EU and UK Export Controls and Sanctions
Enforcement Risks
Practical Insights on How to Address New,Evolving
Compliance Risks Affecting Your Global Business
American Conference Institute’s 17th National Forum on
Global Export Controls Compliance
June 12 & 13, 2014 Washington DC
Andrew W T Wood
Director,
Strategic Export Control
Marcus V. Alston
Senior Counsel –
Global Trade Compliance
Officer
Jasper Helder
Partner International Trade
A reminder of the EU regulatory landscape
– Export Controls: Dual Use, primary regulation on EU level
EU Dual Use Regulation 428/2009 (Annex I Control List)
Regulated on a national level:
Export licenses (general, global, individual) and T&Cs
Enforcement & penalties
– Export Controls: Military, regulation on national level, some EU
harmonization
EU Common Military List
EU Common export licensing criteria
– EU Sanctions Regulations
National additions exist (but rare)
EU and U.S. Sanctions Targets
Afghanistan
Belarus
Burma
DR Congo
Egypt
Tunisia
Libya
Eritrea
Somalia
Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau
Sudan and
South Sudan
Iraq
Ivory Coast
Iran
Liberia
Lebanon
North Korea
Syria
Yemen
Zimbabwe
China
SFRY
Armenia and
Azerbaijan
Cuba
USA (EU/Cuba
Blocking Measures)
Cyprus
Fiji
Haiti
Sri Lanka
Venezuela
Vietnam
Kuwait
EU and US
EU only
US only
US Anti-
Boycott only
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Central African
Republic
Russia/Crimea
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Red Flags must be Cleared
– “The measures set out in the present Regulation shall not give rise
to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal persons,
entities or bodies concerned, if they did not know, and had no
reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe
these prohibitions”
– Presumes due diligence measures have been taken (document!)
‘Knowledge defense’ in EU sanctions regulations
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EU Legal System
– Enforcement is regulated by national laws on national
level (but may be prompted by EU exchange of
information)
No EU rules on penalties (national criminal laws)
No EU rules in respect of enforcement (national codes of
criminal procedure/administrative laws)
– Common denominators between EU Member States
but also substantial differences
– Different cultures: from ‘Informed Compliance’ to
‘Enforced Compliance’
Enforcement Trends: ‘Globalization’
– Increased international co-operation
– New export control laws in countries outside the EU
and US
In the last several years Mongolia, Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines, the UAE, etc. have passed Strategic Trade Acts
or are considering doing do
– Extraditions
Granting extraditions for US export violations (Singapore,
Hong Kong, Germany, Czech Republic, United Kingdom)
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EU Detection of breaches
– Most EU Member States now have EDI customs
clearance systems (Germany: ATLAS, UK: CHIEF, NL:
SAGITTA) which is a key element of customs
modernization
– This permits the ‘screening’ of export declarations in
accordance with risk profiles implemented in these
systems
– Main ‘triggers’ for enforcement cases and investigations:
Detection of export declarations/shipments involving sanctioned
countries through these EDI customs clearance systems
Information obtained through the EU Intelligence Community
Increasingly: voluntary self-disclosures
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EU Enforcement Types
– Administrative enforcement
Audits
Withdrawal of licenses / use restrictions
Warning Letters
– Criminal enforcement
Investigations (commonly by Customs, who mostly are
authorized to conduct criminal investigations)
Prosecution (often by general Prosecution Authorities)
Settlement (in some EU Member States) with Prosecutor /
Customs
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EU Enforcement
– National administrations may have duty to report
violations to prosecuting authorities → may impede
voluntary self-disclosures
– Prosecuting authorities may have discretion to refrain
from prosecution → transparency as well as criteria for
prosecution vary between EU Member States
– Just because cases aren’t publicized as much does not
mean that there is no enforcement: companies try to
settle investigation out of Court to avoid negative
publicity
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EU Enforcement
– While EU sanctions legislation has significantly
increased, there is little published enforcement history
– Historical emphasis on weapons of mass destruction and
arms embargoes in combination with sanctioned
countries
– Prosecution not always based on export controls
breaches but often on common criminal offenses (e.g.,
forgery of documents)
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EU Enforcement Examples – In 2004 a German business man and a trading
company manager were convicted to 4 years and 15
months of imprisonment respectively for the (attempted)
export of aluminum tubes to North Korea, despite a
catch-all decision. The tubes could be used in
commercial products as well as in the construction of
gas ultra-centrifuges for uranium enrichment. District Court of Stuttgart, Case 10 KLs 141 Js 28271/03, Judgement of 28 May 2004 (reported in ‘Enforcing European Union
Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods’, Anna Wetter, SIPRI Research Report no. 24)
– Gotthard L. sentenced to 5 1/2 years for procurement
support of ultracentrifuges for Libya and AQ Kahn
network (forfeited proceeds of Euro 3.5 million) Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, judgment of 31 October 2008, reported in press release by the Court
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EU Enforcement Examples
– Conviction (4 months) for attempts to export dual use
electronic items, thyratrons with ECCN 3A228, which
can be used as ignition in nuclear weapons to Iran.
Quashed in appeal but sentence maintained in view of
falsification charges. District Court of Halmstad, Case B 2051-99, Judgement of 25 Nov. 1999; and Court of Appeal for Western Sweden, Case B
5985-99, Judgement of 6 Sep. 2000 (reported in ‘Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods’, Anna
Wetter, SIPRI Research Report no. 24)
– Conviction (suspended sentence) for knowingly trying
to export non-corrosive valves to Iran. The suspect
wrote that the producers of the valves were not aware
of their end use. Reported on 6 February 2013 on Nuclear Export Controls Blog
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EU Enforcement Examples
– July 2012: Businessman knowingly attempting to sell surface to air missiles (from
North Korea) and Beretta pistols to Azerbaijan without a license and despite an
arms embargo. He was jailed to three ½ years for the missiles and to 2 1/2 years
for the handguns.
Reported on UK BIS ECO prosecutions blog
– December 2011: Two British citizens were convicted (12 and 6 months’ suspended
sentence) for knowingly attempting to breach EU export controls, by seeking to
ship prohibited goods (electrical switchgear) to a factory in Iran. Quashed in appeal
due to unconscious bias of one of the jurors.
Reported by BBC news, court of appeal judgment
– October 2010: Business owner jailed for selling controlled goods without a license
to Iran: a businessman has been jailed for eight months and ordered to pay
£30,000 costs for knowingly exporting controlled goods (in particular the supply of
radiation detection equipment) to Iran without an export license.
Reported on UK BIS ECO prosecutions blog
–
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EU Enforcement Examples
– The suspect (Kouwenhoven) was director of timber operations of
Oriental Timber Company and the Royal Timber Company.
– It was alleged that while serving in these positions he had close
ties with Charles Taylor and facilitated the import of arms for
Taylor in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions.
– Kouwenhoven was prosecuted for war crimes and sanctions
violations, convicted in first instance, overturned in appeal,
cassation pending. District Court of The Hague, 7 June 2006, appeal: Court of Appeals The Hague, 10 March 2008
EU Factors in Enforcement and Prosecution
– Limited resources: the number of officials in authorities
varies significantly between EU Member States
– Proliferation of authorities:
Customs (detection, investigations)
Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Financial Authorities
(financial sanctions)
Ministries of Commerce / Trade / Economic Affairs & related
licensing agencies (export controls, non-proliferation)
Prosecution (often general authority, specialist expertise not
always present in all EU Member States)
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Enforcement : US vs. EU
Civil versus criminal (civil
accounts for significant penalties)
Publicity
Established and regulated self
disclosure practice
Extensive jurisdiction
Administrative versus criminal
(some EU Member States:
forfeiture of proceeds of crime)
Less public (settlements are often
not disclosed)
Self disclosure practice varies
between EU Member States (e.g.
UK/NL well developed,
Southern/Eastern EU less
developed)
Jurisdiction on EU Member States
level
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– How serious is the violation?
– Is a disclosure to government authorities required by contract, foreign regulation or materiality from a securities law perspective?
– Importance of being the first to disclose?
– Risk of current / former employees, business partners or customers disclosing infringements as part of their own disclosure or whistle-blowing
– Likelihood of detection
– Compliance culture
– Multi-jurisdictional investigations – how disclosure in one jurisdiction will affect non-disclosure in other jurisdictions
– Voluntary cooperation – has it previously been credited? How certain and predictable is it?
Deciding to Disclose or Not
– National administrations may have duty to report violations to Prosecuting Authorities
– Prosecuting Authorities may not have discretion to refrain from prosecution
– What response to expect: transparancy varies between EU Member States
Guidelines for prosecution not commonly established or publicly available
No public reporting on concrete cases in most EU Member States
Where settlements occur, these are not commonly published
Where settlement is possible, no published guidelines for amounts/measures
– In some EU Member States legal entities cannot be prosecuted for sanctions violations, only individuals Legal representatives (appointed directors/officers) liable
Company staff directly involved in relevant transactions
Deciding to Disclose or Not: EU considerations
Andrew W T Wood
Director,
Strategic Export Control
Marcus V. Alston
Senior Counsel –
Global Trade Compliance
Officer
Jasper Helder
Partner International Trade
Thank you.