South Asian region in
perspective. The conjectures of offensive realism along with defensive realism may
sufficiently explain and envisage the behavior of India in pursuit of its great power
status; however, it is never free of the impact and reactions from the peer competitors
including Pakistan.
In an anarchical international system, states seek to gain maximum power for not only
an assured survival but also to hegemonies the region, mostly politically and
diplomatically besides at times geographically too. Status of a hegemon facilitate in
imposing will on neighboring states. The authoritative position of hegemon sets the
pace to become a great power and subsequently the super power status. The journey
towards acquiring the status of regional hegemon ushers the other political actors
especially neighboring states to enhance military capabilities and security. In the
process, others in the vicinity feel insecure. Resultantly, it constructs security
complex where states are enmeshed in security competition and their security
interdependence make them locked into a complex situation.
South Asian strategic environment is highly dominated by traditional security
paradigm. The geographical proximity and enduring rivalries worsen the security
situation in the South Asian region. The action reaction syndrome compels the states
to adopt counter measures which impact the strategic balance. It is quiet natural that
51
any of the measure or mean by which a state tries to enhance its security magnitude
in-turn decreases the security of others in vicinity.137
The history of South Asian region is tumultuous. Indo-Pakistan strategic competition
and great powers‘ interest in the region have made the South Asian strategic
environment complex and unpredictable.138
The security complex of South Asian
region broadly embraces four actors; India, Pakistan, China and the US. However, the
actual security competition lies between two actors, India and Pakistan, by virtue of
their pattern of enmity and amity, long common history, geographical proximity,
borders disputes, as well as the similar institutional structures inherited from colonial
power. With the nuclearization of South Asia, Indo- Pak relations are comparatively
stabilized; albeit, fragile, due to BoT.
Since the end of World War-II, realist paradigm visibly prevailed and states have
been involved in building military power either with the purpose of balancing or
buck-passing. Mearsheimer postulated offensive realists‘ preference of great powers‘
strategy of buck passing vis-à-vis Kenneth Waltz‘s balancing strategies. It justifies
Great Powers‘ resolve for space technology acquisition with an ultimate aim to
modernize their respective strategic missile programs including the missile shield.
Undeniably, the traditional security paradigm is dominant discourse in the South
Asian security and asymmetric power struggles are to subdue each other. The three
Indo-Pak wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 cultivated antagonism and insolence which
made their relationship acrimonious. In purview of securitization, actors (Pakistan)
terms Indian military modernization as an act of causing insecurity for it, therefore,
being a less powerful state it directs its security dilemma towards India. The Indian
military modernization and development of missile shield may not be aimed at
Pakistan, but due to securitization and threat perception; however, Pakistan links it
with its security and takes it as existential matter.
137
Robert Jervis, ―Cooperation under the Security Dilemma‖, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978):
169. 138
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―Lowering Nuclear Threshold,‖ Pakistan Observer, May 25, 2017.
http://pakobserver.net/lowering-nuclear-threshold/.
52
Offensive realism follows material approach to study international relations, whereas
securitization theory is subjective. Nevertheless, intention versus capabilities, which
is prominent feature of offensive realism assimilate subjective element (intentions)
which links it with securitization. India‘s missile shield may be aimed at getting entry
into top ranking states in international hierarchy; however, the responses it is
generating in the neighboring actors (China/ Pakistan) are somehow different with
regards to creating security dilemma.
The major strategies for gaining power as stipulated by offensive realism and
followed by India are summarized as follows.
War is a means of acquiring relative power through expansionism, the subjugation of
peers, and the pursuit of foreign policy objective so as to ultimately achieve
hegemony. Since gaining independence in 1947, India has fought three major wars
(1948, 1965 and 1971) as a consequence of territorial disputes.
Bloodletting occurs when a great power ensures that a deadly war being waged by a
rival becomes protracted. India allegedly is involved in proxies against Pakistan and
is supporting non-state actors in Afghanistan, insurgents in Baluchistan and ethnic
movements in Karachi. India is accused of exploiting Pakistan‘s need to fight on
multiple fronts.
Balancing and Buck Passing is a strategy by which great powers seek to prevent
potential aggressors from upsetting the BoP. Through balancing India seeks to
contain its archrival Pakistan either by isolating it, or by increasing power
asymmetries and encirclement through proxies i.e. by opening up multiple fronts.
With buck passing, India is getting closer with another great power (USA) to keep
check on the opponent which is China. All these strategies empirically demonstrate
India‘s behavior as an emerging power.
Nuclear Superiority. Great powers seek nuclear superiority over their opponents. In
the South Asian region, India was the triggering state in the subsequent nuclear
competition with Pakistan. India is currently superior to Pakistan in terms of its
53
nuclear capabilities given it has more advanced technology, strategic allies and
structural support.139
Offshore Balancer. The local great power (India) in the vicinity of a rising regional
hegemon (China) will try to contain it by rubbing shoulders with likeminded distant
hegemon (the US) and if it cannot potentially do so, then the distant hegemon do that.
Presence of the US naval fleet in the Indian Ocean has two purposes to meet, first, to
keep an eye on the Chinese naval activities and secondly, provides a surety to the
Indian side in seeking the great power status without being hindered by the China. In
addition, India has recently tested its BMD weapon system.140
Pakistan‘s
development of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
capability is a reaction to Indian BMD capability.141
Indian BMD capability is
directly linked to its aspiration for acquiring more power so as to become a regional
hegemon i.e. by out-maneuvering Pakistan‘s and Chinese missile capability.
On the contrary, the defensive realists which focus primarily on constraints within the
system bring closer the states to cooperate as expansion is more costly than
cooperation. South Asian security complex is full of mistrust and security struggle
which create security dilemma. The realists do not merely focus on enhancement of
hard power, but defensive realists believe that domestic pathologies restraints the
states to acquire unlimited power, therefore, they are constrained by the system.
According to defensive realists, India can make it more secure without gravely
endangering other. However the hawkish approach followed by the Indian political
139
Rajesh Rajagopalan, ―India‘s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia,‖
Carnegie India (September 2017): 5-6.
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_312_Rajesh_Strategic_Choices_FNL.pdf. 140
Hemant Kumar Rout, ―India Achieves Major Milestone in its Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme,‖
The Indian Express, March 01, 2017. Accessed March 3,
2017.http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/mar/01/india-achieves-major-milestone-in-its-
anti-ballistic-missile-programme-1576270--1.html. Indian Defense Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) tested two of its indigenous BMD systems in the months of February and March
2017. Prithvi Defense Vehicle (PDV) interceptor missile was tested 12 February 12, 2017, that
destroyed an incoming target ballistic missile at an altitude of 97 kms, while Ashwin supersonic endo-
atmospheric Advanced Area Defense (AAD) interceptor missile was tested on March 1, 2017, that
took on target missile at an altitude of 15 kms. Both are likely to be deployed along Indo-Sino and
Indo-Pakistan borders. 141
Asma Khalid, ―Implications of BMD, MIRV Technology in South Asia,‖ Pakistan Observer, May
9, 2017. http://pakobserver.net/implications-bmd-mirv-tech-s-asia/.
54
elite vis-à-vis Pakistan does not let India to adopt defensive realist‘s approach of
restraint.
In South Asia, the security environment has deteriorated in recent years. The growing
political, security and commercial ties between major powers and India, leading to
provision of advanced weapons systems including BMD systems,142
conclusion of
several nuclear cooperation agreements,143
expressions of support for India‘s entry
into export control cartels and permanent seat for India in the UNSC have severely
impacted on BoP and strategic stability in the region.
The US supports enhanced Indian prestige and repute as a responsible state in the
region, entailing exponential increase in India‘s strategic capabilities, including
offensive and defensive missiles potential. Despite the US failure to attain great
power stature for India, it is still treated at par with other nuclear weapon states
without any non-proliferation bindings and responsibilities. India, thus, enjoys an
advantageous position on the global political landscape.
Such discriminated developments are the sources for potential strategic instability in
the region. The Indian access to the dual-use technologies through the MTCR
platform, furnish a classical example of security dilemma, where Pakistan would be
put to a perpetual disadvantageous situation and compelled to take necessary counter
measures using all means at its disposal.
The RMA is gradually introducing state of the art military technologies, whose
effectual operation-ability without the weaponization of space would be impossible
which would be detrimental to the existing multi-lateral non-proliferation regime and
strategic stability. Space weaponization if actualizes, is going to unleash an
unprecedented space weapons race that might spill over to nuclear and strategic
missiles‘ domains; thus, shall affect the strategic environment besides global and
regional peace and stability including the South Asian fragile strategic stability.
142
Gurmeet Kanwal, ―India-US Strategic Partnership,‖ The Indian Tribune, January 19, 2015,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-us-strategic-partnership/31569.html. 143
Kingston Reif, ―Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,‖ Arms Control Association (April, 2018),
https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/104.
55
In the anarchical international system, states enhance technologically advancement in
their military power by RMA and then use it to have an upper hand over the other
state for attaining hegemony in a region or system. For instance, assume there are two
States; A (India) and B (Pakistan), who are competitors within a regional level
system. If state A introduces advancement in military power indigenously as well as
by support of a great power/ penetrating actor (the US), the state B naturally starts
fearing existential consequences besides the other related great power/ penetrating
actor (China). The happening disturbs deterrence equation, which needs to be
balanced. So, as a reaction, state B tries to create a balance by cooperating with
related great power (china) having strategic interests in the region besides adopting
strategies to undermine and control the actions of state A. Thus, a vicious circle of
action-reaction starts leading to stability-instability paradox.
China‘s advanced military capabilities have strategically disturbed Indian security
circles as well as the US strategic interests in the South Asian Region. Both fear that
China by virtue of its advanced military power (conventional and nuclear) and ASAT
capabilities might dominate the South Asian region. India in reaction aims to create
its own ASAT weapon system with the US assistance in order to balance its
deterrence with China.
In the broad spectrum at international level, the US has been trying to counter or
balance China in the Asian strategic setup. To this end, the US provided military
assistance to India in conventional, nuclear and space domains to counter China in
South Asia.144
This creates a kind of balance for the US at the systemic level. At
regional level, China provides military assistance to Pakistan to counter balance India
in the region for balancing the deterrence equation. However, these balancing and
counter balancing acts have costs.
144
Jaspal, ―Lowering Nuclear Threshold,‖
56
Graphical representation of balancing the deterrence is as under:
Figure 1.1
Cycle of Balancing the Deterrence Equation
For a stabilized South Asian region, India and Pakistan have to have mutual trust not
only on each other‘s diplomatic, political and military modernization moves but also
on effects to avoid threat for deterrence purposes. Cooperation, a realist approach is
needed.
To conclude, India and Pakistan are engaged in conflict like environment since their
inception. Both had three major wars and hundreds of border skirmishes, which
continue to-date. India being the biggest democracy wants its share in South Asian
region and desires to be a great power. So it is advancing its military might both
quantitatively and qualitatively. However, its border contiguity with Pakistan doesn‘t
let her to become a ruling state with great power status. India in response to the
Chinese ASAT test in 2007 has galvanized its space program and declared its intent
to have its own ASAT system which would also be its BMD capability, which is yet
another destabilizing factor. Foregoing, it is imperative to have an insight into space
weapons, their inevitability, space weapons‘ legal obligations, their policies of major
US counter balance China through India
India wants to secure hegemony in South Asia and imbalances the deterrence
equation by the US assistance
China assists Pakistan to counter balance the US
ambitions and Indian hegemony
Pakistan wants to contain India and its military
advacnement and counter-balances the
deterrence equation by alliging with China
57
and great powers, and likely nexus of space weapons with BMD development
capability.
Having discussed the complete regional situation and the theoretical paradigms, it can
conveniently be claimed that the offensive realism is best-suited paradigm to test the
hypothesis. The offensive realism lens presumes that the ultimate goal of a state is to
gain hegemony using military might through RMA, and the best an aspiring great
power can hope to achieve is regional hegemony, or domination of its regional
neighborhood. Once a state seeks hegemony at regional level, however, it becomes
involved in a security competition with neighboring states. Missile shield/ ASAT
weapon systems could be among the dominant means to achieve the great power
status. Thus, the neighboring states try to balance it and thus get embroiled in arms
race under action-reaction syndrome influenced by the reification of strategic
environment thereby causing severe implications for strategic stability.
Above insights shall finally lead the study to conclude important conclusions
pertaining to implications of space weaponization on the South Asian strategic
environment. The follow up chapters are an attempt to put into perspective the same.
58
CHAPTER 2
Space Weaponization: A Critical Appraisal
The purpose of this chapter is to set a stage for comprehensive understanding of space
weaponization as a concept and the various diversionary approaches attached to it by
different stake holders. An enquiry is made in detail to differentiate between space
militarization and space weaponization so that to understand the contemporary
debates on the two issues separated by hair-line differences. Notwithstanding, space
weaponization is considered to be a distant dream, factors of ‗probability‘ and
‗inevitability‘ are debated in detail to find out the space weapons‘ actualization.
Moreover, utility of space weapons in terms of destructive and non-destructive terms,
whether space or terrestrial based, is deliberated in detail besides their counter
actions. Space debris issue is also highlighted within space security perspective to
grade their impact on outer space long term sustainability as whenever ASAT
weapons would be employed, it might put outer space into a perpetual state of non-
usage by the space-based assets.
2.1 Outer Space: Kinds and Limits of Earth Orbits
Outer space is the domain beyond Earth atmosphere. It is the near approximation of
the dark world comprising of vacuum. The line which differentiate between the
Earth‘s atmosphere and the outer space starts at an altitude of 100 km from the sea
level and commonly termed as ‗Karman Line‘ named after physicist Theodore von
Karman, who calculated this particular height for outer space.145
The Karman Line is
internationally accepted by the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, an
international aeronautics and astronautics standards body and also identified in draft
treaty titled, ―Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).‖146
Karman Line has a tangible legal value also, as beyond outer space is "not subject to
145
J.C. McDowell, ―The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line,‖ Acta Astronautica (2018): 1-2.
doi: 10.1016/j.actaastro.2018.07.003. 146
Article 1 of the 2008 Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and
of the threat OR Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) (CD/1839).
59
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means" according to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.147
2.1.1 Earth Orbits - Kinds and Limits. Details about various space Earth orbits
with their characteristics and satellites‘ assigned missions are illustrated below:
Table 2.1
Earth Orbits
Ser Earth
Orbit148
Distance
from
Earth
(Km)149
Characteristics Missions
1. Low Earth
Orbits (LEOs),
180-2000 Satellites are generally
smaller in size due to less
power requirement.
In LEO satellites move
faster due to more
gravitation effects, hence
need more number of
satellites for continued
communication.
Best suited for
communication
satellites besides
R&D missions,
remote sensing,
surveillance and
weather
forecasting.150
2. Medium Earth
Orbits (MEOs)
2000-
35780
Satellites in MEO
complete one orbit in 6-12
hours. Comparatively
larger satellites are
stationed here as they need
more power for
transmission and working.
MEO is best suited
for tasks like
navigation and
communications.151
3. Geostationary
Earth Orbits
(GEOs).
35780 and
above
Orbital time period of a
satellite in GEO is equal to
the Earth‘s rotational
period, hence appear
stationary in relation o
earth. Satellites are even
bigger in size as compared
to LEO and MEO.
Satellites are expensive to
Communication for
Command and
Control of strategic
weapons.
Forecasting major
earth weather inter-
alia cyclone. 153
147
Article II of the ‖ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST)‖ of 1967. 148
Anil K. Maini and Varsha Agrawal, Satellite Technology: Principles and Applications, (Delhi:
Willey, 2014), 70. 149
―Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits,‖ Accessed Apr 30, 2017. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/
Features/OrbitsCatalog/page1.php. 150
Maini and Agrawal, Satellite Technology, 71. 151
Ibid, 72.
60
launch and sustain in
GEO.152
Sources: ―Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits.‖ and Anil K. Maini and Varsha
Agrawal, Satellite Technology: Principles and Applications, 70-72.
2.2 Space Weapons: A Debate
Space weapons are of many facets and hence cannot be termed as alike. However,
there is a general consensus that whatever the types of space weapons may be finally
decided in times to come, at least for the time being they do not include those space-
based assets i.e. satellites which support Earth based military operations. They also do
not count on the ballistic missile during their transit through the space as well as
anything, which does not follows an orbit cannot be graded as space weapons.154
Contemporary hype in space weaponization debate kicked-off when the US withdrew
from the 1972 ABM Treaty in June 2002 and paved the way for space-based
components of its BMD system against an intruding ballistic missile. The US viewed
that space operations provide much needed flexibility during the battle conduct,
which is only possible by best exploitation of the ―ultimate high ground- the outer
space.‖155
The world with an anarchic characteristic system is facing an increasing loose debate
on status of space weapons. The open-ended debate is further convoluted with the
issues inter-alia absence of politically acceptable definition of space weapons,
difference between space militarization and space weaponization and the legal
confusions/ gaps pertaining to exercising control over space. The unanswered queries
have not let the space weapons to cross Rubicon.156
Space as a unique domain poses special kinds of challenges to the decision makers.
Military planners, for obvious reason of enhancing security, want to have ingress in
space with strategic advantage of being the first to dominate the ultimate high ground
153
James Clay Moltz, ―Space Security Index: 2014,‖ (Ontario: Space Security Press, 2014), 97. 152
Maini and Agrawal, Satellite Technology, 70-71. 154
Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, RAND MR-1209-AF (Santa Monica: RAND,
2002), 23. 155
William. Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖ Astropolitics
1:3(2003): 1. 156
Columba Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2011): 78-79.
61
with space weapons on their credit for offensive/ defensive purposes, albeit, some
disagree to the advantageous preposition of projecting space as an ultimate high
ground.157
Contrarily, doves with an idealist orientation of keeping space as a
sanctuary desire to maintain the status of outer space as sanctuary and to be used for
peaceful purposes only inter-alia research, navigation, communication and weather
forecasting.158
There could be broadly two ways to tackle likelihood of space weaponization i.e.
idealists and realists approaches. Idealists as a whole oppose weapons especially of
new kind for obvious reason of keeping peace and stability. Idealists house two
different variants in their camp i.e. internationalists and nationalists who share
common objectives of keeping the outer space free of weapons and to remain as a
sanctuary. Internationalists oppose space weaponization as they fear it would air
space arms race, creation of security dilemma and crises instability. Similarly,
nationalists also oppose space weaponization as they argue that space weapons
acquisition would be detrimental to security status and may affect the relative security
vis-à-vis potential rivals, who would feel threatened.159
On the flip side i.e. in pro-space weapons realist‘s camp space racers, space
controllers and space hegemons reside.160
Realists follow the security based approach
and support continual increase in military power for survival. Realist school of
thought argues that space cannot be freer of military operations‘ support due to the
ever increased involvement of space-based assets in intelligence, observation,
communication and surveillance operations.161
Space Racers from the realist
perspective support to urgently secure ultimate high ground before anyone else does
it. Space Controllers also support development of space weapons but only when they
tangibly contribute towards security enhancement. Lastly, Space Hegemons support
157
Glesson, ―Perspectives on Space Operations,‖157. 158
Bruce. M. Deblois, ―The Advent of Space Weapons,‖ Astropolitics 1:1 (2003): 29-30. 159
Vishnu Anantatmula, ―U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space: The Catalyst for a Space-Based
Arms Race with China and Russia,‖ Astropolitics 11:3 (2003): 148. 160
Karl P. Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate,‖ Astropolitics,
1:1 (2010): 11. 161
Michael Pavelec, ―The Inevitability of the Weaponization of Space; Technological Constructivism
Versus Determinism,‖ Astropolitics 10:1 (2012): 39.
62
intense development of space weapons, as they believe that the one, who initiates it,
would become unassailable by its adversary.162
There could be three main drivers for the space weaponization as per the arguments
of ‗determinist theory‘, which include initiative, incentive and need.163
The three
drivers are logically sufficient to value the quest for any new technology, which
remains in waiting to be born as soon as other related conditions are met. In the
comity of nation, ‗initiative‘ remains at top priority with any state. Technology‘s birth
is dependent upon on old ideas, which keep getting matured in different minds at
different places.164
Smart nations are those who remain conscious of this element and
capture the initiative for obvious incentives. Incentives coupled with the need make a
wonderful combination and new technology surfaces, that holds good for the space
weapons inevitability argument also.
2.3 Outer Space – Efficacy of Global Common Narrative
The outer space is graded as global commons. In literal meaning, ‗commons‘ is used
to indicate ―….a piece of land owned by and used by all members of a community [a
resource not owned by any one nation but crucial to the future of all humankind], as
in a pasture used by all residents of a village.‖ Being part of global commons, it
manifests that outer space should solely be used for betterment of civilization and
nothing like militarization is materialized. For that, space faring nations need to
develop and practice only those capacities which are meant to explore and use outer
space for peaceful purposes only.165
Many efforts at political and diplomatic levels
inter-alia United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) etc. deal with the
issue of keeping the outer space free from infringement of any kind of weapons, yet,
efforts did not accrue much of dividends. Apparently, the major space faring nations
led by the US, which block arms control proposals at multi-lateral levels including the
CD, are hostage to anarchical nature of international political system and view the
162
Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo,‖ 9. 163
Pavelec, ―The Inevitability of the Weaponization,‖42. 164
Anantatmula, ―U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space,‖ 148. 165
L. A. Fisk, ―Space as a Global Commons,‖ Lecture script by President of COSPAR.
www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/1st_hlf_Dubai/Presentations/26.pdf.
63
outer space as one of the upcoming Zone of conflict. The argument shall be analyzed
critically during the course of discussion in succeeding parts of the chapter.
2.4 Space Militarization vs. Space Weaponization
Space militarization and weaponization are interchangeably used. The same reason
has been a hedge which is used to dogged proposals regarding reaching on to any new
legal framework since 1967 OST.166
Space weaponization is an ultimate advanced
shape of space militarization.167
Absence of an acceptable definition of space weapon
and lack of any evidence regarding the physical placement of any active weapon in
space, proves that the space has yet to be weaponized, however due to the military
utility of space assets it can conveniently be claimed that space is militarized but not
weaponized.168
Space is said to be militarized when the space assets are used for supporting the
military operations, and on the other hand, is said to be weaponized when space is
utilized for destructive purposes by utilizing state of the art weapons to be used either
from terrestrial to space, space to space or space to terrestrial targets.169
Foregoing, a general consensus prevails that space is considered to be militarized
only because the space assets have extensively been used for facilitation in attainment
of military objectives especially during the Cold War, Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq
Wars.170
Space related activities in support of these wars included surveillance of
defensive and offensive formations, important military installations‘ information,
weapons‘ employment and storage facilities, navigation aid for military aircrafts
employed to perform tasks like reconnaissance and photography, weather forecasting
for deciding right time for a particular military mission, early warning of an incoming
strategic missile, long range strategic communications for effective command and
166
Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖ 76. 167
Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo,‖ 5. 168
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space; A Critical Analysis,‖ South Asian
Strategic Stability Institute (SAASI) Research Report No. 22 (December 2008): 6. 169
Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖ 76. 170
Alasdair McLean, ―A New Era? Military Space Policy Enters the Mainstream,‖ Space Policy, Vol.
16, No. 4 (2000): 243.
64
control and above all provisioning of accurate target data to be engaged by the long
range artillery, ballistic missiles or air force.171
Leaving aside ASAT tests, in actuality there is no precedence of a weapon in space
engaging terrestrial target or actual use of terrestrial weapon engaging an asset in
outer space belonging to an adversary.172
Despite having the technological capacity to
do so, persistent non-development and deployment of outer space-based weapons till
to-date173
puts a question mark on probability of space-based weapons in near
future.174
2.5 Yes and No Dilemma - Need for Having Space Weapons
Space has undoubtedly become ‗strategic center of gravity‘ due to its exponential
utility not only for daily life usages but also for extension of power and enhanced
military reach.175
Gradual increase in numbers of space faring nations besides private
enterprises has aired an unprecedented competition for space control, thus swelling
the chances of outer space becoming future conflict zone.176
Notwithstanding, despite
loopholes in the 1967 OST which obligates states to refrain only from deploying
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) including the Nuclear Weapons in outer space,
space weapons have not attained much traction177
and space weaponization concept is
still considered to be a taboo.
However, after the Cold War when the world witnessed multi-polarity based
international system, this taboo has been put to stress178
and it seems that space
weapons are becoming inevitable and sooner or later there would be either physical
171
Columba Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable: Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space
Weaponization and Conflict,‖ Contemporary Security Policy 29:3(2008): 502. 172
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 502. 173
Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space,‖ 4. 174
Patrick K. Gleeson, ―Perspective on Space Operations,‖ Astropolitics 5:2 (2007): 160. 175
Glesson, ―Perspectives on Space Operations,‖146. 176
Alan Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space : The Need to Protect Space Assets,‖ Astropolitics 10:3
(2012): 248-249. 177
Article IV of the ‖ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST)‖ of 1967. 178
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 502.
65
presence of weapons in outer space179
or instead the terrestrial based space capable
weapons would become common for engaging the space-based assets.
Albeit, space weapons‘ probability is questionable, however, the stated space policies
of the advanced space faring nations including the US, China and Russia postulate
that there is a firm desire among these for developing space weapons for the security
of space-based assets as well as for deterring any hostile act against space-based
assets.180
No one among big giants of space technology claims that they have
weaponized the space.
Some, with realist background do argue that with the tests of ASATs conducted by
the Russia, the US and China, the space domain has already been weaponized.181
Contrarily, space weapon is still an unsung song and is believed to be short of
principal threshold associated to the space weaponization actualization i.e. physical
deployment of weapons on a space-based asset.182
Technology is like fragrance, which cannot be controlled. RMA and continued
process of research and development (R&D) reject the notion that space weapons for
their actual placement in outer space have not been researched and their proto-types
not developed. When these weapons shall be unveiled, need to be seen. Combining
the two i.e. technology advancement and intent projected through national space
policies, makes the claim credible enough that space weapons‘ probability do exist
behind the strategic curtain of ambiguity. The growing fear of having space weapons
technology by the rivals would eventually form-up security dilemma in outer space
domain and hence a vicious space arms race might get started, thereby opening up
fourth zone of conflict- the outer space besides land, air and sea.183
179
Pavelec, ―The Inevitability of the Weaponization,‖42-43. 180
Christian Davenport, ―China and Russia are developing space weapons, bolstering case for U.S.
'Space Corps',‖ Chicago Tribune, April 13, 2018,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-china-russia-space-weapons-20180413-
story.html. 181
Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo,‖ 3-4. 182
Ibid, 5. 183
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 503.
66
Those who grade inevitability with maximum probability index, have many logics to
support their bias. Few of their logics in support of their inevitability thesis are
discussed below.
The proponents of space weapons‘ inevitability accuse human nature184
for being
selfish and slave to the position and status lust, which could compel the states to
enhance their respective military might for security and hegemony. Secondly, the
huge cost involved in developing, deploying, maintenance and sustenance of space-
based assets make them a lucrative targets. Space assets are easy to neutralize as they
follow fixed speed and path in known orbits, which worry their owners, mostly
civilian enterprises, to have some guard with space capable weapons to protect
them.185
Third, space assets being a lucrative target for hurting adversary the most from
economic, day to day functioning and exuberant military dependence perspectives-
adversarial states with whatever cost would prefer to have an asymmetric
arrangement for destroying space-based assets. This particular approach is like a
poor man‘s choice that cannot build and sustain his own strategically important
military satellites.186
Hence, major space faring would develop space capable weapons
to deter any such adventure.
Fourth, prestige could be another strong driver for space weaponization both from
technological and political vistas. States even with limited capacity would try an
effort for establishing their signature in space with weapons on board. Finally, in the
discourse of weaponry evolution, weapons started building up from domain to
domain depending upon the technological access. Land based weapons were followed
by Sea, which ultimately rose to the Air weaponry. Advocates of space weapons‘
inevitability profess their argument that after Air domain, space is naturally the next
in sequel.
Hawks, supporters of having space weapons, argue that there is no harm in
developing space weapons as the weapons have never been a precursor to war and
184
Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo,‖ 17. 185
Deblois, ―The Advent of Space Weapons,‖ 32. 186
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 504.
67
quote peaceful culmination of Cold War which remained cold in true terms despite so
much of RMA in weaponry. Responsible states having space weapons with
demonstrated restraint and responsibility would ensure war prevention through
strategies inter-alia deterrence, dissuasion and assurances. Hawks also negate
strategies of cooperation and transparency, for war prevention and grade them
strategies of weakness.187
Causes for non-development of outer space weapons despite the hawks‘ support for
having one, can be differentiated in two categories i.e. technological and political.
Technological causes include huge sizes of the outer space assets, requirement of
power supply to keep them operational especially when idle during peace time as well
as for generation of lasers etc. overcrowding of the already congested orbital spaces,
congestion of frequency spectrum and the immense cost involved in development,
deployment and sustenance of the space weapons capable assets.
On the political side, probable reasons which restricted major space faring nations
from developing space-based weapons include their concerns about political and
diplomatic back lashing for attempting to convert outer space status from a sanctuary
to a potential conflict zone besides fear of initiation of spiraling unprecedented space
arms race.188
Moreover, anti-space-based weapons professors argue that absence of space weapons,
despite a lapse of sixty years since launching of Sputnik in 1957, manifests that the
space weapons are fictitious and a brain child of think tanks with hawkish approach.
They also argue in support of terrestrial weapons systems inter-alia ballistic missiles
to engage terrestrial based targets as compared to hitting them from space-based
weapons.189
Blown out of proportion, the so-far-totally-conceptual space-based
weapons may sound appropriate to some from political and ideological perspectives,
187
M.V. Smith, ―Security and Space Power,‖ in Towards a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays,
ed. Charles D. Lutes et al. (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 334. 188
Steven Lambakis, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,‖ Policy Review (February & March
2001), 41-51. Accessed May 30, 2017.http://www.hoover.org/research/space-weapons-refuting-critics. 189
Jessica West et al., ―Space Security Index: 2008,‖ (Ontario: Space Security Press, 2008), 183.
68
but this hype may prove to be a dangerous game.190
The development of space
weapons by an asymmetric competitor might endanger the space-based assets of
advanced space faring nations due to comparatively more number of assets.
Interestingly, despite the recognized importance of space weapons, development in
space weapons technology has been rarely observed. Nuclear weapons‘ technology
was advanced and proliferated exponentially after its use by the US against Japan in
August 1945, while in case of space weapons technology, since 1957 Sputnik test it
did not get a physical traction by the major space faring nations less a few tests of
ASATs and occasional policy statements.191
However, the states did exploit the
technology used for Sputnik launch in development of long and short range ballistic
missiles. One can infer from the empirical data related to the ballistic missile
evolution that Sputnik test by the USSR formed the basis of ballistic missile
proliferation.192
However, despite identifying the limitations attached to the space weapons
probability curve, chances of space getting weaponized have not diminished.193
Space
weapons‘ development remains in varying research and development stages.194
There
are concerted efforts from technology, political and bureaucratic corners to address
the limitations and make space weapons a reality, on the pretext that national security
is supreme and can‘t be relegated to doves‘ aspirations.
2.6 An Account of Space-based Assets’ Support for Terrestrial Military
Operations
Since the beginning of Cold War era and domination of realist school of thought most
of the technological research hinged upon multiplying security for survival. Force
multipliers‘ acquisition was the hallmark of the guaranteed security. Outer space as a
190
Michael Katz-Hyman, ‗‗Outer-Space Threats,‘‘ USA Today, June 20, 2005, 14A.Accessed June 1,
2017.https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-06-13-space-weapons-edit_x.htm. 191
Michael Krepon, ―Space and Nuclear Deterrence,‖ in Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-
American Space Relations, ed. Michael Krepon et al. (Washington DC: Stimson Press, 2013), 18. 192
Zulfikar Abbany, ―Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and their Long Shared History with Sputnik
1,‖ DW, July 13, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-and-their-long-
shared-history-with-sputnik-1/a-39658661. 193
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 504. 194
Vladmir Dvorkin, ―Space Weapons Program,‖ in Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security,
ed. Alexei Arbatov et al. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 31.
69
domain has been influential and utilized for the military purposes since 1957. Today,
more than 50 percent of space-based assets are meant to support terrestrial based
military operations. Since 1957, space has realized to be an indispensable domain in
support of terrestrial military operations in contrast to the OST which stressed for
peaceful uses of outer space; however, interestingly states have tacitly lived with it,
perhaps for the sole supporting argument that space assets have not been used
aggressively inside outer space domain against any outer space asset but for defensive
purposes.195
Moreover, most of the commonly used outer space applications are originally an
extension of military applications, for instance, navigation was initially meant for
military aircrafts and now it is overwhelmingly used by the commercial airliners. The
advantages associated to outer space assets have increased the number of space
application users and made the outer space a profitable domain for major space faring
nations. The space assets have virtually become eyes and ears196
by using satellites
borne synthetic aperture radars (weather resistant) and have considerably reduced the
fog of war. Notwithstanding, a dilemma is being faced in outer space management
due to cluttering of satellites in outer space thereby initiating race for securing more
and more slots in Earth orbits and allocation of required radio frequency spectrum.
Emerging space faring nations fear that their rights of having own satellites would be
relegated in favor of advanced faring nations and hence, their outer space national
security requirements would be outsourced to others.
Major support accrued from space-based assets is enumerated below:197
Weather forecasting for deciding the right time and place for the impending
military operations on ground.
Intelligence gathering for planning the response and counter postures.
Ballistic Missile launch warning during all phases of missile flight.
Facilitating attribution of any hostile act.
195
Cesar Jaramillo ed., ―Space Security Index: 2012,‖ 106. 196
Julia Glum, ―War in Space: Congress may Add a New Military Branch amid China, Russia Satellite
Threats,‖ Newsweek, July 6, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/space-military-branch-russia-china-
security-632796. 197
Cesar Jaramillo ed., ―Space Security Index: 2012,‖ (Ontario: Space Security Press, 2012), 106.
70
Authentic verification mechanism managed by Remote Sensing Satellites for
Arms Control treaties.
Satellite imageries‘ for the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR).
Assured and uninterrupted satellite communications for the real-time
exercising command and control over conventional and strategic forces.
Satellites dependent navigation, for instance, the US owned Global
Positioning System (GPS) for the guidance of body of troops, airplane and
missiles. Missile‘s guidance ensures pin-point hitting of the targets thereby
reducing collateral damage. Similarly, satellites guidance assured timely and
accurate application of force for the desired results.
As brought out above, outer space has knitted the common interests all over the
globe. The cooperation web has an inbuilt security due to the mutual vulnerability
factor. Only an insane state actor would risk losing benefits amassed from satellites
by initiating an attack against them. Counter to this optimism, some believe that when
it comes to security of states, rest all loses their priority.
In an anarchic political environment where survivability is supreme, space security
confronts challenging situation. An actor with existential threat, in reaction ought to
opt for space negation capacity building to check the advantages gained by the
potential adversary through their dual use satellites.198
Space assets‘ protective measures inter-alia hardening and responsive space strategy
etc. checkmate space negation strategies. Such action-reaction syndrome may spark
compelling arms race syndrome.199
Technologies have come up to counter space
negation capabilities and out of them, responsive space technique is getting traction.
Responsive space technique involve launching of several small and bigger sized
satellites which remain silent and keep orbiting in their respective orbits till the time
primary satellite gets knocked out deliberately or inadvertently by hostile or
accidental acts. This technique is, albeit, not cost effective yet, has weight to consider
198
Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century, 41-42. 199
West ed., ―Space Security Index: 2008,‖ 113.
71
for obvious advantage of continued supply of data, information and intelligence from
space based assets.
2.7 Outer Space Dominance by Destructive and Non-Destructive Techniques
Offensive realism postulate dominance in space for securing advantageous position so
as to attain hegemony through monopolization. Moreover a state with Great Power
aspiration can only get it if its reach is extended with precision. Outer space expertise
and technology does provide this capacity and hence, becoming a major or great
power is directly linked to being an advanced space faring nation.
The capacity of being accurate is essential for successful conduct of terrestrial based
military missions. Over a period of time, space has become sui-genesis for
performance of tasks which are extremely useful for precision gauged operations.
Space capabilities are critical to modern warfare and provide the space faring nations‘
militaries an asymmetric advantage. Space is exploited to project power and
responding to the multiple operations inter-alia deterrence and crisis response
operations and campaigns.200
Because of the leverage in availability of real time information, space faring nations
enjoy an edge over their potential adversaries in terms of accurate weapons and forces
employment, maintenance of momentum in conduct of fluid battle, situational
awareness, retention of initiative during crucial stages of campaign and terrain
mapping for successful conduct of trans-frontier offensive in an unknown terrain.201
For instance, space facilitated terrain mapping played an instrumental role in Allied
Forces‘ successful offensive operations during Gulf, Iraqi and Afghanistan Wars.
The identified importance and exuberant dependence on outer space assets, advanced
space faring nations have either developed or in process of developing ground and
space-based destructive and non-destructive space negation technologies with a sole
objective of protecting own outer space assets and at the same denying the same to
200
Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖ 1. 201
United States Air Force, ―Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2,‖ (27 November 2006), 2.
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2.pdf.
72
the potential adversaries.202
Space negation with the purpose of ‗outer space
superiority‘, is achieved through neutralizing potential adversary‘s space systems by
use of lethal and non-lethal methods and means.203
Broadly, space negation
techniques can be classified in form of five Ds i.e. disruption, deception, denial,
degradation, and destruction.204
2.7.1 Outer Space-based Destructive Technologies for Space Negation
The space-based destructive techniques will be discussed below so as to understand
as to how outer-space could be used for projection of force by using terrestrial or
space-based weapons and on the parallel deny the same to the peer. Foregoing,
primarily the space-based weapons‘ technologies are known for three pronged
objectives:205
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems. To shoot down an incoming
hostile missile anywhere during its flight path.
Outer Space Control. Protecting own ability to launch, protect and sustain
satellites and at the same time denying the same to the potential adversary.
Force Application from Outer Space. Force application implies having a
capacity to engage terrestrial based targets from space.
The weapon systems being conceptualized or being pursued through dedicated R&D
for meeting the above mission requirements include mainly variants of high-energy
lasers and kinetic energy weapons which can destroy orbiting satellites (space to
space engagement) thousands of kilometers away by precision high energy lasers as
well as physical impact. The conceptualized outer space weapons‘ desired utility and
the limitations attached to their functioning and sustenance, when deployed are
202
The US can be taken as an example which made aggressive claim that it has all the rights to develop
capacities to protect its assets in outer space and at the same deny the freedom of action to potential
enemies. See US National Space Policy, August 31, 2006. Accessed May 26,
2017.http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/2006NationalSpacePolicy.htm#s03. 203
Phillip Baines, ―Non-Offensive Defenses: Space Protection without Space-Based Weapons,‖
Astropolitics, 2:2 (2004): 150. 204
Baines, ―Non-Offensive Defenses: Space Protection,‖ 150-151. 205
Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖ 2.
73
discussed below. Most of these conceptualized space weapon systems are derived
from the US Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI).206
On account of BMD system in space, lasers are considered to be more viable then
kinetic weapons. For an effective laser based engagement of an incoming hostile
ballistic missile, an estimated 25 MW laser beam would be required to pierce through
a ballistic missile body. However, major limitation is generation of 25 MW lasers,
which requires a laser generator as big as of 50 meters diameter. Moreover, the laser
weapon would also require huge mirrors of at least 10 meters diameter to reflect high
powered laser beam. Also, for a précised engagement of a satellite, the laser weapon
borne satellite has to move in a constant direction and speed for over 40 kilometers
while the target also has to maintain the speed and course for at least 50 kilometers,
only than the laser can engage a moving satellite at maximum ranges i.e. 3000
kilometers.207
It is even difficult for chemical based lasers in space, which create vibrations thereby
losing precision. A space-based laser generating platform would need millions of
pounds of chemicals to generate 5 pulses each by a constellation of twenty laser
generating platforms. Supply of such a huge amount of chemical to orbiting laser
platforms is ‗The‘ problem, making it too costly an affair financially besides,
technologically infeasible.208
To-date, research is being carried out tacitly to
overcome the limitations.
Along with the lasers, KE Missile Interceptors is yet another destructive technology,
which employs mass-to-target kill tactics against a ballistic missile during its boost
phase, achieving kill by either high speed collision only or supplementing the high
speed projectile (mass) with inert or explosive device. US Space-based Interceptor
(SBI) as part of US BMD System is one such example.209
206
The SDI was a 1983 initiative by the US President Ronald Regan. It is also interchangeably used as
Star Wars Concept. The SDI promoted space weapons acquisition and their ambitious employment.
See Radovan Vukadinović, ―Strategic defense initiative (SDI) Dilemmas,‖ World Futures: The
Journal of New Paradigm Research, 24:1-4 (1988): 87-88. 207
Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖ 3-4. 208
Bruce M. DeBlois, Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell, ―Space Weapons:
Crossing the Rubicon,‖ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 72-73. 209
Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space,‖ 6.
74
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) and Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs) are taken as
future technologies besides Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP), or high-powered Radio
Frequency (Microwave) technologies, for space-based weapons.210
Various
prototypes of these main kinds shall be discussed in succeeding paras.
Space-based DEWs use either high powered lasers or particle beam (also known as
chemical laser).211
These weapons would be extremely deadly, accurate and without
any warning. If an attack is launched from space using high-powered laser DEW, it
shall take time in milli-seconds- virtually no time to react by the target vis-à-vis
minimum 15-20 minutes of reaction time available to a defender for countering an
incoming ballistic missile through the outer space.212
Particle or chemical lasers are
more effective against circuitry used by target satellites.
KE Space Weapons concept is based on delivering weapons from outer space against
terrestrial based assets. Such weapons shall be stationed on outer space assets (Also
commonly called as Death Stars)213
having explosive free tungsten rod bundles to be
used as free falling projectiles. When released, tungsten rods would capitalize on the
gravity thereby converting potential energy into kinetic energy. The hardened
tungsten rods with tremendous kinetic energy would be potent enough to pierce
through any hardened structure.214
The tungsten rods are also named as ‗Rods from
the God‘.215
KE weapons‘ last minute guidance is problematic. Precision attacks may not work;
however, area attack can be extremely useful, for instance, an offensively disposed
armor formation. Space-based Common Aero Vehicle (CAV)216
which could de-orbit
from its orbit to deliver smart munitions is visualized to be an answer to this
shortcoming.
Concept of ‗Boost phase Kinetic Energy Weapon (KEW)‘ was conceived by the US in
early 1990s; however, the US Congress did not let it materialize for being cost 210
Lambakis, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,‖ 41-51. 211
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 255. 212
Ibid, 253. 213
Ibid, 263. 214
Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, 40. 215
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable,‖ 506. 216
Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖25.
75
prohibitive and ineffectiveness against low altitude short range ballistic missiles. As
per this concept of BMD, it would have consisted of about 700-1000 Brilliant Pebbles
―(BP)‖ stationed in 27 different space orbits at an altitude of 400 kilometers with a
mission to kill about 200 ballistic missiles during their boost phase.217
BPs were
basically small missile interceptors with no explosive in it but planned to kill on the
basis of their speed and momentum. BPs would have been; however, ineffective
against that ballistic missile which attain maximum altitude of 80-100 kilometers and
has range less than 400-600 kilometers (short range missiles).
Contemporarily, a profusion of emphasis is being laid in development of EMP and
microwave capable ASATs for their accuracy and effectiveness in burning out the
sensitive circuit boards of satellites.218
The microwave technology is well researched,
practiced and ripe for deployment in space as ASAT or anti-ASAT weapon
systems.219
Orbital ASAT Weapon System in low Earth orbit is yet another attractive space
weapon option that was planned to be stationed on satellites to kill potential
adversaries‘ satellites, especially those which would assist in successful conduct of
terrestrial operations. A Co-orbital ASAT, orbits in adjacent Earth orbit to its target. It
tries to get closer to the target satellite in a synchronous way i.e. moving silently
without being detected by the tracking capabilities of target satellite. However, due to
the longer time involved in getting closer to the target for an opportunity to a suicidal
kill, it provided a viable chance to the target state to take evasive measures; hence KE
weapons with more speed stood taller as compared to co-orbit ASAT. However, these
kinds of hunter-killer satellites did not move beyond speculations.220
Space mines, as the name implies would be planned to operate covertly. An orbital
ASAT and a space mine are differentiated by the nature of their task i.e. overt and
covert respectively. However, there are allied problems in case of having space mines
217
United States General Accounting Office, Report to Chairman Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate: Strategic Defense Initiative, Estimates of Brilliant Pebbles‘ Effectiveness are Based on Many
Unproven Assumptions, GAO/NSIAD-92-91 (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 1992), 2. 218
―Electromagnetic Weapons, Frying Tonight,‖ The Economist, 15–21 October 2011, 89.Accessed
May 31, 2017.http://www.economist.com/node/21532245. 219
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 258. 220
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 252.
76
too. A huge amount of propellant is required to maneuver the space mine next to
target satellite. Also, prolonged silent orbiting of space mines, continuous tracking of
target satellite and yet avoiding detection would be fuel extensive job- a difficult
preposition for space mines viability.
Parasite Satellites technology for destroying satellites is associated to the People
Republic of China (PRC) military. These satellites are thought to be smaller in size
and act as orbiting limpet bombs. Being undetectable, these satellites would silently
attach themselves with the large satellites‘ bodies and detonate at the time of
choosing.221
2.7.2 Terrestrial Based Destructive Technologies for Space Negation
The Cold War era is replete with advancement in weapons development and R&D. Its
focus was on terrestrial based space weapons to kill satellites in space, primarily with
dual aim i.e. first, space control at critical time during hostilities and secondly,
ensured command and control of strategic weapon systems. Terrestrial based space
weapons were designated to employ nuclear, conventional and DEWs against outer
space-based satellites.222
These weapons have not been employed in actual to-date but
they do exist. The US, Russia and China have already tested their terrestrial based
ASATs against their respective outlived satellites in Earth orbits which; however, are
feared to be detrimental to space security.223
In comparison to space-based KE and laser weapons, terrestrial based weapons are
expected to face less logistic issues besides avoiding the likely political and
diplomatic criticism for being alleged on weaponizing the outer space. Flexibility is
an important advantage associated to developing terrestrial based ASATs as these can
take-on any assigned target up in the space, while the space-based weapons are kind
of designated weapons against a particularly designated space asset.
On the flip side, there are number of limitations attached to terrestrial based-space
capable weapon systems, inter-alia, vulnerability to ground attacks, requirement of
221
James Oberg, ‗‗The Heavens at War,‘‘ New Scientist, June 2, 2001. Accessed June 2,
2017.http://www.jamesoberg.com/heavens.html. 222
Cesar Jaramillo ed., ―Space Security Index: 2012,‖ 24. 223
Ibid, 139.
77
bigger boosters for throwing ASATs in higher Earth orbits and the bad weather which
could hinder laser‘s precision to strike a space-based asset.224
Main kinds of terrestrial
based space weapons are discussed in succeeding part of the discussion.
Conventional Terrestrial Based ASATs, also referred as Kinetic Intercept Weapons
(KIWs)are supposed to be launched in space using carrier like SLV in such a
synchronization with target satellite that it mates it at desired time and place in space.
Until now, nine states have the capability of operationalizing KIWs due to their
capability of launching satellites by SLVs. These sates include Japan, India, Iran,
Israel and the P-5 states.225
For KIWs, tracking a hostile satellite with precision is a
must, only then lead can be calculated to hit it.
Killing a satellite could be achieved either by a direct hit (Direct Ascent Missile)226
or
laying metal pellets in path of satellite orbit.227
Albeit, the technology is worth having
it and proved to be successful, however, spraying metal pellets in Earth orbits would
add to worsening debris situation or in other words could severely impact desired
long term sustainability of outer space.
HAND (High Altitude Nuclear Detonation) as the name implies is leap ahead of
KIWs. HAND concept postulates carrying out nuclear detonation in outer space for
creating high powered EM waves and radiations in form of X-rays - killer to the
sensitive circuitry of satellites, less those which are hardened against these radiations.
Like KIWs, capacity to launch SLV with nuclear warhead is needed for a HAND. On
the flip side, whenever a HAND is employed, it would leave behind long-term
radioactivity cloud in LEO rendering it virtually useless.228
2.7.3 Outer Space and Terrestrial Based Non-Destructive Technologies for
Space Negation
The ASAT capabilities are not confined to only physically destroying a satellite.
Instead of physically destroying the space-based targets for space dominance and
224
Alexei Arbator and Valdimit Dovrkin, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy and Security,
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 104. 225
Cesar Jaramillo ed., ―Space Security Index: 2012,‖ 77. 226
West ed., ―Space Security Index: 2008,‖ 165. 227
Cesar Jaramillo ed., ―Space Security Index: 2012,‖ 140. 228
West ed., ―Space Security Index: 2008,‖ 156.
78
control, traditional non-destructive technologies and techniques also merit pondering.
Non-destructive technologies and techniques, as the name implies, are not weapon
dependent; nevertheless, capable of disrupting and degrading the satellite operations
through active means.
Non-destructive technologies have inherent strategic advantages inter-alia difficult to
detect and attribute, does not create worrisome debris and more importantly gaining
space superiority while living much below the threshold associated to outbreak of
hostilities.
Such non-destructive technologies include, spraying paint on target satellite’s solar
panels for making satellites energy starved, spraying paint on optical instruments to
get the observing satellites blind and disabling critical equipment, for instance
satellite‘s ‗altitude control panel‘ by burning out circuits through use of high powered
EM waves, etc.229
Other common non-destructive means include, jamming the
communication link between the ground station and the target satellites by
overloading their pre-decided radio frequencies.
Spoofing is yet another technique which employs efforts to corrupt the signals
between the satellites and their users. It implies interfering with the authentic signals
by injecting malicious signals.230
By spoofing, one tries to taking-over command of
sensitive and cutting edge satellites. Spoofing is best suited against navigational and
communication satellites.
Laser blinding of the satellite is a temporary effort for blinding a satellite. It is done
by throwing a brighter light (laser) as compared to what satellite was imaging i.e.
dazzling the optical gadgets of a satellite.231
229
William J. Durch, ―Anti-Satellite Weapons, Arms Control Options, and the Military Use of Space,‖
Contract No. AC3PC103, Prepared for United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (July
1984):4-5. 230
Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani, ―India and Space Weaponization: Why Space Debris
Trumps Kinetic Energy Anti-satellite Weapons as the Principal Threat to Satellites,‖ India Review,
13:1 (2014): 56. doi: 10.1080/14736489.2014.873678. 231
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 252.
79
Barring aside active non-destructive means, diplomacy is also classified as one of the
pro-active mean of winning control over outer space affairs. A pro-active diplomacy
implies ‗coercing third party‘ to deny satellites‘ facilities to hostile target state.
2.8 Security Measures against Space Negation Efforts
Concerted security measures are needed to mitigate the effects of space negation
technologies so that to avoid damaging of vital satellites for ensuring sustained access
to and use of outer space applications. Means for space security i.e. protecting the
outer space and terrestrial based assets include active and passive measures including
electronic counter measures (ECMs) and electronic counter counter measures
(ECCMs).232
Space situational awareness (SSA) is a surveillance arrangement to detect potential
threats. It can be defined as, ―the comprehensive knowledge of space objects and the
ability to track, understand and predict their future location‖.233
Capacity to
differentiate between a deliberate attack and an environmental accident (due to debris
etc.) for attribution has been an issue. The solution; however, lies in enhanced SSA,
that enables a state to detect, identify, and locate a space negation effort in the form of
co-orbiting satellites, space mines etc. so that to initiate necessary evasive measures
and later attributing it to the spoiler for punitive measures. Evasive measures include
inter-alia deploying shielding measures for an instant hardening of critical satellite
parts and electronics besides maneuvering the satellite away from the threat.234
In
other words, SSA capacity is an extremely useful tool and a prerequisite for
deterrence maintenance in outer space.235
Redundancy is a viable action to mitigate the damage to a space asset for sustained
space operations. Vulnerability of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) satellites, navigational and weather satellites can be profoundly addressed by
mainly two methods. First, integration of space-based assets with long-loitering both
232
Jessica West, ―Space Security Index: 2009,‖ (Ontario: Space Security Press, 2009), 124. 233
Kate Becker, et al., ―Space Situational Awareness,‖ Space Situational Awareness Educational
Series (2012): 1. 234
Gleeson, ―Perspective on Space Operations,‖ 162. 235
West, ―Space Security Index: 2009,‖ 124.
80
manned (high-altitude aircraft) and unmanned (UAVs) airborne assets.236
Integration
would ensure continued supply of information despite incapacitation of a satellite.
Secondly, deployment of spare satellites in the Earth orbits, to be used for replacing
the damaged outer space asset.237
Redundancy, in kind can also be ensured without putting spare satellites in Earth
orbits i.e. by employing Responsive Space Strategy, which is also commonly termed
as having capability of ‗launch on demand technology‘.238
Responsive space is to
address the space related affairs inter-alia mitigation of crises, launching/ re-
launching of space missions and responding to the impromptu operational situations.
By operationalizing responsive space strategy, advanced space faring nations ensure
meeting national security objectives without any hindrance.
Responsive space concept revolves around the capacity of having increased numbers
of satellites thereby achieving both redundancy as well as ubiquity i.e. being every-
where. Ubiquity is assured by making small and inexpensive satellites (nano and
micro sized), built within 10-30 months instead of expensive satellites with
construction time of 5-15 years. It implies that vulnerability is mitigated through
redundancy factor.239
Body Guard Satellites is also among most discussed concepts regarding defending the
satellites. Bodyguard satellites are equipped with active weapons and are stationed
next to a vital space asset that would, as the name implies, guard the critical space
assets against any attack.240
Space Systems’ Hardening is done to mitigate shock waves created by a conventional
or a nuclear explosion in space. Hardened satellites are not only for protection against
pellets laid in front of orbiting satellite, but also against laser fired on it to burn out its
circuits.
236
David C. Hardesty, ‗‗Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives‘‘
Naval War College Review, 58: 2, (Spring 2005): 45–46. 237
Lawrence Cooper, ―The Strategy of Responsive Space,‖ Astropolitics 1:3(2003): 56. Also See
Gleeson, ―Perspective on Space Operations,‖ 161. 238
Gleeson, ―Perspective on Space Operations,‖ 161. 239
Cooper, ―The Strategy of Responsive Space,‖ 44-47. 240
Spacy II, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Space-based Weapons,‖16.
81
Electronic protection is a must for a secured communication link from satellites to
terrestrial station. There are many counter measures against electronic signals;
however, few basic measures for ensuring an uninterrupted communication link from
satellites to terrestrial stations are discussed here. First, carrying out encryption of
data so that no interference is able to pierce through for generating fake data, second,
increasing the threshold of error protection coding for enhanced rejection capacity of
a system against false signals, third, use of directional antennas to look into a
particular direction so as to avoid malicious energy or signal reception from all round
directions – a measure against jamming threat to address a line of sight electronic
attack, fourth, strict exercise of emission control which implies emitting signals when
essentially needed only, and lastly encryption controls applied on satellites
themselves for deflecting any jamming activity.241
On-orbit servicing and maintenance is a key R&D area so as to carry out on-orbit
servicing, maintenance and thus enhance sustenance of an outer space asset. The
servicing job is to be performed by the robotic technology for an accurate servicing
without endangering astronauts‘ lives. On-orbit maintenance is a beneficial
technology to carry out damage repair besides increasing the probability of using a
particular satellite beyond its intended service life.242
2.9 An Analytical Debate about Probability of Space Weaponization
Debate about space weapons‘ increased probability took off when the famous US
‗Rumsfeld Commission Report‘243
was published on July 15, 1998 i.e. right after the
culmination of Cold War. The report warned the US decision makers that a ‗Space
Pearl Harbor‘ is in waiting, if it does not prepare to deny attacks on its highly
dependent space-based assets.244
The report also cited China Armed Forces for
241
West, ―Space Security Index: 2009,‖ 131. 242
Gerd Hirzinger et al., ―DLR‘s Robotics Technologies for On-Orbit Servicing,‖ Advanced Robotics
(2003): 150-152. Also see West et al., ―Space Security Index: 2008,‖ 171. 243
Donald Rumsfeld, ―Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States.‖ Pursuant to the Public Law 201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998,
https://fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm. 244
Donald Rumsfeld, ed., ―Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization,‖ Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, January 11, 2001, viii. Accessed Apr
15, 2017. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf.
82
preparing to defeat the US in high-tech and space-based future war.245
ASATs tests
carried out by Russia and China in response to the US stated policies indicates
towards balancing theory.246
A few other indicators which give a logical leap towards
space weaponization inevitability perception includes, the US stated policy
statements. Main leads are:
Threat of use of force in space, in case of deterrence failure.247
Resolve of using outer space for multi-layered and integrated missile
defenses.248
Claim of placing space-based component of its Missile Defense Systems.249
Since 1982, a resolution for the treaty titled ‗Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space‘ (PAROS) has been on agenda of Geneva based sole arms control and
disarmament negotiating body called Conference on Disarmament (CD).250
The
overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned about weaponization of
outer space that could lead to an unprecedented arms race in outer space. They also
insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race,
emphasizing that the treaty would not limit space access. However, no head way is
made in even discussing the contents of PAROS, primarily due to the US and other
like-minded states‘ opposition. Advanced space faring nations believes that a new
treaty would negatively impact its national security interests.251
245
Rumsfeld, ed., ―Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management,‖ 22. 246
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison- Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979), 102-128.Also see Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space,‖ 3. 247
US Department of Defense. Space Directive 3100.10. Washington DC: Department of Defense,
July 1999. The directive reads, ―Purposeful interference with US space systems will be viewed as an
infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures,
including, if directed by the National Command Authority, the use of force, to respond to such an
infringement on US rights.‖ 248
The US National Space Policy, August 2006. 249
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic
Environment,‖ NDU Journal 2011: 7. 250
Jozef Goldblat, ―Efforts to Control Arms in Outer Space,‖ Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, no. 1 (2003):
5. 251
Jeffrey Lewis, ―What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,‖
Center for Defense Information Washington, D.C., (2004): 11.
83
Even recently i.e. in 2016, the UNGA First Committee adopted draft resolution
A/71/448252
by a record vote of 178 to none, with 4 abstentions (South Sudan, Israel,
Palau and the US).253
This is a yearly practice that when as per the above quoted
UNGA Resolution, PAROS would appear on CD agenda, is vetoed by the US, as the
CD works on consensus rule.
Russia and China are supportive of starting negotiations on PAROS and have even
suggested a draft treaty in 2008 titled ‗Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space (PPWT)‘ as a fallback position to PAROS.254
PPWT asserted following:
―….not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of
weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place
such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat
or use of force against outer space objects; and not to assist or induce other
states, groups of states or international organizations to participate in
activities prohibited by this Treaty‖.255
PPWT also had the same fate as that of PAROS and despite many CD members‘
support could not find a head way due to the US objection. Denying negotiations on
preventing space weapons treaty speaks in favor of inevitability thesis.
Need for collateral damage avoidance and precision weapons have been the hallmark
of call for the RMA. Each medium i.e. air, sea and land have seen conflicts and space
is expected to be no different.256
Smart space weapons are being pursued, if not in
tangible terms, at least in R&D projects. To be more precise, RMA takes place in true
sense when innovative war fighting concepts are integrated with the new military
technologies and new organizations are formed to adapt the changes. Such an
initiative exponentially adds to the combat potential of the military forces.
Advancement in outer space assets have also been subjected to threats emanating
from the technological leap. The modern armies are capable of engaging the targets at
intercontinental distances using outer space as a medium. Thus space negation
252
United Nations Office of Disarmament affairs, ―The United Nations Year Book-2016,‖ Part I, Vol
41 (2016), 21. https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/en-yb-vol-41-2016-
part1.pdf. 253
UNGA Resolution A/71/448. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/448. 254
Goldblat, ―Efforts to Control Arms in Outer Space,‖ 6. 255
Article II of the 2008 Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and
of the threat OR Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) (CD/1839). 256
Michael Krepon, ―Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive Towards Anti-Satellite Weapons,‖ Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, May-June 2001: 1.
84
technologies are logical counter measures for maintenance of strategic stability and
environment.257
The US President Ronald Regan‘s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) surfaced on the
strategic horizon in 1983.258
SDI was aimed at having a state of the art ABM defense
system against Soviet nuclear tipped missiles. SDI was named alternatively as Star
Wars because of the fiction and preposterous intents to hit the bullet with the bullet in
outer space using different means including lasers. Reagan hoped to make nuclear
weapons obsolete or less effective by having effective missile defense of which few
components were supposed to space based.259
World correlated the SDI with a
famous American movie ―Star Wars‖ of early 1980s260
which had incredible concepts
inter-alia use of lasers by laser firing guns against each other‘s‘ outer space assets,
computer controlled projectiles being fired from electromagnetic guns in space and
firing of particle beams controlled by super computers.
The SDI was later abandoned for mainly three reasons, one, the heavy cost involved
in development of space-based weapons, secondly, it started questioning viability of
ABM Treaty and finally, fear of Soviets‘ reaction which could have been in terms of
preemptive nuclear strike.261
Despite the limitations, SDI kept bothering military
planners for development of space weapons262
especially after President George W.
Bush pulled out of ABM Treaty in 2002.
Termination of the ABM Treaty led to renovation of debate on space weaponization.
The US withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty in June 2002, which was once known
as ―cornerstone of strategic stability‖.263
The ABM Treaty helped in reaching on to
257
Harry K. Lesser, Jr., ―The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Effect on the Future Army,‖ Paper
Presented at US Naval War College (June 1994): 22-24. 258
Krepon, ―Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive Towards Anti-satellite Weapons,‖ 5. 259
Encyclopedia of Britannica. ―Strategic Defense Initiative.‖
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Strategic-Defense-Initiative . 260
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (1983), US State Department Archives. Accessed June 1,
2017.https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/104253.htm. 261
Radovan Vukadinović, ―Strategic defense initiative (SDI) Dilemmas,‖ World Futures: The Journal
of New Paradigm Research, 24:1-4 (2010): 89-91. 262
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable: Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space,‖ 510. 263
Pavel Podvig, ―Missile Defense and the Myth of Strategic Stability,‖ Paper circulated by the
Program on
Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) of the Georgia Institute of Technology, prepared for the
workshop on ―Stability Issues in a New Nuclear Order,‖(December 15-16, 2014): 1.
85
mutually agreed agreements related to nuclear arms reduction. The ABM Treaty was
critically influential during Cold War era, and has been successful in restraining the
two super powers i.e. the US and Russia from deploying missile defenses against
each other‘s ICBMs. The ABM Treaty also restricted the two leading space faring
nations from developing space-based components of the ABM systems. Ramification
of terminating the ABM Treaty was also voiced by the Chairman of 2002 NPT
Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) who anticipated a possible arms race in outer
space.264
It is a common perception that the 9/11 attacks prompted the US to get out of ABM
Treaty obligations, whereas in actuality, the US President Bush Junior had already
indicated his reservations about the Treaty much earlier in one of his talk at the US
National Defense University at Washington D.C. in May 2001. He stated:
―We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to
counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move
beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not
recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No
treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from
pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies
is in our interests or in the interests of world peace‖.265
The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was followed by George Bush articulated
National Space Policy (NSP) of 2006, yet another indicator of space weapons
inevitability. The Bush administration committed without mincing words that the US
has all the rights to ―develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of
action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries‖.266
Subject assertions made the headlines in global security calculus, which surmised that
the US has opened a way for outer space becoming a new conflict zone.
264
Chairman‘s Factual Statement, 2002 Preparatory Committee of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 18
April 2002. Accessed May 10, 2017.http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu///library/treaties/non-
proliferation-treaty/prepcom/trty_npt_prepcom_2002_chairman-sum_2002-04-18.htm. Also see Jaspal,
―Militarization and Weaponization of Space,‖ 6. 265
George W. Bush Remarks at the US National Defense University, May 1, 2001. Accessed June 2,
2017. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html. 266
US National Space Policy, 31 August 2006. Accessed May 20, 2017.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/
library/policy/national/us–space–policy_060831.pdf
86
Albeit, the US NSP 2010 by Obama Administration did stress the need for space arms
control; nevertheless, there was no clear cut commitment for abandoning the idea of
having space-based weapons. Rather, it also reiterated that the US shall, ―deter,
defend against, and defeat attacks from others in space‖, leaving an open ended
debate on having space weapons, albeit with a caveat of defensive purposes.267
Moreover, the 2006, 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) by Bush
administration,268
Obama administration269
and Trump administration respectively,
supported development of terrestrial and space-based capabilities for ‗global prompt
strike‘, BMD and real time accurate provision of early warning and intelligence for
nuclear command and control as a value added steps for enhanced deterrence. For
instance, the latest 2018 NPR states that:
―Space is no longer a sanctuary and orbital space is increasingly congested,
competitive, and contested. A number of countries, particularly China and
Russia, have developed the means to disrupt, disable, and destroy U.S. assets
in space. Because space is no longer an uncontested domain, U.S. NC3 space
systems need to be more survivable, defendable, and provide resilient
capabilities.‖270
Such policy objectives by the most advanced space faring State added to the space
weapons development concerns.
Albeit, there is no proper definition of space weapons, as already brought out above,
terrestrial based weapons capable of hitting a space-based asset is very much
considered to be a space weapon. ASAT weapon system test conducted by China in
2007, followed by a reactionary test by the US against one its dysfunctional spy
satellites in February 2008 (although not claimed by the US as an ASAT test) depicts
potential notion of space-based weaponization.271
267
Laura Delgado Lopez, "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space
Arms Control,‖ Astropolitics, No. 10 (2012): 50. 268
Lewis, ―What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,‖ 9. 269
The US Department of Defense, ―Nuclear Posture Review Report-2010,‖ 24 and 34. Accessed June
3,2017,
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Rep
ort. pdf. 270
Office of the US Secretary of Defense. ―Nuclear Posture Review,‖ February 2018,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-
FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 271
Peoples, ―The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,‖ 78.
87
There is a persistent global concern about dual-use nature of the space technology.
Accessibility of space technology with a face value of peaceful uses can easily be
diverted to military purposes. Currently there are thousands of satellites orbiting in
Earth orbits for commercial purposes; however, they can turn their backs any time
depending upon their owners‘ choice. The civilian purposed outer space assets could
act as sleeper cells for activation of space weapons capability. It gets further
complicated when there is no clear identification between what falls into space
weapon category and what not. The gap is feared to be exploited at critical time.272
2.10 Ramifications of Space Weaponization
Space weapons are likely to win combination of power, prestige and leverage
(influence) for their owners at international helm of affairs. World politics is power
oriented which automatically leads to prestige and provides leverage to act freely
without fear of consequences. Space weapons are believed to be instrumental in
winning and retaining initiative. Moreover, who so ever develops space-based
weapons would monopolies the technology expertise. Space-based weapons either
terrestrial or space-based provides an extended reach and acts as a most preliminary
line of defense.273
Like any other weapon system, space weapons can also be effectively used for
multifarious signaling. If a State conducts a test of space weapon in reaction to an
initiative by rival technologically advanced State, it could have two signals for the
initiator. One, you are not the only technologically advanced State but there are other
peers and secondly, the outer space domain is shared and not hegemonies.274
In other
words, it could be termed as an act of balance of power and restoration of stability.
Albeit, today‘s known characteristics of terrestrial based ASATs do not show that
they are capable of engaging nuclear command and control and early warning
satellites stationed in GEO; however, the same can be neutralized by space-based
offensive means. Any measure whether destructive or non-destructive would severely
272
Peoples, ―Assuming the Inevitable: Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space,‖ 502. 273
Deblois, ―The Advent of Space Weapons,‖ 35. 274
Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes, ‗China‘s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications‘,
Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2007): 40.
88
impact on the confidence of nuclear weapons States, thus destabilizing the strategic
environment and its related dynamics inter-alia deterrence. Resultant panic created
could lower the threshold, imbalance the deterrence equation and lead to a preemptive
strike.275
Developing, deploying and maintaining an outer space weapon is a cost prohibitive
affair vis-à-vis terrestrial based. Moreover, satellites are like sitting ducks276
in outer
space due to their known fixed speed and orbit and hence are extremely vulnerable to
hostile acts including engagement by a precision ASAT weapon. The situation may
warrant escalating the conflict.277
One of the major motivations for space weapon acquisition is to dominate the space
with the purpose of gaining space superiority so as to have an enabling outer space
environment in which one with the space weapons have the leverage278
of carrying
out space operations without any chance of interference. Sense of superiority being
enjoyed by a strong actor is a worst case scenario for weaker side. Having space
weapons, no doubt, provide position of strength and hence is subjected to all the odds
related to reactive maintenance of peace and stability-instability paradox. Space-
based weapons are all likely to pose dilemma of ‗use it or lose it‘.
Outer space is extensively entangled with the nuclear war-fighting strategies too. Any
development regarding outer space weapons shall have an immediate effect on
nuclear accidental use. For instance, if debris collide with an early warning or
command and control designated satellite in GEO, it may be perceived as an attack on
nuclear command and control mechanism and lead to an accidental or pre-emptive
use of nuclear weapons.279
Space weapons shall also be negatively impacting on arms control and disarmament
efforts. States even with no or less space capabilities shall not sit idle to the
developing situation of confronting space weapons. They would either initiate a new
275
Saunders and Lutes, ―China‘s ASAT Test,‖ 42. 276
Captain David C. Hardesty, ― Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and
Alternatives,‖ US Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 46. 277
Lewis, ―What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,‖ 12. 278
Anantatmula, ―U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space,‖ 149. 279
Glesson, ―Perspectives on Space Operations,‖ 160.
89
space program or accelerate their capacity building with focus on space weapons‘
acquisitioning. In other words, major space faring nations with more number of assets
shall have to lose more as compared to emerging one.280
Major space faring nations
may also change their postures from defensive to offensive or in other words from
restraint to aggressive attitudes. If it happens so, years of arms control efforts for risk
mitigation, strategic stability and crises management would go in vein.
Space weapons could also be a catalyst to further lack of trust; increased suspicion
and misperceptions even among the friendly States and might alienate them besides
antagonizing States at the periphery. Any State who decides to go ahead with the
space weapons‘ project has to critically analyze that whether such an adventure
contributes towards making more friends or take friends away.281
Ingress into outer space and especially attainment of space weapons capability speaks
of a State‘s technological excellence. Sense of being excellent infuses ego. Foregoing,
advanced space faring nations behave egoistically due to their geostrategic advantage
and access to the full spectrum space benefits. Egotism, by virtue of its qualities,
makes its recipient distrustful of others and self-centric. An egoistic actor shall only
cooperate with others when it is in its own interest and has relative motivation to do
so or in other words, inculcate a dismissive attitude towards cooperation and efforts
leading to stability.282
The above debate fully corresponds to the Indian attitude in South Asian region
where it assumes that acquisition of space weapons i.e. ASAT would add to its status
of great power by which it can hegemonies the region. India due to its access to
advanced technology including space technology has fallen prey to the egotism and is
dismissive to come on table to settle the long outstanding territorial issues.
In May 2017, India made an effort of space diplomacy by offering free services of its
giant satellite named ‗South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
280
Lewis, ―What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,‖ 12. 281
Karl P. Mueller, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate,‖ in Space
Weapons Are They Needed?, ed. John M. Logsdon et al. (Washington DC: The George Washington
University Press, 2003), 23. 282
Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens (New York:
Rutledge, 2017), 167.
90
Satellite‘, meant for disaster management, internet and communication purposes.
India offered the satellite‘s services to all SAARC countries; however, Pakistan
declined out-sourcing of its strategic needs that too to India.283
Initially, during the bi-
lateral negotiations, Pakistan did agree to join, if it was regionally controlled and not
the India only. The effort seems to be harmless, but it is an Indian effort to
technologically hegemonies the neighboring countries.
Pakistan foreign office spokesperson while explaining Pakistan‘s decision to remain
out of the Indian SAARC satellite project stated:
―As India was not willing to develop the project on a collaborative basis, it
was not possible for Pakistan to support it as a regional project under the
umbrella of SAARC….……Pakistan, which has its own space programme at
an advanced level, was ready to share its expertise and technological know-
how and was keen to participate in the project but India‘s solo flight caused
Pakistan to opt out of the project.‖284
As brought out earlier that the India which offered to have a SAARC satellite during
18th
SAARC Summit in 2014 at Kathmandu, however, later it was revealed that India
wanted to be sole leader with regard to satellite‘s development, launching and
operation less registering it with the International Telecommunication Unit (ITU). It
was not acceptable to Pakistan being disadvantageous to its evolving space
programme, which could have made the SAARC member countries dependent on
Indian space technology. Due to Pakistan‘s opposition to the SAARC titled satellite,
it was later renamed as South Asian satellite.285
2.11 Debris - Space Security Challenge for Long Term Sustainability
Outer space debris are the perpetual threat to costlier and heavily dependent space
assets. They are over 500,000 – 750,000 different sized debris orbiting around the
Earth.286
Firing an ASAT against a satellite or satellites‘ accidental collision in outer
283
―India launches South Asia Satellite GSAT-9: 5 things to know,‖ Hindustan Times, May 6, 2017.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-launches-south-asia-satellite-gsat-9-5-things-to-
know/story-8mu2wj2J1GBoz3BN2gSp2M.html 284
―FO Explains Why Pakistan Quit SAARC Satellite Project,‖ Dawn, May 06, 2017,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1331412. 285
Pallava Bagla, ―SAARC Satellite, PM Modi's Gift Pak Said No To, Set To Take Off: 10 Facts,‖
NDTV, April 30, 2017, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pak-out-but-pm-modis-gift-to-saarc-lifts-off-
next-week-10-facts-1687844. 286
Joseph N. Pelton ed. etal., Space Debris and Other Threats from Outer Space (Arlington: Springer,
2013), 4.
91
space would be catastrophic for the outer space environment due to the space debris
creation.287
The debris created no matter what size it has, behaves as an independent
meteor and start orbiting in Earth orbit with an unbelievable speed of around Mach 20
(10 times the speed of a bullet at those high altitudes)288
, posing existential threat to
satellites and manned outer space stations. The speed and its resultant momentum in
even smallest sized debris in milli and centimeters are enough to critically damage a
satellite,289
unless it is hardened.
Major space faring nations inter-alia the US with hundreds of space assets listed in
their ledger are concerned about the growing population of debris in outer space and
fear that if the use of space weapons would eventually make the outer space
environment untenable. This particular fear of losing more i.e. due to their own
created debris as a result of a space-based conflict, has kept technologically advanced
States at a bay from developing and sequentially using space weapons.
2.11.1 Political and Technical Efforts for Mitigating Space Debris
On the political side, major advanced faring States have started various initiatives to
ensure long term sustainability of outer space290
at multi-lateral levels inter-alia
United Nations. Initiatives are being followed with an objective of establishing
Technical Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) so as to arrive at an verifiable
arrangement for restricting developing, testing, proliferating and employing the space
weapons both terrestrial as well as space-based weapons.
The Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTSSA) Working Group is
an initiative under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the
UNCOPUOS to address debris issue. The LTSSA Working Group‘s goal is to
examine and propose measures to ensure the safe and sustainable use of outer space
for peaceful purpose and the benefit of all countries. It produces a consensus report
287
Jaspal, ―Militarization and Weaponization of Space,‖ 7. 288
Ashley Tellis and Michael Krepon, ―Another Wake up Call,‖ Space News, March 10,
2009.Accessed June 5, 2017. http://spacenews.com/oped-another-wake-call/. 289
Pelton ed. etal., Space Debris and Other Threats, 3. 290
The Secure World Foundation web site defines space sustainability as ―the ability of all humanity to
continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes and socioeconomic development over the long term.
Accessed May 30, 2017. https://swfound.org/our-focus/space-sustainability/.
92
outlining voluntary best practice guidelines for all space actors for voluntary adoption
in respective countries.291
On the technical side, space faring nations are carrying out vigorous R&D on viability
of multiple options for reducing the debris and increasing the SSA capacities for
taking timely evasive measures. There is a growing consensus among the stake
holders to de-orbit the debris for long term space sustainability. There are number of
proposals under research; however, none practically tested for being technically and
economically not viable. A few stake holders also consider developing debris de-
orbiting techniques as potential ‗space weapons‘.292
Few of the salient debris mitigation techniques under R&D phases are listed in
tabulated form (Table 2.2) as under:
Table 2.2
Debris Mitigating Techniques
Ser Technique/
Technology
Technique for
Debris
Mitigation
Current Status
of Research
Policy Concerns
1. Electro dynamic
debris
elimination
technology293
Earth‘s
magnetic field is
exploited for
propelling
debris using a
massive
structure of
around 1000
meters in length
Feasibility in
theoretical
qualification is
completed. Need
a practical
demonstration.
Expensive to build.
Could only be used
in LEO as the
magnetic field in
MEO and GEO are
not comparatively
strong for propulsion.
Need an international
monitoring system.
2. High-powered
ground-based
lasers
technology294
A collision
evasion
technique using
high powered
laser in gigawatt
magnitude and
thereby pushing
away the debris
into lower orbits
High powered
lasers tested in
labs but not
practically.
The high powered
laser producing
mechanism for debris
mitigation is feared
to be dual use i.e.
could also be used as
an ASAT weapon,
hence being resisted
at political level.
291
Pelton ed. etal., Space Debris and Other Threats, 32-33. 292
Ibid, 35. 293
Ibid, 35-36. 294
Ibid, 37.
93
Ser Technique/
Technology
Technique for
Debris
Mitigation
Current Status
of Research
Policy Concerns
and getting the
debris burnt out
in atmosphere.
3. Solar Sail
devices
technique for de-
orbiting debris295
The solar sails
would be
robotically
attached to the
big sized debris
which over a
period of time
push the debris
out in
atmosphere
using robotic
technology.
Only workable
in LEO and not
feasible for
MEO or GEO.
The technology
is still in
conceptual form
and need several
years to be
developed. A
costly affair as
each big sized
debris would
need a separate
solar sail panel.
The technology is not
associated to space
weapons fears;
however, stake
holders desire to
have an independent
organization for
exercising control
over solar sails,
whenever
commissioned.
4. Tether-deployed
nets
technology296
The technology
proposes to
deploy ―nets‖
against orbiting
small sized
debris and then
throw them out
in atmosphere.
Still in R&D
phase to develop
such strong nets.
The technology is not
associated to space
weapons fears;
however, stake
holders desire to
have an independent
organization for
exercising control
over the technology,
whenever
commissioned.
5. Space mist
technology297
The space mist
producing
satellites would
be used to
deploy frozen
gas mist for
bringing small
orbiting debris
down.
Albeit, well
defined concept;
however, needs
operational
testing. A cost
effective option.
The technology is not
associated to space
weapons fears;
however, stake
holders desire to
have an independent
organization for
exercising control
over the technology,
whenever
295
Ibid, 38. 296
Ibid, 38-39. 297
Ibid, 39.
94
Ser Technique/
Technology
Technique for
Debris
Mitigation
Current Status
of Research
Policy Concerns
commissioned.
6. Robotic systems
technology298
As per this proto
type technology,
robots would
clamp on to
debris and then
throw them out
of the orbit for
burning out in
space.
The cost of
robots varies
from high to low
depending upon
the size of debris
to be mitigated.
Considered to be a
kind of ASAT
weapon; however,
stake holders desire
to have an
independent
organization for
exercising control
over these
technologies
Source: Joseph N. Pelton ed. etal., Space Debris and Other Threats from Outer
Space, 35-39.
To conclude, space weaponization is a viable concept. Space weapons are delayed in
their discourse for multiple political reasons. Space is an altogether new domain and
reactions by an adversary State‘s space weapon deployment could be catastrophic.
Technologically advanced States are conceptually and politically clear that space
weapons would be a reality. The international system lacks trust and is full of
misperceptions. The study; however, found that like nuclear weapons, space weapons
may not be used for obvious reasons; yet, space weapons could be beneficial for
deterring potential adversaries from committing any hostile act against space-based
assets. In sequel, next wanting query was about type and nature of probable space
weapons.
It was ascertained from the literature and interviews conducted with related scholars
including Mr. Michael Krepon, Dr. Nicolai Sokov, Dr Jeffrey Knopf that outer space-
based weapons i.e. satellites or space stations borne weapons may not be the desired
form of space weapons due to political, engineering and financial limitations;
298
Ibid, 30-31.
95
however, terrestrial based ASAT weapon systems would be the most probable choice,
capable of killing space-based assets by using either lasers or KEWs.299
Notwithstanding, that the US and other advanced space faring nations are fully aware
of implications, development of outer space-based weapons cannot be ruled out. For
instance, US FY (Fiscal Year) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act encouraged
its Department of Defense―…to examine the feasibility of defeating ballistic missile
threats with a new generation of space-based missile defense capabilities‖.300
The
assertion is however debatable. The US despite having the capacity for developing and
deploying outer space-based non-nuclear weapons did not do so since 1980s i.e. since
US SDI initiative. Moreover, the US Congress also did not exhibit any inclination
towards deploying space-based ABMs (that could be alternatively used as ASATs –
intent matters)301
neither in terms of budget nor legislative.302
Nevertheless, States need
to remain proactive to prevent its actualization either by political and diplomatic
efforts or technological controls.
In the subsequent chapter, an effort is made to dilate upon the legal side of space
weaponization probability, identification of legal gaps to be exploited by space
weapons aspirants and the way forward to restrain aspirants from developing space
weapons.
299
Interview conducted with Mr. Michael Krepon (Stimson Centre, Washington DC) and Dr. Nicolai
Sokov (Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey California) on 22 and 25 June 2017
respectively. 300
Also see Section 183of ―National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,‖ 114 Congress
Conference Report (Washington: US Government Publishing Office, 2016), 1598, accessed November
10, 2017, http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20161128/CRPT-114HRPT-S2943.pdf. 301
Michael Krepon, ―Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Anti-satellite Weapons,‖ Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May - Jun 2001): 4. 302
Steven A. Hildreth, ―Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Issues,‖ CRS Insight (February 21,
2017), accessed November 01, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/IN10655.pdf.
96
CHAPTER – 3
Governing Outer Space: A legalistic Approach
For governing and regulating activities of a body in a given environment; laws and
rules are the ultimate requirement, so as the international space law for outer space
governance. With the increase in number of assets and resultant strategic interests,
international space laws and regulations are necessary. Purposes of the space laws
include, inter-alia, protection of human being from economic, cultural and strategic
threats, maintenance of peace and order, managing Earth Orbits, frequency allocations
and most importantly verifications of the States‘ space related undertakings, etc.303
Space is open to all on equality criterion for exploration. Naturally as per the realist
paradigm, the stronger spacefaring States have been venturing to accrue maximum
advantages by manipulating the international space law.
The space law, which in fact is an international law, is accumulation of set of
international and national rules and regulations for regulating and governing activities
in and related to outer space,304
while space policy which is also interchangeably used
along with space laws consists of those policies and strategies which a State keeps
upfront respecting its military and commercial usage of the outer space as well as
managing civilian space program.305
Detailed discussion on international space law is carried out in this chapter, which
assists in understanding the behavior of the states, thereby ensuring stability in outer
space domain. After a critical appraisal of the evolution of a space law and its
consonance with the international law, an endeavor is made to identify the legal gaps
and challenges in existing space law.
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate that before the space law is thread beard, it is
pertinent to have an insight of the modern International Law‘s evolution of which the
space law is an extension.
303
Ram Jakhu, ―Capacity Building in Space Law and Space Policy,‖ Space Research, No. 44 (2009):
1052. 304
Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Laws and Policy (New York: Springer, 2013), viii. 305
Ibid, ix.
97
3.1 Evolution of Modern International and Space Law
Modern international law and the space law have commonality of terms including the
right of self-defense, common heritage of mankind, perseverance of environment,
amenity to non-combatants inter-alia commercial satellites, attribution and above all
the sovereignty. Each of these basic terms shall be viewed from their evolutionary
perspective in subsequent sections.
International law has transformed a lot since the Grotius work (On the law of war and
peace, 1625), who is believed to be the father of modern international law.306
As per
the legal dictionary, contemporary international law is defined as:307
―It is the body of law that governs the legal relations between or among
States or nations. To qualify as a subject under the traditional definition of
international law, a State has to be sovereign having a territory, a population,
a government, and the ability to engage in diplomatic or foreign relations.
The international law also expands its jurisdiction on intergovernmental
international organizations and even individuals.‖
Many basics of modern international law are inferred from Grotius beliefs, inter-alia,
right of self-defense which he thought to be just under two circumstances i.e.
imminence and certainty of attack. Same thought is translated in the United Nations
(UN) charter as its Article 51 and Daniel Webster‘s stance of ‗imminent threat
criteria‘308
for right of self-defense.
Grotius believed that shared moral understandings and common or natural law based
on human instincts could avoid wars and deaths to non-combatants. He is also taken as
reference for current humanitarian law as Grotius identified in his book De Jure Belli
that parties who wage war should respect humanity309
by looking after the non-
306
Miller, Jon, "Hugo Grotius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition),
accessed January 30, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/grotius/. 307
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. S.v. "international law.", accessed February 2,
2017, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/international+law. 308
Anthony Clark Arend, ―International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,‖ The
Washington Quarterly (Spring 2003): 91. 309
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace Translated by A. C. Campbell (Ontario: Kitchener,
2001), 336.
98
combatants (those who are not fighting), captured combatants, property and above all
the environment.310
Similarly, death to non-combatants could be related to the commercial satellites on
which our daily lives are dependent. The issue has a dilemma kind of situation as it
does not matter that commercial satellites be pardoned from direct attack, but the
dilemma is related to their sustainability from indirect threats emanating from the
debris created in case of direct attack against the military purposed satellites and other
military objective platforms.
Inception of nation-States and the introduction of processes inter-alia globalization,
multi-tiered trade, global travelling, global banking system, extensive inter-continent
travels and communication infrastructures across the globe had tremendous impact on
development of the international law to its current status. However, the international
law despite its maturity in appearance remains in its infancy as for as its viability is
concerned. This is predicated on the assumptions of the sovereignty of nation-States
and notion of equality between sovereign States.311
Nevertheless, international law is all encompassing. It governs diverse inter-State
activities besides vast variety of multi-faceted issues inter-alia ―war to peace and from
terrestrial to outer space domains‖.312
3.2 Sources of the International Law and its Relevance to the Space Law
Looking for a source for an international law is about looking at a particular
precedence for addressing an issue or matter. At national level, the sources for
domestic law include legislations passed by the law making parliaments and the
constitution.313
Outer space being a relatively new area of strategic interests has
variety of sources emanating from international and domestic laws of advanced
310
Aldo Zammit Borda, ―Introduction to International Humanitarian Law,‖ Commonwealth Law
Bulletin, 34:4: 744. DOI: 10.1080/03050710802521523. 311
Geoffrey Damton, ―Information Warfare and the Laws of War,‖ in Cyberwar, Netwar and the
Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Edward Halpin et al. (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 139. 312
A.G. Koroma, ―The Development of International Law and the Peaceful Uses for Outer Space,‖ 3rd
Nandasiri Jasentuliyana Keynote Lecture on Space Law (2011), accessed July 1, 2017,
http://www.iislweb.org/publications.html. 313
Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited A,
2009), 31.
99
spacefaring nations. Space law is in fact fine blend of international and domestic
laws.314
As per the Article 38 (1) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, the sources
of international law comprises of primarily international conventions (treaties),
international custom being a general practice and accepted as a law over a period of
time, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and the previous
judicial decisions besides recognized teachings of the highly qualified publicists of the
various nations.315
To contemplate the basic rules and norms in outer space, it would
be better to have an insight of the international law and its co-relevance with outer
space issues.
International conventions are identified with different terms inter-alia treaties,
agreements, covenants and protocols etc. Formal legally binding treaties are the
product of bargaining process in which parties during multiple interactive sessions try
to converge on mutually acceptable positions to set a standard State behavior for
‗formal restraints‘.316
The treaties could be at different levels i.e. multilateral, bilateral,
regional and international. Memorandum of Understanding; however, does not fall
under jurisdiction of international law. Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of
Treaties stipulates procedures governing any treaty. An important point to consider as
per the Law of Treaties is that a treaty once entered into force is binding on only the
state parties and not the third parties without their nod; however, it shall have its
binding role on these third parties too as ‗rules‘ of the customary international law. It
implies that any space related treaty or convention entered into force should have a
loose binding under the rules of customary law. It is because of this reason that States
are more interested in having informal Codes of Conduct instead of legally binding
treaties.
Second important source of the international law is about customs, which by virtue of
their frequency of uniform practice and history is recognized as a law. The rules
314
Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 31-32. 315
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Accessed June 15, 2017.
http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute#CHAPTER_II 316
Michael Martindale, ―Evaluating State Willingness to Pursue Space Weapons,‖ Defense & Security
Analysis, 31:2 (2015): 114.
100
established under international customary law have binding value for all states.
Customary law is tricky in its outlook. Onus of proving a customary law‘s existence
lies on the claiming state which should have evidences of its uniform practice for
considerable period of time and is widely accepted as a law or norm.317
For instance,
to analyze the extent of space militarization, the researcher is bound to find out the
frequency and history of uniform practices and activities of spacefaring nations in
outer space. ICJ plays a constructive role in this regard for averting misuse of
customary practices which ensures that states practicing a customary norm does it with
a an understanding of legal obligation and not for the political reasons.
Third recognized source of international law is the ‗general principles of law‘. These
sources are referred to only in absence of conventions or the international customary
law. Such principles are easy to comprehend and application.318
For instance, the
principle of compensation which manifests that any sort of loss or injury to a person
has to be addressed through redressing the grievances or compensation. In outer space,
it is the responsibility of the owner state to ensure that its space-based assets do not
damage others‘ assets, otherwise shall be liable to compensation. However, existential
threat posed by those debris which are created by ASAT weapons‘ tests and the
procedures for debris damage compensation remains a wanting issue.
The fourth source of the international law is termed as ‗subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law‘. Article 38 (1) of the ICJ identifies only two such means
which includes teachings (writings) of the highly qualified international law
scholars and previous judicial decisions at international and national tribunals, in
case their rulings pertains to the international law.319
It is pertinent to mention that the space activities are governed mostly by the
international treaties, foremost by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 rather than solely by
the teachings of the law scholars or for that matter customary law. However, by no
317
Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 43. 318
Ibid43-51. 319
Robert Beckman and Dagmar Butte, ―Introduction to International Law‖ Lecture Notes by
International Law Students Association Accessed July 19, 2017,
https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/intlawintro.pdf.
101
means it implies that the customary law or the teachings do not matter for regulating
space activities.
3.3 Domestic Laws and their Bearing on Outer Space Issues
The preceding discussion reveals that space law is combination of both international
and domestic law. Domestic law; however, refers to only those states which are
advanced spacefaring and space-active.320
Domestic law has three main requirements,
first, establishment of new structures and operating procedures for implementing
domestic law in support of space issues, second, methodology of applying domestic
laws to space issues and finally, incorporation and subsequent implementation of
international treaties, agreements and conventions inter-alia of those which has UN
backing within a state legal system. Since the outer space is relatively new and
evolving domain, it merits innovative adaptation of the already held space laws
besides new ideas to adjust to the evolving situations. It implies that the domestic
law‘s established rights, responsibilities and remedies are subjected to re-analysis for
renewed interpretation and formulation of new concepts based on bi-lateral
agreements, dispute resolution mechanisms, new legislations and emergent
practices.321
Incorporation of international treaties in respective domestic law differs from state to
state. However, a state can‘t ignore an international obligation by hedging behind its
constitution. For instance, Article II of the US Constitution obligates the consent of the
US Senate for ratifying an international treaty or convention and when it is ratified that
automatically becomes part of the US domestic law.322
On the contrary, in UK, the
domestic law absorbs an international treaty only after a legislative process, even the
treaty has been ratified already.323
3.4 Outer Space Governance Issues in International Law Perspective
International law recognizes states, international organizations and the nationalities of
individuals and companies as the entities which enjoy rights and corresponding
320
Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 31-34. 321
Ibid, 32-33. 322
Ibid, 35-36. 323
Ibid, 35-36.
102
obligations under its provisions. It may be noted that the individuals do not form part
of legal entity, but under the concept of nationality. Similarly, companies, ships,
aircrafts and orbiting outer space assets are considered under the concept of nationality
i.e. the state where these are registered. Any violation by these entities shall be the
liability of states to respond or compensate. If a ship, for instance, registered in state A
is damaged by state B, state A can claim the losses on behalf of that ship. The practice
in international law connotation is recognized as ‗diplomatic protection‘. The outer
space assets are also under privilege of diplomatic protection. Satellites are
presumably sovereign entities in outer space and hence any attack against them in a
common heritage environment shall be liable to reaction by the owner. The issue of
identity and jurisdiction are inter-woven.
Jurisdiction of the international law implies the power of a sovereign state to exercise
its jurisdiction based on the territorial principle i.e. within its claimed and recognized
territory; albeit, states also claim their jurisdiction on their nationals even outside their
territory under the principle of nationality. On the flip side, the principle of sovereign
equality of states gives immunity to the official representatives as well as flag carriers
including (war) ships and aircrafts from jurisdiction of another state. In case of outer
space domain, it implies that space assets including satellites and space stations
bearing flags have sovereign immunity and hence cannot be subjected to an intrusion.
Earth orbits are free from sovereign claims as the international law categorically
mentions that a nation‘s territorial sovereignty does not extend up to earth‘s orbits,
hence, all nations in the comity can have objection-free overflights of their satellites
over the other nations through outer space domain. The Outer Space Treaty also
mentions that ―…….all nations are free to use and explore outer space, no nation may
appropriate any part of outer space ……‖324
Outer space assets thus have respective jurisdiction under sovereignty principle and
any mischief against their physical security or interfering with their functions could be
liable to punitive actions by the beholder states. Jurisdiction and identity in an
324
See text of Article II of the OST.
103
environment which has no ownership and is regarded as common heritage of mankind
form yet another concern for spacefaring nations.
The international law amply covers the principles and rights on no man‘s land
including outer space, high and deep seas and the Antarctica. With respect to the high
seas, international law has clear principles which profess that no state has sovereignty
neither shall exert, over the high seas. All states have the rights to enjoy freedoms of
the seas, inter-alia, over flights, laying cables, pipelines, navigation, research projects
and the military activities including testing of weapons and different operational
exercises of navies. Similarly, the activities (peaceful) in deep sea bed i.e. area beyond
the national jurisdiction of a coastal state is regulated by the principle of common
heritage of mankind, which is regulated by the sole authority of the International Sea
Bed Authority (ISBA).
Based on the same principle of the common heritage of mankind, outer space is also
being governed; lest, it is weaponized or made use of against its‘ basic principle i.e.
common heritage. It is interesting to note that the outer space is governed by the
similar principles as those of high seas. Outer space is also denied sovereignty claims
by any state and is to be used only for the peaceful purposes to the benefit of humans.
However, the states can exercise their jurisdiction on the space crafts which carry their
flag and registration. The space-based assets over a period of time have become a
necessary tool for our day to day life. Any threat or use of force against these assets
can jeopardize domestic, commercial as well as military needs; hence, invokes concept
of right of self-defense.
John C. Cooper was among the first US Law Professors, who pressed for the right of
self-defense in outer space. He, in his writing The Rule of Law in Outer Space
quoted325
1804 ruling given by the US Chief Justice Marshall in the famous case of
Church v. Hubbart on right of self-defense. Chief Justice said in his verdict that:
325
John C. Cooper, ―The Rule of Law in Outer Space,‖ American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 47,
No. 1 (January 1961): 26.
104
―The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and
exclusive…..But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be
exercised beyond the limits of its territory."326
While firming his stance on the requirement of self-defense or self-protection in outer
space, Cooper also referred to the explanation made by the US Secretary of State
Daniel Webster in a letter to Lord Ashburton, special British representative to
Washington in 1837, while defending destruction of Caroline Ship (Caroline Case), in
which he actually operationalized the necessity of self-defense. The Secretary claimed
in his statement that:
―The right of self-defense becomes more justified and necessary outside
national territory when the threat is instant, over whelming, and leaving no
choice of means and no moment of deliberation.‖327
Cooper argued that threat looming large from outer space meets all above stated
requirements and hence, there is a need to have right of self-defense in the outer space,
whenever rules for the self-defense is being debated in outer space context.328
Yet another US scholar Anthony Clark Arend, while explaining UK forces‘ act of
destroying US owned ship Caroline in Niagara River on the US side identified two
criteria for exercising self-defense, i.e. necessity and proportionality.329
Right of self-defense is categorically stipulated in the mother space treaty i.e. Outer
Space Treaty (OST), which indirectly links the notion of self-defense with the
international activities in the outer space. The OST authorizes that each outer space
activity must fulfill the requirements of the international law, including the UN
Charter. The UN Charter as per its Section 51clearly identifies the inalienable right of
self-defense.
3.5 Absence of Norms in Managing Outer Space Sustainability
The viable and effective outer space regulatory regimes and norms are equally
instrumental at international and national levels for managing space affairs besides
326
Official Text of Church V. Hubbart Case, U.S. Supreme Court, (1804), accessed June 30, 2017,
https://casetext.com/case/church-v-hubbart. 327
See Foot Note 18 quoted in, Michel Bourbonniere, ―National-Security Law in Outer Space: The
Interface of Exploration and Security, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 70 (2005): 8, accessed
July 21, 2017, http://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol70/iss1/2. 328
Cooper, ―The Rule of Law in Outer Space,‖ 27. 329
Arend, ―International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,‖ 91.
105
avoiding chaos and competition among states.330
Having listed the building blocks of
outer space laws, one can find out that the space norms particularly in reference to its
Long Term Sustainability (LTS) are visibly lacking. The OST of 1967 has establish
norm pertaining to the non-placement of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
outer space or on celestial bodies; however, since at that time space was not subjected
to much of traffic, hence, could not encompass the problems likely to arise in 50 years
ahead and beyond. Today, outer space is confronted with terrific issues of debris,
interferences and traffic management without any concrete norms to manage them.331
Norms are extremely important for laying down states‘ behavior trajectory and point
out towards any diversions with regard to their implementation. The norms could be in
the shape of formal legally binding treaties and conventions as well as non-binding
voluntary and less formal instruments, for instance codes of conduct, mutually decided
by the stakeholders.332
Even the codes of conduct, if not translated into formal legally
binding treaties, are encouraged as fallback position because the same can form part of
the international law as customary law333
and practically also, such non-legally
binding instruments are taken seriously due to the political pressures, hence should be
formulated for the sake of saving time.334
Presently, there are two main approaches being followed at political and diplomatic
levels. One, Chinese and Russian proposed Treaty on Prevention of Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) under the CD agenda item of Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and secondly, the European Union (EU) led initiative
of having an outer space ICoC. Most of the advanced spacefaring nations believe that
PPWT is a narrow aimed treaty which might take years to be negotiated. While on the
other hand, since space is getting congested and need norms for adherence, there is an
330
Jakhu, ―Capacity Building in Space Law,‖ 1051. 331
Michael Krepon, ―Norm-Setting for Outer Space,‖ Arms Control Wonk, September 9, 2014,
accessed June 12, 2017, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404264/norm-setting-for-outer-
space/. 332
Lotta Viikari, ―Time is of the Essence: Making Space Law More Effective,‖ Space Policy, No.21
(2005): 1. 333
Krepon, ―Norm-Setting for Outer Space‖. 334
Viikari, ―Time is of the Essence: Making Space Law,‖ 3.
106
immediate need to establish norms through the platform offered by the EU led
ICoC.335
Moscow and Beijing are often blamed for the delay in getting the ICoC effective. The
two outliers are very important actors in space management being the leading one after
the US. Their withdrawn attitude is detrimental to space LTS. It is perceived that both
the states desire to perfect their ABM capabilities in the garb of their advanced staged
and well researched ASAT programs.336
However, it could be termed as the Western
point of view, while the Russians and Chinese sides prefer to have security first and
other cosmetics later.337
Protracted negotiations process involving states‘ interests and scientific uncertainty (in
case of outer space) are the two main reasons for the failure in negotiating new treaties
as well as ineffectiveness of existing treaties, thus space norms are not all-inclusive.
Besides the slackness in establishing norms for the outer space, there is yet a severe
limitation attached to the space oriented norms. It is related to dynamic space domain,
which is continuously been explored, and hence the likely states‘ behavior.338
For
instance the Moon Treaty of 1979 took almost 15 years to enter into force.339
More the
space is explored and reach enhanced, for instance, reaching on to Mars, needs more
elaborated norms for regulating state‘s behavior. Space norms are a must for
predicting behaviors and could only come up with international cooperation coupled
with mutual trust and common interests.340
3.6 Building Blocks of Space Legal Frame Work Stressing Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space
There have been a number of UN initiatives in the shape of resolutions or treaties
(proposed and accepted both) that paved the way for establishing outer space related
legal framework that set the norms for peaceful uses of the outer space. The legal
335
Interview conducted with Mr Michael Krepon, Co-Founder the Stimson Center, Washington DC via
electronic mail on June 12, 2017. 336
Krepon, ―Norm-Setting for Outer Space‖. 337
Ibid. 338
Viikari, ―Time is of the Essence: Making Space Law,‖ 2. 339
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1363 United
Nations Treaty Series, 3. 340
Viikari, ―Time is of the Essence: Making Space Law,‖ 4.
107
journey to the affect started right after 1957 Soviet Union‘s launching of Sputnik-I
satellite. The Table 3.1 undertakes detailed account of relevant treaties and UN
resolutions, which could be regarded as building blocks of outer space legal
framework.
Table 3.1
Building Blocks of Space Legal Frame Work Stressing Peaceful Uses of Space
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
1. 14 Nov 1957/
UNGA/
UNGA Resolution
1148 (XII)341
Organize a ‗joint study‘ by
the US and Soviet experts to
suggest a verifiable
inspection system to ensure
that the outer space assets
sent to space shall be
exclusively for peaceful and
scientific purposes.
The most initial initiative by
the UN to ensure that outer
space is used for peaceful
purposes only.
The subject UNGA Resolution
was adopted after the failure of
the US-Soviet bilateral talks on
keeping the outer space
exclusively for peaceful
purposes342 after the Soviets‘
launching of the Sputnik on
October 4, 1957.
2. 13 Dec 1958/
UNGA/
UNGA
Resolution 1348
(XIII)343
Specifically affirmed that the
outer space shall be
exclusively dedicated for the
peaceful purposes.
Suggested establishing an
Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
Ad Hoc Committee was an
initiative to institutionalize the
cooperation for peaceful uses.
The Ad Hoc Committee was
proposed with an objective of
encouraging the ‗fullest
international cooperation‘ in
the peaceful uses of outer
space.
3. 12 Dec 1959/
UNGA/
UNGA Resolution
1472 (XIV)344
Establishment of
UNCOPUOS.
To set a stage for avoiding
the extension of rivalries into
outer space.
Identify the area(s) of
international cooperation,
and study practical and
feasible means for giving
UNCOPUOS later became the
most influential UN body for
addressing space law issues.
The Committee has five outer
space related treaties and five
outer space ‗principles‘ to its
credit since its inception.
341
Text of the UNGA Resolution 1148 (XII), accessed July 1, 2017, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/119/31/IMG/NR011931.pdf?OpenElement. 342
Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival,‖ 452-453. 343
Text of UNGA Resolution 1348 (XIII), accessed July 1, 2017, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/747/92/IMG/NR074792.pdf?OpenElement. 344
Text of UNGA Resolution 1472 (XIV), accessed July 1, 2017, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/142/95/IMG/NR014295.pdf?OpenElement.
108
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
effect to programs in the
peaceful uses of outer space
which could appropriately be
undertaken under UN
auspices.
4. 20 Dec 1961/
UNGA/ UNGA
Resolution 1721
(XVI)345
Setting of following two
principles for use of outer
space:
International law, including
the Chapter of the UN,
applies to outer space and
celestial bodies;
Outer space and celestial
bodies are free for
exploration and use by all
states in conformity with
international law and are not
subject to national
appropriation.
The UNGA Resolution 1721
can be regarded as one of the
most influential deterrence
initiative346 from legal
perspective against space
weaponization (albeit, there is
no specific mentioning of
space weaponization in the
Resolution) under the UNGA
auspices which recognized that
the International Law and UN
Charter applies to the states‘
outer space activities inter-alia
use of force for self-defense
etc.
5. 13 Dec 1963/
UNGA/
UNGA Resolution
1962 (XVIII)347
―Declaration of
Legal Principles
Governing the
Activities of
States in the
Exploration and
Use of Outer
Space‖.
Identification and declaration of
legal principles for governing
outer space activities. The legal
principles included following
aspects:
Space exploration be for
benefit and interest of all
mankind.
Outer space and celestial
bodies are free for
exploration on equality basis
as per the international law.
Outer space and celestial
bodies are not subject to
national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty.
States‘ activities in outer
space be undertaken in in
accordance with
international law, including
The subject Resolution was a
sequel to above narrated
UNGA Resolution 1721
(XVI). The principles
identified by the UNCOPUOS
are regarded as the most
influential legal base for the
currently enforced outer space
treaties as well as for the future
negotiated treaties related to
outer space activities‘
regulations.
The subject UNGA Resolution
in its preamble part also
recognized and stressed the
need for exploring outer space
for peaceful purposes which
are aligned with the common
interests of the mankind.
345
Text of the UNGA Resolution1721 (XVI), accessed July 2, 2017,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/resolutions/res_16_1721.html. 346
Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival,‖ 453. 347
Text of UNGA Resolution 1962 (XVIII), accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.un-
documents.net/a18r1962.htm.
109
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
the UN Statute.
Promotion of international
cooperation and mutual
assistance.
States are liable for any
activity carried out in outer
space including of the
private organizations.
States shall have jurisdiction
on its space launched object.
Liability clause for
compensation against the
damage caused by an outer
space object.
Astronauts‘ personal safety
and security assurance.
6. 17 Oct1963/
UNGA/ UNGA
Resolution 1884
(XVIII) ―Question
of general and
complete
disarmament‖
The Resolution called upon all
states to:
Refrain from placing
nuclear weapons or
WMDs in Earth orbits, or
on celestial bodies.
Refrain from participating
in any way or encouraging
in above mentioned acts.
The subject Resolution was the
most initial step towards
negotiating the OST.
7. 1963/ Eighteen
Nation
Disarmament
Committee (UN
Body)/ The
Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT)348
To ban the nuclear weapon
testing or explosion in outer
space environment for the
obvious environmental damage.
Opened for signatures on
August 5, 1963 and entered
into force on October 10, 1963
First ever multi-lateral Treaty
which specifically mentioned
Outer Space in its text.
Still in force, however is
stalemated with regard to
including ‗underground‘
testing since 1991 due to the
US resistance.
Currently, the Treaty has 108
signatories, 98 ratifications i.e.
State Parties while 23 states
have acceded but not ratified
it.
8. 1967/ UNGA/
Treaty on
Principles
Governing the
Outer Space cooperation in
exploration.
Banning nuclear and WMDs
in Outer Space.
Opened for signature on 27
January 1967 and entered into
force on 10 October 1967
Regarded a Mother Outer
348
See LTBT Text, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm.
110
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
Activities of
States in the
Exploration and
Use of Outer
Space including
the Moon and
Other Celestial
Bodies (OST)
Space Treaty, Outer Space
Statute and foundation stone
for all future international
space laws and treaties/
conventions.349
OST was a sequel to the
principles identified in UNGA
Resolutions 1884, 1721 and
1962.
Gave birth to other four Outer
Space Legal Treaties i.e. OST,
Registration Convention,
Liability Convention,
Astronaut Rescue and Moon
Agreements.
Restricted in its approach, as
does not cover conventional
weapons in outer space.
An extension of LTBT scope
which added banning
placement of WMDs in outer
space besides nuclear
weapons.
9. 1968/ UNGA/
Agreement on the
Rescue of
Astronauts, the
Return of
Astronauts and the
Return of Objects
Launched into
Outer Space
To ensure safe rescue of
Astronauts and space-crafts
which have an unintended
landing due to emergency,
accident or distress.350
Opened for signature on 22
April 1968 and entered into
force on 3 December 1968.
Agreement‘s preamble
specifically points out about
promoting international co-
operation in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer
space.
The Agreement is an endeavor
of granting immunity to an
astronaut in case of an
emergency unindenting
landing anywhere including
seas and geographic
jurisdictions of other states.
The Agreement obligates states
to cooperate in safe rescue of
Astronaut and space-crafts and
return to their owning States.
349
Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival,‖ 455. 350
See text of Rescue Agreement, accessed July 1, 2017,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/rescueagreement.html.
111
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
10. 1972/
UNGA/Conven
tion on
International
Liability for
Damage
Caused by
Space Objects
(Liability
Convention)
Political commitment for
undertaking liability to pay
compensation for damage
caused by a space launch on
Earth, to an aircraft and
assets in outer space.
Elaboration of compensation
procedures under various
political/ technical situations.
Opened for signature on 29
March 1972 and entered into
force on 1 September 1972.
The negotiations on subject
convention were spread over
10 years (1963-1972) and
were led by the UNCOPUOS
Legal subcommittee.
It is an extension of the
Article VII of the OST
which touched upon the
liability issue.
An indirect warning/
deterrence was initiated
through this Convention
against a deliberate attempt
of causing damage to an
outer space object.
Article VI of the Convention
commits ‗NO
EXONERATION ‗in
liability, if the launching was
not in consonance with the
international law and UN
Statute351
and the damage
was due to malafide intent.
11. 1974/ UNGA/
Convention on
Registration of
Objects Launched
into Outer Space
To identify the identification
of outer space assets
including satellites so as to
facilitate the liability
compensation by assured
attribution.
Opened for signature on 14
January 1975 and entered into
force on 15 September 1976
Besides attribution for liability
compensation through space
monitoring and tracking
facilities, the Convention also
indirectly contributes towards
peace in outer space by
deterring states from initiating
hostile acts from a registered
outer space objects.
Moreover, the registration
convention refrained even
major spacefaring nations from
launching those outer space
assets which had the potential
351
Article VI - Exoneration from absolute liability (Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, UN), accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.lewik.org/term/13516/article-vi-
exoneration-from-absolute-liability-convention-on-international-liability-for-damage-caused-by-space-
objects-un/.
112
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
to be used in offensive mode
or carry weapons as well as
outer space mines.
12. 1979/ UNGA/
Agreement
Governing the
Activities of
States on the
Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies
(Moon
Agreement)
Prohibition of placement of
nuclear or WMD on Moon
surface or the moon orbit.
Prohibited use or threat of
use of force on moon or from
moon.
Opened for signature on 18
December 1979 and entered
into force on 11 July 1984.
Poorly ratified agreement.
Opened for signature in
December 1979 and entered
into force in July 1984. It has
11 signatories and 17 parties.352
Considered to be a failed space
agreement from international
law perspective.
Main Reasons for its non-
acceptance include:353
Intrusiveness due to sharing of
exploration details etc. (Article
VI & V).
Denying ownership to private
entities of any extraterrestrial
asset until the entity has
governmental or international
ownership (Article XI).
Proposal of an international
legal regime to regulate Moon
exploration Article 11).
Sharing of explored Moon
resources including titanium,
transfer of technology in
material terms as well as
intellectual property with
developing states (article VI).
Out of P-5 States only, France
has signed it but not ratified
whereas, the US, Russia, UK
and the China have neither
signed it nor ratified it.
Pakistan had ratified it in 1986
whereas India is just a
352
Legal Status of the Moon Agreement can be viewed at UNOOSA web site, accessed June 28, 2017,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-
2&chapter=24&clang=_en. 353
Michael Listner, ―The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?,‖ The
Space Review, October 24, 2011, accessed June 2, 2017,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1.
113
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
signatory.
The negotiations on subject
convention were spread over
almost 9 years (1970-1979)
and were led by the
UNCOPUOS Legal
subcommittee.
Considered to be an
elaboration of the OST with
specific focus on Moon, which
in those days was the only
planet on which man had
landed.
Moon was accepted to be used
only for peaceful purposes
(Article III of the Agreement).
However the US and Russia
have been and still are tangent
to the understanding of term
‗peaceful‘.
13. 2008354
& 2014355
/
CD/ Draft Treaty
on the Prevention
of the Placement
of Weapons in
Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of
Force against
Outer Space
Objects (PPWT)
Negotiating a legally binding
treaty to preempt placement
of all kinds of weapons in
outer space for ensuring
global strategic stability i.e.
security for all.356
The UNGA on December 2,
2014, adopted with a vote of
126 in favor, 4 against and 46
abstentions, Resolution 69/32
entitled ‗No first placement of
weapons in space. However in
CD, PPWT was rejected by the
US.
Could not make any headway
in the CD.
The US has following
objections to it:357
The draft treaty does not
354
See Text of CD/ 1839, accessed July 20, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/cd/documents-related-to-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-
outer-space/ 355
See Text of CD/ 1925, accessed July 20, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/cd/documents-related-to-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-
outer-space/ 356
Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ―The 2014 PPWT: a new Draft but with the
Same and Different Problems,‖ The Space Review, August 11, 2014, accessed July 20, 2017,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1. 357
See Text of CD/ 1847, accessed July 20, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/cd/documents-related-to-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-
outer-space/. Also see Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ―The 2014 PPWT: a new
Draft but with the Same and Different Problems,‖ The Space Review, August 11, 2014, accessed July
20, 2017, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1.
114
Ser Year / Forum/
Treaty or UNGA
Resolution
Objective(s) Status
address terrestrial based
ASATs, laser weapons or co-
orbital-weapons.
Non-mentioning of threat
posed by space debris created
by the ASAT tests.
Nothing is mentioned about
dual use technologies, for
instance what if a state
captures an active satellite of
opponent state in the garb of
removing space debris from
space.
Definition of ‗outer space
objects‘ does not
commensurate with the
definition of the same already
acknowledged by the Rescue
Agreement and the Liability
Convention.
Difficult to verify the states‘
actions in Space.
3.7 Cardinal for Administering Space Policy and Law
Space laws are markedly different from ordinary laws applicable in other fields. For
instance, the OST obligates states to bear international responsibility for their national
level space activities whether undertaken by the public or private sectors.358
Hence the
private sector has to be in consonance with the state space policy. It includes the
damage compensation by the state whose flag is carried by that space asset which
caused damage to other state‘s asset in space.359
It stipulates that there has to be a state
controlled Space organization which can be referred to for any damage
reimbursements, etc.360
Space policies and laws are two sides of the same coin as the
358
Article VI of the 1967 OST Treaty stipulates that ― States Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities…. non-governmental entities…..‖ 359
Article VII of the 1967 OST asserts that ―Each State Party to the Treaty…is internationally liable
for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space,…‖. 360
Jakhu, ―Capacity Building in Space Law,‖1053.
115
most practiced policy becomes the law.361
Following are the cardinals while
administering space policy and law.362
The UN through UNCOPUOS has the lead and pivotal role in preparing outer
space laws, to be adopted voluntarily by the states in their domestic space
laws.
Second, the outer space is free to be explored by all sovereigns without
discrimination; however, without sovereign claims on any of the celestial
body.
Third, space activities do not belong to public sector only but also include
private and inter-governmental organizations. However, as brought out earlier,
state would be the sole responsible entity for any misconduct or accident
liabilities etc.
Fourth, outer space activities must remain in consonance with the fundamental
principles of the international law as stipulated in Article III of the OST.
Fifth, alternate to the legally binding space norms could be the soft laws in
form of Codes of Conduct to be adopted at inter-governmental or non-
governmental organizations levels so as to address the legal gaps for exerting
moral and political pressures on outliers.
Sixth, space has to be sustainable for times to come; however, increased
military utilization of satellites makes them a potential targets which could
cause debris – a permanent threat to outer space assets. The issue has to be
addressed by more transparency, technical CBMs and cooperation besides
enacting of hard and soft laws.
Seventh, space policies are reflection of states‘ perspectives towards various
issues at national and global level; hence, have to be carefully crafted for
transparency regarding strategic space interests, approaches to meet them and
deterrence purposes, if desired.
361
Ibid, 1051. 362
Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Laws, 85-87.
116
3.8 Challenges and Gaps in the Outer Space Legal Frame Work
The challenges and gaps in the outer space legal framework are twofold. One,
monopolization efforts, led by advanced spacefaring nations and secondly, the gaps
inherited from open ended and vague language used in space regulatory regimes and
treaties including the OST. In reality, powerful nations define the international law
according to their own interests. Law, as a concept, is all about ‗rights‘ and resultant
‗duties‘ i.e. responsibilities. However, in reality, interest based divergences are
observed, when it comes to the application.
Space weaponization probability remains on card of pessimists when they observe the
mix kind of response by the major spacefaring nations on the only two legally binding
outer space related treaties i.e. the OST and the Moon Treaty. Moon Treaty more
specifically had the worse response in its ratification numbers i.e. only 17 ratifications
while none of the P-5 states ratified. The only concern of major spacefaring nations is
the restriction imposed on testing, basing and military maneuvers on the Moon and
other celestial bodies.363
3.8.1 Leading Space Powers’ Monopoly
In conduct of legal international relations, bilateral level of relationship is kept at
forefront. Bilateral level of asymmetries between the two actors determines the
translation of international law, which holds good for the space laws. There could be
four different behavioral scenarios with regard to bilateral relations in overall
perspective of international space law i.e. ‗right or claim‘, a ‗privilege or liberty‘, a
‗power‘ or an ‗immunity‘. From offensive realist perspective, the stronger actor which
aims to hegemonies the region by different strategies inter-alia modernization of its
military capabilities tries to match ‗right‘ with ‗no right‘, ‗privilege‘ with ‗duty‘,
‗power‘ with ‗disability‘, and ‗immunity‘ with ‗liability‘ vis-à-vis the weaker side.364
363
Alan Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space: The Need to Protect Space Assets,‖ Astropolitics, 10;3 (2012):
260. 364
Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 31-32. Also see Hohfeld, Wesley N., "Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," Yale Law Journal, Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper
4378(1917): 716-718, accessed June 11, 2017, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4378.
117
The US is the most advanced spacefaring nation and has been enjoying the sole super
power status since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is totally against putting a check
in form of a legal treaty banning the ASATs or for that matter arms control in outer
space. When the China tested its ASAT in 2007, the US was very calculative in its
response and intentionally did not protest on the test but only complained that the test
was against the US-China space related cooperation. The US State Department
responded to the Chinese ASAT test as:
―We do not think there is an arms race in space. The United States believes
that the existing body of existing international agreements including the
Outer Space Treaty, as well as the liability and respective compensation
conventions provide the appropriate legal regime for space.‖365
The US State Department spokesperson further added:
―….the (US) space policy clearly states that the United States will oppose the
development of (any) new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to
prohibit or limit U.S. access to, or use of, space and that no change in that
policy is warranted. Arms control is not a viable solution for space. For
example, there is no agreement on how to define space weapon. Without a
definition you are left with loopholes and meaningless limitations that
endanger national security. No arms control is better than bad arms
control.‖366
Hence, the US led likeminded European states did not let the outer space law to get
refined and deliberate. The US views that any new legal outer space treaty would limit
its freedom of action in a totally new domain on which it is heavily dependent. It is
because of this reason that despite tremendous concerns about space debris no legal
―Space Preservation Treaty‖ could see the day light.367
3.8.2 Gaps in the Outer Space Legal Frame Work to Preempt Space
Weaponization
Need for an effective and viable regulatory regime i.e. space law was on high priority
list of the strategic planners even before the start of formal space era; however, it was
365
―Who Wants An Anti-ASAT Treaty?‖ Space Law Probe, accessed July 2, 2017,
http://spacelawprobe.blogspot.com/2007/01/who-wants-anti-asat-treaty.html. 366
Jeremy Singer and Colin Clark, ―China‘s Anti-Satellite Test Widely Criticized, U.S. Says No New
Treaties Needed,‖ Space News, January 19, 2007, accessed July 3, 2017, https://www.space.com/3370-
chinas-anti-satellite-test-widely-criticized-treaties-needed.html. 367
―Pies in the Sky,‖, Hindustan Times, January 23, 2007, accessed July 2, 2017,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/pies-in-the-sky/story-gxmoht5qaYN39dlP9zwhWO.html
118
intensified after launch of Soviet‘s Sputnik in 1957.368
A concerted effort was made
which resulted into listing of famous five principles by the UNGA. The US was with
upfront concern about outer space‘s probable use for launching attacks against its
mainland.
While the US was concerned about mainland security and wanted to build resistance
against offensive use of outer space, it was equally conscious of keeping the initiative
and leverage for developing its own outer space offensive capabilities. It never wanted
to put a check on development of offensive capabilities for meeting its strategic
interests. Thus, the formulations of all future space regulatory treaties were
deliberately kept vague and open ended which could be interpreted as per the best-
suited objectives and interests.369
First and foremost is the issue regarding interpretation of the terminology, ‗peaceful
purposes.‘ The OST of 1967 commonly perceived to be the constitution of outer space
and foundation of space law was left open ended in respect of defining the term
‗peaceful purposes‘. The OST is considered to be legalistic foundation for keeping the
outer space restricted to peaceful uses and providing an overall framework for
developing outer space law in times to come. The OST has completed its fifty years of
life. It has not been violated till the writing of these lines, however, experts fear that
things may change for which the OST has to be either equipped further with teeth or
process of negotiating new standalone space treaties may be initiated.370
Despite the OST‘s respectable legalistic stature, its critiques blame it for being open
ended and accuse the advanced spacefaring nations mainly the US and the Soviets for
keeping the outer space susceptible to weaponization by using their relative advanced
stage expertise, political influence, diplomatic mileage and the halfhearted interest
368
Linda Billings, ―How Shall We Live in Space? Culture, Law and Ethics in Spacefaring Society,‖
Space Policy 22 (2006): 249-250. 369
Pizl Dunay , ―The Military Use of Outer Space: Implications for International Law,‖ in Military
Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC Weapons, Military Use of Nuclear Energy
and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law, ed. Hans GiinterBrauch (New York:
Library of Congress, 1989), 478, accessed July 1, 2017, doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1. 370
Jill Stuart, ―The Outer Space Treaty Has Been Successful So Far, But is it Fit For the Modern
Age?,‖ The Wire, January 01, 2017, accessed July 2, 2017, https://thewire.in/104087/outer-space-
treaty-fit-for-modern-age/.
119
displayed by the developing states during negotiations, who thought the outer space to
be a costly affair to explore and develop.
The critical review of the OST reveals that term ‗peaceful purpose‘ is used eight times
throughout the text of the treaty. But not even a single time it is categorically defined
or explained as to what it is implied.371
Legal experts interpret the term in space
weaponization‘s favor as it allows an actor to have space weapons either in space or
terrestrial based for the purpose of deterrence so as to refrain an adversary from
initiating a hostile act against outer space assets which have an almost ‗indispensable
status‘ for smooth running of daily domestic life. Legal experts inter-alia Ogunsola O.
Ogunbanwo assimilate ‗peaceful purposes‘ in two connotations, first, non-military
purposes and secondly, non-aggressive purposes.372
Notwithstanding, major western powers including the US feel no appetite for the
former connotation i.e. non-military purposes and instead believe in later suited
connotation of non-aggressive purposes. They view that military uses of outer space
are good till the time they are not aggressive in nature.373
They also believe that if the
peaceful purposes meant the non-military uses, than the clause 2 of the Article IV of
the OST becomes invalid which allows military personnel for carrying out R&D.
Nevertheless, majority of the states support ‗non-military‘ approach instead of ‗non-
aggressive‘.374
Article IV of the OST is the most exploited section of the treaty with
regard to the issue of space weaponization. It reads:
―States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner‖.
371
Dunay, ―The Military Use of Outer Space,‖ 472. 372
Ogunsola O. Ogunbanwo, International Law and Outer Space Activities (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975), 28. Also see P. K. Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival,‖ in
Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC Weapons, Military Use of
Nuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law, ed. Hans Giinter Brauch
(New York: Library of Congress, 1989), 450-51, doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1. 373
Dunay, ―The Military Use of Outer Space,‖ 473-474. Also see Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer
Space for Human Survival,‖ 452. 374
D. Goedhuis, ―An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty on Outer Space of 27 January
1967,‖ Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 15 (1968): 25, doi. 10.1017/S0165070X00022920,
Published online: 21 May 2009.
120
Albeit, it champions keeping celestial bodies free of nuclear and Weapons of Mass
Destruction without mentioning chemical and biological weapons; however, remains
completely silent to address the probability of placing weapons on Earth orbiting
satellites and most importantly completely overlooks the probability of having
conventional explosive based weapon systems in outer space.375
Moreover, there is no
mentioning of BMD systems and the ASATs neither as space weapons nor as WMD,
which makes them free of any restrictions.376
Reason could be that none of them fall
into category of human casualty intensive weapon system but they do figure out in
terms of massive depletion of outer space as an environment by creating debris as a
result of adversaries‘ outer space assets‘ destruction.
The OST also does not cover the accepted definition of space-weapon. Different
understandings prevail in strategic calculus about exact categorization of space
weapons. Regan‘s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) indicated outer space-based
weapons as the space weapons; however, contemporarily, debate about space weapons
qualification has been focused on terrestrial based ASATs. Outer space-based weapons
on satellite beds have been abandoned and even the US, the most advanced
spacefaring state, has shelved them for political, security, arms race initiation,
financial and diplomatic limitations. Terrestrial based ASATs; however, have been
tested and perfected by the Chinese, Russians and the US sides. For all practical
reasons, ASATs are the contemporary space weapons. Till-to date, there is no legal
restraint on developing ASAT capability including previously negotiated space related
treaties. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 has been under criticism mainly by the recent
ASAT weapons development.377
Notwithstanding there are initiatives in-hand at the
UNOOSA to curtail ASAT probable use against outer space-based assets for LTS of
outer space.
The space worriers, who align themselves with the pure non-military uses of outer
space remain suspicious and argue that if non-military purpose was the implied
meaning of peaceful purpose as indicated in the OST, it would have been categorical
375
Dunay, ―The Military Use of Outer Space,‖ 472. 376
Ibid, 476. 377
Ibid, 484.
121
as was in case of Antarctica Treaty378
and the IAEA Statute.379
Both of these
documents categorically mentioned ‗non-military‘ objectives i.e. by prohibiting using
Antarctica land and sharing of nuclear technology provided under IAEA rubrics
respectively for any sort of military purposes. Same is not the case with language used
in the OST, indeed which was left to the imagination of its interpreters. The gap has
continuously been exploited by major world powers that are extensively engaged in
carrying out R&D regarding space weapons inter-alia ASATs and BMDs.
After the OST negotiations, it took another 12 years to arrive at Moon Agreement in
1979. The agreement even fell short of identifying the connotation of term ‗peaceful‘
as well as ignoring complete spectrum of other kinds of weapons and reiterated OST
lines of banning nuclear weapons and the WMDs in Moon Orbit.380
The critiques pointed out that military personnel involved in R&D are not hedged but
open and can easily be ascertained about their motives whereas on the contrary, non-
aggressive acts do carry hidden intents381
leading to misperceptions and security
concerns among the competitors.
Besides the direct physical threat i.e. employing weapons against the space-based
assets, there is yet another evolving threat i.e. of debris. There is no legal treaty or
initiative to address the debris concerns which are created by the use of ASATs for
instance debris created as a result of 2007 Chinese ASAT test followed by a counter
test by the US in 2008. The two tests had created hundreds of debris which pose
continuous threat to the outer space assets. Even the Liability Convention, does not
cover it and any damage caused by these debris cannot be claimed as the Article I of
the Liability Convention does not identify the debris as space objects.382
It stipulates
378
See Article I of the Antarctica Treaty, accessed June 30, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm. 379
See Article II of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, accessed June 30, 2017,
https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-2. 380
Menon, ―Arms Limitation in Outer Space for Human Survival,‖ 459. 381
Dunay, ―The Military Use of Outer Space,‖ 475. 382
Frans G. von der Dunk, ―The 1972 Liability Convention: Enhancing Adherence and Effective
Application,‖ Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications (March
998): 368.
122
space object definition that ―space object includes component parts of a space object
as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.‖383
There is yet another legal gap in the space legal framework. It is about increased space
privatization trend wherein states engage private entities to launch public sector outer
space assets. All existing space treaties identify the states as the main actors who are
answerable to international community. What if some private agency is used as a
proxy for vested interests to cause damage to opponent‘s space assets. Liability
convention is silent on it.384
Hence, the legal gaps identified in the preceding
paragraphs need to be addressed on priority so that to deter developing, testing and use
of ASATs against space-based assets.
3.9 Contemporary Non-Legally Binding Approaches towards Addressing the
Outer Space Legal Framework Gaps
The outer space is a relatively new domain in which the major spacefaring nations
especially the US seek to avoid any check on its evolving technological capabilities.
For the last almost 35 years, states have depended on nonbinding arrangements for
governing outer space activities and cooperation, the practice has not gone unnoticed
and there is an increased zeal to have binding treaties to coordinate outer space
activities. The US and Russia/ China are at tangent to their approaches in the realm of
establishing outer space legal framework as the former is strongly against having a
legally binding treaty banning the space weaponization whereas the former two sides
are in favor of having one.
In the absence of any political move towards negotiating legally binding treaty which
could restrain space arms race, there have been a number of non-binding political
initiatives to address the challenge and are believed to be compromised positions to be
treated as gap fillers. In 2008, China and Russia jointly proposed PPWT at the CD;
however, the US out rightly rejected it on the plea that it would be difficult to execute
383
See Text of Liability Convention, accessed June 2, 2017,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/liability-convention.html. 384
Dunk, ―The 1972 Liability Convention,‖ 372-373.
123
and verify the states‘ actions. Instead the US proposed to have Space Technical
Confidence Building Measure (TCBMs) for building trust and mutual confidence.385
3.9.1 Space Technical Confidence Building Measure (TCBMs)
The efforts, those started in 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to arrive at
a common position regarding outer space related Technical Confidence Building
Measures (TCBMs) took two years to find headway under the agenda item of PAROS
and in 2010, UN First Committee proposed to undertake a detailed study on outer
space TCBMs. UNGA adopted resolution A/RES/65/68386
which formed a Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on geographical representation basis which having
worked extensively from 2012-13, suggested proposed TCBMs in 2013.387
The TCBMs included: ―information exchange on space policies, information exchange
and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, contact
and visits to space launch sites and facilities, international cooperation, consultative
mechanisms, outreach, and coordination‖.388
Subject TCBMs are prevalent which
proved to be helpful in enhancing trust and transparency thus, ensured peace in outer
space activities besides cooperation.
3.9.2 International Code of Conduct
The EU led International Code of Conduct (ICoC) came out in public in 2008 and after
the deliberation of nearly four years, the EU formally presented it to the international
community at a multilateral meeting held in June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. By
introducing the draft ICoC, the EU presented best practices based voluntary ‗rules of
the road’, which offered a pragmatic approach to achieving, and strengthening,
adherence to norms of behavior in outer space.
The ICoC is believed to be a fallback position after the negotiations on Russia-China
co-sponsored PPWT could not make headway. It seeks to achieve enhanced safety,
385
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 260. 386
Text of the UNGA Resolution A/RES/65/68, accessed July 2, 2017, http://undocs.org/A/RES/65/68. 387
UNGA Resolution No. A/68/189 on Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, http://undocs.org/A/68/189. 388
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,‖ accessed June 2, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/outerspace/.
124
security, and sustainability in space on voluntary basis.389
It emphasizes that space
activities should involve a high degree of care, due diligence, and transparency, with
the aim of building confidence among space actors worldwide thereby avoiding
aggressive acts in outer space environment.
The EU proposed ICoC was criticized by a few spacefaring nations. China and Russia
viewed the ICoC as an impediment to any future possibility of negotiating legally
binding outer space treaty preventing the weaponization. Moreover, reference to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was not acceptable by the non-signatories of
CTBT. States also resisted it being an initiative outside the UN auspices.
Notwithstanding, the arms controllers and legal experts view the ICoC with favorable
note as something is better than nothing in the contemporary political system.390
Notwithstanding the above, once the LTS guidelines, ICoC and the TCBMs have a
wider acceptability, they definitely add to the strength of the international space laws.
Albeit, these are informal arrangements and do not enjoy the legal weight as the
treaties and conventions do; however, has political and moral pressures inherent in
them. Space Weapons‘ aspirant states despite legal leverages would be under political
obligations from initiating an aggressive act in outer space.
States‘ dismissive approach towards further strengthening international space law
sufficiently speaks of the study‘s baseline argument that real politik based
international system is dominating the international relations. Advanced spacefaring
nations are concerned of their primacy sustainability while the developing states are
looking for their survival.
3.9.3 Long Term Sustainability (LTS) of Outer Space
Crowding of the outer space due to its increased uses and corresponding users
including the military users insisted for a need to have some centralized arrangement
for addressing the issue of keeping outer space arena sustainable for times to come.
The spacefaring nations after having identified the UNCOPUOS led outer space debris
389
Steinberg, ―Weapons in Space,‖ 261. 390
Interview conducted with Mr Michael Krepon, Co-Founder the Stimson Center, Washington DC via
electronic mail on June 12, 2017.
125
mitigation guidelines, took a step further in 2007 and supported inclusion of agenda
point of LTS‘ in UNCOPUOS mandate which was formalized in 2009.391
As a sequel, a Working Group of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee was
formed. It was tasked to prepare LTS guidelines to be suggested to the states, private
entities, NGOs and international organizations for voluntary adoption. The overall
framework in which the LTS Working Group was to perform included equitable
access to outer space activities, resources and benefits to all parties.
For more précised and focused work, the LTS Working Group distributed its tasks to
four expert groups to address the various aspects of the sustainability issue. The expert
groups included; sustainable space utilization supporting sustainable development on
Earth, space debris, space operations and tools to support collaborative space
situational awareness, space weather and lastly, regulatory regimes and guidance for
actors in the space arena.
The four expert groups formulated 24 different guidelines in their respective areas and
in June 2016, the Legal Committee of UNCOPUS shared a working paper. Based on
the working paper, the LTS guidelines392
are being further elaborated and shall be
presented to the UNGA for adoption in 2018.393
It took eight long years from proposal of forming a LTS Working Group in 2009 to
suggested set of guidelines. Reasons for the delay in identifying LTS Guidelines
include inter-alia multiple interpretations of terminologies related to outer space.
Moreover, the advanced spacefaring nations worry that the guidelines might limit
freedom of action while emerging spacefaring nations fear that the guidelines might
391
Gérard Brachet, ―The Origins of the ―Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities‖ Initiative
at UNCOPUOS,‖ The Space Policy 28 (2012): 161. 392
Text of the ―Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities,‖ Working paper by
the Chair of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,
A/AC.105/2017/CRP.26 (June 14, 2017), accessed July 2, 2017,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/long-term-sustainability-of-outer-space-activities.html. 393
―United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs‖ Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space
Activities, accessed July 2, 2017, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/long-term-
sustainability-of-outer-space-activities.html.
126
block their access into outer space.394
The LTS guidelines‘ final draft is yet to be
tabled and time would only tell about its fate.
3.10 Roles and Achievements of International Institutions in International
Space Law Making
There are a number of institutions under the auspices of the United Nations those
remain engaged in formulating elements of international space law. Among them, the
foremost is the CD which was formalized in 1979 and is regarded as the sole
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Before attaining the title of CD in 1979, it
was called as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68),395
which
had the credit of negotiating Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963 – the first ever
multi-lateral Treaty which specifically mentioned Outer Space in its text.
Since its inception, the CD has considered a number of anti-space weapons proposals
under its agenda item of ―Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)‖. The
CD proposals under this agenda item included Russia- China jointly proposed space
arms prevention treaty i.e. PPWT and prohibiting the use of anti-satellite weapons,396
which still await consensus to start deliberations. Currently, CD is stalemated rather
failed with regard to outer space related treaties397
and in near future no major
breakthrough is expected.
The UNCOPUOS is regarded as most successful UN committee which has five outer
space related treaties and five outer space ‗principles‘ to its credit. The Committee was
founded in 1959. It is responsible for monitoring and implementing the five outer
space treaties. It has two subsidiary committees i.e. the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. UNCOPUOS is answerable to UN Fourth
Committee, which shapes up and annual UNGA resolutions regarding space affairs
394
Brachet, ―The origins of the Long-term Sustainability,‖162-165. 395
―An Introduction to the Conference,‖ accessed June 2, 2017,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?Op
enDocument. 396
―United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,‖ accessed June 2, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/outerspace/. 397
Kai-Uwe Schrogl, ―Space Law and Diplomacy,‖ Nandasiri Jasentuliyana Keynote Lecture at the
International Astronautical Congress, International Institute of Space Law (December 13, 2016):4,
accessed July 1, 2017, http://iislweb.org/2016-nandasiri-jasentuliyana-keynote-lecture-on-space-law/.
1-14
127
including inter states‘ cooperation peaceful uses of outer space. The Fourth UN
Committee, titled also as ―Special Political and Decolonization Committee‖ is
responsible to handle various subjects inter-alia, the outer space.398
The UNODA, albeit, not extensively involved with the outer space disarmament
strongly believes in keeping the outer space free of weapons of all sorts. From 1990-
1993, UNODA performed as secretariat of the UN GGE on TCBMs in outer space
activities.399
Outer Space merits legally binding international space law to regulate spacefaring
states‘ actions so as to ensure that space remains a common heritage of mankind and is
not used for extending hard power potential i.e. initiation of an arms race in outer
space. As per offensive realism approach of keeping the initiative in one‘s hand,
legally binding treaties/ laws are being rejected by the US and likeminded states at the
consensus based CD at Geneva. Lest it becomes too late, it‘s better to have at least
Code of Conduct so as to build moral and political pressures to preempt space
weaponization. Although, Codes can‘t be a substitute to multi-lateral legal treaties,
inter-alia PPWT, yet something is better than nothing. In following chapter, space
policies of major spacefaring nations shall be dilated upon in detail so as to ascertain
probability of space weaponization.
To conclude, it would not be wrong to admit that space legal framework has many
open-ended issues, which could provide an encouragement for the advanced
spacefaring nations to initiate an arms race in outer space in case their national security
and strategic interests are put to threat. The present OST – mother space treaty- needs
either adjustments or clarifications or else an altogether new outer space treaty is
needed to checkmate any space weaponization related initiative.
398
―Special Political and Decolonization,‖ accessed June 2, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/. 399
―United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,‖ accessed June 2, 2017,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/outerspace/.
128
CHAPTER 4
Leading Space Faring Nations Quest for Space Weaponization
The outer space has been in view of the leading spacefaring nations for augmenting
their security arrangements. However, till to-date they have not placed weapons in
outer space but only developed and tested the terrestrial based weapons that could
reach space domain and threaten the security of space based assets. The non-
development of space based weapons is due to the fear of opening a new domain for
war and initiation of an unprecedented arms race in space that could pose a kind of
perpetual threat to the most dependent space based assets. Notwithstanding, tacitly,
all the leading space faring nations have been signaling about their capacity of
developing the space weapons whenever the need arises. On the face of diplomacy,
these nations have been negating their intents of developing space weapons but there
are tangible indicators of research and development in this regard.
The following discussion is detailed view of leading space faring nations‘ aspiration
about having space weapons on their armed forces‘ inventory is deliberated. While
pursuing the suite, empirical evidences have been critically analyzed so as to
substantiate or negate the probability of space weapons quest by great powers besides
identifying their respective motivations for space weapons.
4.1 Space Weaponization and Global Powers
In order to preempt the probability of placing weapons in outer space there is a need
to have an all-encompassing legal framework which is lacking at the moment. The
discussion in the chapter 3 confirms that currently only the Outer Space Treaty (OST)
prevents the placement of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons in
outer space as well as on the celestial bodies. Though, none of the space faring or
space aspiring states have deployed weapons in outer space; yet, the US, Russian
Federation and China did test their terrestrial based ASAT capacity to destroy or
incapacitate outer space assets. Moreover none of the informal or formal space related
regimes have been on same page with regard to definition of space weapons.
The increased dependence of the space faring states on outer space applications has
also its corresponding vulnerability factor attached to it. None of the sovereign space
129
faring nation would let fiddling with its outer space asset that could have strategic
effect on its power potential as well as economy. In addition, none of the state claims
to weaponize the space to avoid political criticism as well as fear of initiating a
spiraling arms race in outer space. The US, which is the leading space faring state,
does not desire to enter into any legal valued initiative or regime that could impinge
upon its much celebrated advanced space technology. The US peer competitors i.e.
China and Russian Federation view the US reluctance with skepticism and are on
trajectory of equalizing the asymmetry vis-à-vis US.
In international relations literature, policy and objectives are interchangeably used.
Policy can be defined as, ‗the declared objectives that a government or party seeks to
achieve and preserve in the interest of national community‘.400
It would not be an
exaggeration to claim that the outer space has eventually become a useful medium
and its related applications are a viable tool to affect competitors‘ behavior, thereby
adding yet another dimension to contemporary competitive world politics.401
Over a period of time, outer space, due to technological advancements, increased
military interests and spiraling dependence of commercial and domestic activities, has
attained a pivotal role in shaping and exercising international relations. For instance,
activities to address transnational challenges inter-alia mitigating menace of terrorism
through Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), verification of treaties negotiated to
control lethal weapons, preempting proliferation of sensitive technologies and
forewarning climatic catastrophes are heavily dependent on outer space assets mainly
the satellites.402
States‘ outer space potential depends on possession of multiple components that are
necessary to attain the aforementioned capacities and objectives. These elements
include, for instance, first, hardcore physical infrastructures including satellites,
sensors, launch vehicles, command and control centers; second, human resource, for
instance, technological expertise, scientific curiosity and national resolve with regard
400
―Policy,‖ Business Dictionary, accessed July 27, 2017, http://www.businessdictionary.com/
definition/policy.html. 401
Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The search for Security and
Developmenton the Final Frontier (New York: Routledge, 2013), 21. 402
Fabio Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Laws and Policy (New York: Springer, 2013), 61-62.
130
to building infrastructures stipulated above; third, political leadership‘s motivation
and dedication to have outer space domination; fourth, strong and resilient economy
to support high costs involved in perfecting the outer space technologies and lastly,
the geographical location of the state to have a friction free space launching in terms
of absorbing falling down boosters used during initial stages of their launching.403
The more is the sustained and reliable availability of these elements; the easier would
be their route to attaining outer space expertise for meeting ultimate strategic
objective of space domination and security.
The fact of outer space being extensively used for states‘ security and projection of
influence cannot be denied. In fact, there are four main schools of thoughts which are
often referred while studying the outer space from security perspective. First school
belongs to the idea of space being a sanctuary.404
It implies that the space would
purely be used for ‗peaceful purposes‘; however, it does not restrict using it in a ‗non-
aggressive‘ way for ensured security. The non-aggressive approach holds an inbuilt
aggressive tilt in itself in the form of pre-emption or preventive strikes, when felt
threatened. The subject school prevailed throughout the Cold War era that ensured the
strategic stability and deterrence by a muted understanding that each other‘s
communication, early warning and navigation satellites shall not be touched and there
wouldn‘t be deployment of space-based weapons.
The second school of thought pivots around ‗high ground‘ context that supports
developing full spectrum space war-fighting capabilities that could dominate the
terrestrial based strategic operations.405
Third school concerns about survivability of
outer space assets being too essential for the military as well as domestic uses.406
Lastly, the control school of thought, which professes to have an effective control of
space so as to ensure survivability of own space assets, uninterrupted flow of strategic
403
Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 73. 404
Maximilian Betmann, ―A Counter Space Awakening: Assessing the Recent Shift in US National
Security Space Strategy,‖ The Space Review, May 22, 2017, accessed January 2, 2018,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3247/1. Also see Michael P. Gleason, ―European Union Space
Initiatives: The Political Will for Increasing European Space Power,‖ Astropolitics: The International
Journal of Space Politics & Policy, 4:1 (2006): 13-15. 405
Ibid. 406
Ibid.
131
information while at the same time denying the same to the enemy.407
If a nation‘s
space weaponization intent has to be judged, these four schools of thought provide a
useful basis to support the argument of space getting weaponized.
The advanced space faring states use the outer space power potential for not only
swaying the competitor‘s outer space policies but other national policies as well. The
objective is attained through increasing opponents‘ dependency on own space
program besides making individual or collective efforts i.e. through export control
cartels including MTCR, in order to block symmetric outer space capacity
development or by dispiriting opponent‘s aspiration for competitiveness in outer
space technology.
Importantly, in an anarchic international system wherein the national security has the
pivotal place in making national policies, importance of outer space applications has
increased manifolds. Space faring nations‘ developing potential of utilizing outer
space for defense and intelligence purposes besides commercial one is graded as vital
for national security objectives for extended timeframe in future. Foregoing, in order
to ascertain the probability of space weaponization and its subsequent nexus with
BMD in subsequent part of the research, it is pertinent to identify the space faring
nations‘ space weaponization related intents while looking through the security prism.
Notwithstanding, the chapter will cover the likelihood of space getting weaponized
irrespective of whether space-based or terrestrial. To remain focused, an effort shall
be made to restrict the research to only those policy aspects and objectives, which
directly point towards space weaponization probability. It would be a challenging task
as none of the state overtly claims to have deployed or intend deploying space
weapons as it could severely impact upon equation of strategic stability not only in a
particular region but at global level. The empirical evidences supporting on negating
or supporting the probabilities of space weaponization by major space faring nations
i.e. the US, Russian Federation, European Union, China and India, shall be sought
through critical analysis of the official documents available in open source besides
407
Ibid.
132
occasional particular statements by the respective political, military and scientific
elites.
4.2 United States
The US space objectives have been getting exposure in the form of US Presidents‘
directives before they were formally presented as an explicit US National Space
Polices (NSP).408
A critical appraisal of these directives does indicate few common
things inter-alia, furthering of the US interests in space through extensive exploration
and use of outer space, declaration of US right of self-defense in outer space,
international cooperation in the civilian use of outer space for ‗peaceful purposes‘,
maintaining freedom in space thereby enhancing welfare and security of mankind.
The US also characterized the term ‗peaceful purposes‘ which as per the US policy
makers allows for the military related intelligence and other activities in pursuit of
national security and other goals.409
The Americans categorical outer space objectives were reiterated in much known
Rumsfeld Commission Report of 2001 titled, ‗Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization‘.410
The report cautioned the
US strategic planners that if an effective space deterrence capability is not
materialized, soon the US would face a ‗Space Pearl Harbor‘.411
The report also
mentioned about the US adversaries‘ capacity of launching ICBMs which directly
threatens the US mainland as well as the space-based assets. As a sequel, it
recommended to have an effective space negation capability i.e. projecting power in,
from and through space which formed basis for the US decision makers motivation
for seeking ASATs.412
408
―New Space Policy Directive Calls for Human Expansion Across Solar System,‖ NASA Release
17-097, December 12, 2017. https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/new-space-policy-directive-calls-for-
human-expansion-across-solar-system. 409
US Presidential Directive/ NSC-37 (May 11, 1978), 2, accessed September 20, 2017,
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd37.pdf. 410
Donald Rumsfeld, ed., ―Executive Summary,‖ in Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, January 11,
2001, accessed August 21, 2017, https://fas.org/spp/military/commission/executive_summary.pdf. 411
Ibid, 13. 412
Ibid. Also see Michael Krepon, ―Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Anti-Satellite
Weapons,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May - Jun 2001): 2.
133
Rumsfeld Commission Report identified the US interests with regard to outer space,
inter-alia, promoting the peaceful uses of outer space through cooperation, meet the
national security, diplomatic, economic and domestic objectives by fully capitalizing
its outer space potential/ actual capacities and most importantly, to attain space
deterrence through denial capabilities by developing and deploying defensive means
i.e. space weapons. The Commission also proposed that the US Administration can
objectify the deterrence by denial capability through concerted efforts to achieve,
transforming the US military capabilities; second, strengthening the US intelligence
capabilities; third, shaping up the international legal and regulatory environment that
could [directly or indirectly] impinge upon its outer space freedom of action; fourth,
enhancing the US technological edge with regard to outer space technology; and
lastly, developing human resource related to outer space know-how. In nutshell, the
US had identified three pronged outer space objectives i.e. deter aggression against its
outer space assets for an assured national security, maintain the status of most
advanced space faring nation of the world and finally, perusal of its civil space
program in parallel to public sector space program.413
The report also recommended having an explicit national security guidance and
defense policy which could guide development of relevant space deterrence doctrine,
space operable weapons to deter aggression, defend space-based assets and further
strengthen war fighting capacities of the US land, air and sea forces.414
The US opposition to a space arms control treaty became evident in 2005 when the
US vetoed and Israel abstained from voting on the UN Resolution A/C.1/60/L.27,
titled, ―Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)‘. The proposed draft treaty
had an overwhelming support from others.415
The US opposes the draft treaty on the
pretext of lack of verification mechanism and argument that since there are no
weapons in outer space so there is no need to have a political or legal obligation.416
413
Rumsfeld, ―Report of the Commission.‖ 26. 414
Ibid, 28. 415
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). ―Proposed Treaty on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space,‖
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/. 416
Federation of American Scientists. ―Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,‖
https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ArmsControl_NEW/.../NP-NFZ-PAROS.html.
134
The Bush Administration in 2006 officially declared its National Space Policy (NSP).
Prior to 2006, the US NSP was deliberately kept ambiguous, mainly due to the
Russians‘ space related ambiguous approach. Besides that, the US policy makers
opted for being more explicit in listing down their red lines in outer space so as to
deter its peer competitors i.e. China and Russia who have sufficiently achieved the
capacity to carry out sneaking attacks on the US satellites.417
The Americans,
therefore, were threatened for the survivability of their outer space assets on which
their strategic reach, economy and daily domestic life rests. The explicit US NSP of
2006 did create a paradoxical situation. Besides strengthening the US space related
deterrence, it also activated the action-reaction scenario as China thereafter did not
take much time to demonstrate its ASAT capability in January 2007 by engaging it‘s
one of the own aging weather satellite.418
In addition to the US NSP, the US FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act also
made a clear assertion that leaves nothing to imagination that the US is all prepared to
weaponize the space – through actual deployment of weapons in outer space. It
stated: ―…to examine the feasibility of defeating ballistic missile threats with a new
generation of space-based missile defense capabilities.‖ 419
The space-based BMD was planned to be deployed by end 2017, however, the US
Congress did not exhibit any inclination on this proposal.420
The assertion was
received with suspicion and skepticism by the peer competitors in particular and the
world in general and vowed to resist and remain proactive to prevent its actualization
using political and diplomatic efforts.
4.3 Russian Federation
Russia has adopted assertive policy to regain its previous stature in global politics,
which it enjoyed during the Cold War. It is also trying to come out of the inertia of
417
Krepon, ―Lost in Space.‖ 2. 418
Carin Zissis, ―China‘s Anti-Satellite Test,‖ Council for Foreign Relations, February 22, 2007,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test. 419
See Section 183 of ―National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,‖ 114 Congress
Conference Report (Washington: US Government Publishing Office, 2016), 1598, accessed November
10, 2017, http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20161128/CRPT-114HRPT-S2943.pdf. 420
Steven A. Hildreth, ―Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Issues,‖ CRS Insight (February 21,
2017), accessed November 01, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/IN10655.pdf.
135
degeneration in post-Soviet era. Presently the Russians are struggling to transform the
world order from uni-polar to multi-polar. Notably, the Russian armed forces are
overstretched, equipped with old vintage crude equipment due to lack of
technological surge; however, despite all these limitations it is visibly playing
strategic role in security affairs of the world. Russian‘s role in annexation of Crimea
and management of conflict in Syria are cases in point to support Russian long range/
extended zone of influence.421
Russia having seen the zenith of its space capacities is
fully cognizant of outer space role in meeting the security requirements, extension of
power influence and in winning favorable outcome of any future conflict.
To build on Russian space capacity in contemporary era, it is prudent to recall that the
former Soviet Union lead the race for having ingress into space back in late 1950s.422
Post World War II era witnessed Soviets and the Americans at forefront to lead the
world in all power spheres including outer space. Soviet Union was skeptical about
the imperialist states‘ space race motivations and their then likely conquest of space
as part of their war fighting modernization efforts and the debate over identifying
‗outer space as future strategic theater‘. More so, the US President Kennedy had also
committed in 1950s that ‗Control of the space will be decided in the next decade and
the nation which controls space can control the earth‘.423
Foregoing, the Soviet Union
leadership perceived that the imperialist nations led by the US are all set to make
direct use of outer space for enhancing their reach. As a reaction to the anticipation of
the space conquering by the rival imperialist rivals, Soviet Union took the initiative
and launched world‘s first artificial satellite Sputnik in 1957.424
Sputnik’s launch surprised the US and other likeminded states. As per the
international relations paradigm, action by one state often has its profound impact on
its competitors‘ threat calculations either based on the perceptions or misperceptions
421
Keir Giles, ―Assessing Russia‘s Reorganized and Rearmed Military,‖ Task Force White Paper,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 03, 2017), accessed January 2, 2018,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/03/assessing-russia-s-reorganized-and-rearmed-military-pub-
69853. 422
Matthew Mowthorpe, ―The Soviet/Russian Approach to Military Space,‖ The Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, 15:3 (2002): 25. 423
V. D. Skolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, A Report Prepared for the US Airforce Project RAND,
R-416-PR (California: The RAND Corporation, 1963), 424. 424
See Archives of US Department of State, ―The Launch of Sputnik, 1957.‖ https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm.
136
based on the past history. Albeit, Russian outer space program was tagged as entirely
peaceful driven by prestige factor vis-à-vis western European states;425
however, the
US and its other competitors did not buy that and entered into outer space technology
acquisitioning with full zeal. The strategic outer space competition later paved the
way for a continuous threat looming large on the possibility of outer space getting
weaponized.
Nevertheless, Soviet Union‘s space program had been the only competitive space
program vis-à-vis the US which had the capacity of conducting outer space activities
in all its spheres including, manned space program, scientific and commercial
programs and above all military operations facilitation programs. The Soviet
dismemberment; however, resulted into attenuation of its space elements which once
made it a potent space power.426
The competition went on; however, the US due to its
advanced technological edge and political strength superseded the Soviets and
contemporarily, it is the leading space actor on globe. Notwithstanding, Russian
Federation‘s contemporary space program remains formidable and ranks 3rd
largest in
the world (130 satellites/ spacecraft),427
which is being further rebuilt under dynamic
leadership of President Putin.
The Russian Federation is perceived to be initiator of introducing military and
weapons aspect to the outer space which was supposed to remain a common heritage
of mankind. The perception further got strengthened as the Russian space program
was mostly kept secret and centralized throughout its evolution and transformation
period. The approach kept the rivals guessing about its future ambitions which mostly
had security and threat connotations. Nevertheless, even today Russian space policy
remains ambiguous and secret. Whatsoever Russian space vision is available in open
sources is based on speculations, which are derived from statements by its leadership
and the approach it adopted for negotiating or proposing various outer space related
formal or informal regimes.
425
James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Washington DC: US GPO 1998), 52. 426
Ibid, 50. 427
Brian G. Chow, ―Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,‖ Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer
2017): 83.
137
Russian Federation‘s space program is projected to be for ‗peaceful purposes‘ that
follows the broader approach of sanctuary school of thought; however, it did not
separate its military and civilian space facilities which put an umbrella over its
military programs and development. Throughout the developmental curve of the
Russia space program, it was deliberately kept dubious and enigmatic and did not
openly admit its military related space endeavors; which its competitors believed that
it was there right from beginning, mostly hedged behind ‗cover‘ objectives related to
peaceful uses. Few of the frequently quoted hearsay indicators (not exhaustive) and
initiatives in chronological order are stipulated below.428
Table 4.1
Indicators of Russian Quest for Weaponizing Outer Space
Serial Year Soviet (Russia) Indicators/
Initiatives for weaponizing Outer
Space
Overt or Covert Purposes
1. 1960-63 Vostok manned spacecraft Photo Reconnaissance
2. 1963 -
1964
Covert testing of orbital anti-satellite
weapons
Overtly termed as ‗Polyot
missions‘ with the purpose
of perfecting peaceful
space technologies
3. 1966 Covert testing of outer space systems
for checking the feasibility of placing
nuclear weapons in space
Overtly called to be the
space exploration missions
4. 1987 Russian launch of its super booster
‗Energiya‘ which allegedly carried
prototype(not actual) space-to-space
laser weapons
The rocket was tested to
check probability of taking
100 ton payload
5. 1974 Soviet Union allegedly installed
Vulkan gun on one of its space
station - Salyut 3
To be used in anti satellite
role and to guard against
any active interception of
Salyut 3
6. 1976 Russian ―Skif‖ program429
To develop a space-based
anti-satellite laser.
However, was abandoned
in 1984
Source: Brian G. Chow, ―Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat.‖
428
Chow, ―Stalkers in Space.‖ 49-52. 429
Pavel Podvig, ―Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program,‖
Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Working paper (March 2013): 5-6, accessed January 2, 2017,
http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml.
138
Despite having tested ASATs and Fractional Orbital Bombardment (FOB) systems,
Russia never deployed them in actuality; however, both these tests did indicate it‘s
thinking with regard to dominating the ultimate high ground.430
FOB was a Russian
ICBM that could take nuclear warhead in near earth orbit for short duration so as to
avoid detection by the US radars.431
The FOB did not come under 1967 Outer Space
Treaty restrictions as it was not meant to complete orbit around earth and was
designed as such that it would reenter earth atmosphere as soon as it reached intended
target. Having established its potency of controlling the outer space, Russia ceased its
FOB program after negotiating Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty – II (SALT-II)
with the US.432
Contemporarily, Russia is third largest space faring nation with numerous space
related purposes pivoting around single objective of space control. Space control by
the Russia is perceived to be achieved for maintaining capacity to launch precision
strategic and tactical maneuvers; second, protecting outer space assets by denial i.e.
defense by denial or deterrence; third, maintaining strategic and tactical levels
offensive operations capabilities; and fourth, enhancing the prestige factor in
domestic, political, scientific and economic fields.433
To attain and maintain the space
control, Russia has currently 130 spacecraft both in military and civilian domains434
for the purposes of navigation, reconnaissance, met data, communication,
intelligence, strategic guidance, etc.
The Russia in its 2014 military doctrine had explicitly identified the threat emanating
from outer space and the related counter-space measures. For instance, while
identifying the threat from outer space, the doctrine stipulated that:
―Establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems
undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces
related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike concept,
430
Mowthorpe, ―The Soviet/Russian Approach to Military Space,‖: 26. 431
Ibid, 27-28. 432
Ibid, 28. 433
Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane's, 1987), 195-199. 434
Report Published by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Russia Military Power: Building a
Military to Support Great Power Aspiration (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2017), 35.
139
intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic
non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons‖.435
Having identified the threat in terms of probable placement of weapons in outer space
and threat emanating from development and deployment of the US Global Prompt
Strike System, the Russian federation highlighted following space related tasks for
itself so as to deter or prevent a conflict:
―(a) to resist attempts by some states or group of states to achieve military
superiority through the deployment of strategic missile defense systems, the
placement of weapons in outer space or the deployment of strategic non-
nuclear high-precision weapon systems;
(b) to promote the conclusion of an international treaty on prevention of
placement of any types of weapons in outer space;
(c) to adopt in the UN framework regulatory provisions to govern the secure
conduct of outer space activities, including safety of outer space operations
in the general technical sense;
(d) to strengthen the Russian Federation‘s potential in the area of monitoring
objects and events in the near-Earth outer space, including the international
cooperation mechanism in that area.‖ 436
The above discussion reveals that, Russian Federation is well aware of the threat
which emanates from the outer space. It is also well conversant with the fact that
future war shall not be of direct one-to-one fight but indirect means i.e. cyber warfare
and by the use of precision guided munitions at unexpected time and space, duly
supported by the outer space assets. It manifests that the Russia could take all
measures to defend it from the long ranged precision weapons either placed on the
outer space assets or from the terrestrial based weapons using space as a medium.
Russian 2014 Military Doctrine also vows to defend its outer space stations by
developing counter-space-based deterrence.437
Besides, the physical built up in terms
of counter-space capabilities, Russian Federation‘s Defense Minister Shoygu
acknowledged in August 2015 that the Russian Aerospace Defense Troops and Air
Force are being merged together to raise ‗Russian Federation Aerospace Forces‘ due 435
The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, ―The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,‖ No. PR- 2976 (December 25, 2014),
accessed January 6, 2017, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 436
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,‖ No. PR- 2976 (December 25, 2014). 437
See text of Russian 2014 Military Doctrine, 5-7. https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-
001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf.
140
to change in the center of gravity in Russian aerospace sphere to provide coordinated
and real time response measures against the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine.438
The subject merger included Russian space forces responsible for provisioning of
early warning of ballistic missile attack, surveillance and satellite control networks.
Along the political and diplomatic front, Russia champions opposition to the
placement of weapons in the outer space. It fears a catastrophe in case of any outer
space-based weapons gets malfunctioned for any reason. It also believes that space
free of weapons is guarantor to the security, long term sustainability of outer space
and above all predictability with regard to enemy intents – all must for peace. Russia,
in order to preempt outer space-based weapons had proposed a draft treaty along with
China at Geneva based CD titled, ‗Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)‘, which
remains pending due to the US opposition. The US opposition with regard to blocking
discussions on PPWT has further strengthened threat perception of Russia and being
skeptic of the US resistance, it is building its counter-space capabilities. Moreover,
the US ballistic missile defense system deployed in Eastern Europe is being equated
with the US discarded Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983 by the top Russian
political leadership inter-alia Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and,
which is being taken as justification for Russian perusal of counter-space measures.
Importantly, Russians had conducted test of its ASAT weapon system with the name
of Nudol in May 2016.439
The test alarmed the US strategic planners who perceive the
Russian and Chinese ASAT tests as strategic signaling for being capable of exploiting
the US vulnerability of exponential dependency on outer space applications.440
Moreover, although Russian Federation has not declared it but the Chief of US
Strategic Command General John Hyten believes that besides developing terrestrial
based ASAT capabilities, Russian Federation‘s Kamikaze satellites commonly called
438
Golts, Alexander. ―Russia's Aerospace Forces Will Never Take Off.‖ The Moscow Times Online,
August 10, 2015, accessed January 3, 2017, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. 439
L. Todd Wood, ―Russia Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon,‖ Washington Times, December 21, 2016.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/21/russia-tests-anti-satellite-weapon-pl-19-nudol/. 440
Bill Gertz, ―Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile.‖ The Washington Free Beacon (May 26,
2016), accessed January 2017, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-flight-tests-anti-satellite-
missile/.
141
as ‗Kosmos 2499‘ are also silently orbiting in various earth orbits which could kill
themselves on command by hitting themselves against enemy‘s satellites inter-alia the
US space assets.441
The preceding discussion manifests that the Russian Federation is relentlessly
engaged to acquire counter-space capabilities not only in terms of physical capacities
but by organizational and doctrinal innovations. It might not be in position of
employing weapons on outer space assets due to economic, political and arms control
image limitations; however, development of terrestrial ASATs are in advanced stages
that could be deployed at short notices. Russian Federation‘s military views the space
offensive and defensive capabilities as source of deterring aggressive actions against
its outer space assets and if the deterrence fails, yet counter-space capabilities could
be effectively employed to check the spiraling effect of escalation. Russia would;
however, keep occupying high moral ground by sharing the insistence with China to
negotiating a legally binding arms control regime for preventing the space getting
actually weaponized.
4.4 China
China has been extending its military power prongs since it undertook reforms
initiative in 1978 that include proficiency in outer space applications from
commercial and military perspectives which has an instrumental role in extending its
reach in and beyond region.442
China having an eye on objective of maintaining its
great power status has to have assured security against external threats from peer
competitors, sustained economic growth and internal stability. China foresees that an
advanced and compatible space program can support tangibly in meeting all three
objectives.
China‘s space program can be categorized in three terms. The comprehensive end-to-
end program - a full spectrum space program capable of carrying out research and
development in space science for developing satellites and launch vehicles, capability
441
Jim Sciutto, Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, ―Russia Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon.‖CNN,
December 21, 2016, accessed January 6, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/russia-
satellite-weapon-test/index.html. 442
Zhao Lei, ―Key Satellite System Eyes Global Reach,‖ China Daily, March 12, 2018,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/12/WS5aa5d0bda3106e7dcc140f1b.html.
142
to launch satellites and manned space station as well as exercising control over space
assets.
Second, it is an integrated program that fully addresses military and civilian outer
space needs. To be more simplistic, it is unified and being centrally controlled by the
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)
which is responsible to report both Central Military Commission of the Chinese
Communist Party and the General Armaments Department of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA). The program is homogeneous in its objectives and there is no friction as
in case of those advanced space faring nations where inter-organizational rifts and
competitions pull a drag over developmental curve.
Third, the Chinese program is focused i.e. being pursued vigorously with a single aim
of seeking global role in world affairs. Although it is subjected to technological
limitations yet it is focused to meet the deficiencies by following ‗buy, copy, or steal‘
approach.443
China‘s space program is inherently strategic and militarized right from its
inception.444
As stipulated above, Chinese space program doesn‘t differentiate
between military and civilian facilities, thus, the advanced space faring nations
remain skeptical about entering into outer space cooperation with it. It could also be
derived that despite the Chinese desire of seeking MTCR membership, it has not been
granted the same.445
China formally applied for MTCR membership in 2006 which
still remains pending, while on the contrary, India has recently been accorded MTCR
membership to further advance its space program in order to check Chinese rise in the
region.
443
Ashley J. Tellis, ―China‘s Space Capabilities and their Impact on U.S. National Security,‖ Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission ―China‘s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of its Cyber and Space Warfare
Capabilities,‖ May 20, 2008: 2, accessed January 9, 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
AshleyJTellisUSCCTestimonyMay2020082.pdf. 444
Kevin Pollpeter, Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth
5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 44-45. 445
Leonard S. Spector, ―Missile Technology Control Regime,‖ Arms Control Association, April 2018,
https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/49.
143
China is pursuing counter-space capabilities that could exploit the space related US
vulnerabilities. Unlike happy-go during the previous wars especially the Gulf and Iraq
wars, any future conflict in South China Sea or in Pacific could be met with resilient
counter space measures from China. China is aggressively developing ASAT
capability, especially after it observed the role of space in offensive mode during
1991 Gulf War. Historically, it was December 1995 speech by Communist Party‘s
General Secretary Jiang Zemin to the Central Military Commission (CMC), in which
China overtly recognized the importance of outer space for military uses and
exploitations i.e. importance of joint warfare and use of space for command, control,
communication and intelligence (C3I).446
Sooner, PLA also recognized the same in
its military encyclopedia that for favorable results in future conflicts, C3I has to be
preserved at all times while at the same time denying it to the enemy. Empirically,
space control through development of counter-space measures has been on cards of
the Chinese side right from the day it recognized the outer space importance for
extending its influence in and beyond region, which is being pursued to-date with
focused but low-profiled approach. Chinese PLA‘s encyclopedia of 2002 explicitly
recognized outer space as one of the future battlefield like the three other domains i.e.
land, sea and air.447
Chinese counter-space capabilities are diverse that include terrestrial based ASATs,
co-orbital ASAT technology;448
directed energy weapons (DEWs), kinetic and non-
kinetic raids on terrestrial based command and control stations etc. It is also
comprehensive in nature as China has the capabilities to surveil, detect, track and
destroy a much needed hostile satellite(s) during escalation of hostilities.449
Chinese
ASAT test of 2007 was internationally received with a lot of criticism for being the
source of generating over 3000 radar trackable debris in space – an almost perpetual
threat to long term sustainability of outer space.
446
Dean Cheng, ―China‘s Military Role in Space,‖ Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012): 58. 447
Ibid, 55-60. 448
William Matthews, ―Chinese Puzzle,‖ Defense News, 6 September 2010,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4767907. 449
Tellis, ―China‘s Space Capabilities and their Impact on U.S. National Security.‖ 7-9.
144
In order to avoid the criticism, China had afterwards switched over to non-destructive
techniques of ASAT systems and carried out tests of direct-ascent ASATs in 2010,
2013 and 2014.450
The three non-kinetic ASAT tests is like a win-win situation for
the China as it did not only divert the political lashing of being an irresponsible state
with regard to long term sustainability of outer space but also exploited the
opportunity to develop other forms of ASATs. Moreover, in June 2016, China
launched its space debris clearer satellite named, ‗Aolong-1‘.451
Apparently, it
sounded well; however, western strategic planners thought it to be satellite with dual
purpose as it could also perform ASAT role which might grapple the US sensitive
satellites whenever thought to be strategically feasible. Aolong-1 satellite is equipped
with robotic arms having capability of identifying and putting itself in close proximity
of target satellite for performing proximity operations against ‗a non-cooperative
target‘.452
Besides that, China had also tested a long range ballistic missile in May 2013 that
climbed up to 20,000 miles up in space - just couple of miles short of
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) with a stated objective of testing a high altitude
experiment of employing sounding rocket for gathering research data for its National
Space Science Center. The US department of Defense (DOD) which was tracking the
long range ballistic missile could not find insertion of any object into orbit through
this long ranged launch. The US has already expressed its concerns about this space
probing test and graded it as yet another Chinese attempt to perfect its high-altitude
ASAT capability.453
The subject missile could be used against the US owned Global
Positioning System (GPS), intelligence and guidance satellites stationed in GEO.
450
Brian G. Chow, ―China‘s Well-Crafted Counter-space Strategy.‖ Space News, July 10, 2017,
accessed January 9, 2018, http://spacenews.com/op-ed-chinas-well-crafted-counterspace-strategy/. 451
Ibid. 452
Ibid. 453
Craig Murray, ―China Missile Launch May Have Tested Part of a New Anti-satellite Capability,‖
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, May 22, 2013,
2-3,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Missile%20Launch%20May%20Have%2
0Tested%20Part%20of%20a%20New%20Anti-Satellite%20Capability_05.22.13.pdf.
145
Despite the US and western concerns, China remained silent and ambiguous about
test‘s purpose and motives.454
The Chinese silence is understandable as it is moving ahead with its space program
with a focused and un-distractible approach amid the 2011 decree of the US Congress
that discouraged NASA to engage with China bilaterally on space cooperation
besides the US refusal of making China a part of its International Space Station (ISS)
in 2015.455
Both these events coupled with hostile approached US NSP, albeit tagged
with phrase like non-aggressive; China PLA is busy in perfecting its outer space
counter muscles.
The PLA controls Chinese outer space counter-measure capabilities,456
yet there is no
open source evidence in terms of Chinese offensive or defensive space doctrines that
can substantiate its intended military space offensive intents. However, to some
extent it can be inferred from the available public/ official documents and writings,
mostly by western and a few Chinese space experts. A critical analytical approach
reveals substantially that China has the capacity to deploy space weapons not only
terrestrially but also in space too; good enough to deter its peer rival the US from
launching kinetic or non-kinetic operations against Chinese strategic interests in the
region and beyond.
Taking into account the writings of space related Chinese experts it is substantially
visible that Chinese PLA is all set to acquire outer space control. One of the most
respected Chinese space experts Major General Cai Fenzhen also supports China‘s
expansion of borders into space and exercise control over it.457
The idea is primarily
based on the US Lieutenant General Daniel O.Graham‘s theory of ‗high frontiers‘.
Yet another Chinese space expert Huang Zhicheng also supports Chinese control of
space as the US is feared to be in process of establishing a strategic external border
454
Ibid, 3. 455
Leonard David, ―US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?,‖ Space.com,
June 16, 2015, accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-
cooperation.html. 456
Larry M. Wortzel, ―The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare,‖ Astropolitics, 6:2,
(2008): 112. 457
Ibid, 112-114.
146
bounded by its BMD shield plans. Moreover, President J. F. Kennedy‘s famous quote
that ‗who so ever controls space would control the Earth‘, is reflected as master piece
of outer space threat in PLA‘s military text books. PLA‘s Major General Liu Jixian
puts the Kennedy saying in a more elaborative way by quoting that ―whoever controls
the universe controls our world, whoever controls space controls initiative in war.‖458
These indicators in terms of Chinese writings substantially support the idea that China
is on guards with respect to exercising its authority in outer space.
Chinese 2011 Space White Paper also reflects Chinese PLA orientation towards
conducting ‗unified space operations‘. China is likely to take all preventive measures
to sustain potency of its unified operations concept that include continuous
provisioning of information in all domains, capabilities of launching offensive and
defensive operations against terrestrial and outer space-based assets and lastly
maintaining an effective deterrence level against an attack directed at its outer space
or terrestrial based counter-space capabilities.459
Along the political and diplomatic front, China shares championship efforts with
Russian Federation against placement of weapons in outer space and have jointly co-
sponsored a revised draft Treaty PPWT in June 2014 at CD.460
The US, as rightly
perceived to be the main competitor of the two space giants (China and Russia),
graded it flawed and dubious on three issues:461
Definition of space weapon as identified in draft PPWT i.e. ―any outer space
object or its component produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt
458
Ibid, 112. 459
Cheng, ―China‘s Military Role in Space,‖ 69-72. 460
Text of draft, ―Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or
Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of
China (June 16, 2014), accessed January 12, 2018,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/t1165762.sh
tml. 461
Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament, ―Analysis of the
2014 Russian-Chinese Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects,‖ Conference on Disarmament, CD/1998, 1-4,
September 2014, 2, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/007/57/PDF/G1500757.pdf?OpenElement.
147
normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth‘s surface or in the
air,‖ does not cover the terrestrial based ASAT weapons.
The draft treaty lacks verification mechanism. Although, the draft PPWT in its
article V states that ―State parties may implement agreed transparency and
confidence-building measures [TCBMs], on a voluntary basis, unless agreed
otherwise,‖ the US is of the view that it cannot substitute an effective legally
binding verification regime.
With regard to treaty‘s scope, the US objects that (a) it does not cover the
research and development, production, and Earth based storage of space-based
weapons. The gap could be exploited by the parties who might easily breakout
and deploy an already developed space-based ASAT at short notice. (b) While
living within identified red lines of the treaty, the parties to the treaty could
also develop BMD capability (c) the treaty uses terms like use or threat of use
of force, which does not have an acceptable definition in international law.
From above discussion, it could be ascertained that both China and Russian
Federation being the second (176 satellites462
/ spacecraft) and third largest space
faring nations respectively, are skeptical of initiating arms race in outer space as
introduction of space-based weapons could be detrimental to their security. The
concern equally holds good for the US as well, which is the largest space faring
nation in the world (556 satellites463
/ spacecraft); however, does not let initiation of
negotiations on PPWT under Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
agenda at the CD, for the main reason of keeping the initiative in hand of placing
weapons in outer space or for ease of using outer space appropriately in terms of
defensive effort.464
However, to off-set the criticism for blocking a space related arms
control initiative, the US is cautiously supportive of European Union (EU) proposed
International Code of Conduct in Outer Space (ICoC) for regulating space activities
and establishing norms for using space as common heritage of mankind. The code is
462
Chow, ―Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,‖ 83. 463
Ibid. 464
The US State Department, ―International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,‖ Press
Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, January 17 2012, accessed January 12, 2018,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/01/180969.htm
148
obviously not legal in nature and the Chinese and Russians fear that it could be set-a-
side, whenever felt necessary by the US and its likeminded states for meeting their
strategic interests.
4.5 European Union (EU)
Unlike the US and Soviet Union, European Union‘s space program was not
dominated by the factor of security, military or defense during its evolutionary period
in 1960s, but to keep the European Union (EU) intact.465
For instance, when Soviet
Union‘s Sputnik was made to orbit in 1957, it did not perturb the EU like the US was
and instead took it as a building block for the Western European alliance.
During the same era, United Kingdom and France were however on clear trajectory
towards becoming super powers through the development of their respective nuclear
and missile proficiencies duly augmented by political strengths. Within the EU block,
Britain was the first one to have developed its ballistic missile blue streak in mid
1950s; however, did not opt to make it further polished for launching satellites.466
On
the parallel, France had pure security reasons for its missile, space and nuclear
program so as to ensure that its sovereignty is never mutilated again as was in case of
World Wars. France has been the third state in the world that had developed space
launching technology after the US and the Soviet Union. It is also known to be the
main space actor in Europe that was instrumental in creation of European Space
Agency (ESA). 467
Being victim of the Germany‘s onslaught during World War II,
France has been on forefront among the other European states to ensure its tight
defense that included the medium of space. French national space agency, the Centre
National d‘Études Spatiales (CNES), is in close collaboration with the French
Ministry of Defense in pursuit of military space objectives.468
Notwithstanding, when the ESA was established in 1975, its charter supported the
research and development purely for the peaceful purposes that drowned the
465
Jinyuan Sua and Zhu Lixin, ―The European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities: An appraisal, ―Space Policy, xxx (2014):2. 466
Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 66-67. 467
Ibid, 68. 468
Ibid, 68.
149
competitive thinking of the EU states. A Pan-European space program was
established that resisted even using military rockets to launch the satellites but the
commercial one just to offset an impression of being militarized or securitized EU
space program. It can be inferred from above approach that unlike the US and Soviet
Union space programs, the EU space activities under the rubrics of ESA had a single
point agenda i.e cementing the European alliance.469
Later, with the changing security environment, the EU‘s ESA was also transformed
and its 2003 White Paper on European space policy identified outer space as one of
the tool for the ―implementation of EU policies, including security and defense…‖470
The White Paper further crystallizes role of outer space in its foreign, defense and
security policies in following terms:
―Space technology, infrastructure and services are an essential support to one of the
most rapidly evolving EU policies – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
including European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Most space systems are
inherently capable of multiple uses and the credibility of the above policies will be
significantly strengthened by taking better advantage of space applications.‖ 471
In addition, the EU space policies are being dealt with at three different levels i.e.
European Union level, Organisational level (ESA) and the individual state level
(sovereign states). Given the global transformation in approach towards the outer
space i.e. from pure sanctuary to the security side, the ESA which once known for
being the pioneer of peaceful quest of outer space, also brought-in visible changes
and did adopt a US colored security driven approach towards dealing the issues
related to outer space. For instance, on the pattern of the US which paints the term of
peaceful uses of outer space as non-aggressive, the ESA charter during its revision
process of 2003 also overtly took the same lead and defined its approach of peaceful
uses of outer space as non-aggressive - a clear departure from its pre-2003 position
469
Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 72-73. 470
European Commission, White Paper Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union –
An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy‖ (Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 2003), 54, accessed January 12, 2018,
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/index_en.htm. 471
Ibid, 19.
150
which called its peaceful approach as purely non-military, non-defense and obviously
non-security related.472
Moreover, while listing the space dimension of the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP), the EU identified the need for an effective and viable space control
capability inter-alia launch on demand satellites i.e. responsive space capability,
development of more numbers of micro satellites and above all capability attainment
that could neutralize peer competitor‘s satellites.473
The departure from its traditional position about peaceful purposes definition
stipulates that the EU‘s space policy is very much adaptive of the trending use of
outer space for security purposes, for which ‗weapons‘ are needed that could be used
to ensure survivability of outer space assets. Notwithstanding, it is imperative to be
cautious of EU‘s diplomatic and political efforts of keeping the space free of
weapons. EU‘s draft space ICoC is a case in point that is widely accepted as one of
the leading non-legally binding instrument in the absence of a legally binding outer
space norms setting regime.
The EU‘s space ICoC is professed to be an instrument to ensure 3 Ss needed for space
to be used without interruption i.e. Sustainability, Safety and Security.474
Albeit, the
three Ss are common grounds of all space faring nations; however, states with
security concerns, for instance, China and Russia, do not reject it altogether but also
do not view the ICoC as a substitute to a legally binding treaty. China and Russian
Federation have reservations on ICoC on level of explicitness with regard to limiting
military activities in outer space and being a pure EU initiative which was formulated
without being mandated by any formal arms control forum inter-alia the UN or the
CD.
Besides the procedural issues attached to the EU proposed ICoC, China and Russian
Federation fear that it keeps the door open for having space related weapons. For
instance, section 4.2 of the 2014 revised ICoC authorizes direct or indirect damage or
472
Gleason, ―European Union Space Initiatives.‘ 14-16. 473
Ibid, 35. 474
―Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,‖ March 31, 2014 Version, 2.
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.
151
destruction of space-based assets unless it is justified for safety reasons (debris),
posing threat to the human health and more importantly when necessitated under the
sovereign right of individual or collective self-defense as authorized in the UN
Charter.475
Whatever the reason could be for destroying an outer space object, it is apparent that
the space weapons, either based in space or Earth, are allowed to be developed.
Hence, the probability of having space weapons is even found to be more pronounced
on the EU platform. Besides opening an exploitable opportunity for the ASAT, ICoC
also indirectly encourages the BMD development as both have fine nexus and differ
only in two ways i.e. intent and target.
4.6 India
An articulated security policy provides transparency and clarity in a state‘s projected
objectives so as to mitigate security related concerns.476
In case of outer space, India
is yet to unveil its formal National Space Policy; however, its cardinals from military
usage perspective can be derived by reading in between the lines of three main
sources i.e. Research and Development (R&D) projects related to various military
purposed outer space assets‘ development; second, domestic level statements by
space related scientists and politicians dealing with national security issues and third,
occasional formal national statements delivered at various multi-lateral forums
including the UN.477
The Indian space program is as old as 1962.478
In following decades, India established
itself as one of the recognized spacefaring state. Indian outer space is being looked
after by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which has over 15 different
dedicated centers for carrying out R&D in various departments related to outer space.
Like all other advanced spacefaring states, India also started its space program with
475
Ibid. 476
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ―Should India Declare a Space Policy,‖ The Diplomat, August 31,
2013, accessed August 2, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/should-india-declare-a-space-policy/. 477
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ―Need for an Indian Military Space Policy,‖ in Space India 2.0
Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives, ed. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan et al.
(New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2017), 199. 478
N Pant, ―Indian Space Program,‖ Indian Journal of Radio and Space Physics, Vol. 15 (October-
December 1986): 402.
152
focus on socio-economic dividends. The official version of the ISRO space vision is
purely development oriented and nothing is indicated with regard to military
operational uses. ISRO‘s mission statement stated: ―Harness space technology for
national development, while pursuing space science research and planetary
exploration.‖479
India for the very first time released its outer space research vision in July 1970.480
The vision in broader sense articulated the Indian intent of acquiring indigenous SLV
capability while focusing on attaining proficiency in communication, remote sensing
and meteorology capabilities, which the Indian side considered essential for its
development.481
Albeit, the 1970 Indian space vision did not show intent of direct
militarization of the outer space; however, all the four desired space capabilities were
of strategic in nature. SLV capability can have dual-use of ASAT weapon, while
remote sensing, communication and met information are also dual purposed which
are equally beneficial for planning and executing both offensive and defensive
military operations.
Historically, India is acknowledged for its non-offensive and non-military
perspectives about usages of outer space. India is also known for its opposition to the
Regan led US concept of Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI) as well as the outer
space offensive capability acquisition race by the US and USSR.482
Nevertheless,
Indian side had sensed the trend of space militarization to be converted into probable
space weaponization and thus started developing defensive purposed space
applications inter-alia, communication, reconnaissance, navigation, strategic early
warning, geo-mapping and terrain / weather forecasting for planning strategic military
maneuvers.483
Out of 15 different ISRO R&D centers, Space Applications Centre
(SAC) (Ahmedabad) and National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) (Hyderabad) are
479
Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). ―Vision and Mission
Statements.‖ last modified July 31, 2017, http://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/vision-and-mission-
statements. 480
Ajey Lele, ―India's Policy for Outer Space,‖ Space Policy 39-40 (2017): 29. 481
Ibid, 29-30. 482
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Arvind K. John, ―A New Frontier: Boosting India's Military
Presence in Outer Space,‖ Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper No. 50 (January 2014): 7. 483
Ashley J. Tellis, ―The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic
Relationship,‖ International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006): 113-114.
153
busy in developing remote sensing applications, which are known for military as well
as disaster management purposes – the dual purposed applications.
Nonetheless, India which is perceived to be an emerging regional power and being
seen as net security provider has three fold outer space objectives for becoming space
power, one, use outer space capacity as one of its power potential indicator for
accruing its desired level of stature in international political system, second,
demonstration of technological capability and third, enhancement of its national
security by exercising control over space.
The Indian side politically hedge behind the Chinese 2007 ASAT test for justifying
its military side of the outer space endeavors. Indian space capabilities have increased
manifold and is regarded as one of the quick paced advanced spacefaring state. To
count on Indian space military capacities, it has its indigenously developed
constellation of seven Navigation Satellites known as Indian Regional Navigation
Satellite System (IRNSS) to its credit, out of which three satellites are Geostationary
based while rest of the four satellites orbit in Geosynchronous orbit. It is as efficient
as US Global Positioning System (GPS), Russian GLONASS, European Union‘s
Galileo and Chinese Beidou navigation systems.484
IRNSS or NAVIV (Navigation
with Indian Constellation) has the potential of providing locating data with accuracy
of plus minus 20 meters within whole India and 1500 kilometers all around its
borders, thus making it extremely useful for social, domestic, commercial and above
all strategic purposes.485
Importantly, India had orbited its first dedicated military communication satellite in
August 2013.486
Besides that Introduction of Indian remote sensing satellites RISAT-
1 and RISAT-2 have the best possible utilization in mapping the terrain, weather
forecasting, disaster management. These satellites have an on-board Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR) technology which due to their extra ordinary sensitivity can
pierce through fog and clouds for real time early warning, surveillance and detection
484
Victoria Samson, ― India-US: New Dynamism in Old Partnership,‖ in Space India 2.0
Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives, ed. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan et al.
(New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2017), 237. 485
Lele, ―India's Policy for Outer Space,‖ 30. 486
Madhumati DS, ―Navy‘s First Satellite GSAT-7 Now in Space,‖ The Hindu, August 30, 2013,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/navys-first-satellite-gsat7-now-in-space/article5074800.ece.
154
of incoming missiles thus, is termed as ‗Force Multiplier‘.487
To further enhance the
detection capability of an incoming missile, India has entered into a new agreement
on NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) mission, scheduled to be
undertaken in 2021 which is being pursued by the Indo-US Civil Space Joint
Working Group.488
Besides these capacities, Indian expertise in ‗SLV‘ technology
gave it the distinction of ‗spacefaring‘ state when in 1980 Indian indigenously built
SLV-3 had its first successful flight and was able to place Indian Satellite ‗Rohini‘ in
Earth orbit.489
Moreover, to meet Indian armed forces space related requirements and
formulate a short time military space policy, in 2010 an Integrated Space Cell (ISC)
was established at Indian Ministry of Defense. ISC is considered to be a building
block for Indian perceived Aerospace Command.490
With regard to Indian increased interest for securitizing and weaponizing space is
evident from different Indian notables‘ statements. Indicatively, Indian peaceful
approach about space applications entered into transitionary era of change of hearts as
early as 2003. Times of India in 2003 attributed Indian Air Chief Marshal Krishna
Swamy with claim that work has been started on Indian acquisition of space-weapons
platforms in outer space. The Indian Air Chief stated:
―Any country on the fringes of space technology like India has to work
towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards
laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites.‖ 491
The India; however, came upfront in its‘ changed approach when the Chinese tested
ASAT in January 2007 and committed openly for developing its indigenous military
space program in order to address the threat emanating from Chinese offensive space
program. In February 2007, while addressing an international seminar titled,
―Aerospace Power in Tomorrow‘s World,‖ held at Carnegie Endowment, Indian
External Affairs Minister Parnab Mukherji shared his concern and stated, ―recent
developments (Chinese ASAT test) show that we are treading a thin line between 487
Rajagopalan, ―Need for an Indian Military Space Policy,‖ 204. 488
The White House. ―Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh,‖ July 18, 2005, accessed August 12, 2017 489
Lele, ―India's Policy for Outer Space,‖ 29. 490
Press Information Bureau, Government of India. ―Special Cell Set Up to Counter Growing Threat to
Space Assets.‖ last modified July 21, 2017, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33. 491
―Aerospace command under way: IAF,‖ Times of India, October 7, 2003,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Aerospace-command-underway- IAF/articleshow/219096.cms
155
current defense related uses of space and its actual weaponization.‖492
It manifests
that India had noted the imbalance in its geographical region due to the Chinese
ASAT test and has actually started operationalizing space weapons.
In 2007, Indian ISRO Chief also hinted at Indian capability of having space weapons.
He stated, ―…..though, it is well within the capability of India to develop and deploy
a system to knock down a rogue satellites, India‘s concern is to keep outer space a
zone of peace and tranquility‖.493
Later in 2008, while addressing the United
Commanders Conference, Indian Defense Minister AK Antony noted the concern
about Chinese ASAT test of 2007 and wondered that how long India could follow the
policy of non-weaponization of space when the neighbors have developed an
advanced offensive capability.494
In January 2008, while addressing audience at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) at Washington D.C., ISRO head Madhavan Nair,
meaningfully commented that ―Indian space program which was need oriented since
its inception in 1960 has met its objectives and now [India is] looking at what‘s
next.‖495
Again in 2008, Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor also indicated
Indian offensive space designs. He narrated that:
―…the Chinese space program is expanding at an exponentially rapid
pace in both offensive and defensive contents……India, which has an
extensive civilian space satellite program, must optimize space
applications for military purposes.‖496
Similarly, VK Saraswat, a DRDO member and Scientific Advisor to the Indian
Defense Minister, categorically stated in 2010 that if the ‗go-ahead‘ is given by the
492
Address by Indian External Affairs Minister Pernaab Mukherjee at the Inaugural Session of the
International Seminar on ―Aerospace Power in Tomorrow‘s world,‖ at Carnegie Endowment, February
4, 2007, accessed August 1, 2017,
http://carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/feb07/address_external_affairs_minister_internatio
nal_seminar_aero.pdf. 493
Radhakrishna Rao, ―Will India Prepare For Space War?,‖ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
No. 3038 (January 2010), http://ipcs.org/article/india/will-india-prepare-for-space-war-3038.html. 494
David R. Sands, ―China, India hasten arms Race in Space,‖ The Washington Post, June 25, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/25/china-india-hasten-arms-race-in-space/. 495
Jeff Foust, ―India and the US: Partners or Rivals in Space?,‖ The Space Review, February 11, 2008,
accessed July 2017, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1056/1. 496
Sands, ―China, India hasten arms Race in Space.‖
156
Indian Government, the DRDO is capable of producing capacity to fight a space
war.497
Besides statements by various Indian officials, most importantly, in April 2013 Indian
Ministry of Defense shared its policy document titled, ―Technology Perspective and
Capability Roadmap,‖ which indirectly showed Indian Defense Ministry‘s objective
of developing capability to defend outer space assets through counter-space
capability. The document reflected in its envisaged capabilities part:
―….in consonance with the envisaged growth of the Armed Forces, the
capabilities…. to support the overall defense strategy are… space-
based assets for C4ISR, communication of all types, navigation,
meteorology and capability to defend own assets.‖498
India also hedges behind the legal gaps existing in the 1967 OST which left the
terminology of ‗peaceful purposes‘ vague. India following the US precedence, took
the advantage of debate between ‗non-aggressive uses‘ and ‗peaceful uses‘ of outer
space; thus, had full advantage of the vagueness of the OST legal framework and
presented its ASAT capacity building under the garb of defending its outer space
assets.
The Indian National Space Policy did not exist until the beginning of 2018,499
which
can be used as a reference to dilate upon Indian outer space military or weaponization
intention. At maximum, different official statements and primary sourced documents
are available to construct a picture about India‘s intent about its space weapons
policy. India also sees remaining ambiguous more advantageous and beneficial as
compared to the declared outer space policy containing official declaration of
securitizing space primarily for the reason of protecting its long projected political
position of keeping space free of conflicts and weapons.500
At the end, it can
conveniently be concluded that India is in developing phase of space weapons under
the plea of using them for defensive purposes or right of self-defense as stipulated in
the UN Charter. India is also fully involved in developing expertise and mastery in its
497
Rao, ―Will India Prepare For Space War?.‖ 498
Indian Ministry of Defense. ―Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR),‖ by
Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff (April 2013): 36, accessed August 4, 2017,
http://mod.nic.in/technology-perspective-and-capability-roadmap. 499
Lele, ―India's Policy for Outer Space.‖ 28. 500
Rajagopalan, ―Need for an Indian Military Space Policy.‖ 208-209.
157
dual purposed outer space assets so that to avoid finger-pointing by the dovish
scholars.
To conclude, space weapons‘ development is a reality; however, in an embryonic
stage. Different major space faring nations have the capability to develop one,
although, not declared for avoiding political and diplomatic criticism. The US,
Russian Federation and China have already demonstrated their skills of engaging
satellites in outer space through terrestrial based ASAT weapons. Chances of putting
weapons on outer space assets look bleak; however, proximity operations by the
satellites cannot be ruled out so as to decapitate particular satellite(s), if not destroyed
at critical time.
158
CHAPTER-5
The Nexus between Missile Shield and Space Weapons
The Space technology is significant for the proper functioning of the missile shield. It
is not only imperative for detecting the missile fired by the adversary, but it can also
be employed for destroying an incoming hostile missile. Moreover, the propellant
used in the interceptor is identical to the propellant of the long-range ballistic missile
or space vehicle. This chapter deliberates on the nexus between missile shield and
space technology employed for military use. It ascertains the linkages and indicators
pertaining to the two apparently different weapon systems i.e. space arms and BMD
systems, which are in-fact siblings and belong to the same technology family. To
understand the dynamics of BMD and space weapons, the chapter discusses in detail
ballistic missile types and their flight trajectories as well. The main argument of the
thesis BMD and ASATs have nexus, is explored by listing the empirical evidences
and describing in details the BMD and its political determinants, which are the basis
of BMD shield development. Indeed, these developments indirectly keep the initiative
of developing space weapons alive. Finally, the paradoxes and challenges regarding
the BMD or for that matter ASAT weapons are critically examined.
5.1 Space Weapons and Missile Shield Relationship
The leading space faring nations are either great or major powers. These
technologically advanced nations have made themselves excessively dependent on
the outer space-based assets. The outer space objectives of these states ascertained
through their national space policies and space experts‘ analyses, notably, have one
thing in common i.e. national security. Any threat leaning towards their space assets
survivability is seen as ultimate danger to their daily domestic life, commerce and
above all maintenance and extension of power.
The best way to secure the outer space assets is to deny the freedom of initiating
offensive against them. Denial could only be possible if the ASAT weapons are
banned permanently. On the face of it, it seems logical to have a legal valued treaty,
which could ban the capability thereby ensuring sustained security from the
adversaries‘ attempt of fiddling with the existence of the satellites. However, to-date
159
no ASAT arms control treaty exists. Reason is the dual use nature of the ASAT
weapons and BMD capability. It implies that banning ASATs would also indirectly
ban BMD programs.
5.2 Nexus between Space Weaponization and Missile Shield: Indicators
Since the Soviets‘ launching of Sputnik, the ballistic missiles and satellites have been
seen at par due to their long-range target engagement capability. However, with the
RMA, missiles were exclusively associated to their capability of carrying
conventional and unconventional warheads while satellites restricted to carrying
various kinds of sensors. Sequentially, their respective counter measures i.e. ABM
and ASATs parted their ways and were seen through different perspectives of
response as well as international arms control initiatives. Despite of the narrated
difference with regard to their target association, yet there are similarities between
BMD and ASAT weapons which reflect that the two technologies complement each
other.501
ASAT or BMD systems have multiple commonalities to identify their nexus. Few to
mention are, one, both systems comprise of either interceptor missiles or lasers along
with their allied space, sea or terrestrial based sensors, two, both systems use outer
space to interdict their respective targets i.e. a BMD system ideally engages the
hostile intercontinental ballistic missile during its midcourse phase which lasts up to
20 minutes in outer space while an ASAT also engages a target satellite in outer space
earth orbit, three, the two systems could destroy their respective targets either by
employing direct impact or fragments/ splinters produced by using proximity fuse
technology, fourth, on the political and diplomatic fronts, both the technologies do
not have any legal impediment on their respective proliferation.
The above-narrated commonalities sufficiently embrace the fact that the two
technologies i.e. BMD or ASAT are the two-sides of the same coin. In simpler terms,
apparently, the two systems could interchangeably be used against each other‘s
dedicated targets – BMD against satellite target and ASAT against ballistic missile.
501
Ashton B. Carter, ―The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems,‖ Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 2, in
Weapons in Space, Vol. I: Concepts and Technologies (Spring, 1985): 171,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024984.
160
Hence, the growing debate of having space weaponization could not be relegated to a
lower profile. BMD capability, albeit seen through the defensive prism has an
offensive element inbuilt into it. An ASAT capability could incentivize its possessor
to launch preemptive or preventive strike.
Having capability of BMD would indirectly reflect the ASAT capability502
and vice
versa which may not be claimed directly for obvious political, technological, security
and arms proliferation repercussions; however, states with security concerns might
not take it light and initiate series of counter weight initiatives to balance the
disturbing security calculus.
Nexus between ASAT weapons and ABM systems could also be established by the
pattern of their intended use. Michael Krepon opined that the difference between the
SLV vis-à-vis ICBM and ASATs vis-à-vis ABM technologies is only of ‗intent‘,
otherwise its one and the same thing. Michael Krepon recalled that despite strong
recommendation by 2001 Rumsfeld Commission Report on US National Security
Space Management and Organization to develop viable ASATs systems so that to
avoid ‗space pearl harbor‘, the US under Bush administration did not do so.503
The
reasons included political back lashing, unprecedented arms race, taking war into a
new domain and weakening of arms control regimes. Interestingly, the Bush
Administration also did not ban ASAT development through any legal framework for
the reason that it could have direct negative impact on developing ABM systems.504
An ASAT could be a useful BMD itself besides an effective counter BMD system as
well. A BMD system or a ballistic missile needs guidance satellites to achieve
precision in reaching their intended targets. If an ASAT weapons is used against a
BMD system‘s sensor; for instance, reconnaissance, missile tracking and guidance
satellites etc. and physically destroys or carries out electronic impairment, the
502
Carter, ―The Relationship of ASAT.‖ 187. 503
Michael Krepon, ―Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons,‖ Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May - Jun 2001): 3. 504
Ibid, 3-4.
161
incoming hostile missile would lose its intended course, thus achieving BMD
mission505
- an indirect achievement of BMD objective.
For direct engagement, an ASAT or chemical laser beam could be fired on an
incoming hostile missile during its flight, provided ASAT weapon or chemical laser
beam is sufficiently strong so as to penetrate a hard skinned ballistic missile. The
nexus identified proves that ASAT weapon and BMD shield could be employed
alternatively. In 2017, there has been a test fire of a laser based BMD system against
a drone by the US navy which manifests that laser based ASAT weapons are in
offing.506
Perhaps, the invention and testing of such weapons are destabilizing
elements for the international strategic environment.
Although, the 1972 ABM Treaty doesn‘t exist anymore; yet, its text could be used
substantially for identifying implicit linkage between space (ASAT) weapons and
missile shield. ABM Treaty‘s Article II states:
―….[A]n ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of….(a) ABM
interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed
for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.‖ 507
The italic font points towards implicitly using ground based ASAT missiles‘ test
firing on a target ballistic missile. Thus, developing ASAT capability is an extension
of developing BMD shield.
Finally, the practical manifestation of the fact that a BMD system could alternatively
be used as an ASAT weapon system, was the February 2008 US engagement of one
of its disabled satellite USA-193. The US interestingly used its Navy‘s SM-3
interceptor missile (BMD) to shoot down the satellite at an altitude of 247 km by
employing all components of BMD, for instance, command and control, tracking and
surveillance radars and the communication system. Engagement of satellite in an
505
Carter, ―The Relationship of ASAT.‖ 185-186. 506
Marcus Weisgerber, ―Pentagon: We‘re Closer Than Ever to Lasers That Can Stop Iranian, North
Korean Missiles,‖ Defense One, August 17, 2017, accessed November 15, 2017,
http://www.defenseone.com/business/2016/08/pentagon-were-closer-ever-lasers-can-stop-iranian-
north-korean-missiles/130845/. 507
Nuclear Threat Initiative. ―ABM Treaty Text.‖ http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-
limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/appendix-abm-treaty-text/
162
earth orbit by SM-3 interceptor missile met two US objectives, one, a BMD system
developed for engaging a ballistic missile could easily be employed in anti-satellite
role and two, test firing of SM-3 BMD operational viability.508
A BMD system and ASAT weapons have strong nexus and could thus alternatively
be employed. Nexus between the two provides flexibility to their owning militaries
while at the same time denies any arms control initiative, for instance, the pending
PAROS proposal at the CD. It can be inferred that putting ASAT weapons under
arms control checks and balances would also directly or indirectly impact upon BMD
development program which the Americans and their likeminded states count as an
essential for their layered defenses.
5.3 Space Weapons and Missile Shield Nexus: An Arms Control Perspective
Developing ASAT capability cannot be seen in isolation as the BMD and ASAT
weapons technologies substantially reinforce and overlap each other. However, it is
yet to be ascertained in classical sense that at what time during the engagement
trajectory an ASAT weapon fired against a satellite could assume a BMD role. The
overlap between the two technologies offers a loophole in circumventing an arms
control treaty whether related to ASAT or BMD. Foregoing in view the dual nature of
the ASAT and BMD technologies, any arms control initiative to put a check on space
weapons proliferation i.e. ban on development of ASAT weapons etc. would severely
impinge upon the BMD capability as well that may not be acceptable to those states
which have BMD system as an integral part of their strategic defenses against ICBM
threat, hence relegating the chances of negotiating an ASAT or space weapons related
arms control legal treaty at CD to lowest ebb.
Historically, ASATs were tested frequently during the Cold War era and no state
inter-alia the US and the USSR felt any appetite to negotiate an arms control treaty
completely banning the ASAT capacity. The main drag behind the de-motivation for
negotiating a treaty was the urge for building capacity in the form of BMD systems
508
Richard L. Garwin, ―Ballistic Missile Defense and Space Weapons,‖ presentation at 11th PIIC
Beijing Seminar on International Security: Building a Harmonious World of Stability and Win-Win,
October 26-30, 2008, 12. https://fas.org/rlg/Qingdao-Oct2008-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-and-Space-
Weapons.pdf.
163
against each other‘s ICBMs arsenal. Foreseeing the deterring value associated with
the BMD systems, both the US and the USSR had an informal mutual understanding
– not to extend conflict zone to extra-terrestrial domain. The ABM Treaty of 1972
had also bounded the two sides that there would be no fiddling with the monitoring
satellites.
In 1978, when the second phase of Cold War was about to start, the Carter
Administration did propose a legal arrangement for totally banning the ASAT
capability. The proposal could not receive affirmative response due to two main
reasons i.e. lack of modalities for verification and the scope up to which the capability
was to be blocked. The two hurdles in having a legal framework against ASAT
banning could not be settled due to the concerns associated with the ICBMs and their
counter measure i.e. BMD systems. To date, there is no legal treaty which could
impose check on the development of ASATs or BMD systems due to the fear of
banning, one, the ICBMs - carrier of the strategic warheads, two, terrestrial and
space-based BMD systems and third, the SLVs/ Space Shuttles, as all these could
perform ASAT related tasks besides their original intended tasks.509
The subjective approach was also evident from the Regan Administration‘s National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) - 42 of July 4, 1982, which superseded the
previous Carter Administration‘s NSDDs and affirmed the US position, related to
space arms control initiatives in times to come. It stated:
―The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United
States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or
otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems should those
measures be compatible with United States national security. The United States will
oppose arms control concepts or legal regimes that seek general prohibitions on the
military or intelligence use of space.‖ 510
The NSDD statement by Regan Administration manifests a few important positions,
one, the US has kept the term weapon vague and did not mention ASAT denial to
avoid any future diplomatic or political pressures if it chooses to have ASATs both
terrestrial and space-based. Two, the US associated development and deployment of
509
Krepon, ―Lost in Space.‖4. 510
US National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) – 42 (July 4, 1982), 1,
https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/nsdd-42.html.
164
ASATs to its national security requirements, which is an alienable right of any
sovereign state. If it is so, then all advanced space faring nations would opt to follow
the suite being independent and sovereign states - a dangerous preposition projected
by the US which ultimately kept the option of having ASATs till to-date. Third, the
US affirmed that it shall oppose any general prohibition on the military or intelligence
uses of outer space. The position is again directly strengthened with the logic of
sovereignty.
In addition, lately with the introduction of much talked Regan‘s Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) or star war program, scholars opined that the counter measures to
satellites and ballistic missiles i.e. ASATs and BMD systems respectively had
matching characteristics. It is also evident from the fact that Regan administration‘s
support for the SDI did not let any considerable move towards arms control in ASAT
realm. It was because of one prime reason i.e. the US scientists were of the view that
the BMD development under the SDI program could tangibly substantiate mastery in
ASAT development.511
Hence, probability of an arms race in outer space remains
alive and an open ended.
5.4 Ballistic Missile’s Fundamental Knowledge
Before the BMD system as a whole is dilated upon, it is prudent to grasp the basics of
ballistic missile‘s technology including its phases of trajectory; various range
classifications so as to build a platform for comprehensive understanding of a missile
shield concept.
5.4.1 Ballistic Missiles Basics
Ballistic missiles are, in simple terms, those rockets, which are provided with power
through different variant of rocket fuels so as to push them towards intended long
distanced targets at a high speed.512
Generally, the ballistic missiles including the
ICBMs comprise of two to three staged rocket system having solid or liquid fuel to
511
George Rathjens and Jack Ruina, ―BMD and Strategic Instability,‖ Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 3,
Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security (Summer, 1985): 253. 512
Arms Control Association. ―Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,‖ last modified December
2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.
165
propel them along the desired trajectory,513
and a payload atop, commonly known as
‗bus‘, capable of carrying different kinds of warheads including conventional and
unconventional, besides multiple numbers of metal chaffs used for confusing the
radar detection. The bus could have a single warhead or multiple re-entry
conventional and un-conventional vehicles.514
Larger the size of the rocket, larger
would be the volume of fuel it would carry thus covering the longer ranges. On the
flip side, larger the size of ballistic missile more would be the chances for its
engagement by a BMD system.
Once the single or multiple staged rocket is pushed through the initial stages of
atmosphere using solid or liquid propellants, the warhead and decoys/ chaffs get
separated from the rocket body. After getting detached from the rocket body, they
follow an unpowered free falling parabolic trajectory towards their intended target
due to the gravitational forces acting on them. This free falling ballistic dependent
phenomenon makes the likely route and impact point of the warhead predictable - the
most important factor that makes a missile shield effective or otherwise. Prediction
about warhead‘s future course and flight pattern i.e. lead angle and speed are
calculated by employing sensors including satellites and radars which use elements
like speed, direction of flight, acceleration and rate of change of position of the target
warhead(s) so as to ensure that the interceptor missile can engage it with precision.
5.4.2 Ballistic Missiles Classifications and Ranges
Ballistic missiles are classified on the basis of their maximum ranges and the kinds of
warhead they can carry. Maximum range of a ballistic missile is dependent on two
main factors, one, weight of the warhead it has atop and two, the power of missile
engines i.e. the kind of rocket engine. Range of a ballistic missile is inversely
proportional to the weight and size of warhead while it is directly proportional to the
missile‘s engine power i.e. rocket. For an increased range different rockets are
stacked on one another, which keep igniting one after another for hitting targets at 513
Solid propellant is more stabilized vis-à-vis liquid one as in solid propellant, fuel and oxidizers are
combined while in case of liquid propellants both are kept separate and mixed only when missile is
about to be launched. 514
Jeff Porro, ―BMD Technology - A Layman's Guide,‖ Arms Control Today, Vol. 11, No. 4 (April,
1981): 3.
166
maximum ranges. However, the long-range missiles have a dilemma attached to
them. More the range, more would be the size of missile due to multiple rockets
grouped together in a missile. It manifests that although the long-range targets could
be engaged but on the other side it would present a bigger signature to the missile
defense sensors for easy detection and subsequent engagement. The dilemma requires
a fine balance between the size of warhead and size of the missile.
Range is not an inbred characteristic of a missile, as it all depends on the payload of a
missile.515
However, typically the ballistic missiles are classified in following
categories depending on their respective ranges, albeit, there may be a little variation
with NATO and Russian Federation516
missile range classification:
Table 5.1
Range Based Ballistic Missiles Classifications
Classifications Acronym Range
Battlefield Short Range Ballistic
Missile. Range:
BSRBM less than 150 km (a widely
debated new range classification)
Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM Less than1000 km
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MRBM From 1001 to 3000 km
Intermediate-Range Ballistic
Missile
IRBM From 3001 to 5500 km
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM Greater than 5500 km
Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile
SLBM Designation is irrespective of
range
Source: Federation of American Scientists. ―Ballistic Missile Basics.‖
5.4.3 Phases of Ballistic Missile Trajectory and Missile Shield Efficacy
Generally a ballistic missile parabolic shaped trajectory is divided into three distinct
phases i.e. boost phase (from launch pad through atmosphere towards the outer
space), mid-course phase (through outer space) and terminal phase (through
atmosphere on the intended target side). By the book, it is better to kill an incoming
hostile ballistic missile during its boost phase, if not than during the mid-course phase
515
Ian Williams, ―Ballistic Missile Basics,‖ Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, April 1, 2014,
accessed January 12, 2018, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-
basics/ballistic-missile-basics/. 516
Federation of American Scientists.―Ballistic Missile Basics.‖Accessed January 29, 2018.
https://fas.org/nuke/intro/missile/basics.htm.
167
of its flight path towards intended target and the last option- which is the most
dangerous option also- is to take on the ICBM warhead during its re-entry phase. An
effective missile shield could engage a hostile ballistic missile target during any of
the three trajectory phases, it would be imperative to have a little conceptualization of
these so as to better comprehend the expectations and capabilities of a missile shield.
Pictorial representation encompassing the three phases of missile trajectory517
is as
under:
Figure 5.1
Ballistic Missile Trajectory Phases
Source: David Wright, ―Missile Technology Basics.‖
5.4.3.1 Boost Phase
During the boost phase, a ballistic missile is fired from its silos and starts propelling
from earth‘s atmosphere towards outer space due to the thrust produced by its rockets
or engines. It generally continues till the time its engines are under combustion
process until its indigenously produced acceleration ends. The boost phase is an
extremely tricky phase both from missile efficiency perspective as well as
engagement by an effective missile shield. During the boost phase, the missile itself is
subjected to negotiating atmospheric resistance inter-alia air pressure, temperature,
wind and above all high rate of gravitational forces acting against its upward
517
David Wright, ―Missile Technology Basics,‖ presentation at Summer webinar, Union of Concerned
Scientists, June 19, 2014, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-webinars/Summer-Symposium/Missile-
webinar-slides-6-19-14.pdf.
168
movement. Anything happening out of proportion on the missile body could impact
negatively on the smooth flight resulting into maul-functioning of rocket engines or
loss of direction due to heavy applications of ballistics.
The boost phase engagement of a hostile missile is ideally suited from defender‘s
choice. The missile during the boost phase produces enough detectable IR signatures,
which could easily be spotted through space and terrestrial based sensors for having a
red hot tail plume and heated missile fuselage due to atmospheric friction on to it.
Moreover during the boost phase it has a detectable bigger size which keeps getting
small gradually with subsequent inflight detachment of rocket motors or engines. The
identification of warhead is easier during the boost phase as decoys do not get deploy
and the warhead is singularly travelling till the midcourse phase.
Notwithstanding the favorable probability of timely detection of the missile, boost
phase engagement remains a big challenge for the interceptor missile. Main
challenges include one, very less reaction time is offered to the missile shield holder
as the boost phase is extremely short lived i.e. only 2-4 minutes and by the time
decision is taken to fire an interceptor, hostile missile is about to enter into its
midcourse phase of flight with maximum speed, two, the only answer to an assured
boost phase engagement lies in the close proximity deployment of the missile
interceptors. It includes interception by either placing airborne laser generation
capable aircraft or an outer space-based weapon system. With regard to the first
choice, placement of a bigger sized airborne laser generating aircraft in close
proximity is a dangerous preposition for being exposed to an effective Air Defense
system and hostile air force. Moreover the choice of placing weapons in outer space
for a boost phase engagement by using lasers or by using the kinetic kill devices has
political, diplomatic and economic costs. Nevertheless, to-date the option of placing
weapons in outer space has remained restricted to the rhetoric and thus could not
actualize. Without the finalization and entry into force of the PAROS treaty, the
probability of space weaponization remains actual.518
518
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―Space Force: Alarming Arms Race,‖ Pakistan Observer, June 28, 2018,
https://pakobserver.net/space-force-alarming-arms-race/.
169
5.4.3.2 Mid-Course Phase
The mid-course phase is basically the flight path which a missile follows during its
travelling through the space and thus also termed as exo-atmospheric phase. The
boost phase terminates as soon as the missile consumes its boosters and has no more
thrust to give it further speed. However, the missile continues an ascent trajectory due
to the momentum it had developed during its boost phase. As soon as the momentum
breaks the missile finally reaches its highest point of trajectory, commonly termed as
‗apogee‘. From here on it starts following a predictable descending curve towards the
intended target in a glide mode.519
During the mid-course phase the missile deploys interceptor confusing measures
including decoys, chaffs and forms a threat cloud making it difficult for the
interceptor or kill vehicle to differentiate between actual warhead and decoys.
Notwithstanding, it is relatively easier for missile shield to engage a warhead during
this phase missile shield can relatively engage the warhead during the mid-course
phase it is comparatively easy to engage due to the extended reaction time duration
i.e. 15-20 minutes in case of ICBM, predictable flight path, multiple space and
terrestrial based radars tracking the cloud simultaneously. The other good thing about
this phase is that the destroyed missile warhead doesn‘t form debris and burn out
completely on their reentry into atmosphere.520
The best counter measure against warhead during the mid-course phase is ground
based mid-course defense (GMD) system. The US also relies on its GMD system,
deployed on its mainland. 521
The system comprises of interceptors both terrestrial and
sea based (aegis BMD system) while supported by sea based X Band radar, satellite
sensors and ground based tracking radars.
5.4.3.3 Terminal Phase
The terminal phase of warhead trajectory is the last and final phase that starts from
the moment the warhead reenters into atmosphere through the outer space and lasts 519
Federation of American Scientists. ―Ballistic Missile Basics.‖ https://fas.org/nuke/intro/
missile/basics.htm. 520
―Ballistic Missile Basics.‖ 521
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). ―Missile Threat.‖
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/
170
till the time it detonates. It is an extremely short-lived phase, which extends up to less
than a minute during which the warhead descends at a speed of more than 3200
kilometer per hour.522
It is the least desired phase for a defender to opt for warhead
engagement, as there is hardly any time for reaction besides extremely difficult to
track a small sized warhead moving at an extremely fast speed. There are no chances
of error and any slackness could have unimaginable cost. Currently, the US is using
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and PATRIOT Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) types of missile defense system for terminal phase engagement
of a hostile missile/ warhead.
5.5 BMD –Fundamental Concept
The ICBMs are considered to be the best substitute for the long ranged aircraft that
used to be subjected to technical, tactical and atmospheric limitations. To offset the
ICBMs‘ supremacy, BMD concept was developed. A BMD system, as the name
implies, is defense against an ICBM or its warhead that because of height and speed
cannot be countered by normal conventional means. It comprises of interceptor
missiles that could reach longer ranges to kill the incoming hostile ballistic missile
either during all three phases of its flight, its associated early warning and tracking
satellites or radars. BMD system in other words implies ‗hitting the bullet with a
bullet‘.
In a simpler term, a missile shield has to be layered i.e. defense in depth, viably
integrated with supportive systems for instance radars and satellites, airborne early
warning systems etc. to provide real time early warning, battle awareness and assured
communication for exercising command and control during critical stages of the
attack and lastly should be able to provide protection against all kinds of missiles with
varying ranges. Coordinated and collaborative amalgamation of geographically
dispersed BMD sensors and interceptors ensure the protection of own as well as
allies‘ assets. The US contemporarily is the only global power, which is exercising a
viable integrated missile shield across the globe. To be more precise, satellites and
radars act as eyes and ears of a missile shield, interceptors are the main cogent force
522
Arms Control Organisation. ―U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.‖
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense#ballistic.
171
while command and control / communication and battle assessment instruments are
the thinking and accuracy calculating sides of any missile shield. Pictorial
representation of complete BMD intercept anatomy523
is as under:
Figure 5.2
Ballistic Missile Defence Engagement Process
Source: David Wright, ―Missile Technology Basics.‖
5.6 Evolution of the BMD System
The US along with Soviet Union and the United Kingdom spearheaded the BMD
concept almost seventy three years back i.e. in 1945 when the US President Harry
Truman suggested to have a limited missile defense based on the concept of anti-
523
Right, ―Missile Technology Basics.‖
172
aircraft weapons system.524
The concept was envisaged amid the German V-1
(Cruise) and V-2 (Ballistic) missiles those were fired on London in September
1944.525
Later, the fear of Soviet Union missiles substantiated the US concerns about
its continental defense. For better comprehension of the BMD evolution, decade wise
happenings are stipulated below starting from 1944 onwards to-date.526
Mainly the
evolutionary process of BMD concept would be US centric being in the lead,
although China, Russia, NATO and Israel also have missile shield components in
their overall defensive strategies. Yet they have been either in cooperation (Israel and
NATO) or reactionary to the US BMD evolutionary process.
5.6.1 1944-1955
The V-1/2 German missile attacks in 1944 were the start point of the missile age
which subsequently paved the way for development of ballistic missile counter
measures. At that time the Germans were technologically well off with regard to
ballistic missile development capability and had plans to develop even ICBMs if the
World War II protracted beyond 1945. Later throughout the decade, BMD concept
was restricted to conceptual and technological debates. During the 1944-1955 decade
nothing came up tangible with regard to evidential development of the BMD systems
by any of the advanced countries i.e. the US, UK and Soviet Union less carrying out
feasibility research projects.
5.6.2 1956 -1965
Serious and tangible actualization efforts for BMD systems‘ development started
when the Soviet Union had launched its first ICBM and the first ever-artificial
satellite ‗Sputnik‘ in October 1957. The two acts by the Soviet Union were carried
out at the peak of Cold War and sequentially, the US also responded in the same kind
by testing its own ICBM ‗Atlas‘ in September same year.527
The tit-for-tat US-Soviet
524
Vladimir P. Kozin, Evolution of the US Missile Defense and Russia’s Stance (1945-2013)
(Moscow: Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013): 1-5. 525
Garwin, ―Ballistic Missile Defense and Space Weapons,‖ 3. 526
―The Beginning of Missile Defense (1944-2002),‖ accessed January 23, 2018,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/missile/etc/cron.html. 527
Global Security. ―Weapons of Mass Destruction: Atlas 65.‖
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/sm-65.htm
173
acts of testing ICBMs changed the threat scenarios with both rivals. Counter
measures i.e. BMD systems were natural response.
Following their respective ICBM tests, both the Americans and Russians had started
their respective BMD programs. In 1961, Soviet Union took a lead by testing its first
ever-terrestrial based BMD system.528
The US followed the suit and in 1962 tested its
state of the art nuclear tipped terrestrial based BMD system ‗Nike-Zeus‘.529
The
Nike-Zeus BMD system was designed to blow off close to the target ICBM up in
space i.e. during midcourse phase. It could be a direct hit destruction or by shock
waves produced by nuclear detonation.530
Later same year i.e. 1962, Cuban Missile Crises brought the two sides closer to
nuclear brinksmanship. Deployment of Soviet Union‘s missiles on Cuban soil and
waters exponentially increased the need for a potent missile shield for defense of the
US mainland. It is still perceived that the absence of a potent and layered missile
shield brought the US side on negotiating table. The US President Kennedy
negotiated removal of its missiles from Turkey soil as a bargain to the removal of
Soviet missiles from Cuban soil.531
Having seen the brinksmanship through the
Cuban Missile Crises, the US escalated its BMD system development and in 1963
shifted to layered missile shield titled ‗Nike-X‘. It comprised of long and short range
missile defense components i.e. capability to hit the target ICBM during midcourse as
well as during the terminal phase. While the two layers were being extensively
developed, the US scientists were in parallel carrying out research to find out ways
and means to kill an ICBM right during its initial phase of stabilization i.e. boost
phase.532
528
Greg Thielmann, ―Strategic Missile Defense: A Reality Check,‖ Arms Control Association, May
21, 2009, 3, https://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/TAB_StrategicMissileDefense.pdf. 529
―Nike Zeus,‖ Flight International (August 1962): 165,
large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph241/theodosis2/docs/nikezeus.pdf. 530
Ibid, 165-166. 531
Barton J. Bernstein, ―The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?,‖ Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Spring, 1980): 97. 532
Encyclopedia of Britannica. ―Nike Missile.‖ https://www.britannica.com/technology/Nike-missile.
174
5.6.3 1966-1975
The missile and counter missile race between the two Cold War rivals created sense
of insecurity among other emerging global powers including China which
demonstrated its own nuclear capable missile development capacity in 1964. The
addition of Chinese factor in the US security calculus besides the confirmed reports
of Soviets‘ actual deployment of missile shield around Moscow in 1966, the US
defense engineers were quick to reveal their new advanced version of missile shield
‗Sentinel‘ in 1967 that replaced the Nike-X missile shield. Sentinel missile shield
concept pivoted around idea of deploying around 700 nuclear tipped missile
interceptors around the US major cities so as to mitigate the developing missile
threats emanating from the Soviet Union and China.533
Although there have been nuclear related arms control initiatives being pursued at
various multi-lateral forums during this decade, yet there was nothing legal with
regard to controlling missile proliferation both offensive and defensive as well as
space weapons. Foregoing in view, the arms control community was able to prevail
and the Outer Space Treaty (OST) was negotiated in 1967. On the parallel, nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was opened for signatures in 1968. The global arms
control trend against proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies pushed the US
civil society and various human rights champions to protest against the US Sentinel
missile shield for the reason of dangerously exposing the civilians to nuclear
warheads. The protest resulted into trimming down of the Sentinel missile shield
program in 1969 that was finally reduced to ‗safeguard‘ purposes only i.e. to
safeguard against missile threat against the US long-range missile silos.534
Along the political front, the US President Nixon in those days was subjected to
public pressure for the US protracted war of Vietnam (1955-1975) for being
overstretched/ protracted and causing causalities to the US soldiers and inflicting
drain on the US economy. In order to reduce the burden of Cold War and finding
political solution to the Vietnam War, President Nixon took the bold initiative of
533
Alexander Flax, ―Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and History,‖ Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 2,
Weapons in Space, Vol. I: Concepts and Technologies (Spring, 1985): 36-38. 534
Ibid, 36.
175
getting into a historic arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. As a result, US-
Soviet bilateral treaty titled, ‗Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) – I‘ was
signed in 1972 after a hectic negotiation exercise of two and half years. The treaty
had vital significance with regard to offensive and defensive missile controls. The
two cold war rivals decided to freeze their respective ground and sea based ICBM
programs and also agreed to reduce the missile shields to only two sites with total of
100 interceptor missiles for protecting the vital assets.535
Based on SALT-I
commitments, the ABM Treaty was signed at 1972 Moscow Summit.
The ABM Treaty was one of the effective treaty between the two belligerents i.e. the
US and Soviet Union. Under this treaty, both parties had agreed to limit only one site
to be protected by the respective ABM weapons and thus putting a stop to the
development of offensive missiles. Under this treaty provisions, both parties agreed
not to develop, test and deploy space-based, sea-based, air-based and mobile land-
based systems and components of the ABM systems. Verification mechanism was
also put in place. However, later in December 2001, the US President Bush invoked
the treaty on the pretext that the treaty limits the US research and development related
to national security.536
The US withdrawal from the treaty yet again increased
suspicions about its intent to develop space weapons as the BMD and space weapons
are same technology.
Interestingly, later in 1974 the two sides of the ABM Treaty decided to reduce the
number of missile shield sites from two to one as neither sides had so much of
interceptors. The US chose to defend the safeguard missile silos (North Dakota) while
Soviets opted to defend Moscow which was already there in their strategic defensive
plan. It is important to recall that the missile shield under safeguard program could
not last much and got deactivated within 4 months of its operationalization in 1976.537
535
The Day in History. ―Cold War: 1972 SALT Agreements Signed.‖ Accessed January 23, 2018.
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/salt-agreements-signed. 536
Atomic Archive. ―Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972).‖
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty9.shtml. 537
Gregory S. Bowen, ―Safeguard: North Dakota‘s Front Line in the Cold War,‖ Missile Defense
Advocacy (Spring 2004), missiledefenseadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Safeguard-bmd-
paper.pdf.
176
5.6.4 1976-1985
Due to the gradually reducing interests in the missile shield, first seven years of the
decade i.e. from 1976-1985, remained dormant less research and development
projects. The missile shield silence; however, was broken when the US President
announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983,538
which was soon
dubbed by Regan‘s opponent side as ‗Star Wars‘. The SDI was the first dent to the
1972 ABM Treaty. The US President Regan while unveiling his SDI concept urged
the US scientists who made nuclear bombs to use their intellect by building shield
against them - a missile shield. President Regan in ‗US National Security Decision
Directive 119‘resolved to use missile shield being envisaged under SDI program for
switching from an offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence.539
The SDI proved to
be instrumental in successful development/ test firing of terrestrial based missile
shield based on kinetic, laser and chemical kill technologies from 1984-1985.
5.6.5 1986-1995
From 1985 to 1989, the US administration under Regan continued with research on
probabilities and efficacies of missile shield under SDI purview. It was 1989, when
the George Bush Senior Administration came in which had a cautious approach
towards the SDI for three reasons one, the huge cost involved in developing,
deployment and sustenance of missile shield, two, viability of protecting complete US
mainland and lastly, the Cold War was almost over and Soviet Union was losing its
strategic threat value to the US.540
Notwithstanding, the US Administrations was
under a strategic security dilemma i.e. if the US had abandoned the missile shield
program, it meant exposing its citizens to the mercy of missile capable states and if
had opted to continue, the cost involved did not show favorable indicators.
538
Steven R. Weisman, ―Reagan Proposes U.S. Seek New Way to Block Missiles,‖ The New York
Times, March 24, 1983, https://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/science/032483missile-def-
speech.html. 539
Homeland Security Digital Library. ―National Security Decision Directive 119: Strategic Defense
Initiative.‖ Accessed January 12, 2018. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=463017. 540
Donald R. Baucom1, ―The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles,‖ The Journal of Social, Political and
Economic Studies, Volume 29, Number 2 (Summer 2004): 155.
177
The Bush Administration opted for the first choice and while hedging behind the SDI,
started working on the concept of ‗Brilliant Pebbles (BPs)‘ in 1989.541
The BP
concept envisaged considerable numbers of satellites having interceptor missiles
orbiting in the outer space that could engage the hostile missiles during their boost or
mid-course phases after having detected the missile through their integral infrared
radars. The BPs‘ concept while being researched met with loss of interest due to; one,
due to the first Gulf War initiation in which the US troops were exposed to the Iraqi
Scud missiles which were effectively engaged by the US Patriot missile shield and
secondly, due to the melting ice between the US and Russia who reached on to
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)-I and II in 1991 and 1993 respectively.
The BP‘s concept was resultantly relegated in favor of having Global Protection
against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in 1991 - a SDI refocusing approach542
, to provide
protection from limited ballistic missile strikes. It was later made part of the
December 1991 Missile Defense Act also.543
The 1991 MDA also mandated the US
Department of Defense to vigorously pursue a ‗Theater Missile Defense to protect the
US troops in field.544
With increase in bilateral warmth between the US and Russia, in May 1993 the
Clinton Administration officially declared that the ‗Star War Era is over‘ and
renamed Strategic Defense Initiative Organisation (SDIO) as Ballistic Missile
Defense Organisation (BMDO) that would only research for solutions to the regional
ballistic missile defense instead of intercontinental.545
It was widely rejected by the
Republicans and took it as an excuse against building a BMD shield as conceived by
their previous Regan and Bush senior Administrations.546
541
Ibid, 153-154. 542
Steven A. Hildreth, ―Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview,‖ Summary of CRS Report for
Congress (July 2007): 4. 543
Baucom1, ―The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles,‖: 172-173, 544
See Section II of the US Missile Defense Act of 1999,
https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ38/PLAW-106publ38.pdf. 545
Bryan Schatz, ―A History of Missile Defense, From ―Star Wars‖ to Trump,‖ January 27, 2017,
accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/donald-trump-missile-
defense-star-wars/. 546
Ibid.
178
5.6.6 1996-2006
In March 1999, the US President Clinton after a continued low profiled research and
development projects and long heated debates between democrats (anti-ABM system)
and republicans (pro-ABM system)547
over having a National Missile Defense
(NMD) finally signed the 1999 National Missile Defense Act. The act mandated the
administration without any specified timeline to develop and deploy an effective
NMD as soon as technologically feasible. The mandate speaks itself of a withdrawn
approach towards having a NMD system.
Earlier, Clinton Administration having zoomed on to Theater Missile Defense (TMD)
system wanted to have leverage in deployment of ABM system that could address the
missile threat from the North Korea and Iran. However, Russia was skeptical about
the US move and the ABM treaty became a sour point between the two members of
the treaty. The US at that time started thinking of getting out of the ABM Treaty;
however, President Clinton left it to the new US President Bush.548
In 2001, the Bush Junior got elected as the US President and right after his election
took a number of decisions with regard to missile defense. Being a Republican
President, he did not take long to express his dis-satisfaction over the ABM Treaty
viability and validated his ambition of deploying a robust and effective NMD system
despite Russian President Putin‘s warning about prohibition of NMD by both sides
under the rubrics of ABM Treaty. The evolving NMD concept by the US was
received with mixed vibes among the NATO allies. Britain supported the NMD while
France and Germany opposed the NMD system. Notwithstanding, President Bush
went his own way and the missile defense budget was increased by 57 percent for the
FY 02 i.e. from US $ 3billion to US $ 8.3 billion.549
547
Rex Wingerter, ―What Drives the Development of US Missile Defense and Space-Based Weapons?
The Role of US Domestic Interest Groups,‖ Asian Perspective, Special Issue: Avoiding an Arms Race
in Space, Vol. 35, No. 4, (October- December, 2011): 562. 548
Ann Byers, America’s Start Wars Program (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2005), 52-
54. 549
Union of Concerned Scientists. ―US Ballistic Missile Defense Timeline: 1945-Today.‖ Accessed
January 23, 2018. https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-missile-defense/missile-defense-
timeline#.WmyMEHxsDIU.
179
The US President Bush, having no obligations of the ABM Treaty, opted to have a
limited missile defense system i.e. ―fixed, land-based, non-nuclear system‖. The
system had five components including interceptor missiles, command and control
infrastructure, two types of radars (to detect of incoming hostile missiles) and an
infrared system (satellite based radar to detect the missile before even it is detected
and later tracked by the X-band terrestrial based radar). Bush‘s missile defense
system was dependent upon a constellation of 24 satellites for early detection,
tracking and passage of communication to the interceptors.550
Despite having secured the US mainland, the 9/11 attacks took place from a new kind
of threat elements i.e. non-state actors, the terrorists. The 9/11 incident acted as a
catalyst to further strengthen the US security concerns that manifested change in
Clinton‘s approach of single site NMD. The 2001 US Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) Report indicated:
―Integrating missile defenses with other defensive as well as offensive means
will safeguard the Nation's freedom of action, enhance deterrence by denial,
and mitigate the effects of attack if deterrence fails. The ability to provide
missile defenses in anti-access and area-denial environments will be essential
to assure friends and allies, protect critical areas of access, and defeat
adversaries……DoD has refocused and revitalized the missile defense
program, shifting from a single-site "national" missile defense approach to a
broad-based research, development, and testing effort aimed at deployment
of layered missile defenses. These changes in the missile defense program
will permit the exploration of many previously untested technologies and
approaches that will produce defenses able to intercept missiles of various
ranges and in various phases of flight‖.551
The QDR had indicated President Bush pro-BMD intentions and in December 2001
Americans used the withdrawal clause of ABM Treaty and its withdrawal process
finalized after six months in June 2002. Consequently, the ABM Treaty was
terminated.552
The BMDO was renamed as Missile Defense Agency (MDA). It was
initially thought to be very ambitious as layered defense would demand more funds
and resources. However, the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS) highlighted
550
Byers, America’s Start Wars Program, 53-54. Also see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―India‘s Endorsement
of the US BMD, Challenges for Regional Stability,‖ IPRI Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 2001. 551
US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, accessed
January 20, 2018, archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 552
United States History. ―Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.‖ Accessed January 12, 2018. http://www.u-s-
history.com/pages/h1795.html.
180
the changed strategy in which the US unveiled a ‗preemption‘ based deterrence
strategy instead of retaliation and the US layered missile shield was identified in that
as an important factor to counter missile attacks.553
From year 2002 to 2004, the Bush Junior Administration invested heavily in
strengthening its missile shield program and carried out a number of tests of its
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System besides research and development
of TMD. In 2004, finally the US fielded its GMD system silos initially at Alaska
(Fort Greely) and later another in California. Next year i.e. in 2005, the US Naval
version of the BMD ‗AEGIS‘ was given an enhanced role of engagement from only
providing a surveillance/ tracking responsibility.554
5.6.7 2007-2018
From 2007 to 2009, a number of sea and ground based missile interceptors had been
carried out; however, major activity in tangible terms, both technologically and
politically, happened in 2009 when President Obama took over the US Presidency.
He introduced the concept of taking missile shield away from the US mainland in
Europe titled, ‗European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) i.e. against the
President Bush concentration on having homeland based missile shield. The concept
deployed sea based Aegis system against short and medium range missiles threat
emanating from rogue states inter-alia Iran.555
It was an addition to the NATO missile
shield that deployed in three phases from 2011-2018. The fourth phase which will be
deployed in 2022 was however, cancelled556
in 2013 as a restructuring act of
European missile shield mainly due to two reasons i.e. cuts in congressional funding
and evolving North Korean threat. The US Administration amid growing threatening
strategic capabilities of North Korea inter-alia 2013 nuclear test and having mobile
ICBM capability, opted for strengthening homeland missile shield and diverted
553
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September
2002, accessed January 20, 2018, history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2002.pdf. 554
Arms Control Organisation. ―U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.‖ 555
Arms Control Organisation. ―The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance.‖ Accessed
January 12, 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach. 556
Ibid.
181
missile shield funding to increase GMD systems from 30-44 at Alaska along with an
X-Band radar to be deployed in Japan for early warning.557
The era from 2015 to 2018 has been marred with test flights of GMD systems by the
US MDA. The results have been fluctuating and remain not very sure of the missile
shield efficacy. The DPRK and Iranian threats kept evolving amid their nuclear and
long ranged missile programs besides the traditional threats from the China and
Russian Federation. The US Congress being skeptical of its security levels against
missile threats had asked its MDA to even conceptualize outer-space-based missile
shield in October 2015:558
―……commence the concept definition of a space-based ballistic
missile intercept layer to the ballistic missile defense system that provides(1)
a boost-phase layer for missile defense; or (2) additional defensive options
against direct ascent anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic glide vehicles, and
maneuvering reentry vehicles.‖
Besides identifying the need for outer-space-based weaponry, the US Congress also
removed word ‗limited‘ from its missile defense policy. It was received with mixed
reactions both at home and abroad as the removal of word ‗limited‘ did open a new
avenue of placing weapons in outer space. Critiques of the US homeland GMD
system, call the US efforts of weaponizing the space nothing but a sham idea. They
also view that even the US darkens the outer space with hundreds of missile
interceptors; a determined missile attack cannot be stopped. They also criticize that
the 30-44 interceptors deployed at the two silos location has cost the US exchequer
over US $ 200 billion and now the outer space-based weapons would even cost
exuberantly.559
The threat posed by the nuclearized North Korea to the US despite President Donald
Trump and Chairman Kin summit on June 12, 2018 at Singapore could not be
underestimated. The North Korea increased its military muscles to address existential
threats from the US side. It has carried out six nuclear tests since 2006 with last one
557
Tom Z. Collina, ―Pentagon Shifts Gears on Missile Defense,‖ Arms Control Today, April 2, 2013,
accessed January 23, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_04/Pentagon-Shifts-Gears-on-
Missile-Defense. 558
Union of Concerned Scientists. ―US Ballistic Missile Defense Timeline: 1945-Today.‖ 559
David Willman, ―Congress Scrapped This One Word From the Law, Opening the Door To A Space
Arms Race.‖ Los Angeles Times, December 22, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-missile-
defense-unlimited-20161221-snap-20161221-story.html.
182
carried out in September 2016 while tested its missiles for twenty times in 2017.560
The US GMD is earmarked to defend against such threats. On the other hand, in order
to protect its allies inter-alia Japan and naval fleets around Guam, the US had
deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea and Guam
in 2017 and 2013 respectively.561
The deployment was made despite strong Chinese
opposition to the act.562
In 2017, the US had successfully tested its THAAD, GMD
and Aegis missile shield systems and shown resolve to further improve the
accuracy.563
Most importantly in 2017, the Trump Administration has vowed to reinvigorate the
US BMD program and committed to enhance the missile shield budget by many
billions of US Dollars. Reportedly the US National Defense Authorization Act has
shown a possibility of increasing the BMD budget by about 2.5 billion US Dollars.
Among many improvements of the BMD system, the increase BMD budget is
planned to be utilized for an increase in GMD interceptors from 44 to 64? under the
US GMD program.564
To conclude, it can be inferred from above evolutionary process of missile shield that
it is yet to find a whole hearted acceptability by even its holders. A missile shield puts
extra burden on the exchequer vis-à-vis the kind of protection it assures. Not only the
missile shield is not cost favorable, it can also act a catalyst to yet another arms race
in world. The US missile shields in terms of its GMD, THAAD or Aegis systems has
not addressed in totality the threat emanating from its arch rivals Russia and China.
Instead, it has embroiled itself into spending huge exchequer to address threats from
rogue states inter-alia North Korea and Iran. Both China and Russia are following
‗wait and see‘ approach and remain skeptical of the missile shield development.
560
Christina Zhao, ―North Korea Expected to Test a Missile Loaded With a Live Nuclear Weapon in
2018,‖ Newsweek, December 22, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-test-missile-loaded-
nuclear-weapon-2018-756557. 561
Gregory Kulacki, ―Chinese Concerns About U.S. Missile Defense,‖Union of Concerned Scientists
(July 2014): 3-4, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/china-
missile-defense.pdf. 562
Ibid, 3-5. 563
Arms Control Organisation. ―U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.‖ 564
Jonathan Bergner, ―A Smart Way to Maximize Missile Defense Dollars.‖The Washington Times,
October 25, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/25/missile-defense-funding-must-
be-maximized/.
183
Albeit, nothing concrete has been demonstrated or claimed by the US to-date about
developing the space-based missile shield, yet it has created a sense of insecurity
among its competitors who could also opt for the same course thus destabilizing the
outer space and much needed long terms sustainability.
5.7 Significance of BMD Systems in Strategic Security Calculus
Since BMD system and space weapons have same family tree, the debate about BMD
system efficacy should be seen in the perspective of its relevance or nexus with the
space weapons. Missile shield has a mix impression about its significance. There are
two tangent schools of thoughts out of which one supports having a missile shield
while the other opposes it. Both the schools have viable and logical arguments to
support their respective positions. An effort shall be made to highlight both
supportive and dissident arguments with regard to efficacy of a BMD system i.e.
whether BMD is effective, viable and fool proof counter ballistic missile measure or
have some exploitable loop holes that make the arguments of anti-BMD school
thought strong and prudent. The supportive arguments shall be discussed first so that
to identify emanating paradoxes attached to them.
5.7.1 BMD System – Supportive Arguments
Action-reaction phenomenon has been on cards with regard to development of BMD
systems across the globe. The gradual ballistic missiles‘ advancement kept pulling
along its reactionary technology i.e. missile shield. The US has been in lead of
developing different kinds of BMD shields in response to the Soviet Union and
Chinese nuclear tests in 1950s and 1960s and their core nuclear delivery mean i.e.
ballistic missiles. It was Chinese nuclear test of 1964 that prompted the US to
officially declare deployment of first ever missile shield ‗Sentinel‘.565
Despite of the fact that BMD systems‘ pragmatism has faced challenges vis-à-vis
opponents tangent arguments, it remained on military inventory of those states which
had power status consciousness and security concerns, for instance, the US, Russia,
565
Kimberly Misher, ―Why Obama is Right on Missile Defense - What‘s Next?,‖ Policy Outlook,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 2009): 2, accessed January 23, 2018,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/09/18/why-obama-is-right-on-missile-defense-what-s-next-pub-
23857.
184
China, Israel, India, Japan and Germany. The approach reveals that to whatever
degree a BMD shield has pragmatic standing with regard to its viability; it merited an
acceptable level of confidence by the major powers for projection of their power as
well as for adding to defense potency.
The proponents of missile shield argue that the BMD system could address the
developing ballistic missile threat which is not only proliferating vertically but
horizontally as well. Supporters of missile shield argue that it generates a strategic
environment in which concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) based
deterrence is relegated in favor of deterrence by denial. They opine that it would not
be wise to first bear an unimaginable toll of casualties due to a nuclear attack and then
operationalize the second strike capability.566
In addition, having a missile shield would keep the political leverage in beholders‘
hands for negotiating peace from position of strength that could be achieved through
a strong defensive mechanism in place and breakthrough capacity.567
Restrictions on
building a defensive missile shield could perpetuate vulnerabilities of a state,568
which
might not fall under the right choices of a sovereign state and especially for those
states that are super powers or are aspirant for the super power status. Missile defense
restrictions on an adventurist state with rogue leadership in power; for instance North
Korea vis-à-vis the US could make the foreign policy choices hostage to the
aggressor‘s maul intents. The worst political situation might not be averted by having
MAD based deterrence or an assured reprisal capability but by having an effective
defensive missile shield which would deny an aggressive initiative to the rogue
leadership of a reckless state.569
566
Jim DeMint and James Jay Carafano, ―33 Years and 33 Minutes: Why Missile Defense Is More
Necessary Than Ever,‖ The Heritage Foundation, March 24, 2016, accessed January 31, 2018,
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/33-years-and-33-minutes-why-missile-defense-more-
necessary-ever. 567
Riki Ellison, ―Missile Defense in the Next Four Years.‖ The Washington Times, February 14, 2017,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/14/missile-defense-in-the-next-four-years/. 568
Michaela Dodge, ―U.S. Missile Defenses Keep North Korea on Good Behavior.‖ The Washington
Times, October 23, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/23/us-missile-defenses-
keep-north-korea-on-good-behav/. 569
DeMint and Carafano, ―33 Years and 33 Minutes.‖
185
BMD and air defense have nexus too.570
BMD proponents argue that it could
alternatively be used against long-range strategic bombers or a normal/ stealth jet
fighter at Beyond Visual Ranges (BVRs) in a theater scenario. A BMD system on
military inventory provides a leverage to initiate a counter-force first strike. The
counter-force first strike whether conventional or nuclear could break the enemy‘s
will. With first strike, enemy‘s missile capability would likely be degraded and very
few of them would be fired in retaliation as part of second-strike strategy. In such a
favorable situation, a BMD system with even low kill probability would be able to
take on ballistic missiles successfully. Overall the offensive strategy emanating from
the comfort provided by the BMD system on inventory would enable its possessor to
exert itself and reduce the chances of an all-out war, thus, employing its military
power potential elsewhere including defending its allies, projection of power beyond
its territory/ region and providing extended deterrence.
Missile shield proponents also argue that every weapon system has to have a counter
measure, as every technology remains evolving. Empirically also, in 1945 while
addressing Congress, the US President Truman commented, ―Every new weapon will
eventually bring some counter defense to it‖.571
Foregoing, the missile shield
supporters argued that lest the counter technology to ICBMs is developed by the
competitor, it is better to rest the initiative with oneself. One may not keep itself
oblivious of the evolving and unpredictable nature of technology and keep the guards
high so as not to be surprised at the critical time. General Nikolai Talensky argued as
early as 1965:
―…….every decisive new means of attack inevitably leads to the
development of a new means of defense. The sword produced the shield; the
improvement of naval artillery caused battleships to be clad in plate armor;
torpedo-carrying submarines produced a specific system of anti-submarine
defense…‖572
570
Glaser, ―Do We Want the Missile Defenses,‖ 47-49. 571
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003),
29. 572
Columba Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defense: Technology, Security and Culture (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 89.
186
In addition, missile shield supporters opine that defensive natured forces or weapons
are more suited vis-à-vis offensive forces for deterrence purposes.573
An offensive
element on inventory might keep its possessor obsessed with the option of employing
them whenever an opportunity pops-up. Hence, it is better to have defensive means as
compared to the offensive, for dissuading a nuclear weapon equipped opponent from
strategic blackmailing or launching an unwarranted offensive. A missile shield in this
context could prove to be strategically useful as ‗insurance‘ against the probability of
deterrence failure or against an attempt by the aggressor to call its rival‘s nuclear
bluff – an extremely dangerous preposition.574
Mr. Columba People, while justifying missile shield in his work titled, ‗Justifying
Ballistic Missile Defense: Technology, Security and Culture‘, offered to substitute
word ‗war‘ with either arms control or arms race or weapon [missile shield] in
famous Clausewitz dictum, ―war should never be thought of as something
autonomous but always as an instrument of policy‖.575
People‘s thesis in support of
missile shield pivoted around his argument that it‘s the intent that matters. BMD
system is defensive in nature and is meant to check the evil designs of the rogue
states. It‘s the states‘ policy that a weapon on its inventory has to serve offensive or
defensive purpose. BMD system is meant for defense and as per the stated policy of
state of employing it in a defensive role, for instance, the USA, BMD development
merits positive consideration for the overall betterment of the BMD possessor state.576
Along the military advantages of having BMD system, proponents of missile shield
profess that it would ensure survivability of strategic missiles in silos – one of the
core element of strategic deterrence, albeit, nuclear submarines have reduced the
vulnerability factor attached to ground based missiles, yet it would be desirable to
have alternate delivery platforms instead of banking on one kind i.e. sea based second
strike capability. The survival assured through BMD system would make enemy think
many times before venturing into an offensive act. On the contrary side, if there is no
573
Andreas Katsouris and Daniel Gouré, ―Strategic Crossroads in South Asia: The Potential Roles for
Missile Defense,‖ Comparative Strategy, 18:2 (1999): 179. 574
Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defense, 186. 575
Ibid, 185-187. Also see John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Maryland: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 50. 576
Ibid, 187-188.
187
missile defense in place; the absence could instigate an equally equipped and
determined enemy to use coercive means to exploit one‘s vulnerabilities. Moreover,
besides ensuring the survivability of ICBMs, a BMD system is also essential for
protecting the command, control and communication (C3) setup. A secured C3 setup
would deter an enemy due to the fear of an unimaginable level of retaliation despite
first strike.577
BMD system is also believed to be an instrument of raising the nuclear threshold.
States are taken as rational actors and therefore behave rationally on the global
strategic landscape. Although, opponent side of BMD system claim that BMD cannot
ensure a total survival of all important assets across the length and breadth of a state,
the pro BMD scholars are of the view that even a limited BMD capability would
perform its role in raising the level of nuclear threshold.578
BMD supporters argue
that if an aggressor plans to strike an adversary with nuclear weapons, it shall not
initiate a small or limited attack but a large attack so as to ensure that the BMD
system deployed by the recipient state is exhausted. Possibility of launching a large
scale nuclear attack is extremely questionable for the two reasons, one, states are
rational actors and two, the amount of nuclear retaliation could be in an unimaginable
magnitude thereby nothing left for meeting the desired political or strategic military
ends. Hence, BMD whether limited or full scale is supported for protracted peace.
BMD and arms control initiatives are interlinked, BMD proponents believe. BMD
supporters take the lead from the US President Regan‘s famous speech of March
1983 in which he unveiled the SDI program. In his speech, President Regan said:
―….Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war
by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control.
``Deterrence'' means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks
about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests,
concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he
understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our
strength; weakness only invites aggression…. I am directing a
comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and
development [SDI] program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of
eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the
577
Charles L. Glaser, ―Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build?,‖ International Security,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer, 1985): 29. 578
Glaser, ―Do We Want the Missile Defenses,‖ 33.
188
way for arms control measures to eliminate the [nuclear] weapons
themselves….‖579
BMD proponents also argue that a BMD system could play an effective role in
mitigating the possibility of an accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized fire of an
ICBM, albeit, the possibility of such a happening is remote due to the ever increased
security consciousness of states. BMD supporters view the BMD system as blessing
in this regard which could act as a stabilizer in such an impromptu happening.580
A BMD system may not fully protect a state; however, could prove useful for
meeting a state‘s strategy ends against its rival. Any new technology that could add to
the security of one would sequentially lead the competitor to make up the
deficiencies. BMD system introduction by one state could embroil the other side into
military competition thereby impacting strain on other‘s economy i.e. economic strain
imposed through technology advancement.581
However, it depends on military and
political leadership to whether succumb to the security buildup pressure or remain
content with whatever they have on their military inventory. Empirically, only those
states opt for an arms race who either had existential threat, for instance, North Korea
and Iran or those states who were super power status conscious, for instance, the US
and Russia besides great power aspirant states inter-alia India.
5.7.2 BMD System – Challenges and Paradoxes
―Hitting a bullet with a bullet‖ is a commonly used maxim for explaining the
complexed natured BMD system. Hitting a bullet with a bullet at thousands of miles
up in outer space moving with thousands of kilometers per minute involves a delicate
technology which has a correspondingly high cost too. The exuberant cost involved in
development and maintenance vis-à-vis the low hit probability chances have kept the
BMD system development under severe criticism by its critiques. For instance, the
US since its announcement of SDI program has spent hundreds of billions of US
dollars on BMD related R&D; however, the confidence about its efficacy still
remains doubtful.
579
US President Regan‘s address to the Nation, on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983,
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm. 580
Glaser, ―Do We Want the Missile Defenses,‖ 41-42. 581
Ibid, 45-47.
189
The absolute accuracy of a missile defense is still a big question mark. As brought out
earlier, everything related to having a potent missile shield is not glorifying but have
multiple costs and paradoxes attached to it. Had there been not much of cost values,
perhaps the BMD system could have been one of the favorite essential on advanced
militaries‘ inventories. A critical review of the BMD technology reveals that it is
extremely complicated with respect to coordinated and timely employment of its
widely dispersed components in all possible domains i.e. terrestrial, air, sea,
subsurface and the outer space. It makes the system extremely complex, expensive
and technologically difficult to manage.
Opponents of BMD system under grade it for its effectiveness against a hostile
missile even during the mid-course phase. Scientifically, when projectiles of varying
weights move through the space they accelerate with same speed as weight has no
value in space. Based on this theory, when a ballistic missile bus releases decoys
along with the warhead, they all move with same speed, making it difficult for the
BMD interceptor missile to differentiate between the decoy and actual warhead to be
destroyed. Moreover, the warhead temperature could also be lowered by employing
cooled shroud so as to make it difficult for the infra-red detection by the radars.582
In
such a challenging scenario of detecting and differentiating warhead from chaffs or
decoys, a defender would be compelled to fire more numbers of missiles so as to meet
the countermeasures‘ effectiveness. The approach would have two major
disadvantages, one, early exhaustion of the BMD system missiles and two, increasing
the cost of employing BMD system exponentially.
BMD system, albeit, has an impressive face to be presented against the ICBM threat;
however, it has paradoxes attached to it. Major paradox is the assured protection
probability. How much it would be effective against the hostile missile? Is it worth it
from cost-benefit perspective vis-à-vis the kind of protection it would accrue? Would
the BMD system be good enough to protect all strategically important assets as well
as the major population centers? How many numbers of BMD systems would be
582
Union of Concerned Scientists. ―How does a Missile Defense Works?.‖
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/missile-defense/how-gmd-missile-defense-
works#.WnP9xryWbcu.
190
enough? The queries keep bothering the strategic planners despite having BMD on
their credit of military inventory.
One of the major dilemmas attached to the BMD system is query about, ‗what to
protect?‘ The kind of defense a BMD system could provide is of two types i.e. Area
Defense and Point Defense. Area defense encompasses protection of major
communication or population centers like mega metropolitan cities and point defense
covers those strategic assets which if lost could compromise the existence of a state or
military potency, for instance, national command and control centers, state‘s political
capital, missile silos, strategic weapons deployment sites etc. Listing the number of
assets to be protected by a BMD is definitely not easy and has socio-politico
implications attached to it. Every citizen of the state has the right to be provided with
security by state.
It would be very difficult for the state to discriminate between major and minor cities
for providing BMD protection. Preferring a few cities for BMD protection while
relegating the others to the mercy of conventional and unconventional ICBMs could
create political dilemma for the government. Any strategic argument might not work
with the deprived population and BMD system instead of providing sense of security
could turn into a quagmire for the state. So would all the cities have BMD protection
is a big question mark when it is also a known fact that cost of a viable BMD system
is exuberant which is difficult to be beard even by the economically sound global
powers including the USA, Russian Federation and China.
Besides the socio-politico-economic aspect, the BMD system has also security
dilemma attached to it - the arms race dilemma. On the face of it, BMD system would
provide defense against ballistic missile threat but on the flip side it could directly
impinge upon the deterrence equation in the geographical region wherever the BMD
systems are introduced. Deterrence hinges upon the mutual vulnerability of the two
competitors and whenever one of the two would try to plug the vulnerability gaps, the
other would take all possible measures to balance the efforts. Plugging the
vulnerability gaps might give a false sense of security and encourage the deterrence
191
disturbing state to initiate offensive acts so as to hegemonies its authority in its related
zone of interest.
As a reaction to the efforts of addressing the vulnerability, the affected side could
engage in building its muscles as a balancing act for which it has wide array of
quantitative and qualitative choices. It is to be kept atop that it is not the relative force
size which matters but the absolute force size so that to have sufficient retaliatory
capacity against an aggressor.583
For instance, in case of a BMD system deployment,
the balancer being subjected to action-reaction syndrome, could build/ acquire its own
BMD system, build more numbers of ballistic missiles, opt for acquiring cruise
missile technology, introduce battle field or short range ballistic missile and opting
for carrying multiple numbers of warheads in one bus each capable of hitting separate
assets i.e. introducing MIRV technology. The development of MIRV capable ICBMs
by the US and Pakistan in response to the Russian and Indian BMD capabilities are
two cases for consideration. In a nutshell, the approach of balancer would pivot
around the thought that more the numbers of warheads less would be the probability
of countering them by the BMD system; hence the deterrence would remain intact.
BMD supporters‘ idealistic idea that it would provide political space to the two rival
powers or two coalitions to reduce the offensive weapons has again paradox attached
to it. None of the institution would like to negotiate its authority or importance on the
lower side. They would likely be irritated by the forced disarmament or arms control
and hence instead of getting on the back foot could play more proactively to restore
their damaged or about to be damaged credibility. The two options available to
oppressor could be; one, to either increase the number of offensive weapons so as to
outweigh the defenders‘ strength and two, to have a reciprocal equally potent
defensive measure developed so as to bring back the high tide of uncertainty or
strategic imbalance to its normal level.
To conclude, it can be ascertained from the detailed discussion on nexus between
BMD system and ASAT weapons substantially that there is a strong relationship
between the two defensive weapon systems. The two systems use the same kind of
583
Glaser, ―Do We Want the Missile Defenses,‖ 29.
192
technology and could switch their tasks even, during hour of need. The query about
space weapons probability, which was discussed in chapter 2, hence, cannot be seen
in isolation as the BMD and terrestrial based ASATs have substantial overlapping.
Controlling or proliferating BMD indirectly means controlling or proliferating ASAT
weapons.
193
CHAPTER: 6
Proliferation of Space and Missile Technologies in South Asia
India and Pakistan have been advancing their missile capabilities and improving
steadily their space programs. India has been investing in BMD Program. Instead of
balancing the BMD program of India, Pakistan has been improving its striking
capabilities. On January 24, 2017, it tested it‘s a medium-range, surface-to-surface,
ballistic missile Ababeel that uses the MIRVs technology to deliver multiple
conventional and nuclear warheads. Though India did not conduct the test of ballistic
missile having MIRV features, yet it is capable to employ Agni-III and Agni-V for
the MIRVs mission. Moreover, DRDO had already demonstrated India‘s capability to
introduce MIRVs in its missile arsenal. It had launched multiple satellites from one
booster rocket.584
The focus of the following discussion is to deliberate on the patterns of missile and
space technologies‘ proliferation in South Asia while keeping microscopic view of
India and Pakistan. An effort is made to highlight the India- Pakistan space programs
while keeping in view their respective strategic implications on the regional strategic
stability. Proliferation aspect of the space and missile technologies has been given
special treatment while looking through the prism of Indian memberships of the
MTCR, WA and the AG. A bird eye view of the US export control policies being
practiced through enlisting different entities in its Department of Commerce‘s Entity
List (EL) is also covered in detail so as to understand as to how the US manipulates
with its soft-faced domestic laws to meet its political ends. A statistical data is also
collected and presented in graphical form for putting the reality in perspective that
ascertain as to how the Indian MTCR membership enhanced its capability to increase
the rate of ballistic missile testing in last two years (2017-2018) and how it could
contribute towards horizontal and vertical missile and space related technologies‘
proliferation.
584
Loren Grush, ―Record Breaking 104 Satellites Launched Into Space by a Single Rocket,‖ The
Verge, February 15, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/2/14/14601938/india-pslv-rocket-launch-
satellites-planet-doves.
194
6.1 Indian Space Program and its Strategic Implications
The work on the acquisitioning of space capability was started by India in late 1950s
i.e. right after Sputnik launch.585
It was the US Department of Atomic Energy that
facilitated India both technologically and financially to raise its Indian National
Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) in 1962 for putting their space program
on fast track. Indian space program was internationally assisted by the US NASA and
subsequently the USSR.586
The international cooperation helped India to launch its
first sounding rocket in November 1963 from a village Thumba in Kerala Indian
state.587
After launching of its first rocket, the Indian leadership decided to create its
ISRO in 1968 that basically put the space program under more focused lens for
development of space applications and after dedicated research and development
efforts, ISRO managed launching Indian first artificial satellite named Aryabhatain in
1975 with help of Soviet Union.588
India; however, actually became ‗space faring‘
nation when in July 1980, it launched its indigenously built satellite Rohini-I using its
own SLV from its own space launching site ‗Sriharikota‘ in southern India.589
Categorization of space capable states is generally done as per following criteria, in
which India stands high vis-à-vis Pakistan:-
Table 6.1
Criteria Based Classification of States with Space Technology
Serial Categories Capabilities Countries
1. Space Faring States those have the
capabilities of manufacturing
and launching satellites
US, Russia, European
Union, China, Japan and
India
2. Space Emerging States having capability of
either manufacturing or
launching satellites
Brazil, South Korea,
South Africa, Canada,
Germany and Israel
3. Space Aspiring States who do not have the
capability of either
manufacturing or launching
Pakistan, UAE, Brazil,
Venezuela and Nigeria
585
Ajey Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?(New Delhi: Springer, 2013), 60. 586
Ibid, 59-61. 587
Ibid, 59. 588
Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organization. ―Dr. Vikram
Ambalal Sarabhai (1963-1971).‖ Accessed March 12, 2018. https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/dr-
vikram-ambalal-sarabhai-1963-1971. 589
Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, 59.
195
satellites but have strong
WILL to do so
Source: Remarks made during SUPARCO Space Security Conference, Islamabad, 30
November – 2 December 2015.
Since 1968, the ISRO has come a long way in outer space research and development
(R&D) so as to meet its vision of ―Harnessing space technology for national
development, while pursuing space science research and planetary exploration.‖590
Over a period of half a century since 1968, the ISRO has become one of the six
largest space agencies that maintain one of the largest outer space assets for multi-
purposes.591
Until now, ISRO has launched 95 different satellites/space craft
(including 1 micro and 3 nano satellites), conducted 65 launch missions, launched 9
student satellites and last but not the least conducted 2 state of the art and most
difficult re-entry missions.592
Making of inexpensive nano and tiny micro satellites in
abundance can effectively be used for intelligence to meet the field army needs.593
Indian ISRO has achieved mastery in its remote sensing capabilities which has
tremendous civilian as well as defense utilities. It launched its initial two remote
sensing satellites (IRS-1A and IRS-1B) in 1988 and 1991 with their spatial resolution
of 72.5 and 36 meters respectively.594
Indian ISRO kept improving the resolution that
enabled it for exploring and managing national natural resources that helped in
building its crops output, forest management and above all management of water
resources. India has come a long way ahead in remote sensing and is currently
capable of terrain mapping, intelligence gathering and natural resource management
590
Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organization. ―Vision and
Mission Statement.‖ Accessed March 12, 2018.https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/vision-and-mission-
statements. 591
Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organization. ―About ISRO.‖
Accessed March 12, 2018.https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro. 592
Ibid. 593
Ajey Lele, ―PSLV launches 20 Satellites in a Single Mission,‖ Institute for Defense Studies and
Analysis Comments, June 28, 2016, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/pslv-launches-20-satellites-in-single-
mission_alele_280616. 594
Vinay K Dadhwal, ―25 Years of Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) Series,‖ Paper Presented at
50th Session of Scientific & Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS, Vienna, February 11-22, 2013,
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2013/tech-44E.pdf.
196
through its RSS-2A and 2B launched in 2008 and 2010 respectively up to sub-meter
resolution which is as good as the US capability.595
Besides, the remote sensing field, ISRO has a largest fleet of communication satellites
(INSATs) in whole Asia Pacific having nine communication satellites in geo-
synchronous orbit, which is crucial for strategic satellites. The communication
satellites besides provisioning of commercial communications have a strategic value
for much needed assured battlefield communications. On March 30 2018, ISRO had a
failed attempt of launching a high-powered communication satellite onboard its
GSLV.596
The satellite would have been a state of the art communication satellite
with multi-band capability of communicating in C and S band. The satellite had ever
largest antenna width of six meters that could have enabled it to communicate in S
band through handheld ground terminals – the best liked option for any ground forces
commander to have real-time communication.597
Besides developing the RSS/ INSATs and required space applications and assets,
ISRO has also developed its indigenous cost-favorable and self-reliant space
launching capability with the foreign assistance. India launched its first Space Launch
Vehicle (SLV-3) in 1975; it gradually progressed further and developed the Polar
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). The indigenously built PSLV gave India the
capability of launching multiple satellites including of foreign countries because of
which it managed to launch approx. 237 foreign satellites of 28 different countries.598
Indian ISRO is also developing a totally new technology of launching heavy satellites
which differs from its previous expertise i.e. PSLV and SLV. The Geosynchronous
Satellite Launch Vehicle Mk-III (GSLV Mk-III) is being developed that would give
India capability of launching bigger and heavy satellites weighing approx. 4400-6000
kilograms.599
595
Lele, Asian Space Race, 61-62. 596
Chethan Kumar ―ISRO Confirms Losing Contact with Communication Satellite GSAT-6A,‖The
Times of India, April 1, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/isro-loses-contact-with-
communication-satellite-gsat-6a/articleshow/63565033.cms. 597
Ibid. 598
―About ISRO.‖ 599
Lele, Asian Space Race, 61.
197
Yet another accomplishment of Indian ISRO is launching of its own unmanned lunar
probe ―Chandrayaan-1‖, in 2008.600
ISRO plans to go ahead with its second lunar
mission Chandrayaan-2 by October 2018, as the GSLV Mk-II had a textbook launch
especially the indigenously built high thrust ‗Vikas cryogenic engine‘ on March 30,
2018 carrying Indian most powerful communication satellite (GSAT-6A).601
In 2014,
Indian ISRO made a remarkable achievement when after a travel of ten months, its
indigenously built unmanned satellite Mangalyaan reached into Mars orbit with a
budget of just 74 million US Dollars.602
India could achieve the milestone by building
mantra of ―Self-Reliance‖ instead of waiting for foreign assistance.603
The PSLV capability proved to be instrumental in opening unprecedented foreign
outer space collaboration with Indian space program. On the parallel, Indian
development of GSLV gave it the capability of launching heavy and bigger sized
communication satellites in GEO orbit i.e. thousands of miles in dark world.604
These
communication satellites are the most essential satellites for strategic command and
control purposes. The ISRO after developing state of the art space capabilities is on
course of furthering its lift capacity for heavier outer space assets, cryogenic engines,
maneuvering capabilities in outer space by developing stage wised launches using
single and two staged launch vehicles and manned missions to Moon and Mars.605
Indian outer space program has matured to the extent of matching the US, Russia, EU
space accomplishments. One of the major indicators substantiating the claim is
placement of a spacecraft by ISRO in Mars Orbit in September 2014.606
Capitalizing
600
Salman Siddiqui, ―Lagging Behind: 2040 - Pakistan‘s Space Od[d]yssey,‖ The Express Tribune,
August 1, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/415738/lagging-behind-2040-pakistans-space-oddyssey/. 601
ISRO Set to Place GSAT-6A in Orbit Today, Crucial Step for Armed Forces and Moon Mission,‖
The Times of India, March 29, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/isro-to-test-crucial-step-
for-armed-forces-and-moon-mission/articleshow/63523229.cms. 602
Agence France-Presse (AFP). ―Joy For India As Mars Mission Enters Orbit," The Express Tribune,
September 24, 2014, https://tribune.com.pk/story/766494/joy-for-india-as-mars-mission-enters-orbit/. 603
Agence France-Presse (AFP). ―After Mars, India Space Chief Aims For The Moon‖ The Express
Tribune, November 11, 2014, https://tribune.com.pk/story/789368/after-mars-india-space-chief-aims-
for-the-moon/. 604
M Somasekhar, ―GSLV Launch: A Defining Moment for Indian Space Capabilities,‖ The Hindu,
June 05, 2017, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/science/gslv-launch-a-defining-moment-
for-indian-space-capabilities/article9720242.ece. 605
―About ISRO.‖ 606
Raja Qaiser Ahmed and Misbah Arif, ―Space Militarization in South Asia: India‘s Quest for Space
Weapons and Implications for Pakistan,‖ Asian Survey, Vol. 57, No. 5 (2017): 218.
198
on such achievements, Indian political and scientific elite effectively played their
tangible role in promoting the civilian aspects of space program that was primarily
being developed for benefit of human beings as a whole and for socio-economic
Indian development only, without any tilt or indicator towards securitizing it.
India is a fast paced developing country; however, with reference to its outer space
capabilities and expertise, it could conveniently be considered as a ‗developed
country‘.607
After having developed substantial outer space capabilities over a period
of 50 years, present and previous Indian leadership is found to be visibly in favor of
utilizing outer space applications for security and defensive purposes. A secured and
protected outer space environment could substantially support Indian quest for
achieving regional major power status.608
Capacity to control outer space is one such
tangible element that could accrue its aim. The route to achieving aim of becoming
great power is dependent on modernization of its strategic forces including military
which could provide it with reach and forward posture not only in the South Asian
Region but beyond thereby increasing its political, economic and diplomatic
leverages609
- the basic necessities of becoming a great power.
Initially, the Indian space program was purely for peaceful purposes. Father of Indian
space program Dr. Sarabhai also manifested that the program shall remain purely for
peaceful purposes and shall not be diverted to power struggles as was being practiced
than by the two super powers as part of their Cold War tug. He opposed even
development of building SLV that could taint the peaceful space program.610
He
claimed that the Indian space program would concentrate on bringing peace,
modernizing and strengthening Indian society and economy by focusing on
development of satellites and space applications that could forecast natural disasters,
communication, transportation and management of resources for urban and rural
development programs.
607
Louis Brennan and Alessandra Vecchi, The business of Space: The Next Frontier of International
Competition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 108. 608
Ahmed and Arif, ―Space Militarization in South Asia,‖ 218-220. 609
―India Seeks Global Power Status: Pentagon,‖ The Times of India, March 6, 2018.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-seeks-global-power-status-
pentagon/articleshow/63191599.cms. 610
Dinshaw Misty, ―India's Emerging Space Program,‖ Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Summer,
1998): 156-157.
199
The Indian liberal and idealistic approach of peaceful usages of outer space helped in
mustering international cooperation from both the advanced space faring nations of
that time i.e. the US and the Soviet Union. Sarabhai‘s vision; however, had not lasted
for longer time and element of power acquisitioning gradually made ingress into
Indian space program for obvious reasons and compulsions. A few primary
motivations which switched the idealism based Indian space program to somewhat
realist paradigm include, Indo-Sino war of 1962, Chinese testing of its nuclear device
in 1964, opening up of bi-lateral relations between the US and China and lastly, the
Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 in which the US and UK sided with Pakistan. Due to
aforementioned security reasons and other allied motivations inter-alia prestige and
political compulsions, India conducted peaceful nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974.
In response to the Indian nuclear explosion, the Americans immediately placed ISRO
under sanctions; however, by than India had been successful in developing human
resources having the expertise in high-end technologies including outer space and
missiles.611
Diverting dual used high-end technologies acquired for peaceful purposes towards the
military purposes is nothing but proliferation. There is an intricate relationship and to
some extent a riddle to establish fine line between missiles and nuclear relationship.
Space rocket and ballistic missile technologies belong to the same family tree and no
concrete difference can be established between the two. Space rocket are inherently
dual use in nature that alternatively be employed in SLV and warhead carrier roles
with minor designed based changes. Hence civilian purposed rockets can optionally
be used as missiles, if so desires. An element of missile proliferation is therefore
embedded in acquisitioning of space technology. For instance the former, USSR used
its ICBM technology (SS-6) for launching Sputnik in 1957.612
Many advanced states
in space domain inter-alia India, UK, China France and Israel are the known
proliferators who knowingly diverted civil purposed rockets for mastering their
611
Vidya Sagar Reddy, ―ISRO‘S Commitment to India‘s National Security,‖ The Space Review,
October 31, 2016, accessed March 12, 2018,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3092/1#IDComment1058613274. 612
Greg Thielmann, ―The Missile Gap Myth and Its Progeny,‖ Arms Control Association,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_05/Thielmann.
200
missile capabilities.613
India did it twice in less than a decade timeframe (1974-1983).
First, when it diverted the nuclear know-how and fissile material acquired for
peaceful purposes for making Buddha Smile in 1974 under the soothingly romantic
title of ‗Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)‘ and secondly, India achieved mastery in
its SLV-3 program in early 1980s and within couple of years initiated its much
celebrated Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) and to be
specific Agni IRBM program in 1983.614
The Indian PNE and initiation of IGMDP
was regarded as proliferation of nuclear and space related technology and knowledge
to military side. Both events acted as catalyst to creation of NSG and MTCR in 1975
and 1987 respectively.615
Ironically, major powers led by the US got India
membership of three export control cartels i.e. MTCR, AG and WA less NSG which
is being resisted by the Chinese veto authority. Till when China will sustain, only
time can tell amid dominant real-politick based international environment. Similarly,
MTCR is directly linked to controls on WMD carriers including nuclear warheads.
The implications of discriminatory Indian entry into MTCR vis-à-vis Pakistan and
China could be devastating for the regional strategic stability.
Needless to reiterate that space related technologies have a nuclear bias that was
demonstrated during Cold War era. Moreover, generally the nuclear debate
dominated in post-World War-II era and space power issues have remained under
nuclear shadow. Less on a few occasions, outer space security concerns have been
discussed in co-relation with nuclear paradigm. Thus, giving a free hand to India in
missile and space technology has to be seen in nuclear stability perspective. Indian
scholars claim that Indian MTCR membership does not give it a preferential access to
high-end technologies as there is no distinction about exports to MTCR members and
non-members; however, it does give full authorization to trade in MTCR controlled
items to its members.616
A critical but simpler view tells a different story. A country
613
Lele, Asian Space Race, 125. 614
Ibid, 130. 615
Rakesh Sood, ―India and Non-Proliferation: Export Control Regimes,‖ Observer Research
Foundation Occasional Paper No. 150 (April 2018): 4-11. Also see Vidya Sagar Reddy, ―Exploring
Space as an Instrument in India‘s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy,‖ in Space India 2.0 Commerce,
Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives, ed. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan et al. (New Delhi:
Observer Research Foundation, 2017), 167. 616
Sood, ―India and Non-Proliferation.‖ 19.
201
which can export can also obviously import as well which would be off-course an
export from another MTCR member country. Such an exchange of bilateral
technological imports and exports with a tag of civilian use can be detrimental to the
basics of MTCR creation, especially when MTCR is not a legally binding treaty and
an initiative having neither compliance nor verification mechanism. Moreover,
MTCR membership further strengthens Indian global active role in curbing missile
proliferation - an important factor in meeting its great power status.
Similarly capability of launching multiple satellites through PSLV has a strategic
utility. During the Cold War era, only the US and USSR used to launch multiple
satellites which indirectly demonstrated technological supremacy as well as capability
to develop MIRVed missiles. Mastery in MIRV technology can only be claimed if
both ends of technology are met i.e. re-entry and multiple launch technologies. India
has both the capabilities. Albeit, India has not tested MIRV technology but it could be
inferred that it remains a screwdriver away. Presently, ISRO is utilizing the capability
for commercial purposes only, which has acquired it a considerable foreign exchequer
besides repute as a technologically advanced state.617
Leaving aside the civilian side of the Indian space program, it can be inferred from a
number of happenings and indicators that ISRO could be covertly on route to
militarizing and subsequently weaponizing its space program – a major departure
from its stated vision and mission. Weaponizing space in classical terms i.e. physical
placement of weapons in outer space seems to be an exaggerated capability by the
Indian ISRO scientists; however, developing or acquiring terrestrial based weapons
those could hit an outer space based asset is in very much Indian reach.
India, with the international encouragement is exponentially increasing its military
might to exercise its authority in the region and beyond. Outer space domination is
one such tool to manifest its great power status. Outer space capabilities would
provide India with capacity of having Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Moreover,
India has incorporated ‗Space War‘ into its military doctrine while it prepares for a
multi fronts- land, sea, air space, space and information or cyber war. Such a
617
Lele, ―PSLV launches 20 Satellites in a Single Mission.‖
202
development is counterproductive for the South Asian regional security and stability
perspectives.
6.2 Pakistan Space Program and its Strategic Ambitions
Pakistan‘s national space program dates back to 1961 for scientific research, socio-
economic development and national security.618
Dr Abdul Salam, a renowned Physics
Nobel Prize winner, was the one who initiated the Pakistan‘s outer space endeavors
by setting up a space sciences research wing under the purview of Pakistan‘s Atomic
Energy Commission in September 1961. Later the same wing was given the status of
commission (SUPARCO) in 1981.619
Soon after its inception, Pakistan collaborated
with the NASA and did not take long to test its two stage rockets i.e. Rehbar-I and II
in June 1962 to become one of the rocket launching capable state. Pakistan was third
in Asia and tenth in world to have met the prestigious milestone. It was a huge
success for Pakistani newly birthed space agency that managed successful launching
of the rockets weighing approximately 80 pounds up to a height of 130 kilometers in
space.620
Pakistan was lucky to have rocket science knowledge from NASA as at that
time the US had yet to succeed in sending its Lunar mission and hence invited
scientists from other countries to assist in related R&D.621
Despite being the first space agency in the subcontinent, SUPARCO could not keep
up the pace with the demanding space technology development. India which started
its space program almost simultaneously along with Pakistan succeeded in launching
its first satellite in 1975 titled, ―Aryabhatta-I‖, while on the other hand Pakistan‘s
space agency could manage launching of its first ever satellite in 1990 titled, ―Badr-I‖
with Chinese assistance.
Reasons for going off the space development track by Pakistani space agency could
be many. A critical look back into history indicates certain perceived reasons those
could justify slow paced Pakistani space program, to include, first, lack of economic
618
Salim Mehmud, ―Pakistan‘s Space Program,‖ Space Policy (August 1989): 217. 619
―Space Exploration and Pakistan: The Significance of Space Technology,‖ Dawn, October 15,
2012. 620
Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). ―History.‖ Accessed
March 1, 2018. http://suparco.gov.pk/pages/history.asp. 621
―Lagging Behind: 2040 - Pakistan‘s Space Od[d]yssey.‖
203
strength that could support extremely expensive space development program, two,
Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 took away the attention and resources from space
R&D and same were diverted to build military muscles, third, exponential increase in
existential threat after Indian testing of its first ever nuclear device in 1974 especially
amid Indian role in dismemberment of Pakistan might have led the Pakistani
leadership to focus their meager financial and other resources towards building
nuclear weapons program and lastly, applications of different additional licensing
requirements and sanctions on Pakistan‘s space agency SUPARCO. The sanctions
against Pakistan space program were due to the accusations on SUPARCO for
diverting the civil space technologies to building long-range missiles‘ capability for
security reasons.622
Moreover, sanctions and denial of high-end technologies came
under sharp focus when Pakistan initiated its nuclear weapons program in mid 1970s.
Pakistan; however, despite its limited resources kept its space program alive and had
been investing in carrying out different R&D projects. Having secured its frontiers at
least from a conventional large scale adventure by developing a credible full spectrum
minimum deterrence, Pakistani leadership have decided to eye on attaining high-end
space technologies for peaceful purposes.
The ultimate goal of SUPARCO is to acquire the capability to design and build
satellites for remote sensing and communications and to be able to launch
[lightweight] satellites in near-Earth orbits.623
The elements of the Pakistan space
program include, first, promotion of the peaceful uses and applications of space for
socio-economic development and national security, two, non-militarisation and -
weaponization of space, three, fulfillment of international legal obligations and
fourth, the international cooperation. Pakistan‘s National Command Authority under
its Act Number 5 of 2010 has administrative control over SUPARCO which it
exercises through the Development Control Committee (DCC). Pakistan‘s NCA is
headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan while the other members include Federal
622
Lee Kass, ―Iran‘s Space Program: The Next Genie in a Bottle?,‖ Rubin Center, September 2, 2006,
http://www.rubincenter.org/2006/09/kass-2006-09-02/. 623
Mehmud, ―Pakistan‘s Space Program,‖: 217.
204
Ministers for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior. Development Control
Committee is headed by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.624
In 2017, Pakistan‘s NCA divulged its space vision of 2047.625
Although, unlike India,
Pakistan is not a member of the MTCR through which it could have an access to
latest space related technologies, it is furthering its peaceful space program in
collaboration with China. The contours of Pakistan‘s space vision of 2047, however,
are not publicized. Pakistan‘s Space Vision of 2047 is an advanced version of
Pakistan‘s Space Vision 2040.626
Space Vision 2040 was also not unfolded for public
consumptions; however, ex SUPARCO Chairman Major General (Retd) Ahmed Bilal
in an interview did list a few milestones in following words:
―….we should be able to make, produce and launch our own satellites.
That is our hallmark….. National demands will dictate the number of
satellites the country needs…… We will be focusing on different types of
remote sensing satellites and their applications in the next seven-eight
years.‖ 627
However, based on the modern day requirement of a nuclear weapons capable state, it
could be anticipated that the 2047 Space Vision should include development of robust
and reliable communication satellites in GEO for effective and challenges free
nuclear command and control setup, own navigational satellites constellation for an
uninterrupted and assured guidance to its strategic weapons/ delivery means, remote
sensing satellites, research satellites, nano and micro satellites, space launch
capabilities in terms of developing SLVs and launching sites and lastly sending its
astronauts to other heavenly bodies including Moon. With regard to Indo-Pak outer
space competition, the ex DG SPD Lt General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai
remarked during Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference on March 23,
2015 that:
624
Ian Bremmer & Maria Kuusisto, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters,‖
SASSI Research Report No. 15 (May 2008): 10-11,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99926/RR%20No%2015.pdf. 625
Baqir Sajjad Syed, ―Pakistan To Retain Full Spectrum Deterrence Policy,‖ Dawn, December 22,
2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378106. 626
Sikander Shaheen, ―Pakistan Joins Hands with Developed States to Explore Space Prospects,‖ The
Nation, September 18, 2012, https://nation.com.pk/18-Sep-2012/pakistan-joins-hands-with-developed-
states-to-explore-space-prospects. 627
―Lagging Behind: 2040 - Pakistan‘s Space Od[d]yssey.‖
205
―…..space program of Pakistan has lagged behind. Not in any kind of a
competition with India, there‘s no need for a competitive… The Indian space
program is not a threatening program, unlike the nuclear program, so there is
no competition between India and Pakistan. We wish India well with their
wishes to go to Mars, or whatever. But Pakistani space program, as much as
the SPD is concerned, it must meet the essentials of our C4ISR needs, which
means, basically, communications and surveillance. If Pakistan space
program can meet the C4ISR needs of the SPD of the nuclear program, SPD
will be comfortable with it. Beyond that, if our scientists can take us to the
moon, perhaps.‖628
In March 2018, SUPARCO entered into a bilateral technical cooperation agreement
with the China Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) for a joint venture (JV) so as to
co-develop-launch Pakistan‘s communication satellite ―PakSat Multi-Mission
(PakSat-MM1)‖. Before Pak-Sat-MM1 could be launched, China had launched an
interim gap-filler satellite that arrived at Pakistan‘s geostationary orbital location of
38.2 East629
- a substantive value addition through which Pakistan won geostationary
orbital and frequency slot that would be a major contributory factor in solidifying
Pakistan‘s outer space endeavors. PakSat-MM1, once fully developed and launched,
is expected to contribute tangibly towards developing socio-economic side and
exponentially enhance communication services including Direct-to-Home (DTH) in
Pakistan.630
The subject JV would also be instrumental in building Pakistan‘s scientists capacities
in hard core satellite designing and manufacturing besides satellite launching
capacities in outer space. Both the states have agreed to contribute 50% each in
subject JV.631
PakSat-MM1 is perceived to be an important stepping-stone towards
meeting its objectives identified in 2047 Space Vision.
628
Text of the Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai by Peter Lavoy, at Carnegie International
Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, March 23, 2015, 18. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-
230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf. 629
China Great Wall Industry Cooperation. Accessed March 27, 2018.https://twitter.com/CGWIC. 630
Associated Press of Pakistan. ―Pakistan Successfully Acquires Another Communication Satellite.‖
Accessed March 24, 2018. http://www.app.com.pk/pakistan-successfully-acquires-another-
communication-satellite/. 631
Bilal Khan, ―Pakistan Signs New Satellite Contract with China (CGWIC),‖ Quwa Defense News &
Analysis Group, March 27, 2018, https://quwa.org/2018/03/27/pakistan-signs-new-satellite-contract-
with-china-cgwic/.
206
Pak-China outer space cooperation has much celebrated history. The outer space
cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing kicked off with the implementation of
Pakistan‘s first Communication and Remote Sensing satellites i.e. PakSat-1R and
PRSS-1. PakSat-1R was launched in 2001 with Chinese cooperation.632
Remote
sensing capability is crucial not only for weather management and disaster mitigation
but the strategic needs including obtaining real time picture of an area including the
battle field. Pakistan is not new to the remote sensing as it had begun multi-spectral
remote sensing back in 1973 and has a dedicated ‗Remote Sensing Research
Division‘ meant to interpret acquired remotely sensed data.633
As part of 2047 Space Vision, Pakistan successfully launched Pakistan Remote
Sensing Satellite-1 (PRSS-1) and an indigenously produced Pakistan Technology
Evaluation Satellite-1A (PakTES-1A) on July 9, 2018.634
The two satellites would be
instrumental for socio-economic development and national security of Pakistan. The
two satellites would provide Pakistan the capability of ―imagery requirements in the
areas of land mapping, agriculture classification and assessment, urban and rural
planning, environmental monitoring, natural disaster management and water resource
management‖.635
On the other hand, Indian experts view the two launches aboard
single rocket by the China as an effort to spy against Indian military and strategic
movements.636
The skeptical approach could be detrimental to the Pakistan‘s space
technology acquisition and might exert a pull on Indian strategic planners to move a
step further towards their quest for having an offensive space control.
Pak -China bilateral cooperation in the field of outer space is developing with every
passing day. The JVs between the two include satellites manufacturing, outer space
632
Salman Siddiqui, ―PAKSAT-1R: China Launches Pakistan‘s ‗First‘ Communications Satellite,‖ The
Express Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229797/paksat-1r-china-launches-
pakistans-first-communications-satellite/. 633
Mehmud, ―Pakistan Space Program,‖: 219. 634
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, July 9, 2018.
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NjQ0MA. 635
Ibid. 636
Pallava Bagla, ―To Keep an Eye on India, 2 Pak Spy Satellites Launched by China,‖ NDTV, July 9,
2018, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-launches-2-satellites-for-pakistan-strengthens-space-
cooperation-1880458.
207
applications and development of space launch vehicles.637
Pakistan also plans to send
its first astronaut in outer space in collaboration with China by 2020.638
6.3 Existence of Space Law and National Space Policies in South Asia
India and Pakistan are both cautiously moving towards declaring their finalized
National Space Policies (NSPs). Similarly, National Space Laws (NSLs) are also in
embryonic stage. Both the countries have yet to evolve fully in space capabilities,
albeit, India is much ahead in capacity vis-à-vis Pakistan. Draft NSPs and NSLs are
being discussed within their respective decision making circles and relevant
stakeholders comprising of public and private entities involved in outer space
applications.
An in-depth literature review pertaining to space laws and space policies at national
level revealed certain compelling reasons and lacunas, which keep them, guessing
about their likely political and diplomatic fallouts once they officially declare or
commit regarding their outer space boundaries and laws. Both India and Pakistan are
also subjected to same kinds of lacunas that could haunt them later while improving
or mastering in space technologies in times to come. Few of the un-answered queries
even by the UNCOPUOS made them extra vigilant about finalizing their respective
NSPs and NSLs. Few of the lacunas or queries which need to be crystal clear before
getting the respective space faring nations‘ nod in formalizing their respective NSLs
and NSPs could be as under:
What does space weapon mean? Is the weapon based in space, is a space
weapon or also the one which is terrestrial based and could engage a space-
based asset?
What does self-defense mean with regard to operations in space? How the
Article 51 of UN Charter regarding right of self-defense could be interpreted
with regard to outer space?
637
―Pakistan Successfully Acquires Another Communication Satellite.‖ 638
Radio Pakistan. ―Pakistan, China sign contract of Pakistan Multi-Mission Satellite.‖ Accessed
March 28, 2018. http://radio.gov.pk/23-03-2018/pakistan-china-sign-contract-of-pakistan-multi-
mission-satellite-paksat-mml.
208
How the term ‗peaceful purposes‘ could be classified or interpreted while
building outer space capabilities?
How to differentiate between space weapons and BMD? As proved to be the
same technology, will the restrictions imposed on building space weapons
automatically mean restrictions on building BMD capability?
Is use of ‗peaceful and socio-economic development purposed‘ remote
sensing capability over the territorial jurisdiction of another state lawful? If
Yes, how the outer space activities could be called peaceful? And if NO, what
could be the modes of verification that it is not being done and if done, what
could be the penalties, who would be the arbitrator and how the penalties
could be imposed?
What is the threshold when some space asset can be targeted?
How the attribution can be made in case of damage to a space asset? How the
damage can be differentiated between an accidental one or caused by some
debris?
How the debris causing acts be controlled? Is the cost of debris‘ mitigation
effort caused by a space faring nation be borne by all or the one who caused
it?
What are the limits of national sovereignty in space? Is there any concept of
sovereignty in space or can some space faring nation claim sovereignty on a
heavenly body?
Pakistan does not have space legislation and regulatory framework in place. Pakistani
space experts are in process of understanding international space laws, policy and
regulatory issues at the national and international levels. In this context, experts are
engaging with relevant public and private stakeholders, trying to harmonies activities
of terrestrial and satellite operators through new National Telecommunication Policy
and making a resilient effort to know and implement the best practices for capacity-
building in space law, policy and regulatory regime through participation in
international forums and events inter-alia UNCOPUOS. Once approved, National
209
Space Policy will pave the way for space legislation at both federal and provincial
levels.
6.4 US Export Controls Approach towards South Asia
The technology denials approach by the advanced countries mainly led by the US has
negatively impacted upon the developmental process of less developed countries
including Pakistan. Often, these denials are either in the form of sanctions or by
putting organizations/ companies in a watch list/ EL etc, subject to strict licensing
policies. The US has an effective export controls system in place. One of the major
instruments for exercising control over imports and exports of sensitive and dual use
items is the US EL. It comprises of businesses, research institutions, government and
private organizations and even individuals, which could pose a risk of diversion to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and their carriers, terrorism or other
harmful activities contrary to the US national security and foreign policy interests.
The list is maintained by the US Department of Commerce‘s (DoC) Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS), which stipulates the license requirements that apply to
each listed party.639
These license requirements are in addition to any license
requirements imposed on the transaction by other provisions of the Export
Administration Regulations. BIS first published the EL in February 1997.640
Since its
initial publication, grounds for inclusion on the EL have expanded to activities
sanctioned by the State Department and activities contrary to US national security
and/or foreign policy interests. In other words, when some entity is listed in the EL, it
is subjected to additional scrutiny and clearances not only from the DoC but also the
US State Department and sometimes the US Department of Defense (DoD) as well.641
Involvement of US State Department indicates the political motives behind each
inclusion or removal of entity in the EL.
The list is reviewed annually. Although ‗Entities‘ listed in the EL can be removed
after review of the End User Review Committee as stipulated in the procedure set by
639
Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern 640
Ibid. 641
Ibid.
210
BIS, nevertheless, the decisions are taken on political basis (in the case of public
sector entities), as it can be seen in the case of removal of Indian public sector entities
which were removed after the Indo-US nuclear deal got matured, for instance,
removal of ISRO.642
A political dimension to the EL gives it a sense of sanction as US DoC cannot move
forward with regard to license grant to a particular entity till the time political
clearance is obtained. Although, on the face of it, the US State Department does not
subscribe to the word ‗sanction‘ but in all its manifestation it is kind of sanction if not
overt at least covert. Yet another angle of the US EL is that it is not only followed by
the US alone, it is followed strictly on the parallel by the US allies around the globe.
Albeit, the US allies don‘t accept the fact deliberately, they do refrain from any sort
of cooperation with a particular entity that is part of the US EL. For instance, the
Indian space organization ISRO which was part of the US EL since 1998 had all
restrictions with regard to any international cooperation; however since its removal
from the US EL in 2011, the doors have been opened for the ISRO international
cooperation thereby exponentially increasing its space development program.643
On
the contrary, Pakistan space agency SUPARCO is still on the US EL thereby
restraining its peaceful space program since 1998.644
The role of the US EL is not
only hampering the legitimate civilian purposed Pakistan‘s space program it is also
acting as a catalyst to increasing strategic balance in South Asia.
In March 2018, there were 48 different countries that are enlisted on the US EL
including US close allies like the UK, Germany, Israel. A critical view of the US EL
(Figure 6.1), brings out following facts that tell the strategic orientation of the US in
South Asian region:
642
Saurabh Joshi, ―ISRO, DRDO To Be Off Entities List: Report,‖ Strat Post: South Asian Defense
and Strategic Affairs, November 7, 2010, https://www.stratpost.com/isro-drdo-to-be-off-entities-list-
report/. 643
Abhinav Dutta, ―Challenges to the Indo-Us Defence Relationship,‖ Indian Defence Review, Issue
Net Edition, October 18, 2016, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/challenges-to-the-indo-us-
defence-relationship/2/. 644
US Department of Commerce, ―Rules and Regulations,‖ Federal Register 64322, Vol. 63, No. 223,
November 19, 1998, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulation-docs/...entity-list/file.
211
Pakistan has 68 different entities on the US EL vis-à-vis only 3 Indian
entities.
Indian DRDO and ISRO and their related subsidiaries involved in the nuclear
and space programs respectively, were given clean chit to trade freely in
January 2011. Whereas on the contrary, Pakistani public sector entities like
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), SUPARCO and Pakistan
Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology (PINSTECH) etc., are to-date
still under strict scrutiny and additional licensing requirements which are thus
denied any international cooperation even for peaceful purposes.
Pakistan is treated at par with Iran (70 entities on the US EL vis-à-vis 68
Pakistani entities) despite Pakistan having a robust nuclear command and
control setup, stringent export controls and above all state of the art nuclear
security against insider and outsider threats.
Figure 6.1
Countries Wise Detail of Number of Entities on the US Entity List
212
Similarly, Figure 6.2 depicts the US unprecedented favors to Indian entities by
removing them from their EL. A critical review of addition/ removal trend being
followed by the US DoC EL reveals following discriminatory attitude vis-a-a-vis
Pakistan.
Figure 6.2
Percentage Wise Comparison of Addition/ Removal of Entities from the
US Entity List
Since 2016, when the US came upfront to accrue maximum economic and
strategic advantages from the India, it removed 2 more Indian entities from
the EL thus leaving behind only 3 entities. It makes 40% negative trend.
In case of Pakistan, another 18 entities have been added in the US EL. With
addition of 18 entities, there are now total of 68 different entities both private
and public on the EL. This makes the 36% positive trend.
The unfavorable treatment is meted to Pakistan despite of its continued efforts
of exercising maximum restraint in the region, maintaining the nuclear
doctrine of credible minimum deterrence (CMD), offering a comprehensive
strategic restraint regime (SRR) to India and above all making efforts and
offers for resumption of composite dialogue with India.
213
Removal of the Indian entities from the US EL got momentum since US-Indo nuclear
deal and especially got actualized since famous Obama‘s visit to India in 2010. It‘s
not mere the granted advanced technology access to India but much to do with
choreographed rise in Indian global status as a great power that could ultimately lead
to Indian permanent seat in of the UNSC to be pitched against rising China. Different
statements by American important office holders make it obvious that the US Geo-
strategic and commercial interests remain prime movers behind all this. The US
discriminatory moves in favor of India while keeping Pakistan on the sidelines has
implications for the region at large and Pakistan in particular, which India
traditionally believes a hurdle in its path to win great power status.
Unprecedented and discriminatory favors to Indian entities with regard to their
removal from the US EL contributed towards international political and diplomatic
certification that India is a responsible state with whom international cooperation and
trade in sensitive technologies is safe and acceptable. Such trend gave India
membership of MTCR, AG and WA less NSG. Technology/ export control regimes
(NSG, MTCR, AG, and WA) are believed to be setting globally agreed standards for
strategic commerce amongst the different countries. Indian entry into these cartels
alternatively means accepting India as a dejure nuclear weapon state as stipulated in
NPT. Indian access to the space and nuclear technologies (although not as a NSG
member but due to the special US waiver) would further perpetuate respective
asymmetries between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, the Indian memberships of these export control cartels have given a hard
political blow to the arms control initiatives. Push for the Indian NSG membership
without being a member of NPT or any Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) is
against the arms control and disarmament spirits.
214
6.5 Indian Membership of Missile Technology Control Regime
The MTCR, was established by 35 states in 1987 to control the proliferation of the
missiles technology.645
MTCR has been very selective and stringent in making new
members due the technology it controls – WMD carriers i.e. ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles. It is not a treaty but a cartel to shape up the national export control
laws and policies of its member states. It has a technical access that controls the most
sensitive technologies those could contribute towards missile proliferation. India
became a full member of MTCR in 2016646
after a gap of 12 years when Bulgaria was
made MTCR member in 2004.647
MTCR has overall contributed towards missile non-
proliferation. Besides technological barriers, it has been instrumental in creating
normative barriers as well. With the advent of BMD/ CDWs systems, there has been a
visible decline in building long range missiles while the cruise missile technology has
found more appetite among strategic competitors.648
Indian membership of the MTCR vis-à-vis its neighbors i.e. China and Pakistan has
severely impacted upon the strategic stability of the region as it gives an obvious
technological advantage to New Delhi. Apparently, besides many intangible
advantages for instance, prestige and winning status of responsible international
player, India had three primary motivations behind its entry into MTCR. First, to
mitigate the sufferings of its evolving space [deep space] program, which it
categorically mentioned while applying formally for the MTCR membership and
secondly, to perfect its cruise missile program and finally, use the MTCR membership
as a stepping stone for entry into most wanted NSG regime.
Although it appears simple, yet the Indian MTCR membership has a cost i.e. threat of
proliferation entailing asymmetry in the region having potential to undermine the
prevalent strategic stability in South Asia. The MTCR regime does not put
645
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). ― Missile Technology Control Regime.‖
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/. 646
―India Becomes Member of Missile Technology Control Regime,‖ India Today, June 27, 2016,
https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/india-becomes-a-member-of-
missile-technology-control-regime-16525-2016-06-27. 647
Missile Technology Control Regime. ―MTCR Partners.‖ http://mtcr.info/partners/. 648
Aaron Karp , ―Stemming the Spread of Missiles: Hits, Misses, and Hard Cases,‖ Arms Control
Today, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 2012): 8.
215
restrictions on the civilian space program, but yet it is a dual use technology which
could easily be transformed into long range ballistic missiles as many technologies
and materials pertaining to missiles are used alternatively in space launch vehicles.649
Thus, Indian space program is likely to be one of the major beneficiaries of this
membership due to its almost assured access to the space high-end technology. In the
past even before the MTCR membership, India has been getting technological
assistance for developing its SLV project in which it has now achieved close to
perfection status. However, that assistance had few political strings attached to it
which now being MTCR member, India shall not face.
Interestingly, MTCR could singularly be blamed for its weak control, which could not
control missile proliferation and instead has been a source of encouraging the same
by opening a loophole for those who mattered for the MTCR member states with
respect to their political and strategic interests. Despite a clear linkage between SLV
and ICBM technologies whose use differ with regard to user‘s intent i.e. either to
carry a spacecraft or a warhead, the SLV technology was not registered in its
stringent control list.650
An Indian expert on space issues explains the fact of SLV and
ballistic missile technologies being the same in following words:
―…….Technically, space launch vehicles (SLVs) are actually ballistic
missiles used in surface to space mode. Satellites are nothing but the
payloads delivered by missiles from the surface to Earth orbit. Such SLVs
could be converted into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and
suitable guidance and control packages.‖ 651
India faced extreme problem with regard to acquisitioning of cryogenic engines
which could sustain its longer duration SLVs flight to desired orbit location. The
same was denied to the Indian ISRO under the restrictions imposed on to it by the
MTCR regime. MTCR and other western states feared that India could divert the dual
use cryogenic engines to its missile program to build ICBMs.652
It may also be
649
Kelsey Davenport, ―India Joins Ballistic Missile Initiatives,‖ Arms Control Today, Vol. 46, No. 6
(July/August 2016): 28-29. 650
David A. Cooper, ―The US and the Evolution of International Supply-Side Missile Non-
Proliferation Controls‖ in Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects, Occasional
Paper No.7, Center for Non-proliferation Studies (May 2001): 16. Also see Lele, Asian Space Race,
126. 651
Lele, Asian Space Race, 129. 652
Ibid, 65.
216
recalled that the non-proliferation community did raise same kind of concerns on
Brazilian entry into MTCR back in 1995 as it did not shelve its SLV program as
precondition to MTCR membership and they feared that it could build long range
missile under SLV cover.653
The Indian requirements of cryogenic engines were extremely important for lifting
heavy GSLV carrying hundreds of kilograms payload up to GEO. ISRO started its
quest for cryogenic engines as early as 1992 when it purchased seven cryogenic
engines from Russia and started acquiring technology of the same from the US as
well.654
However, Russia could not continue cryogenic engines‘ supply due to the US
and MTCR member countries‘ pressures for the fears that India could divert the
technology towards its strategic ballistic missile program.655
Finally, Indian nuclear
tests of 1998, brought ISRO under US sanctions and whatsoever little assistance
ISRO was getting with regard to cryogenic engines came to a standstill. The denial of
cryogenic engines had a blow to the ISRO SLV program and thus it started R&D for
developing indigenous cryogenic engines. Meanwhile, ISRO used French services for
launching its satellites.656
India has been granted MTCR membership in June 2016 by the US support. The
Indian entry into the MTCR mitigated all its limitations with regard to having heavy
and distant lift capable cryogenic engines. India after its membership of MTCR has
galvanized its SLV program and has become sixth country in the world along with the
US, France, China, Russia and Japan - a key milestone in space sciences.
On the South Asian strategic landscape, India becoming formal MTCR member has
the luxury of access to all the modern technologies associated to the missiles and
missile shields. On the face of it, India being member of the MTCR is fine tuning its
already well developed SLV programs for commercial launching of multiple numbers
653
Evan S. Medeiros, ―Brazil Gains MTCR Membership; Space Program Remains Intact,‖ Arms
Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 9 (November 1995): 28. 654
Greg Koblentz and Jon B. Wolfsthal, ―Russia Agrees to Adhere to MTCR, Suspends Rocket Deal
With India,‖ Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, No. 7 (September 1993): 23. 655
Ibid. 656
―ISRO‘s GSLV Mission a Successful ‗Make in India ‘Story: Here‘s How it Boosts India‘s Mission
to the Moon,‖ Financial Express, March 30, 2018,
http://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/isros-gslv-gsat-6a-satellite-mission-a-
successful-make-in-india-story-heres-how-chandrayaan-2-india-mission-to-moon/1116045/.
217
of satellites in a single SLV whereas it is an indirect development of MIRV capable
missiles while on the parallel same technology could also be employed in a missile
shield mode with a little modification in design. Notwithstanding the above, it can be
inferred that Indian membership of MTCR would exponentially substantiate its
indigenous BMD shield program besides relieving it from import of costlier BMD
systems from the US, Russia and Israel. Indian self-sufficiency in BMD systems for
defending its vital assets implies unbalancing of the fragile balanced equation of
mutual vulnerability between India and Pakistan.
Indeed, India will be having ‗long reach‘ capability so as to assert itself not only
along the globe but in outer space as well. The argument reflects more prudency
when it is seen through the scientific prism of ‗curvature of earth‘ dilemma.
Curvature of earth restricts the direct or low-level long reach assertiveness and thus
the role of outer space gets importance. The power status conscious states would
therefore need an environment in which their ballistic missiles could move freely in
outer space up to the intended targets through guidance provided by the guidance
satellites. On the defensive side, these states would desire to have a viable missile
shield comprising of surveillance radars, early warning systems, technical tracking
means and above all precision capable interceptors. These components could only
work to their maximum desired levels if their owning states have ‗space control‘.
Space control is directly proportional to the deterrence value. Deterrence by denial
assumes a lead role in space security i.e. one denies freedom of action by the
competitor by directly threatening the punishment in same coin to an acceptable level.
For deterrence by denial, ASAT weapons or in classical term ‗space weapons‘ are
must. The space weapons, as we know, are simplistically terrestrial, sea or space-
based systems with allied supporting elements including sensors etc. that could
engage or threaten to engage important strategic satellites in outer space earth orbits.
With an assured access to the high-end technologies, India is probably on path of
securing ‗space control‘ – a preposition which is not in interest of global and regional
strategic stability.657
Misadventure could be the likely outcome and peace stability
657
Joseph Cirincione, ―The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 118 (Spring, 2000):
121.
218
might not find its way in regulating global and regional harmony. Albeit, there could
be multiple solutions to address the asymmetry inter-alia, having a bilateral Indo-Pak
ballistic missile defense treaty or negotiating CBMs like Pakistani proposal of
Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR); however, one of the solution could be in form of
providing an equal access of technology thus, maintaining mutual vulnerability
equation balanced. One thing is for sure that it seems that India is not ready to deploy
weapons physically in the space; however, terrestrial based ASATs are worrisome,
which needs a serious analytical effort to find appropriate and viable response
options. A detailed discussion of policy options pertaining to diplomacy, politics,
arms control and military shall be discussed in subsequent part of the thesis.
6.6 India & Pakistan: Missile and Outer Space Technologies’ Proliferation
The strategic competition between India and Pakistan is obvious in all war fighting
domains i.e. land, sea and air. However, with the fast growing Indian space program
and Pakistan Space Vision of 2047 seem to be heading towards introducing yet
another strategic competition in altogether new domain – the outer space. Having
already established the linkages between missile and space technologies, it could be
conveniently inferred that proliferation in either of the technologies would
alternatively be implying proliferation in both. Succeeding paras would identify as to
how the space and missile proliferations are interlinked and how those could impact
upon security and stability of South Asia.
6.6.1 Vertical Missile Proliferation
In case of Indo-Pak scenario, missile and space capabilities are on tangent course.
Knowingly, Pakistan has a better missile technology as compared to Indian missile
program658
while Indian space technology is much better developed vis-à-vis
Pakistan.659
Linking the two divergent capabilities with proliferation, it seems evident
that Pakistan if desires so could use its missile expertise for building space launch
capability and in case of Indians, it could divert its SLV expertise towards meeting
658
―Pakistan Missile Technology Better than India‘s,‖ The Nation, May 27, 2017,
https://nation.com.pk/27-May-2017/pak-missile-tech-better-than-india-s. 659
Dhrubo Jyoti, ―Pakistan Began Space Programme 8 Years Before India, but ISRO is Galaxies
Ahead Now.‖
219
the technological gaps in missile capabilities. Since Indian membership of MTCR in
2016, there are visible changes in its missile-testing trend. Graphical representations
of India‘s offensive and defensive missile tests are attached at Annexes I and II,
respectively. The Indian missile tests‘ rate has visibly increased since 2016 in both
offensive and defensive missile systems i.e. after getting MTCR membership. The
graphical representation of different Indian missile tests conducted from March 2016
- March 2018 reveal that there have been total of 37 missile tests of different
categories of missiles in 24 months which makes an average of approx. 1.75 tests per
month (Figure 6.3). Such an exponential increase in missile testing trend is thus
contributing to the destabilization of the region. On the parallel, Pakistan showed a
restraint in testing of its missile capability. From March 2016 to March 2018,
Pakistan conducted total of 7 tests of its different versions of missiles (Figure 6.4)
vis-à-vis 37 Indian missile tests.
Figure 6.3
Indian Missile Tests Record – 2016-2018
220
Figure 6.4
Pakistan Missile Tests Record – 2016-2018
Furthermore, a candid data collection revealed that over the last nine (9) years, i.e.
from 2010-2018, India overall conducted 139 missile tests (Table 6.2) while Pakistan
conducted 40 tests (Table 6.3). From the data, it could be that India conducted almost
3.475 times more numbers of tests than Pakistan. The data of the Indian and Pakistani
missile tests have been collected very carefully from different authentic open sources
including different official web sites including Indian Ministry of External Affairs,
Indian NDTV, press releases by Pakistan‘s Ministry of Foreign affairs and Inter
Services Public Relations (ISPR), etc.
221
Table 6.2
Data - Indian Missile Test Record (2010-2018)
Years Prithvi-
I
Prithvi-
II
Prithvi-
III
Agni
-I
Agni-
II
Agni-
III
Agni-
IV
Agni-
V
BrahMos Akash Ashwin
(ABM)
PAD
(ABM)
PDV
(ABM)
K-4 K-15 Shourya Parhaar Nirbhay Total
2010 - 5 1 2 1 1 1 - 3 - 1 1 - - - - - - 16
2011 - 3 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 - - - - 1 1 - 12
2012 - 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 - - - 2 - - - 19
2013 - 4 1 1 1 1 - 1 3 - - - - - 1 - - 1 14
2014 - 3 1 2 1 - 2 - 3 14 - - 1 1 - - - 1 29
2015 - 2 2 1 - 1 1 1 3 - 1 - - - - - - 1 13
2016 - 5 - 2 - - - 1 1 1 2 - - 2 - - - 1 15
2017 - 1 - - 1 1 1 - 4 1 3 - 2 1 - - - 1 16
2018 - 1 1 1 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 5
Total - 28 8 12 7 5 7 5 22 17 10 1 3 4 3 1 1 5 139
222
Table 6.3
Data - Pakistan Missile Test Record (2010-2018)
Years Hatf-I Hatf-II
(Abdali)
Hatf-III
(GHaznavi)
Hatf-IV
(Shaheen-
I)
Hatf-IV
(Shaheen-
1A)
Hatf-V
(Ghauri-
I)
Hatf-VI
(Shaheen-
II)
Hatf-VII
(Babur)
Hatf-
VIII
(Ra’ad)
Hatf-IX
(Nasr)
Shaheen-
III
Ghauri-II Ababeel Total
2010 - 1 1 2 - 1 - 1 - - - - - 6
2011 - 1 - - 1 - - 2 1 1 - - - 6
2012 - 1 1 - 1 - 2 1 1 - - - 7
2013 - 1 - 1 - - - - - 2 - - - 4
2014 - - 2 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - - 5
2015 - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 2 - - 5
2016 - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - 2
2017 - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 1 3
2018 - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 2
Total - 4 4 3 3 3 1 9 4 5 3 - 1 40
223
The preceding discussion thus, reveals that India‘s missile inventory is getting
modernized. It will pursue mastery in building long ranged ICBMs and offensive
missiles besides mitigating technological gaps in its indigenous defensive missile
systems. SLV technology, as brought out earlier, just needs a little modification and
change of intent to be converted into MIRVed missile. Indian quick build-up of
offensive and defensive missile systems could jeopardize the strategic stability in the
region. Therefore, Indian temptation to use offensive missiles in preventive and
preemptive modes, are likely to rise due to comfort provided by missile shield
produced indigenously or through international cooperation. On the other hand,
Pakistan being a non-MTCR member has no opportunity to divert the space
technology acquired under MTCR cover, as in case of India, to develop missiles.
Instead, it could, at maximum, make use of its missile developing expertise to
manufacture SLV capability for satellite launching so that to meet its peaceful
purposed space vision 2047.
6.6.2 MTCR Membership: Creating Options for Missile Development
India is perfecting its missile proliferation by using MTCR umbrella. For instance,
Indian supersonic cruise missile BrahMos, being co-developed by Russia and India
has got free from MTCR related export restrictions to other countries.660
BrahMos
cruise missile is a highly accurate air-breathing missile system, which has the
capability of following nap-of-the-earth technique to avoid radar detection.661
Russia
which was earlier under MTCR compulsions to transfer the technology of
manufacturing BrahMos cruise missile is now free to cooperate.662
India acted smart
and ensured two caveats while declaring successful tests of the BrahMos cruise
missile tests. One, India declared it as a conventional warhead carrier only and
secondly, India declared its maximum range of 290 kilometers having payload
660
Arun Sahgal, ―Technological and Strategic Implications of MTCR for India – Analysis,‖ Eurasia
Review, June 13, 2016, https://www.eurasiareview.com/13062016-technological-and-strategic-
implications-of-mtcr-for-india-analysis/. 661
―BrahMos,‖ Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, November 8, 2016,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/brahmos/. 662
―BRAHMOS: Outcome of successful India— Russia Relations,‖ The Free Press Journal, April 13,
2017,http://www.freepressjournal.in/india/brahmos-outcome-of-successful-india-russia-relations/
1051201.
224
carrying capacity of 200-300 kilograms. The two characteristics kept BrahMos cruise
missile out of ‗strong presumption of denial‘ restriction as stipulated in Category-I
items of MTCR. As per MTCR Category-I items restriction, ‗any complete missile
system would be subjected to strong presumption of denial (export), if it has the
capability of delivering a payload weighing 500 kilograms up to a range of at least
300 kilometers‘. The two limitations could easily be bluffed and cannot be verified as
all depends on its fuel carrying capability and weight/ size of the warhead, keeping it
open ended for proliferation.
Moreover, an unconventional warhead carrying capable BrahMos cruise missile could
not be believed as less threatening as it has strategic strings attached to it. For
instance, BrahMos undetectable cruise missile(s) could be employed against missile
silos to destroy them before they could be employed and sensitive command and
control infrastructure. Any wrong signal or misperception about firing of cruise
missile by India could make Pakistan employ its declared ‗first use‘ or ‗first strike‘
option. Hence, it is highly destabilizing. On Pakistan‘s part, it tested its first ever
cruise missile technology in August 2005663
i.e. much after India who tested its
BrahMos cruise missile in June 2001664
to keep the deterrence equation balanced.
India has recently declared that it is going to sell its BrahMos cruise missile systems
to seven different countries from Latin America, Middle East and Asia-Pacific
regions including Vietnam.665
Albeit, despite strict end-user certifications, selling
cruise missile‘s complete system to other countries is tangent to the global arms
control initiatives with regard to missile proliferation.
6.6.3 Space Technology Proliferation
In addition, it may be recalled that the MTCR does not put restrictions on national
space programs, provided not diverted to missile programs being dual use natured
space technology. However, it is not as simple as predicted or stated. ‗Space control‘
once achieved can severely impact upon the stability. Space control is development of
663
―Pakistan Missile Chronology,‖ Nuclear Threat Initiative (2012): 9. 664
―Indian Missile Chronology,‖ Nuclear Threat Initiative (2012): 103. 665
RajatPandit, ―India in Talks with Friendly Nations for Sale of Missiles,‖ The Times of India, April
9, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-in-talks-with-friendly-nations-for-sale-of-
missiles/articleshow/63684615.cms.
225
offensive space capabilities so as to counter engagement threats against national
security related satellites by the adversary. Space control‘s beholder has the
capability to identify, attribute and negate offensive space capabilities of its
competitor.666
Space control is like achieving space supremacy. Indian space
program is in extremely advanced stage vis-à-vis Pakistan. In order to achieve
supremacy in space, space control is must for it so as to protect its strategically
important satellites through off-course using the compulsorily offensive means for
deterring potential rivals in space. Pakistan is an emerging and evolving space
faring nation. India would not like to have same kind of freedom of action in
space for Pakistan as it has contemporarily. To be more précised, space control
operations that could fall under space control is defined by the US Air Force space
doctrine as under:
―Space control operations include: protective and defensive measures to
ensure friendly forces can continuously conduct space operations across
the entire spectrum of conflict; and operations to deceive, disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities.‖667
Giving a free hand to India for development of space control could be stabilizing
thereby opening up a new domain of conflict and competition. Proliferation of
space technology for peaceful purposes is understandable and supported by the
world community. However diverting the same to gain offensive capability to
deny the same to competitors is worrisome. Pakistan in current geo-political and
geo-strategic realignments may not remain oblivious and might exert its full
capabilities to meet the technological requirements of today. Pakistan‘s acquisitioning
of space technology and become one of the space faring nation is paramount for
strategic stability and security of the South Asian region. Pakistan being a nuclear
power faced with existential threats and having ‗first use‘ nuclear doctrine has to be
kept stable and relaxed with respect to its security concerns. Space control supremacy
by the India may not go well with Pakistani security managers. Technology has no
bounds or boundaries. It cannot be restricted or controlled.
666
Mike Gruss, ―DoD will Spend $2 Billion on Space Control This Year,‖ Space News, March 23,
2016, http://spacenews.com/dod-will-spend-2-billion-on-space-control-this-year/. 667
US Air Force Doctrine, ―Space Control,‖ Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and
Education, June 19, 2012, http://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-14/3-14-D33-
SPACE-OPS-Space-Control.pdf.
226
To conclude, it can be ascertained that outer space is the future. It‘s not about rockets
and satellites only but a major contributory factor in socio-economic uplift of any
developing and developed country. It meets the human desire of exploring the
unexplored galaxy and can contribute massively in winning prestige, respect,
technological advancement, introduce modern way of comfortable living besides
security needs.
The Indian ISRO has not succeeded to the current level of proficiencies and
achievements had its private and public sector organizations not involved into it.
ISRO managed to make its Mars mission a success at a very low cost of only 74
million US Dollars.668
It encouraged and involved more than 100 private Indian
companies both from corporate and public sectors to assist in making Indian Mars
mission dream to a reality. Along the same pattern, Pakistani Government has to
realize the fact and assist the private and public sectors and corporate sector to
contribute in building national space capacities. The private sector needs to be
involved to make the civilians to realize the unseen tangible contribution of space
applications in making life style more comfortable and prosperous.
To conclude, it is evident from data collected regarding Indian and Pakistani missile
tests pattern and the empirical evidences in form of official statements from both
sides that the South Asia is subjected to missile and space technology race. Both the
technologies could conveniently be diverted from civilian use to the military
purposed objectives. There is a need to preempt the trend by the international
community by stopping the discriminatory behavior in the region. Technology is
bound to proliferate and states would do all possible efforts to secure themselves in an
anarchic international system. Moreover, a region with nuclear weapons that has seen
brinkmanship has to remain stabilized and balanced. Space weapons whether
terrestrial or space based would be extremely detrimental to the peace and domestic
development. Arms race has to be checked at all levels i.e. political, diplomatic and
arms control.
668
Aditya Kalra, ―India Triumphs in Maiden Mars Mission, Sets Record in Space Race,‖ Reuters
Science News, September 24, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-mars/india-triumphs-in-
maiden-mars-mission-sets-record-in-space-race-idUSKCN0HJ05J20140924.
227
CHAPTER 7
Missile Shield and Space Weapons Technologies: Implications for South Asian
Deterrence Stability
The missiles and space technologies proliferation certainly advances India and Pakistan
war fighting capabilities. It also manifests the continuity of arms race between them.
Indeed, the arms race between the strategic competitors‘ continuously poses a challenge
to the strategic stability in the region. Moreover, India has been advancing its BMD
Program. The development and deployment of BMD will introduced a new general of
weapon in South Asia strategic environment. It will not only intensify the arms race
between India and Pakistan but also destabilize the deterrence stability between them,
which is imperative for the strategic stability in South Asia.
The following discussion critically examines the Indian programs of BMD and ASAT
development as part of Indian military modernization of its armed forces. Furthermore, it
figures out the increasing role of India in regional and international real-politicks from a
position of strength while keeping the RMA at forefront. It also highlights implications
of ASAT weapons or in other words BMD systems‘ development, role of receding
process of composite dialogue and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between
India and Pakistan for deterrence stability in South Asia and finally suggests way
forward to maintain and sustain the peace and stability in the South Asian Region.
7.1 ASAT Weapons and BMD Systems
The discussion in the previous chapters, reveals that BMD systems and ASAT
weapons have core similarities and they differ with regard to their intent of use.
India‘s indigenous and through cooperation building of BMD systems, thus, should
not be seen in isolation from its quest for having potent space weapons which are
direly needed for protection of its rapidly increasing numbers of satellites through
position of strength. Indian scientists and policy makers at helm of affairs with regard
to outer space have explicitly narrated their sense of securing outer space assets by
threat of use of force in self-defense. Hence BMD development by India indirectly
indicates that its ASAT capability is also being mastered on parallel and vice versa.
228
Offensive roles of ASAT and BMD systems while hedging behind defensive
aspirations i.e. to gain an edge over deterring nuclear weapons would be
counterproductive for maintenance of peace and stability in the South Asian region.
Efforts to mitigate nuclear weapons, their core carrier i.e. ballistic missiles and early
warning or guidance satellites in various earth orbits are thus counter deterrence
activities. Forgoing in view, ASAT weapons or BMD systems could possibly be
referred / termed as ‗Counter Deterrence Weapons (CDWs)‘ for further discussion in
the chapter.
7.2 Counter Deterrence Weapons (CDWs) and Power Politics
In contemporary era of real-politick led inter-state competition, the strategic construct
at global, regional and state levels has hardly any definitive or overarching threat
paradigm, thus, pushing the conflicts towards warranted or unwarranted prpetuality.
Today, currency of power is military might which distinguishes between states in
terms of their level of power and influence. More the military might, more would be
the powerful state and its influence on global and regional politics. Albeit, in order to
ascertain a state‘s overall power position, elements of soft power inter-alia economy,
education, demography, political independence and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
are equally important in parallel to military might, yet in prevailing contemporary real
politick system, the soft power is likely to take considerable time to match the hard
power might.
Hard power is dynamic in nature. It needs to be upgraded, refined and kept relevant
vis-à-vis competitors. An old vintage technology or fighting doctrine might not bring
dividends if not kept parallel or a step ahead of potential rival‘s quest for technology.
However, a fine balance has to be maintained as quantitative improvement might not
go well with doves besides pulling drag on to other elements of national power in
terms of resources constraints. Through qualitative edge, better results are expected
which could accrue desired dividends in more beneficial way. RMA is thus a
comparatively suited approach for maintaining a state of the art modern army with
precision being the key element. If a state can maintain large armed forces duly
equipped with modern weapon systems, her dominant power status would be assured.
229
It is an accepted fact that since the beginning of nuclear age there has been no war
between major or great powers, equipped with nuclear weapons, which indicate that
‗Pax-atomica‘ superseded the BoP and alliances prophesy.669
States often enter into
alliances for attaining BoP vis-à-vis adversary. It also implies that simply increase in
traditional military might or forming alliances would not matter much but having
state of the art and out of the box weapon technologies that deter war.
Space-based weapons or weapons to be used through the space medium can immolate
nuclear weapons role, which they performed throughout the Cold War and thereafter.
Space weapons‘ terror i.e. threat looming above head coupled with extreme sense of
insecurity of being watched round the clock, has given new dimensions to the
campaign planners. Space is believed to be common heritage of mankind and is
resisted from becoming weaponized. However, no common definition of space
weapons exists. Scholars; albeit, against the space weapons, do note that maintaining
space offensive capabilities would keep the adventurers at bay from fiddling with
outer space-based assets which are not only costly but also have dominant role in
meeting domestic needs. However, it remains to be seen that whether probable
introduction of space-based weapons and proliferation of dual use space technology
could stabilize or further destabilize the world‘s peace and security.
7.3 Indian CDWs’ Development Program and Deterrence Instability in South
Asia
The India by strengthening its hard power potential is all set to contribute more
proactively towards security contribution in the region.670
It is being identified as ‗net
security provider‘ in South Asia by the US which implies that India is going to
substantially relieve the US from committing its armed forces in Indian Ocean and
669
James F. Pasley, ―Chicken Pax Atomica: The Cold War Stability of Nuclear Deterrence,‖ Journal
of International and Area Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2008): 23-24. 670
Gurmeet Kanwal in his May 17, 2017 talk titled, ―Cold Start and Frozen Conflict: Competitive
Dynamics on Air and Land,‖ at Carnegie Endowment, Washington stated that India had enough of
looking inward. It is now going to contribute positively to security in the region. Accessed on October
13, 2017, https://www.stimson.org/content/strategic-competition-southern-asia-arms-race-or-
modernization.
230
around.671
The Indian ambition goes in line with the recently announced US Policy
of Afghanistan and South Asia which has ‗regionalism‘672
as one of its main
ingredients thus shall further cement Indo-US strategic partnership. Trump gave his
Afghanistan and South Asia Policy on August 21, 2017 in which he accused Pakistan
and sided with the India. He stated:
―For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence,
and terror….We can no longer be silent about Pakistan‘s safe havens for
terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the
region and beyond. Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort
in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and
terrorists.‖673
The text of Trump‘s speech clearly manifests Indians increased role in the Indian
ocean and the South Asian strategic landscape, for which it is likely to get all strategic
favors.674
On the domestic front, Indian scholars and policy makers strongly believe in building
military muscles for winning great power status in South Asia675
in which CDWs
could play a vital role. Military muscles having elements of CDWs would
substantiate Indian strategic objective of becoming a regional hegemon first, followed
by winning great or super power status.676
Indian amassing of its conventional and
unconventional military capabilities is an undeniable indicator of its pursuing great
power status, and seeking strategic autonomy while on the other hand, Pakistan‘s
nuclear [and conventional force] posture is entirely dominated by security fears
671
Gurmeet Kanwal, ―India‘s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings,‖ Policy
Brief at National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, D.C. (September 24, 2012), accessed
October 29, 2017, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=275#.UqnWcdKVPWN. 672
The US President Trump on Aug 21, 17in an address at Fort Myer unveiled the US strategy to deal
with Afghanistan and South Asia. He outlined the direction which the US will take in its approach to
Afghanistan in particular and South Asia in general. Trump‘s speech was later substantiated when on
October 3, 2017, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis testified on Trump‘s Afghanistan and South Asia
Policy before the Senate Armed Services Committee and introduced acronym of R4+S (Regionalize,
Realign, Reinforce, Reconcile and Sustain) for US Afghanistan-South Asia Strategy. 673
Nora Kelly, ―Full Transcript: Donald Trump Announces His Afghanistan Policy,‖ The Atlantic,
August 21, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-transcript-donald-trump-
announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/. 674
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―U.S. National Security Strategy and Pakistan: An Appraisal,‖ Hilal Magazine
(January 2018), https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-artical/u.s.-national-security-strategy-and-pakistan:-an-
appraisal/Mjk0.html. 675
Kanwal, ―India‘ Military Modernization,‖. 676
Ashley J. Tellis, ―The Evolution of U.S. Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic
Relationship,‖ International Security, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 127-130.
231
emanating from Indian designs.677
Besides the above narrated reasons, role of Indian
scientific community in Indian decision making process is also one of the leading
drivers behind high paced Indian complementing CDW‘s development programs.678
India has been pursuing its indigenous missile defense shield since its 1983 Integrated
Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP); however, it got momentum in 2006.
Along with indigenous development, the US, Russia and Israel are also committed to
help India in maturing its BMD system.679
India claims to have completed phase-I of
its multi layered BMD shield while as part of phase-II, Indian DRDO is in process of
developing hypersonic BMD shield against ICBMs with the name of AD-1 and AD-
2. 680
The long range missile shield shall be effective against missiles fired from a
distance of 5000 km with its radar capable of scanning aerial domain up to 1500 km.
It is being developed on the pattern of the US Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system. In 2012, Indian scientists had claimed that they have developed an
indigenous BMD shield for Mumbai and New Delhi, the two largest cosmopolitan
cities.681
The indigenous BMD developing capacity has placed India among the BMD
producing states; the US, China, Russia and Israel.682
On a future course, the Indian scientists are also carrying out research and
development of a laser-based BMD system. Laser BMD system is envisaged to
engage the hostile missile with speed of sound, which could be fired from sea, air
and land.683
India is also indigenously developing a multi-tiered BMD shield
comprising of Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) and Advanced Air Defense systems for
677
Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 230. 678
Thomas W. Graham, ―Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21stCentury: China, India, and
Pakistan,‖ in The Next Arms Race,ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
July 2012), 272-273. 679
Sharma, ―India‘s Missile Defense Program,‖ 1. 680
―Coming Soon: Anti-Ballistic Missile System For Indian Cities,‖ Indian Military News, March 17,
2017, http://indianmilitarynews.com/2017/03/coming-soon-anti-ballistic-missile-system-for-indian-
cities/. 681
Ibid. 682
Ashok Sharma, ―India‘s Missile Defense Program: Threat Perceptions and Technological
Evolution,‖ Manekshaw Paper, No. 15 (2009): 5-6, accessed October 21, 2017,
www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1262760881MP_15___111209.pdf. 683
Hemant Kumar Rout, ―Anti-Ballistic Missile System for Indian Metros Soon,‖ The Indian Express,
March 17, 2017, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/mar/15/anti-ballistic-missile-system-
for-indian-metros-soon-1581441.html.
232
intercepting hostile ballistic missile at high and low altitudes respectively i.e. in exo
and endo atmospheric domains.684
The two missiles shall operate in tandem, which
increases the system‘s kill probability up to 99.8%.685
Since 2006, India has
conducted thirteen test fires of the subject system with last test conducted in March
2017, which had mixed success rate.
7.4 International Cooperation – Indian Missile Shield
India is yet to achieve mastery over indigenous development capability of its BMD
shield program. India, until 2012 had conducted seven tests of its BMD shield designs
out of which DRDO claimed six to be successful; however, the tests were conducted
in a simulated environment.686
The slow paced under confident BMD development
warranted joint ventures and international cooperation. India after the MTCR
membership has expedited its international cooperation with regard to development of
CDWs i.e. BMD systems and is mainly in close cooperation with the US and
Israel.687
Indo-US ballistic missile defense cooperation was one of the main elements of Indo-
US strategic partnership. The partnership opened avenues of bi-lateral cooperation in
outer space, advanced military hardware and above all dual use technologies inter-alia
missile technology.
7.4.1 Fast Paced Indian Missiles’ Development Supported by Export Controls
Relaxations
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal proved to be the ice-breaker for Indian entry into four
strategic export control cartels. Albeit, despite US earnest efforts, it could not win the
slot for India in most desired Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); however, got India the
684
Gurmeet Kanwal‘s talk at Carnegie Endowment, Washington on May 17, 2017. He stated that
BMD systems both exo and endo atmospherics still technology demonstrators; however, no orders
have been placed, no approval has been accorded for their deployment. 685
Rout, ―Anti-Ballistic Missile System for Indian Metros Soon.‖ 686
Manoj Joshi, ―Government Baffled Over DRDO Chief's Claim on Missile Shield,‖ Mail Today,
July 18, 2012, accessed November 12, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/government-baffled-
over-drdo-chief-claim-on-missile-shield/1/208850.html. 687
Nicolas Blarel, ―Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult Equation to
Balance?,‖ Strategic Analysis, 41:4 (2017): 395-96.
233
memberships of the three cartels i.e. MTCR,688
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)689
and
Australia Group (AG).690
Indian memberships of the three export control cartels are
strategic in nature. For instance, MTCR‘s membership has opened the door for
launching international joint ventures for BMD and other missiles‘ development
besides giving it a choice to get an access to the high-end missile technology that
could be used for either of the CDWs‘ development i.e. BMD and ASAT weapons.
The MTCR membership has made Indian BMD development program as one of the
leading ingredients of Indo-US bilateral relationship which goes straight in favor of
India vis-à-vis Pakistan, thereby directly skimming the deterrence equation in volatile
South Asian region.691
7.4.2 Indo-Israeli CDWs Development Cooperation
In July 2017, Indian DRDO signed a MoU with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for
initiating a joint venture to develop five regiments of Medium Range Surface to Air
Missile (MRSAM) System. Each regiment shall have four MRSAM launchers with
three missiles capable of engaging a variety of multiple aerial targets including
ballistic missiles at a range of 70 kilometers. The system shall comprise of all-
weather radar and land based mobile launchers. Indo-Israeli joint venture costs
around two billion US dollars and shall develop 40 firing units and 200 missiles.692
The ABM system shall have maximum contribution from indigenous resources which
shall give boost to Indian vision of ‗made in India‘.
Indian membership of MTCR seems to have started delivering with regard to long
desired Indian quest of having BMD shield. It is also claimed that the MRSAMs are
688
Kallol Bhattacherjee, ―India Joins Missile Technology Control Regime,‖ The Hindu, June 27, 2016,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/%E2%80%8BIndia-joins-Missile-Technology-Control-
Regime.-Top-5-things-to-know/article14405165.ece. 689
The Wassenaar Arrangement. ―India becomes 42nd WA Participating State.‖ Accessed February
11, 2018. http://www.wassenaar.org/india-becomes-42nd-wa-participating-state-8-dec-2017/. 690
The Australia Group. ―Press Release: India Joins the Australia Group.‖ Accessed January 25, 2018.
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/india_statement.html. 691
Bharath Gopalaswamy, ―Missile Defense in India,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 27,
2009, accessed November 2, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/missile-defense-india. 692
Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, ―Israel to Partner DRDO for Developing Missile Defense System for
India,‖ The Economic Times (July 21, 2017), accessed November1, 2017,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defense/israel-to-partner-drdo-for-developing-missile-
defense-system-for-india/articleshow/59689811.cms.
234
planned to be deployed against Pakistan and Chinese missile threats.693
Moreover,
courtesy MTCR membership, India is now free to purchase Arrow-2 BMD system
from Israel, which it earlier could not acquire due to MTCR restrictions.694
It may be
recalled that the Indians earlier managed to purchase Arrow-2 radar ‗Green Pine‘
having capability of detecting missiles at a range of 500 km. Arrow-2 BMD system is
a long awaited component of Indian comprehensive BMD shield capable of
destroying medium and short range missiles - the kinds possessed by Pakistan.695
7.4.3 Indo-US CDWs Cooperation
Indo-US BMD related cooperation has been on top cooperation cards. It has been part
of Indo-US 2005 strategic cooperation and has also been forcefully reiterated in
various joint bi-lateral declarations from time to time since 2005. The US is all set to
cooperate in maturing Indian BMD development besides sale of the off-shelf Patriot
(PAC-3) BMD system, however, India is found to be bit reluctant as it wants to
mature its indigenous missile defence.696
Strategically, the US is extending all strategic help to Indian build-up for its own
strategic interests especially in Indian Ocean vis-à-vis China. The US discriminatory
favors to India are destabilizing in nature for the South Asian region where two arch
nuclear opponents India and Pakistan reside. Any technologically led deterrence
destabilizing element like CDWs development could be utterly threatening not only
for the region in particular but the world as a whole.
The US had been in favor of strategic stability between India and Pakistan. It had
tangibly assisted in 1971, 1999, 2001-02 and 2008 Indo-Pak crises to stabilize the
situation. The current Indo-US strategic partnership underlines Washington‘s tilt
towards India. Understandably, this tilt is due to the US global strategic agenda and
693
Ibid. 694
Sharma, ―India‘s Missile Defense Program,‖ 15 695
Ibid, 9. 696
Catherine McArdle Kelleher, ―Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the
21st Century,‖ Center on Contemporary Conflict Research Paper (July 2016): 20,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/50379/ Kelleher%20-
%20Missile%20Defense%20and%20 Extended%20 Deterrence%20-%20PASCC%20Final%20
Report% 20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
235
not for destabilizing the strategic and deterrence stability in the region. However,
many notable security analysts in Pakistan look at it with skepticism and think this tilt
inadvertently may destabilize the current strategic stability in the region. They opine
that the US‘s pro-India approach is augmenting its military modernization which
could intensify the arms race between India and Pakistan. Theoretically, arms race
contains an in-built potential to destabilize strategic stability.
India has been looking for its ‗Greater India‘ status since the subcontinent was
divided. Muscling-up India vis-à-vis China could; however, prove to be detrimental
to the US interests in the South Asian region. Resultantly, there could be a scenario
generated in which India and China – the two aggressive neighbors, might have to be
left alone due to the US public and polity pressures for ‗strategic retrenchment‘.697
The US has to be conscious of such eventuality before strengthening India with
defense coated latest offensive technologies (BMD) that could incentivize well
known Indian hardliner Hindu fundamentalist Government to assert itself for
becoming major regional power from a position of strength.
7.4.4 Indo-Russian CDWs Cooperation
Indian MTCR membership made a concrete effect in cementing long awaited Indo-
Russian cooperation with regard to provisioning of state of the art and most reliable
BMD (CDW) S-400 Triumf system to India at a cost of about 3900 crore Indian
rupees.698
The system has the capability of engaging 36 different targets at a time
including recce or spy aircraft, stealth technology equipped flying platforms,
intermediate range ballistic missiles and drones, up to a range of 400 kilometer in
slant range and 30 kilometers in altitude.699
Indian scholars believe that the S-400 system which has the capability of tracking
100-300 targets simultaneously and has hyper and supersonic interceptor missiles,
697
William T. Tow and William Choong, ―Perceptions of BMD: Defense or Disequilibrium?,‖
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No. 3 (December 2001): 390. 698
Krunali Shah, ―India-Russia to Ink Rs. 39,000cr Defense Deal in October,‖ Indian News Bytes,
April o5, 2018, https://www.newsbytesapp.com/timeline/World/19607/93438/nirmala-sitharaman-s-
visit-to-moscow. 699
Ibid.
236
could be employed to protect major Indian cities against Pakistani short range low
yield ballistic missile ‗Nasr‘ developed to counter Indian Cold Start Doctrine.700
Moreover, the induction of S-400 in Indian military inventory that can engage
aircraft, missiles including the MIRVs during terminal phase, is going to add fuel to
the arms race thereby destabilizing the South Asian fragile stability barometer.
7.5 Indian Justifications behind Developing CDWs and Pakistani Counter
Narratives
India has considerable numbers of self-convincing reasons for developing its missile
shield whether attained from indigenous R&D or acquired through foreign
collaboration. India has been taking position that the BMD shield is not Pakistan
specific only but also to cater for the Chinese missile threat as well. However, Indian
strategic thinkers‘ arguments in support of BMD shield are mostly Pakistan
specific.701
Few of the Indian justifications to develop BMD and their Pakistani
counter narratives are discussed in subsequent paras.
First and foremost reason is that the Indian BMD shield is defensive in nature to
guard its vital assets against those nuclear or conventional tipped missiles which
could be fired against it by the rogue/ terrorist elements when they get hold of nuclear
weapons in Pakistan.702
The Indian defense planners while raising the issue pitched
traditional deterrence against rogue elements (states) that is unsound and strategically
faulty. One size doesn‘t fit all. In order to thwart ambitious perception of common
‗rationality‘ among state and non-state actors, BMD capability is necessary.703
Indian
think tanks also use optimistic lens in support of BMD shield and state that it could be
a useful tool for survival of Indian decision making apparatus to, find time to
700
Rajat Pandit, ―India Begins Talks with Russia for Rs 39,000 Crores Triumf Missile Shield Deal,‖
The Times of India, January 22, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-begins-talks-
with-russia-for-rs-39k-cr-missile-shield-deal/articleshow/62596978.cms. 701
Sharma, ―India‘s Missile Defense Program,‖ : 3. 702
Sharma, ―India‘s Missile Defense Program,‖ 3-4. 703
Tow and Choong, ―Perceptions of BMD,‖ 380.
237
differentiate between a state launched or non-state actors‘ launched offensive; thereby
making appropriate decision for response.704
As a counter argument to the notion, raising voices against Pakistan‘s nuclear security
is believed by Pakistani side to be an old rhetoric and argue that Pakistan has come a
long way ahead with regard to its nuclear security and effective command and control
system. Pakistan has always taken issue of nuclear security very seriously and it is
given highest priority in overall security construct of the country. There has not been
a single incident of any such happening or even an indicator in past. Pakistan‘s
nuclear security efforts have been widely acknowledged and appreciated at
international and political levels. Nuclear security Center of Excellence (CoE) is yet
another initiative of Islamabad to not only enhance the safety and security of its
program but also contribute internationally in securing the civilian nuclear
infrastructure of the states using nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Precisely,
Pakistan is training its nuclear security people as per the established international
norms and good practices in vogue. Pakistan had conducted training courses for few
states. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials‘ have also
acknowledged Pakistan‘s nuclear security efforts.705
It is because Pakistan‘s Personal
Reliability Program (PRP) is well established to look after insider threat.706
Permissive Action Link (PAL) with two man control is yet another appreciated act
which makes inadvertent / unauthorized use or accidental use of a nuclear weapon.
More than 40,000 well trained guards ensure physical security of its nuclear
installations while duly supported by state of the art technological counter measures.
Having so much of established nuclear security measures, Indian suspicion of losing
nuclear weapons to terrorists by Pakistan seems a farfetched fear which does not
merit reaction to the level of developing destabilizing BMD shield. Moreover, besides
704
Happymon Jacob, ―Deterrence Debates and Defense,‖ The Hindu, April 21, 2014, accessed
November 09, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/deterrence-debates-and-
defense/article5931349.ece 705
See Pakistan National Statement at 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, April 01, 2016,
http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/national-statement-pakistan 706
Remarks made by Lt Gen (R) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai at Roundtable Discussion at Institute of
Strategic Studies (ISI), Islamabad on ―Pakistan‘s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process,‖ on
March 25, 2016. http://issi.org.pk/press-release-roundtable-discussion-on-pakistans-role-in-nuclear-
security-summit-nss-process/.
238
the nuclear security efforts, it has to be recollected, as Ashley Tellis puts it, that the
nuclear deterrence rests on offense-dominant nuclear regime and once disturbed,
strategic balancing measures like increasing diversity of delivery means and size of
nuclear warheads besides initiating BMD development and enhancing technical
effectiveness of offensive forces of affected state remains open for adoption.707
Secondly, Indian policy makers also opine that Pakistan has stepped up its support to
militants in Indian held Kashmir from the day when it tested its nuclear devices in
May 1998.708
India, believes that Pakistan has used irregular warfare as instrument of
its policy to bleed India.709
Indian BMD shield would keep Pakistan under check for
their cross border interference; thus, provide Indian leadership reassurance and
confidence to mitigate Pakistani nuclear tipped missiles‘ threat both in defensive and
offensive terms.710
As counter-weight to the Indian argument of using terrorism as a
coercive tool against India, Pakistani leadership views the Indian strategic thinking
approach as substantiating their fear that India is all set to operationalize its offensive
doctrines.711
The confidence won through BMD shield could even make the Indian
leadership opt for ‗First Use‘ against its declared ‗No First Use‘.712
There have been
signaling from the strategic community in India regarding changing their nuclear
doctrine to First Use.713
Otherwise also, an intention based doctrine could not be
believed, after all India also did not trust ‗No First Use‘ declared Chinese nuclear
doctrine and went for nuclearizing South Asia.714
BMD is thus a major destabilizing
707
Tellis, ―The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,‖: 122-123. 708
Sumit Ganguly, ―India's Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense,‖ The Nonproliferation Review, 21:3-4
(2014): 375-376, DOI:10.1080/10736700.2015.1040229. 709
Ibid, 375-377. 710
Gopalaswamy, ―Missile Defense in India,‖. 711
Sumit Ganguly indicated that India is looking for a technological solution [BMD shield] to
Pakistani threat of using nuclear weapons in case India launches riposte as response to Pakistan
sponsored terrorist attack on Indian soil. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that India is on course of
fighting conventional war while living below Pakistan‘s nuclear threshold. See Ganguly, ―India's
Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense,‖, 377. 712
Rathjens and Ruina, ―BMD and Strategic Instability,‖ 246. 713
Ali Ahmed, ―Should India give up its NFU Doctrine?,‖ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi, No. 3170, June 25, 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/should-india-give-up-its-nfu-
doctrine-3170.html. 714
Khalid Banuri, ―Missile Defenses in South Asia: The Next Challenge,‖ South Asian Survey, Vol.
11, No.2 (2004): 197.
239
factor in overall deterrence stability calculus and a threat for already fragile strategic
stability of South Asia.
Third, Indian defense planners argue that Pakistan is on course of modernizing its
armed forces with Chinese support which has diluted India‘s known conventional
superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan; hence, BMD is being developed as a response option
against two of its arch rivals China and Pakistan.715
India also showed its concerns
that Pakistan‘s qualitative edge in military hardware has eroded Indian leverage of
punishing its neighbor for committing terrorist activities through its offensive
doctrines like pro-active and cold start strategies. In such an eventuality, India might
not be able to launch a large-scale offensive let alone tilting the conventional balance
in its favor.716
To address the qualitative asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan, India justifies
its armed forces‘ modernization with induction of state of the art equipment including
the BMD shield. The SIPRI yearbook 2016 substantiates the claim. India topped list
of largest major weapons importers and shared 14% of the total global arms imports
from 2010-2015, while on the other hand Pakistan was ranked 7th
among the arms
importing states and shared just 3.3% of the overall global arms import.717
India increased its arms imports by 90% between 2006-2010 and 2011-2015.
Moreover, its major weapons‘ imports are three times more than its regional rivals i.e.
China and Pakistan.718
International critics opine that the major reason for heaviest
major arms import by India is its inefficient government owned arms manufacturing
industry, which could not produce the arms with desired effectiveness and quality.719
On the domestic front, Indian scholars claim that India is under compulsion to
modernize its armed forces for the reason that most of the equipment held are out
715
Balraj Nagal, ―India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent,‖ Regional
Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington (June 30, 2016), Accessed
November 01, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-defense-
furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966. 716
Walter C. Ladwig III, ―Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,‖
Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:5 (2015): 731. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2015.1014473. 716
Kanwal, ―Indi‘s Military Modernization,‖. 717
―SIPRI Yearbook-2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,‖ (Stockholm: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 580. 718
―SIPRI Yearbook-2016.‖578. 719
Ibid, 577-78.
240
dated and obsolete.720
On the contrary, it‘s the perception, which matters. Pakistan
views the Indian armed forces‘ modernization trend through security lens and
believes that modernization effort would subject Pakistan to security dilemma
situation, which could threaten its existence and thus tries to balance while denying
indulgence in arms race.721
Statistics also reflect that India is frustrated with unbalanced equation of strategic
objectives vs capability; thus, investing heavily in importing arms from abroad which
now shall be expedited due to its quick paced memberships of export control cartels
less NSG Indian accusation of Pakistan‘s armed forces‘ modernization as a
motivating force for acquisitioning of major weapons inter-alia missile shield doesn‘t
gel with facts on ground. Pakistan has remained on the reaction mode in often-
debated action-reaction syndrome – a cause for arms competition in South Asia.722
.
India is aware of the fact that time is the essence for attaining great power status and
that can only happen till the time it remains relevant for the US as counter-weight to
China‘s rising power.
Fourth, India also justifies its BMD shield for being defensive in nature so that to
address the fast developing Pakistan nuclear weapons program723
which is perceived
to have about 140 warheads by end of year 2017.724
Indian scholars also opine that
the BMD shield would deter Pakistan from employing ‗First Use‘ which could be
motivated due to comparatively more number of nuclear warheads vis-à-vis India.725
India professes that since it has a ‗No-First Use‘ nuclear doctrine, so the dis-
advantages are likely to be there for India in terms of second strike. Indian scholars
and defense planners also fear, ‗what if Indian strategic forces lose half of their
720
Gurmeet Kanwal‘s talk at Carnegie Endowment, Washington on May 17, 2017. 721
Sannia Abdullah, ―Cold Start and Frozen Conflict: Competitive Dynamics on Air and Land,‖ Talk
at at Carnegie Endowment, Washington (May 17, 2017), accessed October 13, 2017,
https://www.stimson.org/content/strategic-competition-southern-asia-arms-race-or-modernization. 722
Zafar Khan, ―The Arrival of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Deterrent Stability or
Instability?,‖ Comparative Strategy, 32:5: 406.DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2013.840205. 723
Sanjay Badri Maharaj, ―Ballistic Missile Defense for India,‖ Bharat Rakshak, July 2, 2009,
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Today/Contemporary/328-BMD.html; 724
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ―Status of World Nuclear Forces,‖ Federation of
American Scientists, accessed November 10, 2017, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-
world-nuclear-forces/. 725
Nagal, ―India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent.‖.
241
nuclear capable missiles, when the adversary carries out ‗First Strike‘? Foregoing,
there is a need to have defensive BMD and MIRV systems.726
Indian scholars also
opine that it is better to have something than nothing. Whatever the limitations
associated with BMD shield, BMD efficacy cannot be ruled out for a definite
reduction in casualties and material losses by a missile strike.727
Pakistan, however,
has always denied the impression of being the fastest growing nuclear weapons
program and professes the policy of maintaining full spectrum Credible Minimum
Deterrence.728
Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program, no doubt, is Indian centric, yet it
is defensive in nature with the purpose of deterrence alone against any offensive
coming across its eastern borders.
Lastly, India views BMD shield as a guarantor of the strategic stability in South Asia
and not the spoiler.729
India believes that once deterred, Pakistan will not resort to
‗First Use‘ due to the cost involved. In addition, Indian strategic enclave perceives
that defensive BMD shield is consistent with more better and viable deterrence
policy.730
BMD shield capability would provide confidence to the Indian political and
military leadership that First Strike would be survived enough to launch Second
Strike; hence, nuclear weapons could be placed on the lower side of the readiness and
even in de-mated form. Therefore, the Indian BMD shield that is an extension of its
defensive approach would ensure reduced chances of accidental use731
; continue with
its ‗No First Use‘ doctrine732
and protracted peace.733
On the contrary, Pakistan has
variety of reasons to think tangent to the Indian arguments in support of their BMD
shield. With regard to Indian claim that BMD shield would lower state of readiness
and could be kept in de-matted status, is contested and debatable. India has recently 726
Gurmeet Kanwal‘s talk at Carnegie Endowment, Washington on May 17, 2017. 727
Joshi, ―Government Baffled Over DRDO Chief's Claim on Missile Shield.‖ 728
See Pakistan‘s NCA Statement, February 24, 2016, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=3211#pr_link3211. 729
Debalina Ghoshal, ―India Conducts Successful Missile Interceptor Test,‖ Diplomat, May 8, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india-conducts-successful-missile-interceptor-test/. 730
M. V. Subbarao, ―India and Star Wars,‖ The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4
(October – December, 1989): 562, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855457 731
Tellis, ―The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,‖:148. Also see Sharma, ―India’s Missile Defense
Programme.‖ 3. 732
A. Vinod Kumar, ―The Dragon‘s Shield: Intricacies of China‘s BMD Capability,‖ Institute of
Defense Studies and Analyses, February 25, 2010: 10,
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/IntricaciesofChinasBMDCapability_250210. 733
Nagal, ―India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent.‖
242
tested its canistarized Agni-IV Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with
likely MIRV capability,734
which totally negates the Indian claim. Canistarization of
nuclear tipped ballistic missiles and lowering of nuclear threshold are the same side
of the same coin. Besides it, Agni-V can also be easily converted into space launcher
with minor modifications.735
Foregoing, it can easily be perceived that India is on
course of relegating political solutions in favor of technology based war fighting
solutions for resolving outstanding disputes between the two nuclear armed rival
states. India seems to be obsessed with false sense of security, which it assumes that
threat of nuclear destruction can be eliminated by means of technological
advancement and introduction of new weapons systems inter-alia BMD shield. 736
Pakistan; thus, might not be left with flexibility in its approach and instead opt for
taking all possible necessary steps inter-alia modernization of its deterrence seeking
inventory, as the states in arms race tend to act on reciprocal basis.737
7.6 Indian BMD and South Asian Deterrence Stability
The prevalent deterrence stability of South Asia is largely shaped by nuclear weapons
and its delivery means. Both India and Pakistan are actively pursuing modernization
of their respective nuclear capabilities and their delivery means. Indian quest for
acquisitioning of BMD shield acts negatively to the deterrence value held by Pakistan
while it performs positively for the India. BMD could lead to capabilities‘
miscalculation and operational anxiety during tense environment and fog of war
thereby resulting into catastrophic inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia.738
During the Cold War, the US and Soviets had learnt that mutual vulnerability or in
other words Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) moves the stability graph index
734
Gurmeet Kanwal‘s talk at Carnegie Endowment, Washington on May 17, 2017. 735
S. Chandrashekar, Space, War & Security: A Strategy for India (Bengaluru: National Institute of
Advanced Studies, 2015), 107. 736
Rathjens and Ruina, ―BMD and Strategic Instability,‖ 241. 737
Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, ―Understanding the Arms Race in South Asia,‖ Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 2012, 7,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/south_asia_arms_race.pdf. 738
Usman Ghani, ―Nuclear Weapons in India-Pakistan Crisis,‖ IPRI Journal, Vol. XII, No. 2 (Summer
2012) 137-138.
243
towards upper side.739
On the contrary, pro-BMD shield Indian scholars opine that the
concept of MAD was Cold War specific and doesn‘t apply to Indo-Pak scenarios who
maintain much lesser numbers of nuclear weapons as compared to what the US and
USSR had at that time. They tow their line with the argument that BMD is a tool for
achieving deterrence by denial.740
BMD is professed positively with the argument that
since the India is maintaining ‗No First Use‘ doctrine – an already restraint approach,
it cannot let itself lose to the adversary‘s ‗First Use‘ doctrine. BMD, thus, has to be
there to reduce destructive value by the ‗First Use‘.741
Interestingly, India remained
opposed to the US NMD program for the strategic problems associated to it. Indian
Minister of Defense Mr George Fernandes categorically stated that; ―Missile defense
had the potential to undermine the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD)‖.742
Notwithstanding, anti ABM shield scholars opine differently mainly in
terms of cost prohibitions involved in development of ABM shield743
and secondly
the viability factor against Pakistani ballistic missiles due to the short time of flight
and smaller ranges. Pakistan has been a reluctant actor towards performing any act
which could disturb stability equilibrium; however, India being a known aspirant
great power, may learn from the past happenings about initiating an undesirable arms
race. India and Pakistan need to talk bilaterally and try to gather mutual
understanding of the cost and benefit of the BMD shield in overall stability perusal
efforts.
Pakistan believes in maintenance of conventional balance vis-à-vis India for durable
peace. India over the last quarter century has been on top of arms exporting
countries.744
Accounting to the report published by SIPRI, a Stockholm based think
tank, it claimed that India has been the largest arms importer in the world from 2012
739
Zhong Jing, Pan Zhenqiang, ―Redefining strategic stability in a changing world: a Chinese view,‖
Contemporary Security Policy 25, no.1 (April 2004): 124. 740
Jacob, ―Deterrence Debates and Defense,‖. 741
Kumar, ―The Dragon‘s Shield: Intricacies of China‘s BMD Capability,‖ 8-9. 742
Tellis, ―The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,‖:125. 743
Narayan Menon, ―Ballistic Missile Defense System for India,‖ Indian Defense Review 27, no. 3
(July–September 2012). 744
Khurram Abbas, ‖Indian Military Buildup: Impact on Regional Stability,‖ Journal of Current
Affairs, Vol. 1, Nos. 1&2: 123.
244
to 2017 having a share of 13% of the overall global arms imports745
. India is growing
its defense budget at the rate of 7-9 percent annually.746
Indian arms build up to such
an out of proportion ratio is alarming for Pakistan whose main stay of deterrence
capability is based on conventional armed forces strength. Indian efforts of
modernizing its armed forces in qualitative and quantitative terms could be
detrimental to the Pakistan‘s deterrence calculations in particular and region‘s
strategic stability in general.747
India, however, defends its arms build-up for the
Chinese emerging threat.748
Pakistan does not subscribe to this claim and takes the
Indian arms modernization as South Asian centric having regional hegemonic
designs. As Gurmeet Kanwal puts it that modernization drive in the Indian Armed
Forces makes it evident that India is all set to join world‘s great powers‘ club through
attaining capacity to undertake ‗out-of-area‘ operations.749
Indian foreign procurement of BMD shield or developing it indigenously is bound to
create security dilemma situation - security of one actor is insecurity for another.750
Without getting into debate about vitality and efficacy of Indian BMD shield, it
would definitely give a sense of protection; however, at the same time would
undermine Pakistan‘s ballistic missile based deterrence.751
There would be no choice
left with Pakistani strategic planners to bring back the disturbed deterrence equation
by using catalyst of arms race in terms of more warheads and more versatile
missiles752
and undesirable lowering of nuclear threshold753
so as to ensure strategic
equivalence impact on overall stability. Pakistan‘s testing of its MIRV capable
745
―India is World‘s Largest Arms Importer: SIPRI,‖ Hindustan Times, February 20, 2017, accessed
October 21, 2017,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-is-world-s-largest-arms-importer-
sipri/story-Ahi6LhqR7WcZStOyDuIRKL.html. 746
Rehman, ―India: The Next Superpower?,‖ 24. 747
Ladwig III, ―Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,‖ 731. 748
Kanwal, ―India‘s Military Modernization.‖ 749
Ibid. 750
Samuel P. Huntington, ―Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,‖ Public Policy, vol. 8 (1958): 41–
86. 751
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ―The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on
Strategic Stability,‖ in Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, ed. Feroz Hassan Khan,
Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2014), 125. 752
MaleehaLodhi, ―Security Challenges in South Asia,‖ The Nonproliferation Review, 8:2 (2001): 120.
DOI: 10.1080/10736700108436856. 753
Peter R. Lavoy, ―Islamabad‘s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,‖ in Henry D.
Sokolski, ed. Pakistan‘s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College,
2008), 158.
245
missile Ababeel, is claimed to be a counter measure to Indian BMD shield754
and
could be seen through the prism of action-reaction phenomenon. Besides MIRVing
the missiles, Pakistan could also resort to initiating supersonic/ subsonic glide
vehicles programs besides further improving its cruise missile technology - an
initiation of vicious arms race contrary to the global initiative of containing missiles
proliferation.755
BMD shield or in other words CDWs‘ operationalization in the South Asia would
mean closing the possibility of strategic missiles‘ penetration into the defenses i.e.
forestalling the vulnerability factor. Geographically, India has much greater depth as
compared to linear shaped Pakistan. Most of the Indian ballistic missiles test sites for
instance, Wheeler Islands are out of Pakistani aircraft‘ combat radius, thus making
them invulnerable to Pakistani Airforce strikes. The geographical advantage to the
Indian side is countered by Pakistani long-range ballistic missiles. In this scenario,
any effort inter-alia development of BMD shield to nullify Pakistan‘s missiles based
deterrence would be counter-productive and can unnerve Pakistani side for making
more numbers of strategic warheads besides further modernizing its cruise and MIRV
missile programs.
One of the strategic values of BMD shield is that it substantially reduces the political
pressures on military commanders for launching preemptive attack.756
BMD shield
could thus add fuel to the complacency factor with the Indian military planners. The
scenario could be a contributing factor towards miscalculating the operational/
strategic levels of situations and Indian military commanders might fall prey to choice
of preemptive or first use nuclear strike.757
First use incentive would be BMD
capability driven especially when the Gandhi known policy of minimalism and
754
Government of Pakistan, Inter Services Public Relations Directorate, ―Press Release No PR
34/2017 ISPR,‖ January 24, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&id=3705. 755
Kumar, ―The Dragon‘s Shield: Intricacies of China‘s BMD Capability,‖ 11. 756
Brad Roberts, ―On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense,‖ Proliferation Paper No. 50
(June 2014): 22, accessed October 30, 2017,
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf. 757
Frederic Labarre, ―Is Missile Defense Moral?,‖ International Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring,
2005): 561.
246
defensiveness has been antiquated.758
Hypothetically, Indian military planners having
a known hardliner political leadership and its military equipped with a viable BMD
and MIRV capable missiles could find an incentive for resorting to massive First Use
strike despite its declared nuclear doctrine of No First Use.759
The strike would be
with an aim of destroying maximum numbers of Pakistani nuclear capable missile
sites with an assurance that whatever second strike comes on to it shall be mitigated
by the BMD shield.760
Such complacency on Indian part is going to be based ‗BMD
centric confidence‘ and is likely to extremely detrimental to the South Asian
deterrence stability. While on Pakistan‘s part, which claims to be supportive of
Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) in South Asia, the Indian BMD might be instigated
for a preventive nuclear strike. Both kinds of different purposed strikes are least
desired and can only be checked by taking mutually agreed restraint measures.
BMD shield‘s introduction or operationalization of Indian ASAT development, which
are termed as CDWs, in South Asian strategic setting might further widen the trust
deficit between India and Pakistan which has been the hall mark of their bi-lateral
relations.761
Even a positive step between the two is observed with suspicious
approach.762
Furthermore, by developing CDWs against Pakistan strategic missiles,
Indian strategic decision makers‘ attitude would grow further dismissive thus
substantially reducing its appetite for resolving outstanding territorial disputes,
avoiding Indo-Pak composite dialogue and above all expediting operationalization of
its offensive doctrines inter-alia Cold Start and Pro-active Doctrines.763
Another negative fall out of the likely introduction of CDWs in South Asia could be
the launching of deliberate coercive diplomacy in the realms of politics and military.
A BMD capability actually buys time for making and applying strategic choices
758
Vipin Narang, ―Five Myths about India‘s Nuclear Posture,‖ Washington Quarterly 36 (Summer
2013): 155. 759
Narang, ―Five Myths,‖ 147. 760
Ganguly, ―India's Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense,‖ 378. 761
Ibid, 377. 762
Umbreen Javaid, ―Confidence Building Measures in Nuclear South Asia: Limitations and
Prospects,‖ South Asian Studies Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 (July-December 2010): 345. 763
See record of the Press Briefing by Pakistan‘s Foreign Office Spokesperson, November, 09 2017,
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NTYwNQ,,.
247
besides opportunities for [coercive] diplomacy.764
Albeit, not directly related to BMD,
in October 2017, Indian Air Chief‘s hostile statement hints in this direction. He stated
on the eve of Indian Air force‘s 85th
anniversary that, ―[Indian Air force] has the
ability to locate, fix and strike……not only….tactical nuclear weapons but also ……
other targets across the border‖.765
Such statements are an apt reflection of the
coercion whose intensity could go further stronger with BMD shield duly assuring
security against Pakistani missile based nuclear deterrence.
In addition, South Asian region does not confine to India and Pakistan only but the
SAARC states and China as well; however, security architecture of the region is
shaped by India and Pakistan with the former in lead role. China has a shadow role in
South Asia as it falls outside geography of South Asia. Consequently, SAARC states
less Pakistan adjust their security objectives as per Indian interests. In other words,
South Asian region is Indian centric.766
Introduction of BMD systems might narrow
the regional and global political geography; thus, raise the vulnerability level of
comparatively smaller states, in case of deterrence failure.767
India presumes itself to be the fulcrum of South Asian power politics.768
New Delhi
thus, tries to assume South Asia as its integral security unit and perceives that the
security of smaller states inter-alia Pakistan in the west and other SAARC states its
east, is its one of the state function being a major power.769
Moreover, to reduce
Chinese influence in its backyard, India is already in defense and economic
cooperation, albeit with some irritants, with its eastern neighbors including Sri Lanka,
764
Roberts, ―On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense,‖ 22. 765
―India Can ‗Locate, Fix, Strike Targets‘ Across Border, says Air chief Dhanoa,‖ Hindustan Times,
October 5, 2017, accessed October 25, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/iaf-has-the-
capability-to-locate-fix-and-strike-across-the-border-air-chief-marshal-bs-dhanoa/story-
Y6IikH9slGYfwrOBPxq6fO.html. 766
P. Lyon, ―South Asia and Geo-Strategies of the 1990s,‖ Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 1. No. 1,
(1992), 25-39. 767
William T. Tow and William Choong, ―Asian Perceptions of BMD: Defense or Disequilibrium?,‖
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No. 3 (December 2001): 388, accessed September 30, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798559. 768
RajendraSareen, Pakistan: The India Factor (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984), 31. 769
Douglas C. Makeig, ―War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,‖ Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer, 1987): 278-279.
248
Maldives,770
Nepal,771
Bangladesh772
and Bhutan773
. In this regard, BMD shield could
prove to be an instrument for transforming equation of extended deterrence and
negative security assurance.774
BMD capability could galvanize Indian efforts to enter
into defense agreements with its non-nuclear eastern neighbors by offering them
provisioning of extended deterrence against any threat, which it otherwise believe to
be its responsibility. The proposition could offer certain number of strategic
advantages to India; inter-alia, becoming a regional hegemon and international
projection as a responsible nuclear weapon state who tangibly contributed towards
nuclear and missile non-proliferation by reducing incentives for its eastern neighbors
to acquire nuclear deterrent of their own. Such an image could strengthen Indian case
for becoming member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and win permanent seat
in UNSC.
BMD acquisition by India could be detrimental to the success of Global War on
Terror (GWOT) as well. As brought out earlier, India with a state of the art BMD
shield capability might expedite its offensive military strategies inter-alia Cold Start
and Pro-active operations. Pakistan armed forces which are busy in uprooting menace
of terrorism from its territory might have to dilute its military effort so as to address
the conventional threat building along its eastern borders which was earlier looked
after using deterrence tool. Diluting military strength could lead to building up of
terrorists‘ strength in Afghanistan at large and Pakistani tribal areas in particular.
Thus turning the tide in favor of terrorists and losing a war during its consolidation
phase.
Confidence Building Measures offer predictability of actions by the two rival states
under a particular situation and is an instrument to avoid situations leading to 770
Panda, Ankit, ―India Steps Up Defense Cooperation with Sri Lanka and Maldives,‖ The Diplomat,
October 21, 2014. 771
Official document of Indian Ministry of External Affairs on ―India–Nepal Relations,‖ Government
of India, 2016. 772
Piyali Dutta, ―India-Bangladesh Relations Issues, Problems and Recent Developments‖,‖ Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report (September 2010), accessed November 21, 2017,
http://www.ipcs.org/special-report/india/india-bangladesh-relations-issues-problems-and-recent-
developments-97.html. 773
Government of India, Ministry of Defense New Delhi: 2006, ―Annual Report 2005–2006,‖, 198. 774
Shashank Joshi, ―India and ‗No First Use‘,‖ Royal United Services Institute: Harvard University,
September 25, 2012, https://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/india-and-no-first-use/.
249
potential conflict.775
They also assist in conflict management and at least facilitate in
conflict sustainability. Process of initiating CBMs especially the strategic natured
CBMs including Nuclear CBMs (NCBMs) can only break the ice when environment
is ripe for negotiations. Theoretically, a ripeness need an environment in which there
is ‗mutually hurting stalemate‘ and a general understanding prevails that a
misadventure would be cost prohibitive.776
Indian initiative of introducing CDWs
inter-alia BMD shield in South Asia might off-balance the deterrence stability and is
likely to dilute the mutually hurting fear; thus, diminishing chances of having ripe
environment for negotiating NCBMs for protracted peace and deterrence stability of
South Asia.
BMD shield could also distract Pakistan from offering NCBMs and adopt an upward
trajectory in producing more fissile material and missiles. Naturally, India would
follow the suite. Hence, both India and Pakistan would not like to be subject to
constraints that could affect their respective balancing acts,777
which means that road
to most needed NCBMs in South Asia would encounter a dead end.
7.7 Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue Process
India and Pakistan has been on tangent courses since their inception in 1947. Kashmir
has remained and still is the core issue haunting both sides for a peaceful co-
existence. India is not ready to hold plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as per the
United Nations Security Council Resolution(s)778
while Pakistan supports them.
Interestingly, India and Pakistan both consider each other as ‗revisionist‘ states. India
thinks itself to be a status-quo power who wants to stay with its current borders‘
alignment while Pakistan perceives it to be revisionist having purpose of regional
775
Holly Higgins, ―Applying Confidence-Building Measures in a Regional Context,‖ Paper presented
at Institute for Science and International Security, accessed October 12, 2017, http://isis-
online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/higginspaper.pdf. 776
William Zartman, ―Ripeness‘: the Importance of Timing in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,‖
E-International Relations, December 20, 2008, accessed November 01, 2017, http://www.e-
ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/. 777
D Suba Chandran, ―Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere,‖ Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies, No. 3571, (February 2017), accessed October 20, 2017,
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/indo-pak-nuclear-cbms-the-road-to-nowhere-3571.html. 778
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 47, adopted on April 21, 1948 on Kashmir
Dispute.
250
hegemony, if not physical, at-least diplomatically and politically. On the contrary,
India believes Pakistan to be a revisionary purposed state779
that desires Indian held
Jammu and Kashmir to its side, while Pakistan denies the preposition and wants the
world to play its role in getting the Kashmir issue resolved as per Kashmiris‘ resolve.
India however, having physical control of Jammu and Kashmir by force remains
dismissive and finds no compelling reason to settle the issue of Kashmir.780
Secondly,
India is obsessed with the idea that Pakistan with Chinese assistance maintains an
anti-Indian ascendancy approach to be a potential great power.781
While Pakistan
opines that it desires to have relations with India based on reciprocity.782
The cold war patterned bi-lateral relations have come to an end and now the
environment for CBMs to resolve disputes is more favorable. CBMs could be best
tools for provisioning of viable framework for sustained result oriented dialogue and
offering conducive environment to handle issues of mutual fears.783
There has been
understanding on both sides to enter into CBMs for better relations. Indo - Pak
NCBMs were initiated long before the nuclear tests of May 1998, when agreement on
non-attack on nuclear facilities was signed in 1988. Later, the Lahore Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) was signed during Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee‘s visit to Pakistan in 1999 that provided the framework for pursuing nuclear
and conventional CBMs between the two sides i.e. immediately after the overt
nuclearization of South Asia.784
After a phase of heightened tensions during 2001-02 escalation and with the
improvement of general atmosphere between Pakistan and India, the two countries
779
Makeig, ―War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,‖ 285. 780
Ashley J. Tellis, ―Are India-Pakistan Peace Talks Worth a Damn?,‖ Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (2017): 72, http://carnegieendowment.org/publica0tions/?fa=73145.Ashley Tellis
suggested Indian policy makers that India has no reason to step back from its position on Kashmir for
the reasons that it holds physical possession of disputed territory, no need to be conscious of freedom
struggle as the world community is on India side and above all India has requisite resources for
sustaining its dominance. 781
Tellis, ―Are India-Pakistan Peace Talks Worth a Damn?,‖ 34. 782
Makeig, ―War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,‖ 292. 783
A. Z. Hilali, ―Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for India and Pakistan,‖ Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April-June 2005): 217. 784
See text of Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), accessed October 12, 2017,
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf
251
initiated the process of Composite Dialogue in 2004, which also included nuclear and
conventional CBMs talks at expert level.785
Since June 2004, as part of nuclear
CBMs, there have been seven rounds of expert level talks, with the last round held in
December 2012 in New Delhi and thereafter there has been no headway and the only
strategic opening between the two nuclear armed neighbors is resorted to stalemate.
A critical analysis of the existing NCBMs and the approach pursued by the two states
reveals a divergent course. Pakistan‘s approach towards Nuclear CBMs pivots around
pragmatic objectives that include, one, resolution of territorial disputes and other
political/ diplomatic differences through dialogue, two, addressing the bilateral
misperceptions, third, promoting the over-arching concept of strategic stability in
South Asia encompassing nuclear restraint and conventional balance and lastly, re-
assuring the international community that nuclear capabilities of Pakistan and India
constitute a factor for stability in the region.
On the other hand, the Indian side has generally been dismissive in its approach
towards Pakistan in general and Pakistan‘s CBMs proposals in particular. It can be
ascertained from the processes of last seven rounds of composite dialogue. Indian
approach towards nuclear CBMs pivots around its vested interests only, these include,
one, looking for opportunities for reversing the lowering of the nuclear threshold,
two, avoiding Indian entanglement with Pakistan at bilateral level on issues related to
global arms control and disarmament, three, seeking official declarations on nuclear
doctrines including classification of nuclear threshold and lastly, exploring new areas
to introduce restraints on the use of nuclear weapons.
The above claim of varied approaches can be related to the kinds of mutually agreed
existing nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan. The two sides have so far
concluded following significant Nuclear CBMs:-
785
Raviprasad Narayanan, ―The India-Pakistan Dyad: A Challenge to the Rest or to Themselves?,‖
Asian Perspective, Vol. 34, No. 4, (2010): 182.
252
Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities
(1988).786
In accordance with this agreement, both states had agreed to
refrain from attacking each other‘s‘ notified nuclear facilities/
installations. Pakistan and India exchange lists of their respective
nuclear installations and facilities on January 1st every year. The CBM
since its inception has been religiously practiced since its inception
and the lists are shared even during peak of occasional crises between
the two states.
Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests (2005).
The agreement is purposed to adopt appropriate measures to prevent
misunderstanding by advance notification of missile flight tests.
Respective side notifies each other through diplomatic channel prior to
the planned missile test less cruise missile tests.787
Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Nuclear Weapons Related
Accidents (2007).The agreement was reached for appropriate
arrangements to guard against accidents relating to nuclear weapons
and to notify each other immediately in the wake of any accidents with
potential radioactive fallout.
Establishment of Hotlines. As per this agreement, separate hotlines
between respective Director Generals Military Operations (MO)
(established in 1965)788
and Foreign Secretaries (established in
2004)789
are there to prevent misunderstanding, risk management and
crises control.790
786
Federation of American Scientists, ―Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and
Facilities ,‖. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/nucl.htm 787
Erin Creegan, ―India, Pakistan Sign Missile Notification Pact,‖ Arms Control Today (November 01,
2005), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IndiaPa. 788
P. R. Chari, ―Strategic Stability in South Asia: the Role of Confidence-Building and Threat
Reduction Measures,‖ Contemporary South Asia, 14:2 (August 2006): 212, DOI:
10.1080/09584930500314318. 789
Chari, ―Strategic Stability in South Asia,‖ 214. 790
―India, Pakistan to Establish Nuclear Hotline,‖ Fox News, June 20, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/06/20/india-pakistan-to-establish-nuclear-hotline.html.
253
It is quite evident from the above-narrated nuclear related CBMs that India preferred
to enter into only those CBMs with Pakistan which favored the risk reduction. It is
also important to mention that Pakistan in the past had offered a number of nuclear
related CBMs to India, inter-alia, South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (1974),
Renunciation on acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan (1978),
Comprehensive mutual inspection of each other‘s nuclear facilities (1979), Pakistani
proposal of conventional balance (1981) and Bilateral South Asian Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (1987);791
however, India did not take them serious and rejected.
Several of these measures have now been overtaken by time.
Proposal of having a bilateral declaration on Non Deployment of ABMs is on cards
too;792
however, Indian response has been discouraging. Overall, Indian attitude
remained dismissive. It seems that Indian side wants to remain stick to the process of
reviewing the existing CBMs in the overall realm of 1999 Lahore MoU and does not
have interest in new CBM proposals.
7.8 Way Forward to Stabilize the Destabilizing South Asian Deterrence
Stability
Nuclear deterrence has been on work in maintaining stability in South Asia. Non-
escalation of 1999 Kargil conflict, military stand-off of 2002 and other multiple
smaller and medium intensity crises between India and Pakistan indicate the efficacy
of nuclear deterrence.793
Any effort to disturb the deterrence equation would be
undesirable. It demands CBMs and non-provocativeness on part of both India and
Pakistan. The stalemated process of strategic nuclear CBMs needs to be revived - the
only way forward to kick off protracted peace in the region. Pakistan has shown its
resolve for the composite dialogue but the response from India has generally
remained lukewarm. To avoid any new strategic CBM, India has been hedging behind
791
Makeig, ―War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,‖ 278, 291. 792
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (California: Stanford
University Press, 2012), 298. 793
Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, (New Delhi: Vision
Books, 2003), 54.
254
acts of non-state actors and terrorism.794
India also conditioned that composite
dialogue could only be resumed after terrorism from across the border comes to a
conclusive end795
- a rhetorical preposition which Pakistan rejects.796
India and Pakistan both need to understand that composite dialogue between the two
must sustain without getting distracted by occasional irritants. Blame games would
not pay. While Pakistan has offered several CBM proposals for dispute resolutions;
however, India maintains that Kashmir is its integral part and there is no room for any
negotiations. India also never accepted any third party mediation including open
hearted offers from the US797
and China798
. On the other hand, with regard to issues
related to nuclear and strategic importance, India does not want to be tied down in
any bilateral setting.799
Indian approach is generally multi-lateral and international,
whereas Pakistani perception considers regional nuclear restraint as an urgent matter.
Nuclear capability merits viable CBMs between the two competitors so as to avoid
inadvertent and accidental use of nuclear weapons, especially in South Asia where the
chances of accidental nuclear war is much pronounced.800
It demands a robust and
uninterrupted communication. CBMs should be such that they do not let false alarms
to happen which implies that destabilizing systems like CDWs be avoided at all cost.
The CDWs‘ deployment adds to the confidence of aggressor‘s attitude leading to
offensive preemptive strike801
while on the defender side an anxiety due to CDWs
794
―India Reiterates Conditions for Talks with Pakistan,‖ Dawn, November 10, 2017,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1369572. 795
Gurmeet Kanwal‘s talk at Carnegie Endowment, Washington on May 17, 2017. 796
Press release of Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled, ―At UN, Pakistan rejects Indian claim to
Kashmir as India's "integral part",‖ September 22, 2017, accessed October 30, 2017,
http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NTQwNw,,. 797
―Pakistan Accepts, India Rejects US Peace Talks Offer,‖ Dawn, April 05, 2017,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1324928/pakistan-accepts-india-rejects-us-peace-talks-offer. 798
―India Rejects China's Offer to Play 'Constructive Role' Over Kashmir, Says It Is a 'Bilateral Issue',‖
The Times of India, July 13, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kashmir-is-a-bilateral-
issue-india-on-chinas-offer-to-play-constructive-role/articleshow/59578807.cms. 799
SaadiaTasleem, ―No Indian BMD for No Pakistani MIRVS,‖ Stimson Center Off Ramps Initiative,
(October 2017):2, accessed October 15, 2017, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-
attachments/Sadia%20Tasleem%20Off%20Ramps%20Essay%20_0.pdf. 800
Hilali, ―Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for India and Pakistan,‖ 192. 801
Lodhi, ―Security Challenges in South Asia,‖ 121.
255
could lead to preventive strike. Both scenarios are deterrence killers and could lead to
unimaginable destruction process.
Foregoing, there is a need for adoption of a ‗comprehensive approach to strategic
stability‘ and Pakistan‘s proposal of ‗Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR)‘ encompasses
the related factors. Pakistan had proposed to institutionalize a Strategic Restraint
Regime (SRR) in South Asia, first in October 1998, with an objective to engage in
conflict resolution process through a sustained, result oriented dialogue.802
The
Pakistani proposal of SRR is a regional CBM for South Asia with its foundation on
three pillars i.e. peaceful resolution of outstanding territorial disputes, maintenance of
conventional balance and non-acquisition or deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Systems. India has been and still remains allergic to SRR proposal, while on
Pakistani side, it remains on table.803
Second, there could be yet another ambitious aspiring way forward to bring peace and
stability in the region i.e. bilateral ‗No War Pact‘. The suggestion for having no war
pact between India and Pakistan is not new and dates back to 1949 when for the very
first time Indian Prime Minister offered No-War Pact to Pakistan. It was later
reiterated by a number of Indian leaders inter-alia Nehru (1949, 1950 and 1956), Lal
Bhadur Shastri (1965), Indra Gandhi (1962), Desai (1977), Rajiv Gandhi (1982).
However, Pakistan had not been supportive of the suggestion mainly on two pretexts,
one, Kashmir issue needs to be resolved first and secondly, India to accept mutual
force reduction proposal.804
The proposal remained stalemated till 1981 when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
and Pakistan felt threatened along its western borders. Pakistan initiated proposal of
non-aggression and non-use of force with India in the spirit of Shimla Accord. The
Pakistani proposal was responded by a counter Indian proposal of having ‗peace,
802
Irfan Ghauri, ‖India Offered Strategic Restraint Regime,‖ The Express Tribune, November 9, 2017,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1553984/1-anti-pakistan-elements-afghanistan-will-not-succeed-evil-
plans-fo/. 803
See Pakistan‘s NCA Statement, February 24, 2016, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=3211#pr_link3211. 804
Makeig, ―War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,‖ 287. Also see notes.
256
friendship and cooperation‘ treaty on the pattern of Indo-Soviet friendship treaty.805
A
joint commission was also formed which worked relentlessly to perpetuate détente
between the two states. Despite all efforts, trust deficit remained a blocking
instrument. The process came to nose-down crash when Pakistan highlighted its
principled stance on Kashmir issue at United Nations Human Right Commission in
February 1982. India blamed Pakistan for this act as violation of Shimla Accord.806
Third, India and Pakistan can have mutually agreed ‗moratorium on development,
testing and deployment of ABM807
and ASATs systems‘, albeit, it sounds optimistic
in the present political circumstances. India looks beyond the region and aspiring for
great power status, while Pakistan is fixed with its security compulsions – the two
tangent approaches being followed by the two arch nuclear equipped rivals.
Fourth, the moratorium could later be translated into a legally binding bilateral ABM
Treaty between the two states. Any tangible legally binding effort to limit or control
the BMD shield could substantially rein strategic offensive arms, encourage arms
reduction/ balancing negotiations and slashing the probability of a nuclear war.
A suggested general framework might include following aspects which could be
further refined during negotiations process of a probable Indo-Pakistan ABM treaty:
Restrain from developing, testing and deployment of BMD system which
could be based in either of the domain i.e. land, sea, air or space.
Bilateral commitment not to be part of any BMD shield setup.
Refrain from developing an exo-atmospheric SAM system, which could be
employed alternatively as a missile shield or ASAT weapon.
Restraining conduct of interception test against sub-orbital target including
missile warhead even by a long range SAM system.
805
Ibid, 287-288. 806
Ibid, 289. 807
Lodhi, ―Security Challenges in South Asia,‖ 121.
257
Not to acquire any kind of technology which could be employed against
countering missiles inter-alia air or drone based lasers using electromagnetic
frequencies, etc.
However, an ABM treaty could be under two circumstances, one, when both India
and Pakistan have acquired ABM technology and there is a zero-sum kind of
situation. Two, when only India is pursuing BMD shield and is in initial stages of
operationalizing it while Pakistan resultantly feels concerned about degradation of its
deterrence credibility - the contemporary situation. Such a destabilizing development
in the regional strategic environment could compel Pakistan to field its own BMD
shield - a costly affair; albeit, at some stage the balancing act would mean zero-sum
game i.e. plugging the vulnerability gaps and substantially reducing the potential
values of first use or massive retaliation doctrines.808
On the other hand, in case geo-
political-military circumstance prevail for having a bi-lateral Indo-Pak bilateral ABM
Treaty i.e. if India freezes its ABM shield program, the two states need to actualize
their claimed rational behavior for the sake of protracted peace and stability in the
region.
Last but not the least, India may like to reconcile its BMD shield development
program and trade-off BMD program for Pakistan‘s MIRV technology, which it has
already demonstrated.809
India also has a MIRV technology access amply visible from
its launching of space launch vehicle carrying about hundreds of smaller satellites.810
India and Pakistan may not miss the opportunity of bringing back balance to the
South Asian strategic stability which is being threatened by the introduction of BMD
systems in the region. Indian BMD shield might not be viable against Pakistan‘s
advanced cruise, ballistic and MIRVed missiles. It‘s time to initiate arms control
initiative based on reciprocity and equality. Choice lies with the Indian and Pakistani
defense planners and strategic forecasters. It would be difficult at a later stage to 808
Kumar, ―The Dragon‘s Shield: Intricacies of China‘s BMD Capability,‖ 11. Albeit, Kumar in his
thesis, compared Indian and Chinese BMD competition for suggesting BMD Treaty between the two;
however, same template has been placed over Indian and Pakistani environment. 809
Kamran Yousaf, ―Ababeel to ‗Neutralize India‘s Defense Shield‘,‖ The Express Tribune, January
25, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1306241/ababeel-neutralise-indias-defense-shield/. 810
Katie Hunt and Medhavi Arora, ―India in Record Satellite Launch as Asia's Space Race Heats Up,‖
CNN, February 15, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/13/asia/india-china-asia-space-
race/index.html.
258
manage their deployment etc., once fully developed, operational and integrated in
overall military plans.811
With the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1998, South Asia housing India and
Pakistan is acquainted to the alarming rhetoric of being nuclear flash point. Nuclear
winter is the least desired option. While living below each other‘s nuclear threshold,
both India and Pakistan have tried to find a space for fighting a low-intensity conflict
to meet their political ends. Kargil conflict of 1999 on part of Pakistan while
operationalization of war fighting doctrines inter-alia Cold Start, hot-pursuit and Pro-
active operations and admittedly812
supporting terrorist activities in Baluchistan from
Afghanistan on Indian end, are cases in point to support the argument. The trend has
to be curbed as it could spiral into a full fledge war - a nuclear war.
Realization prevails on both sides regarding non-utility of war. Pakistan has been
indicating its resolve for peace with India. On November 6, 2017, Pakistani Prime
Minister Mr Shahid Khaqan Abbasi committed that ‗war is not an option with India
and that only talks can resolve all outstanding issues including Kashmir‘.813
Foregoing in view, when an all-out war between the two nuclear armed states seems
highly unlikely, and there is political understanding too, negotiating a No-War Pact
appears to be doable. However; purely based on contemporary South Asian strategic
environment, it can be ascertained that till the time there is no progress towards
settlement of Kashmir issue, No-War Pact seems a distant dream.
The preceding discussion reveals that South Asia being the most militarized region in
the world814
needs a balanced, careful and intricate handling. Given the optimistic and
pessimistic arguments by India and Pakistan in support or against the BMD shield,
there is a need to identify a framework for a predictable behavior by the two states on
811
Tasleem, ―No Indian BMD for No Pakistani MIRVs,‖ 1. 812
Shailaja Neelakantan, ―When NSA Ajit Doval Outlined India's New Pak Strategy- Defensive
Offense – Perfectly,‖ The Times of India, October 4, 2016, accessed November 10, 2017,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/When-NSA-Ajit-Doval-outlined-Indias-new-Pakistan-
strategy-defensive-offense-perfectly/articleshow/54670600.cms 813
―War with India not an option, says Pakistan PM,‖ The Times of India, November 6, 2017, accessed
November 15, 2017,https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/war-with-india-not-an-option-
says-pakistan-pm/articleshow/61532820.cms. 814
Hilali, ―Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for India and Pakistan,‖ 193.
259
BMD issue. India being supportive of CDWs in the form of missile shield and ASAT
weapons‘ acquisitioning seems to replace the ‗mutual vulnerability‘ based deterrence
to a ‗mutual defense‘ that could reduce the incentives for having offensive
weapons.815
It sounds good that the security and stability be based on defense instead of
destruction; however, the Indian optimistic approach and arguments in support of
having a missile shield, needs to be translated into legally binding arrangements
including bilateral arrangement, coupled with an instrument of effective verification
mechanism. Else, the arguments would remain cynical to Pakistan and value not more
than informal rhetoric having no political, diplomatic or legally binding compulsions.
Given the history of conflict prone India and Pakistan bi-lateral relations a gradual,
step-by-step and incremental approach towards CBMs would be more feasible as
compared to an all-encompassing initiative which might include sustained composite
dialogue process for building trust and identifying mutually acceptable CBMs related
to restraint, bilateral moratorium to introduce CDWs shield and MIRV capable
missiles and finally a bilateral ABM treaty.
815
Subbarao, ―India and Star Wars,‖ 568.
260
CONCLUSION
The outer space will have a predominant role in any future conflict. Different space
applications would be instrumental in deciding the conflict‘s outcome. The one who
would be stronger in applying space applications would rule. Possession of advanced
space technology would be a measuring tool of a state‘s power status on the global
power politics horizon. Physical placement of weapons could be an utmost desire of
an advanced space faring state; however, same is not likely to actualize in near or
mid-time frame due to the perceived fears of arms race in outer space. An arms race
in outer space could be extra detrimental to the advanced space faring nations
themselves for having more stakes. At the same time, these states want to have
weapons those could deter potential enemies from interfering with their space assets.
It is a kind of paradoxical situation.
Alternatively, space faring states with power status aspirations, including India, look
for indirect means by developing terrestrial based weapons which have the capability
of engaging targets in outer space. In other words, space faring nations are
deliberately exploiting the nexus between space weapons and BMD systems. In South
Asian context, by developing BMD weapon systems for defensive purposes against
strategic missile threats, India is achieving three strategic aims. First, to challenge the
credibility of Pakistani missile based deterrence thereby defeating its will to challenge
Indian regional hegemonic designs and aspiration to achieve great power status, two,
achieve space control by having dual purposed BMD weapons in offensive mode and
most importantly three, build its case for permanent membership of the UNSC
thereby meeting its long awaited quest of becoming a regional major power.
Therefore, the Indian acquisitioning of BMD system cannot be seen in isolation as it
is going to impact on strategic landscape of South Asia.
India has a strong evolving desire of being accepted and recognized as a great power
in international political system. It is being projected by the US as net security
provider in Indian Ocean and balancer to Chinese rise. India, thus would and is, doing
all possible lobbying efforts at political, economics, diplomatic, military and
technological levels. Not only that India is doing its bid vigorously, it is lucky that its
261
great power quest is being supported by the Americans. The US has seen its power
peak and is viewed to be on declining side especially due to two factors i.e. recession
shock of last decade and being militarily overstretched far from its main land. The US
think tanks and policy makers are thus, on a course suggested by the Mearsheimer
who suggested that super powers may regionalize the security issues with an
overarching oversight.816
India in this case is best suited to the US for counter-
balancing China; however, during the course of being used, Indian side is found to be
sharp and smart enough to permanently build a sustainable military prong duly
substantiated by the non-kinetic capacities. The US has no choice but to put India on
fore front despite of the fact that India was never on the US side during cold war era.
Foregoing in view it can be visualized that in near or midterm future conflicts, the
outer space and its applications could play a zestful impersonation in making and
implementing major powers‘ interests and policies across the globe. The policies
could be coercive, persuasive or cooperative in nature depending upon the kinds of
interests and actors they would be dealing with. In nutshell, CDWs (i.e. BMD and
ASAT weapons) would have a celebrated status of force multipliers, sharing a
significant pie of a state‘s prestige and national power indicators.
Contrarily, the school of thought which believes in keeping the space free of weapons
argue that any placement of weapons in space would add fuel to the global insecurity
and might lower threshold levels for using nuclear weapons besides instigating
nuclear arms race invariably by the security conscious states. Whereas proponents of
space weaponization argue in favor of doing that as the space weaponization is an
attractive option for the hegemons both globally and regionally. Space controllers
believe that the US must attain space weapons before some others do that as it would
enable the US to controlling the space.
The realist perspective in the contemporary era is substantiated by the strategic acts
by ‗Sole‘ super power, the US who has invested heavily in its capability of ―..global
816
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power, 141-143. Also see Waltz, ―History the Origins of War,‖
615-16.
262
Prompt Strike‖.817
Space would definitely be a desired medium in achieving the
desired reach. A single space weapon placement initiative by any major space faring
nation could result into domino effect.
Technology has no bounds and thus can‘t be restricted. For instance, the US did its
Manhattan Project discreetly, however, despite its extreme vigilance, care, secrecy
and control, the RMA in nuclear technology early in 1950s could not bar proliferation
of nuclear technology across the continents. It was later the joint consortium of
nuclear ―haves‖ that category of ―have-nots‖ was created by concluding ―Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)‖. In case of space technology, which is a dual use, is yet to
be considered for introduction of stringent controls. RMA, is leading to likely
propositions where-in, there could be a leap towards space weaponization in near or
mid-time frame, if not timely checked by having some kind of norms, ethics, controls,
code or even a legally binding treaty, otherwise like nuclear weapons, yet another
source of extreme destruction from space may be unleashed.
Outer space as a domain is not restricted to inter-states technological competitions but
political as well. Political angle has started dominating the international space politics
and competition. Space objectives of space faring states are focused on two pronged
aims i.e. first, hinder-less access to space benefits and secondly, security of outer
space assets. The two aims; hence, influence the spacefaring states technological and
political choices while practicing international relations dynamics with different
actors.
Having analyzed the outer space military objectives of major spacefaring states, it can
be deduced that states in an anarchic international system adopt all possible measures
including outer space so as to ensure survival in evolving competitive international
political system and meeting the strategic interests. Albeit, objectives of the
spacefaring states do no admit developing outer space-based weapons; however,
actions speak louder than rhetoric especially of non-weaponization of space. There
817
Amy F. Woolf, ―Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues,‖ Congressional Research Services (CRS) Report, April 6, 2018: 1-2,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.
263
have been a number of tests conducted to demonstrate space denial technologies.818
To this end, the states prepare policies to muster all possible resources that add to
their power potential. Moreover, as the states‘ space objectives manifest, outer space
could be considered as the upcoming domain for inter-state customary competition.
Sequel to the above, outer space has thus achieved a decent place in scholarly
strategic debates, especially under the circumstances when outer space access and
capabilities have been accorded status of an important variable for measuring a state‘s
hard power potential.
Contemporarily, the world great and major powers are exercising maximum caution
and not letting infringement of placing weapons in outer space. Although, space was
militarized right at the time of its inception, however, still there exists a vacuum in
differentiating between militarizing and weaponizing the space. Major space faring
states; however, are conscious of their growing stakes in outer space assets and
applications. They desire to have weapons which could engage targets up in the dark
world i.e. outer space with an aim of deterring other rival space faring nations from
manipulating with their assets. The manipulation could be destructive or non-
destructive with an objective of decapitating the space asset‘s performance. However,
due to the mutual cautious approach being followed by the space faring nations,
ASATs are not being frequently tested. The rider clause behind this approach is
nothing but the mutual stakes as all the space faring nations have made their daily life
so much dependent on the space related applications that none of them could afford to
make each other unnerved with regard to posing threat to space assets. Overall, till the
conduct of this study, space-based weapons remain on cards of major and great
powers; however, they are currently relying on their terrestrial based capabilities in
the form of having SLVs, long range missile and above all BMD systems.
In the legalistic framework, none of the space treaty encompasses restrictions on
placement of conventional weapons less the WMDs, including nuclear weapons.
Albeit, the OST has played its role in keeping weapons away from the space-based
assets and heavenly bodies, yet the loop holes inter-alia non mentioning of placing
818
Rajagopalan, ―Need for an Indian Military Space Policy.‖ 202.
264
conventional weapons or defining terms like ‗peaceful purposes‘ explicitly keep
haunting the space worriers who remain skeptic about future of outer space to be used
as yet another dimension of conflicts and wars. Pro-space weaponization experts
argue that rapid RMA can easily transform dovish space approach into hawkish
approach depending upon the security concerns. Albeit, there is MTCR to exercise
vigilance and control over the long range missile technology proliferation, however,
the acquisitioning of dual-use technologies like satellite carriers to the space i.e. SLVs
through MTCR membership could alternatively be used as ASAT weapon.
In addition, major space faring powers are subjected to the arms control related
paradox. Despite of the dire need to have legal instruments i.e. Treaty on Prevention
of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) and Prevention of Arms Race in
Outer Space (PAROS), to be negotiated at the CD, the US and its likeminded states
do not subscribe to start negotiations. The two anticipated reasons are, first, not to
restrict their initiative to have space-based weapons when needed and secondly, they
do not want to subject their BMD and SLV capabilities to technical checks or
verification mechanisms being dual use in nature.
Missile shield, albeit defensive in nature could alternatively be used in offensive role
when there is a change in intent and employed in ASAT mode, thus has potential of
severely impacting upon strategic stability and prevalent deterrence equations in
various regions including South Asia. One thing is for sure that the supporters of both
ASAT weapons and BMD systems present them as defensive weapons while hedging
behind the apparent logic of deterring an aggressor from undertaking offensive action
against the beholder. Whereas, on the flip side both ASAT weapons and BMD
systems could be employed in offensive role, either in preemptive or preventive
modes so that to deny an opponent an opportunity of utilizing satellites and ICBMs to
their strategic advantages respectively.
Since no defensive weapon system could be graded as absolute in nature; thus, they
remain evolving. ASATS and BMD systems are extension of the same argument that
augments the repeated rhetoric of, ‗something is better than nothing‘. Effectiveness of
the two systems would remain evolving and could win a status of ‗must‘ for military
265
inventories of technologically advanced super and regional powers in foreseeable
future, if not imminent. BMD and ASAT tests in contemporary era reflect the
probabilities on higher side for their permanent induction and strengthened role in
military strategies across the globe. It is simply a matter of time before they are fully
developed. The US Administration under President Trump at global level and Indian
DRDO at South Asian regional level, have recently demonstrated their resolve to
have mastery in BMD systems which indirectly reflects ‗would be‘ intent of
developing ASAT weapons i.e. space weapons. However, every dual purposed
technology has strings attached to it. Strategic community needs to weigh cost-benefit
of space weapons less it is irreversible. President Trump‘s announcement of having a
dedicated ‗space force‘ as sixth branch of armed forces could incentivize its peer
competitors to follow the suit in terms of building their respective offensive and
defensive space capacities, thus, leading to an unprecedented arms race in the outer
space.819
In this context, India is all set to have major chunk out of the US led political,
diplomatic and technological relaxations. India is modernizing its armed forces,
especially the space capacities to an out of proportion limits. Outer space domination
which is commonly perceived to be the 4th
dimension of future warfare after air, land
and sea, would add to the security concerns of its neighbors especially Pakistan.
Indian military planners are well aware that development of a potent, sustained and
reliable outer space dependent C4I2SR capability coupled with other ground based
military power can provide an assured peace from a position of strength mostly based
on deterrence by denial design. Denial based deterrence objectifies the enemy that the
launched aggression or an act of preemption or first use would be countered before
getting effective and thus would be un-proportionally defeated. The CDWs play the
role of a dependable tool for denial strategies. India is thus likely to be incentivized
for launching offensive against Pakistan strategic assets besides important
conventional military hardware so as to attain a challenge-less environment in the
region and meet its long awaited dream of becoming a regional hegemon. India;
819
Jaspal, ―Space Force: Alarming Arms Race.‖
266
therefore, assumes to have an opportunity to push Pakistan to submit to the Indian
ascendency. Pakistan, on the contrary, assumes it-self to be faced with existential
threat from its eastern neighbor, has come a long way ahead in building its credible
conventional and nuclear-armed forces. Pakistani experts and leadership have been
claiming that its armed forces have all possible contingencies ready to meet any kind
and magnitude of threat emanating either from west, east or two-front scenario. In
such an eventuality, any adventurism could be responded by its well-developed full
spectrum unconventional capabilities besides conventional befitting response.
In such an alarming scenario, development on the Indian side under the garb of
preparing for Chinese threat may not bring dividends. The situation has to be
stabilized at all stages as the future wars especially the kinetic part of it would be too
destructive, uncontrollable and costly even for the victor. There is a need to
cooperate, initiate dialogue, build confidence, exercise maximum restraint and above
all resolve the outstanding issues especially the unresolved territorial issues between
India and Pakistan so as to invest the national exchequer for betterment of people
along the two sides of borders between the two arch rivals.
Historically, India is hostage to her perception of ‗MAHA-BHAARAT‖ i.e. greater
India. India has been projecting itself for being the biggest democracy for attaining
status of a major actor in the global politics. Besides mustering soft elements of
national power, India has put-in all possible efforts to modernize its armed forces.
Indian active pursuance of acquiring state of the art military hardware and
introduction of new technologies inter-alia BMD systems and space modernization
have contributed towards unbalancing the balanced equation of regional strategic
stability.
India perceives China to be its arch rival especially losing in 1962 war. India since
then remains engaged in power accumulation exercise. China is an advanced space
faring nation with hundreds of satellite orbiting in Earth Orbits. These satellites are
dual in nature and as per known facts are contributory elements to strengthening its
military means. China after being threatened by the US and Indian antagonist
267
policies, preferred to join the ASAT capable countries club in 2007 to deter an attack
against its space-based assets.
The continuously evolving Indian military and space modernization is likely to
disturb the threat perception scenarios for the competitors in the region and result into
action-reaction syndrome leading to security dilemma. Within the security complex,
the intensifying security dilemma creates misperceptions regarding the capabilities of
the competitors that aggravates tendency of miscalculations. The Indian intentions
behind gaining such capabilities are to become regional hegemon not only in the
region but outer space as well.
Indian entry into MTCR in 2016 has opened the door for technology access, which is
being extensively cashed by the Indian scientists to address their technological
shortcomings. India by virtue of MTCR members has got an access to the advanced
missile and space technologies which indeed would strengthen its space and missile
program including its indigenous ABM program. In other words, the rout to India‘s
military modernization is now legally open for the US and by implication other
countries to indulge in high technology and defense trade with India Absence of a
non-discriminatory and non-criterion based system would be detrimental to the South
Asian strategic environment.
The South Asia strategic environment remains fragile and conflict prone. Any shift in
asymmetric levels between the states or introducing a new conflict domain of outer
space may lead to spiraling effect in escalating the security situation. It is also
believed by the optimists that an all-out war is not possible between India and
Pakistan due to the existence of BoT; however, pessimists do caution that despite
restraint exercised by the planners on both sides, situation may get out of control due
to misperceptions.
It is also appreciated that the sovereign states may not give up their attained
technologies who generally glue themselves to their stated positions because the
political, military and scientific leadership cadres would not like to have domestic
lashing for the U-turn besides fearing to lose their international stature. Despite all, it
is yet profound to consider alternatives or trade-offs which could project win-win
268
kind of situation for both sides. The trade-offs might include abandoning a particular
technology by one state vis-à-vis shelving the equally important related technology
by the other state.
On the parallel of Indian offensive designs‘ perception, there is a school of thought
which believes that albeit, India has an impressive military and space modernization
programs; however, in actuality things are not that serious as posed by the Pakistani
hawks. For instance, Indian indigenous military modernization programs are facing
delays due to technological challenges. It is an open secret that mostly the Indian
scientists‘ claims are not more than the rhetoric and tall claims for personal glory. But
the patriot Pakistani strategic community and analysts take the Indian claims
seriously and thus are inter-played by the strategic opinion makers in Pakistan as real
one.
On the Pakistani side, its experts profess that the AQ Khan episode is history and they
had a sufficient nuclear learning. They also offer to move forward and begin a new
trust and non-discrimination based international cooperation with Pakistan too.
Pakistan has taken stringent export control measures of all sensitive items and related
technologies. For the last two decades, Pakistan‘s efforts in strengthening institutional
controls, taking stringent legislative and administrative measures related to strategic
export controls have been widely acknowledged including the US and UN. Pakistan
is looking forward for a mutual respect based treatment at par with other developing
states including India. A prosperous and normal Pakistan is in the interest of the
global and regional peace and harmony.
Indian strategic missile program, which is strategically balanced vis-à-vis China and
Pakistan, has matured. An edge in missile development coupled with its tested BMD
systems would likely further cement the Indian dismissive attitude to resolve the
outstanding territorial disputes with its neighbors besides getting encouraged to
launch offensive (limited) without fear of losing, and thus diminishing hopes for
having a lasting peace in the region. Hence, the South Asian strategic environment‘s
stability shall have a big question mark.
269
In case of Indian perpetual dismissive attitude towards Pakistan, it will not be left
with any other option but to further its missile program in terms of lethality, accuracy,
stealth characteristics, achieving mastery in MIRVing capability, development of
land, sea and air based ballistic and cruise missiles. Sequentially, when there would
be more numbers of carriers, correspondingly more numbers of warheads would be
required. Similarly, more numbers of warheads would need more fissile material. It is
also understandable that in case of Pakistan‘s defensive arrangements India won‘t
stay idle and would likely follow the suit. It is an unwanted chain reaction under the
realm of action-reaction syndrome which implies nothing but initiating a new wave of
vertical proliferation of missiles and nuclear warheads. The domino effects continue
as the China might jump in to balance the Indian missile and warheads build-up. The
domino trended happenings would undeniably impact upon the strategic stability of
South Asia. Moreover, in case of misperception or overconfidence, preemptive or
preventive strikes can take place, the US and its likeminded states would prefer siding
with India due to the their huge investments in India. The above stated scenario is
based on empirical evidences inferred from various direct and indirect statements at
Summit level.
In addition, Pakistan with an advanced missile program may also opt for venturing
into developing its own BMD system as a counter measure against Indian modernized
missile program after having the MTCR membership edge. Although, the preposition
is mere hypothetical till culmination of the study in 2018, yet it provides an avenue of
logical thinking. While keeping in view the nexus between BMD and space weapons,
employment of a Pakistani BMD system in ASAT role against Indian outer space
assets cannot be over-ruled. The argument could be substantiated empirically as well.
In the past, Pakistan has been following reactionary trend to keep the deterrence
equation balanced vis-à-vis Indian offensive capabilities. Indian development of
CDWs and its increased space stakes (space vision 2047) could yet again motivate
Pakistan to follow the previous reactionary trend and thus develop counter balancing
BMD faced ASAT capability. Hence, Indian acquisitioning of BMD capability with
an aim of winning great power status could lead to initiation of an unprecedented
270
space arms race thereby entailing severe ramifications for South Asian strategic
stability.
Thus, the arguments validate the research hypothesis i.e.
―Indian quest to acquire BMD technology provides it with the
capability of extending the theater of war from land to outer space
which would be instrumental in furthering its aspiration to join the
queue of great powers of the world. However, due to the likely domino
effect, the BMD systems could lead to the initiation of space
weaponization entailing destabilizing arms race in South Asia.‖
271
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via electronic mail in June 2016.
Interview conducted with Mr Michael Krepon, Co-Founder the Stimson Center,
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Interview conducted with Dr Jeffrey Knopf, Center for Non-proliferation Studies
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