Emerging Risks Identificationin Food and Feedfor Human Health

An Approach

© VWA, 2005

VWA - Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority

Directorate of Research and Risk Assessment

The Hague

The Netherlands

June 2005

pan-European proactiveidentification of emerging risksin the field of food production

A charm worn as protection against mischief and disease

PERIAPTwww.periapt.net

Editors

H.P.J.M. Noteborn

B.W. Ooms

Guest Editor

M. de Prado

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3

Preface .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6

Executive summary .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9

1 The scientific challenges for risk assessment ......................................................................................................................... 131.1 The food supply chain analysis ................................................................................................................................................................. 131.2 The host environment analysis .................................................................................................................................................................. 151.3 Oecd’s emerging systemic risk analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 19

2 The stakeholder’s position .............................................................................................................................................................................. 232.1 Crosscutting sectoral experiences ........................................................................................................................................................ 232.2 Test out the holistic vision ............................................................................................................................................................................... 332.2.1 Articulation of the host environment ..................................................................................................................................................... 332.2.2 Prioritisation within the host environment ....................................................................................................................................... 34

3 Human behaviour and perception on decision making ................................................................................................... 39 3.1 The game-theoretic modelling ................................................................................................................................................................... 393.2 Assessment of decision-making ............................................................................................................................................................... 403.3 Reasonable and unreasonable decisions ....................................................................................................................................... 41

Conclusions and recommendations ...................................................................................................................................................... 45

Key references ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 48

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 50

Keynotes speakers biographies ................................................................................................................................................................ 52

Periapt members ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 54

Stakeholders panel ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 55

Table of contents

After a series of recent ‘food scares’ within the

food and feed production chain, action has

urgently been needed to rebuild public

confidence in Europe’s food production system,

and in the institutions and scientists responsible

for ensuring its safety. Therefore, the

Commission has established a new European

Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in the framework

of the 2002 EU General Food Law (Regulation

(EC) No 178/2002). However, there is a growing

need not just to monitor or assess known risks,

but also to identify and manage new or re-

emerging ones. The ERA-NET SSA PERIAPT

project begins the process of a pan-European

co-ordination between Ministries and Food

Authorities/Agencies, being an important

contribution by the Commission to a better

understanding of the changing nature of food

and feed production, and to a required detection

of research policy actions in the emerging risks

identification at the transnational level1.

3

Foreword

1 More information available on www.periapt.net

The increasing complexity of food and feed

production systems, increased globalisation of

trade, market introduction of novel foods and

application of new food processing

technologies may lead to new or unforeseen

(emerging) risks with a negative impact on

human and animal health, environment and

economy. Moreover, known risks may re-occur

and increase in frequency, due to the expansion

of the European internal market, altered human

habits or changes in conditions and methods of

food production. These issues are of great

general concern.

There is a need for a systematic approach to

identify new, unforeseen, and re-emerging risks

associated with the food and feed production in

a European and global setting. The traditional

assessments so far considered, which are

mainly related to the food supply chain itself,

usually neglect the impacts from outside the

food supply chain. Until now the traditional

approach did not prevent the new and

unforeseen risks that EU citizens were

confronted with regarding food safety.

Therefore, it is proposed that the future strategy

should consist of a way to identify the

aforementioned risks more proactively and

systematically across Europe. This includes the

basic idea that only the application of a holistic

vision creates the possibility to identify

emerging risks. Through networking the

coherence and co-ordination of required

national and regional research programmes

should be improved too. This will enable

national systems to take on tasks collectively

that they would not have been able to tackle

independently.

This strategy evolved from the PERIAPT project

and its workshop “To identify food and feed

related emerging risks” held in Bonn, Germany

on 5-6 July 2004. The strategy focuses on

answering two of the generic research

questions embedded in the General Food Law

(Regulation (EC) No 178/2002): ‘Can we identify

new and/or re-emerging chemical or microbial

risks in food and feed production chains in an

expanding European market?’, and ‘Where there

is any information leading to suspect an

emerging (serious) risk, can the competent

(inter-) national agencies reply as a matter of

urgency and forward any relevant information in

their possession?’

Presentations of keynotes speakers and the

panel discussions made it possible to comment

on the vision. Their valuable inputs and

recommendations shaped the subsequent

course and outcomes of the envisaged

approach of networking. It became clear that

the proposed infrastructure could only be

carried out successfully within the European

and global context. The activities promoted by

4

Preface

this programme should intend to develop in the

long term a major instrument for taking

preventive measures at the disposal of

Ministries, national Food Authorities/Agencies,

the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), and

the European Community at large in the

exercise of its risk assessment policy. Thereto,

the adoption of indicators as qualitative and/or

quantitative signals with predicting power has

been put forward. It is recognised that the

contribution to and input for the identification of

emerging risks has to be provided by all

stakeholders such as government, industry,

research and consumers etcetera.

Through the PERIAPT project, the establishment

of an enlarged and sustainable platform on

transnational research programming and

policymaking would significantly contribute to

create a systematic approach in this priority

area. Among others, this proactive networking

and knowledge management will place the

consumer in a better position to judge potential

risks of various impacts on the food and feed

production chains including changing dietary

habits.

The Hague, June 2005

5

I want to express my sincere thanks to all

members of PERIAPT, who devoted so much

time, effort and humour to make this SSA ERA-

NET project a success. First of all, the

contribution of Frans Pijls (Rabobank

International) in putting the PERIAPT team on

the track of the holistic vision is acknowledged.

The valuable inputs of the stakeholders and

experts invited to comment on the holistic

approach that the PERIAPT team developed to

identify emerging risks during the workshop in

Bonn are highly appreciated. Especially I want

to thank Andreas Kliemant, Marion Koopmans,

Marcel Mengelers, Olivier Mignot, Udo Pollmer,

Wim Ooms, Reinhard Selten, Maurice Smith and

Barrie Stevens, who as keynotes/lead speaker

or facilitator made the workshop a success. I

thank the chairpersons, rapporteurs and

Christian Grugel’s team who guided us through

the brainstorm and roundtable sessions, and

Marijn Colijn who facilitated us in prioritising

our driving forces and critical factors. I want to

thank the mayor of Bonn for saying a warm

welcome to us. Last but not least the Gustav

Stresemann Institute (GSI) in Bonn for providing

such excellent facilities.

I want to express my gratitude to Daphne

Dernison for her organisational assistance and

contribution to the workgroup meetings and

Maudeen Martinez for her technical assistance.

The continuous interest and support of

Carmelita Stoffels (DG Research), Nathalie

Scheidegger (LNV) and Djien Liem (EFSA) have

been very stimulating and are highly

appreciated.

Finally, the VWA would like to express her

gratitude to the European Commission,

Directorate-General for Research

(Biotechnology, Agricultural and Food Research)

for their financial support through the Sixth

Framework Programme for Research and

Technological Development (FP6) “Integrating

and Strengthening the European Research Area

(ERA-NET)” contract no. ERAS-CT-2003-510200

PERIAPT.

Hub P.J.M. Noteborn, project co-ordinator

VWA

Directorate of Research and Risk Assessment

6

Acknowledgements

Traditionally, the identification and assessment

of food related risks are achieved through

expertise from within the food supply chain.

However, due to recent developments in

globalisation, food technology, climate changes,

political and social developments, consumer

behaviour and perception and more proactive

risk management strategies, it becomes

necessary to look at information available

outside the food supply chain. Exploring only the

food chain for the identification of emerging

risks is probably a too narrow approach and

may in specific cases only identify a problem

when food safety is already threatened. The

necessary information is likely to be drawn

from a combination of knowledge both from

inside as well as from outside the food supply

chain (i.e. covering the fork to farm/fisheries

chain and its host environment). This holistic

vision was tested in an international workshop

held in Bonn. A stakeholder’s panel with

different scientific and managerial expertise

was recruited from academia, research centres,

biotech and breeding companies, food

industries, regulatory agencies (regional,

national and EU), international governmental

organisations, media, and consumer

organisations across Europe and the United

States. They were informed of the envisaged

holistic vision and were challenged to comment

on this approach. Furthermore, panel members

were introduced to the principles of game-

theoretic models to predict the impact of human

behaviour on decision-making.

The vast majority of the stakeholder’s panel

agreed that a holistic approach could be used

as an instrument to identify the needs for a

useful concerted system/procedure at the

European level. One of their recommendations

was to investigate the feasibility of this forward-

looking approach by studying a specific group

of hazards with a selected group of experts (i.e.

focus group). Another lesson learned was that

the holistic vision to assess emerging risks (i.e.

integrating the analysis of a supply chain and its

host environment) could be used successfully

for programming research on this specific topic.

Further development of this approach at a

transnational level is encouraged and helps to

avoid ‘surprising’ food scares in the future. The

outstanding expert, Nobel prize laureate

Professor Dr Reinhard Selten (University Bonn),

concluded that game theory can be certainly

used as a proactive risk management tool as

soon as the play, the actors and their interests

are known, but it does not hold a solution for the

identification of emerging risks in the food and

feed sector.

The PERIAPT project has highlighted the need

to continue interdisciplinary deliberations on

crosscutting issues that could increasingly

challenge risk assessment in the coming years.

7

Executive summary

The necessary research has to be done in a

transnational action involving a variety of

sources and resources. At the moment,

however, most programming or funding bodies

do not tackle emerging risks in specifically

designed national or regional research

programme. Research is scattered around in

projects, which makes it difficult to extract a

harmonised approach.

To summarise, it can be concluded that the

PERIAPT project has successfully:

■ Demonstrated that stakeholders with very

different interests and from all perspectives

outside and inside the food chain are

interested and committed to work together to

seek solutions based on the holistic vision

(i.e. covering the fork to farm/fisheries chain

and its host environment);

■ Stimulated interest for future networking to

focus, in depth, on the issue of emerging

risks identification for European research,

food safety development and policy;

■ Facilitated an understanding of attitudes,

expertise and knowledge from all

stakeholders, which were anticipated and

incorporated in transnational research

programming approaches. This will ensure a

best practice strategy to meet national,

regional and European demands, while

working towards future success of European

research policy and programmes;

■ Provided an unique opportunity for research

programming bodies (including the New

Member States and European regions) to

interact directly with all stakeholders

involved in the risk analysis process

including DG SANCO of the European

Commission and EFSA;

■ Contributed towards building an increased

understanding and solid foundation for

improved trust between representatives of

European research programming bodies;

■ Sought and found an enlarged, sustainable,

platform, which can realistically develop in

the long term a transnational research

programme on emerging risks by enhanced

co-operation of national and regional

research programmes (SAFEFOODERA2);

■ Developed a model which might be a major

strategy at the disposal of national food

authorities and EFSA in their excercise of

proactive risk assessments (Regulation (EC)

No 178/2002);

■ Stated that game theory can contribute to a

proactive risk management as soon as the

play, the actors and their interests are

known, however, it does not hold a promise

to identify emerging risks in the food and

feed sector.

8

2 More information available on www.safefoodera.net

The present

Although our foods have never been as safe as

they are nowadays there is major public

disquiet and intense debate about the adequacy

of current procedures for assessing and

managing food safety. Poorly informed about the

benefits and risks of new foods and food

production technologies, and with little insight

into scientific risk assessment procedures,

European citizens have lost confidence in the

food industry, in its regulators, and in the

scientific community, which supports and

defends food safety. For example, the quality of

food in supermarkets, restaurants and fast food

outlets is questioned due to the annual cases of

food ‘poisonings’. Whereas, genetic

engineering of crop plants, increasing

sophistication of attack methods of bio-

terrorists, SARS and Avian Influenza exposed

the vulnerability of the food supply chain (WHO,

2003).

Next to this, regulatory frameworks differ across

jurisdictions. For example, the EU regulatory

system represents a ‘process-based’ approach,

whereas the US legal system advocates a

‘product-based’ regulation. This led to efforts of

governments and industry to improve and

harmonise the risk analysis approach on a

global level (e.g. EEA, 2001). In response to

scientific uncertainties in risk assessment and

due to the growing impact of risk issues in

developed countries, the notion of precaution

has emerged as a major concept in today’s risk

management practice. Among others, the

‘precautionary principle’ has become a central

issue in the General Food Law of the European

Union (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002) (European

Commission, 2002). But, there are still serious

limitations related to its practical

implementation in risk prevention such as

‘surprising’ food scares (dioxins, MPA) etcetera.

Until now the efforts for achieving a continuous

improvement of food safety led to the

development of standards and the acceptance

of innovative principles in risk assessment

strategies. The trends moved from a reactive to

a proactive identification of food and feed

related risks through the use of surveillance and

monitoring programmes. At present, the control

of the final product towards the consideration of

production chain as a whole is advocated as the

‘from farm to fork’ principle. The adoption of the

concept of hazard analysis and critical control

points (HACCP), the determination of the

appropriate level of protection (ALOP) and,

consequently, the setting of food safety

objectives (FSOs) represent one of the more

concrete outputs of those trends (FAO/WHO,

1995, 1998; Smith, 2002).

9

Introduction

The future

There is a growing interdependence of

economies and civil societies, and an

intensification of global trade (OECD, 2003). This

requires risk assessment infrastructures that

produce or enhance interactions among key

players, data sources and inter- and

governmental institutions with a view to

enabling or strengthening the implementation of

specific preventive measures (WHO, 2001). For

example, some common errors in today’s risk

analysis practice are:

■ Too much trust in existing assessment

systems and protection measures;

■ Neglecting open transparent regulatory

procedures;

■ Downplaying insider threats and consumer

perception;

■ Underestimating interdependencies and

complexities of food production systems;

■ Misinterpretation of statistical data and

human behaviour;

■ Underestimating the ‘enforcement power’ of

labelling and impact of incremental changes;

■ Adopting a too reactive approach to risk

management;

■ Bypassing a two-way communication and

exchange of information between all

stakeholders;

■ Less weight to criteria such as ethics and

cultural aspects as compared to technical

issues.

Above all, it is necessary to move from the

reactive attitude towards a more proactive

identification of food and feed related risks.

Using forward-looking surveillance, post-

decision monitoring and enabling the integration

and management of the risks by introducing

emerging technologies, such as a collaborative

e-science environment, might do this, for

instance. Among others, human behaviour is

considered to be a prevailing risk factor in most

cases. Nowadays there is a strong tendency to

10

The basic definitions of hazard and risk as described in Codex Alimentarius and Regulation (EC)

No. 178/2002 (also known as the General Food Law) are the backbone of all other definitions:

Hazard:

A biological, chemical or physical agent in, or condition of food or feed with the potential to cause

an adverse health effect.

Risk:

A function of the probability of an adverse health effect and the magnitude (severity) of that effect

consequential to a hazard(s) in food.

Risk analysis:

A process consisting of three interconnected components: risk assessment, risk management

and risk communication.

reverse the control system of food production in

the direction of ‘from fork to farm’ (i.e.

consumer driven).

Traditionally the focus in risk assessment is

based more on historic experience and

information - like recorded observations of

hazard occurrence, past incidents and crises -

and direct food safety consequences than on a

formal evaluation of the structural (up- and

downstream) processes determining the hazard

and risk (FAO/WHO, 1997; WHO, 1999). It is not a

matter of if but when.

Faced with these developments in risk

assessment the existing procedures are likely to

lead to a number of limitations, because of:

■ Impacts of factors outside the food supply

chain are usually neglected, because it is

mostly assumed that the food and feed

production system is self-contained in

operation, location and time;

■ Models are far from reproducing real-world

conditions accurately as they are often a

recording of past occurrences, setting

boundaries and levels rather than a formal

evaluation of various crosscutting upstream

interacting processes influencing the

evolution of a risk;

■ Existing risk assessment methods often

ignore the human factor or use simplistic or

standardised schemes of behaviour.

Many classical problems look set to take on

new forms in the food and feed chain, and

hazards are re-emerging, such as brucellosis,

teaniasis and dioxins. Some problems are

characterised by both extreme uncertainty and

ambiguity, but with a potential for extensive and

perhaps irreversible harm (e.g. consistent:

antibiotic resistant pathogens, TSE, new

zoonotic diseases or casual: food terrorism). A

risk assessment in a more proactive mode

should recognise therefore a plurality of factors

involved. Some of which undergo fundamental

changes in space and time. It accounts for the

impacts the ‘non-discipline related’ and food

chain crosscutting processes can have, like the

unnoticed or undetected problems with

acrylamide, semicarbazide, noroviruses,

11

Emerging risk:

A potential food or feed borne or diet-related hazard that may become a risk for human health in

the (near) future.

Emerging risks can result from three different types of hazards such as:

■ An unidentified new form of known hazard (e.g. unidentified mycotoxin, avian influenza);

■ A not well-known hazard (e.g. acrylamide, endocrine disrupter);

■ A well known re-emerging hazard: (e.g. Brucellosis, obesity).

Excluded are:

■ The unidentified hazards of which nothing is known;

■ The well-characterised hazards that are presently controlled.

cryptosporidium ssp or VTEC non-O157: H7. This

means that an improved risk assessment

process will need to combine knowledge

coming from a larger variety of disciplines and

areas of expertise, and should pay increased

attention to changing conditions outside the

food supply chain (i.e. host environment).

The vision

It is recognised that a next step forward in risk

assessment should be taken. While there is

never a foolproof way to ensure contamination

will never happen, a well-documented proactive

identification system could minimise the

potential of ‘surprising’ emerging risks.

Of course, self-organising and self-learning

systems would be the dream of risk assessors

and managers. Even if they were taken by

surprise the system would put everything in

place to mitigate the risk. This might be

considered as wishful thinking, however.

But, it becomes more and more clear that a

timely emerging risks identification is the first

step in the proactive risk analysis process. It

represents one of the driving forces for the

anticipatory and advanced system/procedure to

ensure food wholesomeness and safety. For

instance, it can be speculated whether a

forward-looking surveillance of trends or major

changes outside the food chain could have

prevented the problems related to the detection

of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) in pigs

(2002), semicarbazide in glass jars containing

baby food (2003) or dioxins in cow milk due to

the use of Marley clay-contaminated potato

by-products in feed (2004) etcetera.

Many organisations have recently addressed

this issue. The Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD) faced

the problem of emerging systemic risks under a

global point of view: “Tackling the issue of

systemic risk in a future-orientated manner by

examining the trends and driving force shaping

the risk landscape in the next few decades”

(OECD, 2003). This global exercise provides

valuable input for a systemic approach of

identifying emerging risks in the food and feed

sector. At the European level DG-Research,

DG-SANCO and EFSA take the responsibility to

tackle the issue of emerging risks too. The

EFSA, according to article 34 of Regulation (EC)

No.178/2002, is working on the methodologies

and procedures to do so.

12

Emerging risk identification:

A system or procedure aimed at proactively identifying and preventing a potential hazard from

becoming a risk.

Characteristics are:

■ Anticipatory systems instead of responsive systems (e.g. increase or decrease of an indicator

(see host environment analysis);

■ Different from rapid alert systems (e.g. RASFF);

■ Preventive measure (i.e. pre-early warning system).

A limited inventory of programmes on food

safety made it clear that the emerging risks

identification is a relative concept or even

absent topic. Therefore, the focus is on

anticipating the reason why an emerging risk

may enter a food supply chain. Additionally, it is

questioned: ‘How and when does a risk

emerge?’; ‘What kind of information is needed?’;

‘What kind of expertise is needed?’ and, ‘How

quantitative should the information be?’

Moreover, an outline is given of the main

implications of our enhanced understanding of

food production and advances in the risk

analysis of complex interrelations as food

systems are. All these deliberations triggered

the development of the holistic vision on food

and feed safety. The pros and cons of this more

holistic approach of risk assessment were

considered, and analysed in more detail. Even

so, whether game theoretical principles could

add a new dimension to our understanding of

the evolution and management of new and/or

re-emerging risks.

1.1 The food supply chain analysis

Health protection by setting standards and

monitoring has been provided against a battery

of malevolent human actions: from unintended

operator failures to abuse of pesticides

“cocktails” or illegal growth promoters.

Whatever the vagaries of human nature, non-

compliance to standards is one of the more

predictable threats, and many types of residues

exceeding the Maximum Residue Level (MRL)

are sufficiently frequent to generate monitoring

schemes and substantial databases in order to

fit risk profiles.

Today, the identification of food and feed related

risks to human health is achieved by using the

expertise available within food production

chains (Van Wagenberg et al. 2003). This focus

on the food production chains greatly benefits

from the multivariate knowledge within every

link of the chain, which has been acquired

during decades of experience and research.

But, this centralised and focused view within

the risk analysis paradigm has become less

effective. A command-and-control structure

emphasising a top-down approach of individual

compliance to rules is obviously less adapted to

modern, largely, decentralised economies and

societies with growing interdependency. In

particular, internationalisation and production

complexity makes food supply chains and its

processes difficult to break down into readily

codifiable nodes, as needed in top-down risk

management structures. For example, HACCP is

mandatory now, but there is a high variation in

its operational implementation showing big

regional or sectoral differences in size,

commodity and service type etcetera. The

difference in systems worked with does not

13

1 The scientific challengesfor risk assessment

make it easy to design a harmonised framework

in food safety governance. Increasingly there is

a need for capacity and knowledge building

between the private and public sector on data

generation and exchanges.

In modern society, risks will increasingly have to

be considered from a forward-looking

standpoint, for example:

■ There are human habits and food produces

out of common context in a short period of

time, such as the use of pre-cooked

convenience meals;

■ There are a number of interactions and

subtle feedbacks between sources of

hazards, like the climate change, which can

only be appreciated through a much broader

strategy than the ‘isolated’, targeted food

supply chain approach.

Hazard identification should therefore be based

less on historical records, and more on methods

anticipating (major) changes in the nature of the

host environment, relating to frequency,

intensity, vulnerability, repercussions, human

behaviour, technological innovations etcetera.

At the same time, it is crucial to assess risks as

objectively and scientifically as possible. At the

domestic and regional level in particular, it may

frequently be of vital importance that consumers

are informed and prepared for emerging risks

that did not even exist in the past, such as

antibiotic resistant pathogens and food-

terrorism. Especially, cyber-terrorism belongs to

this category as food industry uses Internet

applications for their processing operations in a

global context.

At present, the science-based risk assessment is

considered from a dual perspective only. The

scientific process is fully aimed at reactive,

defensive measures and is a first step in making

decisions on a country’s allocation of resources

to mitigate the experienced risk (European

Commission, 2000; OECD, 2003). This supply chain

targeted assessment encompasses well-known

steps such as:

■ To identify measures of hazard;

■ To identify sources of hazards (hazard

identification);

■ To characterise agents and processes acting

on the chain;

■ To quantify uncertainty of factors and

parameters and evaluate the probability of

scenarios (hazard characterisation);

■ To evaluate consequences of exposure by

dose-response or sensitivity assessment

(exposure assessment);

■ To combine evaluated consequences and

probabilities and compare them with risk

limits (risk characterisation);

■ To evaluate the sensitivity of the risk

assessment to changes in parameters.

Given the growing economic, social, cultural and

environmental interdependence that prevails and

is likely to increase in the future, it is vitally

important both to share information globally and

transfer information and knowledge to less

developed countries. This is a prerequisite not

only for improving food safety in poorer

countries, but also for stemming the flow of

emerging risks back to the EU through channels

such as migration, tourism and global trade

etcetera. International co-ordination and co-

operation structures helping to deal with global

interdependencies clearly need to be improved,

also in research programming (OECD, 2003).

14

Attempts to tackle the issue can be categorised

in: (i) early warnings and alert procedures like

the European system RASFF or the WHO

network (emergency) INFOSAN (WHO, 2004), (ii)

forms of shields in case of cyber- /food-

terrorism and anti-tampering including backup

mechanisms like EU RAS-BICHAT (Dekker-

Bellamy, 2004) and, (iii) vulnerability

assessments like the USDA-FSIS/HHS-FDA

CARVER & Shock methodology (FDA-USDA,

2004). However, they face a number of

challenges that will become crucial in the near

future like:

■ The incorporation of more extensive and

timely societal, cultural and environmental

interactions both domestically, regionally and

internationally;

■ The set up of intensified transnational co-

operations in policymaking including

research management and co-ordination;

■ The exchange or retrieval of critical data,

expert infrastructures and intelligent

networking in e-science and Dbases at the

local, regional and international level.

To summarise, due to the observation of

globalisation, market concentration, innovations

in food processing, consumer perception and

distrust, cross-border habits or changing

consumption patterns, it is important to broaden

the scope of the risk assessment. A holistic,

broadened vision will enable to search for

emerging risks. The aforementioned traditional

retrospective, reactive approach to the handling

of risks needs to be complemented with a more

prospective and proactive strategy (European

Commission, 2002). This asks for, in particular, a

pan-European research programming

framework for dealing with improvements and

innovations, as well as, with major uncertainties

and gaps in today’s scientific knowledge in the

field of emerging risks identification.

1.2 The host environment analysis

Nowadays, the trends in prevention and

mitigation of food and feed related risks to

human health shift from reactive towards

proactive identification and from controlling the

final products towards critical links within

production chains. It is considered that the

adoption of these trends is not enough. To

control emerging risks proactively it might need

much more knowledge and information than is

available within the production chain only. This

holistic vision means the exploration of a larger

area of disciplines and a variety of different

fields of expertise, which are more or less

related to the food production chain i.e.

analysing the host environment.

Chemical and biological hazards can (re-)

emerge and become risks at different levels of

the food chain, such as primary production,

processing, distribution, catering and

consumption. They are usually detected during

food monitoring carried out either by private or

public bodies involved in food safety. This

means that the search for an abnormal variation

in the composition of products (e.g. exceeding

of limits and standards) or process technology

(e.g. non-compliance GMP) is limited to the food

chain itself. But the primary reason for the

emergence of a risk can also be found outside

the food production chain. A well-known

example is the formation of fungus (and its

harmful mycotoxins) on certain types of grain in

relation to the amount of rain during the

flowering of the ear (of the corn).

15

That is the reason why solely exploring the food

chain is probably a too narrow approach and in

several cases will only allow identifying a

problem when food safety is already threatened

or affected. A more proactive attitude requires

therefore an investigation of fields of interest,

not only inside, but also outside the food chain:

the host environment analysis. For example,

human behaviour and risk perception is of

crucial importance and must be taken into

account as one of the starting points of an

emerging risk, as well as, for instance,

nutritional disorders. Therefore, it is proposed to

search for new trends and signals that indicate

changes in the food production chain or

consumption patterns, which could lead to the

emergence of risks. It endeavours to tackle the

issue in a future-oriented manner and, thereby

shaping food safety in the next decades.

However, the influential factors and fields of

interest in the holistic conception of risk

assessment are numerous. Some of them are

mentioned below, illustrating how an evolution

in one of these sectors or fields of interests

could result in a (emerging) risk in the food

chain:

Economy

An economic recession may result in the

effect that consumers spend less money on

top quality food, which changes supply and

demand patterns and, consequently, results

in different habits and consumption patterns.

How changes in an economic situation of a

country may influence the evolution of

(emerging) risks in food is illustrated by

China’s booming economy. In coming years

the population and income growth will mainly

manifest in Asia. The global meat market has

grown fast over the last decades. Worldwide

meat consumption amounts approximately

243 millions tons is still increasing. Main

drivers are the population size and

prospering economies in developing

countries. It appears that meat consumption

is very responsive to income levels and rises

significantly in enlarging cities showing a

parallel increase in demand for further

processed and value-added products. It can

be anticipated that China’s prosperity

induces an increased national consumption

of meat. Consequently, due to its enormous

population the increased production of

animal proteins will lead to more exposure to

the usual pathogens introduced with food of

animal origin. Certainly, the significant level

of ‘backyard’ farming in Asia might

contribute to this pathogenic threat.

International trade

Globalisation makes trade exchanges more

and more complex due to length and duration

of transport of feed, living animals and food,

as well as, the increase in number of steps

between the producer and the consumer.

These vulnerable points induce a (cross-)

contamination of feed or food.

Climate

A climate change leads to a modification of

the behaviour of micro-organisms, which

may end up in new or different biological

food risks. The formation of fungus (and its

harmful mycotoxins) on certain types of grain

is influenced in relation to the amount of rain

during the flowering of the ear of the corn.

16

Culture

For certain food products there is a sharp

peak in demand within a very short period of

time. At Christmas time there is an increased

demand for turkey in some Western

countries or for pike in some East-European

countries. This sharp peak in demand implies

that a large number of these animals must be

ready (healthy and fattened) for slaughter in

time. It is necessary to be aware of the fact

that in some cases this could be only

achieved by increasing the use of antibiotics

to prevent outbreaks of disease. Non-

compliance of the withdrawal period leads

then to the occurrence of intolerable levels

of residues of antibiotics.

Demography

A third of the population in the developed

countries will be aged over 60 by 2050 -

versus 19% in 2000 - and a similar evolution

is projected for the developing countries at a

later date. Older populations are more

vulnerable to certain risks (e.g. epidemics),

and their attitudes could have an impact on

how risks are perceived and managed. On

the other hand, more active and affluent

health will be a key issue in the demand for

functional foods.

Interaction with drugs

The interaction with drugs represents a

source of emerging risk as some lessons of

the past have shown. For instance, it was

reported that azoic compounds present in

colorants for food have adverse effect

whenever aspirin is ingested.

This list is not exhaustive, but illustrates the

need of the involvement of a much broader

range of disciplines and fields of expertise to

explore and determine an efficient strategy of

identifying emerging food risks. The objective is

to take into account all these requirements and,

thereby aiming for a truly holistic approach. This

will enable to make a ‘harmonised’ policy on

transnational emerging risks identification. Such

a policy and co-ordination improves the

effectiveness of the global management of food

safety and helps to avoid ‘surprising’ food

scares in the future.

The proposed basic flow diagram in respect to

the holistic vision on risk identification is

depicted in Box 1-1.

The terminology of this integrated, holistic

analysis can be explained by using the

formation of fungus and its harmful mycotoxins

on certain types of crop plants. The growth of

moulds seems to be strongly dependent on the

climatic conditions (particular humidity) during

17

Influential sectors Critical factors Indicators

Box 1-1 Flow diagram holistic approach

the cultivation of the crop. This emerging hazard

of an unforeseen and unusual contamination of

the crop by mycotoxin-producing moulds is

therefore classified in the area of nature and

environment (influential sector). Within this

influential sector critical factors occur that

catalyse the outbreak. The weather conditions

and the attack of insects in stages peculiar for

each crop represent two of these critical

factors. Regarding the weather conditions a

signal of the evolutionary risk can be produced

by measuring the amount of rain (indicator), at a

specific time of cultivation: the flowering of the

corn’s ear. An indicator can therefore

provisionally be defined as a signal that indicates

(directly on indirectly) the (possibility of)

occurrence of an emerging hazard.

Indicators are related to different stages of a

certain supply chain, but the information on

indicators is not always supplied by or related to

the feed or food production process. In case of

the mycotoxins meteorological institutions could

supply the data. Of course, it is necessary to set

criteria for an indicator including its validation.

This is a vital part of the host environment

analysis, therefore, some preliminary criteria are

proposed. First, there is a direct or indirect

relationship with the occurrence of an emerging

risk. Where there are indirect relationships the

analysis should not be based on too many

(uncertain) steps (sequences) between the

indicator and the emerging risk. Secondly, an

indicator is a qualitative or (semi-) quantitative

signal with an identified unity, which enables the

use of a certain threshold or limit. Thirdly, the

indicator gives a direct indication of the status of

one or more stages of the production process or

the signal is indirectly or directly related to (one

or more stages) of the production process.

Approach

To identify indicators within the context of the

host environment analysis it is obligatory to

allocate the signal sources and expertise and

mobilise the support for this difficult task,

preferably transnational. In this way the

research needs are identified and can be

programmed in a concerted manner. The next

important step is to discuss how and where the

information on indicators can be collated and a

networking system established and managed.

Common factors across the entire spectrum are

needs for intelligent information gathering,

collaborative e-science environments,

knowledge management, anticipatory warning

mechanisms, search engines based on

collaborative ontology modelling, timely

identification of vulnerabilities and incorporation

of the impact of human behaviour including the

assessment of shifts in scientific content and

perception intensities etcetera.

As a result of the host environment analysis in

relation to emerging risks identification the

research and managerial challenges for the

future can be grouped around themes such as:

■ Importance of earmarking influential sectors

outside the food and feed supply chain;

■ Use of effective forward-looking surveillance

based on indicators;

■ Design of self-learning dictionaries and

definition of data catalogues;

■ Tracing of sources and planning of resources

for emergency measures;

■ Assessment of perception intensity using

models of self-organisation (game-theory);

■ Building up partnerships with European

institutions and industries;

■ Managing and planning of transnational

research programmes.

18

1.3 OECD’s emerging systemic riskanalysis

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) has reported results of

a two-year fact-finding project entitled

‘Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century: An

agenda for action’ (OECD, 2003). Barrie Stevens

of OECD presented an overview of the OECD

project during the consensus workshop in Bonn

(Germany). A summary of his keynotes speech

is included in Box 1-2.

19

Box 1-2

OECD’s project Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century: an agenda for action

Barrie Stevens (OECD), workshop PERIAPT, 5-6th July Bonn, Germany

(summarised by the PERIAPT team and, authorised by Barrie Stevens)

Holistic Approach for Emerging Systemic Risks

Technically, risks can be considered the combination of two factors: the probability that a

potentially harmful event (hazard) will occur; and the vulnerability, as the potential damage

inflicted by the occurrence of a hazard in terms of both direct and indirect consequences. The

2003 OECD report (OECD, 2003) focuses on a category of risks that has received considerable

attention in OECD countries in recent years, called systemic risks in the context that affects the

systems on which society depends (health, environment, transport, telecommunications, etc).

As a preliminary overview, two items have to be considered: on the one hand, conventional risks

look set to take on new dimensions and new risks are emerging, many of which are

characterised by extreme uncertainty and the possibility of extensive and maybe irreversible

harm; and on the other hand, the impact of those risks on our society and economy. The

particular focus on such risks requires the need for a holistic approach to risks in the future,

underlying the notion of emerging systemic risks.

A multitude of trends, developments, driving forces are influential sectors, which will have an

important effect on the nature of risks, and the context in which they are managed. Thus, critical

factors influencing the evolution of risks and the vulnerability of systems over the next ten to

fifteen years are of great significance in order to identify emerging systemic risks. The sheer

complexity of today’s world requires a holistic approach to the subject of emerging systemic

risks, which must capture not only the interdependencies and interactions among the hazards,

various systems and driving forces influencing the overall context of risk management, but also

the increasingly important international dimensions.

Main Driving Forces and Critical Factors shaping the risk landscape in the future

From OECD´s point of view four categories of trends or driving forces (namely influential sectors

20

by PERIAPT) can be expected to influence the nature of risks and their management in our

society in the next decades:

■ Demographic trends: population structure and organisation.

■ Environmental trends: climate change, pollution, etc.

■ Technological trends: connectedness, mobility, speed and pervasiveness of change, new

technologies.

■ Socio-economic trends: increasing scale and intensity of economic activities.

1. Demography

In addition, three dominant aspects (defined as critical factors) of ongoing global demographic

evolutions are expected to have a substantial influence on risks: ageing, migration and urbanisation.

Ageing

A third of the population in the developed countries will be aged over 60 by 2050 - versus 19% in

2000 - and a similar evolution is projected (albeit at a later juncture in this century) for some

developing countries, in particular China. Older populations are more vulnerable to certain risks

(e.g. epidemics), and their attitudes could have an impact on how risks are perceived and

managed (e.g. perception). On the other hand, more active and affluent health is likely to be a key

issue in the demand for functional foods in this ageing category.

Urbanisation

Nowadays, around 2005, there is a population of 2 billion living in urban areas in developing

countries (Asia, Latin America and Africa), while in 2030; the urban population will increase to 4

billion. Large concentrations of population and assets in mega cities will increase the potential

impact of negative events, particularly where planning procedures are inadequate (e.g. spread of

drug resistant microbes, the emergence of new infections, adverse poor sanitary and water

conditions causing a rapid increase of infectious and food borne diseases).

Migration

In the near future, major migration is expected to occur from developing countries to developed

countries, from Asia and Central America to North America, from Africa and Asia to Europe.

South- North migration, from Asia. Within developing countries, mass migration is often the direct

result of extreme poverty and/or of a catastrophe (war, natural disaster), and in turn contributes

to aggravating risks (e.g. through the propagation of infectious diseases). As society becomes

more affluent, the demand for food changes might lead to increased production needs, new types

of foods and novel types of zoonotic diseases. But, this forward-looking picture bears of course a

high level of uncertainty.

21

2. Environment

Climate

Global warming has been increasing during the period 1961-1990, above all, in Europe, and in much

of the world, the average temperature is expected to increase by 4-8ºC over the long term, causing

more precipitation and a rise of 0.1 to 0.9 meters in the sea level. Freshwater reserves will come

under increased pressure and competition, and biological diversity may decrease. With present

consumption patterns, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in water-shortage conditions by

the year 2025 (e.g. non-hygiene status in developing countries with malnutrition via gut infection).

The change in temperature and humidity will probably have important consequences for health as

the panorama of disease changes in some regions of the world. Warmer climate may reduce

some illnesses but amplify others. And as the survival conditions of a variety of infection vectors

(e.g. mosquitoes) and other disease-causing organisms (e.g. salmonella) are modified, new or

different biological food risks might appear, and the incidence of both endemic and imported

diseases is likely to increase. In some parts of Europe and of the United States, malaria or

leishmaniasis, for instance, could develop, and food-borne diseases might become more frequent.

3. Technology

Information, communication, space and transport technologies have developed possibilities of

exchange between people - no matter how distant - to an extent that few imagined only twenty

years ago. The openness and connectedness of systems and the mobility of people, goods,

services, technology and information increase the number of potential interactions that can

generate or influence a hazard.

New technologies

The frontiers of scientific discovery and technological innovation will continue to expand at

breathtaking speed and replace those existing, sometimes before all of their implications have

been thought through. Emerging technologies in the area of life sciences alter living matter - and

therefore have the potential to change the environment - on an unprecedented scale (e.g.

biotechnology, xenotransplantation, (bio-) nanotechnology).

Transport and Mobility

For the next decades, an increase in transport activities is predicted in developing countries,

more than in OECD countries. According to the World Tourism Organization, most of the

passenger traffic consists of tourists travelling around the world, arriving, above all, in Europe

and South Asia. For example, Sweden has estimated that 90% of its Salmonella cases are due to

22

international travel; in France it accounts for 70% of typhoid fever cases, and in the USA 60% of

cholera cases. On the other hand, world trade will likely increase at a rapid rate, bringing greater

exposure of populations to different types of foodborne pathogens.

4. Society and Economy

Globalisation makes trade exchanges more and more complex. On one hand, due to the length

and duration of transport of feed and food, which increases in a number of steps between the

producer and the consumer. But, on the other hand, market concentration in some areas could

generate new risks due to loss of diversity. These vulnerable points may induce a rapid (cross-)

contamination of feed or food including emerging risks of low level toxicants.

Competition and a number of current mergers and acquisitions leading to oligopolies,

geographical concentration (e.g. industrial technological changes) point towards reduced

diversity and increasing scales, in domains such as the economy (market concentration due to

clusters), urbanisation (mega cities), and the environment (loss of bio-diversity). Diversity helps

spread risks over space and time. Concentration, on the contrary, aggregates risks, and might

become a major issue in coming years (e.g. spread of antibiotic resistance).

This list of four influential sectors and several critical factors, described by OECD, is not

exhaustive, but it illustrates the need for the involvement of a very broad range of disciplines and

fields of expertise to explore and determine an efficient strategy of managing emerging food-

borne risks. As the examples show, a plurality of factors, disciplines and expertise must be

involved, such as: food science, agronomy, veterinary medicine, nutrition, toxicology,

microbiology, social sciences (psychology, sociology, economy), stakeholders of the food chain,

science philosophers, science journalists, policy makers, trend watchers, insurance companies,

etc. Similarly the tools and research to be used for identifying signals, indicators of emerging risk,

will have to be of a very different nature and reproduce real-world conditions more accurately.

OECD’s report clearly provides a scientific and

managerial basis of our understanding of

emerging risks identification. The report

suggests there is a need to identify any driving

forces (influential sectors) and critical factors

that shape, and will continue to shape, the risk

landscape of the future including food safety.

Much work remains to be done, but it illustrates

that these factors include demographic,

environmental, technological and socio-

economic developments - all of which are set to

influence significantly the context in which all

risks (health-related risks, natural and

technological disasters) unfold in the coming

years. OECD’s findings of how to tackle, for

instance, health risks provide a very worthwhile

input within the context and aim of PERIAPT.

Above all, the OECD report stresses too the

importance of the holistic approach (i.e. host

environment analysis).

Assessing emerging risks solely based on

current knowledge of food supply chains results

in a more or less reactive, conservative attitude.

Because it does not cover all possible

influences one can think of. However, the

emerging systemic risk analysis of OECD (OECD,

2003), together with Rabobank International’s

approach to analyse the hosting environment

(Pijls, 2003), gave enough food for thought to

develop a holistic vision: the host environment

analysis. This kind of analysis incorporates

expert knowledge available within the food

supply chain, as well as, outside the food supply

chain (i.e. covering the fork to farm/fisheries

chain and its host environment). Especially the

added values of expertise of a variety of

disciplines, which are to a greater or lesser

extent related to the food supply chain as a

whole, are essential to identify emerging risks.

2.1 Crosscutting sectoralexperiences

The workshop considered case studies to

conduct retrospective assessments of the

various risk analysis approaches that have been

followed in these cases. The view is to examine

what lessons can be learned and to provide

guidance on possible improvements of risk

assessment. The keynotes speakers presented

the challenge, whether emerging risks can be

managed and what research opportunities exist

for capitalising a greater co-ordination and co-

operation between fields of expertise, data

sources, resources and assessment systems

and models. Each speaker putted on the task of

preparing the brainstorm session by addressing

questions such as: ‘what did we learn from

history?’; ‘what was the impact of the problem

on the public?’; ‘what role(s) did the

stakeholders play?’ and, ‘what actions

undertook industry and risk management to

mitigate the problem?’. Above all whether these

lessons from the past delivered opportunities for

the future. For example, have there major

indicators of risk been missed or ignored?

Case studies

The first case study focused on the risks of

Avian Influenza (AI) and SARS. AI-viruses do not

normally infect species other than birds and

pigs. However, the first infection of humans with

an AI-virus occurred in Hong Kong in 1997. The

most recent cause for alarm occurred in

January 2004, when research confirmed the

presence of H5N1 AI-virus in human cases of

severe respiratory disease in Vietnam. Severe

acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral

respiratory illness that was recognised as a

global threat in March 2003, after first appearing

in Southern China in November 2002. A

previously unrecognised corona virus causes

SARS, called SARS-associated corona virus

(SARS-CoV). The primary way that SARS

23

2 The stakeholder’s position

appears to spread is by close person-to-person

contact. But it is possible that SARS-CoV might

be spread more broadly through the air or by

other, yet unknown, routes.

The second case study addressed acrylamide. A

substance that is not added to foods, but in April

2002, research results announced by the

Swedish National Food Authority showed that

acrylamide could be produced in certain starch-

based foods, such as potato chips and French

fries if cooked at high temperatures. Very

recently, scientists discovered the mechanism

of action by which acrylamide is formed in

foods.

The third case report focused on the scientific

and technological innovations in the field of

trans fatty acids (TFA). TFAs raise bad

cholesterol levels in the blood, thereby

increasing the risk of coronary heart disease

(CHD). While there is no evidence of risk at

current EU levels of intake and the reduction of

energy from fat including saturated fatty acids is

of major importance, WHO, EFSA and

Authorities/Agencies elsewhere, recommend

that manufacturers should reduce levels of TFA

arising from hydrogenation. Here scientists have

to act on existing knowledge while recognising

that further research will bring new data, which

may in turn lead to revised conclusions and

recommendations.

Marion Koopmans of RIVM reviewed the

problems related to Avian Influenza (AI) and

SARS and the existing policy approaches to the

management of these emerging risks. A

summary of her keynotes speech is included in

Box 2-1.

24

Box 2-1

Emerging risks of Avian Influenza and SARS

Case Study 1: Avian Influenza and SARS (Marion Koopmans, RIVM)

(summarised by the PERIAPT team, authorised by Marion Koopmans)

Our country’s public health system was charged with simultaneous responses to avian influenza

and SARS.

First example: the case of SARS

Around February 2003 there were reports from China that people were suffering from pneumonia

with an unknown cause. The problem became global when a physician who treated patients of

this disease, which turned out to be SARS, travelled to Hong Kong and started a chain of

transmissions, which disseminated the disease all over the world. Almost all SARS cases in the

world have been linked to this person. The WHO launched an international effort to develop

preventive measures. A lab research team figured out the cause of the new disease: a novel

corona virus, not seen in humans before. Studies in China showed that the virus was related to

animals. Many animal traders in Southern China had anti-bodies to this pathogen, especially

25

people handling civet cats. These data pointed to the source of the virus in animals. Studies

isolated a virus that was characterised as a corona virus. A similar virus was found in civet cats.

A piece of the viral genome was missing when comparing the human viruses to the animal

viruses. This may mean that there is not much of a direct risk of zoonotic infection with this virus.

It may have been this accidental mutation, which led the virus to take off in humans, but this is

still an open question. Within two months it became known that the virus was primarily

transmitted via droplets. The virus evolved very rapidly, which is typical when there is a species

jump but which made it difficult to predict how the virus would behave in a few years from now.

Fortunately, SARS was eradicated from the human population.

The net result of SARS was fairly limited but significant as a warning signal: over 8000 cases,

primarily among health care workers. One in 10 cases were fatal, especial in people over 50.

How good are we at detecting this kind of infection? The answer is: fairly poor. Only 30 % of

routine samples of SARS cases yielded corona virus diagnosis. Another issue was the role of

different modes of transmission. While primarily considered a respiratory disease, there is debate

on the role of faecal shedding. People tested positive for the virus for up to 3 months after the

onset of illness. The stool from people who had been infected by SARS but had recovered was

shedding SARS corona virus. Quite a big chunk of the total SARS burden in Hong Kong appears to

be linked to faecal transmission, people with SARS had SARS virus in the intestinal cells. We

don’t know how far SARS is from a food borne disease? Current food quality control leaves space

for viruses to move around.

Second example: the threat of a pandemic influenza virus

Around the time of SARS, we had an outbreak of a highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry in

our country: it was typed as influenza virus type A subtype H7N7 (A/H7N7). Influenza viruses are

omnipresent in wild waterfowl, the reservoir for these viruses.

Every now and then a reservoir virus spills over to a susceptible host, which may be a pig,

chickens, but also, directly humans. The problem occurs when a pig or a human is simultaneously

infected with a human influenza virus and a reservoir virus. What may emerge is a new virus that

can be transmitted between humans and has the outer surface of an animal virus, which prevents

it from being recognised by the immune system. Those viruses can cause rampant influenza

pandemics.

What were the direct risks for humans in the A/H7N7 outbreak? There were a few case reports in

the literature of humans infected with avian influenza: 18 cases with H5N1 avian influenza, 6 of

them fatal. So there was a (low) direct risk.

26

The more distant risk was a simultaneous infection of humans with an animal virus and the

human influenza virus and then to get a new pandemic strain.

In the first week after the announcement of the poultry outbreak, veterinarians reported health

(mostly eye) complaints. One was diagnosed with avian influenza and one with a regular human

influenza. The two viruses were circulating in the same group. So there was a high-risk scenario

for the generation of a new virus.

Preventive measures were taken:

■ Hygiene measures;

■ Use of regular protective gear: masks, glasses, goggles;

■ People with regular human flu were not allowed to work to reduce the likelihood of getting

simultaneous infections.

In addition, enhanced surveillance was initiated to detect possible additional human cases. By

the second week, there were 14 confirmed cases so we reinforced preventive measures by

mandatory vaccination for the regular human influenza virus. We added anti-virals.

The number of cases of avian influenza infections had risen very quickly in a short period of time

so we started looking at the family contacts to see if the disease was spreading further. By the

third week, three family contacts were confirmed. The virus was spreading from one person to

another. So we added mandatory anti-viral prophylaxis to everyone handling poultry.

We finally had 453 people with health complaints. .

Later on, we had a fatal case: a veterinarian became infected with the avian influenza virus

without any eye symptom. He died of respiratory distress syndrome. He had worn protective

clothing but no eye protection and had received no anti-viral treatment.

Retrospective analysis showed that anti-viral treatment was the only preventive measure that

was proven to be effective.

The viruses in people with eye disease and the viruses circulating among chickens were very

similar. In the fatal case it was a very different virus, which is a worrisome scenario.

If you get a species jump, the virus can mutate very quickly. This type of evolution may also help

select viruses that can efficiently transmit from people to people.

There are other lessons to be learned from this experience:

■ The various ministries had different messages from the onset. Agriculture said that there was

no risk to human health, whereas the Health Ministry said that the risk did exist;

27

■ Although the animal epidemic was localised, we had cases in humans all over the country;

■ We faced communication problems;

■ In farms with poultry and pigs, there were pigs which were also showing signs of infection, but

that scenario did not appear in the avian flu protocols;

■ There were also misunderstandings related to the fact that veterinarian response systems

were not connected to human response systems.

We can conclude that if this virus had spread efficiently from people to people, it would have

been very difficult to contain. We learned that we needed to improve risk communication, to

motivate people to apply the measures. We also learned that risk estimations differ per region. In

the Netherlands, there was virtually zero risk to consumers because eggs and poultry from

affected premises do not make it onto the market. In Vietnam, when people have sick animals,

they just slaughter them quickly and eat them; so sick animals were massively consumed, as

were raw eggs (as part of local dishes). Live animal markets and poor hygiene were also other

causes for the spreading of the disease. Quite a few of the cases were linked to food handling,

and it remains to be seen how exactly these people became infected.

Modelling can help us think through some of these epidemics and their consequences.

The modelling group of Anderson in the UK who modelled the SARS epidemic concluded that if

nothing had been done, there would have been an exponential worldwide extreme scenario, with

a fatality risk of 10%.

Reinhard Selten (University Bonn):

What is the sequence of events and what are the interests of the people who make the salient

decisions? Somebody, a veterinarian, first discovers something suspicious. What is his influence,

his interest? Does he alarm the authorities? What is his responsibility?

The authorities have to give some orders about what has to be done. What orders can they give?

What are the consequences again? At each step, I would like to ask: what was done? What could

have been done? What were the interests of the players?

Marion Koopmans:

This is exactly the kind of exercise that we need to do. There were conflicting interests: not so

much from the vets, but from farmers. There was poor compliance in the application of the

measures. There was also differing information from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry

of Health. People got confused and did not comply.

Olivier Mignot of Nestlé Research Centre

reported on the unintended occurrence of

acrylamide in foods, which constituted a major

challenge for public administrations as well as for

industry, science and entrepreneurs. A summary

of his keynotes speech is included in Box 2-2.

28

Box 2-2

Report on acrylamide and its risk analysis

Case Study 2: Acrylamide (Olivier Mignot, Nestlé Research Centre)

(summarised by the PERIAPT team, authorised by Olivier Mignot)

Acrylamide is a compound synthesised and used by the industry for more than 50 years to

produce polyacrylamide. In 1997 in Sweden, health problems were identified in workers exposed

to acrylamide in their professional environment as a result of an incomplete polymerisation of

polyacrylamide. Interestingly, the researchers noted that individuals of the control group had also

an important content of acrylamide adducts in the blood. However the possible existence of

another source of exposure to acrylamide concerning the whole population was not further

investigated at that time.

In 2002, the presence of acrylamide was established in a broad range of food commodities as a

result of Maillard reactions occurring during processing, which was immediately reported to the

press and to the public as a potential health issue, given that acrylamide is classified as probably

carcinogenic to humans by IARC. However, although this was new scientific knowledge, the

exposure to acrylamide is not a new fact - it may be considered that acrylamide is formed since

food is cooked - and at the time the information was made public, many uncertainties were

present about: (i) the actual intake level, (ii) the toxicological properties of acrylamide, and, most

importantly, (iii) the actual risk for the consumer.

This case is interesting to be analysed in more detail, because risk assessors and risk managers

faced this event in a very emotional context, involving many stakeholders (industry, authorities,

researchers, media, public) with conflicting interests.

Both public bodies and private companies started extensive research programmes focused on

the existing gaps in knowledge on acrylamide (improvement of analytical tools, mechanism of

formation, toxicology profile). The global level of co-ordination between research programmes

was rather good but some difficulties arose in sharing information due to the temptation of using

of research findings to obtain patents on new processing methodology or to derive marketing

tools. Although in addition this is difficult to estimate, emotional factors, such as the pressure of

the expected public impact due to the large publicity of the acrylamide case, may have played an

important role in the design of scientific research, beside purely science-based forces.

Regulatory bodies, also under the pressure of the media presented different answers at national

levels, even if information available was quite similar everywhere. Intensive debates between risk

assessors and risk managers occurred sometimes. A ‘wait and see attitude’ was generally

29

adopted with strong message to the industry to search for mitigation measures but without

putting pressure with regulatory limits. In one case at least ‘signal values’ for food commodities

were established. International organisations (WHO, EFSA, EC) confirmed that for the time being a

final risk assessment cannot be done and that regulatory limits cannot be fixed in these

circumstances. It was however decided to conduct a thorough risk assessment (JECFA results

pending for February 2005).

It was noted that the media attitude evolved with time. In the beginning of 2002, there appears to

be an important peak of attention and article coverage. Nowadays, the acrylamide case is

considered as a dormant issue that however may pop up anytime in the media if a definitive

association with cancer is established in the future.

The public at large did not exhibit panic behaviour. But they had mainly questions to ask rather

than delivering complaints at the consumer service centres of the food industries.

The most important lesson to be learned from the acrylamide case is that there is now an

increased awareness among all stakeholders about processing contaminants. Analysis of what

actually occurred in this case gives useful indications for the establishment of an adequate

network for emerging risks:

■ Initial signals of what can become an emerging risk can be found outside the food chain. Five

years before the discovery of acrylamide as an unintended food contaminant, a clear indicator

of a possible dietary exposure has been reported in a study related to human health. This

justifies the holistic vision supported in the PERIAPT project to build a network efficient in

analyzing the host environment of food chains.

■ Early and adequate use of all relevant information or signals about what could be an emerging

risk determines the events that might occur later on. Early evaluation of the hazard and of the

exposure, including remediation of gaps in knowledge should be carried out without allowing

an emotional climate to interfere.

■ Informing media and public is essential, but this should be done in a timely manner. An early

evaluation of the case has to be carried out in a way that allows a clear understanding of the

problem. Premature communication forces risk managers to take an attitude on board without

a science-based, robust risk assessment at hand. This may result in a low degree of

harmonised, balanced, national management options. As the identification of emerging risk is

situated at the very beginning of the food process, the need for communication to the public at

that stage must be carefully assessed.

30

■ Communication and co-ordination should be fair and complete between risk assessors and

risk managers, regulatory authorities and private companies so that resources devoted to

emerging risks are based on an appropriate risk/benefit analysis;

■ There seems to be a need to formalise a strategy between stakeholders and to define an

action plan with clear steps in decision-making in order to allow similar treatment of potential

future cases.

These points are of high importance to allow a proactive attitude in the area of the emerging

risks.

Maurice Smith of Unilever deliberated on the

technological and scientific aspects of trans

fatty acids (TFA) in products, which arise from

hydrogenation and explained to the audience

why industrial and governmental policies have

been revised. A summary of his keynotes

speech is included in Box 2-3.

Box 2-3

Trans Fatty Acids and risk for public health

Case Study 3: Trans Fatty Acids (Maurice Smith, Unilever Health Institute)

(summarised by the PERIAPT team, authorised by Maurice Smith)

Cholesterol can be split into so-called good cholesterol: HDL (high density lipoproteins) and the

bad form of cholesterol: LDL cholesterol (low density lipoproteins).

Trans fatty acids, which are found naturally present in fats from ruminant animals, are also

formed by partial hydrogenation of liquid oils. They raise the levels of LDL and lower the levels

of HDL cholesterol, so not only do they raise total cholesterol, they also have a negative impact

on the balance of good and bad cholesterol.

Studies have shown a significant increased risk in cardiovascular disease with increasing

intakes of trans fatty acids. Decrease of trans fatty acids intake could mean less coronary

related deaths.

More SAFA (saturated fatty acids) are consumed in the diet than trans fatty acids. One should

look at the balance of fats overall. It is not only about the quantity but also about the quality of

fats being consumed.

31

The highest levels of transfats are found in baked products and some industrial frying oils,

whereas in margarine levels have been reduced to virtually zero.

In the late 50’s - early 60’s, we were asked to produce a margarine that contained a certain

balance of fatty acids to target the concerns of cardiovascular health. Becel in the Netherlands,

Flora in the UK and Fruit d’Or in France.

The fact that it is a fat spread allows us to change the fatty acid composition to meet consumer

needs based on functionality. You can affect the texture, taste and nutrition.

There are three major components in fat spreads or margarine:

■ The liquid oils;

■ The hard stock, at normally fairly low levels (about 10%) which helps crystallise the oils;

■ The water.

The hard stocks are typically the source of trans fatty acids.

Transfats in the early 90’s were typically used to obtain the crystal structure. You need something

that is solid at ambient temperature so that you can spread it. You can use fully hydrogenated

vegetable oil for that. But it also needs to melt in the mouth at 35 degrees.

There are a number of ways to produce this hard stock: (i) partial hydrogenation, which results in

trans fatty acids; (ii) interesterification: basically taking different oils, using a catalyst or enzyme

system to mix up the fatty acids on the triglyceride. This technology can be used to produce hard

stocks that will not contain trans fatty acids.

What were the drivers for us to make a change?

■ Trans fatty acids were arising from industrial process, they were not natural, they were

avoidable, and they had an increasingly negative consumer perception

■ There was a shift in the balance of scientific evidence

■ Our positioning was also healthiest spreads so it was difficult to accept the presence of trans

fatty acids in our spreads.

■ There were other internal and external factors to be considered as well.

On the negative side:

Externally, there were the opinion leaders, a negative press and also competitive pressures.

Internally, these were expensive changes to make.

Technology wise, the challenge was to decrease the levels of trans fatty acids but without

increasing the saturated fats, and still maintain product quality. We had to reduce the cholesterol

raising elements in spreads across the board, and not end up in a worse position.

The retrospective analyses of the keynotes

speakers showed that there is much that can be

learned from history. In principle, two basic

observations are communicated:

■ Risk management and regulatory control

involve balancing the costs of being too

restrictive on systemic (product) changes

with hazards and risks of being unclear,

certainly in those situations of scientific

uncertainty and non-compliance of rules;

■ Where ‘early warnings’ are ignored, where

the scope of hazard appraisal is too narrow

and where management actions are taken

without sufficient consideration of

alternatives, or of conditions necessary for

implementation in the real world, risks

emerge.

Reductionism science and linear causality are

useful approaches, but they are limited. They do

not cope well with the dynamics of complex and

sometimes chaotic systems, characterised by

feedback loops, synergisms, and thresholds.

Certainly as food production is linked by multi-

factorial and interdependent crosscutting

sectors in- and outside the food and feed supply

chain. This complex reality demands better

concerted science with a focus on ‘what we

don’t know’, as well as on ‘what we do know’

(EEA, 2001).

In the future risk assessment could achieve a

better balance by analysing influential sectors

and critical factors outside the food chain and

their influence on the evolution of hazards and

risks. At least, the availability, scientifically,

politically as well as economically, of a richer

body of information from an enlarged variety of

diverse sources should be taken into account.

32

On the positive side:

We were going to establish customer leadership. We initiated a major project to look at the

safety and nutritional impact of the processes for changing the fat content of our products. We

then showed that we had safe and effective methods before we actually implemented them. We

began to lower trans fatty acids levels in 1994. From a marketing point of view, it was a difficult

thing to explain: that you’ve taken something out of the product that people did not actually

realise was in there but was not doing them any good when it was. For the long-term support of

our brand and product it was a very important change to make.

Conclusion: it was important as a company to be aware of what was happening in the scientific

field, to know and be involved in the risk assessment process. This allowed us to take some early

decisions. We had to look very carefully at a strategy to reduce trans fatty acids levels, to be sure

that we would actually offer some real benefits. We could leverage our expertise in oil processing

to improve the nutrition of our products. We looked at local issues and the perception of the

problem. Somebody had to push that through because it was not immediately obvious to all

concerned that change was needed. Effective internal communication of the risks was important:

the short term challenges, the longer-term benefits.

The case studies both supported and illustrated

the need for:

■ Adequate long-term research into early

warnings (including environmental and

health monitoring);

■ Research to reduce ‘blind spots’ and gaps in

scientific knowledge;

■ Reduction of interdisciplinary obstacles to

learning;

■ Real world conditions that adequately

account for hazard and risk appraisal;

■ Use of ‘lay’ local knowledge, as well as

relevant specialist expertise;

■ Taking full account of knowledge,

assumptions and values of changes outside

and inside the food and feed supply chain;

■ Reduction of institutional obstacles to

learning and concerted research actions.

2.2 Test out the holistic vision

2.2.1. Articulation of the host environment

The stakeholder’s panel was divided into three

working groups, each group as diverse as

possible regarding affiliation, background and

discipline (n =16/session). The aim was to create

an overview of the influential sectors and critical

factors, which are of importance considering

emerging risks in the food production (supply)

chain. These brainstorm sessions provided a

platform to consider the model of the holistic

approach and to reach agreement on which

influential sectors are to be addressed in future.

Main trigger for selecting an influential sector

was a notion that this driving force is of

importance to cause emerging risks at the level

of the food and feed chain. Thereby, focus was

always on potential threats to human health. The

working groups gave no attention to addressing

indicators as this aspect is out of the scope of

the workshop.

The ‘yellow-sticker method’ was used as a

validated way to arrive at identification and

articulation of the influential sectors and their

critical factors. Each participant was given a set

of yellow self-adhesive stickers, and was asked

to write down any type of sector that a holistic

vision of the food chain should fulfil, one area

per sticker. After a few minutes stickers were

collected by the local convenor. A session

followed where they were posted on a

whiteboard in groups addressing related types of

driving forces. The group discussed then each

type of driving force, and the views noted by the

convenor. In a second round, the same method

was used to nominate the critical factors per

selected driving force (i.e. influential sector).

These specifications were used subsequently as

a starting point by the panel to prioritise them by

considering the methodology of Expert Choice.

The three brainstorm sessions delivered the

decision tree as illustrated in Figure 2-1. The

tree consists of the selected influential sectors

and clustered critical factors as elements,

which are presented to the expert choice

panels in pairs for comparison and judgement.

The brainstorm sessions highlighted some

important elements. From global and regional

perspective, for instance, vulnerability may be

also based on combined effects of population

age structure, their health status and the

country’s infrastructures. During the last years a

number of public health incidents have had a

major impact on worldwide economies and

public health systems. Another aspect is the

relationship between health and food. Health

will become increasingly important, possibly

also due to demographic change, not least in

the Western countries, where over the next 20-

25 years ageing could be an important aspect in

respect to new, emerging, risks.

33

2.2.2. Prioritisation within the host environment

To prioritise the influential sectors (areas) and

their critical factors the methodology of Expert

Choice was used. The method is based on the

theory of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). This

is a powerful and flexible decision-making

process to help, for instance, managers to set

priorities and to make the best decision when

both qualitative and quantitative aspects of a

decision need to be considered. By reducing

complex decisions to a series of one-on-one

comparisons, then synthesizing the results, AHP

not only helps decision makers to arrive at the

best decision, but also provides a clear

rationale that it is the best. Designed to reflect

the way people actually think, AHP was

developed in the 1970’s by Dr. Thomas Saaty

(Wharton School of Business), and continues to

be the most highly regarded and widely used

decision-making theory.

Two groups of stakeholders (n=24/group)

participated in the Expert Choice, and the

results of both groups have been combined.

Accordingly, the overall results have been

discussed in a plenary session.

The AHP and Expert Choice software

(www.expertchoice.com) engaged the working

groups in structuring a decision into smaller

parts, proceeding from the goal to objectives to

sub-objectives down to the alternative courses

of action. They made simple pair wise

comparative judgments throughout the

hierarchy to arrive at overall priorities for the

alternatives. The AHP helped the stakeholder’s

panel to cope with the intuitive, the rational and

the irrational, and with risk and uncertainty in

this complex setting. Members vote on each

possible pair while answering, from the

34

EconomyTradeSupply & demandWealth & income levels

Science & Technology & IndustryNew scientific knowledgeNew technologyProcessing & distribution

Nature & EnvironmentClimatePollutionNatural catastrophes

Consumer behaviourConsumer perceptionDietAttitude

InformationMediaCommunication interestExperts roles

AgriculturePlants & animal healthProduction systemsBiodiversity

Globalisation

Culture & DemographyEducationLife styleMobilityAgeing

Government & PoliticsProcedures for New legislationSupervision & enforcementTrade barriersFood terrorism

Figure 2-1

Decision tree to prioritise the influential sectors and

critical factors of the host environment of the food and

feed supply chain

perspective of vulnerability, the question: ‘which

influential sector or critical factor is most

important to influence the safety of the food

chain i.e. may lead to the occurrence of

emerging risks?’. The anonymous on-line voting

is not just a simple conception of saying yes or

no to one of the two issues to be compared, but

the panel members had to express the

probability of the opinion by ranking the vote on

a scale ranging from 1 to 9. An example is given

above (Figure 2-2).

The stakeholder’s priorities with respect to the

host environment of the food and feed chain are

presented as graph in Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4.

Generally speaking, human behaviour has a

substantial impact on the decision-making

process. Therefore, it is not justifiable to

statistically rely on these ‘snapshots’ of the

selected panel, although it covered a very broad

range of backgrounds in research policy and

safety management.

Nevertheless, the results indicated the direction

to go in the context of development and

research. Comparing the relative scores it is

35

Figure 2-2

Example of a vote using Expert Choice system (vote the relative importance of the sector “Economy”

compared to the sector “Science&Technology&Industry”)

36

Agriculture

Science & technology & industry

Nature & environment

Consumer behaviour

Government politics

Economy

Culture & demography

Information

0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 0,25 0,3

combined score S-2 score S-1

Figure 2-3

Expert Choices: prioritised influential sectors regarding emerging risks

clear that the area agriculture was considered

to be of greater importance than the sector

information. Which means that this sector

should get more attention when thinking of

recommendations for a scientific “best

practice” related to emerging risks

identification. But again, it is important to stress

the fact that what has been achieved during the

workshop is a momentary impression of that

particular time and interviewing that mixed-

group of experts. To get a more consistent

picture the Expert Choice sessions should be

executed several times with different group of

experts, managers, scientists, consumers and

politicians etcetera.

37

education

procedures for new legislation

supply and demand

communication interest

ageing

trade

natural catastrophes

experts roles

wealth & income levels

life style

food terrorism

trade bariers

mobility & migration

bio diversity

0 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,1 0,12 0,14

attitude

globalisation

consumer perception

media

supervision & enforcement

climate

processing & distribution

new technology

pollution

diet

new scientific knowledge

plants & animal health

production systems

combined score S-2 score S-1

Figure 2-4

Expert choices: prioritised critical factors regarding emerging risks

In general, the stakeholder’s panel agreed that a

holistic vision is the right way to attack the task

of emerging risks identification as presented by

OECD (OECD, 2003) and the PERIAPT project.

Broad co-operation and cross- sectoral

collaboration are required to assess and detect

the hazards involved at an early stage.

Eventually, it is even proposed to change

influential sector into influential area, because

this reflects more the significance of a broad

crosscutting sectoral approach. An integration

of the three brainstorm session reports allowed

the conclusion that stakeholders did not

significantly alter the basic conception and

principles of the host environment analysis as

presented to them. The finalised conception of

the host environment of the food chain is

depicted in Figure 2-5. It shows the agreed

articulation and definition of the holistic model

according to the panel at stake.

The concerted analysis of the host environment

needs to be validated, possibly by considering

expert focus groups for deliberation on a

specific emerging hazard, like a new form of

mycotoxin. It can be argued that more Expert

Choice sessions with diverse groups will

contribute to improving the understanding of the

elements that should be a part of the host

environment analysis. Moreover, it is of vital

importance to integrate industry into the

research programming structure that has to be

developed transnational.

38

Figure 2-5

Conception of analyzing the host environment of the food supply chain regarding emerging risks

(bold: influential sector; standard: critical factor)

Science, Technology & Industry

new scientific knowledge

new technologiesprocessing&distribution

Nature & Environmentclimate

pollutionnatural catastrophes

Food chain

Consumer Behaviourperception

dietattitude

Informationmedia

communication interestexpert roles

Agricultureplant&animal healthproduction systems

biodiversity

Public Health & Welfare

infrastructurelifestylediseases

Culture & Demographylifestylemobility

educationageing

Economytrade

supply&demandwealth&income level

globalisation

Government & Politicsnew legislation

supervision/enforcementtrade barriersfood terrorism

The factors influencing human choices remain

more or less outside the scope of conventional

models for risk analysis. In particular, current

models do not reflect the effects of changes in

human decisions due to modified or intensified

perceptions of risks, incentives or different

policies among countries. This can lead to large

biases in risk assessment. Several case-studies

on human errors in food supply chains have

indicated this such as the Belgian dioxin crisis

(1999), BSE in the UK (1986), and more recently

the Dutch dioxin crisis of Marley clay

contaminated potato by-products (2004). It is

anticipated that introducing the human factor

into the risk analysis paradigm would make the

process more proactive, improves the relevance

and quality of technical analysis, and increases

the legitimacy and public acceptance of the

resulting decisions. Consequently, such an

approach acts as an anticipatory early warning

for future repercussions in the economic, social

and political domains.

3.1 The game-theoretic modelling

Admittedly, the evaluation of subtle

appearances in many human interactions

proves to be difficult. Characterising the major

positive and negative factors of human

behaviour to safety performance could

significantly improve a proactive risk analysis,

however. For example, the analysis of human

decision-making uses a mathematical aspect

called ‘game theory’. Game theory provides an

extremely useful perspective on competitive

interactions, like they are within the food and

feed business. Much of the art of applying game

theory lies in identifying the essential factors

and interactions in a complex situation. It

improves our understanding of those

interactions, and contributes to developing

tactical as well as strategic actions from the

discipline provided by game-theoretic models.

Food-terrorism is an example where the

analysis of adversarial situations has a game-

theoretic flavour (Banks, 2002). There is a range

of targets, with different degrees of vulnerability

and different costs if successfully attacked. The

game theoretical question is how a country can

most effectively allocate its available resources

to minimize damage while expecting terrorists to

spend their resources to maximize damage.

Early risk identification

Game theory is not only for economic objectives

of importance, but is of relevance of conflict

situations, such as perceptions of information in

the case of food crises. Early risks identification

mainly deals with recognising hazards before

they turn out to pose a threat to human or

animal health. In essence this requires the

formation of an interactive, iterative and fast

acting process of uptake of early signals from

various sources or networks. With regard to this

39

3 Human behaviour andperception on decisionmaking

latter aspect the information source could also

be brought into an unfavourable position if itself

appears to be the cause of the emergence of a

risk, however. Game theory can without doubt

be of assistance. For that purpose cases of the

past were analysed and learned from them.

3.2 Assessment of perception

During the workshop in Bonn two stakeholder’s

roundtable debates on Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy (BSE) and acrylamide scares,

were organised in order to track down and

oversee past and ongoing activities of risk

management. Eventually and inevitably,

attention came to focus on the lessons learned

as well as how the risk analysis cycle (European

Commission, 2000) and, in particular, risk

management might be improved in the future.

The first roundtable was devoted to the

occurrence of ten cases of a new variant of an

incurable, fatal neurological defect, Creutzfeldt-

Jacob disease, of which UK government

announced in 1976 that this was most likely

caused by the consumption of beef infected

with BSE. In his role as facilitator Udo Pollmer

(EU.L.E) critically deliberated on the

phenomenon of denial by governments due to

either a lack of scientific knowledge and the

complexity of the disease (United Kingdom) or to

the consideration that the disease was not

present in their country (Germany). One of the

major errors of judgement occurred in 1979,

when the incoming Thatcher government

scrapped proposed regulations that would have

banned cattle being given supplementary feed

derived from sheep meat that was possibly

contaminated with scrapie. This decision was

reversed in 1989, but the damage had been

done, which in terms of public´s perception,

depended on the mass media rather than on

expert opinions. As a matter of fact, media tend

to shift the issue at stake away from information

based on science-based facts towards framing

the issue in terms of entertainment that is readily

´digested´ by the audience. On the other hand,

authorities and decision-makers turned this

crisis into a major disaster by reacting to slow or

denying the problem.

The second roundtable considered the

implications of acrylamide in food and the role

of risk management. Andreas Kliemant (BVL)

enforced how to act in the future and how to

rationally use the risk analysis paradigm and

enforcement resources in a situation where

there is scientific uncertainty and absence of

´consensus´ in society. Proactive communication

increases public trust; however, communicating

uncertainties if it is not necessary often

increases public confusion. Whereas,

transparency shows how complicated decision-

making is when there is scientific uncertainty

rather than certainty. By focusing part of the

Swedish press conference on the question

whether its carcinogenic effects in laboratory

animals are also of relevance for human beings,

EU citizens became confused. Authorities were

not advising consumers to reject any specific

food or product. In addition, consumers were

advised not to change their dietary habits.

Because of the complexity of causal relations

and gaps in data this scare involved large gaps

in the understanding of the ´natural” browning

phenomenon in heat treated foods and the scale

at stake. Certainly, the proactive communication

by Sweden has lead to greater public distrust of

both regulators and scientists.

40

The learning from these two food scares

included all parts of the risk analysis paradigm

i.e. risk assessment, risk management and risk

communication. It left the research managers,

scientists and policy makers with questions to

be answered in the near future, like:

■ Were there any indicators that could have

predicted the emerging risks at stake?

■ How can the emerging risks be identified in

the future?

■ Did the observed risks correspond to a

previous assessment?

■ Were there crosscutting sectoral warning

signals received?

■ Were there any unexpected aspects of

vulnerability?

■ Which trends contributed to creating the

evolution of the risk or systemic

vulnerability?

41

3.3 Reasonable and unreasonabledecisions

Having participated in the roundtables as

observer, Reinhard Selten of University Bonn

reflected on the unintended occurrence of BSE

and acrylamide in foods, which constituted a

major challenge for public administrations as

well as for industry, science and entrepreneurs.

A summary of his key reflections is included in

Box 3-1.

Box 3-1

Game theory and risk analysis

Reinhard Selten (University Bonn)

(summarised by the PERIAPT team and, authorised by Reinhard Selten)

Prof Dr Dr h.c. mult. Reinhard Selten became interested in game theory in the late 1940s when he

read an article about the subject in the magazine Fortune. Refining the research of John F. Nash,

Selten proposed in 1965 theories that distinguished between reasonable and unreasonable

decisions in predicting the outcome of games. In 1994 Professor Selten shared the Nobel Prize for

Economics with John F. Nash and John C. Harsanyi for their development of game theory.

He developed in the 1970s a qualitative version of game theory i.e. scenario bundle analysis. This

method tries to make game-theoretic concepts applicable to situations that do not lend

themselves to the quantification of cost and benefits. At present, the focus is on recent empirical

insights into how humans approach and perceive decision problems. Much of this work is driven

by experiments in Selten’s Economic Laboratory at the University of Bonn. While many theorists

still think of behavioural economics as a collection of anomalous “irrationalities,” experimentalists

42

have in the last two decades arrived at a more detailed picture that not only is informing empirical

investigations, but also is changing our views of what constitutes rationality.

Game theory is a mathematical area used for modelling and analysing interactive situations

involving conflict and/or cooperation. It is not all about conflict; it is also about co-operation. It is not

in itself making any prediction of anything. It is not a substantive area but a method like statistics.

You always have to put in some additional knowledge besides game theory in order to apply it.

When we have to model a game, certain questions have to be answered:

1. Who are the players? Who are those people or entities or organisations and, who interact and

may be looked upon as the players?

2. What are choices that these players have? What strategic possibilities are there? What can

they do? This is relatively simple in games where everybody has to make just one choice.

However, in general games the structure is more complex: there is a beginning where

something happens and some people have to respond to this event and their action will make it

necessary for others to act or give them an opportunity to act, which may go on over many

layers of action. And one has to describe this structure. In order to do this one hast to describe

the structure of the game, getting know who acts, when, under what circumstances and so on.

3. What information do people have when they make their decisions? There are games where

there is perfect information, for example chess. Everybody knows everything that happened in

the past.

In a card game, the game starts when the cards are first distributed among the players. This is

a random move. The players are only informed about their own cards. They don’t know the

cards of the other players. Over time they have to respond to new information.

Random events can also occur during the game, in games with dice for example.

4. What are the rules defining the end of the game? There are games, which never end, but for

practical purposes, there are rules about the end of the game.

5. What are the motivations of the players? In parlour games, the players want points or money.

In real situations, gains and losses may play a great role but other motivations have to be

considered as well and integrated into the model.

Game theory is never enough by itself; some real knowledge has to be put in.

Game models can help to look at what really happens in the course of the risk management of a

situation which can be similar to a game situation:

■ Who are the actors;

■ What is the structure of the choices that can be taken by the actors;

■ In what time structure;

■ What is the information that they have when they act and also,

■ What are the motivations (aims, goals, fears) of the actors?

43

All this has to be taken into account when looking at the history of incidents, which happened in

the past. Game theory can be used for modelling situations in economics or social sciences and

also in evolutionary biology for the behaviour of animals and plants.

Current understanding of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) like BSE is incomplete

- scientists have yet to determine all the contributing factors to BSE and the best ways to make

them inactive. Decisions to protect public health often demand action based on incomplete

scientific evidence. From the lessons learnt, it becomes clear, that the development of the BSE-

case is a consequence of human decisions. Government, science, agriculture and the meat

industry are identified as the main influential sectors that influence the emerging risk of BSE.

Looking back one of the biggest issues of the BSE crisis has been the undue information policy

both of government and scientists. There is a conflict of interest between supporting agricultural

producers and protecting consumers with effective food standards.

Looking at German’s governmental point of view and its managerial behaviour around the late

seventies, there is initially the denial of the problem. They played down the crisis situation and, it

turned out that the official results were too late available in the public domain. However, the

German government as one of the “players” was forced to react after the United Kingdom

notified the risk of Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease due to the consumption of BSE-infected beef. The

government was now under the pressure of the German public (the other player). At that stage,

the risk managers had to make a choice out of various possibilities and options to act. German

regulators decide to ban all import of British beef and of living cattle. Obviously, the rationale has

been that if they would not lie on an obligation upon holding all imports from the UK, a panic in

German’s population could pop up. This would have negative consequences for the sitting

German government, in particular, at the sight of the next elections. German governmental bodies

made decisions during the evolution of the BSE scare, which they thought were strategically best

options at that time. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such a denial can be

consistent with self-interested behaviour. First, they could not act independently, as their

decisions depended on the decisions of other players (e.g. consumers, NGO’s, beef industry

etcetera). Second, they acted more or less based on their expectations of other player’s

behaviour or interests. For instance, the public who would stop buying beef. Third, politicians

made own calculations.

Selten reflected the statements of the keynote lecture of Olivier Mignot (Nestlé Research Centre).

Acrylamide is first discovered in the blood of workers in Sweden, but later it is also found in the

blood of the whole Swedish population. In the case of acrylamide, the case received so much

national and international media attention because the institutions communicating the findings

were highly trusted. With regard to the acrylamide scare, there was an eighteen-hour

communication vacuum, which led to media hostility and widespread rumour and speculation.

44

The Swedish Food Authority was conscious of that, as they were responsible for keeping silence.

As a “natural” product of maillard reaction created during the cooking process it could not be

totally avoided in view of our actual nutrition-habits. The authorities as one of the players

involved took a view that it was necessary to inform the consumer on new food safety matters

whilst research scientists felt that the target should be science editors as the findings were

scientific in nature and not necessarily newsworthy. It may be concluded that risks that by their

nature would be seen as mild were amplified by some of the players. Acrylamide forms naturally

when carbohydrates are cooked and have been in food since humans discovered fire. On one

hand, by amplifying this naturally occurring risk the public quickly concluded there was little need

to pay much attention to this food alarm. On the other hand, after the observation of acrylamide

public bodies and private companies (two of the players) started extensive research programmes

due to the large publicity of the acrylamide case and, to the discussions with regulators. The

industry and government made calculations about possible solutions and decided a voluntary

minimisation strategy to reduce the contamination of acrylamide.

Reinhard Selten drew the conclusion from these two food scares as they have been discussed in

the roundtable sessions that game theoretical modelling and calculations would prevent us from

big mistakes!

The dates - from the retrospective analyses of

the food scares BSE and acrylamide on

behavioural patterns, incentives, and stakes of

actors - can be described in a modelling

framework. The challenge will be to analyse

differences in the level of facts and perception

intensity. A particular strength of game theory is

that it operates as a precedent measure in case

of crisis management. Its science is highly

useful to complement the tasks of risk

management. However, game theory

presumably cannot help to predict emerging

risks. Once further developed it may well be

used in the future for certain categories of

crosscutting sectors that influence food safety,

such as the critical factor of human behaviour.

Many factors such as the increasing flows of

goods, extreme weather conditions and

technological innovations go hand in hand with

new and re-emerging risks. This makes it

necessary to explore outside and inside the

food chain changes in order to develop a

proactive assessment for the identification of

those new and/or (re)-emerging risks. For

example, the OECD report on systemic emerging

risks in the 21st century (OECD, 2003) concludes

that there is an urgent need to review existing

policy approaches in the management of major

emerging risks.

This publication brings together the analytical

work as a key element of the project PERIAPT

and the managerial recommendations for

transnational co-operation and research

programming in the future. Also it reflects a

broad consensus among the invited

stakeholders.

Conclusions

Working together with the stakeholder’s panel

PERIAPT has offered the chance to access a

broader field of expertise in research and safety

management, whether from government,

science, industry, consumer organisations or

NGOs. On one hand, the keynotes and lead

speakers focussed on the lessons learned from

the past, and, on the other hand, the brainstorm

sessions and Expert Choice improved the

understanding to carry out risk assessments in

a more proactive, even preventive, way that

covered the fork to farm/fisheries chain and its

host environment. Several models have been

proposed and the finalised model of the host

environment analysis shows promise how

society can channel the uncertainties and

probabilities into positive improvements in the

daily governance of (re-) emerging food and

feed hazards. This will, in the future, allow for

further refinement of tools and systems, which

might be needed in the context of the General

Food Law.

The workshop managed to establish a ‘first’

snapshot of the PERIAPT-strategy by trying to

pinpoint influential sectors including their

critical factors. Today, an interpretation of the

world around us has been created - the holistic

vision on food safety - and, based on the outputs

and advises, research policy makers and

managers can respond accordingly in the

future.

In parallel, it is essential to try to develop a

model of human behaviour: their interests at

stake, the conflicts and interactions including

the time structures based on game-theoretical

modelling. It is encouraged to answer the

question in which game the emerging risks

identification plays. So far, the roundtable

debates on BSE and acrylamide learned that the

45

Conclusions and recommendations

game theory might not be applicable for the risk

assessment but certainly for the risk

management and risk communication as soon

as the play, the actors and their interests are

known.

The effectiveness of a ‘transnational’ forward-

looking system is only as good as the quality of

the national or regional systems allows. In

developing countries monitoring and early

warning systems are often inadequate or even

nonexistent. It also holds for the Western world

where there is, for instance, a shortage of

epidemiologists (i.e. epi-based risk assessment).

That makes it for the old and new Member

States imperative to strengthen the co-

operation and co-ordination in research

programming and management. Related to this,

multidisciplinary knowledge, intelligent

information, Dbase skills and technologies

should be transferred and, thereby, close

potentially dangerous loopholes in the overall

coverage of the proactive monitoring and

surveillance effort.

To improve the emerging risks identification

more interdisciplinary expert based knowledge

will be needed. It is suggested that countries

need to collaborate on developing an

international standard metadata or ontology in

the area of food and feed safety including

nutrition. In consequence, it is important that

participating countries improve communication

and collaboration at national and (sub-) regional

level for the continued success and further

development of information exchange.

In conclusion, it was demonstrated that

stakeholders with very different interests and

from all perspectives outside and inside the

food chain are interested and committed to

work together to seek solutions based on the

holistic vision (i.e. covering the fork to

farm/fisheries chain and its host environment).

The workshop facilitated an understanding of

attitudes, expertise and knowledge from all

stakeholders, which was anticipated and

incorporated in the envisaged approach. This

approach should in future ensure a best

practice strategy to meet national, regional and

European demands, while working towards

future success of European research policy and

programmes.

Recommendations

The concept of the holistic vision should be

widely developed to guide the safety

assessment by scientists in governments,

academia and industry alike. The strategies on

emerging risks identification should include

three action levels:

1. European level;

2. International level;

3. Member States level.

Instruments and targets to be achieved within

the levels are:

1) European level:

a) Formation of a European network

including representatives/experts of

EFSA, EC, EU and, MSs. The goal of this

network will be to develop an interactive,

iterative and fast acting process of up

taking of inputs from the national

networks (see level 2), elaborating the

issue, designing strategies, individuating

priorities and going back to the Member

State level (see level 3). Harmonisation of

alarm thresholds for indicators of (re-)

emerging risks will be a task of the

46

network as well as harmonisation of

managements actions for the emerging

‘risky’ situations.

b) The network should receive the

necessary financial support by the

Commission.

2) International level:

a) International (governmental)

organisations, mainly WHO, OECD and

FAO, are involved in programmes aimed at

the surveillance of food safety and

security, communication and assessment

of risks, holistic monitoring of events

(sentinel sites) that could directly or

indirectly provoke changes in food and

feed safety. It is within the activities of the

global strategy for the surveillance of

food borne diseases where the above

European network (level 1) should include

members of such organizations and

benefit in real time of the outputs of the

above programmes during their

development.

3) Member State level:

a) Formation of national/regional networks

under the umbrella of the National/

Regional Food Authorities/Agencies

(NFAs) including representatives/experts

of disciplines/authorities as individuated

by the PERIAPT project. Those networks

will act within the NFAs and will benefit of

the work of Ministries/Bodies/Institutions

according to strategies and areas

indicated by the workshop such as trade,

environment, meteorology, technology

etcetera. Within national/regional

Network alarm thresholds for the

indicators of (re-) emerging risks will be

individuated and harmonised at the

European level. Deviation from such alarm

thresholds will be promptly put forward

and discussed both within the national,

the European and the international

networks. If the case, prioritisation will be

performed.

b) The networks should receive the

necessary financial support at the

national or regional level.

c) The output of the workshop can be

considered as a scientific and managerial

preparatory colloquium for a 4-years co-

ordinated action as project that takes in

the framework of the European research

area (i.e. ERA-NET).

What next?

The outcome of the PERIAPT project is

considered as input for a 4-years coordination

of National and Regional Activities, project

called SAFEFOODERA that takes place in the

framework of the European research area. The

primary objective of SAFEFOODERA is to

establish a European platform for protecting

consumers against health risks from the

consumption of food through a co-ordination

action ERA-NET of 12 Member States, 3 new

Member States, 3 Associated Countries and 2

regional organisations representing 480 million

European citizens. This project will address

various topics in relation to food safety of which

emerging risks is one of the main topics.

47

The following list references the authors cited in

this report.

Banks, D.L. (2002) Statistics for homeland

defense. Chance Vol. 15(1) pp. 8-10

Codex Alimentarius Commission Twenty-Third

Session (FAO Headquarters, Rome, 28 June - 3

July 1999) Principles of Risk Analysis

ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/ALINORM99/al99_09e.pdf

Codex Committee on General Principles

(Seventeenth Session, Paris, France, 15 - 19

April 2002)

Proposed Draft Codex Working Principles for

Risk Analysis

ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/ccgp17/gp02_03e.pdf

Dekker-Bellamy (2004) Defing a European

Appraoch to preventing Bio-terrorism: Health

Security Policy in the 21st Century. NDA

background Report. pp. 1-10.

European Commission (2000) The Report of the

Scientific Steering Committee’s Working Group

on Harmonisation of Risk Assessment

Procedures in the Scientific Committees

advising the European Commission in the area

of human and environmental health 26-27

October 2000 (published on the internet

20.12.2000)

European Environment Agency (EEA) (2001) Late

lessons from early warnings: the precautionary

principle 1896-2000 Environmental issue report

No 22 Luxembourg: Office for Official

Publications of the European Communities. pp.

1-210 Copenhagen 2001 (ISBN 92-9167-323-4)

European Commission (2002) Regulation (EC) No

178/2002 of the European Parlaiment and of the

Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the

pronciples and requirements of food law,

establishing the European Food Safety Authority

and laying down procedures in matters of food

safety. Official Journal L31, 1-24

FDA (2004) Mapping out federal food safety

programmes: CARVER + Shock.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/

4001s1_02_Brackett%20.ppt

FAO/WHO (1995) Application of Risk Analysis to

Food Standards Issues. Report of the Joint

FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Geneva,

Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995. WHO, Geneva,

WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3.

FAO/WHO (1997) Risk Management and Food

Safety. Report of a joint FAO/WHO Consultation,

Rome, Italy, 27-31 January 1997. FAO Food and

Nutrition Paper n°65, FAO, Rome

48

Key references

FAO/WHO (1998) Application of Risk

Communication to Food Standards and Safety

Matters. Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert

Consultation, Rome, Italy, 2-6 February 1998. FAO

Food and Nutrition Paper n° 70, FAO, Rome

FAO (2003) FAO/SLOVAK Workshop Internet

Portal on Food Safety - Communication Systems

to strengthen Food Safety and build Consumer

Confidence Nitra, Slovak Republic 23 - 26 March

2003 FINAL REPORT PEC/NIT-05 (REV. 2)

OECD (2003) Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st

Century: An Agenda for Action Paris: OECD

Pijls, F. (2003) Rabobank International: Food &

Agribusiness Research. Keynote lecture:

Building knowledge by close cooperation “Food

for Thought” In: Kick-off meeting ERA-NET

PERIAPT, The Hague, 5 December, The

Netherlands. http://www.periapt.net

Smith, M., (2002) Food safety in Europe (FOSIE):

Risk assessment of chemicals in food and diet:

overall introduction. Food and Chemical

Toxicology 40: pp.141-144

Van Wagenberg, C.P.A., M.J.B. Mengelers, A.J.

Smelt, M. Breet (2003) Methode voor pro-

actieve signalering van gevaren voor de

voedselveiligheid. Rapport 8.03.03. LEI, DEN

HAAG. (Dutch language only)

WHO (1999) Principles for the Assessment of

Risks to Human Health from Exposure to

Chemicals. IPCS Environmental Health Criteria

210, WHO, Geneva.

WHO (2001), Macroeconomics and Health:

Investing in Health for Economic Development.

Geneva: WHO.

WHO (2004). The international Food Safety

Authorities Network (INFOSAN).

http://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs_management/i

nfosan/en/infosan_0904.pdf

WHO (2003), Prevention and Control of Influenza

Pandemics and Annual Epidemics. Geneva:

WHO.

49

AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process

AI Avian Influenza

BVL Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety

BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

CIDC Central Institute for Animal Disease Control - Lelystad

CSO Central Statisitics Office

DG SANCO Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General of the EC

DG RESEARCH Research Directorate-General of the EC

DAP-ELIKA Agrofishery and Food Research Directorate, Basque Government

DON Deoxynivalenol (vomitoxin)

EC European Commission

EU European Union

EEA European Environment Agency

EFSA European Food Safety Authority

ERA European Research Area

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FAVV/AFSCA/FASFC Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FSA Food Standards Agency

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

GMO Genetically Modified Organism

GFL General Food Law

GMP Good Manufacturing Practices

ISS National Institute of Health

IZZ National Food and Nutrition Institute

JIFSAN Joint Institute of Food Safety and Applied Nutrition

(FDA & University of Maryland)

MSs Member States

NFAs National Food Authoritiwes/Agencies

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction

50

Abbreviations

PPO Applied Research Station for Arable Crops

PRI Plant Research International

RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed

RIKILT RIKILT Institute for Food Safety

RIVM National Institute for Public Health and the Environment

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SSA Specific Support Action

TFA Trans Fatty Acids

TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy disease

TNO Voeding

TNO Nutrition and Food Research

USDA US Department of Agriculture

VWA Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority

WHO World Health Organization

WUR Wageningen University Research

51

Dr. Marion Koopmans of the Department of

Virology of the National Institute for Public

Heaklth and the Environment (RIVM) has several

years of experience on virological and

epidemiological research of enteric viruses in

humans and animals. The group has developed

molecular diagnostic and typing assays for

different viruses (Norovirus, enterovirus,

poliovirus), and used these in epidemiological

studies to better understand their role as

causes of illness in humans. In addition, they

perform (molecular) virological surveillance of

water quality, serves as WHO reference centre

for polio-eradication, and assist regional public

health laboratories and food inspection services

in outbreak investigations

Dr. Olivier Mignot started with Nestlé in 1986,

right after getting a degree in Biology from the

University of Lausanne (Switzerland) with

specialisation in microbiology and molecular

biology. He was occupied in different areas

within Nestlé’s R&D as microbiologist,

laboratory manager, quality manager, and head

of scientific support. During a period of 8 years

in France he divided his attention to operation

and R&D and came back to Switzerland in 2001,

as manager in the Corporate R&D Management

Unit, more specifically in charge of deployment

of consumer preference testing programme.

Since June 2003 he is in charge of the Quality &

Safety Department at the Nestlé Research

Center in Lausanne. He has been active in

International and European Standardisation

bodies (ISO/CEN) and is currently a member of

the ILSI Emerging Pathogens Task Force, as well

as the Nestlé Representative to the European

Chair in Food Safety Microbiology at

Wageningen.

Prof. Dr. Dr. H.c. mult. Reinhard Selten is a

German mathematician and economist who

studied mathematics at the Johann-Wolfgang-

Goethe-University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

He received his Master’s degree in 1957, and his

PhD in 1961. His master’s thesis and later his

PhD thesis had the aim of axiomatizing a value

for e-person games in extensive form. This work

made him familiar with the extensive form, in a

time when very little work on extensive games

was done. For his advances in Game Theory

(pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of

non-cooperative games) Reinhard Selten won in

1994 The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic

Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Nobel

Memorial Prize in Economics), together with

John Harsanyi and John Nash. He is also well

known for his work in bounded rationality, and

can be considered as one of the founding

fathers of experimental economics. He was

professor at the School of Business

Administration, University of California at

Berkeley, USA (1967-1968); at the Department of

Economics of the Free University of Berlin,

Germany (1969-1972); at the Institute for

Mathematical Economics of the University of

Bielefeld, Germany (1972-1984). Nowadays

52

Keynotes speakers biographies

Reinhard Selten is professor emeritus at the

University of Bonn, Germany, where he was

appointed as professor at the Department of

Economics in 1984. He holds several honorary

doctoral degrees. He is (co-)author of numerous

books (more than 50) and articles. His main

areas of interest are Game Theory and its

applications as well as Experimental Economics

and the Theory of Bounded Rationality.

Dr. Maurice Smith (PhD, DipRCPath) is a British

citizen and holds a PhD in Medicinal Chemistry

from the University of London. He got his degree

in Applied Biology from the University of

Hertfordshire. His previous professional

experience includes an occupation at the

Institute of Cancer Research, Royal Marsden

Hospital, London (1978); the Toxicology

Laboratory, Rayne Institute, University College,

London (1980); Department of Health, London

(until 1982); Unilever Research, Safety and

Environmental Assurance Centre, - UK/NL. He

joined the Unilever Health Institute in

Vlaardingen (NL) in 2000 to become what he is

today, Scientific and Regulatory Affairs

Manager. His professional interest focusses on

Nutrition and Toxicology, Regulatory support to

Novel/ Functional Foods and health claims for

foods.

Dr. Barrie Stevens is Deputy Director of the

Advisory Unit to the Secretary-General of the

OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development. He is a British

citizen, and holds a PhD in economics and social

policy from Hamburg University, Germany,

following studies in business and languages in

Manchester, UK. Previous professional

experience includes university teaching

(economics, social policy), project management

in market research (industrial and consumer

research) and marketing consultancy. He joined

the OECD in 1982 and worked on a variety of

socio-economic issues, including structural

adjustment, trade protection and education and

training. He has been involved in future studies

since the creation in 1990 of the OECD

International Futures Programme, which is

located in the Advisory Unit. The Programme,

which is concerned with the identification and

evaluation of newly emerging economic and

social issues, aims to promote strategic thinking,

test new ideas, and stimulate dialogue between

government, business and research on long-term

issues.

He is author or co-author of some 40 books and

articles on themes ranging from societal change,

globalisation and new technologies, to trade,

health, energy and transport. Most recently he

was co-author of a major OECD report on

“Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century”

(published in 2003), and is currently preparing an

OECD report on “The Security Economy”

scheduled for publication in the summer of 2004.

53

Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (VWA)

Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority

(Dr. H.P.J.M. Noteborn [contact]; Dr. M.J.B.

Mengelers; Drs. D. Dernison; B.W. Ooms DVM)

Prinses Beatrixlaan 2

P.O. Box 19506

2500 CM The Hague

The Netherlands

Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und

Lebensmittelsicherheit (BVL)

Federal Office of Consumer Protection and

Food Safety

(Dr. H. Waldner [contact]; Dr. H. Franzen; Dr. M.

Jud; J. Glasner; R. Nachtigal)

Rochusstrasse 65

D-53123 Bonn

Germany

Istituto Superiore di Sanita (ISS)

National Institute of Health, Centre for Food

Quality and Risk Assessment

(Dr. M. Miraglia [contact]; Dr. C. Brera; Dr P.

Aureli)

Viale Regina Elena 299

00161 Rome

Italy

Instytut Zywnosci I Zywienia (IZZ)

National Food and Nutrition Institute,

Department of the Hygiene of Food and Nutrition

(Dr. L. Szponar [contact])

Powsinska Street 61-63

02-903 Warsaw

Poland

Federaal Agentschap voor de Veiligheid van de

Voedselketen (FAVV)

l’Agence Fédérale pour la Sécurité de la Chaine

Alimentaire (AFSCA)

Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain

(FASFC)

(Prof. Emeritus Dr. Ir. A. Huyghebaert [contact];

Dr. L. Mohimont)

WTC III,

Simon Bolivarlaan, 30

21rst floor

B-1000 Brussels

Belgium

Dirección de Investigación Agropesquera y

Alimentaria del Departamento de Agricultura y

Pesca del Gobierno Vasco, Agrofisheries and

Food Research Directorate, Basque Government

(DAP-ELIKA)

Basque Foundation for Agro-food Safety

(M. de Prado [contact]; Mr. M. Ascacibar)

Granja Modelo Arkaute, s/n

01192 Arkaute (Alava)

Basque Country Region

Spain

54

Periapt members

Declan Bolton Food Safety Department IR

Erno Bouma Plant Protection Service NL

Marijn Colijn Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) NL

Jacek Czarnecki Polish Federation of Food Industry PL

Ola Eide Nordisk Innovation Center (NICe) N

Aintzane Esturo Azti, food and fish technolgical research institute ES

Christian Grugel Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety D

Lieve Herman Ministry of the Flemish Community Agricultural Research Centre B

Geert Houben TNO Nutrition and Food Research NL

Patric Huselstein Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture D

Ramón Juste NEIKER, Agricultural R&D Institute ES

Beate Kettlitz Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) D

Andreas Kliemant Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety D

Marion Koopmans National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) NL

Otto Kühn SAP AG Community Deutschland D

Iñaki Larrabeiti Eroski, food consumer distribution group ES

David Lineback JIFSAN, University of Maryland US

Djien Liem European Food Safety Authority NL

Hans Marvin RIKILT- Institute of Food Safety NL

Olivier Mignot Nestlé Research Centre CH

Thomas Peh SAP AG Community Deutschland D

Rebecca Phillipson Food Standards Agency (FSA) UK

Udo Pollmer European Institute for Food and Nutrition Research (EU.L.E) D

Luc Pussemier FPS Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment-

Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Center B

Stewart Reynolds Central Science Laboratory (CSL) UK

Gerhard Schieffer University of Bonn D

Reinhard Selten University of Bonn D

Maurice Smith Unilever Research Laboratory Vlaardingen UK

Martien Spanjer Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) NL

Barrie Stevens Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development UK

Carmelita Stoffels DG Research F

55

Stakeholders panel

Francesca Tencalla Monsanto CH

Rob Theelen Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality NL

Anneke Toorop Ministry of Public Health, Welfare & Sports NL

Londa VanderWal Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) US

Annet Velthuis Wageningen University & Research Center NL

Frans Verstraeten DG SANCO B

Christine Vinkx FSP Health Food Chain and Environment B

Huib de Vriend Dutch Foundation Consumer & Biotechnology NL

Boleslaw Wojton National Veterinary Research Institute PL

Alisdair Wotherspoon Food Standards Agency (FSA) UK

56

© VWA, 2005

Emerging Risks Identificationin Food and Feedfor Human Health

An Approach