ENGR 107: Engineering Fundamentals Lecture 3: Engineering Ethics C. Schaefer September 3, 2003.

ENGR 107: Engineering ENGR 107: Engineering FundamentalsFundamentals

Lecture 3:

Engineering Ethics

C. Schaefer

September 3, 2003

September 3, 2003 ENGR 107: Engineering Fundamentals

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Reference(s)Reference(s)Ethics in Engineering: 2nd Edition, Mike W.

Martin and Roland Schinzinger, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1989.

Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 2nd Edition, C. Harris, M. Pritchard, and M. Rabins, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000.


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Engineering EthicsEngineering Ethics“Technology can have no legitimacy unless it inflicts

no harm”, Adm H.G. Rickover, father of the US nuclear navy.– What does Adm. Rickover mean by this?– Should engineers avoid technology that has the

potential for [______] inflicting harm on a society or its members? Possibly? likely?

Engineers have an ethical and social responsibility to themselves, their clients, and to society.

Practically (although there is much debate about this), engineering ethics is about balancing cost, schedule, and risk.


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Engineering EthicsEngineering EthicsEngineering ethics is:

– the study of moral issues and decisions confronting individuals and organizations involved in engineering,

– the study of related questions about moral conduct, character, ideals, and relationships of people and organizations involved in technological development.


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General TermsGeneral TermsEthics – critical reflection on what one does

and why one does it.Morality – social conventions about right

and wrong conduct.Descriptive ethics (non-normative) –

factual investigation of moral behavior and beliefs, i.e., the study not of what people ought to do but how they reason and how they act.


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General TermsGeneral Terms

Normative ethics – (general) Which “action guides” are worthy of moral acceptance and for what reasons? Action guides include theories, principles, rules, and maxims.

Normative ethics – (applied) Professional codes of ethics that specify role norms or obligations that professions attempt to enforce.

Tacit ethic – unsaid, unspoken rule of practice.


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Ethics NomenclatureEthics Nomenclature Meta-ethics – theories about ethics. Normative ethics – recommendations of

standards and guidelines for morally right or good behavior;– engineering ethics (and professional ethics, in general)

are normative in nature.

Ethical relativism – ethics relative to specific culture or society.

Ethical absolutism – same ethical standards apply to all societies and cultures.


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Training in Preventive EthicsTraining in Preventive Ethics

Stimulating the moral imaginationRecognizing ethical issuesDeveloping analytical skillsEliciting a sense of responsibilityTolerating disagreement and ambiguity


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QuestionsQuestions

Should we judge what is ethical by a relative or absolute standard? Why or why not?

But which (whose) “moral standard” do we use to judge these things?– Is the Engineering Code of Ethics relativistic or

absolute?


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Organizing Principles to Resolving Organizing Principles to Resolving Ethical IssuesEthical Issues

Utilitarian thinking – a standard that promotes those individual actions or rules that produce the greatest total amount of utility to those affected.– A code that enjoins engineers to promote the safety,

health, and welfare of the public.– What is utility, though? Happiness?– Preference utilitarianism – promote those conditions

that allow each individual to pursue happiness as he or she conceives it.

– Two conditions necessary for this: freedom and well-being.

– Practically, for engineers, this advocates cost/benefit analyses.


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Problems with UtilitarianismProblems with Utilitarianism Difficult to quantify benefits for ALL those affected. “Greatest good” difficult to apply to an all-inclusive

population. Someone gets “shafted” – approach justifies perpetrating

injustice on individuals, i.e., someone gets left out. Three approaches:

– Cost/benefit – quantifiable approach. Maximize positive utilities (benefits) against negative utilities (costs).

– Act utilitarian – “will the course of action produce more good than any alternative course of action that I could take”?

– Rule utilitarian – “would utility be maximized if everyone did the same thing in the same circumstances”? Adoption of commonly accepted rules.


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The Ethics of Respect for PersonsThe Ethics of Respect for Persons Those actions or rules are right that, if followed, would

accord equal respect to each person as a moral agent. One well-known Respect for Persons Approach

– The Golden Rule – “universalizability”: “Treat others a you would like them to treat you” (Christian). “Hurt not others with that which pains you”, (Buddhist) “What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow man”,

(Judaism) “No man is a true believe unless he desires for his brother that

which he desires for himself”, (Islam)

Two others not discussed:– The self-defeating criterion– Rights


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Impediments to ResponsibilityImpediments to Responsibility

Self-interest. Fear. Self-deception. Ignorance. Egocentric tendencies. Microscopic vision. Uncritical acceptance of authority. Groupthink.


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Questionable Engineering PracticesQuestionable Engineering Practices Trimming – “smoothing of irregularities to make data look

extremely accurate and precise” Cooking – “retaining only those results that fit the theory

and discarding others”. Forging – “ inventing some or all of the research data…” Plagiarism – misappropriating intellectual property. Conflicts of interest (such as accepting gifts.)

– actual– potential– apparent


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Clearly Wrong Engineering PracticesClearly Wrong Engineering Practices Lying Deliberate deception Withholding information Failing to adequately promote the dissemination

of information Failure to seek out the truth Revealing confidential or proprietary information Allowing one’s judgment to be corrupted.


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Code of Ethics of EngineersCode of Ethics of EngineersFundamental CanonsFundamental Canons

1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties,

2. Perform services only in areas of their competence,

3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner,

4. Act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees,

5. Avoid deceptive acts in the solicitation of professional employment.

National Society of Professional Engineers


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Code of Ethics of EngineersCode of Ethics of EngineersProfessional ObligationsProfessional Obligations

Engineers shall be guided in all their professional relations by the highest standards of integrity,

Engineers shall at all times strive to serve the public interest, Engineers shall avoid all conduct or practice which is likely to

discredit the profession or deceive the public, Engineers shall not disclose confidential information concerning the

business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client or employer without his/her consent,

Engineers shall not be influenced in their professional duties by conflicting interests,

Engineers shall uphold the principle of appropriate and adequate compensation for those engaged in engineering work,

Engineers shall not attempt to obtain employment or advancement or professional engagements by untruthfully criticizing other engineers, or by other improper or questionable methods.


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Code of Ethics of EngineersCode of Ethics of EngineersProfessional ObligationsProfessional Obligations

Engineers shall not attempt to injure, maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation, prospects, practice or employment of other engineers, nor untruthfully criticize other engineers’ work.

Engineers shall accept responsibility for their professional activities; provided, however, that Engineers may seek indemnification for professional services arising out of their practice for other than gross negligence, where the Engineer’s interests cannot otherwise be protected.

Engineers shall give credit for engineering work to those to whom credit is due, and will recognize the proprietary interests of others.

Engineers shall cooperate in extending the effectiveness of the profession by interchanging information and experience with other engineers and students, and will endeavor to provide the opportunity for the professional development and advancement of engineers under their supervision.


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Space Shuttle Challenger Space Shuttle Challenger DisasterDisaster


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Case BackgroundCase Background Morton Thiokol developer of Space Shuttle solid rocket

boosters (SRB’s) Roger M. Boisjoly senior engineer for SRB and SRB joint

design. Inspection of previous flights (STS-51C) indicated hot gas

blow-by in primary seals in two field joints. Seal leaks could weaken joint and cause catastrophic

failure of SRB and loss of Shuttle and its crew. Seal leaks attributed to cold weather effect on O-ring

resiliency. O-rings lost resiliency below about 50° F.


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Case BackgroundCase Background If O-rings were cold, they would not flex. During hot gas blow-by, seals (O-rings) would

erode (be “eaten” away). Earlier launch (STS-51B) also indicated some

blow-by and seal erosion. Earlier seal failures prompted Thiokol to conduct

seal tests on resiliency– First indication of failure mode.– Test results kept secret from NASA until “Flight

Readiness Review” immediately preceding decision to launch STS-51L (Challenger).


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Solid Rocket Booster DesignSolid Rocket Booster Design


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Solid Rocket Booster DesignSolid Rocket Booster Design


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SRB Joint DesignSRB Joint Design


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Events Leading to Flight Events Leading to Flight Readiness ReviewReadiness Review

Following seal test results, a memo was circulated to technical and management personnel at Thiokol outlining problem.

Memo indicated potential for catastrophic failure of SRB joints, loss of shuttle vehicle, and loss of crew.

NASA asked Thiokol to present a summary of all booster seal problems. (NASA later denies this).

A task team was formed to solve the problem.


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Events Leading to Flight Events Leading to Flight Readiness ReviewReadiness Review

Task team denied adequate resources by Thiokol management – manpower and materiel.

NASA and Thiokol significantly pressured to keep launch schedule.

Thiokol or NASA management never acknowledged Boisjoly’s status reports.


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Flight Readiness ReviewFlight Readiness ReviewTelcon between Thiokol, Marshall Space

Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center to discuss whether to launch STS-51L next day.

Temperature predicted at launch: 18°F.Seal erosion problems and concerns

discussed.Task force problems presented to NASA –

Thiokol management NOT happy with Boisjoly.


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Flight Readiness ReviewFlight Readiness ReviewNASA asked Thiokol middle management

for launch decision. Thiokol does not recommend launch.

NASA clearly disappointed.Thiokol requests private “caucus”.During caucus, Thiokol General Manager

pushes for middle management to launch – he apparently does not want to disappoint his client, NASA.


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Flight Readiness ReviewFlight Readiness Review

Engineers NOT encouraged to talk during Thiokol management caucus.

Thiokol management felt that all facts were on table.

Thiokol recommends launch to NASA.According to Boisjoly, the launch decision

resulted from “intense customer intimidation”.


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The ExplosionThe Explosion


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Hot Gas Leak from SRBHot Gas Leak from SRB(prior to explosion)(prior to explosion)


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Post DisasterPost DisasterSeven astronauts, including one teacher,

lost their lives in the explosion.Cost of disaster is in the billions;

– $1.7 billion to replace Challenger with Endeavor

– $450 million launch costs– Payload hardware and development costs– Congressional hearings– Process changes and oversight


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Post DisasterPost DisasterSpace shuttle program put on hold for

several years of investigation and hardware redesign.

During Roger’s Commission proceedings, Thiokol and NASA management begin to cover up missteps.

Cover up exposed.


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Post DisasterPost Disaster Boisjoly leaves Thiokol following efforts of

management to “punish” him. Some fellow employees hold grudge against Boisjoly’s testimony to Congress.

Thiokol or NASA never really held accountable for disaster.

$10 million fine to Thiokol reportedly not paid. Chance of another catastrophic Shuttle disaster is

1 in 131 flights – even after redesign!


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The Crew of Flight STS-51LThe Crew of Flight STS-51L

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ENGR 107: Engineering Fundamentals Lecture 3: Engineering Ethics C. Schaefer September 3, 2003.

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