Enclosure 1 SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Final Exercise Report (Final)

Enclosure 1

JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND

SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISEGREENLAND SEA 2013

(SAREX Greenland Sea 2013)

FINAL EXERCISE REPORT

Product Status:Version / Release: 2.0

JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND3900 NUUKGREENLAND

SAREX GREENLAND SEA 2013 Final Exercise Report

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PRELIMINARY PAGES

DATE: 01 November 2013

SUBJECT: SAREX GREENLAND SEA 2013 Final Exercise Report (FER)

REFERENCES:

Authority. JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND (JACMD) as the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) authorizes the Documentation – SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Final Exercise Report (FER).

Promulgation. The SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 FER has been developed in accordance with SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Exercise Plan Part Three (EXPLAN Part 3) - Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting.

Distribution. According to Annex A. Addressees are authorized and encouraged to distribute copies of this document to all stakeholders and interested parties as they see fit.

Stig Oestergaard NielsenMajor General

RECORD OF CHANGES:

Version Date Description

1.0 2013-10-01 Draft - for review

1.1 2013-10-22 PXD Working Document

2.0 2013-11-01 Final version

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Table of Contents

1. Letter of Promulgation......................................................................................................6

2. Summary of Action Items..................................................................................................7

3. Exercise Abstract..............................................................................................................8

3.1. Command and Control.................................................................................................9

3.2. Participating Units and Organizations........................................................................10

3.3. Exercise Aim and Training Objectives........................................................................12

3.4. Training Audiences vs. Training Objectives................................................................12

4. Exercise Description.......................................................................................................14

4.1. Exercise Setting.........................................................................................................14

4.2. Scenario and Conduct of the Exercise........................................................................14

4.3. Background for the Scenario......................................................................................18

4.4. Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting Design................................................................18

5. Achievement of the OSE’s Training Objectives...............................................................19

5.1. SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Training Objectives........................................................20

6. Subject Area Enclosures.................................................................................................21

6.1. Search Operations (Training Objective no. 1).............................................................21

6.2. Rescue Operations (Training Objective no. 2)............................................................22

6.3. Evacuation Operations (Training Objective no. 3)......................................................24

6.4. Medical Support (Training Objective no. 4)................................................................24

6.5. Use of Air for Medical Evacuation (Training Objective no. 5)......................................24

6.6. Media and Press Management (Training Objective no. 6)..........................................25

6.7. Counter Maritime Pollution (Training Objective no. 7)................................................25

6.8. Experimentation (Not a Training Objective)...............................................................26

6.9. Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk.....................................................................26

Annex A: Distribution............................................................................................................28

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List of Abbreviations

AO Area of Operations SA Situational Awareness

AOR Area Of Responsibility SAR Search and Rescue

ARCC Air Rescue Coordination Centre SMC SAR Mission Coordinator

CONOPS Concept of Operations SITREP Situation Report

COMPLAN

Communications Plan SOP Standard Operating Procedure

DV Distinguished Visitor SRU Search and Rescue Unit

ENDEX End of Exercise STARTEX Start of Exercise

EO Exercise Objective TA Training Audience

EXBRIEF Exercise Brief PTA Primary Training Audience

EXCON Exercise Control TO Training Objective

EXDIR Exercise Director TTX Tabletop Exercise

EXPLAN Exercise Plan

FCC Final Coordination Conference

FER Final Exercise Report

FIR First Impression Report

IPC Initial Planning Conference

IAMSAR International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue

JRCC Joint Rescue Coordination Centre

MEL/MIL Main Event List and Master Incident List

MPC Main Planning Conference

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

O/T Observer/Trainer

OCE Officer Conducting Exercise

ODE Officer Directing Exercise

OPV Offshore Patrol Vessel

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

OSE Officer Scheduling Exercise

POB Persons On Board

PXD Post-Exercise Discussions

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1.Letter of Promulgation

In order not to lose the Arctic SAREX momentum following The Arctic Council SAREX Agreement in 2011 and in the wake of the Greenland Sea 2012 SAREX (10-12 September 2012) Denmark decided to plan for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 at a fairly late stage. Due to a short planning cycle it was decided to re-use the SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 scenario with some adjustments. In order to bring Arctic SAREX into a more suitable and long term planning cycle the Danish Arctic Ambassador recommended to the Arctic Council that responsibility for future SAREX should follow the chairmanship of The Arctic Council. This recommendation has been well received by Canada, the incoming Chair of the Arctic Council. Canada will be planning and hosting the Arctic SAREX in 2014.

SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 (02-06 September 2013) served several purposes; Firstly to follow up on Lessons Identified (LI) from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and secondly as an add-on from 2012 a tabletop exercise (TTX) to plan and coordinate counter maritime pollution. Unlike the 2012 SAREX, an external staff of Exercise Control (EXCON) was planned to take over the EXCON responsibilities during the SAREX 2013 execution giving the staff of the newly established Joint Arctic Command opportunity to become fully engaged as exercise players. Finally a number of trials related to communications, surveillance and search were incorporated in the exercise.

Some 1.000 people from different organizations across the Arctic were involved in the exercise. The scenario was once again centered on a cruise ship in distress in a remote Arctic area, necessitating a large and complex maritime search and rescue (SAR) operation. As such, SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 illustrated the importance and usefulness of international cross-border cooperation and coordination. Maritime SAR off Greenland’s coastline is principally a national responsibility of the Kingdom of Denmark but the exercise showed bilateral and multilateral cooperation to be of paramount importance in order to avoid extensive loss of lifes following a ship disaster. At the same time, the exercise provided an excellent opportunity for testing the counter maritime pollution state of readiness as a TTX but also to follow-up on Arctic SAR plans and procedures on a larger scale. Gaining experience in cooperation amongst the stakeholders was a key priority and for this reason, the exercise can be described as a success.

Exercises like SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 are primarily conducted to develop organizations' ability to handle disasters. Subsequently, the knowledge and learning achieved through exercises must be operationalized through analysis and evaluation. The evaluation of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 generally shows that the participating organizations were able to coordinate and coorporate in a remote area. The personnel in the tactical field response demonstrated very high professional skills and dedication in their efforts to save lives. However, while it is encouraging to note that many actions and procedures worked well during SAREX Greenland Sea 2013, the areas where weaknesses or room for improvement have been pointed out have precedence in this Final Exercise Report. More specifically, the evaluation highlights inadequate means of communications; ; The need for an Air Task Organization for handling a large number of aircraft; the need for a formal SAR cooperation agreement between the national coordination forums at the strategic level in

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Denmark/Greenland and Iceland focusing on national coordination and cooperation in case of emergency responses; the need to develop a contingency plan for deploying counter maritime pollution equipment most effectively to Greenland etc. etc.

It is important that these and other relevant conclusions and learning points from SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 are now being followed up upon. Readers are therefore encouraged to closely consider the LI and action items suggested in the FER with a view to implementing changes that may strengthen emergency preparedness in both a national and in a wider Arctic context. Given that the exercise was organized by Danish authorities, the lessons identified and action items set forth in the FER (sections 6) are mostly aimed at emergency preparedness within the Kingdom of Denmark but some of them are of a more general character and may be of concern to organizations and cooperation forums in all eight Arctic Nations; Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States of America.

Finally, it must be stressed that although the overall conduct of the exercise was successful, not everything went according to plan. Technical difficulties were encountered which not only affected the performance and opportunities of the Training Audience (TA) but also forced Exercise Control (EXCON) to engage in dynamic scripting for the Main Event List/Master Incident List (MEL/MIL). The difficulties were especially related to weather conditions, transportation of TA to the Area of Operations (AO) and inadequate technical means of communications but also to issues such as limited experience with the common C3 SAR log system.

As the exercise progressed most challenges were resolved in a satisfactory manner but there is still a need to evaluate the technical lessons closely in order to implement simple and effective means of communication in the Arctic region. Communication and relay stations are crucial to enable effective SAR operations in the high Arctic.

2.Summary of Action Items

This section briefly summarizes the conclusions and recommendations identified during the SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 and the Post Exercise Discussion in Nuuk 22-23 Oct 2013 included in section 6.

Investigate if MRCC Nuuk have all needed communication systems at disposal for SAR.

Consider developing a common international SAR log to be used by all SAR organizations in the Arctic region.

Consider having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert in Greenland throughout the summer season.

Consider strengthening the JACMD manning on the Air and on the Logistical side. Test mobile self-sustained satellite internet transceiver solutions capable of covering

at least 10 NM with internet. The OSC is responsible for the SAR coordination and as such responsible for including

all the on scene actors – including the captain of the ship in distress.

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Consider developing a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) for local emergency plan for casualty assemblies delineating local responsibilities.

Consider establishing a formal SAR cooperation agreement between the national coordination forums at the strategic level in Denmark/Greenland and Iceland focusing national coordination and cooperation in case of emergency responses.

Consider establishing an Air Task Organization for handling a large number of aircraft as a part of JACMD contingency plans.

Develop a contingency plan for deploying counter maritime pollution equipment most effectively to Greenland.

Update the JACMD SOP for countering maritime pollution to include the international operational guidelines on maritime pollution operationalized in accordance with JACMD responsibilities.

Consider updating bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation agreements on countering maritime pollution.

Consider expanding JACMD environmental section to become a knowhow center for countering maritime pollution in the Arctic.

Future exercise recommendations: Investigate if JACMD can get an unclassified exercise frequencies package to be used

in future exercises. Facilitate that the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) and the Police are able to plan for

investigating criminal activities on board ships in distress in parallel to rescue/evacuation operations.

National representatives are responsible for that own national safety regulations are included in the EXPLAN’s safety Annex while safety at all times is a national responsibility.

Develop a communication plan for handling the Media and Press at JACMD and continue training the Media and Press handling in future exercises – also with external counterparts.

When JACMD is Primary Training Audience (PTA) JACMD should not be the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). Have an external Core Planning Team in charge for planning and executing future similar exercises.

Consider separating the Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day) Program from the exercise play and have the DV-Day as an Arctic SAR introduction show letting the units introduce themselves as Arctic SAR capacities.

Consider running experimentations at the DV-Day.

3.Exercise Abstract

SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was a live full-scale SAR exercise using the main planning products for SAREX 2012. The exercise was executed as realistically as possible given prevailing circumstances in a remote Arctic area. Meteorological data, geography, borders, infrastructure, political and economical conditions, etc. all corresponded with reality.

The AO for SAREX Greenland Sea 13 (i.e. the primary exercise arena) was the Greenland Sea, King Oscar’s Fiord, Ella Island and Mestersvig Airstrip in northeastern Greenland.

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Reykjavik and Keflavik in Iceland, approximately 600 nautical miles or 1.000 km from the AO, were used as the main maritime and air hubs for maritime and air assets proceeding into the AO.

The exercise took place from 02-06 September 2013. It was divided into three phases and three events:

Phase 1 – Pre-STARTEX Phase (Greenland Sea): Before 02 Sep 2013Phase 1 was the pre-STARTEX phase to get all Training Audiences (TA) ready and in place before SAREX Greenland Sea 2013.

Phase 2 – Search Phase (Greenland Sea): 02-03 Sep 2013 Phase 2 including STARTEX and the initiation of the SAR operation focused the effective use of all available units and how the search for the missing cruise ship was organized and conducted.

Phase 3 – Rescue and Evacuation Phase (King Oscar’s Fiord): 04-05 Sep 2013 Phase 3 focused the rescue and the evacuation of the cruise ship crew and the passengers from King Oscar’s Fiord with only two small airstrips and no other infrastructure or a major air/sea port. In parallel, the TAs had to handle a counter maritime pollution disaster from the cruise ship.

Day five of the exercise, 06 September 2013, was used for hot wash-ups and other post-ENDEX activities.

The execution of the exercise was mainly driven by the MEL/MIL, which was uploaded to the Apan Exercise Management WEB-page www.apan.org (only available to EXCON). Throughout the exercise the MEL/MIL injects were dynamically adjusted by the EXCON as needs arose, e.g. handing out new Tetra-Flex radios to all the relevant on-scene TA prior to Phase 3.

3.1. Command and Control

Joint Arctic Command (JACMD) was Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). During the execution phase 02-06 September 2013 the role and the responsibilities of the key EXCON positions; the Exercise Director (EXDIR), Officer with Primary Responsibilities (OPR) and the Chief Analyst were filled by staff from the Danish Chief of Defence Headquarters (HQ). The reason for having an external EXCON running the execution phase was made upon recommendations from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 recommending JACMD to be trained as a new-established HQ during SAREX Greenland Sea 2013.

The external EXCON was furthermore supported by a number of Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) embarked on board HDMS VAEDDEREN and a number of O/Ts located with Training Audiences (TAs) elsewhere.

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3.2. Participating Units and Organizations

Training Audience (TA), Exercise Control (EXCON), Role-player (RP)

Country

Units TA RP EXCON

Canada 1 Hercules Transport Aircraft C-130 (Incl. 8 + 2 SAR Techs)

1 OPS-Officer in Keflavik

2 EXCON embarked in HDMS VÆDDEREN

2 Observer/Trainers on Ella Island

JRCC TRENTON

2 Observer/Trainers in MRCC Nuuk

XX

X

XX

X

Kingdom of Denmark

HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN incl. LYNX (HVBJ)

HDMS VAEDDEREN incl. LYNX (VDRN – Simulating cruise ship)

HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN (KNUD)

1 Challenger Maritime Recce Aircraft CL-604

1 Hercules Transport Aircraft C-130

1 Maintenance Support Team

1 Senior Umpire on board HVBJ

3 Teams from Squadron 690 MEDEVAC (22 all in all)

1 Air Transport Wing (ATW) Coordinator in Keflavik

1 Tactical Air Command make-up team (TAC DEN)

1 TAC DEN EXCON member on board VDRN

1 TAC DEN Observer/Trainer at MRCC Nuuk

Danish National Operational Staff (NOST)

Danish National Police

1 Chief of Defence Role-Player (CHOD DEN)

3 CHOD DEN EXCON Staff members embarked in VDRN

1 CHOD DEN Media Role-Player embarked in VDRN

2 JACMD EXCON embarked in HDMS VAEDDEREN

25 Danish journalist students as Role-Players

Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)

2 DEMA Observer/Trainers at MRCC Nuuk

Sirius Military Dog Sledge Patrols as security

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Nuuk (MRCC Nuuk)

1 x Danish Navy SAR SME in MRCC Nuuk (SME)

4 x Naval Home Guard SAR SMEs with HVBJ, KNUD and ICG

Air Rescue Coordination Centre Soendre Stroem (ARCC)

Greenland Police Command Station (CS)

2 Greenland Police Registration Team Command Posts

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

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Country

Units TA RP EXCON

(CPs)

2 Observer/Trainers on CP Mestersvig and CP Ella Island

20 Greenland Police Students as “cruise ship passengers”

1 Police Students’ leader

Greenland Emergency Management Commission (GEMC)

1 Police Observer/Trainer in GEMC

Greenland Department of Housing, Nature and Environment

Greenland Department of Health and Infrastructure

1 Department of Health Role-Player

Danish Maritime Authority in Greenland

Air Greenland Operation Centre

1 Air Greenland AS-350 helicopter including sling

Mestersvig Airstrip

1 NAVIAIR AFIS controller located in Mestersvig

2 Greenlandic journalists (KNR+Sermitsiaq)

2 Danish journalists (Danish Radio+JyllandsPosten)

MRCC Torshavn

1 MRCC Torshavn Observer/Trainer on board HVBJ

18 Role-Players and Observers with different Training Audiences

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Iceland ICGV TYR incl. 1 Observer/Trainer

1 Coast Guard Maritime Surveillance Aircraft DASH-8 (300)

1 DASH-8 Observer/Trainer

Keflavik Airfield

ICE-SAR Teams (16 persons)

15 ICE-SAR Roleplayers as casualties

SAR-TECH Jumpers (8 persons)

Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Iceland (JRCC Iceland)

National Crisis Coordination Centre (NCCC)

1 NCCC Observer/Trainer

1 OPS-Officer in Keflavik

1 Response Group (Fire and Rescue Services)

National and Municipality Police

The Environment Agency of Iceland

The National Health Sector

Host Nation Support (HNS)

1 EXCON in VDRN

Personnel for staff elements at different command

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

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Country

Units TA RP EXCON

levels

1 Police Liaison Officer at Mestersvig Airstrip

X

Norway Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Bodoe X

USA 2 Air National Guard, AW109 C-130

JRCC BOSTON

1 USCG Observer/Trainer on board VDRN

3 USCG Observer/Trainers at MRCC Nuuk

1 ANG 109AW Observer/Trainer at MRCC Nuuk

X

X

X

X

X

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3.3. Exercise Aim and Training Objectives

The aim of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was to train the SAR organisations of the 8 Arctic Nations in a real live exercise providing SAR cooperation training to all participants in a remote Arctic environment. Additionally, and as an add-on from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, Maritime Pollution should play a part in SAREX 2013. To this end, seven Training Objectives (TO) were established and approved by the participating nations:

No. Training Objective Event 1 Event 2

1Effective search operations and cooperation between all involved centres and units

2Effective rescue operations and cooperation between all involved units

3Effective evacuation operations and cooperation between nations and all involved units

4Effective medical support and cooperation between nations and all involved units

5Effective use of air for medical evacuation between nations and involved units

6Effective media and press management between nations and all involved units

7Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities and organizations

The seven TOs form the framework for evaluation in this report and the observations, discussions and conclusions in section 5 and 6 are structured according to the TOs.

3.4. Training Audiences vs. Training Objectives

TO no. 1.Initially, the Primary Training Audiences (PTA) during the Search Phase for the missing cruise ship (Scenario Phase 2) were the Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs) in Norway; Iceland; the Faroe Islands and in Greenland. MRCC Nuuk was the overall responsible RCC during the Search Phase. As the scenario evolved other RCCs and their supporting capacities were included as PTA. In the AO the PTA was the immediate response forces within the Exclusive Economical Zones (EEZ) of Greenland and Iceland such as Offshore Patrol Vessels; Maritime Surveillance Aircraft; neighbouring countries Air Support; local helicopters and other identified support and assistance available in the AO. During Phase 2 the primary objective was to conduct an effective search and the cooperation between all involved RCCs and units. Another primary objective was to train the On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC) tasking process and to train the OSC hand-over procedures between the search units. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) co-located with the PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.

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TO no. 2.The PTA during the Rescue Phase (Scenario Phase 3) were extended to include participating nations’ highest emergency coordination committees for national and bilateral coordination and support. Consequently, nations identified and suggested expeditionary capacities ready and relevant for the ongoing SAR rescue operation in King Oscar’s Fiord. MRCC Nuuk was responsible for identifying the needed capacities, to coordinate national and international deployments and the re-enforcement of the SAR operation in the AO in coordination with the OSC. In addition to the emergency coordination committees Greenland’s Police and the department of Health and Infrastructure and the department of Housing, Nature and Environment within the Government of Greenland were included as PTA. Greenland’s Police was responsible for registering the crew and passengers from the cruise ship in distress and the departments within the Government of Greenland to prepare and coordinate within their responsibilities, respectively. Again, SMEs co-located with the PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and reported to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN. Role-players simulated cruise ship casualties and different relevant national authorities.

TO no. 3.The PTA during Evacuation Phase (Scenario Phase 3) were as mentioned in the description of TO no. 2. MRCC Nuuk was still responsible for the ongoing rescue while the Greenlandic Police were responsible for planning, organizing and executing the evacuation in accordance with the issued Evacuation Plan. Again, SMEs co-located with the PTA as O/Ts observed, trained and reported to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN. Role-players simulated cruise ship casualties being evacuated but also different relevant national authorities.

TO no. 4.The PTA related to TO no. 4 were medics deployed into theatre and their reach-back organizations plus the doctors and their triage at all levels. Achieving the TO depended on the deployment and the reach-back effectiveness but also on the cooperation and the triage at both the tactical and the operational level. O/Ts observed and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.

TO no. 5.Effective use of Air for Medical Evacuation needs careful planning and coordination between all the stakeholders. The PTA related to TO no. 5. were the Police as responsible for the Evacuation, MRCC Nuuk as the Air Task Coordinator (ATC) and all other Air Planners involved. The Police forwarded their Evacuation requirements to MRCC Nuuk and O/Ts observed how effectively Air was used for Medical Evacuation and reported their observations to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.

TO no. 6.This year the Media and Press PTA were Joint Arctic Command, the Greenlandic Police and Greenland’s Emergency and Management Commission in Nuuk. O/Ts observed and reported how professional the PTA handled the massive pressure from 25 journalist students simulating the local, the national and the international media and press like the BBC, CNN and the New York Times.

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TO no. 7.As an add-on from SAREX 2012 a Maritime Pollution TTX played an important part in this year’s SAREX. O/Ts observed the planning and the cooperation between the stakeholders and the efficiency of the current contingency plan for getting Counter Maritime Pollution equipment into theatre and reported to the EXCON on board HDMS VAEDDEREN.

4.Exercise Description

4.1. Exercise Setting

Geographic distances and the lack of infrastructure were two major factors in the planning and execution of SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. The AO was the Greenland Sea, King Oscar’s Fiord, Ella Island and Mestersvig Airstrip. Reykjavik and Keflavik in Iceland, approximately 600 nautical miles or 1.000 km from the AO, were used as the main hubs for maritime and air assets proceeding into the AO. No towns or settlements exist on the northeastern coast of Greenland that can provide facilities or assets that might help a search and rescue effort. The only permanent human presence in the area is the Danish Sirius Military Dog Sledge patrols, which maintain a number of depots along the coast.

Seasonal temperatures for the AO are between -1°C and 4°C. In September the average precipitation is 56.6 mm and mean number of days with precipitation is 12 days. From 10-13 September, there is an average of 13.5 hrs. of daylight plus approximately 5.5 hrs of nautical twilight. In the first two days of the exercise, the weather was relatively rough in the Greenland Sea, with gale force winds off shore, while it was comparatively calm in King Oscar’s Fiord. Ice conditions were mostly clear, with isolated drifting bergs.

4.2. Scenario and Conduct of the Exercise

At the Post Exercise Discussions (PXD) in Nuuk in the period 22-23 Oct 13 it was concluded that the scenario for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was realistic though capacities had to be pre-positioned prior to the exercise.

The scenario involved a medium-sized cruise ship the “ARCTIC VICTORY” (simulated by HDMS VAEDDEREN) with 250 passengers and crew, which first went missing in the Greenland Sea and later ran aground in King Oscar’s Fiord off Ella Island, followed by an explosion and resulting fires on board. For this exercise, operations were minimized during the night due to insufficient EXCON personnel for 24-hour operations.

The exercise setup called for a multitude of tasks in the operational response, including maritime search and rescue; fire fighting at sea; evacuation by sea and air; deployment of emergency medical personnel, fire and rescue personnel, and police registration personnel; use of a specialized search team with cameras and listening equipment to locate missing persons below deck; triage and emergency medical treatment by doctors and paramedics at sea and on shore; establishing a reception facility for evacuees on land, establishing guard duty to protect evacuees against the possibility of attacks by polar bears; continuous updating of the SAR service’s Persons On Board (POB) list and the police’s Disaster Involved Registry (DIR) with identities and medical status of evacuees, etc, etc. All in all, the intent was to closely simulate the many challenges of coordinating a multinational search and

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rescue effort in the high Arctic.

The scenario was initiated on Day 1, when the cruise ship failed to report position on time through the mandatory reporting system GREENPOS to Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Nuuk, Greenland. The situation called for efforts to establish communication with the cruise ship, subsequent notification of other Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) in the high Arctic region, and tasking of all available aircraft and surface vessels for a search operation in the Greenland Sea. MRCC Nuuk acted as the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC), while the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) CL-604 Challenger initially assumed the role of On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), being the first asset in the area. It later handed OSC duties over to HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN (HVBJ), which was the first ship to arrive. For training purposes, a number of handovers were conducted of the OSC and Aircraft Coordinator (ACO) roles throughout Days 1 and 2, something that in a real-life operation should of course be limited to a minimum in order to prevent confusion and loss of situational awareness.

On Day 1 EXCON was forced to withdraw the HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN (KNUD) with the purpose of pre-deploying participants to Ella Island for phase 2 of the exercise. The RDAF Challenger, the Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) vessel TYR, and HVBJ and HVBJ’s organic helicopter executed a search in the open sea including an OSC chop from the Challenger to the HVBJ. No actual search targets were deployed, as this would have been the scripted task of KNUD otherwise engaged. During the search the RDAF Challenger successfully dropped 4 x US Coast Guard ‘Self Locating Datum Marker Buoys’ (SLDMBs) used by RCC Boston and MRCC Nuuk to develop the Search Area.

Day 2 was in general nicely conducted in accordance with the script. As an example the search area assigned by MRCC Nuuk corresponded precisely with the search area developed by RCC Boston. Day 2 was primarily focused on the search for a missing life raft from the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ with 12 persons on board. Furthermore, MRCC Nuuk was a part of a satellite experimentation project of getting satellite photos from the search area. At the end of Day 2 the “ARCTIC VICTORY” reported their position and it was confirmed that all 12 passengers from the missing life raft were safe which concluded the search phase and Event 1.

In the morning on Day 3, “ARCTIC VICTORY” with all 250 crew and passengers suddenly ran aground near Ella Island in King Oscar’s Fiord. The ship initially reported the situation well in hand, with minor fires and no widespread panic. However, it soon became apparent that the ship’s crew did not, in fact, have the situation under control. Subsequently, an explosion in the engine room resulted in multiple injuries, fire on board and tilting of the ship. Hence, the need arose for an extensive rescue operation to save the crew of 50 persons and the 200 passengers (simulated by Greenland Police Students and crew from HDMS VAEDDEREN), who were either still on board or had entered life rafts. Full evacuation was necessary and, as exercise artificiality, in order to train the land-based rescue teams, including the police, this involved establishing a land based reception facility on Ella Island, rather than use the space on board the ships in the area.

Emergency medical support assets were shipped, flown, and parachuted in to conduct triage

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and to treat the casualties. An evacuation chain was established to transport evacuees, first by small boats to Ella Island, then by helicopters and small aircraft from Ella Island to Mestersvig Airstrip, where a Casualty Staging Unit for triage was established, and then onwards by large aircraft to Iceland, where the nearest full hospital was located. Unfortunately, this evacuation chain was somewhat delayed on Day 3 by a number of factors:

EXCON had to freeze the exercise in the morning on Day 3 to ensure that all relevant TA had received and been instructed in operating the new Tetra-Flex VHF radios. TA using the same radios and frequencies was a Lesson Identified from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 to be tested in SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to distribute the radios prior to SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 leaving EXCON no other options than to freeze the exercise in the morning of Day 3.

EXCON also had to freeze the exercise prior to deployment of the Canadian SAR-TECH Teams from the Canadian C-130 Hercules in order to ensure that all safety precautions including clear lines of communication, pre-positioning of safety-boats prior to the parachute drop etc.

Establishing local satellite internet connection in the fiord systems above 72N was also a recommendation from SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 to be tested during SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. During Day 1 and 2 the Danish Telegraph Regiment (TGR) was responsible for establishing an internet link from Mestersvig to Ella Island for testing purposes. Unfortunately, the link system never became operational due to failure in one of the relay stations. Not having internet connection hampered using the common C3-log system but also EXCON’s ability to coordinate the exercise play using Apan as the EXCON steering and management tool.

The Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day) was held on Day 3. Due to other tasks in Daneborg the Sirius Sledge Patrol was not as strongly manned as expected on Ella Island. Subsequently, the DV-Day program had to be adjusted. EXCON decided to use KNUD’s SAR vessel to transport VIPs to the participating TAs to watch the exercise unfold. HDMS HVIDBJOERNENs rubber dinghy was also used as VIP transportation leaving the OSC without Response Team transportation. The decision of including the SAR vessel and the rubber dinghy in the DV-Day program led to confusion within the TA, not having the SAR vessel and the rubber dinghy at disposal; on the other hand the decision resulted in a successful execution of the DV-Day.

HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN, as the OSC, organized the rescue assistance with available resources such as the rescue/boarding teams from ICG TYR, HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN, and HDMS HVIDBJOERNEN but also the Canadian SAR-TECH Teams dropped from the Canadian C-130 Hercules. When the rescue/boarding teams had gained control with the widespread panic, when the fire from the engine explosion was extinguished and the casualties were carefully organized, the OSC, in close coordination with the Police Command Post (CP) leader on Ella Island, decided to evacuate the 248 crew and passengers, leaving the captain and the chief engineer on board for interrogation and blood sampling by the Police.

The boarding teams carrying out the damage control, the hands-on rescue and the evacuation effort on the ”ARCTIC VICTORY” and elsewhere on Day 3 were professional and

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the cooperation was good between all the units of different nationalities. However, it was observed that the OSC should have focused more on the need for assistance on board the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ rather than focusing on taking charge leaving the captain without influence. Another observation was that the boarding teams prioritized fire and damage control higher than taking care of the casualties (which of course also could have been the right decision based on how dangerous the situation was), and finally the boarding teams did not immediately request a passengers’ list making it impossible to check if passengers were missing. It took the boarding team a while to figure out that a number of passengers had entered some of the life rafts.

It was also observed that a number of unmarked “No-Players” interfered with the Ex-Play like VIPs and EXCONs making it very hard for the Response Teams to separate “No-Players” from the Training Audience.

The most injured casualties were evacuated first and the rest followed in prioritized order. At Ella Island the Police CP registered the incoming crew and the passengers, and organized the further evacuation to Mestersvig Airstrip. In general, the evacuation was delayed based on the previous mentioned factors, but another initial delaying factor was that Air Greenland had to extract the AS-350 helicopter on Day 3 due to a real life or ”No Play” task, which severely reduced the evacuation capacity from Ella Island to Mestersvig to be only one LYNX helicopter. The VIPs arrived with TWIN OTTERs (TWOs) on Day 3 and a bright TA member decided to enroll the TWOs in the evacuation chain, which naturally speeded up the evacuation and made it up for the missing AS-350.

On the morning of Day 4 the EXDIR reset the situation having all the 250 crew and passengers back on the “ARCTIC VICTORY” and the evacuation was started over once again. Not having the VIP program running in parallel and having all SAR resources available, including Air Greenland’s AS-350 helicopter, HDMS KNUD RASMUSSENs SAR vessel and HDMS HVIDBJOERNENs rubber dinghy, the rescue and the chain of evacuation was improved on Day 4. The exercise play on Day 4 started as Day 3 with ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ running aground, engine explosions, widespread panic etc. The conclusion of rescue of Day 4 was that everything was fast and highly professional handled by the TA. During Day 4 the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) Search Team searched the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ with special cameras and listening equipment to make sure that all persons on board were located and evacuated.

The effort by the trained personnel coming on board the ”ARCTIC VICTORY” was excellent and their conduct and cooperation was professional. Good use was made of floor plans of the ship in conducting the search efficiently and in handing over search responsibilities between the teams.

After the ship had been confirmed empty, and the evacuation had been concluded with the last of the evacuees arriving in Iceland, Event 2 ended and ENDEX was called.

During Day 3 and Day 4 a counter maritime pollution tabletop exercise (TTX) was conducted in parallel with the rescue and evacuation operations. The Government of Greenland’s

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(GoG) Ministry of Housing, Nature and Environment (MoHNE) was responsible for handling the oil spill from the “ARCTIC VICTORY”. The GoG only had limited resources to deploy for countering the “ARCITC VICTORY” oil spill, and consequently the MoHNE immediately requested counter maritime pollution assistance from Denmark. After a political decision CHOD DEN ordered JACMD to take all necessary steps to plan for countering the oil spill from the “ARCTIC VICTORY”.

JACMD used the counter maritime pollution Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) and requested floating boomers at ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ. ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ immediately started to plan for deploying the boomers and was ready for the deployment using a Danish C-130 Hercules on Day 4. The feedback received from ADMIRALDANFLEET HQ was that the SOP for counter maritime pollution assistance to JACMD was executed without any delaying factors or other complications and that no critical remarks needed to be included in this report.

4.3. Background for the Scenario

The background for the chosen exercise scenario was threefold. Firstly, the existing resources available for Arctic SAR are scarce and the sheer enormity of the geographic distances will render any large-scale SAR operation in or near the AO being extremely challenging for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. The sea line from the AO to the nearest major seaports in Iceland is approximately 600 nautical miles across open sea. The average transit time at 15kts is approximately 40 hours.

Secondly, a steady increase in ship activities, though decreased cruise ship activities have been noted during the last two years, the tendency of growing activities in the Greenlandic Waters is evident. The polar sea ice has gradually withdrawn from the northeastern coast of Greenland during summers. As of yet, the biggest cruise ships with thousands of passengers do not sail in the primary exercise area, but small and medium-sized cruise ships do. Large ship accidents have occurred elsewhere off the Greenland coast before, and the risk of a future major accident with potentially extensive loss of human life could be high. Furthermore, Greenland’s coastline is environmentally vulnerable to maritime pollution. The risk of pollution accidents increases with the increasing ship traffic, as well as the growth in mineral exploration and extraction activities in the Arctic region.

Thirdly, the above factors have led to a growing awareness that it is of vital importance to strengthen the Arctic emergency preparedness in general and SAR preparedness in the waters off Greenland in particular. The Danish Defense, in cooperation with Greenlandic civil authorities, performs a number of tasks in and around Greenland including airborne and seaborne surveillance, fisheries inspection, pollution control and, not least, maritime and aeronautical search and rescue (SAR). These areas are focus areas for development in the coming years and a Danish Arctic Response Force is in the process of being established to support Arctic emergency challenges.

Similar development can be witnessed in the other Arctic nations and has resulted in the “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” and the Oil Spill Agreement issued in 2013 and both signed by the eight member nations of

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the Arctic Council. SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was conducted within this framework, and the large number of participating units and organizations of different nationalities testified both to the commitments agreed upon and the potential for further strengthening of SAR cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.

4.4. Evaluation, Analysis and Reporting Design

As stipulated in the Exercise Plan Part Three (main body), the aim of the evaluation, analysis and reporting for SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 is to improve upon and enhance cooperation on standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Arctic SAR operations. To this end, the evaluation, analysis and reporting design during the exercise and post-exercise included:

Tactical Analysis: Daily observations by O/Ts communicated through the Apan Exercise Steering WEB-page, e-mail and other means, as well as observations and comments by EXDIR during nightly update briefs. A battle rhythm to collect all necessary information was established and morning and evening briefings were conducted throughout the exercise.

Hot wash-ups: A hot wash-up lead by EXDIR and COs from TA was held on the 6th of September 2013 in Mestersvig. To supplement this, all Training Audiences were encouraged to conduct hot wash-ups within own organizations and units. A concept with a suggested content and format was distributed, in which TA were asked to answer hot wash-up questions individually and/or through group work and forward the answers to the Chief Analyst prior to Hot Wash-up via email.

First Impressions Report (FIR): Was to be distributed on the 6th of September 2013.

Draft Final Exercise Report (Draft FER). To be distributed to all stakeholders on the 1st of October 2013.

Post Exercise Discussions (PXD). To be conducted on the 22–23 of October 2013 in Nuuk, Greenland. The PXD will focus on the participants’ suggestions for adjustments and additions to the Draft FER text.

Final Exercise Report (FER): Will be approved, published and distributed to all stakeholders on 01 November 2013.

5.Achievement of the OSE’s Training Objectives

SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was the largest multinational search and rescue exercise to be held in the Arctic region in 2013. The SAREXs are the result of an increased cooperation amongst the Arctic Nations, sharing concern for the safety in the Arctic region, with increased ship traffic as a consequence of the global warming and reduced sea and polar ice.

SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was designed to closely simulate the complexity and challenges of mounting a search and rescue operation involving the rescue and evacuation of a fairly

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large number of people in the remote Arctic. This in order to expose weaknesses in the organization and coordination so that these might be turned into Lessons Identified (LI), remedied and ultimately resolved as Lessons Learned (LL).The scope of the exercise was deliberately ambitious, in order to most accurately reflect the scale and logistical difficulties of a live operation in a remote Arctic region visited by cruise ships very similar in size and number of people on board to the simulated “ARCTIC VICTORY”.

SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 was meant as a follow-up on SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and not least the LI from last year to validate whether or not these LI could be changed to LL.

Apart from the LI and the experience and training value gained by the participating units and authorities, the exercise again this year tested and validated the JACMD concept of operations (CONOPS), which calls for two Arctic Patrol Vessels, one on the western coast and one on the eastern, to be permanently stationed as far north as the pack ice allows during the summer, and an Arctic Patrol Frigate with organic helicopter patrolling the rest of the coastline. Additionally one Arctic Patrol Frigate with helicopter is stationed at the Faroe Islands, from where it can be deployed to the Greenland Sea.Due to long distances, only JACMD assigned ships and ships from either Iceland, Norway (Svalbard) or Canada, can be expected to reach an accident area in time to mount effective rescue operations.

The CONOPS allows the organic helicopters on board the Off Shore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to, if necessary, be deployed forward to the Arctic OPVs in the far north as soon as the OPVs are in range, and provides the only SAR helicopter capacity to be able to reach the remote north within 24 hours.

The exercise tested Air as the first response in the search operation, but also the ability to augment available platforms, to reinforce the search operation and to establish temporary forward bases to support the rescue and evacuation operations.

5.1. SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Training Objectives

Briefly summarized Event 1 was the search phase of the exercise spanning the first two days, and Event 2 and 3 was the rescue and evacuation event plus the counter maritime pollution event spanning the final two days.

The overall impression of the achievement of the Training Objectives is as follows:

1. Effective search and cooperation during the search operations were conducted by the units and the involved authorities. However, not all the planned activities were played in accordance with the script e.g. bad weather hampered dropping a life raft from a C-130 and on Day 1 HDMS KNUD RASMUSSEN was used for transportation instead of participating in the search operation. Nevertheless, the overall impression is that TO-1 was achieved.

2. The cooperation between the participating units and the rescue from the ‘ARCTIC VICTORY’ was well-organized and effective. TO-2 was achieved.

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3. A slow start on the evacuation process from Ella Island became more efficient later during Day 3 as the registration team gained experience in organizing the registration, and the severely wounded were starting to be evacuated. The evacuation from Mestervig to Iceland was well-organized and effective. In general the overall impression was insufficient information sharing both horizontally and vertically, especially at the strategic level. As an example there was no information exchange between the Danish National Operational Staff (NOST), Greenland Emergency Management Commission and the Icelandic counterpart the Icelandic ‘SST’. It is also unclear how the cooperation between the respective countries’ health authorities played-out. However, with the evacuation of casualties to Iceland and the rest of the crew and passengers to Nuuk, Greenland, TO-3 was successfully achieved.

4. Effective Medical Support and cooperation between nations and all involved units. TO-4 Achieved.

5. Effective use of Air for Medical Evacuation between nations and involved units. TO-5 Achieved.

6. In general, and as during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, the organizations had a hard time handling the press and media pressure, especially JACMD during the search phase in Event 1. JACMD suffered from not having a detailed press policy in place, but also an insufficient organization to deal with a media storm like the pressure the journalist students put on JACMD HQ. The overall impression is that JACMD HQ did not meet TO-6 during the search phase, though much better prepared and organized during the search and the evacuation phase; TO-6 was met in Event 2. The overall impression was that the Media TO-6 only was partly achieved.

7. Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities and organizations. Event 3 was played as a tabletop exercise (TTX) and the overall impression was that TO-7 was achieved.

The TO achievement visualized:

No. Training Objective Event 1 Event 2

1Effective search operations and cooperation between all involved centres and units

2Effective rescue operations and cooperation between all involved units

3Effective evacuation operations and cooperation between nations and all involved units

4Effective medical support and cooperation between nations and all involved units

5Effective use of air for medical evacuation between nations and involved units

6Effective media and press management between nations and all involved units

7Effective planning for counter Maritime Pollution between Arctic authorities and organizations

Stop-lights: Green (achieved), Yellow (partly achieved) and Red (not achieved).

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The OSE’s Training Objectives have in general been met. What remains is to make the LI into LL by making the necessary adjustments and to see if the desired effects have been achieved.

6.Subject Area Enclosures

The following subsections contain conclusions and recommendations from SAREX 2013 as they pertain to each of the Training Objectives/Subject Areas. They are aggregated from multiple observations made by both O/Ts, TAs and EXCON staffs, and confirmed during the Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk 22-23 October 2013. The Lessons Identified (LI) are intended to be general in nature and should be of interest to all involved parties. The LI from both SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 and SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 are included in enclosure 3 in a LI/LL-matrix divided into specific actionable items for COM JACMD and secondly into LI/LL of general interest which may not be applicable to all nations or organizations.

6.1. Search Operations (Training Objective no. 1)

6.1.1. Means and methods of communication

Conclusion and RecommendationWhen initiating a SAR operation it is important that the SMC have all available communication systems to alert all units in the area of the operation in order to get as many units/vessels as possible to assist, and to alert the wider SAR organization to the operation being initiated. Investigate if the SAR authorities in Greenland are setup to utilize all available distress communication systems, and if they have the necessary distress communication equipment to conduct SAR operations. Follow up on the question in the Arctic Contact Group to SAR in Greenland.

6.1.2. Use of the common log system (The C3 SAR Log)

Conclusion and RecommendationDuring SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 the common internet log proved extremely effective as both a SAR log and as a SAR information tool for higher Commands and strategic coordination forums. The common log has been updated with all SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 recommendations, including an off-line backup if the internet connectivity is lost. During SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 and in the aftermath at the Post Exercise Discussions (PXD) it was concluded and recommended that only entities directly involved in the SAR operation should have writing access to the C3 SAR Log, and that other Commands and coordination forums carefully should be identified and only have reading access. Terms for access should clearly be stated in the Standing Operational Procedure (SOP). Finally, it was recommended to develop a common international log system to be used by all SAR organizations in the Arctic region.

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6.1.3. Search for life rafts from ships

Conclusion and RecommendationLong distances and rough weather are making direct guidance of rescue units extremely important to save lives in the Arctic. Fixed wing search craft will normally be the first in the operation area and probably be appointed as OSC directing other SAR assets directly to the target. This scenario was trained during SAREX 2012 and 2013 and proved highly effective. Having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert throughout the Arctic summer season in Greenland’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is recommended.

6.1.4. JACMD capability as SMC

Conclusion and recommendationThe manning at JACMD was observed inadequate in case of a short notice emergency like the SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. It was generally recommended to strengthen JACMD manning on the operational side like Air and the logistical with no or very little redundancy. Furthermore, it was recommended to establish a plan for an immediate augmentation of JACMD HQ in case of emergencies and states of higher alert. Finally, it was concluded to avoid having JACMD as OSE/OCE as MRCC in future SAREXs. The priority should be having JACMD/MRCC Nuuk as PTA.

6.2. Rescue Operations (Training Objective no. 2)

6.2.1. Communications

Conclusion and recommendationAs recommended during SAREX Greenland Sea 2012, a simple and self sustained satellite internet transceiver solution, easy put on a mountain top, capable of covering at least 10 Nm, is recommended as the interim solution until internet SATCOM coverage in the fiord systems and above 72N is available. Such systems are recommended to be tested and implemented immediately. If an area is covered with internet the Tetra-Flex system can link-up and Tetra-Flex data be exchanged. Otherwise, it must be investigated if it is possible to deploy larger generators or attached fuel tanks for the Tetra-Flex relay stations which was tested and failed during SAREX 2013.

As an alternative to internet SATCOM and Tetra-Flex the Greenlandic Police used HF making the lines of communication long and the risk of losing information higher. Another alternative could be the newest Iridium phones. It is possible to share data “raw text messages” using the newest Iridium pilot data connection (like the ATW-690 and the ICESAR solution) used on Ella Island and Mestersvig. The system could be useful for all actors as an alternative until having full internet coverage and Tetra-Flex running.

Conclusion and recommendationDuring the PXD in Nuuk it was concluded that the EXPLAN had all the necessary Training Audience contact and communication information needed for SAREX 2013. It was also

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concluded that the participating units in general should have prepared better for the exercise by developing internal communication plans and contact information as supplement. Units could easily have established their own overview and distributed it internally as well as externally. However, it was recommended to investigate if frequencies have to be classified or if it is possible for JACMD to plan an exercise using non-classified frequencies.

Conclusion and recommendationThe Telegraph Regiment should be invited to participate in future SAREX planning conferences if they are to support the exercise with equipment.

6.2.2. Criminal investigations

Conclusion and recommendationDuring the PXD it was concluded that the OSC – in close cooperation with the Police – should plan for encountering criminal investigation. Naturally, saving lives have the highest priority, but it is important to plan for criminal investigation and interrogation in order to follow international standard procedures and regulations. The decision is recommended included and tested in future exercises.

6.2.3. Rescue Teams

Conclusion and RecommendationWhen a cruise ship is in distress and the captain has sent a mayday, the appointed OSC is responsible for the rescue operation in total, not the cruise ship captain. This was the conclusion from the PXD. The PXD forum also agreed on that the OSC primary task is to coordinate the rescue and the evacuation in close cooperation with all units and their rescue teams, and strive to include and coordinate with the cruise ship captain. The PXD found it very important that the OSC and the cruise ship captain are coordinating to plan and prepare the rescue and the evacuation as effective as possible.

6.2.4. Safety

Conclusion and recommendationDuring the execution of SAREX13 an observation stated that the safety precautions related to the parachuting jumps were not given sufficient priority. During the PXD safety was discussed and the conclusion was that safety at all times is a national responsibility, however, safety related to parachuting jumps should have been included and clearly stated in both the EXPLAN and in the Exercise script.

It was recommended that national representatives actively should submit national safety regulations to the Core Planning Team during the Planning Conferences, and acknowledge

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that national safety is included in the EXPLAN’s Safety Annex according the national regulations. Furthermore, representatives should inform the host nation about specific national safety precautions to be included in the planning to de-conflict and prevent misunderstandings.

6.3. Evacuation Operations (Training Objective no. 3)

6.3.1. Casualty assembly at Ella Island

Conclusion and recommendationThe conclusion from the PXD was that after a chaotic start at Ella Island things got well-organized and the evacuation was executed according to the Evacuation Plan. As a supplement to the Evacuation Plan it was recommended to establish a local emergency plan delineating responsibilities between all the engaged units at Ella Island e.g. to prevent the casualties from getting cold and to plan for special care.

6.4. Medical Support (Training Objective no. 4)

6.4.1. Coordination at higher level

Conclusion and recommendationLack of communication and coordination between Denmark-Greenland and Iceland had a negative effect on Iceland’s preparedness for receiving the casualties coming from Greenland. The nations should prioritize a formal cooperation agreement on situations like SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 in order to identify situations, priorities and responsibilities. It was recommended to work out a bi-lateral cooperation agreement between Denmark-Greenland and Iceland identifying situations, priorities and responsibilities and to establish a contingency plan with defined roles and responsibilities and processes for communication between involved authorities and agencies in each country.

6.5. Use of Air for Medical Evacuation (Training Objective no. 5)

Conclusion and recommendationAt the PXD it was concluded that the use of Air for Medical Evacuation all in all was well planned and well executed. The PXD forum agreed that the decision of selecting naval units for minor injured casualties and air for severe injured casualties were right. The PXD also concluded that if a similar operation should take place in a more isolated area far from an airstrip, there is a need for more helicopters and Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft to enable transportation of casualties to the nearest airstrip, for further Medical Evacuation by large fixed wing transportation aircraft. It was also concluded and recommended to consider logistical aspects and the architecture of an Air Task Organization (ATO) for handling a large number of aircraft as a part of JACMD contingency plans.

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6.6. Media and Press Management (Training Objective no. 6)

Conclusion and recommendation: Day 2, the first day with Media role-play, showed that especially JACMD was not prepared and manned to handle the Media and the Press and suffered from not having a communication plan for handling the situation. JACMD Lessons Identified from Day 2 was efficiently in-cooperated on Day 3 and the Media and Press handling was improved compared to Day 2. It was also noticed that the internet was used more effectively to inform relatives and the public. Becoming more internally focused and effective, the extern communication and the coordination between the authorities in Nuuk, like who is responsible for informing the Media and Press in which areas, were never observed effective. External coordination between the stakeholders in Nuuk should be taken to future exercises for examine to become a Lessons Learned.

6.7. Counter Maritime Pollution (Training Objective no. 7)

Conclusion and recommendation: The PXD concluded that the Tabletop Exercise (TTX) for countering the Maritime Pollution in King Oscars’ Fiord was challenging for all involved parties. JACMD is responsible for countering oil spill incidents outside the 3 NM borderlines off the coastline. The oil spill incident happened inside the 3 NM borderlines of the coastline inside the National Park, not covered by the emergency preparedness organization normally in force between the municipalities in Greenland. The Government of Greenland is responsible for the National Park but had no immediate response plan ready for an oil spill incident in the area. When the cruise ship ran aground and the oil spill was confirmed, the Government of Greenland contacted JACMD asking for assistance. The incident between all the involved parties in Greenland and counterparts in Denmark and Iceland revealed a number of LI like:

o Investigate and develop a contingency plan for deploying counter maritime pollution

equipment most effectively to Greenland. o Attach the contingency plan to the JACMD Standing Operational Procedure (SOP);

include a description of the responsibilities; the coordination and the reporting system between the Government of Greenland and JACMD.

o Include how to handle dual-operations in Greenland in the SOP.

o Continue working with the Danish Defense Center for Operational Oceanography

(DDCOO), exploiting new surveillance and oil drifting models for Greenland. o Update bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements and attach these to the JACMD SOP.

o Delineate operational guidelines to become more operationalized in the JACMD SOP.

o Develop JACMD environmental section to become a knowhow center of countering

maritime pollution in the Arctic.

6.8. Experimentation (Not a Training Objective)

Conclusion and recommendation

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The use of radar data from satellites is a most valuable tool for monitoring the Arctic environment. It allows large areas to be surveyed for oil spills, ships and icebergs. Correlation with AIS data can confirm a ships identity as well as checking if the ship has the AIS turned on and is using it correctly. There are a number of remaining challenges to be met. These include update frequency and coverage as well as data availability. In addition, the methodology used needs further verification. It is important that SARIS is kept updated with new and relevant meteorological and oceanographic information, in order to support search and rescue operations in the Greenlandic and Faroe waters.

It is recommended that the use of radar satellites to monitor the Arctic environment continues to be tested in new and different scenarios, in order to optimize the use not only of radar satellites but also other sources of information and data. This could be done by conducting dedicated trials using Danish units, maybe even as a mini-SAREX exercise in 2014 with only Danish participation.

It is recommended that DCOO continue to work on coordinating and improving the meteorological and oceanographic support to the Arctic Command.

6.9. Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) in Nuuk

During the PXD Syndicate Leaders back-briefed their syndicate work, concluded and recommended on observations and added three new LI to the previous listed (6.9.1. – 6.9.3.).

6.9.1. Future exercise planning and execution

In future exercises JACMD should not be Officer Scheduling the Exercise, Officer Conducting the Exercise or EXCON, when JACMD focus should be on preparing as Primary Training Audience. Ideally, an external Core Planning Team should plan and execute the Arctic SAR exercise.

6.9.2. Need for Air Space Management and an Air Control Officer

During the exercise the lack of an air space separation between the Canadian C-130, the Navy helicopters and the Twin Otters delayed the operation and the drop of the Canadian SAR-Techs. The observation was also submitted in 2012 but the lack of Air Space Management and an Air Control Officer became crystal clear to all in 2013. During the PXD it was concluded and recommended to include Air Space Management and an Air Control Officer in the operation and to promulgate the decision in the EXPLAN.

6.9.3. Do not run the Distinguished Visitors Day in parallel to the SAREX

The Training Audience was frustrated trying to handle the rescue operation on Day 3 in parallel to the execution of the Distinguished Visitors Day (DV-Day). The recommendation from the PXD was not to run both the Rescue Phase and the DV-Day in parallel. Add a special day for the DVs, and let them see all the units and let the units introduce

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themselves. This will probably satisfy the DVs but also allow the Training Audience to concentrate on doing their SAR job without interference and frustration. The PXD recommended having a special day running DV-Day Program and experimentations, not interfering with the Training Audience and the exercise play.

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Annex A: Distribution

SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS (SAO)

CanadaMINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCECANADIAN JOINT OPERATION COMMAND MARLANTHQ HALIFAXJRCC TRENTON

DenmarkMINISTRY OF THE STATEMINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRSMINISTRY OF BUSINESS AND GROWTHMINISTRY OF JUSTICEMINISTRY OF TRANSPORTMINISTRY OF DEFENCEARCTIC EMBASSADORNATIONAL POLICEDANISH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYDANISH MARITIME AUTHORITYDANISH TRANSPORT AUTHORITYCHIEF OF DEFENCEARMY OPERATIONAL COMMAND DENMARKADMIRALDANFLEETTACTICAL AIR COMMAND DENMARK1ST NAVAL SQUADRONNAVAL WARFARE SCHOOLDANISH TASK GROUPAIR TRANSPORT WING SQUADRON 721AIR TRANSPORT WING SQUADRON 690EXPEDITIONARY AIR STAFFCHIEF NAVAL HOME GUARDNAVAL HOME GUARD DISTRICT WEST

GreenlandGOVERNMENT OF GREENLANDMINISTRY OF HEALTH AND INFRASTRUCTUREMINISTRY OF NATURE AND ENVIRONMENTGREENLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMISSIONTHE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO GREENLANDCHIEF CONSTABLE TO THE POLICE, GREENLANDDANISH MARITIME AUTHORITY, GREENLANDAIR GREENLANDNAVIAIR FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTRE SONDRE STROMAASIAAT RADIOFaroe Islands

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HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE FAROE ISLANDSMINISTRY OF FISHERIESMRCC TORSHAVN

FinlandMINISTRY OF THE INTERIORFINNISH TRANSPORT SAFETY AGENCYNAVY COMMAND FINLANDMRCC TURKU, FINLAND

IcelandMINISTRY OF THE INTERIORICELANDIC COAST GUARDJRCC REYKJAVIK

NorwayMINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE POLICENORWEGIAN NATIONAL JOINT HQ COMNAVJRCC BODOEAIRLIFT SVALBARDROYAL NORWEGIAN AIR FORCE 333 SQUADRONASSOCIATION OF ARCTIC EXPEDITION CRUISE OPERATORS

Russian FederationMINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIONMINISTRY OF TRADEMINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR CIVIL DEFENSE,EMERGENCY AND ELIMINATION OF CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL DISASTERSRUSSIAN NAVY, NORTH FLEET

SwedenMINISTRY OF ENTERPRISE, ENERGY AND COMMUNICATIONSSWEDISH MARITIME ADMINISTRATIONNÄRINGSDEPARTEMENTETSJÖFARTSVERKET

United States of AmericaEUROPEAN COMMANDUNITED STATES COAST GUARDJRCC BOSTONUNITED STATES AIR NATIONAL GUARD 109TH AIRLIFT WING, NEW YORK

INTERNAL (HQ JOINT ARCTIC COMMAND):COM, COS, J1, J3, J4, J5, J7,

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Enclosure 1 SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 Final Exercise Report (Final)

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