ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT - Gold Coast Quarrygoldcoastquarry.com/assets/Documents/QQ - Hazard...

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

APPENDIX

QQHAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT

Gold Coast Quarry EIS

©RiskTools Pty Ltd COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE Version April 2013 1

A report on the risks and hazards of the

proposed

Boral Gold Coast Quarry

for the

Environmental Impact Statement

Facilitated by RiskTools Pty Ltd



Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 3

2. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 5

2.1 Project Description ................................................................................................ 5

2.2 The Quarry Process ............................................................................................... 7

2.3 Stages of Development ......................................................................................... 7

3. PROCESS USED .............................................................................................................. 13

4. OUTCOMES ................................................................................................................... 16

4.1 Hazards and risks to people and property .......................................................... 17

4.2 Risk Management Plan ....................................................................................... 19

4.3 Emergency Management Planning ..................................................................... 21

4.4 Key Hazards and Incident Scenarios ................................................................... 22

4.5 Credible Incident Scenarios ................................................................................ 24

4.5.1 Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s. ................................... 26

4.5.2 Excessive airborne dust from stockpiled material. ...................................... 29

4.5.3 Fly rock incident from use of explosives. ..................................................... 30

4.5.4 Catastrophic failure of the Dam ................................................................... 31

4.6 Bushfire Management Plan ................................................................................ 34

4.7 Health and safety ................................................................................................ 34

4.8 Description of public health and safety community values including potential

impact and mitigation measures ........................................................................ 34

4.9 Emergency management plan ............................................................................ 35

4.10 Risks to people working at the quarry (on-site risks) ......................................... 35

5 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 37

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS) including tallied Level 2 areas which

participants identified as of concern to them.

APPENDIX B Guide to Analysis – Likelihood and Impact

APPENDIX C Infrastructure RBS

APPENDIX D Risk Management Plan – All Risk Summary Report

APPENDIX E Risk Management Plan for Infrastructure – All Risk Summary Report

APPENDIX F Sample report extracts - Risk Rating Analysis summary (project and

infrastructure), Commitment by Responsible Person, Risk Treatment Priority

Report

APPENDIX G Incident Response and Emergency Management Site Assessment

APPENDIX H Draft Master Programme



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RiskTools Pty Ltd was selected to provide hazard and risk assessment services as part of

the EIS Consultant Team for the GCQ. Risk management forms part of many of the

associated Consultant reports that form the EIS and of specific note are:

• Blasting – Blastechnology

• Traffic management – Cardno Eppell Olsen

• Environmental - Cardno Chenoweth

• Bushfire – Bushfire Management – Cardno Chenoweth

• Flood Management – BMT WBM “Water Resources and Floodplain Management”

This report should be read in conjunction with these other specialist reports.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the EIS included (in section 7) detailed requirements

for a Hazard and Risk Assessment. This report details the TORs and then addresses each

in details.

In order to develop a risk management plan, a workshop with Boral and Consultants was

held on the 3rd October 2012. The workshop used Boral’s standard risk management

process and Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS). The context was derived from selecting

specific sections of the RBS (refer marked up RBS in Appendix A) and workshop

objectives. These were:

To construct, operate and de-commission a facility in a way that manages risks to

levels that comply with relevant legislation and meet stakeholders reasonable

expectations.

To provide continuity of supply of materials for the Gold Coast.

As a result most risks identified were those that emanated from the project. The process

used is described in the report. After the workshop team members were charged with

the responsibility to develop treatment measures and action/review dates based on the

project’s draft master schedule (refer Appendix G).

The resultant risks were recorded in Boral’s risk management software (RiskOrganizer)

and the risk management plan report is contained in Appendix D. A similar process was

used to address risks specifically arising from the infrastructure. (Refer Appendices C and

E). The toolset contains many other reports that assists Boral in being proactive in the

management of risks over the course of the project through to and including operations.

The TOR also required a number of specific areas to be addressed including:

• Construction accidents

• Blasting events

• Structural damage to external infrastructure

• Landslides

• Lateral seam impacts



• Land settlement external to the project site

• Site incursion by fauna

• Ground water alteration

• Spills of materials during loading, unloading and transport

• Natural events such as cyclones, earthquakes, bushfires or local flooding.

These are contained in in the risk management plan and summarised in section 4.4 of

the report. Additionally a number of credible incidents were identified as part of the

workshop and these (in conjunction with the specialist Consultants) were quantified (as

far as was practicable) and compared to legislated requirements referenced in the NSW

Government Department of Planning Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning dated January

2011 requirements. In particular:

The identification of hazards and the quantification of risks outside the boundaries of a

potentially hazardous development, and the assessment of that risk in terms of the

nature of land uses in the vicinity provide the basis for compatible land use safety

planning”.

The four scenarios addressed in this report (section 4.5) are:

• Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s

• Excessive airborne dust from stockpiled material

• Fly rock incident from use of explosives

• Catastrophic failure of the dam

The risks arising from these incidents were assessed as Negligible and not of any

significant increase to the hazards that the community currently faces (without the

development).

An incident response plan was developed based on these incidents and other hazards as

a subset to the existing GCQ Emergency Management Plan. Preliminary discussions have

also been held with some Emergency services and they have proposed a detailed review

of the plan as part of design development. This is a process supported by Boral.



2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Project Description

The proponent is proposing to establish a new extractive industry operation on a greenfield

site bordering Old Coach Rd and Tallebudgera Creek Road, at Reedy Creek on the Gold

Coast.

The project is necessary to compensate for the scheduled winding down of Boral’s existing

West Burleigh Quarry, which has sufficient reserves for only a further 6.5 to 9 years of

production (depending on market conditions). Given the lead times that are involved (in

gaining development and environmental approvals; establishing the operation and

completing preliminary site works in order to enable full scale production), it has been

necessary for Boral to commence the relevant approval processes to ensure that an

adequate, uninterrupted and efficient supply of construction materials remains available for

critical infrastructure and construction projects in the Gold Coast region.

The Gold Coast Quarry will represent an investment of $140-$160million (2012 dollars) by

Boral into the economy of the Gold Coast region and is projected to provide continuity of

employment for approximately 100 staff across Boral’s integrated quarrying, asphalt,

concrete and transport operations. An estimated total of 246 full-time equivalent (FTE)

person-years will be directly required for the development and on-site construction of the

project. The flow-on benefits of this employment would generate further employment

opportunities for the wider Gold Coast region and Queensland, resulting in a total of

approximately 480 and 490 full-time equivalent person-years, respectively. Once

operational, the proposed Gold Coast Quarry would directly generate 24 FTE positions. The

flow-on benefits of this employment would support about 65 FTE positions in Queensland,

with 62 positions generated in the Gold Coast. The proposed Gold Coast Quarry would

provide a net increase in employment opportunities and help continue quarrying industry

jobs within the area once the West Burleigh Quarry resources are exhausted.

The proposed Gold Coast Quarry contains the last and largest known deposit of meta-

greywacke quarry rock resources on the southern Gold Coast. Meta-greywacke is of

extremely high strength and forms the excavated and processed quarry product. The meta-

greywacke resource is located within a deposit that is favourably surrounded by ridgelines

and has the benefit of having substantial vegetated buffers on land owned by Boral. In

developing this proposal, Boral has balanced the need to secure and develop this hard rock

resource with the social and environmental factors associated with extractive industry

development. After taking into account a range of environmental constraints and providing

appropriate separation buffers during the detailed design process for the proposed quarry

footprint, it has been estimated that a total of 79 million tonnes of measured, indicated and

inferred quarry resources have been delineated on the site (within the optimised pit shell

and including the area to be developed for the plant and associated infrastructure). Boral

has voluntarily sterilised a significant proportion of the resource which is known to occur on



the site in order to achieve an appropriate balance between environmental, economic and

community interests.

The proposed development will operate as a quarry for the extraction and processing of

hard rock primarily for use in concrete, asphalt, drainage materials, road base, bricks/blocks,

pavers, pipes and landscape supplies. Investigations confirm that the quality and consistency

of the resource at the site is of equal or better quality than the meta-greywacke deposit

situated at Boral’s existing West Burleigh Quarry, providing an opportunity to completely

replace the current quarry operations at Boral’s existing West Burleigh Quarry. The proposed

Gold Coast Quarry will supply the Gold Coast region with high grade construction materials

for at least of 40 years whilst maintaining continuity of employment across Boral’s

integrated quarrying, asphalt, concrete and transport operations.

The greenfield site will be fully developed and operated in accordance with recognised

industry best practice. Initial development requires the removal of significant overburden

volumes over the first few years of site development, including the introduction of mobile

crushing plants to develop the site and value the excavated material. Boral estimates that

approximately 5-6 million tonnes of materials (all types) will be removed from the site to

allow the site infrastructure and fixed plant to be built.

Overall, the proposed Gold Coast Quarry’s processing plants and supporting heavy mobile

equipment (HME) will comprise:

Mobile Crushing Plants

Proprietary modular trains from recognised (best practice) manufacturers such as Sandvik

or Metso. The 3-stage road base train consists of a Primary Jaw, Secondary and Tertiary

Cone Crushers complete with screens, conveyors and stockpiling conveyors. The second

train (for aggregates production) will be the same or similar to the first and may include a

vertical shaft impactor (VSI) to improve aggregate quality for use in higher specification

applications. Each train will be targeting to achieve a minimum of 300 tonnes per hour of

aggregate or base course materials. The estimated capital cost of each train is $6 million

(2012 dollars).

Fixed Plant

The plant will be designed as a modern, ‘fit for purpose’ crushing plant which will target

the production of aggregates. It is estimated that the production rate will be between 750

- 900 tonnes per hour to achieve an annual production of 2 million tonnes. The estimated

cost of the plant is $75 million with a construction timeframe of 18-24 months.

Mobile Fleet

There will be two distinct fleets, firstly a development fleet which will service the site

development and stripping works, through to load and haul service for the mobile

crushing trains. The second fleet will be sized to service the 750-900 tonne per hour fixed

plant. Over the course of the establishment and operation of the project, there will be a

range of equipment on the site for various periods of time. This equipment includes the

following:

- Excavators;



- Graders;

- Front-end Loaders;

- Bulldozers;

- Compactors;

- Articulated Dump Trucks;

- Water Trucks;

- Haulage Trucks; and

- Cranes.

2.2 The Quarry Process

The quarrying process commences with a survey of the rock face and bench to be developed

(by drilling and blasting). Laser survey equipment defines the rock mass, and an optimised

blast hole pattern is designed, and drilled. As production requirements demand, the drilled

“shot” is then charged with bulk explosives, and fired, in accordance with the site blasting

model and procedures.

Once the rock has been blasted, fragmented rock will be loaded from the pit floor onto haul

trucks, whereas any larger rock fragments (“oversize”) will typically be broken by a rock

breaker before loading. The load and haul fleet will generally be operated continuously

during the operating hours of the quarry, in order to maintain continuity of supply for

processing.

The primary stage of processing involves the use of a jaw crusher and vibratory screens, with

crushed product being held in an interim stockpile called a “surge pile”. From this stage,

material will be conveyed to several downstream stages of crushing and screening

equipment. After processing, the material will be conveyed to individual product stockpiles.

The processing plant, including primary and secondary crushers (and screens to separate

dust and aggregates) will be located within the plant and infrastructure area, near the

individual product stockpiles.

The quarry materials are then either loaded directly by a front end loader (‘sales loader’)

from the stockpiles, or via overhead storage bins at the plant (under typical conditions), to

road haulage trucks. The road haulage trucks then proceed across the weighbridge and

through the wheel wash before exiting the site to deliver quarry materials to the market.

2.3 Stages of Development

The site will be developed in a sequence of discrete stages. Each stage will involve a series of

phases:

Site establishment (‘E’) , development (‘D’), and construction (‘C’) stages (featuring a

number of intermediate phases);



Quarry operation (‘Q’) stage (featuring a number of phases) associated with the

development of the quarry pit itself; and

Rehabilitation and decommissioning of the site once the operations have concluded.

The timing and rate of progression through the stages associated with the pit development

will be defined by market conditions and demand. It is not appropriate to specify

timeframes for the development of each respective phase of the project at this early point,

but the quarry will have an operational life of at least 40 years.

During the construction and site preparation stage, the proposed Gold Coast Quarry will

operate with mobile plant(s), and be replaced with a permanent fixed plant as soon as

practicable after the plant site infrastructure area and initial pit have been established

(estimated to occur between years 4 and 5 of the approved development).

The staging plans for the project, as prepared by Lambert & Rehbein detail how the

development of the quarry is intended to progress. The following Table provides a general

overview of the works that will be undertaken as part of each phase of the development

stage.

Table: Quarry Development Staging

SITE ESTABLISHMENT STAGE

PHASE WORKS UNDERTAKEN

E1 The external access road and associated intersection (from Old Coach Road) will be constructed.

During this phase, approximately 58,000 tonnes of excess material will be removed.

E2 A portion of the access road, as it enters the site from the intersection constructed as part of Phase E1, will be constructed and sealed (with bitumen).

Earthworks (cut) associated with the development of the internal road network are undertaken, specifically for the construction of:

- the internal road that will ultimately link to the plant facility and ROM pads; and

- the access and maintenance road extending to the dam.

Temporary weighbridge and wheel wash area will be developed.

The water storage dam embankment wall (requiring 89,300 tonnes of fill) and associated spillway will be constructed.

Overall, a total of approximately 233,000 tonnes of overburden will be removed from the site as a result of the development of this phase.

E3 The extent of the internal access road created in Phase E2 will be sealed with bitumen.

The temporary weighbridges and wheel wash areas will be removed and replaced by the permanent facilities.

The construction of the facilities pad will be commenced.

The sedimentation pond will be developed.

The temporary buildings associated with the (construction) facilities pad will also be constructed.

Filling works will be completed in an existing gully so as to facilitate the future pad area for the plant equipment.


The extent of filling completed as part of this phase equates to 115,900 tonnes.

DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION STAGE




DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION STAGE


D1 Earthworks associated with the construction of the plant pad will be continuing. These earthworks will be performed in a ‘receding rim’ fashion in order to minimum impacts on nearby sensitive receptors.

By this time, the quarry dam and sedimentation pond will be operational.


Furthermore, approximately 279,000 tonnes of quarry product extracted from the site will be utilised and sold as marketable material.

D2 Earthworks associated with the construction of the plant pad will be continuing.



D3 Earthworks associated with the construction of the plant pad will be continuing.

The ROM pad and ROM ramp will be created, and a small amount of fill will be required to develop this area (24,890 tonnes).



D4 Earthworks associated with the construction of the plant pad will be completed.

The final floor level for the plant area will be RL 34m AHD.

The final floor level for the ROM pad will be RL 50m AHD.

The stockpile area for the storing of materials will be cleared of its overburden.

The stockpile area rock (suitable for product) will be left in place for processing at a more economic rate once the permanent plant has been established.


Furthermore, approximately 540,000 tonnes of quarry product that can be utilised and sold is extracted.

C1 The construction / erection of the crushing plant will be commenced.

All permanent buildings (e.g. site office, employee facilities, workshop etc) will be constructed.

Earthworks associated with the removal of overburden are commenced with respect to extending into the area that will ultimately become the quarry pit.

C2 The construction / erection of the crushing plant will be completed.

Earthworks associated with the removal of overburden will be continuing with respect to extending into the area that will ultimately become the quarry pit.

QUARRY OPERATION STAGE


Q1 Extractive activities associated with Q1 will be undertaken.

The base levels for Q1 will range between RL 78.0m AHD (western end of the pit area) and RL 66.0m AHD (eastern end of the pit area, adjacent to the ROM pad).


The base levels for Pit Stage 2 will be RL 54m AHD (eastern end of the pit area, adjacent to the ROM pad).

Rehabilitation of the benches associated with the pit will commence as possible.


The base levels for Q3 will be RL 30m AHD (western end of the pit area).



QUARRY OPERATION STAGE



Q4 Extractive activities associated with Q 4 will be undertaken.

The base levels for Q4 will be RL 6m AHD (centrally located within the pit area).



The base levels for Q5 will be RL -66m AHD centrally located within the pit area).


RiskTools Pty Ltd was selected to provide hazard and risk assessment services as part of the

EIS Consultant Team.

The State Government have issued the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the environmental

impact statement. Section 7 of the TOR relates to hazard and risk, and are the basis of this

report. These are included (shaded) below using the numbering system from the TOR.

7 Hazard and risk

7.1 Hazard and risk assessment

Describe the potential hazards and risks to people and property that may be associated with

the project, which may include but are not restricted to:

• Identifying potential hazards, accidents, spills, landslides and abnormal events that

may occur during all stages of the project, including possible frequency of occurrence

• Identifying all hazardous substances to be used, stored, processed or produced and

the rate of usage

• Potential wildlife hazards, natural events and implications related to climate change.

A preliminary risk assessment for all components of the project shall be undertaken as part

of the EIS process in accordance with Australia/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS ISO

31000:2009 Risk management – principles and guidelines (Standards Australia/Standards

New Zealand 2009. With respect to risk assessment:

• The EIS should deal comprehensively with external and on-site risks including

transportation, landslide and blasting risks

• The study should assess risks during construction, operational and decommissioning

phases of the project

• Analyses of the consequences of each hazard on safety in the project area should be

conducted, examining the likelihood of both individual and collective consequences,

involving injuries and fatalities to workers and to the public.

• Present quantitative levels of risks from the above analysis

Provide details of the safeguards and technical recommendations that would reduce the

likelihood and severity of hazards, consequences and risks to persons, within and adjacent to

the project area. Consideration should include, but not be limited to, how SPP 1/03:



Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Flood, Bushfire and Landslide (Department of Local

Government and Planning & Department of Emergency Services 2003) would be addressed.

Present a comparison of assessed and mitigated risks with acceptable criteria for land uses in

and adjacent to the project area.

Discuss the results of early consultation with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QRFS)

Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) and Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) on

the site’s risk classification to determine future emergency services delivery.

Develop a risk management plan in consultation with QFRS and QAS and provide the plan in

the EIS.

The plan should consider interruption to QFRS, QAS and EMQ services in the event of any

road closure required for the project works.

Conduct a hazard identification study to identify the nature and scale of hazards that might

occur during the construction and operation of the project. This would be expected to

include hazards involving:


• Blasting events


• Landslides







A set of incident scenarios should be selected. This set should include credible event

scenarios (eg catastrophic failure of a processing unit and the consequential zone of effect).

This will require an evaluation of the likelihood of each scenario occurring in order to

calculate the level of risk in surrounding areas due to the presence of the facility.

Assess the acceptability of the risk on site, and to surrounding land uses, by referring to

nationally adopted risk criteria presented in Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No.

4: Risk Criteria for land Use Safety Planning (Department of Planning (NSW) 2008). Present

details of the methodology and results of each step described above in the EIS.

Prepare a bushfire management plan and include in the EIS. Consult with GCCC’s Bushfire

Management unit when developing the plan.



7.2 Health and safety

The EIS is to clearly demonstrate methods of protecting or enhancing human health for the

construction and operation phases.

7.2.1 Description of public health and safety community values

Describe the existing health and safety values of the community, workforce, suppliers and

other stakeholders in terms of the environmental factors that can affect human health,

public safety and quality of life – such as air pollutants, odour, lighting and amenity, dust,

traffic, noise, vibration, pedestrian and bicycle use and water.

Discuss provision of amenities such as water and waste management for any truck waiting

areas internal or external to the site.

7.2.2 Potential impact and mitigation measures

Define and describe the objectives and practical measures for protecting or enhancing

health and safety community values. Describe how nominated quantitative standards and

indicators may be achieved for social impacts management, and how the achievement of the

objectives will be monitored, audited and managed.

The EIS should assess the cumulative effects on public health values and occupation health

and safety impacts on the community and workforce from project operations and emissions.

Recommend practical monitoring regimes in this section.

7.3 Emergency management plan

The development of emergency planning and response procedures within an Emergency

Management Plan is to be determined in consultation with the State regional emergency

service providers including QFRS, QAS, Queensland Police Service and EMQ.

Provide an outline of the proposed integrated emergency management planning procedures

(including evacuation plans, if required) for the range of situations identified in the risk

assessment in this section. This includes strategies to deal with natural disasters during

construction, operation and decommissioning.



3. PROCESS USED

Boral have a thorough risk management process which falls broadly under two headings:

• Project risk management

• Operational safety including Emergency planning

Each of the processes follow AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and

Guidelines. Both processes have been in operation and honed over many years.

To assist clarity in reading this report it is worth reiterating two definitions from the above

standard:

• Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives

• Hazard is a source of potential harm

The context for project risk is derived from a number of factors two of which warrant

expansion:

1. A Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS). Boral have a national framework for Capital

Projects. This enables projects to be assessed and reported against a common

framework. A copy of the RBS is in Appendix A.

2. Project objectives. For the definitional reason stated above these are key to enable

an assessment of the impact of a risk on the project (objectives). The objectives also

reflect the desired outcomes for the project and are a measure of a project’s success.

The objectives in terms of safety and meeting the requirements of the EIS were

workshopped and agreed as follows:

To construct, operate and de-commission a facility in a way that manages risks to

levels that comply with relevant legislation and meet stakeholders reasonable

expectations.

To provide continuity of supply of materials for the Gold Coast.

These two objectives are key. They help provide the context for the risk management

plan and in particular reflect risks to the community (on and off site) both arising

from the project and from not doing the project.

The requirements of the TOR have been addressed under two main areas:

• Risks to people and property adjoining and beyond the property (external risks).

• Risks to people working at the quarry (construction, operations and in due course de-

commissioning – on-site risks).

A risk workshop was convened on the 3rd October 2012 to identify and analyse risks on the

project. This workshop specifically excluded the risks associated with construction, operation



and de-commissioning the plant as this work was undertaken as a separate activity.

Participants at the workshop were generally those that had been working on the project for

several months and had an appreciation of the risks in their particular areas of expertise.

This also enabled interfaces between Consultants’ areas and their associated risks to be

explored.

Participants at the workshop were:

Name Organisation

David Hackett Boral

Elke Stapf Boral

Jessica Van Soest Boral

Matt Leon Boral

Mike Cooper Boral

Paul West Boral

Russel Wilson Boral

David Francis Cardno Chenoweth

Jeff Baczynski Cardno Eppell Olsen

Matthew Schneider Cardno HRP

Scott Clarke Cardno HRP

Annie Holden ImpaxSIA

Ashley Ruffin Lambert & Rehbein

Louisa Davies Norling Consulting

Gavin Halling Risk Tools

Rod Farrar Risk Tools

In accordance with the ANS/NZ ISO 31000 a key requirement is to give risk management

workshops a context. Boral achieve this (in part) through their National framework RBS and

tailoring this to suit a specific context. There were five areas in the standard framework that

were deemed irrelevant to the EIS. Referring to the RBS (Appendix A) these were:

Client Management

Commercial

Financial

Management and

Systems

The participants reviewed the RBS and marked up the five Level 2 areas that were of

greatest concern to them. The level two selections were totalled and marked up accordingly

(refer Appendix A). This helped to ensure the risk areas were prioritised as well as ensuring

the concerns of all involved would be raised.

The workshop then proceeded to identify risks. These were entered into Boral’s risk

management toolset “RiskOrganizer” (RO). Each risk was described using a prescript “There



is a risk that…. something happens … that will impact on the project objectives”. A guide to

the five levels of Likelihood and Impact was tabled and is included in Appendix B.

Subsequent to the workshop, the participants (and others in the team) best able to identify

and manage treatments (mitigation measures) for each risk were identified. Those allocated

this responsibility then proceeded to identify and where possible (given the early stage of

the project) undertake treatment measures.

During the workshop the team was asked to identify a series of credible incident scenarios.

These were noted and were a key input into the Draft Emergency Management Plan.

Additionally the workshop specifically addressed:


• Blasting events


• Landslides







The risks associated with safety during construction, operations and decommissioning of the

plant used a different RBS to the one described above. An RBS was developed to reflect the

specific infrastructure. This RBS will enable any safety information to be readily transferred

between those involved in the project (Owner, Designer, Constructor and Operator) and

help to enhance the communication of safety matters between these separate parties.

Additionally the Infrastructure RBS will enable HAZOP (Hazards in Operations) studies to be

undertaken during detailed design.

The infrastructure RBS is shown in Appendix C. It is quite high level reflecting the current

level of design and will be broken down into further detail as design proceeds. The

Infrastructure designers and Boral personnel identified risks associated with constructing,

operating and decommissioning the plant.



4. OUTCOMES

The outputs from the 3/10/12 workshop are in the following Appendices:

Appendix D All Risk Summary Report

This report shows all the risks identified together with their current analysis, treatments,

those responsible for the treatment and an initial action date. When reading the risk it

should be done with the predecessor “There is a risk that…”

Appendix E All Risk Summary Report for infrastructure

The format is the same as Appendix D and shows the risks associated with the plant

infrastructure.

Appendix F Sample report extracts.

Risk Rating Analysis summary (project and infrastructure)

This report shows the current overall risk profile for the project. The numbers

at the bottom of each square show the initial analysis (when a risk is first

entered) and the number at the top shows the current rating. The report

enables Boral management to monitor the risk profile of the project and over

time ensure the reduction in the profile.

Risk Treatment Priority Report

This report shows those treatments that have been identified as ones that will

benefit more than one risk. The treatments that benefit the most risks are

priority actions and once undertaken the analysis for each affected risk is re-

visited and where appropriate updated.

It is worth making some overview comments regarding these Appendices.

1. The reports in Appendix D and E form the risk management plan for the project.

Extracts of other reports are contained in Appendix F and are examples of the reports

that assist Boral in the ongoing management of the plan. They are included to

demonstrate the process (in part) that Boral adopts in managing risks as an ongoing

process.

2. It is important to underscore that the analysis (likelihood and impact) reflects the risk

level at the point in time of compiling the EIS and is based on the “product” of

likelihood and impact (refer Appendices B and F). As the sole purpose of analysis is to

prioritise risks, participants, where there was a disagreement in analysis, selected the

more conservative higher likelihood or impact value. Prioritisation means that a High

risk should take precedence (in terms of action) over a Significant risk.

The risk levels will reduce substantially over time as treatments are undertaken. In

some cases a risk will be closed because the time for it to occur has passed. The EIS

process has already substantially reduced the risk levels of the project with 17 risks

that were identified in the initial workshop being closed out. Similarly many



treatments have been identified which once they are undertaken will substantially

reduce the risk levels.

3. Treatments have an action (or review) date and someone who is responsible for

undertaking the treatment. Those responsible for undertaking treatments have been

selected from the current team and will be re-allocated to those most able to

undertake the treatments as the team develops over subsequent phases. Most

treatments will be undertaken later in the project (eg as design is undertaken). The

dates are for action or a review as appropriate and should be viewed as indicative at

this early stage of the project. They have been selected based on the Draft Master

Programme (refer Appendix H).

4. The overall risk profile for the project (refer Appendix F) in terms of the EIS is

Moderate which is appropriate at this early stage of the project, particularly as many

treatments cannot be undertaken until future stages. The profile comprises:

• 5 High risks (none of which have a severe impact)

• 16 Significant risks

• 11 Moderate risks and

• 11 Low risks

Once treatments have been undertaken it is expected that there will not be any High

risks and that most of the Significant risks will be reduced to Moderate or Low.

5. Some risks identified in this report have also been addressed in more detail in other

specialist consultant reports that form part of this EIS (eg Blasting and Traffic

Management). This data has been referenced rather than duplicated in this report.

Where additional information on a risk is sought then reference to these other

specialist reports should occur.

The TOR may be addressed by referring to the data in Appendices D and E. This section

highlights the TOR (in italics) and then addresses each of the items.

4.1 Hazards and risks to people and property

Describe the potential hazards and risks to people and property that may be associated with

the project, which may include but are not restricted to:

• Identifying potential hazards, accidents, spills, landslides and abnormal events that

may occur during all stages of the project, including possible frequency of occurrence

• Identifying all hazardous substances to be used, stored, processed or produced and

the rate of usage

• Potential wildlife hazards, natural events and implications related to climate change.

The hazards and related risks regarding accidents are contained within the two Appendices

D and E which comprise the EIS risk management plan for the development. The likelihood

of a risk gives an indication of the frequency of occurrence. A guide to the descriptions of

likelihood is contained in Appendix B.



Key hazard areas that have been identified include:

• Traffic hazards. These are largely addressed in the traffic management report.

• Blasting (including fly rock and landslides). Boral (and their specialist sub-consultants

Blastechnology and likely blasting contractor Orica) have substantial experience in

this hazard. Fly rock is dealt with later in this report and in Blastechnology’s detailed

report. Suffice to say that with good design and SOPs the risk of injury arising from

Fly rock may be eliminated. Landslide (slope failure) without treatment is a Moderate

risk and with treatments including implementing a detailed Blast Management Plan

and SOPs may be reduced to Minor levels.

• Hazardous substances are small in number, namely:

o explosives,

o oils (fuel oil - diesel and engine oil)

o welding gases

o solvents/paints and

o potentially some additives

The risk levels for all of these may be reduced to Minor through the implementation

of SOPs. Fuel oil storage is also dealt with in more detail later in this report.

• The potential hazards for wildlife include:

o Bushfires

o Noise

o Entering the site and being injured

A Bushfire Management Plan (refer report by Cardno Chenoweth) has been

developed for the site. The risks of bushfire damage will be reduced by the project

due to:

- The presence of on-site personnel who will be able to raise the alarm earlier

and take prompt action (dousing small fires before they spread)

- The on-site dam storage (anticipated to be some 90ML) which will be

available for emergency services to fight fire.

Although it is conceivable that noise levels (blasting and plant operations) may

impact wildlife there are no established and agreed noise level criteria for evaluating

disturbance of wildlife during the day and hence there is no means of assessing any

adverse effects. Noise levels will be monitored and kept to levels so they are not a

nuisance to people. As work will largely be during daylight hours it is not anticipated

there will be any risks to foraging or breeding activities of nocturnal animals.

Wildlife entering the site may in part be managed by making entry unattractive eg

ensuring the site is clean and rubbish receptacles are impervious to wildlife. Similarly,

reducing the attraction of buildings by sealing them so they cannot be accessed by

wildlife (eg possums) will reduce the likelihood of wildlife nesting at the site facilities.

A more detailed assessment of the risks associated with Wildlife is included in report

“Matters of National Environmental Significance Report” which forms part of the EIS.

A more detailed risk assessment is also contained in the chapter in the EIS report

entitled “Flora and Fauna Impacts and Mitigation”.



• Natural events and implications related to climate change

The risks associated with climate change have been specifically addressed in a report

entitled “Climate, Natural Hazards and Climate Change for the Boral Gold Coast

Quarry” by Katestone Environmental Pty Ltd which forms part of this EIS.

The Katestone report examined six climate related risks:

Impact Description Unmitigated

risk

Mitigated risk

Dust production due to prolonged dry spells and wind MODERATE LOW

Water supply constraint for process use and dust suppression due

to drought MODERATE LOW

Uncontrolled discharge from storage dam and/or sediment pond SIGNIFICANT MODERATE

Flooding of quarry pit MODERATE LOW

Erosion or failure of slopes and haul roads in quarry MODERATE LOW

Loss of grid power to quarry operations MODERATE LOW

The above analysis shows the current rating of these risks and their level once

suitable treatments (during design and operations) have been undertaken. The

uncontrolled dam discharge is also addressed in 4.5.4.

4.2 Risk Management Plan

A preliminary risk assessment for all components of the project shall be undertaken as part of

the EIS process in accordance with Australia/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009

Risk management – principles and guidelines (Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand

2009. With respect to risk assessment:

• The EIS should deal comprehensively with external and on-site risks including

transportation, landslide and blasting risks

• The study should assess risks during construction, operational and decommissioning

phases of the project

• Analyses of the consequences of each hazard on safety in the project area should be

conducted, examining the likelihood of both individual and collective consequences,

involving injuries and fatalities to workers and to the public.

• Present quantitative levels of risks from the above analysis

Provide details of the safeguards and technical recommendations that would reduce the

likelihood and severity of hazards, consequences and risks to persons, within and adjacent to

the project area. Consideration should include, but not be limited to, how SPP 1/03:

Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Flood, Bushfire and Landslide (Department of Local

Government and Planning & Department of Emergency Services 2003) would be addressed.

Present a comparison of assessed and mitigated risks with acceptable criteria for land uses in

and adjacent to the project area.



A risk assessment has been carried out for all components relevant to the EIS in accordance

with AS/NZS IOS 31000:2009. Risk identification has been undertaken for both external and

internal (on-site risks). The resultant Risk Management plan is in two parts and is contained

in Appendices D (project risks) and E (risks specifically related to the infrastructure).

Each risk has been analysed in terms of the likelihood of the risk occurring and impact on

project objectives if the risk did occur (refer Appendix B for the guide used in assessing the

likelihood and impact). Each risk has one or more treatment (mitigation) measures and each

of these has an owner and an action/review date. Boral’s risk management processes

proactively manage these treatments. During the EIS preparation a number of risks were

mitigated and the risk level reduced, and some risks identified in the first workshop were

closed out through appropriate treatments or being no longer applicable.

Additionally specialist consultants have also addressed risks in more detail in their specific

reports. These include:

• Blasting – Blastechnology

• Traffic management – Cardno Eppell Olsen

• Environmental - Cardno Chenoweth

• Bushfire – Bushfire Management – Cardno Chenoweth

• Flood Management – BMT WBM “Water Resources and Floodplain Management”

Landslides have been addressed in the Geotechnical Report (Groundwork Plus), the Risk

Management Plan (Appendix D) and further in this report.

The Risk Management Plan (infrastructure) in Appendix E has identified risks associated with

the plant and its operations and also considered construction, operations and de-

commissioning. These infrastructure risks are of necessity quite high level at this stage (early

Concept design). As more detailed design occurs it is expected that these risks will initially

grow in number as more elements are considered but that the risk level will then reduce

substantially over the design period as each risk is considered and addressed during the

Safety in Design process.

The developed framework (Refer Appendix C RBS infrastructure) and risks may be built on by

those parties involved in the project downstream (designers, constructors, operators,

maintainers and eventually the decommissioning team). The ability to enable

communication of risks, so they can flow through each contributing party to a project, helps

to address 3 of the 6 key implementation Principles of the Guide to Best Practice for Safer

Construction (Engineers Australia 2007). This guide describes itself as aspirational and the

principles are leading edge.

From the Risk Management Plan it is apparent that there are no unusual risks arising from

the project and operations will be similar to other quarries such as West Burleigh Quarry.

Accordingly Boral’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed/tailored to suit GCQ

will be used to manage many risks as part of normal quarry operations.



The risks for land use adjacent to the project have similarly been addressed in the Risk

Management plan (Appendix D). Credible incident scenarios have been identified and

quantified and then compared with acceptable criteria later in this report.

4.3 Emergency Management Planning

Discuss the results of early consultation with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QRFS)

Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) and Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) on

the site’s risk classification to determine future emergency services delivery.

Develop a risk management plan in consultation with QFRS and QAS and provide the plan in

the EIS.

The plan should consider interruption to QFRS, QAS and EMQ services in the event of any

road closure required for the project works. Discussions have been held with the QAS and QRFS. Neither raised any significant concerns

in relation to risks posed by the site.

QAS' main requirements are access and copies of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for any

hazardous substances stored at the site. They have also advised they would prefer pre-

identified collection points (such as a first aid post) in order to render treatment as quickly as

possible. Both of these requirements are part of Boral’s standard procedures (SOP’s) for

large quarries.

QFRS requires access and water in order to effectively fight any fires that may start on the

site. Once again, the provision of MSDS to QRFS will be important to ensure they are aware

of the potential types of fire they may confront. The project dam is anticipated to be some

90 ML which is a substantial volume of water that would be available for fire fighting. QAS have advised that they propose to form an Emergency Services Committee during the

design/planning stages once initial approval to the development has been granted. They

anticipate meeting weekly during the design phase and then, once all of their requirements

have been addressed, would reduce the frequency. Boral support this approach as an

emergency management plan to an appropriate level of detail would not be possible until

the designs have been developed further. Road closures during construction may be required for short periods while transporting large

equipment. This will only be known once detailed design, and construction scheduling has

been undertaken. These would be a topic of discussion during the above meetings to ensure

there is minimal disruption if indeed large loads should require road closures.

An Emergency Response Plan for the CGQ (OHSQ:12.1 ER:F6) was developed in June 2012.

The plan was based on that in use at West Burleigh Quarry. A series of incidents was

identified in the 3 October 2012 workshop and the management of these incidents including

action plans is included in Appendix G. A number of them are also detailed further in section

4.4. These plans should be considered drafts and will need to be reviewed and updated in

conjunction with the Emergency Services and the type of works occurring on site at any

particular stage (eg construction, operations).



4.4 Key Hazards and Incident Scenarios

Conduct a hazard identification study to identify the nature and scale of hazards that might

occur during the construction and operation of the project. This would be expected to include

hazards involving:


• Blasting events


• Landslides







A set of incident scenarios should be selected. This set should include credible event scenarios

(eg catastrophic failure of a processing unit and the consequential zone of effect). This will

require an evaluation of the likelihood of each scenario occurring in order to calculate the

level of risk in surrounding areas due to the presence of the facility.

Assess the acceptability of the risk on site, and to surrounding land uses, by referring to

nationally adopted risk criteria presented in Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No.

4: Risk Criteria for land Use Safety Planning (Department of Planning (NSW) 2008). Present

details of the methodology and results of each step described above in the EIS. During the workshop on the 3rd October 2012 the above hazards and related risks were

specifically addressed and are contained in the risk management plan.

Considering each individually:

• Construction accidents:

Construction risks were identified and are contained in Appendix E and were based

on the infrastructure RBS. There were no unusual construction risks that apply to the

project and standard construction methods are anticipated. The adopted RBS will

enable the risks associated with construction to be built on during the design phase

and carried through to the construction phase.

• Blasting events:

This risk has been included in both Appendix D and E. The risks associated with

blasting have also been covered in detail in Blastechnology’s report.

• Structural damage to external infrastructure:

This risk may arise due to blasting which is covered in Blastechnology’s report.

• Landslides:



Landslides off site were assessed as a Rare likelihood due in part to the fact there is a

300 metre buffer between the operation and adjoining property. Landslides on site

were viewed as Unlikely. Both risks would be reduced further by the quarry pit

development plan, the blast management plan and related SOPs.

• Lateral seam impacts:

Lateral seam impact was viewed as Unlikely and if encountered could be

accommodated by changes to the pit development and blasting management plans.

• Land settlement external to the project site:

This risk was considered and then eliminated as not possible given the 300 metre

buffer to the site boundary and bearing in mind this is a quarry rather than an

underground mining operation.

• Site incursion by fauna:

This was assessed as a Moderate risk but one that could be reduced by keeping a

clean site (rubbish in bins that cannot be accessed by fauna), sealed buildings to

reduce the potential for nesting within the infrastructure and through escape routes

for wildlife adjoining traffic corridors

• Ground water alteration:

This was viewed as a Moderate risk to the nearest registered bore. The requirement

for and alternatives to bore water are to be considered as part of the design noting

that the one bore at a GCCC sports field is low yielding and has limited attractiveness.

The next closet bores are at the extremity of the radius of influence and should not

be impacted as a result of the proposed quarry development.

• Spills of materials during loading, unloading and transport:

This was assessed as a Moderate risk however there were a range of possible

mitigation measures that would reduce this to a Low risk. (Refer risk in Appendix D

“product is spilt from vehicles onto the road and is a factor in an accident”)

• Natural events such as cyclones, earthquakes, bushfires or local flooding:

Risk of cyclones and earthquakes were both viewed as low in this area and would be

catered for during the design in accordance with the relevant standards.

Bushfire management is addressed in three reports:

o Water Resources and Flood Plain Management

o Bushfire Management Plan

o The Emergency Management Plan (refer Appendix G for the first draft of the

plan)

Local flooding has been addressed in two of the EIS reports:

o Water Resources and Flood Plain Management

o Climate, Natural Hazards and Climate Change for the Boral Gold Coast Quarry



4.5 Credible Incident Scenarios

During the October workshop the team also considered a set of credible incident scenarios.

There were initially four identified as warranting further examination:

• Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s



• An accident arising from the quarry’s trucking operations

The TOR requires consideration of the likelihood of each scenario in order to calculate the

level of risk to surrounding areas due to the presence of the facility. An accident due to

trucking operations has not been considered further in this report for the following reasons:

• A traffic accident is not considered the same as an incident arising on/from the site

that affects areas surrounding the development.

• Traffic accidents may arise due to a number of factors of which only the following

may be influenced or controlled by Boral:

o Good design of roads to the relevant standards for which Boral is responsible

(part of detailed design).

o Suitable maintenance/supervision of fleet vehicles (part of SOPs)

o Ensuring the trucks are legally loaded when they leave the quarry

o Suitable fatigue management and training of drivers (part of SOPs)

• There are also a range of factors that could give rise to an accident that are beyond

the control of Boral including:

o Road design and maintenance by others

o Maintenance of other vehicles

o Behaviour of others (drivers, pedestrians and cyclists)

Traffic Management is covered in detail in the Traffic Management report by Cardno Eppell

Olsen.

One of the risks identified in the workshop was the failure of any dam constructed on site.

During design development a 90ML dam was proposed and if this was to fail there is

potential for damage to occur beyond the boundary of the site. This was added as a credible

incident scenario and is addressed below (4.5.4).

The risks associated with these four scenarios were assessed bearing in mind the NSW

Government Department of Planning Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning dated January 2011.

The following is an extract from this document (emphasis in bold has been added):

“The identification of hazards and the quantification of risks outside the boundaries of a

potentially hazardous development, and the assessment of that risk in terms of the nature

of land uses in the vicinity provide the basis for compatible land use safety planning”.

There are two dimensions of risk which should be considered separately, individual and

societal.



When a risk is to be imposed on an individual or a group of people (e.g. by locating a

hazardous facility in an area), the concept of ‘acceptability’ of that risk for the decision

making process is that it should be low relative to other known and tolerated risks.

In assessing the tolerability of risk from potentially hazardous development, both qualitative

and quantitative aspects need to be considered.

Relevant general principles are:

• the avoidance of all avoidable risks;

• the risk from a major hazard should be reduced wherever practicable, even where the

likelihood of exposure is low;

• the effects of significant events should, wherever possible be contained within the site

boundary; and

• where the risk from an existing installation is already high, further development

should not pose any incremental risk.”

Drawing on these general principles, the guideline presents and discusses quantitative risk

criteria related to fatality (individual and societal), injury, property and environmental

damage.

One of the most important aspects of the reference is in relation to the acceptability of the

risks. It states:

“Regulators have concluded that if a risk from a potentially hazardous installation is below

most risks being experienced by the community, then that risk may be tolerated. This is

consistent with the basis of criteria setting used in these guidelines, as well as those adopted

by most authorities nationally and internationally.

The Department has adopted a fatality risk level of one in a million per year (1 x 10-6

per

year) as the limit for risk acceptability for residential area exposure. This risk criteria has been

adopted by the Department when assessing the safety implications of industrial development

proposals. It is also appropriate in considering land use proposals in the vicinity of potentially

hazardous facilities.

In setting criteria, it is also necessary to account for variations in the duration of exposure to

that risk at any particular point by any one individual. People’s vulnerability to the hazard

and their ability to take evasive action when exposed to the hazard also need to be taken into

account.”

The reference details that the level of tolerable fatality risk to a member of the public is a

likelihood of 10-4 per year (1 in 10,000 chance). The level of risk considered acceptable is

10-6 per year (1 in 1,000,000 chance).

Showing this diagrammatically (refer to Figure 12: Indicative Societal Risk Criteria in the

above paper):



Diagram A

For GCQ the risks that may cause societal fatalities need to be in the band width marked

ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practical) or lower. Each of the identified scenarios has been

considered bearing in mind the above.

4.5.1 Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s.

There are three main factors to be considered for catastrophic failure of the fuel tank:

• The flashpoint of diesel fuel. The flashpoint of a chemical is the lowest

temperature where enough fluid can evaporate to form a combustible

concentration of gas. The flash point is an indication of how easy a chemical may

burn. Materials with higher flash points are less flammable or hazardous than

chemicals with lower flash points.

The flashpoint for diesel fuels ranges from 37°C to 54°C which depends on the

grade used (by comparison the flashpoint for petrol is -43°C). The diesel used by

Boral is understood to be grade D2 Low Sulphur which has a flashpoint of 52°C.

• The auto ignition temperature is the point where a substance at normal

atmosphere will spontaneously ignite. For diesel this is 210°C.

• For a fire to occur there has to the right mix of diesel vapour and air.

As maximum ambient air temperatures on the Gold Coast only occasionally exceed 40°C and

have never exceeded 50°C there is no likelihood of auto ignition due to ambient

temperature. The other foreseeable ways that diesel fuel could reach the ignition

temperature are:



Bushfire – this may be mitigated by keeping the tank away from other fuel

sources (ie with a suitable separation gap from bushland and other fuel sources).

Refer also to the Bushfire Management plan.

A lightning strike – this may be mitigated by appropriate lightning protection.

Hot work such as welding. It is unlikely there would be a need for Hot Work on

or in the vicinity of the diesel tank once it was in use. (There may a requirement

for some hot work during construction but this would be before filling with

diesel.) However, in the unlikely event this was required the work would need to

be undertaken by following Boral’s SOPs for Hot Work.

Additionally for an explosion to occur there would need to be a build-up and sudden release

of gas pressure within the tank. As the tanks are ventilated the likelihood of an explosion

would be Rare.

With the buffer zone the tank will be at least 500 metres from any residential property.

Additionally the buffer zone incorporates vegetation and it is almost inconceivable that in

the Rare event of an explosion of the tank any debris would travel this distance as well as

travelling over/through the vegetation buffer and then injure a person.

A review of accidents of storage tanks has been undertaken by James I. Chang and Cheng-

Chung Lin in their paper A study of storage tank accidents. This reviewed the cause of 242

storage tank accidents across the world from 1960 to 2003. Some key points relevant to GCQ

were:

• 59 (of the 242) involved tanks containing oil products (Fuel oil, diesel, kerosene,

lubricants).

• Fire and explosion account for 85% of the accidents.

• 80 accidents (33%) were caused by lightning and

• 72 (30%) caused by human errors including poor operations and maintenance

The paper also included a cause and effect (fishbone) diagram developed for the

management of fuel tanks.



These items will form part of the detailed design and maintenance/operation of the tanks.

Key issues from the report were:

• Lightning protection

• Development and implementation of Operations and Maintenance procedures

(SOP’s)

• Separation from potential fire sources

Tanks will be manufactured in accordance with AS 1692 The Manufacture of Steel Tanks for

Flammable and Combustible Liquids and installed / operated in accordance with AS 1940 The

Storage and Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids.

In addition, there is significant separation between the quarry and residential areas that also

greatly reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic failure of the diesel tank impacting on the

local population. Key distances from the fuel tanks (to an accuracy of +/- 25metres):

• To nearest point on GCQ property boundary: 300m • To nearest known rural residential structure: 500m (homes in Yarraman Dr /

Tallebudgera Creek Rd - to the SSE of the proposed storage location)

• To nearest residential subdivision: 550m (homes in Old Burleigh Town - Sirec Way /

Marlee Crt) • To nearest public infrastructure: 500m (Old Coach Rd reserve alignment, in a couple

of locations)

Conservatively, there are many thousands of above ground diesel fuel tanks in Australia

(industrial complexes, mining operations, large construction sites and farms). Worldwide the

numbers would readily exceed 100,000. In a 40 year period there were accidents with 59

tanks (only some of which resulted in injury or death) which is conservatively 1 accident in

1,000 or 10-3.

The likelihood of a piece of material of sufficient size to carry 500 metres and then hit

someone would be very conservatively less than 1 in 1000. Hence the likelihood of an



explosion and then a fragment hitting someone outside the boundary would be 10-6. To this

may be added the likelihood of the person being hit being fatally injured. The risk is well

within the boundaries of Negligible in Diagram A.

4.5.2 Excessive airborne dust from stockpiled material.

Katestone Environmental Pty Ltd were engaged to undertake an Air Quality Assessment for

the GCQ in December 2012 as part of the EIS.

The air quality assessment was conducted in accordance with recognised techniques for

dispersion modelling and emissions estimation. A review of the activities proposed at the

Gold Coast Quarry highlighted that the most important air pollutant would be dust

(considered as TSP, PM10 (particles of the order of 10 micrometres or less) and PM2.5).

The following proposed activities at the GCQ are likely to result in the highest dust

emissions:

• Material handling by site machinery such as bulldozers / front end loaders / scrapers

• Drilling and blasting within the pit area

• Excavation of raw material

• Processing of raw material (crushing and screening) by both mobile and fixed plant

• Wheel generated dust associated with haulage of raw material and product

• Wind erosion of raw material and product stockpiles

• Wind erosion of exposed areas (pit and plant areas)

The findings of the air quality assessment of the Gold Coast Quarry are as follows:

• The predicted ground-level concentrations of TSP, PM10 and PM2.5 due to the

Project are below the relevant Air EPP objectives in all residential areas and at all

sensitive receptors assessed in isolation and cumulatively;

• The predicted dust deposition rates due to the Project are below the relevant

objectives and assessment criteria in all residential areas and at all sensitive

receptors due to Project operations assessed in isolation and cumulatively; and

• There are no regulatory air quality objectives or guidelines relevant to dust effects on

flora and fauna in the vegetated buffer. Some areas of the vegetation buffer may

receive high dust deposition rates but are not considered large enough to adversely

affect vegetation, whilst the majority of the vegetation buffer receives a relatively

low dust deposition rate.

There are a number of specific standards that apply to dust emissions and these are referred

to in Katestone’s report. These detailed requirements are more detailed and appropriate

when analysing this risk than the more general approach adopted in Hazardous Industry

Planning Advisory Paper No. 4: Risk Criteria for land Use Safety Planning (Department of

Planning (NSW) 2008). So saying it is apparent from Katestone’s report that by being below

the relevant Air EPP objectives, the level of fatality risk would be well within the negligible

framework of Diagram A above.



4.5.3 Fly rock incident from use of explosives.

This risk has been addressed in Blastechnology’s report and the relevant section (6) is

reproduced below for ready reference.

Since flyrock has the potential to cause injury and death, it is considered the most important

factor over which total control is required – flyrock can be eliminated through strict charging

protocols. Flyrock can be considered as any rock fragment which is projected from the blast

area beyond the clearance zone. Such events are required by law to be reported, and are

considered extremely grave. To date there has never been a flyrock incident (projection of

rock beyond the quarry’s boundary) at the West Burleigh site, and the practices to be

adopted at the proposed Gold Coast Quarry will be heavily based on the very safe practices

deployed at the West Burleigh operation for the past 20 years. Modelling suggests that with

the charge configuration of 10.5 metres of explosive and 2.5 metres of stemming, an 89 mm

diameter hole, and an explosive of density 1.2 g/cc, rock fragments will not be projected

more than approximately 50 metres from any blast.

Blasting operations which occur within 300 metres of occupied structures or private land

must deploy special procedures to ensure absolute public safety. The diagram below

presents areas of the proposed quarry development which lie within 300 metres of the

boundaries of privately-owned properties.

In the case of the sensitive zone located in the southern section of the development pad,

this area lies within 300 metres of the northern boundaries of 3 property boundaries in the

Tallebudgera Creek Road area. The affected zone represents approximately 10% of the total

area of the development pad, requiring special procedures for only a small number of blasts.

Boral have demonstrated the ability to blast safely under even more stringent conditions

(within approximately 80 metres of housing) at the West Burleigh Quarry. Furthermore, the

sensitive receivers are located behind the affected area (i.e. the benches in this section of

the quarry will be oriented such that rock projections from the bench faces will be directed

away from the nearby properties) where flyrock risk is lessened.

Areas within the proposed quarry

footprint at which blasting operations

will be conducted within 300 metres

of residential properties.



In the case of the sensitive zone located in the north-western section of the proposed quarry

pit, this area lies within 300 metres of three allotments at the north eastern end of the

Approved Stage 20 at the Observatory Estate, within which no development has yet

occurred. The affected area of the quarry pit also represents a small fraction of the proposed

pit (less than 3%), and once again, benches in this section of the quarry will be oriented such

that rock projections from the bench faces will be directed away from the nearby properties.

Boral has developed the procedures and demonstrated over the past 20 years at the West

Burleigh Quarry its ability to blast safely at these distances from residential structures.

The protocols required in order to control flyrock include:

1. Ensuring that every charged hole conforms to a minimum stemming length, such that

rocks cannot be projected more than approximately 100 metres;

2. Ensuring that every face hole is surveyed for hole deviation, and that all sections of

the charge column for face holes conform to a minimum burden such that rock

fragments cannot be projected more than approximately 100 metres;

3. Any uncharged holes in the pattern (e.g. blocked holes) are back-filled so that

fragment projections cannot occur.

The high degree of control over flyrock may be seen in photographs in Appendix B of

Blastechnology’s report. This shows a series of frames taken from video records which are

routinely taken of blasts at the Boral West Burleigh quarry.

From Blastechnology’s report it is apparent that with strict charging protocols the risk of

flyrock can be eliminated and hence there would be no risk of a fatality.

4.5.4 Catastrophic failure of the Dam

A dam of some 90ML is proposed for operational and water management reasons. The risk

of a catastrophic failure of the dam has been identified as a credible incident scenario.

There is community concern regarding the potential for medium to large dams, including

ring tanks and some weirs, to fail and threaten lives. The applicable act is the Water Supply

(Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 (the Act) which received assent on the 21 May 2008. The

dam safety provisions of the Act commenced on 1 July 2008.

The Act details the provisions for referable dams and the process for determining whether a

dam is referable or not. Dam owners need to check whether their dam is subject to this

legislation. The Act requires owners of particular dams to assess the impacts of dam failure

on the safety of people living downstream of the dam, by way of a dam failure impact

assessment, to determine whether the dam is a referable dam. The new legislation also

provides for regular ongoing assessment of the potential threat to people from unexpected

flooding caused by a failure of one of these dams.

The Guidelines for Failure Impact Assessment of Water Dams and the Queensland Dam

Safety Management Guidelines for referable dams have been developed to help owners

comply with the Act and dam safety conditions for referable dams.



It is likely that the GCQ dam will be more than 8m in height. This makes it a referable dam

under the dimensions contained in the Act despite the capacity being less than 500ML

(volumetric trigger for a referable dam).

As the GCQ Dam is a referable dam, it is subject to a failure impact assessment which is the

process to determine the number of people whose safety could be at risk should a dam fail

(population at risk). The results of the assessment are used to determine:

• whether a dam is referable and

• the failure impact rating of a dam.

A dam is considered to have failed when:

• a part or all of the dam physically collapses, for example, when:

o the earth wall slumps

o part of the wall erodes when overtopped

o foundation weakness removes a section of a concrete dam wall.

or

• there is an uncontrolled release of any of the contents from the dam, for example,

when:

o a gate or valve fails

o an outlet pipe breaks.

At this early stage in the design process it is not possible to develop a quantitative risk

assessment of a catastrophic dam failure, however, there are a number of factors that will

reduce the Likelihood of the failure occurring and the consequences if it does occur. These

are discussed below.

Certification of Failure Impact Assessment. A failure impact assessment must be certified

by a registered professional engineer, which is a person, company or unit registered under

the Professional Engineers Act 2002. He or she is responsible for certifying, as specified in

these guidelines, the:

• accuracy and content of a dam failure impact assessment

• adequacy and accuracy of the modelling used to calculate the population at risk

• accuracy of the assessed population at risk and other matters.

The assessment has to be independent and cannot be certified by an engineer who is:

• the owner of the dam being assessed or

• an employee of the owner of the dam or

• the operator of the dam or

• an employee of the operator of the dam

Recertification of Failure Impact Assessment. Under the requirements of the Act, Failure

Impact Assessments need to be carried out, as a minimum, every five years.



Consequences

The NSW Government’s Consequence Categories for Dams highlight’s seven consequence

categories:

• Extreme

• High A

• High B

• High C

• Significant

• Low

• Very Low

The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) rates consequences against

two categories, Probable Loss of Life (PLL) and Population at Risk (PAR).

The PLL table is as follows:

Probable Loss

of Life (PLL)

Severity of Damage and Loss

Minor Medium Major Catastrophic

<0.1 Very Low Low Significant High C

≥0.1 to <1 Significant Significant High C High B

≥1 to <5 High C High B High A

≥5 to <50 High A High A Extreme

≥50 Extreme Extreme

The PAR table is below:

Population at

Risk (PAR)

Severity of Damage and Loss

Minor Medium Major Catastrophic

<1 Very Low Low Significant High C

≥1 to <10 Significant Significant High C High B

≥10 to <100 High C High C High B High A

≥100 to <1000 High B High A Extreme

≥1000 Extreme Extreme

The distance from the dam to the site boundary along the watercourse is some 400 metres

and around 900m to the far North East edge of the green space abutting the industrial area.

The watercourse does not flow towards nearby residential property (which in any case is on

higher ground). Given these distances and topography (bushland) the resultant dissipation of



forces from water suddenly escaping from the dam will be substantially reduced. Given this

overland flow path it is expected the Probable Loss of Life and Population at Risk will both be

very low.

Previous Dam Failures

A small number of large dams have failed, or partially failed, in Australia but only one of

these failures has resulted in loss of life (Briesis Dam, Tasmania, 1929). Safety standards and

engineering design tools are such that the likelihood of a failure is now significantly lower

than at any time previously.

Quantitative Analysis

Although a formal Failure Impact Assessment is not possible at this stage, by following the

requirements of the Act, the likelihood of a failure of the GCQ Dam is extremely low. When

coupled with the low level of consequence that arises from the distances from the quarry

site to residential areas, the level of risk of a catastrophic failure of the GCQ dam is assessed

as extremely low and would be well within the Negligible area in Diagram A.

4.6 Bushfire Management Plan

A Bushfire Plan has been developed as part of the EIS by Cardno Chenoweth. Additionally

the following reports address some aspects of Bushfire Management:

• Water Resources and Flood Plain Management which outlines proposed vegetation

management and

• The Emergency Management Plan (refer Appendix G for the first draft of the plan)

should a bushfire occur.

4.7 Health and safety

The EIS is to clearly demonstrate methods of protecting or enhancing human health for the

construction and operation phases.

This is described in the risk management plan (refer Appendix E) and future risk

management processes are described later in this report (Section 4.10).

4.8 Description of public health and safety community values including potential impact

and mitigation measures

Describe the existing health and safety values of the community, workforce, suppliers and

other stakeholders in terms of the environmental factors that can affect human health,

public safety and quality of life – such as air pollutants, odour, lighting and amenity, dust,

traffic, noise, vibration, pedestrian and bicycle use and water.

Discuss provision of amenities such as water and waste management for any truck waiting

areas internal or external to the site.

Define and describe the objectives and practical measures for protecting or enhancing health

and safety community values. Describe how nominated quantitative standards and indicators



may be achieved for social impacts management, and how the achievement of the objectives

will be monitored, audited and managed.

The EIS should assess the cumulative effects on public health values and occupation health

and safety impacts on the community and workforce from project operations and emissions.

Recommend practical monitoring regimes in this section.

The above are described in the Risk Management Plan (Appendices D and E), this report and

relevant segments of the specialist Consultant reports. In particular:

Air Pollutants Katestone Environmental

Odour Katestone Environmental

Lighting and Amenity Lambert & Rehbein

Dust Katestone Environmental

Noise & vibration Acoustics RB, Blastechnology

Traffic, pedestrian and

bicycle use

Cardno Eppell Olsen

Water BMT WBM and Australasian Groundwater & Environmental

Social Impacts Management ImpaxSIA and Three Plus

Public Health values Detailed in this report and above specialist consultant

reports

Silica Dust Katestone Environmental

Safety impacts on the

community and workforce

This report and the risk management plan (Appendices D &

E)

4.9 Emergency management plan

The development of emergency planning and response procedures within an Emergency

Management Plan is to be determined in consultation with the State regional emergency

service providers including QFRS, QAS, Queensland Police Service and EMQ.

Provide an outline of the proposed integrated emergency management planning procedures

(including evacuation plans, if required) for the range of situations identified in the risk

assessment in this section. This includes strategies to deal with natural disasters during

construction, operation and decommissioning.

Refer Appendix G and 4.3 above.

4.10 Risks to people working at the quarry (on-site risks)

The identification and analysis of each hazard on safety in the project area including

mitigation measures over the life of the project from construction, operations and

decommissioning of the plant

An initial risk management plan for the safe construction, operation and de-commissioning

of the plant has been developed (Appendix E). At this (EIS) phase of the project it is of

necessity a high level plan, which will be developed in further detail as design is undertaken



and the project unfolds. An RBS that reflects the infrastructure was developed based on the

plant’s systems (refer Appendix C) and then major activity areas (referred to in the report as

risk categories) were identified. This RBS will also be developed as design occurs to reflect

additional and more detailed elements of the plant. The RBS may also be used for

HAZID/HAZOP studies.

The key risk areas that were identified at this early stage were:

Drill and Blast Blasting

Drilling

Shot plan and design

Primary crushing plant Commissioning

Construction

For each of the risks proposed treatment measures have been developed. The risks for other

elements of the plant (eg secondary and tertiary) will be similar to the Primary crushing

plant (and hence have not been duplicated and will be developed later in the project). The

other areas that will be developed in the future are Electrical and Process Control Systems.

The design of these systems is at an early concept stage and no major or unusual safety

concerns have been identified. Working with electrical safety systems is a normal part of

quarry operations and Boral have detailed SOPs relating to this environment.

The risks associated with Drill and Blast are also part of normal operations and are similar to

those being managed at the West Burleigh Quarry (WBQ). It is noteworthy that GCQ has

bigger buffers/separation from operational areas to sensitive receptors than WBQ. Most of

these risks will be treated through a Blast Management Plan and the development of

detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). A key element to the successful

implementation of SOPs will be regular reinforcement of them (eg tool box meetings), audits

and fatigue management. These are activities that Boral manage as part of their day to day

operations at WBQ and similar sized quarries throughout Australia. (A more detailed

commentary is provided in the Blastechnology report of the EIS.)

Importantly for this EIS there is no increase in risk to the public visiting site or personnel

working on site arising from blasting than that which already exists at the West Burleigh

Quarry. With the recent development of more accurate computer modelling and resultant

improved processes the risks now are less than they were at WBQ some 10 years ago.



5 CONCLUSIONS

Risk management has been undertaken as a core part of the work of specialist consultants

and this report. The risk management plan for the project is contained in Appendices D and

E of this report. This should be read in conjunction with the following plans:

• Blasting Blastechnology

• Traffic management Cardno Eppell Olsen

• Environmental Cardno Chenoweth

• Bushfire Management Cardno Chenoweth

• Flood Management BMT WBM “Water Resources and Floodplain

Management”

From these plans there are few risks that are unique to the GCQ development and many are

normal operational risks that exist in most Boral quarry operations. At this early stage of the

project the level of some of the risks remains quite high. This is to be expected given the

conceptual nature of design at this point in time. The analysis levels will reduce significantly

during the project’s next stages. Boral’s risk management processes also encourage early

proactive management to ensure treatments are undertaken promptly and reduce the level

of risk.

A range of hazards were included in the TOR and each has been specifically addressed and

found to be either low or moderate risks that can be managed with the identified treatment

measures. Similarly four credible incident scenarios were identified, researched and

quantified. All were found to be “Negligible” and fall within the acceptable legislated

boundaries.

Preliminary discussions have been held with the Emergency Services Authorities. An initial

draft Emergency Management Plan, including incident scenarios, has been compiled and

there are no areas that are of major concern and that cannot be handled by SOPs similar to

processes Boral currently uses on many other quarry sites (eg West Burleigh Quarry).



APPENDIX A

Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS) including

tallied Level 2 areas which participants

identified as of concern to them.













APPENDIX B

Guide to Analysis – Likelihood and Impact



Risks

Likelihood Description - general Description - project Indicative frequency

Almost Certain The event will occur

on an annual basis

Can be expected to occur

during the project

Once a year

Likely The event has

occurred several times

or more in your career

May occur during the

project

Once in 3 years

Possible The event may occur

once in your career

Has occurred on an

earlier project

Once in 10 years

Unlikely The event does occur

somewhere from time

to time

Could but not expected to

occur during the project

Once in 30 years

Rare Heard of something

like this occurring

elsewhere

Conceivable but highly

unlikely to occur during

the project

Once in 100 years

Consequence / Impact

Scale Financial - %cost

overrun from contract

price

Project Time % overrun from

planned

Severe 20 +% Most objectives cannot

be achieved

20 +%

Major 10-20% Some objectives cannot

be achieved

10-20%

Moderate 5-10% Some objectives

affected

5-10%

Minor 2-5% Minor effects that are

easily remedied

2-5%

Insignificant 0-2% Negligible impact upon

objectives

0-2%

Opportunity Impact

Scale Financial - %cost

overrun from contract

price

Time % overrun from

planned

Outstanding Financial gain > 20% Significantly enhanced

reputation

20 +%

Major Financial gain 10-20% Enhanced reputation

10-20%

Moderate Financial gain 5-10% Some enhancement to

reputation

5-10%

Minor Financial gain 2-5% Minor improvement to

image

2-5%

Insignificant Financial gain 0-2% Small benefit 0-2%



APPENDIX C

Risk Breakdown Structure based on the

quarry infrastructure







APPENDIX D

Risk Management Plan – All Risk Summary

Report
































©RiskTools Pty Ltd COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE Draft version 11.03.13 65

APPENDIX E

Risk Management Plan for Infrastructure

All Risk Summary Report





















APPENDIX F

Sample report extracts.

These have been included in order to demonstrate how Boral (in part) is able

to manage risks as an ongoing process over the course of the project.

Risk Rating Analysis summary (project)

This report shows the current overall risk profile of the risks in Appendix E for

the project. The numbers at the bottom of each square show the initial

analysis (when a risk is first entered) and the numbers at the top show the

current rating. The report enables Boral management to monitor the risk

profile of the project and over time ensure the reduction in the profile.

The numbers show that the risk levels (analysis) have been reduced over the

development of the EIS.

Risk Treatment Priority Report

This report shows those treatments that have been identified as ones that will

benefit more than one risk. These treatments are managed as priority actions

and once undertaken the analysis for each affected risk is re-visited and

where appropriate the analysis updated.







APPENDIX G

Incident Response and Emergency

Management Site Assessment

The following form an appendix and should be read in conjunction with the existing GCQ

Emergency Management Plan.



Incident Response and Emergency Management Site

Assessment

NOTE This document should be viewed as a draft to

be further developed during detailed design and

development of SOPs.



INCIDENT RESPONSE MANAGEMENT PLAN SITE

ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

This Plan summarises the rationale and approach undertaken by the Boral to manage any

incidents at the Gold Coast Quarry site. The specific response to emergencies at GCQ is

contained in document OHSQ: 12.1 ER:F6 - Emergency response Plan.

All Hazards Approach to Incident and Emergency Management

The GCQ adheres to QLD State Emergency Management arrangements and adopts an ALL

HAZARDS comprehensive approach to:

• Prevent or mitigate hazards from impacting the community or environment;

• Prepare for incidents;

• Respond to incidents as they occur;

• Recover from incidents

Examples of the GCQ’s approach to each of the key emergency management elements of

Prevention, Preparation, Response and Recovery can be found in the below table:

EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS EXAMPLES

Prevention / Mitigation

• Robust inspection

• Preventative maintenance strategies and activities etc

• Robust design codes and practices

• Reliability and redundancy design and strategy

• Induction briefings

• Training

• Consultation

Preparation

• Training

• Emergency management exercises

• Vulnerability and risk assessment processes

• Networks established with emergency service organisations and

QLD Government agencies

• Operating policies and procedures etc

Response

• Highly trained staff

• Policies and procedures

• Emergency management plans and procedures

• Contingency plans etc

Recovery

• Emergency management plans and procedures

• Highly trained staff

• Contingency plans

• Post Incident debriefs etc



INCIDENT REPORTING

Important Contacts

The table below shows the important contacts for the GCQ Incident and Emergency

Response program:

Agency Note Phone Number Website

Police, Ambulance, Fire

Brigade During Emergencies Only Dial '000' www.emergency.qld.gov.au

Queensland Fire and

Rescue

First Officer

Tallebudgera Rural

Brigade;

or

07 5533 8212 www.ruralfire.qld.gov.au

Area Director Rural

Operations (Ipswich) 07 3381 7122 www.ruralfire.qld.gov.au

Other Contacts

The table below provides a range of additional contacts:

Agency Note Phone Number Website

State Emergency

Services 132 500 www.emergency.qld.gov.au

Gold Coast Council

Bushfire Management

Planner 07 5581 1526

www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au

General Enquiries 1300 130 854

Emergency After

Hours 1800 637 000

Disaster Hotline

(during disasters only) 1800 606 000

Actions to be undertaken in the event of an Incident

The following are the Immediate Actions to be undertaken in the event of an incident:

• If an incident has occurred at the GCQ and the situation is potentially life threatening

call 000 in the first instance.

• If the incident is not life threatening, it is to be reported to the Quarry manager who

will:

o Assess the situation and potential consequences;



o Prioritise the response based on intelligence gathered;

o Contact / dispatch designated operational staff to attend the incident or

advise of a course of action based on the prioritisation assessment; and

o Advise of any specific hazards which may be present at the location of the

incident.

• The GCQ Quarry Manager will escalate the incident accordingly and notify relevant

stakeholders.

GCQ adheres to QLD State Emergency Management Arrangements meaning that key

emergency service organisations such as QLD Police, Fire and Rescue QLD and the SES may

be the controlling authority depending on the nature of the incident

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Examples of Potential Incidents at GCQ

Examples of potential incidents at GCQ include:

• Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s (including fire/explosion)

• Loss of diesel outside bund during refuelling/fuelling operations

• Loss of fuel within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve

• Loss of oils/solvents within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve



• Catastrophic failure of dam releasing large volumes of water into on-site and off-site

water courses

• Vehicle accident causing spillage of fluids

• Vehicle accident causing spillage of materials (rollover of vehicle)

Types of Incident and Emergency Management Plans

Boral and the GCQ have various types of plans and procedures in place to effectively manage

incidents:

• Health and Safety Policies and Procedures;

• Corporate Emergency Management Guidelines;

• Corporate Business Continuity Plans;

• Corporate Communications Plans;

• Dangerous Goods Emergency Plans;

• Bushfire Management Plans;

• Operating Policies and Procedures; and

• Pollution Incident Response Procedures.

Incident Categorisation and Escalation

Once an incident is reported, the GCQ Quarry Manager will assess the situation and

prioritise the response using information received. The Quarry Manager will also categorise

and escalate the incident as required, delivering a proportionate response ranging from



assigning quarry resources to deal with routine and minor incidents, through to whole of

quarry response (with emergency services support where required) for significant incidents.

COMMUNICATIONS DURING INCIDENTS

Communications with Stakeholders during Incidents

GCQ has a communications plan and established points of contact with its key stakeholders

and will notify relevant stakeholders of incidents as required.

Once an incident has been categorised, GCQ uses its systems and procedures to identify and

notify all relevant stakeholders and to update identified stakeholders with any changing

circumstances. GCQ has the following corporate resources to draw upon to assist with

stakeholder communications during incidents:

• Public Relations Officer;

• External Communications Officer;

• Incident Management Teams; and

• Crisis Management Specialists.

Communications with Relevant Authorities and Stakeholders

GCQ has established relationships with key emergency service organisations and QLD

Government agencies.

In the event of a pollution incident, the following authorities are immediately notified in

accordance with the requirements of the Protection of the Environment Legislation

Amendment Act 2011:

• QLD Environment Protection Authority;

• Local Council;

• WorkCover QLD; and

• Fire and Rescue QLD.

Other key stakeholders which may need to be notified of incidents include:

• QLD Police;

• QLD State Emergency Service (SES); and

• QLD Rural Fire Service (RFS).

Attachment 1 to GCQ Emergency Management Plan

Incident Response Management Plan

Gold Coast Quarry Emergency Management Plan

Incident Response Management Plan - Site Assessment Sheet

List of Hazards at Site that may give rise to an Incident

(all hazards listed in this sheet are to be subjected to a risk assessment)

Site Name:

Gold Coast Quarry

Responsible Person:

xxxxx

Date:

xx/11/2012

Name/ Description

Covered under Haz Chemicals/MSDS (if applicable)

Amount Stored (if applicable)

Location of Storage (if applicable)

Map Reference

Need for Early Warning1 Current Controls

See Risk Assessment (Incident Number)

Chemicals/Fuels/Lubricants (raw materials and products which can cause pollution)

Diesel Class 3 Xxx ltrs Diesel Storage Area Map Ref #1 No

• Bunding

• PMP

• Training

• Spill Kits

• SOP

• Inductions

• Fire Fighting Equipment

• Fire Fighting Procedures/ Training

• Site Security

Incident #1-3

1 Early warnings relate to informing neighbours who may be affected by the emission/discharge of the substance. If this substance is of a type and quantity which may reach neighbours then early warning assessment of actions is required to be undertaken.


Name/ Description




Map Reference

Need for Early Warning Current Controls


Chemicals/Fuels/Lubricants (raw materials and products which can cause pollution)

Oils/Solvents Class 3 Packaged goods up to xxx ltrs

Workshop Area Map Ref #2 No

• Bunding

• PMP

• Training

• Flammable Cabinet

• Spill Kits

• SOP

• Inductions



• Site Security

Incident #4

Oils/Fuels Class 3 Packaged goods up to xxx ltrs

Workshop Area Map Ref #3 No

• PMP

• Training

• Spill Kits

• SOP

• Inductions



• Site Security

Incident #1-3


Name/ Description




Map Reference



MATERIALS (e.g. stockpiles, silos, bulk solids .etc.)

Aggregate stockpiles

N/A Variable Dedicated on site Map Ref #4 and #5

No

• On site Dam

• Water sprays

• Water cart

• Maintain manageable levels

• Site Security

Incident #5

Explosives N/A N/A N/A N/A Possibly

• Storage regulations

• PMP

• Training

• Exclusion areas

• SOP

• Inductions



• Site Security

Incident #6

AQUEOUS (e.g. dams, wastewater tanks, other water storage area)

Water Storage Dam N/A Variable (max 90

ML) Map Ref #6 No

• Construction to applicable Standards (AS1289.0-2000)

• Pump maintenance

• Regular inspections

• Discharge system

Incident #7


Name/ Description




Map Reference



SUBSTANCES IN PROCESSES (substances which could be emitted from operational processes i.e. treatment plants, vehicles .etc.)

Vehicle Transit Class 3 N/A N/A N/A No

• Licensing

• Training

• SOP

• Inductions

• Road laws

• Vehicle servicing

Incident #8

Vehicle Transit N/A N/A N/A N/A No

• Licensing

• Training

• SOP

• Inductions

• Road laws

• Vehicle servicing

Incident #9


IMPACT ON NEIGHBOURS ASSESSMENT - EARLY WARNINGS

Site Name:

Gold Coast Quarry

Responsible Person:

xxxxx

Date:

xx/11/2012

Incident Type/Description External Release (air, waterway .etc)

Neighbours impacted/extent of impact

Communication methods/ Early warnings

Actions and other control measures (e.g. posting on website, community group meetings)

Site runs out of water Dust Neighbours in the immediate area may be impacted, however, this will depend on the extent of the dust and the wind at the time of the water outage

There will be no way to provide early warnings in the event of such an incident.

Communication in an incident like this would take place after the fact and would involve speaking at community groups meetings as well as posting on the website and may include a mail drop.


RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Table 1: Measures of Consequence Value Description Impact

1 Insignificant No damage 2 Minor Minor on/off site environmental harm. Off site environmental nuisance. Minor licence parameter breach. 3 Moderate Material on/off site environmental harm. Significant licence parameter breach. 4 Major Serious on/off site environmental harm, largely reversible. 5 Catastrophic Serious on/off site environmental harm, largely irreversible.

Table 2: Measures of Likelihood

Value Description Impact 1 Practically impossible Exceptional circumstances only 2 Unlikely The event is not expected to occur 3 Possible The event could occur at some time 4 Likely The event will probably occur in most circumstances 5 Almost Certain The event is expected to occur in most circumstances

Table 3 Risk Ranking Table

Insignificant (1)

Minor (2)

Moderate (3)

Major (4)

Catastrophic (5)

Almost Certain (5) M (5) H (10) H (15) E (20) E (25) Likely (4) M (4) M (8) H (12) H (16) E (20) Possible (3) L (3) M (6) H (9) H (12) H (15) Unlikely (2) L (2) M (4) M (6) M (8) H (10) Practically Impossible (1) L (1) L (2) L (3) L (4) M (5)


RISK ASSESSMENT ON POTENTIAL IMPACTS

Hazard and Likelihood Risk Assessment and Corrective Control Measures Site Name:

Gold Coast Quarry

Responsible Person:

xxxxx

Review Date:

xx/11/2012

Name/Ref of Pollutant/ Chemicals

Description of Hazard/ Incident

Leading to Hazard Lik Conseq Risk Impact on

Neighbours

Control measures Corrective Action

Coverage Under Other Plans

Resp Person

Action Date

Diesel

Incident #1 Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s

1 1 L1 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): Due to location within bund, damage to tanks is unlikely to occur from external equipment. In addition, tanks are maintained in good structural integrity with low risk of failure through corrosion. Consequence (Insignificant): Failure resulting in loss of all or substantial volume of tanks would be captured entirely by existing primary bund with no release to soil or water

As per Action Plan

When required

Incident #2 Loss of diesel outside bund during refuelling/fuelling operations

2 2 M4 N/A

Likelihood (Unlikely): Due to location within bund an incident while refuelling or refuelling may occur on some occasions. Hoses and refuelling equipment are maintained with low risk of failure. Consequence (Insignificant): Failure resulting in loss/leakage from refuelling from hose, nozzle or plant/equipment would be captured by a secondary bund or spill kill with minimal release to soil.

As per Action Plan

When required

Incident #3 Loss of fuel within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve

1 1 L1 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): Drain valve, hoses and refuelling equipment are maintained in good structural integrity with low risk of failure. The drain valve is locked at all times. Consequence (Insignificant): Failure resulting in loss of all or substantial volume of tanks would be captured entirely by existing primary bund with no release to soil or water

As per Action Plan

When required

Incident #4 Loss of oils/solvents within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve

1 1 L1 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): Due to location within bund, spillage during delivery and use is unlikely to occur. In addition, hoses and decanting equipment is maintained in good structural integrity with low risk of failure. Consequence (Insignificant): Failure resulting in loss of oils/solvents from packaged goods would be captured entirely by the primary bund with no release to soil or water.

As per Action Plan

When required


Name/Ref of Pollutant/ Chemicals

Description of Hazard/ Incident

Leading to Hazard Lik Conseq Risk Impact on

Neighbours

Control measures Corrective Action

Coverage Under Other Plans

Resp Person

Action Date

Materials

Incident #5 Excessive airborne dust from stockpiled material

2 1 L2 Minor

Likelihood (Unlikely): Stockpiles are maintained to a manageable level on a monthly basis. Use of water sprinklers and water cart on-site during windy periods. Consequence (Insignificant): Excessive dust from stockpile causing nuisance to surrounding area.

As per Action Plan

When required

Incident #6 Fly rock incident from use of explosives

1 3 L3 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): Significant safety measures and assessments are undertaken prior to any blasting. Geotechnical assessments as to rock composition and density are also done. Consequence (Insignificant): May cause small rocks to fly into surrounding areas. Large rocks and boulders would be contained on site. This is more a safety issue than a consequence issue.

As per Action Plan

When required

Aqueous

Incident #7 Catastrophic failure of sediment dam releasing large volumes of water into on-site and off-site water courses

1 1 L1 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): Dams are frequently monitored and inspected for levels and integrity. Water can be released at moderate flow if dam appears to be filling. Consequence (Insignificant): Consequences will see minor amounts of water released into waterways and surrounds. Will not impact on surrounding residents

As per Action Plan

When required

Substances in processes

Incident #8 Vehicle accident causing spillage of fluids

2 1 L2 N/A

Likelihood (practically Impossible): There is a high likelihood of an accident given the types of roads and the number of trips undertaken, however, the likelihood that such an accident would result in fuel spillage would be unlikely. Consequence (Insignificant): Emergency services are equipped with equipment and chemicals to quickly deal with any spillage. It is likely it will only be a small amount of fluids.

As per Action Plan

When required

Incident #9 Vehicle accident causing spillage of materials (rollover of vehicle)

2 1 L2

Likelihood (practically Impossible): There is a high likelihood of an accident given the types of roads and the number of trips undertaken, however, the likelihood that such an accident would result in a material spillage would be unlikely. Consequence (Insignificant): material will be able to be cleaned up with no adverse environmental consequences


Emergency Management Plan Response Actions Incident No 1

Incident Number 1

Catastrophic failure of above ground diesel tank/s Actions required:

• Contact all relevant people/department (refer to Immediate Reporting Contact Sheet)

• Ensure bunds are capturing full volume of diesel

• Ensure bund integrity is sound throughout the entire period of the incident (i.e. periodic inspections)

• Contact service provider (insert details) to pump out bund contents

• Area to be restricted to incident management personnel

• Ensure spill kit available for any release from the bund

• If any release from bund onto unsealed soil/surface water - Environmental consultants to be engaged to investigate and remediate contamination

• Repair replace tanks

• Refuel tanks

• Inspect bund for ongoing serviceability

Alarm Raising Any personnel involved or witnessing incident to report to immediate supervisor and PIRMP actions to be implemented

Emergency Controller

• Xxxx - Quarry Manager

• Call Service provider (xxx)

• Spill kit manager (Supervisor)

• Periodic inspections and update reporting of site and bund (xxx)

Scale of Incident Incident will most likely be restricted to storage area with minimal external impact, however, potential for bund overflow or failure may result in soil and surface water contamination that will require specialist investigation/remediation

Evacuate Only if fire or explosion potential exists. Quarry Manager and any advice provided by Fire department as part of attendance after immediate notification.

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

• Xxxxxx

External mandatory

• Immediate reporting contact sheet to be used

External non-mandatory: N/A


Rescuer/Respondent and Safety Checks As per Site Emergency Plan or Fire Department as part of immediate reporting

Rescue and First Aid As per Site Emergency Plan or Fire Department as part of immediate reporting

Clean up and Waste Disposal Service provider to dispose of diesel and advise on required clean up

Reporting and Re-preparedness

See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 2

Incident Number 3

Loss of diesel outside bund during refuelling/fuelling operations Actions required:



• Utilise spill kit for any release from the bund


•






Scale of Incident Soil and surface water contamination that will require specialist investigation/remediation


Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

• Xxxxxx

External mandatory







See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 3

Incident Number 3

Loss of fuel within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve Actions required:


• Ensure bunds are capturing full volume of diesel














Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

• Xxxxxx

External mandatory







See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 4

Incident Number 4

Loss of oils/solvents within bunded area with leaking or open drain valve Actions required:


• Ensure bunds are capturing full volume of liquid














Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

• Xxxxxx

External mandatory







See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 5

Incident Number 5

Excessive airborne dust from stockpiled material Actions required:

• Employees, Contractor/Visitor to notify site representative of issue immediately (induction)

• Daily monitoring to be undertaken to assess weather and site conditions


• Dust suppression activity to commence immediately on stockpiles


Emergency Controller • Xxxx - Quarry Manager

Scale of Incident Incident likely to be very minor in nature

Evacuate Not required

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

• Environmental Representative

External mandatory

• Nil


Rescuer/Respondent and Safety Checks N/A

Rescue and First Aid First aid may be required for those who suffer excessive dust inhalation

Clean up and Waste Disposal N/A


See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 6

Incident Number 6 Fly rock incident from use of explosives Actions required:




Scale of Incident Incident will most likely be restricted to site

Evacuate Not required

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager


External mandatory

• Nil



Rescue and First Aid First aid may be required for those who are struck by falling debris



See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 7

Incident Number 7

Catastrophic failure of dam releasing large volumes of water into on-site and off-site water courses Actions required:


• Contact neighbours if there is going to be an inundation of water

• Area restricted to Incident Response Personnel

• Contact local contractor to rebuild dams immediately



Scale of Incident Catastrophic failure of one or more sediment dams are likely to result in off-site impacts to water courses which would predominantly reduce water quality over a short period of time. As such, impact to the environment/human health is not considered to be significant.

Evacuate Only if flood potential exists. Quarry Manager and any advice provided by Fire Dept as part of attendance after immediate notification

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager


External mandatory

• Nil


Rescuer/Respondent and Safety Checks As per Site Emergency Plan

Rescue and First Aid As per Site Emergency Plan

Clean up and Waste Disposal Consultants to be contacted to advise on required clean-up


See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 8

Incident Number 8

Vehicle accident causing spillage of fluids Actions required:


• Contact emergency services

Alarm Raising Any personnel involved or witnessing incident to report to immediate supervisor back at GCQ site


Scale of Incident May result in injuries. Will involve spillage of fluids which will require specialist clean up by Emergency Services and may also require evacuation of neighbours

Evacuate N/A

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

External mandatory

• Nil



Rescue and First Aid N/A



See SOPs:

• X

• Y


Incident No 9

Incident Number 9

Vehicle accident causing spillage of materials (rollover of vehicle) Actions required:


• Contact emergency services

Alarm Raising Any personnel involved or witnessing incident to report to immediate supervisor back at GCQ site


Scale of Incident May result in injuries. Will be limited to spillage of materials which can be cleaned up with no use of chemicals or evacuation procedures to neighbours

Evacuate N/A

Communications

Internal:

• Quarry Manager

External mandatory

• Nil



Rescue and First Aid N/A



See SOPs:

• X

• Y


APPENDIX H

Draft Master Programme


Date post:	16-Apr-2020
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