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Radical Neglect?The War on Terror and Latin America

R.Guy Emerson

ABSTRACT

The rise of leftist governments in the Americas and the adoptionof policy initiatives contrary to U.S. interests highlight a disconnectin interamerican relations, which cannot be understood simply asU.S. neglect of Latin America. In contrast to arguments that

attribute the deteriorating relations to U.S. preoccupation with theMiddle East, the article examines whether the War on Terroracted as a guiding paradigm for the George W. Bush administra-tion in Latin America. Opposition to this War on Terror paradigmwas evident following Colombias 2008 air strike in Ecuador. Jus-tified as a preemptive strike against a terrorist threat, Colombiasaction met regional condemnation. The article argues that thisColombia-Latin America division reflects a larger geostrategic dis-connect, whereby the War on Terror is challenged, causing theincreasing marginalization of Washington and resistance to U.S.policy.

The Latin American turn to the left is well documented. The supposedpink tide saw the Brazilian Workers Party leader, Luiz Incio Lulada Silva, succeed Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his market-orientedreforms. Similarly, the policies of Argentinas neoliberal architect, CarlosMenem, have given way to the unilateral repudiation of Argentine exter-nal debt, in defiance of international financial institutions. Mass protestsin Bolivia toppled President Gonzalo Snchez de Lozadas government

in 2003 and eventually led to a landslide victory for the antineoliberalEvo Morales in 2006 (Potter 2007). In his 2006 address to the UN Gen-eral Assembly, moreover, the president of the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela, Hugo Chvez, delivered one of the most overtly hostileattacks against a U.S. president, likening George W. Bush to the Devil.

Add to this the electoral success of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, MichelleBachelet in Chile, Tabar Vzquez in Uruguay, Rafael Correa in Ecuador,Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, and theperceived tilt to the left during the Bush presidency was manifest. Such

movement led Sheila Collins to note that Americas backyard could nolonger be considered safe to play in (2005). While Latin Americas political shift to the left reflects broader

movement within interamerican relations, this article centers on thegeostrategic nature and diplomatic consequences of the shift. An

2010 University of Miami

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understanding of these movements, however, is not possible throughanalysis that focuses on events in Washington. In making this argu-ment, the article has two aims. The first is to dispel assumptions thatchange in the Americas is explained by U.S. preoccupation with theMiddle East and the consequent neglect of Latin America. On the con-trary, the following analysis will suggest that the War on Terror actedas a guiding paradigm for a U.S. policy that extended beyond the con-fines of Iraq and Afghanistan to include the Western Hemisphere.Second, the article argues that in spite of an approach to the hemi-sphere shaped by the War on Terror, events originating in Latin Amer-ica are as important as those in Washington in explaining the discon-nect in the Western Hemisphere.

The article begins by illustrating the theoretical shortcomings ofneorealism and dependency theory and the limitations they place oninteramerican analysis. In so doing, it attempts to go beyond the deter-minism of regional power asymmetries by moving the analysis towardan understanding of interamerican relations that acknowledges theagency of Latin American state actors. It examines the practical conse-quences of U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Bush adminis-tration, and more specifically the regional effects of the War on Terror,challenging arguments about the significance of U.S. withdrawal fromthe region after September 11, 2001. The question it then explores is, ifthe U.S. policy concentration on the Middle East cannot explain theregional disconnect, what can? Focusing on the geostrategic quality ofthis disconnect, the study finds that the regional disconnect stems fromLatin American opposition to the expansion of the War on Terror tothe Western Hemisphere. It uses Colombias military intervention intoEcuadorian territory in 2008, which killed a guerrilla leader and pro-

voked opposition from other Latin American countries, as a reference toargue that a combination of factors in both Latin America and the UnitedStates offers a more nuanced understanding of the changing nature ofinteramerican relations.

THEORETICALLIMITATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCEOF RECOGNIZINGLATINAMERICANACTORS

The assumption that the United States is the principal agent of changein Latin America is reflected in the wider theoretical scholarship oninteramerican relations. The two predominant theoretical schools on the

Americas, neorealism and dependency theory, underplay the capacity ofLatin American states to act independently of Washington. As will beshown, this is largely a result of the emphasis placed by both theorieson structural factors as the primary determinants of state interaction. Thepractical consequence of this determinism is to entrench Latin American

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subordination, whereby U.S. economic and strategic military supremacyalone shape the policy options and preferences of Latin American states.

Determinism is evident in the two central tenets of neorealism,anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. Anarchy underpins the inter-national system for neorealists. Central to the anarchic system is theassumption of no functional differentiation between states, which, forKenneth Waltz, means that all states perform the same functions in orderto constitute themselves as political units (Waltz 1979). In making thisargument, Waltz is not concerned with the capacity of states to performthese functions, but with the condition that, at a systems level, all statesface the same tasks to perform (Waltz 1979; Buzan 1998).

When forced to move beyond this politicolegal idea of the state andexamine the distribution of capabilities, however, Waltz differentiatesbetween dominant and secondary states. In addition to giving the inter-national system an appearance of order, this differentiation offers aninsight into interamerican relations. Waltz argues that the internationalsystem is ordered by secondary states automatically acting or balanc-ing against the hegemony of dominant states (Waltz 1993, 1979). Apply-ing Waltzs balancing proposition to interamerican relations, Latin Amer-ican opposition to Washington is consequently involuntary.

Dependency theory directly challenges this assumption. While Waltzs no functional differentiation between states is implicitly con-tested through dependistas hierarchical core-periphery dichotomy,dependency theory views the balancing proposition as contrary to Latin

American history. The premise of balancing ignores that peripheralelites often perceive dependency on the core as consistent with theirinterests (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Bandwagoning behavior seesperipheral state actors maintain rather than balance against the statusquo, as economically it may be in their interest to preserve dependentrelations (Schweller 1994).1

Acknowledging bandwagoning behavior by peripheral states andthe difficulty of balancing against the United States is important for tworeasons. First, it highlights that any resistance to U.S. policy prescriptionsis not automatic, but involves Latin American state agency. Second, at atheoretical level, bandwagoning behavior and the push to act in accor-dance with U.S. interests contrast with Waltzs balancing proposition.Rather than automatically balancing against a hegemon, an uneven dis-tribution of capabilities highlights the difficulty Latin American statesface in acting independently of Washington.

This point is emphasized by Arthur Stein, who argues that the dis-tribution of capabilities between states not only determines the contextof interaction, but also influences the preferences of interacting states(Stein 1982). Far from automatic balancing, asymmetrical capabilitiesprobably result in interaction that is more favorable to the hegemon.

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Applying Steins arguments to the Americas, U.S. preferences not onlystructure the choices available to Latin American actors, but also condi-tion their policy preferences. Therefore, while opposition to U.S. policyprescriptions is possible, the likelihood of opposition is minimized bythe preponderance of U.S. capabilities in interamerican relations.

The premise of power determining outcomes is not confined toneorealism. Regardless of how neorealism and dependency theory con-sider power, be it strategic-military for neorealists or economic fordependistas, each establishes a global hierarchy that determines subal-tern subordination.2 While neorealism views outcomes as highlydependent on the distribution of capabilities among states, dependencytheory argues that peripheral integration into the global system perpet-uates their underdevelopment. Not only is peripheral state developmentconditioned by the structure of the world capitalist system, but periph-eral actors must also follow the systems imperatives in order to sustainthemselves. This adherence to the system ensures state conformity tothe hierarchy of core and periphery, consequently leaving the core des-tined to rule while the periphery is destined to be ruled (Wendt 1987).

The international structures for both neorealism and dependencytheory determine the role of the state. Whether it is established througha distribution of capabilities or the capitalist world economy, the structureconstrains the foreign policy options available to subaltern states (Wendt1987).3 The practical limitation of the emphasis on structural factors is thatboth dependency theory and neorealism have difficulty acknowledgingchange originating from Latin American actors. This stems from the fail-ure to consider how the state as an agent can shape the internationalsystem (Hobson 2000). With the emphasis of both theories placed soheavily on structural factors, the state can no longer modify the interna-tional structure or its position in it (Hobson 2000, 2001).

To recognize change that originates in Latin America, it is necessaryto place greater focus on the agent rather than the structure. For JohnHobson, this is possible through a study of autonomy that recognizesstate agency in spite of structural constraints (Hobson 2000). This viewcontrasts with realist interpretations of autonomy, which argue that noexternal actor can enjoy authority within state borders, or dependencyinterpretations that stress autarchy (Krasner 1996; Amin 1990). Reorien-tating the focus of autonomy toward a recognition of state agency offersa new lens through which to view interamerican relations. First andforemost, it moves analysis beyond a determinism that underplays Latin

American capacity to pursue its own interests independently of U.S.strategic objectives. The deficiencies of narrowly viewing change in the

Americas as a product of events in Washington can be highlightedthrough the false assumption that the current disconnect in the Ameri-cas is a product of U.S. neglect.


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A Priori Shortcomings

At first glance, the argument that the War on Terror explains the diplo-matic disconnect appears persuasive. Viewed through a geostrategic

lens, U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to claims ofhegemonic overreach, enables Latin America to challenge its subordina-tion in interamerican relations. U.S. preoccupation beyond the hemi-sphere not only appears to offer Latin America the flexibility to generatepolicy options according to its own interests, but also reduces the fear ofpossible retribution should those interests contradict U.S. objectives.

These interpretations of change are based on an understanding ofautonomy as noninterference; that is, an understanding of interameri-can relations that emphasizes the importance of favorable geopolitical

factors largely beyond Latin Americas control. The hemispheric discon-nect has occurred due to U.S. withdrawal from the region and notthrough action in Latin America itself. The logical extension of this viewis that the ability of Latin American states to act independently expandsand contracts irrespective of their action. A change in hemispheric rela-tions, it is argued, depends on the United States and its strategic inter-est at any given time.

The principal weakness of defining change according to a conjunc-ture of external factors is that it fails to recognize Latin American states

and their capacity to influence external factors. To overcome this weak-ness, it is necessary to move beyond a restrictive view of autonomy asnoninterference to the aforementioned view that is mindful of Latin

American agency. While analysis needs to recognize U.S. interests, theseinterests are not absolute and should not overshadow events in Latin

America. A multidimensional approach acknowledging both U.S. andLatin American interests better explains the present state of interameri-can relations.

THE BUSHADMINISTRATION: FROM ENGAGEMENTTO RADICALNEGLECT

In contrast to assumptions of neglect, the Bush administration initiallysought to foster closer relations with Latin America. Breaking the tradi-tion of making Canada the destination of the first presidential visit,George W. Bushs first official travel in 2001 was to the ranch of Mexi-can president Vicente Fox. More than a symbolic gesture, this illustrated

President Bushs intent to engage the region by broaching the con-tentious issue of legalizing Mexican immigrants (Angrisani 2005). Fol-lowing these events, the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001 rein-forced perceptions of a new era in interamerican relations. Heralded asunprecedented, the surprising level of amity with which delegates set


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2005 as the deadline for hemispheric trade talks concerning the FreeTrade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was surpassed only by the fact thatagreement was reached at all. This consensus, however, was not to last.

The September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and thePentagon shifted Latin America from an issue of presidential concern tothe domain of lower-level officials. Although the War on Terrorreduced high-level political engagement with the region, it is a mistaketo suggest that Washington withdrew. Indeed, it is important to dis-tinguish between priority and importance. Just because other regionsoccupied the center of Washingtons attention, this did not render Latin

America insignificant (Russell 2006). A closer examination of post-2001U.S. policy reveals a clarity of purpose that belies the withdrawal thesis.

The War on Terror as Guiding Paradigm for the Americas

With the impending fall of the Soviet Union, Thomas Carothers wrotethat the collapse of the Iron Curtain would render obsolete the para-digm Washington had used to define Latin America. The result,Carothers argued, would be a policy approach that improvised and

would become increasingly incoherent (1990, 14). Writing 11 yearslater, Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach argued that the collapse of this

paradigm gave Latin America greater policy flexibility than it experi-enced during the Cold War (Tulchin and Espach 2001). In practicalterms, Heraldo Muoz has argued that this flexibility was a product ofbenign neglect under the Clinton administration, and Peter Hakim hasstated that after 9/11 Washington effectively lost interest in Latin Amer-ica (Muoz 2001; Hakim 2006, 39). Although a postCold War analysisof U.S. policy toward Latin America does not concern this article, therelevant question is whether the War on Terror replaced the Cold Waras the guiding paradigm for U.S. policy toward Latin America during the

George W. Bush administration.While senior officials in the administration focused on the MiddleEast, lower-level appointees sought to recast regional policy as comple-mentary to the War on Terror (LeoGrande 2007). In the U.S. StateDepartment, policy initiatives increasingly were constructed by OttoReich, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs; his suc-cessor, Roger Noriega; and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.4

The first signs of a radicalization of the State Departments Latin Ameri-can stance became apparent in 2002 with the ultimately unsuccessful

coup dtat against the Chvez government. Declassified CIA documentsshowed that State Department and White House officials were aware ofthe Venezuelan oppositions plans; since then, it has also come to lightthat the United States provided both logistical and financial support indeveloping a post-coup transitional government (Foster 2007).5


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The Guardian newspaper reported that before the 2002 coupattempt, Reich met with the coup plotters at the White House to discusslogistics. One of those present, Pedro Carmona, was later installed as

Venezuelas president for the two days before Chvezs eventual rein-statement (Vulliamy 2002). Equally embarrassing for Washington wasthe initial welcome it gave the coup plotters on the day of the golpe,offering diplomatic recognition amid regional calls to respect democracy(Foster 2007). This support was given even though the Venezuelanopposition acted in violation of the Democratic Charter of the Organi-zation of American States (OAS), to which Washington is a signatory.6

The radicalization of Latin American policy in the State Department,however, was not confined to Venezuela. Since 2001, and particularlyduring President Bushs first term, Washington increasingly sought toinfluence the domestic politics of Latin America by providing diplomaticand material support to actors sympathetic to U.S. interests. U.S. involve-ment extended most commonly, though not exclusively, to the threat ofeconomic sanctions (LeoGrande 2007). Coercion involved threats to haltremittances to El Salvador during its 2004 elections and Nicaragua in2002, in addition to claims that bilateral assistance to Nicaragua andBolivia would end if the respective electorates did not vote according toU.S. interests in their respective 2002 elections (Domnguez 2007).7

It should be noted, however, that during the Bush administrationssecond term, there appeared to be a softening in the State Departmentthat coincided with the replacement of Roger Noriega by Thomas Shan-non as assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs. Aftertaking charge in 2005, Shannon called 2007 a year of engagement,saying that both he and the United States were willing to work withanybody who wants to work with us (cited by Birns and Kellberg2007). Although these comments contrast with the comparison made byformer U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld between PresidentChvez and Hitler, Shannons approach to the region appeared incon-sistent (Associated Press 2006). During Nicaraguas 2007 election cam-paign, Shannon met with the two conservative candidates but not withthe eventually victorious Sandinista, Daniel Ortega. Shortly thereafter,the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Paul Trivelli, threatened economicsanctions if Ortega were elected president (LeoGrande 2007). In con-trast, a nonconfrontational approach to Bolivia saw Shannon and La Pazspeak of common interests and open doors (cited by Birns and Kell-berg 2007).

Although improvement may have been evident, trends towardwarmer interaction ran concurrently with actions that undermined closerrelations. In September 2008, Bolivian president Evo Morales expelledU.S. ambassador Philip Goldberg amid assertions that Washington waspromoting separatist elements in that country. President Morales


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claimed that the U.S. ambassador was conspiring against democracyby supporting opposition groups that sought greater autonomy andincreased control over natural gas revenues (BBC News 2008). Inresponse, the United States asked Bolivias ambassador to Washingtonto leave, while David Johnson, assistant secretary of the Bureau of Inter-national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the State Department,stepped up hostilities by stating that Bolivia, along with Venezuela, hadfailed demonstrably in the war on drugs. The result was the lifting ofthe Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, thereby rescind-ing Bolivias access to U.S. markets at preferential tariffs in return forcooperation on drug matters (Phillips 2008).

The Rise of the Pentagon in Policymaking

While an improvement may have been evident in the State Department,an additional concern was the increased role of the Pentagon in con-structing U.S. policy. Part of a decadelong shift, proposals for hemi-spheric security have increasingly come from the Pentagon and not theState Department (Diamint 2004; Ciponline 2004). This has increased theimportance of the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) in constructinghemispheric policy, as the body responsible for Latin America and the

Caribbean (except Mexico) at the Pentagon.The increased profile of the Defense Department has coincidedwith a wider transfer of resources away from the State Department withrespect to the Western Hemisphere. It is estimated that Southcom hasmore people working on Latin America, about 1,100, than most keycivilian federal agencies combined, including the Departments of State,

Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury, and the Office of the Secretary ofDefense (Ciponline 2004). In its recent strategy statement, CommandStrategy 2018, Southcom announced its intention to expand its scope

by acting as the regional coordinating body for both military and non-military operations (Southcom 2008).The Pentagons greater role is another element of the qualitative

change in U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere. The immediateresult of an enhanced military standpoint has been that policymakerselsewhere in the U.S. government have begun to approach Latin Amer-ica from a disproportionately security threatbased position (Ciponline2004). This shift has occurred in the Pentagon itself: the Bureau for

Western Hemisphere Affairs initially was transferred from the Bureau for

International Security Affairs into a bureau with the disquieting name ofSpecial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and then later movedinto Homeland Defense and Americas Security (Isacson 2001).8

Although the Defense Departments higher profile was evidentduring the Clinton administration, viewing Latin America through the


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lens of the War on Terror accelerated this trend. Traditionally, U.S.

training of foreign military troops has been funded and administered bythe State Department, due to its foreign policy implications. The StateDepartments training programs were governed by the Foreign Assis-tance Act of 1961, which is scrutinized by the U.S. Congress and pro-hibits assistance to military units known to violate human rights (Just the

Facts2007).9 In contrast, Defense Departmentfunded programs provideless scrutiny from a human rights perspective (Ciponline 2004). Sincethe shift to the Pentagon, two-thirds of U.S. military training for Latin

America is now paid for directly through the Department of Defense, a

change partly explained in that congressional support is more easilygained for defense spending than for foreign aid (Ciponline 2004; Justthe Facts2007). The movement of Latin American policymaking towardthe Pentagon coincided with a broader increase in total U.S. militaryspending in Latin America.

After a brief drop in 2001, U.S. military spending in Latin Americahas increased significantly (figure 1). Beginning in the period20052007, 5 countries in the region were among the top 20 globalrecipients of U.S. military assistance (Just the Facts2007).10 In addition,

between 2001 and 2005, 85,820 Latin American soldiers were trained inthe United States. This compares with the 61,000 soldiers and policetrained by the infamous School of the Americas between 1946 and 2000(Tokatlian 2008). The justification for the increase in spending was madethrough reference to the War on Terror. Southcom Commander Gen-


Figure 1. Total U.S. Military and Police Aid to Latin America(millions of US$)

Source:Just the Facts2009

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eral James Hill declared, as with every other combatant commander,the war on terrorism is my number one priority (cited by Ciponline2004, 3). Additionally, in his 2004 Posture Statement, General Hillasserted that terrorists throughout the Southern Command area ofresponsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, laun-der money, and smuggle humans (cited by Ciponline 2004, 3). Thesestatements have had direct policy implications.

Dubbed effective sovereignty, the policy promoted by the Penta-gon contends that U.S. national security is threatened by Latin Americangovernments failure to exercise control over the vast ungovernedspaces within their borders. As General Hill explained in March 2003,todays foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms trafficker, thedocument forger. . . . This threat is a weed that is planted, grown andnurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines,rivers and unpopulated border areas (Hill 2003). This policy position

was reinforced by thensecretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld. Terror-ists and transnational criminals, he remarked, often find shelter inborder regions or areas beyond the effective reach of government. They

watch, they probe, looking for areas of vulnerability, for weaknesses,and for seams in our collective security arrangements that they can tryto exploit (cited by Isacson 2005). These statements paint Latin Amer-ica as a soft underbelly for the terrorist group Al-Qaeda to mountattacks on the continental United States (Steinitz 2003).

Viewed from a historical perspective, the policy of effective sover-eignty is the latest version of the internal enemy threat circulatedduring the Cold War. Part of the U.S. national security doctrine tocombat local communism in Latin America, defense against the internalenemy had two intertwined components: military training and the teach-ing of the national security doctrine (Wright 2007). In addition to aquantitative increase in operational training, the teaching of the nationalsecurity doctrine qualitatively reoriented military training by situatingthe internal enemy as the chief threat to national security.

This new method of training had dangerous repercussions. Militarydictatorships in the region appropriated the language of the internalenemy and expanded it to include unions, opposition party leaders,human rights defenders, journalists, authors, and leftist intellectuals, andto justify the censure of democratic institutions (Tokatlian 2008; Isacson2005).

While this threat is less apparent today, the policy of effective sov-ereignty sets a dangerous precedent in Latin America. At its most fun-damental, effective sovereignty establishes the ideological and physi-cal tools necessary for regional militaries to undermine civilianauthorities (Lobe 2004; Isacson 2005). Central to this danger is the riskof politicizing the armed forces by widening their responsibility to fight-


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ing crime or other roles that civilians can perform. The monopoly themilitary develops on the use of force (or the threat of force) means that

when it disagrees with the civilian consensus there is a heightened pos-sibility of violence (Ciponline 2004). This line has further blurred asSouthcom, traditionally a trainer of defense personnel, has envisaged agreater role for itself in the training of regional police forces (Ciponline2008).11 The application of the War on Terror paradigm through effec-tive sovereignty strengthens the military, security, and intelligenceforces that have historically posed a danger to democracy while also

weakening civilian and democratic institutions (Diamint 2004).Far from acting as a new paradigm, however, the invocation of

effective sovereignty and the repoliticization of the internal enemyreflect a continuity of logic between the War on Terror and previousCold War approaches. Just as the internal enemy historically provideda justification for continued U.S. involvement in military and politicalbodies throughout Latin America, so does effective sovereignty today.This continuity is illustrated in reference to the War on Drugs and PlanColombia, in which the purported new security discourse associated

with the War on Terror appears to be based firmly in an old threatanalysis.

Dangers in Practice: Plan Patriota

The application of the War on Terror to the Western Hemisphere hascaused the Southern Command to have to defend its resources and rel-evance in the Pentagon. It did this first by changing narcotraffickers tonarcoterrorists in sections 1004 and 1035 of the 2002 Defense Autho-rization Law, originally used to fight drugs in Colombia (Just the Facts2007). The Southcom Command Strategy 2018 notes that narcoterror-ists derive their funding and power from the sale of illicit drugs and

have evolved into groups in Colombia including [the guerrilla organiza-tion] FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] (Southcom 2008,9). While this shift may appear merely semantic, the change enabled adoubling of military training in Colombia, with funds originally designedfor counternarcotics programs diverted to support counterinsurgencymissions (Ciponline 2004).

Although Plan Colombia was established under the Clinton admin-istration, the policy has increasingly become defined as a key elementof the War on Terror. Colombia is currently the largest recipient of U.S.

military assistance in Latin America, and from 1997 to 2007 received $2out of every $3 of U.S. military aid spent in the region (Just the Facts2007). In 2006 alone, U.S. assistance to Colombia amounted to $741.68million, approximately 80 percent of which was military and police aid(figure 2). The justification for this spending has centered on the


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antidrug campaign Plan Colombia and more recently on the launch ofPlan Patriota.

Changes in the 2002 U.S. Defense Authorization Law laid the foun-dations for the 2003 launch of the military offensive Plan Patriota inColombias ungoverned spaces. A primary example of the dangers of

both the policy of effective sovereignty and the increased militariza-tion of the U.S. approach, Plan Patriota required significant logisticalsupport and intelligence from Washington to enable Bogot to retaketerritory from the FARC guerrillas (Isacson 2005). Similar to the expan-sion of the War on Terror to the Americas, Plan Patriota simplified acomplex conflict into an armed confrontation, whereby farmers and thepopulation at large were met with military force rather than engagedthrough other politicosocial means (Diamint 2004). With policyinformed primarily by a military focus, concerns about human rights and

broader policy considerations were sidelined. While the War on Terror underscored the militarization of U.S.

policy, it also framed Washingtons approach to other parts of the region.The most explicit example of War on Terror thinking involved the tri-border region encompassing Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. U.S. offi-


Figure 2. U.S. Aid to Latin America, 2006 (millions of US$)

Source:Just the Facts2007, 2627

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cials have claimed that several Middle Eastern terrorist groups have oper-ated in this region for more than a decade. Francis X. Taylor, then coor-dinator for counterterrorism at the State Department, declared onDecember 19, 2001 that it is no secret that you have, living in this area,more than 15,000 persons from the Middle East. Islamic extremist organ-izations such as Hizballah, Hamas, al Gamaat al Islamiyya, and others areusing this vibrant area as a base from which to support terrorism (Taylor2001).12 His successor, Cofer Black, later echoed these sentiments, claim-ing that the region was a hotbed of terrorist activity (Goldberg 2002).

Added to this interpretation was a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administrationreport stating that Hizballah was using the ungoverned space to laun-der money (Levitt 2002). Facing this threat, in 2005 Washington estab-lished closer military ties with the Paraguayan government that saw aseries of U.S. Special Forces exercises and a contingent of four hundredU.S. troops stationed at the international airstrip of Mariscal Estigarribianear the politically sensitive triborder region (Prevost 2007).13

Despite increases in military expenditures, however, limits to theexpansion of Washingtons regional presence were also becomingapparent.14 Although the extra U.S. funding was welcomed, a perma-nent or even temporary military presence often met opposition. This sit-uation increasingly concerned Washington, as the loss of its coopera-tive security location in Ecuador in 2009, for example, would have leftthe United States without a permanent military base on the South Amer-ican mainland. While rumors circulated that Peru could host the relo-cated base, on May 6, 2009 the Pentagon budget submitted to Congressrequested the funding to develop a new $46 million military base inPalanquero, Colombia. In a proposed ten-year agreement, furthermore,the United States is set to use seven Colombian military bases to con-duct counternarcotic and counterterrorist activities in the region. In spiteof developments in Colombia, however, U.S. attempts to step up mili-tary relations in other parts of the region appear to be floundering.Facing this opposition, Washingtons strategic approach has becomeincreasingly unilateral. The reactivation of the Fourth Fleet underlinedthis shift.

Created during World War II to combat German submarines, theU.S. Fourth Fleet was originally disbanded in 1950. In July 2008, how-ever, it was relaunched and assigned to U.S. naval forces under theSouthern Command. Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. chief of navaloperations, stated that reestablishing the Fourth Fleet recognizes theimmense importance of maritime security in the southern part of the

Western Hemisphere, and signals our support and interest in the civiland military maritime services in Central and South America (U.S.Department of Defense 2008). In this capacity, the Fourth Fleet is tasked

with combating terrorism, keeping sea lanes free and open, countering


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illicit trafficking, and providing humanitarian assistance (Kozloff 2008).Because Washington can point to no imminent military threat in theregion, however, the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet has a symbolic sig-nificance, indicating a potential return in Washington to gunboat diplo-macy (Ross 2008).15 Comments made by Admiral Roughead that theFourth Fleet sends a strong signal to navies in the region do not augur

well for cooperative interamerican relations (Ross 2008). The FourthFleet also raises the specter, however unlikely, of deteriorating relationsand possible conflict.

All of these developments made the War on Terror a significantpart of the Bush administrations policy approach to Latin America. Tosuggest that the War on Terror was an all-encompassing guiding par-adigm for the Bush administration, however, is an exaggeration. Thepersistence of previous threats associated with the policy of effectivesovereignty reflects continuity with the past rather than a completebreak. It should be noted also that trends toward greater militarizationpreceded the Bush presidency. Moreover, while a radicalization in U.S.policy was apparent, so too were steps to improve relations, as was evi-dent with the appointment of Thomas Shannon.

From this perspective, the sending of mixed signals illustrates alevel of policy incoherence that undermines arguments of a new guid-ing paradigm in U.S. policy. This is not to argue that uncertainty is notdangerous. Interamerican relations under the Bush administration sawthe specter of greater, and potentially violent, conflict. Irrespective of

whether the War on Terror acted as a guiding paradigm, these trendsundermine the assumption that the present disconnect in the Americasis a product of U.S. withdrawal. The notion of U.S. neglect contradictsevidence of a radicalization of its policy toward Latin America. This shiftpoints more to a qualitative change than to a quantitative change in rela-tions, a distinction that the withdrawal thesis potentially overlooks.

COLOMBIA AND THEAPPROPRIATION OF THEWAR ONTERROR

In view of the difficulty of explaining the geostrategic nature of the dis-connect through U.S. action alone, this study emphasizes Latin Ameri-can action and the rejection of the War on Terror rationale. The analy-sis so far has highlighted this trend. The Ecuadorian governmentsdecision to close the U.S. base at Manta in 2009 and the regionwide calls

for the reinstatement of democracy in Venezuela in 2002 despite U.S.opposition were clear examples of Latin American states disagreeing

with U.S. policy framed in the logic of the War on Terror. This trendcan be further traced by investigating the regional responses to Colom-bias air strikes on Ecuadorian territory.


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At 12:25A.M. on March 1, 2008, eight aircraft of the Colombian airforce launched attacks on Ecuadorian territory, which killed 25 people,including the second-in-command of the FARC, Luis Edgar Devia Silva,known by his nom de guerre, Ral Reyes. Although the attacks weredefended by appropriating the language of the War on Terror, Colom-bian claims of the right to undertake preemptive strikes against a ter-rorist threat met condemnation throughout Latin America. As a result ofthis reaction, Washington became increasingly marginalized in theregion, which made it unable to act as a legitimate powerbroker in thediplomatic crisis that followed Colombias attack.

Ecuadors president, Rafael Correa, immediately denounced theraids as a massacre and an act of aggression that constituted a breachof Ecuadorian air space and sovereignty (Walser 2008). After expellingthe Colombian ambassador, Carlos Holgun, from Quito, PresidentCorrea announced on national television that he would mobilize 3,200Ecuadorian troops along the Colombian border (Fernandes 2008).

For his part, Colombian president Alvaro Uribe initially claimed thatEcuador could not be informed of the attacks because the Colombianmilitary was in hot pursuit of the terrorists (Kraul 2008). However, withcasualties found dead in their underwear, the justification of hot pursuitturned to assertions that Ecuador had not given Colombia sufficient sup-port in its war against terrorism and therefore could not be notified, asUribe explained, for the fear that the operation would fail (cited byFernandes 2008, 2; Forero 2008). Again citing the terrorist threat, Uribeadded that the operation was against one of the most sinister terroristsin the history of humanity (cited by Perfil 2008). Colombias foreignminister, Fernando Araujo Perdomo, went further, justifying the pre-emptive raids as the right of self-defense. The terrorists, among themRal Reyes, have had the habit of murdering in Colombia and invadingthe territory of neighboring countries to find refuge. Therefore,Colombia did not violate the sovereignty, but instead acted under theprinciple of legitimate defense (cited by Nagle 2008, 1).

Using the language of the War on Terror and self-defense distin-guished the March 2008 attacks from previous alleged violations ofEcuadorian sovereignty. Although the policy of preemption originatedbefore the George W. Bush administration, preemptive self-defensebecame apparent U.S. policy when, in a speech at West Point in 2002,President Bush stated, we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt hisplans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge (Bush 2002).16

This stance was later expanded in the 2002 National Security Strategy.

The greater the threat, the greater the threat of inaction, and the morecompelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend our-selves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of theenemys attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver-


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saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. . . . In anage where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the worlds most destructive technologies, the United States cannotremain idle while dangers gather. (U.S. Government 2002, 15)

Following the March 1 attacks, Washington offered immediate sup-port to its closest ally in the region and the justification of self-defense.

John Negroponte, then U.S. deputy secretary of state, declared, webelieve they [Colombia] were acting in a justifiable way, while Secre-tary of State Condoleezza Rice called Colombia a good friend and stated,everybody needs to be vigilant about the use of border areas by ter-rorist organizations like the FARC (cited by Infobae 2008; Walter andMurphy 2008b). Reaffirming this stance on March 4, President Bush

called President Uribe and reaffirmed his full support for democracy inColombia, while on March 18, President Bush said that the UnitedStates strongly supports, strongly stands with Colombia in its fightagainst the terrorists and drug lords (cited by Walser 2008).

This support was not surprising, given that Colombia was essentiallyexercising its control over ungoverned spaces. In addition to rhetori-cal support, Washington also offered military assistance in the Colom-bian attacks. As Colombian officials told reporters, Washington providedspying equipment and intelligence assistance that helped track Reyess

location (Lobe 2008).17U.S. support, however, contrasted starkly to the condemnation

voiced by Latin American states. The reaction among Latin Americanstates to the events of March 1 can be broken into three categories:

vehement opposition, qualified support, and a more pragmatic opposi-tion that sought a diplomatic solution. It is significant that states in thisthird category came to be seen by both Colombia and Ecuador as thelegitimate brokers of peace, rather than Washington. Although this tri-partite categorization had a level of fluidity, the division helps to illus-

trate the increased U.S. isolation that underlines the geostrategic ele-ment of the regional disconnect.

The most fervent opposition to Colombias action came from Cara-cas. In addition to calling President Uribe a coward and a U.S. pawn,President Chvez immediately closed his countrys embassy in Bogotand moved ten battalions of troops to the Colombian border (TrendNews Agency 2008; Acosta 2008). In a similar vein, Nicaraguan presi-dent Daniel Ortega broke diplomatic relations with Bogot, citing thedangers caused by Colombias attacks and its violation of international

law (Walter and Murphy 2008a). This opposition was reinforced byCuba, which blamed the United States for the incident, and by PresidentEvo Morales of Bolivia, who condemned external agents for trying toconvert Latin America into an imperial backwater (Xinhua News Agency


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2008a; Agencia EFE 2008a). This vehement opposition contrasted withmore qualified support for Colombias action.

As opposed to the U.S. endorsement, the more qualified support ofMexico and Peru emphasized the dangers of preemption whileacknowledging the terrorist threat. This stance had Jorge del Castillo,Perus prime minister, essentially repeating the U.S. line, claiming thatthe Colombian attacks prove that the FARC are taking advantage of thehidden jungle zones (cited by Associated Press 2008a). Similarly, Pres-ident Felipe Caldern of Mexico was initially hesitant to condemnColombias attacks before the OAS because Mexico perceived the ter-rorist threat to be real; he stated that Mexico would comply fully with[its] international obligations in terms of combating terrorism, narcotraf-ficking and organized crime in its diverse forms (cited byLa Nacin2008; Lpez 2008).18 However, such comments were always qualified by

what Caldern believed was the need to reject any action that consti-tutes a violation of territorial sovereignty (cited by Reuters 2008). Sim-ilarly, President Alan Garca of Peru affirmed that the region desire[s] ajust and honorable end to this situation, [and] for our dear friend, Pres-ident Uribe, to give due redress and apologies to the Ecuadorian gov-ernment (cited by Xinhua News Agency 2008b). This qualified supportleft Washington as the only state in the hemisphere to fully supportColombias action, in spite of the sovereignty issue.

U.S. marginalization, already apparent, was accentuated by a third,more pragmatic approach to the diplomatic crisis. While they criticizedColombia and its actions, the third category of states emphasized a diplo-matic solution. Chilean president Michelle Bachelet maintained thatEcuador and the region deserved an explanation from the Colombian gov-ernment, but also stated that her country would work to find a diplomaticsolution (cited by Associated Press 2008a). Similarly, Brazil condemned theattacks and called for an explicit apology, while presidential adviser Marco

Aurelio Garca stated that we are going to mobilize all the force of Brazil-ian diplomacy and of other South American capitals . . . to find a solution(cited by Agence France-Presse 2008a). Uruguays foreign minister, GonzaloFernndez, echoed this position, pushing Colombia, Venezuela, andEcuador to urgently establish a dialogue so as to resolve and overcomeexisting differences (cited by Agence France-Presse 2008b). In addition toits outright criticism of President Uribe, Bolivia also strengthened calls fordiplomacy; its foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, made a fervent callfor dialogue (cited by Agence France-Presse 2008c).

By offering a more pragmatic though nonetheless forceful condem-nation of Colombia, these countries became the only actors that Colom-bia, Ecuador, and by extension, Venezuela could trust (Lobe 2008). Thisarrangement relegated the United States to the periphery of WesternHemispheric diplomacy.


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U.S. marginalization was also apparent in the OAS, the chiefregional body in the Americas for issues of security and diplomacy. Withits headquarters in Washington, the organization has become increas-ingly important to the United States, considering that it is one of the fewremaining regional bodies of which the United States remains amember. This point was reinforced by the State Department when itcommented, we believe that the OAS is an appropriate place for thesetwo countries [Colombia and Ecuador] to find a solution (cited by

Agence France-Presse 2008d). On March 4, U.S. hopes materialized asthe OAS convened its Permanent Council, and the following day pro-duced the resolution that reaffirmed the principle that the territory of astate is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of mili-tary occupation or other measures of force taken by another state,directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever (cited by Walser 2008).

After 14 hours of negotiations, Secretary-General Jos MiguelInsulza said the resolution was aimed not to condemn but to indicatethe legal principles of the OAS charter (cited by Garca 2008). Despitethis noncondemnation, the United States was the only state among theorganizations 34 members (besides Colombia itself) to defend Colom-bias actions. The U.S. representative to the OAS, Robert Manzanares,argued that his country completely backs the forces of the Colombiangovernment and President Uribe and again highlighted the need tocombat the threat of terrorism (cited byClarn 2008). While Washing-ton already held an isolated position, this separation became more pro-nounced with calls by President Correa to create an OAS without theUnited States, arguing that a resolution to the crisis would be bestachieved among Latin American leaders themselves rather than throughthe OAS (Agence France-Presse 2008e).

OAS negotiations reached a consensus resolution on March 17,2008. The new resolution rejected the Colombian incursion, statingthat no state or group of states has the right to intervene, either directlyor indirectly, for whatever motive, in the internal or external affairs ofanother, and warned Colombia not to repeat such action under anycircumstance (cited by Marcella 2008, 8; Tokatlian 2008). U.S. opposi-tion, however, was again evident. Washington argued that Ecuador had

violated UN Resolution 1373, which obliges states to define as a crimethe aiding of terrorists, whether through refuge or financial support, andto share information about groups that plan terrorist attacks. Addition-ally, the United States argued that the OAS had not considered OAS Arti-cle 22, and Article 51 of the UN charter, which both concern the rightof legitimate self-defense (Agencia EFE 2008b).

The OAS took a different view of events. The organization avoidedclassifying the FARC as a terrorist group and thereby avoided any pos-sible justification for the Colombian attacks (Vieira 2008). U.S. disap-


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pointment at these proceedings became apparent when Secretary-Gen-eral Insulza was invited before the Subcommittee for the Western Hemi-sphere of the U.S. House of Representatives and obliged to defend hisorganizations handling of the crisis (Agencia EFE 2008b).

Washingtons support for President Uribe largely removed the UnitedStates from a significant role in defusing the diplomatic crisis. Its applica-tion of the language of the War on Terror to the Americas not only placedit in opposition to the majority of Latin American states but also reinforcedperceptions of U.S. partiality toward Colombia. As a consequence, theUnited States as a diplomatic actor became increasingly irrelevant. Presi-dent Lula da Silva of Brazil summed up the situation best, labeling the OASdeclaration deeply historic as for the first time the United States stoodalone. All the other countries (except Colombia) defended a position andthe United States accepted the result. It was an unprecedented event(cited by EFE News Service 2008). Not only did they highlight a limit toU.S. influence, the events in the OAS showed Latin American states pur-suing policy objectives irrespective of the U.S. position. It is this divergenceof interests as much as U.S. incapacity to influence regional preferencesthat underpins the disconnect in interamerican relations.

The isolation of the United States in regional diplomacy was furtherillustrated with the success of the Rio Group in minimizing hostilities inthe Andes. Beginning on March 6, the 10th summit of the Rio Grouptook place in the Dominican Republic and included all of its 24 Latin

American and Caribbean members. The Rio Group denounced the vio-lation of the territorial integrity of Ecuador and reaffirmed that the ter-ritory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporar-ily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken byanother state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds (cited by Marcella2008, 39; Walser 2008).

While this statement was similar to the OAS findings, what distin-guished these proceedings was that after seven hours of negotiations,President Uribe apologized for the violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty,and President Correa called for the military escalation to end. As oneobserver remarked, in seven hours they went from insults to hugs(cited byEl Tiempo 2008). For the Venezuelan communications minister,

Andrs Izarra, the significance of these steps was that peace had comeabout outside of U.S. influence (Agencia EFE 2008a). Just as PresidentCorrea had argued during the March 4 round of OAS negotiations, con-flict appeared to be more easily resolved without Washingtons presence.

The isolation of Washington in regional security and diplomatic mat-ters is also apparent in other contexts. The founding in 2008 of theUnion of South American Nations (UNASUR) was heralded as anotherstep toward regional integration that again emphasized a movementaway from active U.S. involvement. While UNASUR is more than a secu-


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rity organization, the South American Defense Council (CSD) estab-lished within its framework sets the basis for the creation of a regionalarmed forces and the further coordination of defense policies.

The U.S. position in this new organization was made clear byBrazils defense minister, Nelson Jobim: there is no possibility of par-ticipation by the United States because the council is South Americanand the U.S. is not in South America (cited by Miiller 2008). U.S. isola-tion was confirmed when, in September 2008, rather than convene anOAS meeting, Chilean president Bachelet called an emergency UNASURsummit to discuss the internal crisis in Bolivia. As UNASUR released theLa Moneda Declaration, which fully backed the Morales government,Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassador to La Paz, while Secretary-GeneralInsulza declared that the exclusion of the OAS from the regional dia-logue was completely wrong (cited by Snchez 2008). To this extent,the trend toward greater U.S. isolation was not confined to Colombiasattacks on Ecuador.

The appropriation of the language of the War on Terror, eventhough widely rejected in this case, set a dangerous precedent. Whilethe repercussions of the Bush administrations approach remaineduncertain, the Colombian attacks on Ecuador made it clear that the par-adigm of the War on Terror had gained some traction in Latin Amer-ica. Although the regional condemnation of these attacks may havedownplayed the extent of this traction, criticism was far from immedi-ate, as evidenced by Mexico and Peru. While not as pro-Colombia as

Washington, the qualified support offered by Presidents Caldern andGarca highlights the potential for future schism in Latin America.

It is this difference in response to the Colombian attacks that pointsto future uncertainty over the impact of the War on Terror in Latin

America. While Colombias eventual apology at the Rio Group summitillustrated a temporary healing of wounds, a long-term perspective

would suggest that underlying tensions might remain and potentiallybecome more apparent should Latin American and interamerican rela-tions continue to become militarized.

An alternative way to view the events of March 1, 2008 is to empha-size the regional condemnation and resistance to the War on Terror.The condemnation in the OAS, in the Rio Group, and by individualstates highlights the extent of opposition to U.S. policy prescriptions, as

well as the change in the interamerican dynamic. Taking a short-termview of Colombias action and the regional criticism, Latin Americanresistance underpins the disconnect in the Americas. Not only does itemphasize Washingtons growing isolation as a regional powerbroker, italso highlights a limit to U.S. influence. Expanding on this view, it is

Washington, rather than its southern neighbors, that needs to adapt tothe new geostrategic setting. Instead of arguments that Washington can


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retain control simply by paying greater attention to the region, the diplo-matic crisis following the March 1 attack forces the United States to rec-ognize limits to its regional influence. U.S. reluctance to acknowledgethe new setting helps to explain the incoherence of a policy that calledfor a year of engagement and only 12 months later relaunched theFourth Fleet.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has centered on the disconnect in the Western Hemispherewith respect to geostrategic and diplomatic relations. Consequently, it isimportant to note that hostility toward the logic of the War on Terror

itself does not explain the regional divide, but rather is emblematic of abroader shift in interamerican relations. In speculating on what hasenabled the division, opposition to the War on Terror should be seenas part of a generalized shift away from U.S. policy, which developedpartly from the perceived failures of neoliberal economic policies in the1980s and 1990s. Resistance to neoliberal reforms saw a change in soci-ocultural attitudes toward political leaders and policies that opposed thiseconomic trend and its perceived architects in Washington.

The rejection of this economic policy, pejoratively referred to as the

Washington Consensus, reveals a relationship between political actorsand social forces that underpins the capacity of Latin American leadersto make independent policy decisions on economic and security issues.

Just as the failure of the FTAA negotiations in 2005 reflected a distrustof U.S. economic prescriptions, Washingtons failure to impose the Waron Terror paradigm reflects distrust in a geostrategic sense.

Interpreting the disconnect in the hemisphere solely through struc-tural factors related to the distribution of capabilities or (potential) eco-nomic power does not adequately acknowledge the dynamics of oppo-

sition to the radicalization of U.S. policy. Regional resistance to the Waron Terror was neither automatic, as the balancing proposition argues,nor futile, as the structuralist approaches of neorealism and dependencytheory assume.

Without discounting the possibility of a relative decline in Wash-ingtons distribution of capabilities and its capacity to change theregional balance of power, shifting the focus beyond structural factorsto include the agents concerned offers a more nuanced understandingof Latin American opposition to U.S. security overtures. This is possible

if a more normative approach is taken. At the domestic level, opposi-tion to U.S. policy prescriptions among the Latin American citizenry, andthe electoral success of governments promoting a similar position, high-light a normative basis whereby opposition to the United States is nolonger seen as radical. Although variation in opposition is evident both


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in and between regional states, citizen sentiment plays a key role inlegitimating an independent policy approach.

This position is reinforced at a regional level by past acts of oppo-sition, such as the failure of the FTAA, which lay a foundation for oppo-sition to U.S. geostrategic interests and the imposition of War on Terrorlogic. These domestic and regional factors affect the normative envi-ronment in which Latin American states make their policy decisions.This change is reflected in a wider transformation in the hemispheresinstitutional environment. The creation of UNASUR, the rejuvenation ofthe Rio Group, and the developments in the OAS are evidence of anevolving setting that reveals these wider movements in interamericanrelations.

These institutional developments point to a longer-term shift in rela-tions that is likely to extend beyond the political cycle of leftist leaders.However, this is not to say that structural variables are inconsequential.The economic growth of Latin America, fueled partly by a boom in com-modity prices that began in 2002, is an example of a structural forcebeyond events in Washington that undoubtedly opened up new oppor-tunities for Latin American leaders to make independent policy decisions.

These observations, however, do not suggest that U.S. influencewas inconsequential in the creation of regional division. In contrast toassumptions that the disconnect was a product of U.S. neglect, a grow-ing militarization of U.S. policy became evident, a policy that viewed the

Western Hemisphere as complementary to the War on Terror. Whenattempts to militarize relations encountered regional opposition, one of

Washingtons responses was to act unilaterally and relaunch the FourthFleet. Examined in relation to the Colombian airstrikes in Ecuador, thegeostrategic and diplomatic disconnect was a product of Latin Americasopposition to the logic of the War on Terror and its expansion to the

Western Hemisphere. To this extent, not only did the War on Terrorfail to mask a decline in Washingtons relative influence in the region, italso revealed that the decline extended beyond the economic sphere toinclude diplomatic and security issues.

Viewing actors throughout the Western Hemisphere as agents ofchange in interamerican relations offers a better understanding of theregional disconnect. The growing militarization of U.S. policy, combined

with opposition to the expansion of the War on Terror to the Ameri-cas, underpin an understanding of this divide. While the full conse-quences of the Bush administrations approach to the Western Hemi-sphere are yet to be seen, the current state of interamerican relationssays as much about Latin America as it does about Washington.

Although resistance to U.S. policy prescriptions is far from unanimous,the existence of Latin American opposition reflects policy positionstaken in reference to the regions own concerns.


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This situation has been facilitated by a convergence of regionalbeliefs associated with the perceived exhaustion of the Washington Con-sensus, and the rise of Latin American leaders in an environment thatenables greater independence from the United States. These factors cre-ated a context in which Latin American opposition to the War onTerror was possible. To this extent, Washington needs to recognizeboth the growing policy autonomy in Latin America and the militariza-tion of its own regional approach. Until this awareness becomes appar-ent, the geostrategic disconnect in the Americas is likely to persist.

NOTES

The author would like to thank John Minns, Daniel Martn, and Barry Carrfor their input and criticism. Thanks also extend to Lisa Villani, Toni Hall, BruceKent, and four anonymous reviewers ofLAPSfor their direction.

1. In addition to bandwagoning for economic reward, Stephen Walt attrib-utes bandwagoning behavior to weak domestic states, as they are more vulner-able to hegemonic pressure. He also highlights isolation as creating bandwago-ning behavior, whereby the cost of balancing against the hegemon alone is toogreat (Walt 1987). For analysis that seeks to move beyond the bandwagon-bal-ance dichotomy see later work by Randall Schweller, specifically Schweller1997.

2. Although power for both neorealism and dependency theory results insimilar outcomes, the definitions themselves are different. Waltz contends thatpower predominantly concerns military capacity, with other measures of statepower important only if they can be converted into coercive forms (Waltz 1979).More recently, Christopher Fettweis labels this distinction potential andkinetic power (Fettweis 2006). Dependistas, however, maintain that this viewof power is futile for the periphery, arguing that the pursuit of power includesthe pursuit of wealth. Subaltern state survival, dependistasargue, depends pri-marily on economic development rather than security concerns (Escud 1997).

This consequently highlights the inadequacy of potential power if its ultimateaim is economic survival and not military kinetic power.3. Although the structures of both neorealism and dependency theory are

generally considered similar, Alexander Wendt distinguishes between them.While both structures constrain the choices of states, the dependency structurealso generates the state itself. That is, the international capitalist system both cre-ates and constrains the periphery (Wendt 1987).

4. In addition to involvement in the failed 2002 Venezuelan coup dtatattempt, Reich also equated Castros Cuba with Nazi Germany (Doyle and Isac-son 2001). For his part, Noriega played an active and successful role in inhibit-

ing the extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, despite his conviction in absentia forthe 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people. Posada Carriles isbelieved to have had links with the Central Intelligence Agency. Noriega alsohelped to expand the U.S. embargo on Cuba (Lettieri 2007). Finally, during thenomination process of John Negroponte for the position of UN ambassador, U.S.


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Democratic senator Christopher Dodd accused Negroponte of perjury for hisfailure to disclose his tacit support for human rights abuses in Honduras. Specif-ically, these included the Big Pine II joint military exercises, which deployedthousands of U.S. troops in Honduras from 1983 to 1984, and the training of

Contra forces on Honduran bases by CIA and Argentine advisers. These abuseswere perpetrated by Contras during Negropontes tenure as U.S. ambassador toHonduras. More recently, as director of national intelligence, Negroponte estab-lished a CIA unit to oversee intelligence operations in Venezuela and Cuba(Democracy Now 2004; Birns and Kellberg 2007; Doyle and Isacson 2001).

5. Wayne Madsen, a former U.S. intelligence officer interviewed by theGuardian, explained that U.S. military attachs in Venezuela and counternar-cotics agents were in contact with the coup plotters. During the coup attempt,U.S. Navy vessels were stationed off Venezuelas coast and, according to theGuardian, knew of the coup (Niman 2002). For more on U.S. funding of oppo-

sition forces in Venezuela see Jones 2004; for military involvement and anaccount of U.S. economic support, see Golinger 2006.

6. The welcome extended to the International Monetary Fund, which wasready to offer funds to the new administration.

7. For more on the role of the State Department and the U.S. Agency forInternational Development in conjunction with the National Endowment forDemocracy, see specifically Domnguez 2007 and the rest of that issue ofNACLA

Report on the Americasfor more general background on the U.S. role in pro-moting low-intensity promarket democracy in Latin America.

8. The author thanks Adam Isacson for the clarification on this, and manyother points.

9. State Departmentfunded military aid and training programs are over-seen by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, and the foreign operations subcommittees of the appropriationscommittees (Ciponline 2008).

10. Colombia is the 5th-largest recipient of U.S. military aid, while Boliviais 8th, Peru 10th, Mexico 12th, and Ecuador 20th.

11. Increased police training comes in spite of a U.S. ban on the trainingof foreign police forces, instituted in the 1970s due to human rights violations

committed by graduates of its training programs.12. Although the triborder region was named a terrorist hotspot, the fourterrorist groups that Washington recognizes are located in the Andes. Three arein Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC; the NationalLiberation Army, ELN; and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC)and the fourth is in Peru (Shining Path).

13. The U.S. and Paraguayan governments deny that the U.S. militarysought to establish a base at Mariscal Estigarribia. The U.S. government assertedthat only limited and short-term deployments of U.S. military personnel werescheduled, and only between July 2005 and December 2006. In the region, the

U.S. has military bases in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Roosevelt Roads and ForthBuchanan (Puerto Rico), air bases in Reina Beatriz (Aruba), Hato Rey (Curaao),Palmerola and Soto Cano (Honduras), and radar stations in Colombia and Peru.It is also building military camps in Barahona (Dominican Republic) and atPalanquero (Colombia) (Russell 2006).


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14. Increased military spending extends beyond Washington. Defensespending by governments throughout Latin America rose from US$24.7 billionin 2003 to US$38.4 billion in 2007 (Military Balance2008).

15. Developments since July 2008 have included a growing regionwide

militarization. In an apparent response to U.S. warships delivering aid to Geor-gia, Russia held joint military operations with Venezuela in the Caribbean inDecember 2008. This was the first time since World War II that a Russian war-ship passed through the Panama Canal.

16. The policy of preemptive attack originated in 1992 during the firstGeorge Bush administration. Aimed at maintaining U.S. preeminence, the 1992draft Defense Planning Guidance, crafted by I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, andZalmay Khalilzad, all Defense Department staff members at the time, set out aframework and a justification for preemptive attacks. It proposed the use ofpreventive or preemptive force, and the idea of forsaking multilateralism if it

didnt suit U.S. interests (U.S. Department of Defense 1992). Sidelined duringthe Clinton administration, the idea of preemptive self-defense again arose in aseries of reports produced by the Project for the New American Century, notablyin 1997 and September 2000, which again outlined the case for U.S. preemi-nence through the use of preemptive strikes.

17. Ecuador later argued in an OAS report that U.S. support was necessaryto supply the advanced guiding technology needed to launch the six GBU-12bombs that hit the FARC encampment (Vieira 2008). A spokesperson for South-com would neither confirm nor deny U.S. military participation, stating, we doprovide intelligence support to partner nations but I cant get into details onoperations (Associated Press 2008b).

18. Calderns response was no doubt affected by the presence of fiveMexican students in the FARC encampment.

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