emil ee (2)

White Oaks Secondary School

Extended Essay

Why had the Venetian monopoly over trade weakened in the face of rising Atlantic powers during the 16th and 17th

Century?

Emil I. Stanca

002952-0064

Subject: History

Emil Stanca 1Waning of the Latin Republic

Total Word Count: 3960

Abstract

For most of the early modern period, Venice and other Italian city states had been the world’s

center of economic dominance. These empires established vast trade routes and unique commercial

infrastructure, leading to one of the most widespread and tightly controlled hegemony over trade the

world had ever seen. However, by the 17th century, history saw this region lose its power in the face of

rising Atlantic colonial states, most notably England and the Netherlands. It is unquestionable that this

dynamic shift in supremacy shaped our modern world because it gave birth or resulted in the formation

of the vast Atlantic empires which still live on and influence global politics today.

However historians continuously debate over the nature of this transfer of power from the

Mediterranean to the Atlantic. To come to a greater holistic understanding as to how the highly

influential empires of Britain, France and the Netherlands rose to power internationally, this paper

began a systematic investigation of this issue. It attempts to answer the question why had the Venetian

monopoly over trade weakened in the face of rising Atlantic powers during the 16th and 17th century? It

proposes that the degree of political liberation was the primary factor that determined which power

would establish hegemony over Europe. This counters the popular notion that the geographic efficiency

of Atlantic Trade was large enough to destroy the Venetian monopoly permanently.

` This paper will first provide an important criticism of the Atlantic Trade Theory in the context of

Venetian’s economic ability to compete. It will then propose and evaluate the idea that the decline of

political liberation in Venice had made it inable to properly compete with the commercial and more

liberal markets of Atlantic Nations.


Word Count: 287

Why had the Venetian monopoly over trade weakened in the face of rising Atlantic powers during the 16th and 17th century?

Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................. 1

Introduction.......................................................................................................2

Atlantic Trade Theory.........................................................................................3

Rise of Venice as an Economic Powerhouse........................................................9

Formation of the Oligarchy and Decline of prosperity.......................................13

Economic Superiority of North Atlantic States..................................................17

Conclusion....................................................................................................... 19

Appendix A: Maps............................................................................................20

Appendix B: Graphs and Charts........................................................................22


Work’s Cited.....................................................................................................28

Introduction

Throughout the middle ages and the majority of the early modern period, Venice and

other Italian City States, along with the Ottoman Empire, created a powerful monopoly over all

commerce connecting the traditional western world of Europe, the Oriental trade of south

eastern Asia and the through trade in the Levant. However, around the mid-sixteenth century

the world experienced a gradual but greatly influential transfer of both trade power and

consequently imperial dominance to western European states along the Atlantic, such as

England and the Netherlands. This dynamic shift in power gave rise to the colonial empires that

still exist and affect the world today. To explain how modern day empires such as Britain came

to own such a vast hegemony over global trade requires an exploration of this topic, and thus

pushes historians to ask why had the Venetian monopoly over trade weakened in the face of

rising Atlantic powers during the 16th and 17th century?

Ultimately, this paper will argue how the lack of political liberation in Venice was the key

reason for its decline, and how thus more liberal markets along the Atlantic out-competed the

Mediterranean monopolies. However this paper will first need to prove that the efficiency of

Western European Atlantic trade over Venetian land trade could not be the sole reason for the

shift in power. This leads into later analysis that Venice had the economic capabilities to

compete with Western Europe, but was incapable of utilizing this for political reasons. Hence


Political liberation is proven to be the key cause for the shift in dominance between empires in

17th century Europe.

Atlantic Trade Theory

According to the Historiography of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James

Robinson, many in the academic community accept that the rise of cross Atlantic trade to the

new world and around the Cape of Good Hope was the main reason for the transfer of

hegemony1. Admittedly the rise of Spanish and Portuguese colonial success coincided with the

decline of goods which were transferred along the Silk Road through the Levant2. Although

Venice continued to compete with these new rivals, the entrance of France, England and the

Netherlands on the Atlantic scene throughout the seventeenth century continued to take away

business from Ottomans and the Italians in Eastern Asia3. Moreover as Atlantic commerce

expanded European markets began flooding with products produced in the west4. Thus it

becomes reasonable to assume that the astounding growth faced in Western Europe, and more

importantly the transfer of economic power to this region from the Mediterranean, is a result

of new routes and areas in the Atlantic being utilized by Spain, Portugal, France, England and

the Netherlands.

1 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth” The American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 546-550

2 Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century” The American Historical Review 45, no. 3 (1940): 581-582

3 Richard T. Rapp, “The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution” The Journal of Economic History 35, no. 3 (1975): 499-450

4 Richard T. Rapp, “The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution” The Journal of Economic History 35, no. 3 (1975): ()


Nevertheless there are many central problems with this theory which provokes

historians to look internally at societal frameworks in relation to trade. The possibilities of

Atlantic trade, however efficient and cheap, should not have been enough to counter the

Italian-Ottoman control of the region. Between the eleventh and fifteenth century Venice had

established a powerful ownership over finance and exchange of goods across the Levant and

towards southern Asia. In the thirteenth century, the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, sacked

the city of Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire5. By 1453, the Ottoman

expansion from the east had annexed the remainder of Byzantine territory, leaving Venice to be

the sole economic power in the region. The Ottomans in turn gained a monopoly over the

intermediate trade through the Middle East6. Figure 1.1 in Appendix A is a regional map which

depicts the extent of Venice’s control over the Mediterranean following the end of the

Byzantium Empire, giving a general idea of their colonial domain7.

The duo power these empires had established in the region could not have been

destroyed by the introduction of Atlantic trade. Fleets controlled along the Atlantic were only

half the size of the Venetian fleet and only had a cargo size equal to two thirds of

Mediterranean merchant ships8. This resource gave Venice the ability to conduct large scale

trade expeditions not seen on the Atlantic coast and allowed the empire to secure trade

hegemony and colonial rule with greater naval might then any other local competitor. In the

5 Jonathan Phillips, “The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople” History Today 54, no. 5 (2004)

6 Siriol Davies and Jack L. Davis, “Greeks, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire” Hesperia Supplements 40, (2007): 25-27

7 “Formation of the Italian Nation “ <http:/ /pages. uoregon.edu/mapplace/EU/EU19%20-%20Italy/Italy%20revised.html> (September 2nd 2014)



east the Ottomans controlled the Indian Ocean trade through its Red Sea and Persian Gulf

ports, which provided cheap access to south Asian trading partners9. This port should have

given the region the same access to India via oceanic routes as Western European states had.

Figure 1.2 in Appendix A is a map which illustrates the access the Levant had to the east via the

Indian Ocean10. Figure 3.1 in Appendix C shows a medieval map depicting trade through the

Indian Ocean11, originating from Middle Eastern ports. Furthermore, Diogo do Couto, a

Portuguese writer chronicles in his Decada 8a (pg. 205-207) that Ottoman presence in red sea

and Persian gulf ports threatened Lisbon’s economic dominion of India, saying “All the business

(handled by the Portuguese) would immediately fall to the Turks and by means of the Red Sea

and Persian Gulf… they can acquire (products) much more cheaply than in Portugal”12. The full

unmodified exert is provided in figure 3.2 Appendix C13. These two primary sources, the map

and the exert, shows that traders recognized both the existence and the significance of oceanic

routes from Middle Eastern ports, and thus would have used them to compete with the rise of

Atlantic commerce. This paper suggests there must therefore been internal factors preventing

the region from executing efficient competition with Western Europe.

9 A. H. Lybyer, “The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade” The English Historical Review 30, no. 120 (1915): 578

10 <http:// www .maps.com/ref_map.aspx?pid=11440> (September 2nd 2014)

11 <http:// www. salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/november01_index.php?l=16> (September 10 2014)

12 Giancarlo Casale, “The Ottoman Administration of the Spice Trade in the Sixteenth-Century Red Sea and Persian Gulf” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 2 (2006): 190

13 Giancarlo Casale, “The Ottoman Administration of the Spice Trade in the Sixteenth-Century Red Sea and Persian Gulf” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 2 (2006): 190


Furthermore the ability for Levantine trade routes to readjust made it a flexible

competitor for event he efficient sea routes around Africa. Various moments throughout

history saw the region face intense problems and issues which blocked the mobility of trade.

The collapse of the Mongol empire made the northern Black sea route unsafe, Civil war in

Persia completely froze exchange through the area and conflict between the Church and the

Malmuks of Egypt created barriers for Italian merchants in Alexandria14. Despite these instances

where trade was threatened, exchange of goods through the area always recovered in the long

run. Two key features played a role in the efficiency of Levantine trade readjustment. Firstly the

‘short haul’ system meant that goods exchanged several hands before reaching their final

destination, thus merchants carrying trade always travelled though familiar regions 15. Because

of this, even major obstructions like civil war would not necessarily deter merchants from

conducting their operations, as they would own an inherent familiarity with the area they

traversed. Secondly, the region had thousands of diverse routes which could be taken, often

categorized into 4 subsections: A Land route from the northern Caspian Sea to China; an

exchange route though Trebizond to Tabriz and Central Asia; two roads from Lajazzo to the

Persian Gulf; and a route across the Nile into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean16. This Diverse

array of options meant that obstruction of trade was only temporary, and commercial exchange

could easily reroute in the long run. Atlantic trade routes to China however did not possess this


15 American Museum of Natural History. “Essential Questions” <http://www.amnh.org/education/

resources/rfl/web/silkroadguide/concepts.php> (August 28th 2014).



fluidity as it only consisted of a single route around the tip of Africa. Thus the unique

infrastructure of Levantine trade challenges the notion that exchange along the Atlantic could

alone permanently destroy the Mediterranean dominance. Figure 1.3 in Appendix A is a map

which depicts the routes available through the Levant17. This illustrates the extensive amount of

networks and thus options for merchants to choose from during periods of obstruction.

Furthermore even after Atlantic Trade had begun, power in the Mediterranean region

had not been permanently been damaged. When Portuguese merchant ships began circulating

the Cape of Good Hope during the early 1500’s, influx of spices from India along land routes

diminished significantly18. This success was short lived however, because by the 1560s trade

had not only recovered in Venice, but had actually improved. The first decade of the 16th

century witnessed Portugal transporting on average 1,300,000 lbs. more of spices then Venice.

However this had only shocked the Mediterranean markets temporarily. By 1560 Venice

witnessed 1,310,454 lbs. of spices flood its markets; nearly 200,000 lbs. more than its average

before the rise of Portuguese trade19 . Meanwhile Lisbon’s markets, although having used

Atlantic routes, lost most of its shares and profits in the spice trade by 156020. Thus, although

Atlantic trade shocked Mediterranean markets, it failed to destroy them and cannot be the

reason for the transfer of trade power to North West Europe.

17 <http:// gibaulthistory. wordpress.com/chapter-6/> (September 1st 2014)


19 Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century” The American Historical Review 45, no. 3 (1940): 581

20 Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century” The American Historical Review 45, no. 3 (1940): 582


Finally near the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the sixteen hundreds,

the world saw transfer of trade and colonial power concentrate in England and the

Netherlands, while nations such as France, Spain and Portugal significantly lagged behind

economically. This can be seen mainly by the fact that the urbanization rate (UR) of

Netherlands and England, which lagged behind the rest of Europe at 8% (western European

nations not including these two had an average of 10%), increased dramatically over the course

of 550 years to reach 24.5 % in 1800. This high UR surpassed Western Europe’s new 17 percent

and Eastern Europe’s low 6%21. A graph depicting UR between European regions can be found

in figure 2.1 Appendix B22. Although all costal nations used and prospered from Atlantic Trade,

only England and the Netherlands benefited in the long run. Furthermore, studies held by

Engerman (1972), Engerman and O’Brien (1991), O’Brien (1982) and Bairoch (1993) illustrate

how Atlantic trade profits were too low to account for this economic growth. For example

Bairoch calculated in 1993 that trade between Western Europe and the rest of the world,

however large, only accounted for 4 percent of the total GNP of the region before the 1800s23.

Thus, Atlantic Trade was not a powerful enough economic force to guarantee the global

dominance of Atlantic nations.


22 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth” The American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 547



Rise of Venice as an Economic Powerhouse

As proven above, Atlantic trade was not enough to diminish the long established

markets in the Mediterranean. Firstly Venice possessed the resources and the flexible trade

route options necessary to out-compete Atlantic rivals. Furthermore even when trade was

introduced it was not enough to remove the long standing hegemony in the Mediterranean. It

was additionally observed that Atlantic trade as an economic force was not strong enough to

bring the prosperity seen in some Atlantic nations.

Thus this paper hypothesises that the internal political structure of Venetian society had

a more profound impact on its decline in the face of Atlantic Trade. As will be seen, the

oligarchic nature of the Republic created rigidities in the socio-economic landscape which could

not compete with the more efficient liberal markets emerging in England and the Netherlands.

Atlantic Trade became an added bonus to northern Europe’s superiority in the economic liberty

and mobility provided to entrepreneurs.

Historical investigation of Venice shows that the region faced innovation in economic

and political institutions after its official independence from Byzantium in the Golden Bull treaty

of 99224. Consequently, as Venice and the Levant were given more economic liberty, it

produced greater commercial success. As argued by John H. Pryor, Byzantium’s conquest of the

Eastern Mediterranean destroyed closed Arabic communities and opened trade between

Western Europe and the Levant, vastly improving economic prospects25. Venice’s dominion

24 Third Millennium Library. “Cambridge Medieval History- Vol.IV- The Eastern Roman Empire (717-1453) Chapter XIII” <http: //ww w.cristoraul.com/ENGLISH/MedievalHistory/Cambridge/IV/13-Venice.html> (August 25 th 2014)

25 John H. Pryor. “Geography, Technology and War: Studies in Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1572” Cambridge University Press (1988): 111


over the mouths of the Lombardy Rivers and its location between Byzantium and the west

made it an ideal port and distributer for the rest of Europe26. The key locations of Venetian

ports are shown in the Map in figure 1.4 Appendix A.27.Byzantium thus grew commercially

closer to Venice, granting it duty free access to Byzantine ports in 108228. This allowed Venetian

merchants to conduct larger scale expeditions with comparatively lower costs than those faced

by other city states.

Venice also moved towards achieved greater liberty within its society a century later

after the assassination of Doge Vital II Michele. The result was the formation of the ‘Great

Council’ in 1172; a republic sponsoring democratic elections and legislation29. The newly formed

republic pushed towards policies that ultimately improved Venetian industry and more

importantly ability to trade abroad, leading to greater success. Historian Diego Puga and Daniel

Trefler argue that this new found political liberty Venice faced internationally and within its

society led to massive economic growth30

26 Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, “International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization” Discussion Paper for the Centre for Economic Policy Research, no. 9076 (2012): 6


28 Sarah Marie Kampbell. “The Economy of Conflict: How East Mediterranean Trade Adapted to Changing Rules, Allegiances and Demographics in the 10th-12th Centuries AD” A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of Princeton University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (January 2014): 110

29 Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, “International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization” Discussion Paper for the Centre for Economic Policy Research, no. 9076 (2012): 9-10



These conclusions are supported by the fact that this Political Dynamism yielded the

formation of an economically sustainable empire. Legislation was passed to privatize and secure

the operations of merchants and traders. Property Rights for example, which protected an

individual’s assets and capital from governmental incursion, were adopted31. This innovation

made the expansion of enterprise more secure and favourable as governments could not

intervene. Bankruptcy laws, regulation of liability for companies and creation of a common

currency (the Ducat) were all institutional developments which helped facilitated increase in

investment, entrepreneurship and resulting economic growth.32 The invention of one particular

tool, known as the Colleganza, was especially powerful. It was a contract established between

two merchants who would split profits on their own terms. One merchant, the sedentary

individual, would provide all the required capital and material for trade; while the other

merchant, the traveller, acted as the sale representative for the goods bought and sold by the

sedentary merchant33.

The document in Figure 3.3 Appendix C, translation credited to Diego Puga and Daniel

Trefler, is a Colleganza signed between Zaccaria Stagnorio, a travel merchant; and Giovanni

Agadi, a sedentary merchant. The success of these documents can be obtained from the

context of this example. Zaccaria Stagnorio, the son of a slave, was able to enter the

commercial market as a simple travel merchant who could participate in commercial activity

without any initial start-up capital or funds. He eventually established one of the richest 31 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth” The American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 551


33 Max Nisen, “How Globalization Created and Destroyed the City of Venice” Business Insider, September 8th, 2012


families in the region34. The efficiency of this system was noticed by the ‘American Dream’

nature of its success, in that any commoner like Stagnorio could ascend to economic

providence. Thus the Democratic system which governed Venice and the subsequent economic

reform which passed lead to the liberation of the market and encouragement of profit-driven

individuals to expand their trade success. This increase in investment and citizen wealth defined

Venetian economic success before the 1300s.

Formation of the Oligarchy and Decline of prosperity

However the same Democratic system which encouraged economic expansion soon

facilitated the rise of a virtual dictatorship, which heavily entailed the decline of Venice

thereafter. The moment of History known as the ‘Serrata’ saw the domination of the Great

Council by rich family dynasties during the 14th century. In 1323, Legislation was passed which

made membership in parliament hereditary, and thus an oligarchy of new merchant dynasties

had dictatorial control over all legislation in the city. Following the enactment came much

dissent and protest, which was met with martial law and brutal executions35. Such is the case

when a commoner named Boccono lead 11 associates with the support of a vast angry mob to

the gates of parliament in. However the plot was uncovered beforehand, and state police

captured, disarmed and hanged the conspirators; leaving their corpses on display in St. Mark’s

square36.



36 Guido Ruggiero. “Chapter 1” in Violence in early Renaissance Italy (Rutgers University Press, 1980.)


As argued by David Acemoglu, this new oligarchy facilitated the exclusion of merchants

from the market, as participation in trade and commerce became exclusive for rich families or

Council members only37. This conclusion can be seen in the fact that the rich merchant nobles

who seized power in parliament moved to protect their personal economic prosperity at the

expense of commoner involvement. Venetian legislation during this era strongly opposed

commercial partnerships with foreigners38. Thus trade and prospects for commercial expansion

and foreign investment were limited. The Re-organization of the Venetian fleet throughout the

early 1300’s, which placed all merchant ships under the ownership of the state, limited the use

of galleys for trade to those who could purchase the equipment or those with ties to

parliament39. This was followed by the Capitulare Navigantium Act, which, according to Puga

and Trefler, “Forbade any merchant from shipping wares with a value in excess of the

merchant’s assessed wealth.” However because only rich and high income families received

wealth assessments, poor or even middle income individuals could no longer participate in

trade 40. The chart in figure 2.2 Appendix B, derived by Puga and Trefler based on analysis of

every Colleganza between 1073 and 1342, shows that the percentage of joint trade deals

37 Daron Acemoglu, “Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies” Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 1 (2008): 35-36

38 Maria Fusaro, “Cooperating Mercantile Networks in the Early Modern Mediterranean” The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): ()




involving commoners decrease from 40 % to 0% in 200 years41. Sharpest decline on commoner

participation is observed to be in the 1300’s when Venice began drifting towards an Oligarchy.

Thus mobility and liberty of commoners to enter the market was blocked and frozen by the

Grand Council. The same armature entrepreneurship which brought Venice to economic

providence ceased to exist by the mid-1300s.

The impact which change in the institutional framework of Venice had on the industrial

landscape and imperial power of the region was profound. The monopolization of trade

towards the dominion of select families meant that prices of goods which funneled into Venice

and into northern Europe were ignorantly kept high for the benefit of high profits. A study

conducted by E.B Fryde proved that average prices in the Mediterranean were consistently

higher than those set in England for the same traded goods following the 14th century42. This

inefficiency created by the oligarchy meant that the introduction of any new competition would

destroy Mediterranean markets, whose prices would be less favourable. For example, when

Portugal first opened its route around the Cape of Good Hope, exchange of eastern luxuries

through the Levant dwindled to miniscule amounts43. R. Fulin’s translation of Girolamo Priuli’s

and Marino Sanuto’s journals, written between 1502-1507, revealed that these two Venetian

merchants and chroniclers witnessed an almost immediate cut off of trade flow to Alexandria

and Levantine markets around the same year that Portuguese began its incursions in the Indian


42 E.B. Fryde, “Anglo-Italian Commerce in the Fifteenth Century: Some Evidence about Profits and the Balance of Trade” Reveu belge de philoqie et d’histoire 50, no. 2 (1972): ()

43 Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century” The American Historical Review 45, no. 3 (1940): 581-583


Ocean44. See figure 3.4 in Appendix C for an unaltered sample of Priuli’s diary45. Another

example is English, Dutch and French incursions in Mediterranean markets, which were

accomplished through smuggling products into Venetian controlled ports or receiving rights to

conduct commercial expedition in ottoman territory46. By 1630, the Venetian share of the

Levantine market fell to 25%, while English reached 40%47. Thus Venice was unable to properly

compete against rising markets throughout Western Europe.

Investment and trade expansion by private individuals, which gave rise to the wealth of

Venice in the 12th and 13th century, eroded following the restriction of political participation in

1324 (when hereditary rule was re-adopted). This naturally makes sense. Merchants during

democratic years could push for economic reform which protected their property and business.

When Power became concentrated in the hands of hereditary merchant families, legislation

was taken to eliminate opponents; establish political dynasties and restrict the ability to

conduct trade to the upper class nobility only. The result meant a more restricted market

vulnerable to competition.

Economic Superiority of North Atlantic States

During the 15th, 16th and particularly the 17th century, the world saw a gradual shift of

economic providence towards the North Atlantic States of England and the Netherlands. 44 LOST MY CITATION

45 <http://lettere2.u nive.it/deltorre/corso/materiali_ spec.htm> (September 2nd 2014)




Analysis of internal institutions which governed these regions yields and proves that the

geographical access to the Atlantic, which these states owned, were not the true or full reason

for this transfer of hegemony. Instead, these regions saw surprising shifts away from absolute

autocracy, furnishing a liberal environment perfect for merchant confidence, investment and

ultimate success. Thus Venice, which limited the political and thus economic freedom of its

citizens, failed to compete with the rising powerhouses in Western Europe.

England, although inherently a monarchy, faced grand changes in the political system

which governed the island. Events such as the English Civil War (1642-1649) and the Glorious

Revolution (1688-1689) set England on a course towards extensive checks on the monarchy and

supremacy of parliament over hereditary rule48. The English Reformation spawned by King

Henry’s extrication from his wife in 1532, limited and virtually eliminated the influence of the

Papacy (Church) in Britain49. This in turn would prevent Britain from facing similar restrictions

on trade which Venice encountered during moments such as the Pope’s ban on commercial

flow to Alexandria50. Political liberation also occurred in the Netherlands. The Duchy of

Burgundy, as it was called during the 15th and 16th century, faced heavy taxes on commercial

activities imposed by the Hapsburg Empire starting in 1493. The resulting uprisings and

revolutions between 1572 and 1648 culminated in the formation of an independent Dutch


49 Alec Ryrie, “The English Reformation” History Today 63, no 6 (2013)



Republic51. Consequently, the political and economic liberty of the region attracted thousands

of merchants from Antwerp and Germany52.

The nature of the institutions, which governed these regions, meant that there were

virtually no barriers against entrepreneurship and investment since checks on power provided

subsequent protection for merchants and empowered them to pursuit economic reform53. This

is seen through the change in the dynamic of European trade following the institutional

changes of England and the Netherlands. Firstly, urbanization rates of the Netherlands and

England as previously discussed, which grew by a small 2.1% between 1300 and 1500, would

skyrocket to 24.5% in the next 200 years. This occurred after successful institutional change had

been complete54. Refer to figure 2.1 Appendix B for a chart illustrating change in urbanization

rates55.

A specific detailed study on English profits reveals much more. Refer to the graph in

figure 2.3 Appendix B for British Profits on Trade per annum56. Profits on trade per annum were








near negligible in 1575, but then sharply expanded during the 1600’s once institutional changes

were beginning to take place. By 1700, profits reached a soaring 900 000 pounds per annum

following sharp increases starting in the mid-17th century. Thus economic growth and power

within this region trailed the liberation of enterprise and investment, which naturally increased

an entrepreneur’s ability to formulate businesses and conduct trade missions.

Conclusion

Thus, through an analysis of internal factors, a more comprehensive view can be

adopted for the transfer of trade hegemony from the Mediterranean to North West Europe.

Although Atlantic trade was a powerful tool used by costal nations, it is not enough to account

for the extensive economic growth which turned England and the Netherlands into industrial

powerhouses. Even if it was it would still not explain the inability of Venice to compete with the

Atlantic route since the efficiency and infrastructure of the Levant trade would have prompted

a continuous and fluid exchange of goods.

Investigation showed pointed that Venice gained economic providence after the

establishment of a democratic republic, allowing merchant and entrepreneurs of any social

class to succeed in trade and commerce. After the devolution of Venice towards an oligarchy of

economic dynasties, entrance into the merchant and commercial markets was impossible.

Meanwhile England and Netherlands faced a liberation of their political systems, which was

followed by unprecedented economic growth.


Thus with the introduction of more capitalistic and free economies in north west

Europe, the traditional trade monopoly held by Venice in the Mediterranean could not

compete; as it’s oligarchy restricted the freedom of investment and entrepreneurship which

had ironically spawned its success. Through these historians can conclude that political

liberation was the key divider between which empires would dominate the globe. Using this

new focused answer to the question why had the Venetian monopoly over trade weakened in

the face of rising Atlantic powers during the 16th and 17th century, historians can begin

exploring the continued evolution of political liberty in the context of global powers and

imperial strife, all of which have laid the foundations of the modern world.

Appendix A: Maps

Figure 1.1: Extent of Venetian Colonies


Figure 1.2: Red Sea and Persian Gulf Ports

Figure 1.3: Diverse array of global land routes (particularly those connecting east and west)


Figure 1.4: The strategic location of Venetian ports

Appendix B: Graphs and Charts


Figure 2.1: Urbanization Rates by Region and classification

Figure 2.2: Declining Involvement of Commoners in Colleganza’s


Figure 2.3: British Profits per annum during the early modern period

British Profits on Trade per annum (adjusted to 17th century average price)

Period Average Profits per annum (pounds)

1500-1575 Negligible

1576-1600 40 000

1601-1650 200 000

1651- 1675 500 000

1676-1700 900 000

Appendix C: Primary Sources

Figure 3.1: Medieval Map illustrating Routes from Persian Gulf and Red Sea ports to India


Figure 3.2: Untranslated Exert from the Decada,

Figure 3.3: A sample Colleganza


Figure 3.4: A sample of Priuli’s writings



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http://www.cristoraul.com/ENGLISH/MedievalHistory/Cambridge/IV/13-Venice.html

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Casale, Giancarlo. "The Ottoman Administration Of The Spice Trade In The Sixteenth-century

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"Chapter 6." Mr Gs AP World History. http://gibaulthistory.wordpress.com/chapter-6/

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