E NVIRONMENTAL J USTICE AND THE B RAZILIAN A MAZON APREPRINT X.M.B. Verschuur Forest and Nature Policy Wageningen University and Research Droevendaalsesteeg, 6708 PB Wageningen, the Netherlands Supervised by Dr. J.H. Behagel [email protected]July 17, 2020 ABSTRACT The forest fires and deforestation levels that rapidly increased in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 resulted in global media coverage and became a point of international concern. This information brought forward tensions regarding the use of and decision-making on the Amazon while competing claims regarding environmental justice were made. Despite the absence of a common understanding on environmental justice, the concept is widely applied by scholars and practitioners alike. The study reconstructs the discourses and discourse-coalitions in the Dutch and British media that shape the Amazon fires as an issue and illustrate how environmental justice is articulated. The results are helpful in contextualising various political debates and discourses beyond this case study to include other (transnational) environmental issues. A discourse analysis of media sources revealed three dominant discourses: 1) Bolsonaro as the Hero; 2) Bolsonaro as the Villain; and 3) The problem is bigger than Bolsonaro. The portrayal of Bolsonaro as a Villain was favoured by the media and supported by a powerful discourse-coalition, therefore suggesting that – at least internationally – this appears to be hegemonic. The two dominant Hero/Villain discourses used discursive strategies largely based on division and polarisation, including through the use of divisive rhetoric such as mythological archetypes. Distributive justice was extensively and widely articulated by all three discourses, thereby illustrating that concerns on the overemphasis of distributive justice by environmental justice scholars are warranted. The research thus illustrates how competing discourses ‘make sense’ of the Amazon fires whilst highlighting power dynamics in knowledge production, truth creation and value systems, including hegemonic ideologies. Ultimately, in order to address socio-environmental issues, a genuine attempt should be made for greater respect, recognition and participation of less powerful actors and discourses in (environmental) decision-making while using a multidimensional and critical justice approach. Gaining insights into (alternative) discourses and how these came into being is thus a first step towards more inclusive environmental politics and governance.
Transcript
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
A PREPRINT
X.M.B. VerschuurForest and Nature Policy
Wageningen University and ResearchDroevendaalsesteeg, 6708 PBWageningen, the Netherlands
The forest fires and deforestation levels that rapidly increased in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019resulted in global media coverage and became a point of international concern. This informationbrought forward tensions regarding the use of and decision-making on the Amazon while competingclaims regarding environmental justice were made. Despite the absence of a common understandingon environmental justice, the concept is widely applied by scholars and practitioners alike. Thestudy reconstructs the discourses and discourse-coalitions in the Dutch and British media that shapethe Amazon fires as an issue and illustrate how environmental justice is articulated. The results arehelpful in contextualising various political debates and discourses beyond this case study to includeother (transnational) environmental issues. A discourse analysis of media sources revealed threedominant discourses: 1) Bolsonaro as the Hero; 2) Bolsonaro as the Villain; and 3) The problemis bigger than Bolsonaro. The portrayal of Bolsonaro as a Villain was favoured by the media andsupported by a powerful discourse-coalition, therefore suggesting that – at least internationally – thisappears to be hegemonic. The two dominant Hero/Villain discourses used discursive strategies largelybased on division and polarisation, including through the use of divisive rhetoric such as mythologicalarchetypes. Distributive justice was extensively and widely articulated by all three discourses, therebyillustrating that concerns on the overemphasis of distributive justice by environmental justice scholarsare warranted. The research thus illustrates how competing discourses ‘make sense’ of the Amazonfires whilst highlighting power dynamics in knowledge production, truth creation and value systems,including hegemonic ideologies. Ultimately, in order to address socio-environmental issues, a genuineattempt should be made for greater respect, recognition and participation of less powerful actors anddiscourses in (environmental) decision-making while using a multidimensional and critical justiceapproach. Gaining insights into (alternative) discourses and how these came into being is thus a firststep towards more inclusive environmental politics and governance.
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Disclaimer This thesis report is part of an education program and hence might still contain (minor) inaccuracies anderrors.
Citation Verschuur, X.M.B. (2020). Environmental Justice of the Brazilian Amazon: A Discourse Analysis. MSc.Thesis. Wageningen University and Research. Forest and Nature Policy.
AcknowledgementsI wish to express my sincere gratitude to dr. J.H. Behagel for providing me with the opportunity to conduct this researchand for guiding me throughout this master thesis. I also wish to express great appreciation to my family and myhousemates for putting up with me throughout this second thesis - I could not have done it without your support! Inparticular I want to thank Eva, Judith and Marta for their extensive contributions (feedback, brainstorming, support),Gautham, and Marnix for being my LaTeX hero.
9 Appendix A: Newspaper articles used for the analysis 60
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Table 1: Abbreviations used throughout thesis
Abbreviation Meaning
BLA Brazil’s Legal AmazonCEJ Critical Environmental JusticeCSR Corporate Social ResponsibilityDMA Discourse-Mythological ApproachEJ Environmental JusticeEPA United States Environmental Protection AgencyFUNAI National Indian FoundationGCF Green Climate FundHR Historical (Emission) ResponsibilityIBAMA Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural ResourcesINPE National Institute for Space ResearchNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationUK United KingdomUN United NationsWUM Wise Use MovementZD Zero-Deforestation
2 Newspaper articles from the Guardian that were used for the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 Newspaper articles from the Telegraph that were used for the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4 Newspaper articles from de Telegraaf that were used for the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5 Newspaper articles from de Volkskrant that were used for the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
List of Figures
1 Monthly area of rainforest lost in the Brazilian Amazon due to deforestation (2015-2019). [1] . . . . . 7
2 French President Macron’s tweet on Amazon fires, 22 August 2019. [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Deforestation levels in Brazil (2015-2019); Note the reference to ’record level’. [3] . . . . . . . . . . 32
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1 Chapter I: Introduction
October 29th, 2018, marked the day that populist-authoritarian candidate1, Jair Bolsonaro, was elected as president ofBrazil. His election was based on an extreme, far-right movement with the majority of support coming from the southof Brazil where many of the economic elite and agribusinesses are located. Throughout the following year, Bolsonaro’sadministration made it into a multitude of headlines in different media outlets around the world, in particular regardingthe increased deforestation rates and forest fires. Newspaper headlines were diverse and included titles such: “Chaos,chaos, chaos: a journey through Bolsonaro’s Amazon inferno” [5], “#PrayforAmazonia Rainforest” [6] and “Bolsonarodeclares ’the Amazon is ours’ and calls deforestation data ’lies’” [7].
Bolsonaro, an ex-military member, found much of his support from the agribusiness sector, the powerful evangelicalchurches, and Brazil’s political and economic elite [4, 8, 9]. Opening up the Amazon rainforest to extractive industriesand agro-industrial monocultures has been an integral part in his campaign and advanced in his early presidential term,but increasingly has also become a point of contestation. Nevertheless, the success of Bolsonaro’s campaign was largelybased on “the promise of radicalizing markedly authoritarian rural policies” [4, p.960], a promise that would favour theminority group of wealthy landholder producers. In the populist reasoning, the “claims of a minority group are framedto be equivalent to the claims of the ‘the people’, while the interests of most are rendered as antagonistic to those ofthe nation” [4]. That this political and economic elite contribute(d) to making Brazil an agricultural economic power,thereby benefiting “the country as a whole” (p.960), are long-standing claims that largely emanate from Brazil’s militarydictatorship (1964-85). Back when Amazon colonisation measures were encouraged, the Produtores (or producers)aided in making Brazil one of the biggest agricultural producers in the world [4, 10]. As such, they argue(d) thatthey are Brazil’s hope when it comes to realising economic growth, an argument that “obfuscates the “differentiatedentitlements” that grant some groups of people privileged possession of—and access to—resources while excluding anddispossessing other groups” [4, p.965] [8].
During the 1970s and 1980s, developmentalist policies shaped the Amazonian frontier as a site of violence andenvironmental destruction, setting in motion racial hierarchies and agricultural expansion of monoculture ecologies[4], including cattle ranching. Deforestation rates were very high during the 1980s and 1990s, partly a result ofthe continuous expansion of large-scale cattle ranches into the forests. During the mid-1980s, environmental issueswere identified and the conservation of the Amazon was stimulated by different actors such as foreign nations andtransnational environmental groups, further triggering Brazilian anxieties on the internationalization of the Amazon(i.e. “the exercise of territorial sovereignty by a third country” [10]). In the 1990s a socio-environment responsewas witnessed (e.g. the creation of the ‘Ministry of Environment and the Legal Amazon’ in 1992 [10]), with newenvironmental governance measures imposed in the mid-2000s. Between 2004 and 2014, deforestation declineddramatically, of which 70% of the ’deforestation slow-down’ happened between 2004 and 2007 [11, 12]. Between 2008and 2012, intervention strategies by both federal and state governments occurred which included, for instance, “lawenforcement campaigns and credit restrictions for landowners who deforest illegally” [12, p.1] as well as other measuressuch as the 2006 Soy Moratorium and 2009 beef agreement (Tac da Carne) [11, 13]. As a result of multiple factors,including these policies, deforestation rates dropped “to historic lows” and the situation was considered a ’deforestationsuccess story’ both in terms of forest conservation and supposedly ‘green’ agricultural production [14, p.377]. In short,Brazil witnessed a myriad of policy changes: “Over the past half-century, state policies for the Brazilian Amazon haveshifted from direct appropriation of land in support of elite and corporate interests to agrarian resettlement projectsfavouring smallholders, to laissez-faire neoliberal policies favouring private enterprise and, most recently, to new formsof ‘green grabs’ of territories for environmental purposes” [14, p.377].
1’Populist’ refers to “actions [that] do not follow legal precedent or expert knowledge but rather reflect the will of leaders whoclaim to speak for the people’” [4, p.959]. In other words, the actions do not support the will of the of the majority but instead aparticular group who supposedly represent the true identity of the people and the nation. The rule is ’authoritarian’ in the sense thatthose who provide opposition between the ruling power and ’the people’ are considered to be “enemies of the nation and excluded byforce from spaces of political deliberation” (p.959)
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Despite the general downward trend in deforestation rates, deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (BLA2) between2012-2018 increased 65% annually, including a 150% deforestation rate increase in Brazil’s Indigenous territories from2016 to 2018 alone [16]. This reversal in the deforestation trajectory is largely attributed to changes in governanceand policies, including a controversial revision in 2012 of Brazil’s Forest Code. Since Bolsonaro’s election, however,deforestation rates have surged (see Figure 1). Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research’s (INPE) data recorded a278% increase in deforestation rates in July 2019 compared to the previous year, resulting in 870 square miles beinglost in one month alone [3, 9, 17, 18].
Figure 1: Monthly area of rainforest lost in the Brazilian Amazon due to deforestation (2015-2019). [1]
The causes and drivers of deforestation are varied but mainly relate to governmental policies and commercial drivers[4, 10–12]. The former includes the dilution of “environmental regulations, undermining indigenous rights, and endingprograms in support of smallholder farmers” [4, p.960] largely supported by the ‘ruralista front’ [8]. The latter includeseconomic activities such as the increased demand of export-driven commodity agriculture (e.g. soy, cattle [19]),logging and mining [8, 11, 20, 21]. Infrastructural projects [8, 22] have also contributed to increased deforestation, ashave a number of indirect drivers such fluctuating commodity prices, migration patterns, growing unemployment andprovisional subsidies [11, 23–26]. As such, these (in)direct drivers and data on historical deforestation in the Amazonillustrate that, although Bolsonaro and his administration advocate a strong anti-environmental rhetoric, the incrementsof forest loss are situated in broader and more complex political environment that faces numerous challenges.
The recent global outcry in the media referred to both the elevated deforestation rates as well as the increased numberof reported forest fires. Although many sources appear to use deforestation and fires interchangeably, they arenot synonymous. Deforestation “converts large extents of natural forests into agricultural lands” whereas fires are“commonly used as a land management technique to clean land of wood debris and invasive weeds in agricultural plots”[21, p.1058]. Although forest fires are a common occurrence during Brazil’s dry season, which usually runs from June toOctober, the data that INPE released concerned national and international actors alike. One of the many concerns refers
2In Brazil, one can distinguish between the Classical Amazonia and the Brazilian Legal Amazon (BLA). The former is Brazil’snorthern region and consists of seven states (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins) whereas the latter isBrazil’s largest administrative unit contains all nine states in the Amazon Basin (those previously mentioned and parts of MatoGrosso and Maranhão).[15] In this thesis, I refer to the BLA when talking about the Amazon.
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to the impact deforestation has on the global climate. The Amazon is often referred to as the ‘lungs of the planet’ and avital carbon sink. Moreover, the Amazon’s importance for biodiversity, hydrology, its (Indigenous) inhabitants, amongstmany other social, cultural, economic and ecological elements, is widely and frequently acknowledged [20, 27].
French president Emmanuel Macron was most vocal about his concern of the situation in Brazil, and the situation in theAmazon specifically. Macron’s Tweet in which he described the situation in the Amazon as an international crisis andemergency, calling for international action (see Figure 2), went viral. It was quickly pointed out, however, that theimage Macron used in his Tweet did not correspond with the fires but instead was an image taken in 1989. This resultedin outrage and skepticism of various actors, some of whom referred to Macron’s post as ‘fake news’ (see figures 3a and3b). The ’dramatic event’ – i.e. smoke from the Amazon reached the city of São Paulo on August 19, which blackenedthe skies even though it was mid-afternoon [28, 29] – coupled with concerns shared by well-known celebrities andpoliticians, were successful in capturing the public’s attention. Consequently, the Amazon fires became both a mediaand political issue. The fires thus provide a useful and practical illustration of how (environmental) issues go throughdifferent phases of attention with public interest ebbing and flowing at different points in time [30].
Figure 2: French President Macron’s tweet on Amazon fires, 22 August 2019. [2]
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(a) A response emphasising sovereignty [2] (b) A response emphasising fake news [2]
The increased number of fires and rates of deforestation have, in addition to the drivers discussed above, been coupled tothe significant policy changes Bolsonaro has invoked since his presidency. This include, for instance, the elimination ofthe Ministry of the Environment (as well as the climate sections of both the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs) with its duties becoming part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply. Moreover,the administration of Indigenous lands was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Agriculture.Threats were made to withdrawing Brazil from the 2015 Paris Agreement [4, p.123], NGOs were expelled from thecountry, cutbacks were implemented on programs that support family agriculture, and claims for land by Indigenousand Afro-Brazilian communities were denied [4, 31]. In addition, opening up the Amazon rainforest to extractiveindustries and agro-industrial monocultures has been promoted extensively [4, 12]. Overall, environmental regulationshave deteriorated, Indigenous and quilombolas rights have been undermined3, support from smallholder farmers haveended while those who oppose the populist and authoritarian agenda, such as environmentalists or Indigenous leaders,have been attacked by far-right forces [8][4].
1.1 Problem Statement
Although the recent global (media) outcry was a response to the forest fires and deforestation more generally, thebroader context appears to concern itself with dilemmas regarding the use and decision-making of the Amazon, as wellas broader social and economic developments. As such, themes which are frequently addressed in the media includethose of sovereignty, Indigenous populations, international interference, responsibility, environmental protection etc.Environmental issues and conflicts, such as the Amazon fires, are increasingly being addressed through questionsof justice[32]. Despite the concept’s presence in (media) discourses, it remains a contested notion up to date. Acommon definition of (environmental) justice is absent, and the ambiguity of what constitutes justness, such as ‘just’environmental management, is therefore a strong driver of environmental conflicts [33]. The literature highlightsdifferent focal points of justice interpretations, including those related to distribution, deliberative processes andrecognition. This plurality, and ambiguity, thus calls for an exploration of the role of justice in environmental protection,and in particular those environmental issues that transcend (national) boundaries and territories. It should be recognised,however, that the different approaches to justice are “infused with tensions arising from centuries of colonial exploitation,global economic inequalities, and the challenges of aligning different ways of knowing and valuing nature” [33, p.122]when attempting to understand how environmental justice is used and articulated in discourses on environmental issues.
3“In Brazil, Quilombola communities are rural communities composed of descendants of enslaved people who maintain a stronghistorical link with the past. Quilombola communities enjoy land rights under the 1988 Constitution.” [8, p.404]
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Ultimately, discerning how these different interpretations and approaches are used in various discourses is a first steptowards understanding what the (practical) implications of these references to justice are.
1.2 Research Objective
By using the global outcry on the increased forest fires and levels of deforestation in the Amazon as a case study, thisthesis seeks to identify the discourses and discourse-coalitions that shape the Amazon fires as a problem in Dutchand British media. By doing so, this research attempts to illustrate how a discourse analysis and conceptions ofenvironmental justice add essential insights to an analysis of environmental issues and politics, such as revealing powerdynamics and competition between discourses and their coalitions. Ideally, the results are helpful in contextualisingvarious political debates and discourses beyond this case study to include other (transnational) environmental issues,such as climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation, etc. that take place on different geographies andscales.
1.3 Research Questions
The following research question will be addressed: How do various political discourses in Dutch and British media onthe Brazilian Amazon fires articulate environmental justice?
To answer this question the following sub-questions will be investigated:
1. What are the main, current, discourses on the Brazilian Amazon?
2. How do these discourses articulate environmental justice?
3. Which discourse is dominant and which conception of justice is prioritised?
The first sub-question provides the basis of the results, illustrating that in the context of this thesis, three main discourseswere identified. Here, the discourse-coalitions and their major storylines are presented, as are some of their maindiscursive practices - including the use of mythological archetypes. The second sub-question focuses on how the threedominant conceptions of environmental justice (i.e. distributive justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition)and Critical Environmental Justice are articulated in the discourses. Sub-questions three then aims to explore howparticular political discourses become ’dominant’ and finds that power and discursive practices play a crucial role. Inaddition, the results highlight a prioritisation of particular justice approaches throughout the discourses. Overall, theresults discuss these three main discourses and illustrate how various actors perceive, and construct, the Amazon firesas a problem in different ways.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter two explores the theoretical framework in depth, beginning with adiscussion on discourses, discourse analysis and relevant analytical concepts (discourse-coalitions, storylines, mytho-logical archetypes, crisis narratives, and divisive rhetoric). The second part of the theoretical framework discussesenvironmental justice (EJ) theories as forming a (potential) part of discourses. Here, the focus lies on the three mainconceptions of EJ and their limitations as well as a brief section on Critical Environmental Justice. Chapter threeaddresses the methods used, while the following three chapters explore the results of the analysis in depth. Each ofthe three discourses (Discourse 1: Bolsonaro as the Hero; Discourse 2: Bolsonaro as the Villain; Discourse 3: theproblem is bigger than Bolsonaro) will constitute a separate chapter and will include the main storylines identified,the discourse-coalitions, the language used, and the different aspects of EJ that were articulated within each discourse.Although each discourse is referred to numerically in the thesis (Discourses 1, 2 and 3), this does not imply a hierarchicalorder in any way. Chapter seven then discusses the findings of the previous chapters by reflecting on the results usingthe theoretical framework and, where appropriate, complements it with additional literature. Suggestions for movingforward and some limitations are outlined as well. Finally, Chapter eight will conclude the thesis with a concisesummary and highlight why this research is relevant.
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2 Chapter II: Theoretical Framework
2.1 Part 1: Understanding Discourse
The Amazon fires are presented by the media as an issue that deserves attention and is illustrative of how environmentalevents can become a political issue. The way in which such an issue or story is interpreted, how actors give it meaning,and what part of the story gains priority, depends on the sender and the receiver of the message [34]. As such, how theissue is understood changes from individual to individual. However, this lack of mutual understanding does not meanthat there is a lack of meaningful political interventions. On the contrary, it can prove to be very useful in creating andmaintaining different political coalitions. The issue itself is thus discursively created by discourse-coalitions, groupsof actors who share particular storylines, to make sense of the world through a (simplified) reality. What gives thesecoalitions their political power is that “the actors group around specific storylines that they employ whilst engaging inenvironmental politics” [32, p.4]. By controlling a discourse, actors can exert power – and it often the privileged actorsthat these discourses give power to [35, 36]. The Amazon fires thus form part of political discourses - discourses thatoccur in public spaces - whereby a discourse analysis allows for an exploration of “a struggle for discursive hegemonyin which actors try to secure support for their definitions of reality” [32, p.59].
Discourses can be understood as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is givento social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices”[34, p.67][32, p.44]. In the context of this thesis, such ideas, concepts and theories refer specifically to environmentaljustice theories, development or conservation practices, the justification of discourses, and so forth. To understandand grasp the meaning of the Amazon fires as an issue, the following sections will elaborate on specific elementsrelated to discourse analyses including storylines, discourse-coalitions, and power in discourses, followed by particularmechanisms including crisis narratives and discursive strategies as divisive tools. Part two of the theoretical frameworkwill dive deeper in the concept of environmental justice, viewing it as an idea or concept which forms part of a discourse.A discourse analysis of Dutch and British media gives us unique insights into how environmental justice is understoodand used in the context of the Amazon fires, and by whom.
My understanding of discourse and discourse analysis is based on several assumptions. First, I follow the notionthat language is “not a neutral medium through which reality is described; instead discourses play an active role inconstructing and constituting our world, identities and social relations” [30, p.270]. Second, discourse analyses arebased on the premise of social constructionism. Social constructionism can be generalised under several principles,including a critical approach to ‘taken-for-granted knowledge’, recognising that there is not one objective ‘truth’;‘historical and cultural specificity’ characterise the way in which we understand and represent the world: this is not fixedor static; it “acknowledges the link between knowledge and social practices” as well as “a link between knowledgeand social action” [30, p.268]. For this thesis, I look at the discursive constructions as presented by Dutch and Britishnewspaper articles, excluding an examination of visual imagery used by the media.
2.1.1 Storylines
Storylines are narratives4 on social reality through which actors gain a common understanding by simplifying reality inorder to make sense of the world and make it manageable [34]. Storylines present different aspects of the ’problem’,highlighting points of significance and hiding others. The problem definition continuously changes as storylines arenever static. Within each story, most people tend to have their own version, yet it is often assumed that there is mutualunderstanding of the same issue. This, Hajer claims, is a false assumption. One of the advantages of a discourse analysisis that it illuminates these differences, but at the same time illustrates that these different interpretations can provide afunctional basis for developing political coalitions. As storylines become more prominent and an increasing number
4The term narrative is often used in this thesis in a “pretheoretical and imprecise way to refer to various kinds of languagerepresentations of some length”. A narrative can be defined, however, as a concept that “is used to represent a specific kind oftext/talk structure within a ‘storyline’ . . . which can be realized through different genres such as fairy tale, novel, reportage.” [37,p.2]
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of actors make use of it, it attains a degree of permanency. However, storylines have to ’sound right’, meaning thatthe story must be plausible and the “author of the argument and the discursive practice that is employed must also betrusted” [30, p.271]. Lastly, storylines have the power to position actors in different ways (e.g. perpetrators, victims,experts, problem solvers), including ways in which “specific ideas of ’blame’ and ’responsibility’, and of ’urgency’ and‘responsible behaviour’ are attributed” [32, p.64-65].
2.1.2 Discourse-coalitions
When actors use particular story lines, which are not necessarily synonymous with their interests, discourse-coalitionsare formed. Discourse-coalitions are made up of: “a set of storylines; the actors who utter the storylines; and thepractices within which the discursive activity is based” [30, p.271], or in other words, “a group of actors that, in thecontext of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period oftime” [34, p.70]. Actors within a coalition need not have met, nor do they have a specific strategy. Instead, “what unitesthese coalitions and what gives them their political power is the fact that its actors group around specific storylines thatthey employ whilst engaging in environmental politics” [32, p.4]. However, although storylines might be shared, theirinterpretation and perception of (environmental) issues may differ and change depending on different factors such ascontext, knowledge production, and power. Moreover, the actor’s perceived interest might change as a result of differentstorylines.
2.1.3 Power in Discourses
The relationship between power, knowledge and truth has been explored by many (for example Stoltenborg & Boelens[36]; de Bont et al., [35]) when attempting to understand how discourses function. For Thompson, discourses can beexplained as the following:
“Discourses determine what is ‘true’ at a certain point in time, and therefore distribute power to someand not others. This power in turn allows these actors to influence what is seen as normal and ‘true’.In this way, discourses both create and are created by power and knowledge.” [35, p.644]
Backgrounding and foregrounding of information, choosing what topics are addressed and which ones are not, as wellas which (alternative) meanings and/ or explanations are recognised or ignored, are important processes to take intoaccount when looking at knowledge production and truth creation [35]. As such, “discourses are not innocent tools:they often serve to justify particular policies and practices and obliterate alternative modes of thinking and acting” [36,p.456]. Science, dominated by the scientific elite, tends to be one of those dominant discourses that is privileged overothers [38, 39]. As Turnhout [39] argues, “science tends to end up in a dominant position, in charge of the facts and ofthe problem definition, with non-scientific actors in the position of receivers of knowledge and co-creators of solutionsor options” (p.366). As such, scientific representation of the environment is not a neutral process, but instead is basedon intentional and purposeful selectivity.
In order to understand to how (environmental) knowledge production takes place, it is necessary to identify who the’knowers’ are of such knowledge production, who defines them, and ultimately how ’environmental problems’ and’solutions’ are conceptualised [35, 36]. The recognition and representation of such knowers tends to be unequallydistributed, however, as certain knowledge systems and ontologies are prioritised over others. This may result inknowledge production favouring certain governance logics, which then “attract and privilege certain groups of actors”[39, p.366]. Hence, the hegemony of certain discourses and discourse-coalitions may lead to a particular representationof a topic, such as the Amazon fires, which exclude other actors, alternative representations or governance logics in theprocess. Being aware of such processes makes it possible to take note of how political forces take shape and what theiroutcomes are.
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2.2 Mechanisms of Discourse
It has been noted that language is not a neutral medium but that language profoundly shapes the way in which the worldand reality is understood [40]. Indeed, “language has the capacity to make politics”, rendering events as important orinsignificant, creating political conflicts, or shifting power balances [40, p.179]. As such, there are different mechanismsto discourse and the practices that may ensue. Based on their relevance for this thesis, I have chosen to elaborate brieflyon the use of ’crisis narratives’ and certain discursive strategies, in particular looking at blame games, vilification,apocalyptic framing, and mythological archetypes. These strategies were observed in the discourses and provide someclarification into the way the Amazon fires are constructed as a problem beyond the environment to include social,economic and political elements.
2.2.1 Crisis narratives
The introduction of the thesis already highlighted a ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ narrative put forth by Macron and allies(see Figure 2) regarding the fires in the Amazon. Making up a major storyline in the discourse, crisis narratives aretherefore considered as an analytical concept. A crisis or an emergency can be defined as “an exceptional moment; adeparture from the norm that calls forth a concomitant response” [38, p.63]. Such a response allows for an exception ofthe ’normal’ state of affairs; hindrances that prevent accurate responses from occurring (such as the rule of law), arenow able, and ‘supposed’, to be overridden [38, 41]. As a result, invoking such a narrative and a (perceived) state ofemergency gives political discourses power. As Skilling [38] argues, crisis narratives “are not free-floating stories orideas in a vacuum. Rather, they are crucially defined by their relationship to dominant interest and value positions, topolitical fields of power and influence and to broader social constructions of aspirations and fears” (p.62).
Crisis narratives have proven to be effective and powerful ways of communicating a story due to, what Skilling [38] hascoined, defamiliarisation: a balanced combination of novelty of credibility. The unfamiliarity, or abnormality, of thesituation is crucial to a crisis narrative as such a narrative introduces a feeling of threat into the otherwise ’normal’ world,thereby achieving the effect of ostranenie, or defamiliarisation. The word ’crisis’ thus derives power from everydayevents becoming dangerous situations. Credibility of such crisis narratives is achieved by “articulating themselves withthe authoritative status of certain institutions, qualified experts and supposedly objective regimes of measurement” [38,p.63]. Here, again, we witness the relation between power(ful actors), truth-creation, and knowledge.
2.2.2 Discursive strategies as a divisive tool
Language plays a powerful role in the construction of discourses and politics; indeed, it “to create signs and symbolsthat can shift power-balances and that can impact on institutions and policy-making” [34, p.67]. Language can createpolitical conflicts but can also downplay events; it can suggest possible solutions, but also undermine them. Thediscursive term ‘crisis’, for instance, can have major societal implications as was described above. However, I find thatcreating opposition and using divisive rhetoric is particularly prominent in political discourse. According to Laclauand Mouffe [42], this is not a new phenomenon as they argue that democratic politics is built on social division: “thepositive assertion of any identity... is always constituted by an element of exclusion and a negative relation with anantagonistic ‘other(s)’” [43, p.220]. The ’us’ and ’them’ antagonisms are not understood as “fixed, singular or pureoppositions, but as contingent relations that are constituted by hegemonic struggles between different discourses” [43,p.220]. Political identities are thus often defined in terms of antagonisms (leading to the ’othering’ of (political) actors)whereby the hegemonic antagonism is sustained through the suppression of alternative discourse.
Blame Games The antagonistic ‘other’ is achieved through various means. Talisse [44] argues that political strategies,especially those in populist discourses and dominant political ideologies, make use of belief polarisation5. The ‘politics
5“Belief polarization invokes what is sometimes referred to as the "echo chamber effect,” when a person surrounds his or herselfonly with others who share their same beliefs or views. As Dr. Talisse put it, “Interaction with like-minded others turns us intomore extreme versions of ourselves,” which in turn means that, “As we shift into our more extreme selves, we embrace increasinglynegative attitudes towards those we perceive to be different.” [45]
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of blame’, or ‘blame games’, within political and environmental discourses also help create and maintain the ‘other’.Blame games are common in modern executive politics, whereby different individual or collective social actorspartake in “offensive and defensive symbolic performances” to attach or detach blame to or from their opposition [30,p.228]. A government’s blame game’s basic goal is to “persuade an audience (e.g. the readers of a newspaper) thatsomeone in question, such as a government or a concrete officeholder, either should or should not be blamed” [30,p.231]. Argumentation6 is one way of achieving this, and manipulation of the audience’s perception occurs throughargumentative moves by both the blame makers and the blame takers. Emotional appeals, however subtle, are oftenused in such government-related blame games as are assigning moral values to (political) actors [46].
Vilification The opposition created towards a common enemy can further be magnified through the use of violentdiscursive imagery, which I have grouped under the overarching term of ’warrior language’. Such language evokesfeelings of distrust, violence, conflict, war, and so forth. Similarly to the other identified discursive practices, dramaticadjectives and verbs – including vilification of the ‘other’ – are used to convey a battle between ’good’ and ’evil’.Enemy vilification can occur in a variety of ways, such as an “ascription of negative in-group values to the out-group”[47, p.76]. This tends to be “enhanced with the use of metaphors, which structure the discourse and can add emotionalcolouring to the text” (p.87). Overall, the rhetorical patterns present in enemy vilification help create a simplisticcategorisation of the ‘other’ whereby a dual opposition of values between the in- and -out groups are created.
Apocalyptic Framing Apocalyptic framing forms part of broader discursive strategies that create or (re)enforceopposition. Within apocalyptic framing the issue in question is often presented as “extra-human, driven by cosmicforces, and, as such, Fated” [48, p.162]. Other scholars, such as Heinz [49], note that the framing of environmentalissues, such as the fires in the Amazon, as a violent crime “helps set up symbolic oppositions between the minority anddominant groups, thus justifying the affected group’s need for forceful reactions” (p.52). Such framing therefore createsand perpetuates “clear-cut us-versus-them oppositions” (p.52).
Foust and Murphy [48] identify multiple forms of apocalyptic framing such as the tragic apocalyptic frame, the comicapocalyptic frame, and the polarising rhetoric of melodrama. In these strategies, readers are forced to choose sides,for example between heroes and villains, believers and non-believers. The polarising structure of these strategies areparticularly effective because the readers are not given a more nuanced options of what is considered to be the ‘issue’.Actors are pitted against each other, for example ruralists versus environmentalists, and otherwise ‘credible’ discourseor actors (i.e. science or scientists) are discredited. There are varying opinions as to the effect of such polarisingrhetoric. Some argue that the “polarising effects of melodrama may inspire action” (Schwarze in [48, p.162]), whereasothers counter this [50]. Foust and Murphy share concerns with the divisive rhetoric of, particularly tragic, apocalypticframing. They worry that such framing will reduce the feeling of collective action, responsibility and agency.
Mythological Archetypes The final discursive strategy that helps perpetuate opposition and division that will bediscussed here is the use of mythological archetypes in journalism. An initial review of newspaper sources suggestedthat mythological archetypes played an important role in the discourses as values were juxtaposed (Bolsonaro’s ‘evil’policies versus Macron ‘saving the lungs of the planet’), highly emotionally loaded words (‘Holocaust’) were used, aswere stereotyping and simplistic categorisation (Bolsonaro as a ‘climate sceptic’). According to Kelsey, journalists andpoliticians may use mythological archetypes to construct political affairs [51–53]. Angela Phillips (in [53]) argues thatjournalists use ’familiar moral codes of storytelling’ whereby they use similar “basic character archetypes or myths,that are used by filmmakers and novelists” (p.12). Such codes can vary depending on the cultural context, but stillcontain the “archetypal moral conventions of storytelling” [53, p.973]. Noteworthy is that journalists do not necessarilyintend on constructing stories using these models - it may be an unintentional act. However, when myths and stories areperceived as “true, valid, factual accounts of the world”, it becomes problematic [53, p.973]. As Lule [54, p.184] points
6Argumentation is understood here as “a linguistic/cognitive action pattern of problem-solving that is characterised by a sequenceof speech acts (e.g. expressive, declarative, assertive, commissive, interrogative, directive) that are used to convince somebody of theacceptability of a standpoint by challenging or justifying controversial validity claims about truth and normative rightness, that is,questions of knowledge and questions of what should or should not be done” [46, p.231]
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out: “Myth celebrates dominant beliefs and values. Myth degrades and demeans other beliefs that do not align withthose of the storyteller”. As such, the storytelling becomes “a highly politicised negotiation of discursive practices” [53,p.972].
In the context of this thesis, the mythological archetypes of a ‘Villain’ and a ‘Hero’ will be explored as the initial reviewof newspaper sources already illustrated that Bolsonaro and his allies were portrayed as either ’good’ or as a ’bad’.Although other archetypal characters exist, such as the ‘Trickster’, the ‘Victim’, or the ‘Shadow’, the media’s emphasison Bolsonaro as the main character allowed for a focus on the Hero/ Villain role. Heroes tend to take on multiple formsin storylines, including, but not limited to, “warriors or pacifists, leaders or rebels, saints or sinners, rocket scientists,rock musicians, or sports stars” [54, p.83]. What these characters have in common is their dramatic and personifiedcharacter which reflects “the core values and ideals of the societies in which their stories feature” [53, p.975]. A Hero isoften on a journey, pursuing a (moral) mission for the greater good of society while facing trials and battles, ultimatelyvictorious and triumphant [54]. The Villain, on the other hand, is “expected to be callous, ruthless and unconcerned bythe misery and destruction brought about by their actions” [55, p.127]. Ultimately, “journalists are storytellers (or mythmakers) in contemporary societies” where society gets a way to express its “prevailing ideals, ideologies, values andbeliefs” [54, p.15]. In other words, myths are social narratives that help explain social life.
The discursive strategies such as those described above are also used in environmental debates and discussions. Interms of environmental issues, some scholars argue that these issues are “unresolvable because of the use of polarizingtactics and over-simple reports of enmities” or because of the diversity of arguments, ultimately suggesting that theunresolvability can be both positive and negative [40, p.179]. This diversity in argument is also visible in the wayenvironmental justice, as a concept, is used by various discourse-coalitions. By conducting a discourse analysis andlooking at the way environmental justice is articulated, specifically, it becomes possible to gain insights into the differentinterpretations, priorities and power dynamics between discourses. As such, the following section will elaborate on thedifferent approaches of environmental justice approaches, their limitations, and their relevance.
2.3 Part 2: Understanding Environmental Justice
2.3.1 A brief introduction into environmental justice
The Amazon fires are an example of how an environmental issue becomes political. The discourse-coalitions thatcreate and maintain the discourses go beyond ’environmentalists’ but include a wide range of actors who deal withenvironmental issues including politicians, scientists, corporate executives, small holders etc. Environmental justice(EJ) is a concept that has been able to facilitate many “debates on environmental issues, laws and decisions” [56, p.4],partially due to the lack of a common definition. Although some scholars question the concept’s utility and relevance[56], I argue that the different conceptions of EJ provide us with a useful tool to understand how different environmentalchallenges are understood, presented and acted up by different (groups of) people. Supporting the claim that eachjustice approach provides useful insights to issues of different temporal or geographical scales, this thesis values amulti-dimensional and plural approach in order to contribute to “long-term conservation and social development goals”[33, p.169]. Moreover, when it comes to complex and transboundary issues such as the Amazon fires, a singularconception of justice would fail to adequately address the diversity and magnitude of the issue.
The evolution of EJ theories can broadly be grouped into two phases. The first phase has its roots as a socialmovement in the United States (US) during the 1970s and 1980, where communities of colour and those of lowerclasses received higher exposure to risks from waste facilities and other toxic sites [57]. These perceived injustices ofenvironmental harms gained momentum after grassroot networks and research studies confirmed that “the instinct ofenvironment-harming facilities [were] being sited in the ‘path of least resistance’” [56]. This ’first phase’ of EJ was thusprimarily focused on accounts of distributive justice, although it went beyond the classical approach of (material) goodsdistribution [57]. The EJ debates expanded beyond the issues of hazardous (waste) sites to include the global commonsand the concept of ‘inter-generational justice,’ a concept that gained prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s. Instead offocusing solely on distributive justice, this second phase of EJ literature advocated the need for other forms of justicesuch as procedural justice and justice as recognition. Shifting away from distributive justice was partially a result of
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critics who disagreed with the general notion that environmental injustice is based on an “inequality in the distributionof environmental risks. . . , when this is clearly not the case” [57, p.22]. When the 2000s were reached, EJ discoursesexpanded even more to include climate justice where the topics of distribution, equity and historical responsibility areaddressed [58, 59]. The increasingly complex nature of both environmental issues and political economic systems,however, has resulted in EJ cases going beyond the national scale. Despite most “environmental justice movementsand claims [being] particular and place-bound local struggles”, they tend to have a globally constituted character [33,p.167].
Although EJ as a concept has developed and been used extensively over the past few decades, it remains a highlycontested and ambiguous term where a common definition remains absent. As this thesis does not aim to give a moralpersuasion over which approach should be given primacy, or determining what is considered just or unjust, the followingparagraphs will briefly describe what these different approaches to justice are. Noteworthy is that distributive justiceis discussed more extensively in the theoretical framework than procedural justice, justice as recognition, or CriticalEnvironmental Justice (CEJ). This is largely because of the overrepresentation of distributive justice in academia andadvocacy [33]. As such, the six distinct ‘principles’ of distributive justice as categorized by Okereke and Dooley [59]will briefly be explored. This should not imply, however, that this thesis favours the distributive justice approach.Instead, the aim is to understand how different conceptions of justice manifest themselves and ultimately how theserepresented by the discourses in Dutch and British media.
2.4 Distributive Justice
Although conceptions of distributive justice are incredibly varied, this approach has dominated the justice debates overthe last few decades [16, 33]. Simply put, distributive justice can be understood as “the distribution or sharing out ofgoods (resources) and bads (harm and risk)” [16, p.10]. Determining what is considered just or unjust distribution,however, is frequently based on normative claims [33]. The emphasis on this approach to justice is “not surprisinggiven the materiality of environmental goods and bads, and the implications of inter- and intra-generational distributionfor the wellbeing of current and future people” [33, p.169]. The following paragraphs will highlight six dominantdistributive justice approaches as identified by Okereke and Dooley [59].
Justice as Utilitarianism Justice as utilitarianism favours the idea that “justice is about finding and maximisingwelfare utility to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people” [60, p.8] (based on Bentham1789/1948 and Mill 1973). As such, (re)distribution occurs along lines of creating the greatest amount of utility, whereutility is frequently understood in terms of happiness or preferences – although some would question whether it shouldbe maximised at all [59]. Maximizing ‘utility’ or ‘preferences’ is also deemed problematic because: a) it is practicallyimpossible to aggregate all elements of human welfare across different levels – from the individual, across societies orbetween nations; and b) “many environmental philosophers have observed, preferences are misinformed as to longerterm environmental consequences” [59, p.84].
Justice as Liberal Egalitarianism This approach to justice “emphasise[s] the separateness of individuals and takesequality and freedom of all as the most basic good” [59, p.84]. As such, the theory tries to create an ’ultimatemoral ideal’ by combining both political equality and economic liberty. Rawls [61] is one of the primary liberalegalitarianism thinkers and argues that institutions have failed in decision-making as inequality tends to affect thealready disadvantaged. As such, Rawlsians support the idea that social and economic inequalities should be arrangedin such a way that it balances in favour towards the least advantaged in society. Rawls calls this ‘justice as fairness’,which Armstrong has used to argue that the ‘principle of fairness’ (in the context of environmental conservation) bindsoutsiders by justice to share both direct and opportunity costs (in the protection of forests), and that if “they refuseto do so they can be found guilty of free-riding” [62, p.109]. The ‘global resource dividend’ is another offshoot ofliberal egalitarianism, arguing that “nations who have used more than their fair share of the global commons are madeto compensate those who have been disadvantaged” (Pogge, 1998 in Okereke & Dooley [60, p.84]), which can furtherbe coupled to notion of ‘historical responsibility’. Historical responsibility supports the argument that “developed
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countries are responsible for a large percentage of historic emissions (as well as deforestation) and should not onlycompensate developing countries accordingly but also bear the burden of current efforts to mitigate climate change”[59, p.84]. Nevertheless, liberal egalitarianism does contain elements that conflict with long-term sustainability. Forexample, viewing the autonomous individual from a liberal perspective allows for the over-consumption of resources asit does not recognise the fact that freedom and limits are not always harmonious [60].
Market Justice The philosophy of market justice argues that markets should be the main (re)distributor of wealth.Market justice has gone hand in hand with the rise of neoliberal governance and this approach rejects governments’interventions when it comes to the redistribution of resources. Proponents of this theory deny the ability of individualliberty and egalitarianism being compatible, and instead argue that the market (without government interference)stimulates human ingenuity [63]. In addition, “social inequalities are accepted as the inevitable consequence of libertyand enterprise” [59, p.85]. This approach is not without critique, however. A plethora of scholars have argued thateconomic incentives are not enough when it comes to changing behaviour for a more sustainable society [59].
Justice as Mutual Advantage Justice as mutual advantage advocates that justice should be based on agreements“that have positive net benefits for all” [59, p.85]. The notion of states’ moral obligations to (re)distribute wealth infavour of the economically disadvantaged, including rights to welfare, is rejected, as is the idea of individual inherentmorality. Instead, “justice is the outcome of agreement entered into by rational agents with the aim of furtheringtheir self-interests” [59, p.85] . The aim of justice as mutual advantage is to provide people with a maximum chanceof achieving their good, assuming that everyone else is also trying to achieve their (different) good [60, 64]. ForHarman [65], however, justice is “nothing more and nothing less than conventions which translate in the ordering ofrelevant institutions in such a way as to enable individuals (and nation states) to pursue and maximize their gains underthe constraints of an agreed legal framework” [59, p.85]. This can be viewed through the claims of sovereignty and’national circumstance’ - a tactic or strategy applied by states to “either challenge or justify status quo rights and historicentitlements, or more generally to secure special favour with respect to the sharing of particular burdens and benefits ofinternational co-operation” [59, p.85].
Justice as Communitarianism According to communitarians, communities do not receive enough attention in liberaltheories of justice. Justice in this perspective “can only be determined on the basis of cultural context and valuesassociated with the good in question” (Miller, 2000 in [59, p.85]). The communitarian ideas of justice reject the notionof a liberal focus on individualism as they believe it has two significant negative consequences, namely “the loss ofcommunity and the neglect of the state in upholding certain public goods” [59]. The idea of the state, communities andcitizenship play a central role. However, communitarianists often argue there are not enough shared values and culturalties at a global scale to apply international distributional justice (Miller, 2000 in [59, p.85]).
Justice as Meeting Needs Justice as meeting needs emphasises the states’ obligations in meeting “the rights ofcitizens [irrespective of race or nationality] for opportunities to fulfil their own potential” [59, p.85]. This view isunderpinned by the idea of humans’ moral equality. Nussbaum [66] and Sen [67] look at this through a capabilityapproach where they advocate the need to boost “the capability of all individuals to lead meaningful lives” [60,p.8]. When basic needs (i.e. material rights) are met, political equality can be achieved [68]; civil-political rightsbecome meaningful due to the possibility of exercising voting rights and owning property, for instance [60]. Conceptsthat support a redistribution towards directly meeting the needs of the poor include ecological citizenship, historicalresponsibility and the polluter pays principle [59].
Limitations Distributive justice’s dominance in EJ debates over the last few decades [16] has been critiqued byvarious scholars, some of whom argue that the excessive focus of distribution needs to be placed in the backgroundwhile other issues are looked into [69, 70]. Curran finds it problematic, for instance, that the implicit assumption,“without explicit justification, that distributional inequality is sufficient for injustice” [57, p.299]. Distributive justice’smain critique, however, refers to its relative simplicity of focusing solely on distribution without taking broader social,cultural, institutional, and symbolic mechanisms into account [71]. For Young, distribution is an important part of
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justice, but it would be a mistake to equate justice to distribution. She argues that part of the reason why unjustdistribution exists in the first place is due to a lack of recognition of both individuals and communities (i.e. at a culturallevel). To combat this, one must look at issues of domination and oppression.
2.4.1 Procedural Justice
Procedural justice concerns itself with the deliberative processes that shape decision-making, including who participatesin decision-making, how, and on who’s terms. However, there is a lack of consensus on whether procedural justiceshould be its own justice dimension or not. Some scholars view procedure as an antecedent of distribution, and as suchsubsume procedural justice under distributive justice (Vincent, 1998 in [33]). Others, such as Martin et al. [33] viewprocedure as a separate justice dimension. This perspective argues that procedural justice is an “important pre-conditionfor distributional justice and therefore a cause of injustices, but it may not always equate to distributional justice”(p.169). Miller, one of the more traditional justice theorists, argues that procedural justice is based on respect andrecognition (p.26) [69]. Other theorists such as Fraser and Young agree that these dimensions are closely interlinkedand have noted that “the relationship between justice as equity and justice as recognition is played out in proceduralrealm, as both hinder the ability of individuals and communities to participate” (p.26) [69]. In other words, whentackling questions of distribution and recognition it is necessary to take political processes into account. Hence, intheir view, justice contains – and is dependent on – democratic and participatory decision-making procedures. BothYoung and Fraser argue that improved participatory mechanisms can help mitigate other forms of injustice, such ascombating institutionalised domination and oppression. As such, there is a need to go beyond the distributive and lookat the decisions made based on rules and procedures [71]:
“The idea of justice here shifts... to procedural issues of participation in deliberation and decisionmaking. For a norm to be just, everyone who follows it must in principle have an effective voicein its consideration and be able to agree to it without coercion. For a social condition to be just, itmust enable all to meet their needs and exercise their freedom; thus justice requires that all be able toexpress their needs.” (p.34)
Limitations Limitations to procedural justice theories can loosely be divided in three groups (based on pragmatic,radical, and persectivalist objections [72]). The perspectivalist objection is particularly relevant for this thesis, as itargues that any theory on procedural justice is “fundamentally misguided because it fails to acknowledge the perspectivesof those who have been excluded from the making and shaping of modern procedure doctrine” [72, p.236] . Suchperspectives may include those of women, people of colour, Indigenous peoples, and so forth. This issue has particularlybeen addressed and worked with by scholars such Fraser and Young. One of the arguments relates to the necessity ofaddressing and mitigating other forms of injustices in order to improve participation [69]. Furthermore, Fraser arguesthat it is not just “that political and cultural institutions create conditions that hamper equity and recognition, but thatboth distributive inequity and misrecognition hamper real participation in political and cultural institutions” [69, p.28].As such, there appears to be a trend that acknowledges that procedural justice cannot be viewed in isolation – especiallynot without taking matters of distribution and recognition into account.
2.4.2 Justice as recognition
Justice as recognition gained prominence during the 1980s as a result of studies on social movements and how thesemovements constructed justice claims. Walker [16] defines justice as recognition as “justice [which] is conceived interms of who is given respect and who is and isn’t valued” (p.10), emphasizing the need for respect and opportunities forparticipation in decision-making. It not only includes recognising different ways of knowing the world, culture-naturecosmologies and so forth, but the approach also argues for respecting and treating these views equally and avoidingdomination and oppression [33]. Moreover, the recognition of cultural differences and then “being reflexive regardingwhose culture is privileged and respected” [73, p.124] is central in this justice dimension.
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Justice as recognition is highly relevant within conservation efforts as it concerns itself with “respect for local knowledgeand cultures” [74, p.254]. Within academic debates on EJ, “recognition has largely been expressed in relation to theclaims of Indigenous and local peoples to cultural respect and self-determination” [33, p.169]. I follow Martin et al.’s[33] claim, which argues that it is important to:
“...consider any instances in which forms of discursive power suppress the right to alternative waysof thinking. This extends to framings of justice itself: malrecognition can occur where conservationorganisations uncritically assume that they are the legitimate source of justice norms. Such framingcan determine whose knowledge counts and which problems and conflicts are rendered visible orinvisible.” (p.169)
Limitations Some scholars dismiss the separate categorisation of recognition as a justice approach, arguing it shouldnot be treated as a separate justice dimension. One reason is that these scholars subsume justice as recognition underprocedural justice as they view the former to be a precondition of the procedural justice or of distributive justice (seeSchlosberg [69, 75] for more detail). More generally, the applicability of justice as recognition remains difficult, in partdue to the contested meanings and different approaches of this concept. There are also debates on who is entitled tosuch recognition, respect and moral consideration. Martin et al. highlight a few points of concern, such as: “concernsover the spatial and temporal scope of responsibility”; “whether or not the reach of moral responsibility should expandto include non-humans”; and “a moral responsibility towards the spiritual world which is central to some cultures andtheir perception of EJ” [74, p.255-256].
2.4.3 Critical Environmental Justice
David Pellow [76, 77] is a critical scholar of current EJ theories and tries to encourage people to think beyond questionsof distribution, procedure and recognition - the three of which still dominate EJ debates so far. He argues that despitethe shift in EJ studies to be more inclusive to wider concerns and approaches, “it still lacks critical insights and needsto be enhanced to address those flaws and limitations” [78, p.1]. Consequently, Critical Environmental Justice (CEJ)emerged and became a complex framework with entangled elements and components.
The flaws of EJ that Pellow refers to are fourth-fold. Primarily, Pellow argues that current EJ studies are over-relianton state power. Although the concept of justice has expanded from a focus on distribution to include procedure andrecognition, Pellow argues that these ideas only exist in principle and not in practice “because attempts to be recognisedby the state achieve little progress by policy changes” [78, p.1]. Pellow’s second critique concerns “the focus on one ortwo forms of social inequality” [78, p.1]. Consequently, he argues for an intersectional perspective whereby EJ studiesand movements should recognise, and include, multiple forms of inequality as they all play a part in how environmentalinjustices are experienced. The third limitation concerns the tendency to only focus on one scale, whereas Pellow arguesthat issues of EJ take place on multiple scales (i.e. spatial or temporal scales). Lastly, he argues that “while EJ studiescorrectly theorize that marginalised human populations are viewed as less valuable to society than others... they do notfully go beyond the boundaries of place” [78, p.1]. In contrast, CEJ suggests that all “threatened bodies, populations,and spaces are indispensable to building socially and environmentally just and resilient future for all of us” [76, p.224].
In response to these flaws, Pellow developed a CEJ framework based on four pillars, arguing that EJ studies andmovements should be: intersectional “i.e. multiple social categories of difference (including more-than-human)” [78,p.1], multi-scalar (i.e. spatial and temporal), anti-authoritarian (i.e. power versus counter-power) and the indispensabilityof both human’s and non-humans [76, 77]. Overall, the framework is complex and contains entangled components andelements. Although CEJ does not bring incredibly new insights, it is more methodologically inclusive can other EJstudies as it draws on different disciplines (e.g. race and ethnic studies, gender and sexuality, environmental humanities,critical race feminism, political ecology, and critical animal studies) [76, 79]. This intersectional and interdisciplinaryapproach, albeit complex and perhaps seemingly anarchistic, may provide contributions to EJ debates.
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2.4.4 Discussion on Environmental Justice
As the above paragraphs highlighted, there are different approaches to EJ and a common understanding, or definition,of the concept is lacking. Schlosberg [80] argues that the “early work on environmental justice pushed beyond manyboundaries: it challenged the very notion of ‘environment’, examined the construction of injustice beyond inequity, andillustrated the potential of pluralistic conceptions of social justice” (p. 37). In addition, he argues that EJ has expandedboth spatially and conceptually. The former refers to the encompassment of a broader range of issues, whereas thevertical expansion refers to “the global nature of environmental injustices” (p.37). On a conceptual level, Schlosberglooks at justice in human and non-human relationships and argues that “the recent extensions of the environmentaljustice frame move the discourse into a new realm – where environment and nature are understood to create theconditions for social justice” (p.37). Nevertheless, distributive justice remains a dominant approach within EJ theoriesup to date [33, 73].
As Schlosberg [75] argues that all definitions of justice are inadequate as they are ’incomplete theoretically’ and’insufficient in practice’, he advocates for a plural and multidimensional justice approach. Such an approach wouldallow for an exploration of different justice dimensions and their relationships between each other, without ascribingprimacy to one particular approach [33, 75]. This thesis supports such a plural and multidimensional approach tojustice. Acknowledging plurality can help shed light on how different individuals and groups view and understandjustice. Recognising these differences can have potential implications in “the pursuit of long-term conservation andsocial development goals” [33, p.169]. As such, it is important to recognise that there are multiple rational argumentsfor using a particular justice approach and any agreement in how justice is understood seems unlikely.
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3 Methods
3.1 Data collection and selection
This thesis was conducted using qualitative research methodology and was largely based on a qualitative data analysisof electronic media coverage from four different Dutch and British newspapers. Newspaper articles were chosen asdata sources because newspapers are integral to disseminating local news to the public [53], influencing knowledgeproduction and the way in which society is understood. As Heinz [49] puts it:
“Like all media, newspapers construct and transmit knowledge to the public. Readers try to connectwhat they read in news reports to their understanding of society. This process creates social institutionsthat exercise the dominant powers mobilizing racial, economic, and political inequalities.” (p.48)
In order to investigate the ‘European’ perspective on the Amazon fires debate (note here that I do not wish to implythat these newspapers and their views are representative of the whole of Europe), a newspaper on the political left andone on the political right for both the Netherlands and the United Kingkom (UK) was used [81, 82]. This decisionwas made in order to have a relatively balanced representation of the political spectrum. Consequently, de Telegraaf,de Volkskrant, the Telegraph and the Guardian were chosen with a total of fourty articles used for the analysis (seeAppendix 9 for all newspaper articles). The newspaper articles, which form the bulk of the data, are complemented byother sources such as social media posts, grey and academic literature. Noteworthy is that the analysis only includesdiscursive elements (i.e. text), excluding visual approaches such as photographs and/ or videos.
Document selection was based on certain criteria. Primarily, the time scope included the months of July, August andSeptember 2019 where the articles were published. This time period marked the beginning of the Amazon fires anddeforestation being a ‘trending topic’ on (social) media, the main event being the skies blackening in São Paolo duringthe afternoon resulting from the smoke of increased fire activity in areas such as the Amazon. For an article to beselected, search results needed to mention the Amazon, either Bolsonaro or Brazil, and deforestation or the fires. Thesearch queries were carried out both in English and in Dutch, and resulted in: 34 articles from de Telegraaf, 62 articlesfrom de Volkskrant, 117 articles from the Guardian, and 23 articles from the Telegraph.
Relevance was then determined based on “the roles these documents fulfilled in the articulation of discourses and howthey reflected certain practices” [83, p.56]. In addition, they needed to include at least one ‘themes’ (i.e. sovereignty,number of fires, G7, drivers of deforestation, causes of fires, and an international response) in order to establish awide range of topics covered in the media. The articles also needed to be considered a ‘news item’: explicitly labelledopinion pieces were not consulted. Lastly, the remaining articles were chosen in terms of their contribution to providing’new’ information (i.e. the information had not (extensively) been covered in the other articles). In short, the selectioncriteria included: a) being a ‘news item’; b) relevance; c) novelty; d) diversity in topics addressed.
3.2 Data Analysis
The data analysis was conducted through several rounds of qualitative coding, using Atlas.ti, that can be grouped intotwo main phases. During the first phase, coding was done manually and through auto-generated codes, which providedpreliminary thematic categories and concepts. These themes and concepts (e.g. economic development, conservation,sovereignty, drivers of deforestation/ fires) helped identify the main storylines and discourse-coalitions. In the secondand third rounds of coding, attention was paid to how the theoretical concepts outlined in the Theoretical Frameworkwere articulated in the newspaper articles. The second round of coding looked at how the dominant conceptions ofEJ were articulated (i.e. distributive, procedural, recognition, CEJ). Specifically, this round looked at how conceptssuch as responsibility, distribution (of costs), recognition, participation in decision-making, and the four pillars ofPellow (intersectional, anti-authoritarian, indispensability and multi-scalar) came forward in the storylines of differentdiscourse-coalitions. A third round of coding looked specifically at the language, i.e. the discursive elements usedsuch as crisis narratives, mythological (Hero/ Villain) archetypes, ‘warrior language’, violent imagery and apocalyptic
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framing, blame games, vilification, and divisive rhetoric. Focusing on language helps to understand that language is nota neutral medium but shapes the way in which the world is understood [30, 32, 34].
The discourse-analysis thus reveals how storylines represent different parts of a discourse, a simplified version of howactors (i.e. members of discourse-coalitions) try to make sense of reality [34]. The results chapters highlight the threedifferent discourses and their major storylines identified in Dutch and British media, how the actors in the discourse-coalition articulate EJ, and the language that is used. Paying attention to the discursive elements helps understandhow the discourses are legitimised and justified, as well as revealing some of the power dynamics at play. For thisthesis, ‘dominance’, or the power of a discourse, is based on Hajer’s conception of ‘discourse structuration’ (i.e. whenmany people use a discourse to conceptualise the world [34]). Specifically, ‘dominance’ here is understood through acombination of the frequency of use of the storylines in the media and through the support of powerful actors. Given thediversity of the actors involved, however, I do not wish to imply that the discourse-coalitions are homogenous groups.Instead, the discourse-coalitions are made up of actors who will likely possess different characteristics, attributes,interests etc., but for the sake of the analysis these nuances were omitted. Ultimately, the analysis gives us insight intohow different discourse-coalitions make sense of the Amazon fires (and deforestation) through the use of storylines that,together, form a discourse. Noteworthy, however, is that “even though one discourse can be dominant, ultimately thepolitical debate draws on many different discourses” [34, p.70].
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4 Bolsonaro as the Hero
4.1 The Discourse
“It is a fallacy to say that the Amazon is a heritage to humankind and a misconception that isconfirmed by scientists, to say that our Amazon forest are the lungs of the world.” [84]]
One of the discourses on the Amazon fires, as identified during the discourse-analysis, presented Bolsonaro as aHero. The discourse mainly concerns itself with three thematic areas: 1) political sovereignty; 2) development andprogress; and 3) Brazil as a conservation leader. The discourse is presented by a discourse-coalition of politicians(Bolsonaro’s administration), the industry, agribusinesses or produtores, the Brazilian evangelical voting group andwealthy landowners.
4.1.1 Storyline 1: Political Sovereignty
The Amazon fires, other than being an environmental issue, have ignited international concerns and started a movementthat many see as a threat to Brazil’s sovereignty. This perceived threat to sovereignty and the presence of an anti-internationalisation discourse are not new phenomena but have remained since the 1960s where the last militarydictatorship (1964-1985) was based on a similar rhetoric. Nationalism and patriotism were then very much present, asis increasingly the case in the current situation [85, 86].
“’It is matter of international meddling in the Amazon,’ General Augusto Heleno, head of theInstitutional Security Cabinet, reiterated. The NGOs are believed to map out gold and other richesof the indigenous territories and share that information with European countries. The Ministry ofEducation is now looking at the possibility of developing military schools in the reserves so that theharmful influence of the international NGOs on the children is minimised.” (Own translation) [86]
The vested interests the NGOs and foreign countries are believed to have in the Amazon help give the storyline itscredibility. It is argued that NGOs and foreign governments have had their eyes on the biodiversity and mineral wealthof Brazil’s indigenous reserves [85, 87]. In addition, the storyline emphasises the fact that 60% of the Amazon rainforestlies in Brazilian territories [9, 88, 89] and as such the only country who can decide on matters regarding the BrazilianAmazon is Brazil itself. This decision-making largely concerns matters on the use and protection of the Amazon,including the country’s environmental policies. Respecting sovereignty includes recognising that decisions about theAmazon are an internal matter. Unlike Macron claimed, the storyline argues that the Amazon is not a global issue, nordoes it belong the international community. If anything, the unfounded and unjust feeling that the Amazon is a publicgood is an example of colonialist practices:
“"Any country has problems. But the sensationalist attacks we suffered from the large part of theinternational media over the fires in the Amazon awakened our patriotic feelings," he [Bolsonaro]said, accusing foreign critics of questioning Brazil’s sovereignty over the region in a disrespectfuland "colonialist" manner.” [85]
The sensationalist attacks that the previous quote refers to are believed to taint both Brazil’s and Bolsonaro’s image.This does not only concern discursive practices, but the discourse-coalition also addresses the misleading and ’fake’images used by the media to represent the Amazon burning [90] (see Figures 3a and 3b). In addition to the media andforeign press playing a role in disseminating false information, NGOs have also played a role in undermining Brazil’ssovereignty. All in all, the international community is found to be largely guilty and to blame for the spread of false,and often romanticised, information on the Amazon, the fires and its inhabitants.
“There are complaints by the Brazilian media about the romantic view Europe has on the Amazon.As if only Indians and wild animals live there. In reality the Amazon, including cities such as Manausand Belem, belongs to one of the most dangerous regions in the country. Cocaine from Peru and
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Columbia is smuggled along the rivers of the Amazon to the northern coast from where it continuesits smuggled route to Europe. You don’t hear Macron talk about these issues.” [87] (Own translation)
Lastly, this storyline argues that undermining Brazil’s sovereignty when it comes to conservation is an act of hypocrisy.Europe has deforested in the past and there are also forest fires in other parts of the world (such as Siberia). Instead ofproviding money for Brazil to combat the fires, the money could be better spent elsewhere: “Take that money and helpAngela Merkel reforest Germany”, Bolsonaro said [17]. If Brazil had followed Europe’s suit, the Amazon would be asavannah by now. As such, there is a strong feeling of entitlement:
“The Amazon belongs to Brazil and European countries can mind their own business because theyhave already destroyed their own environment, said Brazil’s far-right president Jair Bolsonaro, whoalso described his own government’s satellite data showing an alarming rise in deforestation as"lies”. "We understand the importance of the Amazon for the world - but the Amazon is ours. Therewill not be any more of that sort of policy that we saw in the past that was terrible for everyone," hesaid. "We preserve more [rainforest] than anyone. No country in the world has the moral right to talkabout the Amazon. You destroyed your own ecosystems."” [7]
4.1.2 Storyline 2: Development & Progress
This storyline emphasises the (economic) potential of the Amazon and the need for development and progress. Theperception of the Amazon is that it can provide Brazil with a wealth of riches and resources, thereby providing thecountry with an opportunity to utilise these riches and enhance development. In particular, agriculture and cattleranching are considered to be the driving forces of Brazil’s economy. Therefore, these sectors should be stimulated, andnot restricted, by (environmental) policies [86]. The pro-business and anti-environmental rhetoric has found a lot ofsupport, especially from the industrial and agricultural sectors. The emphasis on development and progress has alsohelped the storyline gain support from individuals who see this as (one of) the only way(s) to tackle poverty.
“He’s our hope for improvement," said Martins Tavares, 33, a goldminer who said he and virtuallyall of his colleagues backed Bolsonaro, believing his promises to open up the Amazon would helpthem feed their families. Rui Souza, the owner of waterside petrol station in Humaita that sells togoldseekers, said he was also optimistic Bolsonaro would do away with environmental and indigenousreserves so they could be commercially exploited. "Our Amazonia is so rich, my friend. But we’re notallowed to use any of it," the 65-year-old complained. In Rondonia - where 72% of voters backed thefar-right candidate in last year’s election - support is even more widespread. Bolsonarian billboardsdot the highways declaring: "Together we will change the destiny of Rondonia and Brazil! ” [5]
“’We have to develop that backwards region,’ Placido Valledares, a 70 year old businessman presentat a demonstration in Blumenau, agreed. ’That is the only way to tackle poverty in Brazil.’ Valledaresbelieves that the problem of deforestation is very much exaggerated: ’If you cut down trees in theAmazon there will be new ones within a few years,’ he claims. ’That’s because of the tropical climate,Europeans don’t understand that.” (Own translation) [87]
The storyline further finds its support with the argument that the distribution of land is currently unfair. Therefore,the notion to open up the Amazon, including the Indigenous reserves and protected areas, to economic activities iswelcomed. Many find it strange that the Indigenous peoples, for instance, have stewardship over 14% of all land, yetthey only make up 0,5% of the population [9, 87]. The Amazon could be put to better use and help Brazil’s economy:
“Bolsonaro has dismissed the [deforestation] figures, insisting the country "will truly take off oncewe manage to sensibly extract the riches" in the rainforest, of which 60% is in the Amazon.” [17]
The development narrative is further legitimised by the government by making a discursive link to the Indigenouspopulation and the romantic and unrealistic view Europeans have on Amazonian inhabitants. Bolsonaro argues that
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the Indigenous population wants to integrate in Brazilian society, make money and don’t want to hinder Brazil’sdevelopment [86]:
“Foreigners complaining about his [Bolsonaro’s] plans to open up indigenous reserves to miningshowed a lack of respect for the human rights of Brazil’s indigenous people, Bolsonaro said. "Youwant the indigenous people to carry on like prehistoric men with no access to technology, science,information, and the wonders of modernity," he said. "Indigenous people want to work, they want toproduce and they can’t. They live isolated in their areas like cavemen. What most of the foreign pressdo to Brazil and against these human beings is a crime.” [7]
Bolsonaro argues that Brazil finally has “a president who cares about those who were here before the arrival of thePortuguese in 1500. Indians don’t want to be poor landowners living on rich soils - especially the richest soils on Earth”[85]. In other words, he is assumed to be a defender of the Indigenous and with him in power Brazil will be able toenjoy the prosperity it deserves. Interestingly, this sentiment appears to be contradictory to the popular anti-Indigenousrhetoric Bolsonaro has advanced.
4.1.3 Storyline 3: Brazil as a Conservation leader
This storyline emphasises that Brazil is a conservation leader: the country protects more forest than anywhere else inthe world [7, 85]. Therefore, (international) criticism to Brazil’s environmental policies is unwarranted. Moreover,the history of developed countries is very often built on (resource) exploitation, including historical deforestation andemissions. Current ’developed’ countries are thus acting in a hypocritical manner. Instead of making the forest fires atop priority at the G7 and securing funding to combat those fires in Brazil, the money would be better spent to “helpAngela Merkel reforest Germany” [17], Bolsonaro argued. Arguments such as these appear to discredit ’Western’politicians and actions. Moreover, appeals to morality are made to justify the current situation in Brazil:
“We understand the importance of the Amazon for the world - but the Amazon is ours. There will notbe any more of that sort of policy that we saw in the past that was terrible for everyone," he said. "Wepreserve more [rainforest] than anyone. No country in the world has the moral right to talk about theAmazon. You destroyed your own ecosystems.” [7]
Deforestation data, according to this discourse-coalition, is based on ’lies’: the figures and data published by INPEare incorrect and exaggerated. Moreover, Brazil and Bolsonaro have to suffer sensationalist attacks by the (foreign)press, undermining Brazil’s conservation efforts. Lastly, it is argued that the fires are a normal phenomenon for thistime of year (i.e. the dry season) and is often started by natural causes, criminal intent or Indigenous and traditionalcommunities [7, 84]. Bolsonaro stated the following:
“’We are currently in a traditionally hot and dry season, with severe winds that unfortunately causefires in the Amazon. In years with more rain, the fires are less intense, but in particularly hot yearssuch as this one, their frequency goes up. Although the fires this year are not above the average of thepast 15 years, we are not happy with what we’re seeing’.” [91] (Own translation)
Overall, the discourse articulates EJ in the three storylines in a variety of ways, which the following section willdemonstrate.
4.2 Environmental Justice
“Brazil does not owe the world anything when it comes to environmental protection.” [9]
This first discourse, where Bolsonaro is the Hero, uses arguments which are largely based on elements of EJ. The mainelements that come to the fore are (historical) responsibility, fairness, distribution and decision-making. The two mostprominent ways in which EJ is approached are those relating to distributive and procedural justice. A distributive justice
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approach can be understood in different ways, much like the concept of EJ is understood in different ways [59]. Thishelps illustrate that some elements of distributive justice are more central in the discourse than others. In addition, itmay be the case that different actors within the same discourse-coalition give my priority to, or emphasise, certainaspects over others.
Matters of historical emissions and deforestation play a crucial role in the argumentation, legitimacy and justice approachof this discourse. The idea that ’Western’ countries were able to develop as much as they did over the years was largelya result of relatively unrestricted growth and natural resource exploitation. As Bolsonaro stated, Europeans deforestedtheir own forests in the past but now that developing countries want to do the same these developed countries are againstit. Instead, emerging economies, like Brazil, feel entitled to enjoy the same industrial and economic opportunities thatdeveloped nations got to enjoy in the past. Moreover, there is the issue of compensation. The discourse argues that thereare many costs to conserving the Amazon, which Brazil simply cannot afford (“During one of his live-speeches onFacebook the next day, Bolsonaro stated that the government was trying to find the cause of the fires, but that they lackthe means to combat them.” [92] (Own Translation)), but also that the Amazon provides riches that will help developthe economy. As such, both direct and opportunity costs exist and are currently a burden Brazil is carrying. In this lineof thinking, conserving the Amazon currently does not outweigh the benefits of economic growth. Moreover, sinceBrazil already conserves more forest than any other country in the world [7], it is understandable and justified thatconservation is not considered to be a priority. The following quotes are examples of how actors in Discourse 1 justifyor legitimise their discourse:
“The Amazon belongs to Brazil and European countries can mind their own business because theyhave already destroyed their own environment, said Brazil’s far-right president Jair Bolsonaro, whoalso described his own government’s satellite data showing an alarming rise in deforestation as"lies”. "We understand the importance of the Amazon for the world - but the Amazon is ours. Therewill not be any more of that sort of policy that we saw in the past that was terrible for everyone," hesaid. "We preserve more [rainforest] than anyone. No country in the world has the moral right to talkabout the Amazon. You destroyed your own ecosystems."” [7]
“Rocha, a retired police colonel, said: "If we look at the situation in other countries, their forests areburning much more than here in our Brazil. You go to London, or other countries, and what do yousee? "It’s not fog - it’s smoke! Smoke from burning; from industry. So how can they demand of uswhat they haven’t done themselves?”” [5]
“Brazil gets almost half of its energy from renewable sources, whereas Germany is still dependent oncoal, the most polluting energy source. Bolsonaro correctly points out that Europe cut down vastareas of its own forests and that it is a clear example of arrogance when they then demand emergingeconomies not to do that. And what about the money that Western countries promised developingnations to help them combat climate change?” [86] (Own translation)
“The richer countries believe that global warming is such a big problem that everyone should adjusttheir economy and their way of living in order to prevent disastrous consequences. This conflictswith the view of poorer countries. They tell the rich countries: you caused this problem with yourunlimited industrial development, and now that we want to develop and enjoy a piece of the pie youprevent us from doing the same and make finding solutions our responsibility.” [93] (Own translation)
This prioritisation of economic growth is further supported by the way in which the rainforest is valued. The Amazonis mostly valued in terms of terms of the services and provisions it provides to humanity (i.e. instrumental value). Inaddition, it is valued from a monetary perspective. The discourse argues that these (potential) benefits that the Amazonprovides should be reaped. Agriculture and cattle ranching, amongst other activities, are the economic driving force ofthe country so investing in these sectors is for ’the greater good’. It will maximise utility, but current injustices need to
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be tackled. This includes addressing the unequal distribution of land and the natural riches. As such, for Brazilians toget out of poverty the Amazon needs to be exploited, and that includes opening up some of Indigenous reserves andprotected areas. The discourse argues that for development and progress to take place, cutting back and dismantlingsocial and environmental organisations and policies are necessary. Opening up different parts of the Amazon will helpenhance livelihoods, reduce economic inequalities (by rearranging them so that they benefit the least advantaged insociety, such as the farmers and miners trying to get out of poverty, as well as the Indigenous peoples who want todevelop and modernise), and boost capabilities. Bolsonaro argues that he is the only one who really follows throughwith what he promised during his campaigns and he will bring prosperity to the country. People want, and will be ableto, modernise - including the Indigenous population who do not want to live like ’prehistoric cavemen’ [7, 94, 95].Unlike the foreigners, Bolsonaro respects the Indigenous population and does not want to “keep them as inmates inreserves, as if they were animals in a zoo” [9]. This respect translates itself into a willingness to integrate these citizens,“bring value to all Brazilians” [9], and give them access to the wonders of modernity. Those (especially foreigners) whodisagree with his plans to open up Indigenous reserves to resource extraction are disrespecting the human rights ofBrazil’s Indigenous population [7]. This discourse suggests that these are examples of injustices:
“You want the indigenous people to carry on like prehistoric men with no access to technology,science, information, and the wonders of modernity,” he said. “Indigenous people want to work, theywant to produce and they can’t. They live isolated in their areas like cavemen. What most of theforeign press do to Brazil and against these human beings is a crime. ” [7]
Interestingly, however, the notion that justice is brought to the Indigenous peoples by giving them access to the ’wondersof modernity’, for instance, is starkly contrasted with the discourse’s general anti-Indigenous rhetoric. On the one handBolsonaro says he is a supporter of the Indigenous; on the other hand, he suggests that the current distribution of land isunfair. The fact that Indigenous territories make up 14% of all land yet the indigenous people only make up 0.5% of thepopulation [87, 96] make ’unfair distribution’ an appealing argument that appears to resonate with many people. Otheractors, such as wildcat miners or small-scale farmers, also want a piece of the pie. Such an unequal distribution of land,the discourse would argue, is not only unfair but also undermines Brazil’s potential for economic growth. This appealfor development also finds its support within the Indigenous community, as the presence of Ysani Kalapalo Bolsonaro’sUN address in September 2019 illustrates [85].
In terms of decision-making, the fact that Brazil is the only country who has the ’moral right’ [7] to talk about theAmazon is based on the issues addressed above (i.e. historical responsibility, the unequal distribution of (direct andopportunity) costs and benefits, and finding the greatest good for the greatest amount of people). Related to this, it isnoteworthy that Harman’s [65] understanding of justice also comes to the fore (i.e. where (international) conventionsallow individuals and states to act as “rational egoistic actors to pursue and maximise gains under an agreed politicalframework” [59, p.85]). Throughout the forty articles analysed, ’sovereignty’ was continuously emphasised by membersof this discourse-coalition. As the Amazon lies within Brazil’s national territorial boundaries, this discourse uses an EJargument in which it is stated that the rainforest belongs to Brazil and the international community does not have a sayin matters concerning its use.
“Chrisóstomo seethed: "He’s [Macron’s] not Brazil’s president. He’s not even from the Americas.This forest is not shared, as he claims. It belongs to a nation which enjoys complete autonomy andauthority to decide what happens to the forest and takes every possible care to preserve it."” [5]
Since Brazil is a democratic, free nation, any foreign interference in the decision-making on the Amazon is seen as anattempt of reinstating colonialist practices. The discourse seems to imply that the decisions and policies agreed upon arerepresentative of the will of the people as Bolsonaro was democratically elected president who is only following throughon this promises on opening up the Amazon. However, it appears that matters of participation and decision-making aresignificantly influenced by powerful actors such as the evangelical churches and the agribusiness lobby [3, 9, 89].
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4.3 Language
A notable feature of the language used in this discourse is that actors frequently apportion blame to one another andmake use of emotional argumentation. Bolsonaro is the Hero of this discourse, a champion of the people. AlthoughBolsonaro is presented as such, it appears to be more of a construction by the discourse-coalition instead of Heroconstruction by the media. Heroes, depending on the context, can take on different roles. Bolsonaro appears to berebellious, openly accusing, and blaming other actors while his characterisation of the Hero is largely based on theidea of ’the Hero’s Journey’; a journey filled with trials, tribulation, obstacles and betrayal. As a Hero, Bolsonaro isexpected (or presents himself) to achieve four main things: 1) bringing prosperity to the people by creating economicgrowth; 2) opening up the Amazon (including protected areas and Indigenous reserves) for such economic developmentand for integrating the Indigenous population; 3) fulfilling a mission from God; and 4) preventing the West fromtaking over the Amazon and continuing their neocolonialist practices. Strength is a key feature, and Bolsonaro hasreceived an appropriate nickname: Captain Chainsaw. Moreover, we see a strong presence of ’warrior language’, orviolent discursive adjectives where the people have to, for example, “...battle the devastating wave of forest fires” [97].With Bolsonaro as the Hero in this discourse, Macron has become representative of the ’West’ (i.e. the enemy). Theidentification of the enemy allows for polarisation and blame games.
Starting with his campaign, Bolsonaro goes on a ‘Hero’s Journey’: he is a man of the people who will bring prosperityto the nation and fight corruption. Eight months into his first term, his approval ratings plummeted by from 38.9% inFebruary to 29.4% in August, and disapproval ratings for Bolsonaro’s personal performance rose from 28.2% to 53.7%[98]. His campaigns were largely based on the promise to open up the Amazon to agribusinesses and mining, and sincehis presidency fewer illegal timber has been confiscated [99]. Since then, however, his supporters and allies have alsoexpressed concerns: “Brazil’s agribusiness lobby, which wields significant influence within Congress, also expressedconcerns over a drop in exports due to a potential boycott of Brazilian products” [89]. However, it should be emphasisedthat similarly to Farage in Kelsey’s study [53], Bolsonaro “does not reflect the values of any individual society as awhole, but certain values that exist within society, or in other words, the ideological agenda that he serves” (p.975).
Bolsonaro and his allies have apportioned blame to various actors. Primarily, NGOs and environmentalists were blamedfor starting the fires as a response to the government’s budget cuts - a statement which Bolsonaro later retracted dueto lack of evidence [29, 92, 99–101]. Moreover, “they were angry because they would not receive any more fundingfrom the government. They were trying to give Brazil and Bolsonaro a bad image” [92]. Attributing blame further tookplace on a global level, especially regarding the ’Western’ attitude towards Brazil. This included blaming Macron forbehaving in a colonialist manner, for treating the Amazon as a colony or ’no-mans-land’, for using Amazon fires as apolitical strategy, amongst other things. The following quotes are illustrative of this sentiment:
“Rondonia’s governor, the Bolsonaro ally Marcos, Rocha, took an identical line, dismissing the ’fuss’over the fires as a foreign ruse to shackle Brazil’s economy.” [5]
“Mr Macron, said Mr Bolsoanro, was bent on sensationalism and seeking "personal political gainsin an internal matter for Brazil and other Amazonian countries."” [89]
“"Most of the foreign press has a completely distorted image of who I am and what I intend to dohere with our policies and for the future of our Brazil," he [Bolsonaro] said. "I perfectly understandthe level of the poisoning that is done to Brazil by the foreign press."” [7]
Blame was also apportioned to the natural climate where it was reasoned that drought and the extremely dry summermonths were the cause of the forest fires [89, 101]. Members of the discourse-coalition claimed that INPE publishedfalse data - the figures were lies and the director was to blame, which ultimately led Galvão to lose his job [93].Scientific claims were made which increased the legitimacy of the argument, although other actors (particularly thosefrom Discourse 2 and 3) consider them to be erroneous. Below is an example of how the Bolsonaro has described thecause and the data of the forest fires:
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“Bolsonaro called the data published by INPE this month ’lies’. ’They [the data] are manipulatedand higher than what they should be, to tarnish the name of Brazil and its government.’” [88] (OwnTranslation)
The blame games were often accompanied with name-calling and ad hominem7 used as tools for disagreement andcounterattacks. Examples of these include:
“Jair Bolsonaro, whose move to meddle in the environmental organisation’s governance led to Nor-way’s decision, reacted by suggesting that Europe was not in a position to lecture his administration."Isn’t Norway that country that kills whales up there in the north pole?", the Brazilian president said."Take that money and help Angela Merkel reforest Germany."” [17]
“The diplomatic row between the leaders had escalated earlier in the day, when Macron condemnedBolsonaro for what he called "extraordinarily rude" comments made about his wife, Brigitte, afterthe Brazilian president expressed approval online for a Facebook post implying that Brigitte Macronwas not as good-looking as his own wife, Michelle.” [1]
“Bolsonaro’s education minister, Abraham Weintraub, branded Macron a characterless, "opportunis-tic knave" and "a cretin", while Brazil’s president mocked the French first lady’s appearance onFacebook.” [103]
“"Macron cannot even avoid a foreseeable fire in a church that is a world heritage site," Lorenzonisaid in a reference to the blaze that devastated the Notre Dame cathedral in April. "What does heintend to teach our country?"” [1]
Throughout the discourse, different strategies and tactics that were used during the Wise Use Movement (WUM) are alsovisible here. Similarly to the WUM where they tried to “marginalise environmental groups by highlighting the viewsand actions of the radical fringe of environmentalism, and in other ways promote the perception that environmentalistsare atypical of the public” (Maughan Nilson quoted in [104]), this discourse tried to ostracise environmentalists andNGOs. For example, labelling environmentalists as religious fanatics was one of the strategies used:
“Bolsonaro, whose anti-environment rhetoric has included a pledge to end "Shi’ite ecologist activism,"has questioned the latest official figures showing deforestation increased 88 percent in June comparedwith the same period last year. He uses the word "Shi’ite" as a synonym for radicalism rather thandenoting a branch of Islam.” [94]
Another tactic used aims at downplaying threats to the environment. Claims are made by members of the discourse-coalition that argue that the data on the fires and deforestation levels are exaggerated, as well as stating that fires are anatural event during the dry season. Moreover, the discourse presents itself as having the best environmental policies inthe world as it has more forest than any other country. Argumentation and claim-making are frequently of a comparativenature (i.e. ’we protect more more forest than any other country’) and conclusions are drawn without proper supportingevidence:
“"Our Amazon is larger than the whole of western Europe and remains virtually untouched - proofthat we are one of the countries that most protects the environment," Bolsonaro claimed.” [85]
Together, actors within this discourse-coalition form a group wherein, although diverse, share similar interests anda common “aversion to environmental regulations, which essentially constrain what they can do on private propertyand how they can use public land” [104, p.279]. The coalition - which includes the agricultural sector and resource
7“an argumentation method where the characteristics or authority of the writer are attacked without addressing the substance ofthe argument” [102]
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extraction industries - appears to provide their support to this discourse on the perceived threat of environmentalpolicies and the perceived harm they have endured as a result of environmental policies. As such, one of the main goalsappears to be guaranteeing access for these industries on public, protected and Indigenous lands. The economic costs ofenvironmental policies for protecting this land and the costs of combating the fires are stressed, illustrated in section4.2 which shows how the direct and opportunity costs are used as arguments in the discourse. Moreover, there is aperception that the Amazon is a renewable resource: “’If you cut down trees in the Amazon there will be new oneswithin a few years,’ he claims. ’That’s because of the tropical climate, Europeans don’t understand that” [87] (Owntranslation).
Lastly, the belief that environmentalists want to attain power is demonstrated by: 1) Bolsonaro and his administrationblaming the NGOs for the fires; 2) people at the pro-Bolsonaro protests stating that the NGOs are there to map out andsteal the Amazonian riches [87]; and 3) Bolsonaro reproaching Macron for his ’colonialist mindset’. This supportsthe notion that environmentalists do indeed have something to gain from environmental policies and that there ismore to their agenda than simply being concerned with the common good. The arguments above are able debunk theenvironmentalists’ legitimacy. Moreover, environmentalism is often equated with a political left ideology and found tobe destructive. Bolsonaro’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2019 in New York was illustrative ofthis sentiment but, according to experts, relied heavily on fallacies:
“Brazil’s president went on the offensive, starting his speech with a Trumpian excoriation of socialismand concluding with an obscure broadside against the leftist "ideological thought systems" he allegedhad invaded Brazilian schools, universities, homes and even souls. "With these methods, this ideologyhas always left a trail of death, ignorance and misery, wherever it has gone," Bolsonaro said. At theheart of Bolsonaro’s speech - which Brazilian fact-checkers said contained nine falsehoods and fiveimprecise claims - was a lengthy counter-attack against domestic and international criticism of hishighly controversial vision for the Amazon and Brazil’s indigenous communities.” [85]
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5 Chapter 5: Bolsonaro as the Villain
5.1 The Discourse
“The Brazilian president is a right-wing populist who solely thinks in nationalist solutions, is allergicto foreign meddling and does not concern himself at all with offending someone else’s wife.” (Own
translation) [93]
The second discourse which features prominently in the media is one that portrays Bolsonaro as the Villain. Therepresentation of this mythological archetype is particularly strong when juxtaposed against the environment andIndigenous peoples. Discourse 2 is mainly advanced by environmentalists, civil society (concerned groups or individualsand NGOs), celebrities, a few politicians, and the international community in general (with some exceptions such asUS president Donald Trump). Three main story lines were identified: 1) The Amazon as a crisis; 2) The Amazon as aglobal issue; and 3) Bolsonaro is an enemy to all.
5.1.1 Storyline 1: The Amazon as a Crisis
This storyline is particularly concerned with the Amazon fires being something abnormal and out of the ordinary. Theissue has gained the title of a crisis or an emergency, thereby invoking a narrative which allows one to respond in away that normal circumstances would not permit: the situation is regarded as an exception and asks for a concomitantresponse, even if that requires departing from the political-constitutional norm [38].
The ’crisis’ storyline emphasises that the ’lungs of the planet’ are on fire: an inferno, as some have called it [5]. ’Ourhouse is burning,’ stated French president Emmanuel Macron, dubbing it both an international crisis and an emergencythat should be addressed as a top priority during the G7 summit (see Figure 2). Other politicians, such as Germanchancellor Merkel, also wanted to treat the fires as an emergency [33]. The perception that the environmental issue is infact a crisis is supported by claims of record-breaking numbers (see Figure 4), and phrases such as ’raging inferno’s’,’irreversible damage’ and so forth. This sentiment was not just present in the international community, but also in Brazilitself. Several states, including Brazil’s largest state, Amazonas, declared a state of emergency [105].
More specifically, the storyline argues that the record breaking fires and deforestation rates increased by 278% by Julycompared to year before, equalling a destruction of approximately 870 square miles [17]. These figures are consideredto be so high that a ’tipping point’ may soon be reached. This will irreversibly degrade the Amazon into a dry savannah,“transforming from a vital sink for global emissions to releasing an estimated tens of billions of tonnes of carbon intothe air” [9]:
“About 17% of the Amazon has been destroyed over the last 50 years with some scientists fearing therainforest could reach an irreversible tipping point if that rises to 20% or 25%.” [85]
With this dire outlook in mind, the storyline finds it obvious that the fires are a treated as a global crisis and emergency.For some, the Amazon fires have reached another level of destruction. Marina Silva, senator, ex-environmental ministerand leader of the Rede opposition party, wrote in a letter that: “Since the nazisme murdered millions a Jews, the wordHolocaust obtained the meaning total destruction. And that is what is happening now: the holocaust of the Amazon”[92].
5.1.2 Storyline 2: The Amazon as a Global Issue
This storyline is largely based on the ’Amazon crisis’ storyline and argues that the situation in the Amazon is notjust a concern for Brazil anymore, but that it is a global issue. The actors urge for more (international) action andresponsibility, with French president Macron being most vocal about it this:
“Speaking on French TV on Monday night, Macron reiterated that the Amazon was a global issueand intensified his criticism of Bolsonaro. "We respect your sovereignty. It’s your country," Macron
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Figure 4: Deforestation levels in Brazil (2015-2019); Note the reference to ’record level’. [3]
said. But the trees in the Amazon are "the lungs of the planet", he added. "The Amazon forest is asubject for the whole planet. We can help you reforest. We can find the means for your economicdevelopment that respects the natural balance. But we cannot allow you to destroy everything.”(Emphases added) [1]
Moreover, Macron has argued that France is an Amazonian nation, and appears to imply that this justifies France’sconcern and interference in the fires.
“Pointing out that France itself is "an Amazonian nation" because of its overseas department, FrenchGuiana, he said: "The Amazon is so important... in terms of biodiversity, oxygen and the fight againstclimate change, that we must proceed with reforestation"” [106]
Apart from being the ’lungs of the earth’, the Amazon rainforest is a necessity for the planet in terms of regulatingits climate through carbon storage and water sequestration while at the same time hosting a significant number ofspecies. The rainforest harbours, for example, 16,000 species of trees and 2.5 million species of insects that we know of[107], as well as several hundred thousand (Indigenous) people, including 300 different tribes. Due to the Amazon’senvironmental and cultural importance, the storyline argues that the international community has a say and responsibilityto speak up: the Amazon is something that belongs to us all.
The current Minister of the Environment of Brazil, Ricardo Salles, is believed to not be a ’real’ minister but instead an’anti-minister’ as he does not care about the protecting the rainforest. Although deforestation happened in the past andalways has been an issue in the Amazon, Brazil at least had previous ministers that cared about the environment. Salles,however, does not and, according to Marina Silva, actively works against nature instead [103]. In August 2019, theopposition party Rede initiated an impeachment process against Salles and ForaSalles (’away with Salles’) became atrending topic on Twitter that day [92].
In response to the Amazon fires as a global issue, the international community acted in different ways. The firstconcerned the Mercosur Deal (a free trade agreement between the EU, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, knownas the Mercosur Bloc) that was a two decade-long deal in the making and should have been ratified in 2019. However,
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due to the events in the Amazon (most notably the highly escalated fires and deforestation levels), several governmentsthreatened to block this deal. Concerns about the increasing deforestation rates led to the Irish parliament backing a“symbolic motion instructing the government to "immediately begin building a coalition across the EU to ensure thatthis deal is rejected"” [17].
Additionally, the international community decided to take a stance concerning the Amazon crisis by withholding fundsthat should have been received by organisations such as the Amazon Fund. The Amazon Fund was set up in 2008 toreceive donations for reforestation and other conservation projects in the Amazon [88]. Its largest contributors, Germanyand Norway, decided to suspend their additional funding; Norway chose to withhold an expected payment of $33.27mand Germany $39m. This decision was based on the fact that Brazil did not stick to the terms of agreement as Brazilunilaterally decided to close the Fund’s steering committee. The countries argued that Bolsonaro’s administration didnot show it was serious in combating deforestation [17].
5.1.3 Storyline 3: Bolsonaro as an Enemy to All
The third storyline emphasises Bolsonaro as a right-wing populist and climate change denier [108], and presentshim as an enemy to all: the environment, the Indigenous people, the political left etc. Climate Observatory, aBrazilian NGO, stated that “As expected, Bolsonaro’s speech... has doubled down on division, nationalism and onecocide...Bolsonaro’s policies bring an immediate risk to all humankind” [85]. Over the last few months, Bolsonaro’sapproval ratings plummeted [7] from 38.9% in February to 29.4% in August. The disapproval ratings on Bolsonaro’spersonal performance as president rose from 28.2% to 53.7% [98], suggesting that his actions and policies do not reflectthe views of the wider public. Rubens Ricupero, a former environment minister, even called president Bolsonaro the’most despised and detested leader on earth’ [103].
Concerning the Indigenous populations, Bolsonaro has been dubbed the gravest threat and primary enemy. Bolsonaro’santi-Indigenous rhetoric features prominently in (inter-) national media, and according to the Guardian Bolsonaro hasopenly declared war on the approximately 400 tribes [109]. Furthermore, his plans of opening up Indigenous reserves,the dismantling of Funai (the government agency on Indigenous peoples) [95] and weakening of law enforcement haveput many of the Indigenous population in danger: “Only a global outcry stands between them and genocide” [94].
“"We are in a situation of great danger. [Bolsonaro] is proving himself to be the number-one enemyof the indigenous," he [a leader from the Javri Valley indigenous territory] said.” [95]
This anti-Indigenous sentiment and rhetoric has translated itself into policies that undermine past environmental andhuman rights efforts in Brazil. This includes ’crippling budget cuts to Funai’ [95] and dismantling of other agenciessuch as Ibama (Brazil’s environmental protection agency). Ibama has lost power since three regional headquarters weredeactivated, which left only one central command post to tackle environmental crime in a state roughly three times thesize of Spain [5]. Moreover, changes in policies and the continued lack of law enforcement (for example tackling illegaldeforestation) have further contributed to the destruction of the Amazon rainforest:
“"Just imagine if all this is destroyed, if the government opens this area up. In two years it will all begone," he [a leader from the Javri Valley indigenous territory] predicted. "The wood will be gone.The fish will be gone. The rivers will all be polluted. All they want is to destroy.” [95]
Different actors, such as government officials, wildcat goldminers, Indigenous leaders and environmental activists,have argue that the anti-environmental rhetoric put forward by Bolsonaro and his allies, coupled with the lack of lawenforcement, have contributed to scale of the fires and the increased deforestation [5]. In addition, Bolsonaro has openlysupported economic activities, mining, agriculture, logging, construction of hydroelectric dams etc., that exploit thenatural environment. This new “age of wrecking” [5] is a direct result “total disregard for the vital ecological role theAmazon serves” [9]: “He’s a bad man. It’s as if he understands nothing," he [a Matis elder] remonstrated. "He doesn’twant to help the poor or the suffering. He just wants to help the rich so they can get the resources they desire” [95]. The
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storyline thus highlights the environmental and cultural destruction and supports the concern of the (inter-)nationalcommunity.
5.2 Environmental Justice
As with Discourse 1, elements of distributive justice are featured most prominently in this discourse. Similarly, it wasobserved that different approaches to distributive justice are used whereby the focal point of each approach differsslightly. One of the most prevailing arguments in this discourse tends to revolve around the moral responsibility toprotect both nature and its people. In this discourse, emotional and moral argumentation play a role, as the followingquote illustrates:
“Adriane Muelbert, an ecologist who’s studied how Amazon deforestation plays a role in climatechange, told National Geographic: "It’s a tragedy... a crime against the planet, and a crime againsthumanity."” [105]
This normative claim appears to represent the general sentiment of Discourse 2. The fact that deforestation is consideredto be a crime against the planet and against humanity is illustrative of the Amazon’s (perceived) utility. In this discourse,forests are valued in terms of the ecosystem services (simply put, the benefits,) that they provide. Hence, it is largelyinstrumental valuation that takes place, although signs of intrinsic valuation also come to the fore. Considering that theAmazon is a transnational natural resource and provides numerous benefits on a global scale, it has become a point ofconcern for the international community. The Amazon is the world’s largest terrestrial carbon sink and an importantstabilizer of our climate, and this discourse often treats it as a public good (i.e. non-rivalrous and non-excludable); theAmazon is "our house" and "the lungs of the earth". The discourse argues that the fires are "a subject for the wholeplanet". As such, the fires became an issue of top priority at the G7 summit in Biarritz.
It is repeated that the Amazon is the world’s largest terrestrial carbon sink, contains a high level of biodiversity,sequesters water, regulates the planet’s climate and provides a home to millions of people - including approximatelythree hundred indigenous groups. As such, this discourse would argue that the greatest utility would result fromconserving and protecting the rainforest, ultimately leading to improved well-being for all. If we continue with thestatus quo, “Bolsonaro’s policies bring an immediate risk to all humankind” [85]. Conserving the Amazon is thereforeseen as an act for ’the greater good’, an argument that is presented as being more valuable than other arguments(e.g. national sovereignty). In many ways Discourse 2 treats the Amazon as a public good, a dominant argumentbeing that the Amazon is essential to life on earth (i.e. ’the lungs of the planet’) and therefore belongs to all ofus [29, 89, 93, 109–112]. Moreover, in these storylines the rainforest provides positive net benefits for all, therebyresonating with a ’justice as mutual advantage perspective’.
“French president Emmanuel Macron also described the Amazon as a ’public good’ due to its role inglobal climate change mitigation.” (Own translation) [113]
The global importance of the Amazon justifies the international community’s concern and willingness to participate inthe decision-making of the Amazon, especially when future generations are taken into account. Although ’Western’countries seem to be particularly concerned with the conservation and protection of the Amazon, the discourse doesnot engage with thoughts on what the underlying drivers may be, thereby largely excluding the ’West’s’ responsibilityin what has been termed a ’crisis’. However, there appears to be some understanding towards the importance of theAmazon as a driving force for the Brazilian economy, but this does not justify the Amazon’s destruction:
“"The Amazon forest is a subject for the whole planet. We can help you reforest. We can find themeans for your economic development that respects the natural balance. But we cannot allow you todestroy everything."” [1] (Statement made by Macron.)
The international community’s concern is further legitimised by several factors. Primarily, science and data, whichillustrate a current disbalance between economic and environmental activities and priorities, is continuously referred to
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and used to gain credibility. Secondly, international pressure is warranted and legitimised by relying on these data sets,but also due to the perceived lack of credibility and ’child-like behaviour’ of Bolsonaro: it is said that Bolsonaro ’lied’at the G20 regarding his climate change commitments [89]. Thirdly, Brazil’s unilateral decision of closing the AmazonFund’s steering committee illustrated that he is not serious about curbing deforestation. Consequently, the discourseargues that it is legitimised, and even necessary, for the international community to pursue stronger measures. Thisincludes, for instance, blocking the Mercosur deal or potentially boycotting Brazilian commodities.
Lastly, it is noticeable that the distributive justice principle of addressing needs and capabilities is - albeit to a limitedextent - included. The perspective put forward is that by destroying the natural environment and actively engaging in aanti-Indigenous rhetoric, for instance, the Bolsonaro administration is limiting and reducing access to the needs andcapabilities of marginalised communities. Within such a justice approach, a healthy environment is a human right andshould apply to everyone and logging, mining, cattle ranching and agriculture will severely decrease the well-beingof the environment and many affected population groups. Based on this sentiment, the discourse presents the currentsituation to be one focused on malrecognition and social injustice while putting forward the argument of ’the greatergood’.
Other injustices have come forward during processes of decision-making and participation. Various occurrences haveled to (inter)national consternation and critique: INPEs director being fired after conflicts over the deforestation data;Bolsonaro’s son being appointed Brazil’s ambassador to the US earlier this year, an act which some coined nepotism[7, 9]; and INPE’s budget was cut by 24%, and the Indigenous affairs are now controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.These examples show that those who take a stance against the current (environmental) policies are increasingly atrisk. Moreover, events such as these decrease the overall legitimacy and accountability of the government and itsagencies, especially when illegal: “There have been numerous accounts of unpermitted development and land grabson indigenous reserves, while the environmental regulatory issued fewer fines than at any point since 1995 during thefirst two months of his presidency”[9]. It also suggests that more participation of different actors is needed and shouldbe sought in policy-making. Concerns also apply to the global nature of the forest fire crisis, and therefore includethe participation in decision-making over the fate of the Amazon. Some of the members of this discourse-coalitionwould argue that participation in decision-making involves looking beyond the traditional nation-state. The Amazon’sfuture - and all of the global repercussions - should not be decided by the Bolsonaro administration alone. Many publicfigures expressed their concern, including Dutch minister Kaag [112], Irish prime minister Varadkar [114], Germanchancellor Merkel [88], French president Macron, actor DiCaprio, football player Ronaldo etc. The openly statedcriticism on Bolsonaro’s policies by a wide variety of actors illustrate that many find the overall message of Discourse 1questionable and perhaps find comfort in the normative claims presented by Discourse 2. The discursive practices usedby this Discourse, including those that help present moral and normative claims, will be discussed in the followingsection.
5.3 Language
“Bolsonaro has ushered in a new age of wrecking.” [5]
The language in this discourse can be defined by several notable tendencies including portraying Bolsonaro as a Villain,describing the Amazon fires as a crisis and/ or emergency, using ’warrior language’, and using violent discursiveelements. This discourse can also be characterised by the ambiguity of deforestation and fire data, which the actors inthe discourse-coalition argue are based on facts.
Bolsonaro is frequently and explicitly characterised as a villain in the media, particularly in Storyline 3 where Bolsonarois considered to be an enemy to all: the greatest threat towards the environment and (Indigenous) people. Typicalvillains tend to display certain characteristics such being “self-centred, power-hungry and interested only in achievingtheir personal goals, usually at the cost of others” [115]. This resembles the image of Bolsonaro in this discourse:a power-hungry politician who represents violence, marginalisation, climate scepticism, nepotism, and disposing ofopposition (for example by firing Galvão).
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When it comes to descriptions of Bolsonaro, it is noteworthy that he is frequently coupled with the terms ’far-rightpopulist’ and/ or ’climate sceptic’; these two adjectives seem to define, and be synonymous with, the Brazilian president.However, he is also described as ’the most detested leader in the world’, the greatest enemy to the indigenous, as wellas a plethora of other adjectives: “Ever since he took office in January this evangelism, populism, and total disregard forthe vital ecological role the Amazon serves have been the hallmarks of Mr Bolsonaro’s tenure” [9]. These traits seem tobe equated, in the newspaper articles, with Villain archetypes.
Bolsonaro is described as ’Captain Chainsaw’, a name which, it appears, he has come claim himself and is used bythe media: “The Amazon, Captain Chainsaw insists, is his to do with as he pleases” [9]. In addition, the actors of thisdiscourse-coalition portray Bolsonaro as evil: he only wants to make the rich richer, he wants to destroy the Amazon,encourage genocide of the Indigenous population, and has declared war on the 400 Indigenous groups [109]:
“"Only a global outcry stands between them [the indigenous peoples] and genocide, said StephenCory, director of Survival International... "President Bolsonaro and his friends in the logging industrywould like nothing more than for those who still survive to be eliminated."” [94]
Moreover, Bolsonaro is portrayed as having set in motion a global crisis. The actors in this discourse-coalition presenttheir understanding of the Amazon fires as a problem using dramatic adjectives. The Guardian in particular describedthe forest fires in the Amazon as if it was part of an apocalyptic movie:
“From afar, it resembles a tornado: an immense grey column shooting thousands of feet upwardsfrom the forest canopy into the Amazonian skies. Up close it is an inferno: a raging conflagrationobliterating yet another stretch of the world’s greatest rainforest as a herd of Nelore cattle looks onin bewilderment. “It started this morning,” said Valdir Urumon, the chief of an indigenous villagein this isolated corner of Rondônia state, as the vast pillar of smoke loomed over his settlement’spalm-thatched homes. By late afternoon, when the Guardian arrived on the scene, the fire hadintensified into a catastrophic blaze, streaking north through a strip of jungle perhaps two miles long.Huge plumes of smoke drifted skywards as if this sweep of woodland near Brazil’s north-westernborder with Bolivia had been subjected to a ferocious bombing campaign.” [5] (Emphases added)
This type of apocalyptic framing is not unusual (see Foust & Murphy [48]), but it is debatable whether, and how, suchnarratives and storylines have power and are effective. Some scholars, such as Skilling [38] argue that the power ofa story depends on a combination of credibility and novelty. The credibility is largely achieved by the actors in thediscourse-coalition - particularly through the use of science - and the novelty status is gained through the discursivestrategies of using words such as ’unprecedented’ and achieving ’record-breaking’. The following quote, which againuses strong visual language, is illustrative of this sentiment:
“Experts say the current rate is unprecedented and the direct result of demons unleashed by MrBolsonaro in his pledges to turn a blind eye to environmental degradation in the name of economicprogress.” [9]
However, there is much ambiguity in the media concerning the statistics on the severity of the fires, perhaps due tothe different ways in which journalists, media outlets, experts and organisations define the environmental issue. Somehighlight the intensity of the fires: According to NASA, the amount and intensity of the fires in the Brazilian Amazonwere at its highest in 2019 since the year 2010, but when taking the entire Amazon into account, including the areasoutside Brazil, this figure becomes more nuanced. In the latter case, the figures of 2019 are very close to those of 2016,but do not surpass it [116]. It therefore appears misleading to describe the forest fires in 2019 as ’unprecedented’ orachieving ’record numbers’. Emphasising different parts of the problem may create confusion amongst the readers. Forexample, the Telegraph, the Guardian and de Volkskrant published an article that responded to the question: why is theAmazon burning and is it really that bad? The headlines illustrate some of the ambiguity:
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’Record number forest fires in the Brazilian Amazon.’ De Volkskrant (Own translation) [117]
’NASA: Amount of fires in the Amazon lower than usual.’ De Telegraaf (Own translation) [118]
’Record 84 per cent yearly increase in Amazon fires blamed on deforestation in Brazil,’ The Telegraph[119]
To support claims that the fires are a crisis, an emergency, and an unprecedented event, the members of this coalitionoften highlight the irreversible damage that will occur if nothing is done. This includes mentioning the threat of reachinga ’tipping point’, which is supported by scientific evidence:
“It should be no surprise that when large areas of rainforest are burnt down, it has profoundconsequences. Devastating droughts and storms go from 100-year events to ones we must expect everydecade. Summers gradually move from lovely to too hot to life-threatening. The Earth is one great self-regulating system and if we destroy one part, our species might not survive the next steady-state. [120]
‘About 17% of the Amazon has been destroyed over the last 50 years with some scientists fearing therainforest could reach an irreversible tipping point if that rises to 20% or 25%.’” [85]
The use of scientific evidence and statistics to support the actors in this discourse-coalition also include referencesto the number of species living in the Amazon, the hydrological importance of the rainforest, ecological systemsthinking, the rate of deforestation and increases in forest fires; in other words, ’language of ecology’ [30]. However,some claims appear to be selectively chosen and not necessarily scientifically founded. For example, Macron andother celebrities stated through social media that the Amazon produces 20% of the planet’s oxygen and as such theAmazon has frequently been coined the ’lungs of the earth’. This phrase, or signifier, depicts the Amazon as beingsomething absolutely crucial to the Earth’s and humankind’s survival; it generates the oxygen that we need to breath.The metaphor evokes visualisation through imagery, thereby strengthening the meaning of the phrase. Indeed, “thebenefit of metaphors is that we can express ideas for which there are no words (or for which singular words don’t quitesuffice)” [121]. However, even though several newspapers articles referred to this 20% figure, only two articles statedthe number was actually closer to 6% [3, 86] and another explained that it was impossible to provide accurate estimatesas it depends on the location and the methods used [116].
Macron’s Twitter post (Figure 2), “Our house is burning. Literally. The Amazon rainforest - the lungs which produces20% of our planet’s oxygen - is on fire. It is an international crisis. Members of the G7 Summit, let’s discuss thisemergency first order in two days!” (emphases added) [2], not only stated the 20% figure, but also called the currentsituation both a crisis and emergency. As the theoretical framework elaborated on in detail, the introduction of a termsuch as the word ’crisis’ allows for an exception of the ’normal’ state of affairs. Procedures and a course of actionis called upon which does not follow the normal state of affairs, such as discussing the issue as a priority at the G7Summit. As Skilling [38] noted, crisis narratives are influenced by “their relationship to dominant interest and valuepositions, to political fields of power and influence and to broader social constructions of aspirations and fears” (p.62).This relationship between crisis narratives and power are addressed in a counter-discourse provided by Bolsonaro.According to the Brazilian president, Macron had a personal agenda when defining the Amazon fires as a crisis:
“Mr Macron, said Mr Bolsonaro, was bent on sensationalism and seeking "personal political gainsin an internal matter for Brazil and other Amazonian countries."” [89]
Although the aim here is not to analyse what the underlying motives of such a response are, the quote above doeshighlight some of the tensions that have surfaced as a result of the fires. These tensions, and the opposition createdtowards and enemy, is further magnified through the use of ’warrior language’. Such language evokes feelings ofconflict, war, violence, distrust etc. Similarly to the other identified discursive practices, dramatic adjectives and
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verbs are used to convey a battle between ’good’ and ’evil’. It is not uncommon to find words such as ’inferno’,’vuurzee’ (sea of fire), ’destruction’, ’obliteration’, ’catastrophic’, ’engulfed by wildfires’ and even ’holocaust’ in thenewspaper articles. Although all four newspapers make use of such ’warrior language’, it is striking that such languageis dominated by the Guardian and de Volkskrant. The following words or phrases, all retrieved from a single Guardianarticle [85] are illustrative of this point:
• ’locking horns with a succession of world leaders’
• ’Brazil battling to repair its overseas image’
• ’Brazil’s president went on the offensive’
• ’Trumpian excoriation of socialism’
• ’With these methods, this ideology has always left a trail of death, ignorance and misery’
• ’..."ideological thought systems" he alleged had invaded Brazilian schools, universities, homes and even souls’
• ’That line was a clear jab at Macron with whom Bolsonaro is locked in a long-running diplomatic feud thatescalated last month’
Some other quotes (from all four media outlets) that are worth mentioning to illustrate their ability of presentingBolsonaro as a Villain and the Amazon fires as a place of (violent) conflict:
• “The Amazon, Captain Chainsaw insists, is his to do with as he pleases.” The Telegraph [9];
• “...battle the devastating wave of forest fires” The Guardian[97];
• “...Bolsonaro has dismissed $22m in G7 assistance amid the bullish head of state’s war of words with Frenchpresident Emmanuel Macron” The Telegraph [97];
• “a war of words intensified” The Guardian [89];
• “a war is raging in the Amazon” de Volkskrant [86];
• “a battle of words is raging” (own translation: ’er woedt een woordenstrijd’) De Volkskrant [93];
• “holocaust” De Volkskrant [92]
• “the tree trunks stand around him like skeletons” (own translation: ’boomstammen staan als skeletten om hemheen’) De Volkskrant [86];
• “smoldering remains” (own translation: ’smeulende resten’) De Volkskrant [86];
• “apocalyptic images” (own translation: ’apocalyptische beelden’) De Volkskrant [86];
• “phenomenal attack” (own translation: ’verbluffende’ aanval’) De Telegraaf [99].
Overall, apart from portraying Bolsonaro as the Villain, the discursive practices and strategies used in this discoursehave presented the situation as a crisis, the discourse-coalition of Discourse 1 to be evil, created and enhanced oppositionor polarisation, emphasised normative claims, and described the current situation in the Amazon as if it was part onapocalyptic movie.
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6 Discourse 3: The problem is bigger than Bolsonaro
6.1 The Discourse
This discourse, which I have come to call the problem is bigger than Bolsonaro, is not featured as prominently as theprevious two in the Dutch and British media. Compared to Discourses 1 and 2 where Bolsonaro and his allies are seento be Hero’s or Villains, this discourse provides a more nuanced view on the Amazon fires and deforestation rates. Thediscourse-coalition that puts forward this perspective include concerned and critical individuals and groups, such asenvironmentalists, journalists, and other members of civil society. Three story lines were identified and concerned theunderlying drivers of the fires and deforestation, that the fires are illustrative of a global problem, and the necessity ofshared but differentiated responsibility.
6.1.1 Storyline 1: Underlying Drivers
“No matter how many troops President Bolsonaro deploys in Amazonas, the burning will only stopwhen the root causes are addressed.” [120]
Actors in this discourse-coalition have recognised that the link between fires, deforestation and the overconsumptionof resources has not properly been addressed. Increasing levels of deforestation in the Amazon are largely a result ofa growing demand for Brazilian (forest-risk) commodities, such as beef, leather and soy, that have found their wayaround global markets. From 1993 to 2013, the Brazilian cattle herd grew 200% to more than 60 million cows. Theglobal production of footwear went up to 23.5 billion pairs by 2018, accounting for 55% of all leather production[109]. Hardly anyone asks where the cows came from, and demand for zero-deforestation (ZD) leather is virtuallynon-existent. The US National Wildlife Federation found in an analysis that Brazil supplies approximately 22% ofglobal leather exports and that the country is the single largest source of animal hides [122]. As such, the largest driverof deforestation in the Amazon is attributed to cattle ranching.
De Volkskrant notes that the production of soy and cattle are responsible for almost 75% of the deforestation in theBrazilian Amazon. In 2018, the EU imported 500 million worth of meat, and 6 million tons of soy from Brazil of whichapproximately 87% is used for feed. Western-Europeans consume on average 85kg of meat and 260kg of dairy a year,more than double the global average. Although the European Commission already recognised in 2013 that Europe’sconsumption patterns play a significant role in deforestation, European leaders and Bolsonaro tend to ignore this point[86]. As such, the storyline argues that the overconsumption of resources coupled with long and unclear supply chainsshould be addressed properly. Currently, the traceability of commodities remains difficult and ’sustainable’ options arescarce. Moreover, global trade and politics also contribute to forest destruction. Trump’s trade war with China (at thetime of writing), for instance, generated a gap in soy exports which caused Brazil to fill it and add additional pressure tothe Amazon [1]. In addition, the demand for beef is expected to increase in Europe as a result of the Mercosur deal,adding even more pressure to the Amazon and the Cerrado [1]. Threatening to block or delay this deal, which somecountries have done, will not yield any substantial positive impacts as the deal itself is considered to be outdated:
“Most observers already recognise that a treaty that was 15 years in the making needs radicalupdating to recognise current realities, not least a climate crisis that is no longer just a future threat.”[120]
The power of other actors, such as the produtores, should not be underestimated. The agribusiness lobby and theevangelical voting group wield significant power in Congress, and “the former army captain was elected with the supportof the mining and agricultural sectors” [17]. Although Bolsonaro’s administration has weakened the environment agencyINPE, underfunded FUNAI, attacked (conservation) NGOs, dismissed satellite data on deforestation and promotedopening up the Amazon to economic activities such as agriculture, mining, logging, and infrastructure, there are manyother actors at play. The agricultural lobby, for instance, has helped erode the protection systems that were regarded assuccessful in curbing deforestation between 2005 to 2014 [3]. Although the general trend over the last few decades wasa decrease in deforestation, these levels steadily increased again with presidents Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer.
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This does not compare, however, with the huge spike that can be observed after eight months of Bolsonaro’s presidency(see Figures 1 and 4).
6.1.2 Storyline 2: The fires are illustrative of a global problem
Deforestation is not only a problem in Brazil, but is illustrative of global trend. Therefore, deforestation cannot solelybe attributed to Bolsonaro or a particular ideology (e.g. right-wing populism). Bolivia, for example, also saw elevatedlevels of deforestation (a 114% increase in fires in the first eight months of 2019 compared to the same period theprevious year) but was ruled by a left-wing populist at the time. Venezuala saw a 19% rise compared to 2018, and “Peru,Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana have recorded more than a 100 per cent increase this year [2019]” [105]. Otherregions in the world have also needed to respond to enormous wildfires in 2019. Russia, for instance, declared a state ofemergency after wildfires spread across Siberia [123]. Australia faced an earlier, and more severe, bushfire season than’normal’ and also declared various state of emergencies [124].
This storyline especially illustrates that the Amazon fires and deforestation are actually an emblem, or metonym,representative of much larger and more complex issues. The public conflict Macron and Bolsonaro had online wasmore than a simple ’war of words’ [89, 97] between two people on the Amazon fires, but revealed other tensions.Recognising that the Amazon fires are illustrative of other global problems should not take away its perceived urgencyor concern. However, underneath the surface of these debates are tensions over other matters such as global climatechange. Matters of responsibility and deciding who has to shoulder the costs of climate change mitigation, biodiversityloss etc. have increasingly led to tensions between ’developed’ and ’underdeveloped’ countries [93]. A link betweenmitigating the climate crisis and avoided deforestation has been made:
“The lack of effective global funding schemes to halt deforestation is a source of great shame.Considering that the mitigation cost of carbon emissions from avoided deforestation is by far thelowest across the spectrum, and that without addressing deforestation we can never achieve globalnet zero carbon emissions, the lack of funding is astonishing.” [120]
Combating climate change, for instance, would involve wealthier nations applying effective climate policies in theirown regions as well as supporting the development of sustainable economies in other countries [93]. Unfortunately,a global vision on climate change has not yet been reached and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) still lacks financialresources [93, 98, 125].
The topic of the Amazon fires brings up another issue, namely the importance of respecting, valuing, and recognisingdifferent people and ways of thinking. An article in de Volkskrant stated that from satellite images it is possibleto see that the areas that are managed by the Indigenous communities are green oases in an otherwise barren anddeforested landscape [86]. It is therefore argued that the Indigenous communities are the best guardians of the forest.The Amazon is furthermore important for the Indigenous people in terms of their, “cultural survival, self-determination,and wellbeing” [111], as Earth Alliance stated.
“"It’s not just deforestation that has gone up in the Amazon [under Bolsonaro]. Violence againstindigenous groups has, too," he said.” [95]
However, recognising that the Indigenous people and their way of living is jeopardised by external activities, suchas land grabbing and deforestation, is not enough. As Macron was quoted in de Volkskrant, “we need proper policyregarding the Amazon. But we also need to involve NGOs and the local population more than we do now” [86]. Thisstatement recognises the need for more participation in decision-making, especially in environmental policies. Othershave different suggestions:
“"He sees us as animals. As if we didn’t know how to think," said Ewerton Marubo, who hopedforeign funding might help tribes adopt surveillance techniques to safeguard their land.” [95]
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Increased recognition and participation could influence the dominant way of thinking and allow different valuationsystems of the Amazon. According to an author from the Telegraph argues, this is the only way forward: “We will neversave the rainforest until a living tree is worth more to Brazil than an incinerated one” [120]. Moreover, he argues that:
“The Paris Agreement will fail to meet its aim of saving us from self-destructive climate breakdownunless a comprehensive agreement with a performance-based funding mechanism is introduced tomake the standing tree more valuable than the cut down tree.” [120]
This, however, appears to be the extent of the recognition and valuation narrative. The Discussion (Chapter 7) will putthis storyline in the broader context of (hegemonic) ontologies and the power of discourse.
6.1.3 Storyline 3: Shared but Differentiated Responsibility
Storyline 3 brings us to the notion of ’shared but differentiated’ responsibility. Historical deforestation and emissionsare topics that continuously addressed, resulting in some parties blaming others for their part in the current climatecrisis and other environmental crises. Although the previous two discourses both had arguments that support, andcounter, the issue of responsibility and the distribution of costs/ benefits, this storyline argues that there is a globalresponsibility towards mitigating environmental destruction of which the responsibility is not necessarily divided evenly.This perspective also goes beyond the current discourses on the Amazon fires towards recognising that the fires arereally a metonym; they form a small part of a much larger environmental crisis narrative.
With this in mind, the storyline promotes the idea that responsibility does not only concern putting out the firesor the (illegal) deforestation that is currently happening, but that the responsibility covers many more aspects ofsociety. Consumers have a responsibility, for instance, with the products they buy (and have the ability to demandZD commodities). Governments have a responsibility towards (environmental) conservation by discouraging harmfulactivities and encouraging the more environmental friendly alternatives. For example, European companies have astrong presence in the Amazon: Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian aluminium factory of which one third is owned by theNorwegian government, is active in the Brazilian Amazon and has been accused for years of dumping toxic waste [86].Dutch companies are involved in the development of soy ports, railroads and roads in the Amazon. Moreover, althoughit is generally recognised that the consumption patterns of ’Western’ countries play a significant role in the Amazon’sdeforestation, European leaders tend to avoid this issue, as does Bolsonaro since increasing the production of cattle andsoy would be beneficial for the Brazilian economy [86]. Some critics consider these actions to be hypocritical and theidea that a relatively small percentage of money is invested into conservation efforts compared to the investments madetowards exploitative economic activities is deemed problematic:
“For this [conservation] to be effective, governments will also need to align their environment andtrade policies. Currently countries like the UK spend small sums on overseas conservation, thenpromote billions of dollars worth of trade in beef, soy, timber, minerals and other products thatundermine Amazon protection efforts.” [3]
This global ’hypocrisy’ has angered Bolsonaro but also many environmentalists and concerned individuals alike.Many do not consider the current responses to the Amazon fires or deforestation to be enough. After the G7 summit,environmental campaigners argued that “Mr Macron announced no specific plan of action or timetable” [98] and thefunding was considered to be insufficient:
“Environmental groups said G7’s emergency fire aid was insufficient and failed to address the tradeand consumption drivers of deforestation. "The offer of $20m is chump change, especially as thecrisis in the Amazon is directly linked to overconsumption of meat and dairy in the UK and other G7countries," said Richard George, the head of forests for Greenpeace UK.” [1]
As such, the storyline acknowledges the complexity the Amazon fires and deforestation, linking it beyond the fireand deforestation hotspots. Responsibility, or lack thereof, comes from a wide range of actors, practices and policies.
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For shared but differentiated responsibility to be enhanced or better understood, environmental, economic and socialtrade-offs should properly be investigated. For example, Macron has argued that economic development withoutnecessarily destroying the environment is possible: “We can find the means for your economic development thatrespects the natural balance” [1]. Moreover, it is important to recognise that in order to mitigate the effects of a tippingpoint and for reducing emissions, it is not only necessary to protect, but also massively reforest, the Amazon. Thiswill, however, require “far more financial support than anything seen until now” [3] and action from both state andnon-state actors.However, others argue that protecting the Amazon requires a different valuation system: the rainforestwill never be saved “until a living tree is worth more to Brazil than an incinerated one” [120]. This ties in to recognisingthe importance of different ontologies, systems of valuation, knowledge production etc. All in all, responsibility comesin different forms, involving a multitude of (global) actors, and does not necessarily have to be ’evenly’ divided.
6.2 Environmental Justice
Although Discourse 3 is not a dominant discourse, it did articulate elements of EJ quite strongly. The analysis revealedthat Discourse 3 is largely based on normative justification where moral claims and responsibility were frequentlyaddressed. Interestingly, the ways in which EJ was articulated in the discourse beared resemblance to the three storylinesidentified. It appears as if this discourse has a strong foundation based on EJ. As with the other two discourses,distributive justice most often comes to the fore, although hints of CEJ, justice as recognition and procedural justice arealso visible. Due to distributive justice’s prominence in the discourse, this subsection will begin with exploring thisapproach.
A significant part of Discourse 3 is based on a recurrent theme of responsibility. The discourse recognises thatEurope (and the wider international community) is partly complicit in the destruction of the Amazon - Bolsonaro’sadministration simply cannot be the only to blame. The Netherlands, for instance, is the second biggest importer of soyglobally. As the storylines highlight, deforestation in the Amazon is a global problem and therefore global responsibilityand action is required. This means questioning governmental involvement, priorities, and policies (e.g. funding forconservation versus funding for increased soy production) in both Brazil and other countries:
“The G7 should not make room for the crisis in the Amazon, it should be clearing the agenda fornothing else. Without rainforest we wouldn’t even have economies to launch trade wars.” [120]
Threats made by countries to block the Mercosur Deal are an example of governments taking a stance towardsBolsonaro’s environmental policies as undermining Brazil’s export market may be a way to induce action. However,here we see a recurrent dilemma which illustrates that far more needs to change if environmental or social goals are tobe achieved:
“Green campaigners claim the [Mercosur] deal pays "lip service" to international goals to combatclimate warming, and that it will lead to a surge in Brazilian cattle ranching, which many believe isresponsible for growing levels of deforestation.” [17]
As such, the discourse tries to connect different phenomenon to each other in an attempt to understand the current crisesand explore possible solutions. For one, it is argued that developed countries should not only help fund and protectareas in developing countries, but that they also have a responsibility to pursue conservation and climate mitigationefforts in their own countries. This responsibility extends itself towards the notion of historical responsibility. AsBolsonaro frequently points out, developed countries have a responsibility to compensate for their historical emissionsand deforestation rates. Discourse 3 does not counter this argument, but neither does it release Brazil of its ownresponsibility towards environmentally and socially friendly (or ’just’) policies and practices. The discourse tries to takean inter- and intra-generational approach to the problem, providing scenario’s and weighing out options. The followingquote is illustrative of this comparative argumentation:
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“After all, every western economy jump-started their industrial revolution with the charcoal andfarmland from clearing national forests. Funding Brazil and other tropical forest nations to forgothat path is a tiny cost compared to the bill humanity will face without rainforest.” [120]
The above quote begins to highlight other dilemma’s that come up when thinking of distributive justice. The costs thatare frequently refer to range much broader than simply the direct costs of the fires and deforestation. It also involvestaking into account other costs, such as social and opportunity costs. These costs should also be shared, as conservingthe Amazon is not for the benefit of Brazil alone. As Armstrong [62] argues, the principle of fairness binds outsidersby justice to share both direct and opportunity costs in the protection of forests. If “they refuse to do so they can befound guilty of free-riding” (p.109). This means that the international community has a significant responsibility inconserving the Amazon, especially because the Amazon’s value (albeit different interpreted) is widely recognised.
One could argue that the above examples are not only illustrative of distributive justice but contain elements thatresonate with CEJ, in particular the pillar that refers to scale. Pellow argues for a multi-scalar approach to analysingenvironmental problematique, which Discourse 3 pays attention to. Issues and perspectives concerning different spatialand temporal scales can be observed in the storylines. Geographically, we see international concerns arising across theworld with social media playing a major role. Nationally and regionally, the weakening of environmental agencies andpolicies have already had effects on Indigenous reserves and protected areas as more and more actors feel ’emboldened’[95] by the direction environmental management and decision-making is taking. In more localised settings, violence,land grabbing and encroachment, (unsustainable) natural resource extraction, protests and demonstrations are observed.How these micro-sociological interactions have macro-sociological implications cannot be concluded from this thesis,but the discourse does hint at, for example, institutional (environmental) racism [126] which is partially achieved bythose micro-sociological interactions and discourse creation.
Similarly, the temporal scale has been addressed: the struggle appears to be (in part) to try and identify whetherhistorical actions or future repercussions weigh more. The conflict is not so much about the fires as it is over mattersof sovereignty, economic growth, development and feelings of entitlement. Historical actions, particularly those of’developed’ countries, have proven to be powerful arguments used by actors in discourse-coalition 1 to justify theircurrent actions policies (e.g. deforestation, resource extraction). Although this discourse recognises that developedcountries share the responsibility in protecting the environment and mitigating climate change, it does not agree withthe justification and legitimacy Discourse 1 seems to be looking for. Instead, shared but differentiated responsibilityis what this discourse pleads for. Moreover, future prospects and well-being are taken into account frequently, thusillustrating that the intra-generational (including future generations) is of importance as well.
The context, including the way ’utility’ is defined, helps explain how the environment is valued; “indeed, differencesin views over the worth of forests and how forests ought to be valued (as carbon stocks; as ecosystems; as home toindigenous communities) reflect, in part, differences in utility functions and which preferences ought to be maximized”[59, p.84]. The discourse challenges the hegemonic instrumental valuation (largely driven from a monetary perspective)of the Amazon by looking beyond instrumental gains. Although the benefits of ecosystem services (including theirinstrumental value) are widely recognised, including in this discourse, Discourse 3 hints at and opens up the possibilityof different perspectives on the worth of the Amazon and the way it is valued. As a headline in the Telegraph states,“we will never save the rainforest until a living tree is worth more to Brazil than an incinerated one” [120]. This quoteseems to suggest that there may be more to the rainforest than simply the use it provides to humanity.
The different ways in which the Amazon is valued also depends on who is taken into account. The Indigenouscommunities (though not homogeneous, of course) might view the Amazon differently then, let’s say, the produtores orlogging companies. For the former, the Amazon might have more of an intrinsic value whereas the latter two may valueit from an instrumental perspective. The distinction bears resemblance with ways in which economic goods (simplyput, materials that satisfy human wants and provide utility) are classified based on exclusivity and rivalry. Whereasactors active in the agricultural or mining sectors might view the Amazon as a ’common-pool resource’, for instance,Indigenous communities may regard the Amazon as a public good. The following quote from a Indigenous respondentillustrates this sentiment:
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“"All he thinks about is money. All he thinks about is deforestation," Mayoruna complained, warningof the implications for the global climate if Javari’s forests were lost. "The forest isn’t just for usindigenous," he said. "It’s for everyone."” [95]
These different ways of viewing the world, valuing the environment, and ways of thinking are recognised to be ofimportance. As a result, this discourse does not only articulate elements of distributive justice, but also justice asrecognition and procedural justice (albeit less elaborate). The anti-Indigenous rhetoric promoted by Bolsonaro and hisallies, for instance, has led to domination, oppression and violence and is therefore seen as a form of injustice. As EarthAlliance wrote, the Amazon is critical for their “cultural survival, self-determination, and wellbeing” [111] but this isnot respected, nor recognised, by Bolsonaro’s administration. However, as it has been observed that the Indigenousreserves and protected areas have relatively little deforestation [86], the discourse recognises that their (and other localcommunities’) participation in decision-making may be necessary:
“Politicians should also listen more to the voices of the people who live in the forest, such asindigenous groups and riverine communities.” [3]
The recognition of the importance of different people and differing ways of thinking is addressed, albeit to a limitedextent, is a crucial part of CEJ as well. The pillar racial and socio-ecological indispensability helps to illustrate thatdifferent beings (human and non-human, different ethnicities etc.) play vital roles in conservation and for achieving EJ.The presence of Indigenous peoples and their stewardship of Indigenous lands have illustrated that they are indispensablewhen it comes tackling deforestation and continuing environmental conservation [127]. Recognising Indigenous peoplesand their ontologies would give room to different perspectives on environmental valuation and worth, as well as the(perhaps) indispensable role non-humans play [76, 127]. Moreover, the acknowledgement of other local and minoritycommunities (e.g. Riverine communities) illustrate that at least some actors in this discourse-coalition recognise thatthey deserve recognition, and be involved in decision-making, as well.
Lastly, within the notion of responsibility, Discourse 3 puts forward the idea that consumers can also play a critical rolewhen it comes to reducing deforestation levels by choosing what, where, when and how they buy. As environmentalphilosophers have observed, however, “preferences are misinformed as to longer term environmental consequences”and preference satisfaction does not necessarily lead to ultimate wellbeing [59, p.84]. For instance, cattle ranching isresponsible for 70% of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon [107], with leather from the fashion industry playing asignificant part [109]. The overconsumption of such commodities has an enormous impact on the levels of deforestation,but as has been noted, many consumers are not aware of the high-forest risk these products bring. Coupled with longand murky supply chains, and it becomes difficult for consumers to trace back where their product comes from. Thismisinformation or lack of information (for example on what the social and/or environmental impacts are) makes itdifficult to change the status quo and consume more sustainable products. Nevertheless, the discourse appeals for moreeffort to be placed in sourcing sustainable commodities, for example through ZD certification [109].
Overall, this discourse (including the different ways in which EJ is articulated) illustrates the complexities inherent towhat is perceived as an environmental problem. This recognition of complexity manifests itself into a critical view ofthe Amazon fires. As such, I find that CEJ’s pillar, intersectionality, provides a useful way of understanding the issue athand. An intersectional approach (depending on the case) includes looking at class, religion, race/ethnicity, sexuality,citizenship, species and ecosystems that are more-than-human etc. [78]. The storylines have addressed many of theseissues, but have also shed light on the importance of using an interdisciplinary approach. Combining current and futurestudies from various disciplines (e.g. political ecology, ethnic studies, environmental sciences etc.) even further wouldhelp tackle the fire and deforestation issue from multiple angles and exemplify the nuances already created by thisdiscourse. Nevertheless, although the discourse shows hints of other justice approaches, distribution remains central:(shared but differentiated) responsibility, distribution of costs and benefits, and multiple forms of valuation are keyelements.
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6.3 Language
Contrary to Discourses 1 and 2, Discourse 3 did not have any clear mythological archetypes. There is no distinct Hero,Villain, or other character. Instead, the discourse makes use of a counter-argumentative structure, which explains theAmazon fires problematique while using “concessive and contrastive connectives” (p.4) such as but, however, and onthe other hand [37], which “makes it possible to combine arguments which are oriented in opposite directions” (p.4).By using concessions in such a way, the argumentation is presented as nuanced although it still orients it in a particulardirection. For example, the farmers or wildcat miners are seen as both villains and victims. The livelihoods of thepoor are acknowledged, which portrays them as victims, but instigating fires and environmental destruction is seenas something ’bad’, which makes them villains. Similarly, we see competing portrayals of Brazil in a quote from deVolkskrant, again being illustrative of the nuances this discourse promotes:
“Macron is not the only one who is concerned with Bolsonaro’s environmental policies. Germany andNorway both decided to suspend their donations to the Amazon Fund due to their disapproval overBrazil’s policies. The evening prior to the G20-summit, German chancellor Angela Merkel describedthe situation in Brazil as ’dramatic’. Bolsonaro responded by saying Germany could learn a lot fromBrazil. He has a point. Brazil gets almost half of its energy from renewable sources whereas Germanystill depends on coal, the most polluting energy source. Bolsonaro rightly points out that Europedeforested a majority of its forests, illustrative of an arrogance that argues growing economies cannotdo the same. And where is the money that Western countries promised to help developing countriescombat climate change?” (Own translation) [86]
Here, Brazil is cast as both a villain and victim: A villain due to its questionable environmental policies, and a victimbecause of its ’developing country’ status and the entitlements it is owed due to the West’s past practices. Nuances inthis discourse are further achieved through the use of epistemic expressions (e.g. ’maybe’, ’probably’) where “elementsof alternative or competing narratives” are introduced [37, p.5]:
“"We must stand together during this crisis, to show there are effective economic alternatives inthe Amazon and deforestation makes no sense." Not all concur, however. According to Jackson dosSantos, sales manager at Juma EcoLodge, which sits on a tributary 60 miles south of Manaus, theentire narrative of the forest fires is a conspiracy. "It’s a campaign from the EU to put pressure onBrazil as our new president is very US-friendly and because it’s seeking trade agreements with [SouthAmerican trade body]Mercosur," he said. "There have always been fires from farmers clearing land.There are no wild fires around the lodge and we operate normally. Unfortunately, this campaign ismassively affecting reservations." That’s probably a minority view.”
As such, we find that the absence of a clear role division prevents a particular actor or group from becoming a ’scapegoat’and being blamed for the issue, complication or ’crisis’. Instead, the possibility of collective and individual actionis highlighted, as is shared but differentiated responsibility. It appears that the nuance encourages the possibility ofcollective agency and uses normative and moral claims to support this idea. As such, the language is often comparativeand emphasises potential trade-offs. A comparative perspective, such as the following examples illustrate, allows one“to explore the impacts of conflicting narratives (frames) on public opinion, attitudes, emotions, and behavior” [37, p.2].For example:
“The researchers were trying to persuade them that there was greater economic value in saving therainforest biome than in destroying it. They very nearly succeeded.” (Emphasis added) [109]
“We will never save the rainforest until a living tree is worth more to Brazil than an incinerated one.”(Emphasis added) [120]
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“In my opinion, the Paris Agreement will fail to meet its aim of saving us from self-destructive climatebreakdown unless a comprehensive agreement with a performance-based funding mechanism isintroduced to make the standing tree more valuable than the cut down tree.” (Emphasis added) [120]
These comparative statements illustrate that there are different perspectives on what constitutes ’the problem’, rangingfrom differing storylines, to different problematisation, and different solutions. This highlights the complexity of anenvironmental issue such as the Amazon fires. More specifically, the discourse does not pretend to give a single solutionto a single problem. However, it does highlight the importance of global responsibility at different geographies anddifferent scales. Government interventions, consumer responsibility, corporate social responsibility (CSR) are believedto be part of a collective movement aimed towards a improving a more sustainable and ’just’ society. The actors in thediscourse-coalition are not afraid to criticise the status quo and the policies that are currently in place. Words like ’fail’and ’shame’ are attributed to (the lack of) political action and perceived responsibility, and the 18 million presented bythe G7 was coined ’chump change’. This illustrates that there is a sentiment of possible improvement.
One concept or thought in particular that stands out in this discourse, is valuation. The discourse appears to be in aconstant dilemma over what should be valued, by whom, and why. As such, these moral conundrums are at the heart ofthe EJ approaches used in the discourse. It is clear that the discourse does not recognise a single problem or advocatea single solution; indeed, the moral dilemmas and the ambiguity of EJ, coupled with the issue’s inherent complexityprevents a uniform approach. Recognising this, the discourse does not appear to be very successful in presenting itselfas the ultimate ’truth’, something that the other two discourses appear to so more successfully.
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7 Discussion
The discussion is divided into five parts. Part one will answer the research questions specified in the introduction beforedebating three themes that emerged from the analysis. These themes - power and dominance, environmental justiceand ways of moving forward - will be explored further and constitute discussion parts two, three and four respectively.Finally, part five of the discussion will reflect on the research process and highlight certain limitations that came to thefore.
7.1 Part I: Bringing it together
7.1.1 Competing Discourses
The results found that there are three competing discourses on the Amazon fires. Discourse 1 presents Bolsonaro asthe Hero and is largely advanced by the Brazilian political and economic elite and allies (including the agriculturalsector, mining and logging industries, the evangelicals and the ‘ruralista front’). The discourse-coalition uses itspolitical and economic position to influence the public through campaigns, mass-media (e.g. social media), blamegames, polarisation, Hero archetypes (including the Hero’s journey), WUM tactics and emotional argumentation, whilstenhancing its position of social and political power. The actors advance three main storylines that emphasize (1) politicalsovereignty, (2) development and progress, and (3) Brazil as a conservation leader. Bolsonaro’s own rhetoric (and thoseof his allies) illustrates how the discursive constructions of the Hero “functioned to support and promote the ideologicalagenda and political objectives” of his party [53, p.971]. This ideological agenda appears to gain its legitimacy throughthe use of EJ elements and its credibility through powerful actors, where the discourse (similarly to the WUM) “drawsmembership from people who are pro-development, anti-big government, opposed to environmentalists, or just plainworried about their future economic prospects” [104, p.279]. The storylines highlight that “environmentalists andindigenous peoples have been [and still are] viewed as opponents to economic growth and barriers to development”[128, p.252], a perspective that was shared by ex-president Lula. Moreover, it is noteworthy that this discourse bearresemblance to previous anti-internationalisation discourses in the Amazon (see Zhouri [128] and De Sartre & Taravella[10], for instance).
Discourse 2 emphasises archetypal Villain traits when describing Bolsonaro and his allies. Bolsonaro is considered toan enemy to all (i.e. both to the people and the environment). The discourse contains three main storylines that refer to(1) the Amazon as a crisis, (2) the Amazon as a global issue, and (3) Bolsonaro as an enemy to all. The discourse ismostly advanced by the scientific and political elite, including environmentalists, civil society, and politicians. Thepower of the discourse is largely fueled by governmental and environmental reasoning, whereas the responses advocatedare mainly market-based. Moreover, the discourse seems to actively address certain topics whilst occluding others (e.g.criticising Bolsonaro’s environmental policies but choosing to leave out information on the role of European businessesin the destruction of the Amazon). Although the importance of the Amazon as an ecosystem is highlighted (with phrasessuch as the Amazon being the ‘lungs of the earth’ featuring prominently), economic and political arguments trumpenvironmental reasoning. In terms of discursive observations, it is notable that Bolsonaro is frequently coupled withadjectives such ’right-wing populist’ and ’climate sceptic’, suggesting that these characteristics define him. Additionally,the language makes use of violent discursive elements and imagery, including ’warrior language’ (which aided inportraying Bolsonaro and what he represents as being ‘evil’) and framing the Amazon fires as a crisis and emergency.Consequently, the discourse-coalition appears to legitimise its interference and concern regarding the Amazon throughtheir argumentation that implies it is ’for the greater good’ - both in terms of people and planet. The following quotefrom de Volkskrant provides a relatively accurate – albeit simplistic - description of how Bolsonaro is perceived in thisdiscourse: “The Brazilian president is a right-wing populist who solely thinks in nationalist solutions, is allergic toforeign meddling and is not concerned at all with offending someone else’s wife. The two [Macron and Bolsonaro] arecomplete opposites of one another and continuously clash” (Own translation) [93].
Contrary to the polarisation and opposition that the first two discourses encourage, Discourse 3 presents a counter-discourse where a common enemy is absent. Instead, the discourse argues that the problem is bigger than Bolsonaro
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and promotes three storylines based on (1) the underlying drivers of the fires and deforestation, (2) that the fires areillustrative of a global problem, and (3) the necessity of shared but differentiated responsibility. As it recognises that thefires are, in fact, emblematic, the discourse-coalition consists of critical individuals who take broader social, economic,and political processes into account when trying to give meaning to this environmental issue. In this way, the discourseis tentatively open to the idea of including alternative world views and knowledge production as it gives room for a shiftaway from hegemonic ideologies. Overall, Discourse 3 provides a more nuanced - albeit normative - perspective onthe Amazon fires. It does not advocate a single solution, nor does it recognise a single problem. Instead, it recognisesthe complexity of the issue and necessary plurality and interdisciplinarity required to tackle the Amazon fires anddeforestation while looking at the broader context, including the influence of powerful actors. A key feature is theargument that the current ’crisis’ cannot solely be blamed on Bolsonaro’s administration: deforestation was a problemprior to his election, it remains a problem in many other (developed and developing) nations today, and deforestation/forest fires also occur in countries with more socialist ideologies. As such, the issue is more complex than simplyattributing the high deforestation rates to Bolsonaro’s climate-skepticism or right-wing populist ideology (nevertheless,this observation does not make Bolsonaro’s administration guilt-free in the matter). Our increasingly globalized worldand interconnectedness through trade, for example, makes it difficult to blame one particular actor or coalition (asthe absence of a Hero/ Villain character seems to illustrate) considering the issue is a global one. As such, Discourse3 provides a tentative antagonistic approach to the current hegemonic (neoliberal) discourses whereby shared butdifferentiated responsibility remains key.
The competing discourses are found to have varying degrees of ’dominance’, whereby dominance is understood simplyas a discourse having more power than another (in the context of discourse analyses as presented by Hajer [32, 34, 129]),and was determined through a combination of the frequency of use and the support of (powerful) actors. Using theseguidelines, Discourses 1 and 2 were observed to be more ‘present’ in Dutch and British media compared to Discourse 3,with Discourse 2 gaining more support from a variety of actors. The discourse-coalition of ‘Bolsonaro as the Villain’consists of (mainly ’Western’) political actors, scientists, and civil society members – in other words, the political andscientific elite. These actors, and the discourse they support, are portrayed as credible and legitimate (public) figuresby different media outlets through the use of scientific facts, authority and references to legality, normative claimsand justifiability. Two points of attention should be addressed, however, when suggesting that Discourse 2 appears tobe slightly more powerful than the other two: 1) this ‘power’, or ‘dominance’, is based on Dutch and British mediaand as such fails to give an accurate impression of how Brazil’s media, and its citizens, understand the Amazon fires;and 2) the discourse-coalitions supporting the discourses are presented as homogeneous groups, a generalization andsimplification of a diverse group of people with diverging experiences, views, vested interests etc.
7.1.2 The articulation of environmental justice
In all three discourses, distributive justice is referred to most frequently and contains two dominant elements, thedistribution of (direct and indirect8) costs and the distribution of (historical and shared but differentiated) responsibility.The former mainly refers to the costs and benefits regarding the conservation or exploitation of the Amazon whereas thelatter refers to the different ways in which responsibility is divided or allocated. Historical responsibility is mainly calledupon by Discourse 1, arguing that historical deforestation and emissions exempts developed nations from criticising thecurrent situation. Shared but differentiated responsibility is mainly addressed in Discourse 3, a perspective that arguesthat there are ample actors who are (in)directly responsible for the Amazon’s deforestation and therefore all have aresponsibility to mitigate these trends and their consequences, including consumers. However, responsibility is not‘equal’ but is influenced by a wide range of factors such as the ability for resource mobilisation or historical trends ofdeforestation and emissions.
Aspects of distributive justice are further advanced through arguments of the ‘greater good’, utility/ valuation, andsovereignty. Discourse 1 mainly argues that economic activities and development are for ‘the greater good’ of the
8References were made to social and opportunity costs, albeit implicitly. The former can be understood as the costs to society,such as biodiversity loss or increased greenhouse gas emissions – both relevant to the Amazon case. Opportunity costs can beunderstood as the opportunities Brazil will forego if it chooses conservation over development, for instance.
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people of Brazil whereas Discourses 2 and 3 argue that conservation of the Amazon is for ‘the greater good’ of theplanet. Nevertheless, neither of these two discourses state that conservation is more important than economic growth,but rather that alternatives should be found where economic development can be coupled with environmental protection.These dynamics are illustrative of different perceived worth of the Amazon (i.e. utility and valuation), with instrumentaland monetary valuation trumping intrinsic valuation. Lastly, we find that distributive justice comes forward in thefrequent claims made of ’sovereignty’ (in terms of Harman’s [65] understanding), particularly by Discourse 1 in which‘sovereignty’ makes up one of the storylines.
Other justice approaches, such as justice as recognition, procedural justice and CEJ are underrepresented in thediscourses when compared to distributive justice. Discourse 3 attempts to counter this focus on the distributive realm andthe hegemonic truth-creation of powerful actors. It addresses the need for counter-discourses and alternative worldviewsand knowledge, consequently illustrating the perceived necessity of justice as recognition and the incorporation ofalternative meanings and increased participation in the procedural realm (although somewhat mildly). Aspects ofprocedural justice also emerge in questions over the decision-making of the Amazon where sovereignty and globalresponsibility are juxtaposed, leading to tensions over who gets to decide and participate. A critical view on the situationand the ways in which justice is understood is largely absent, although Discourse 3 makes an attempt at incorporatingthis.
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7.2 Part 2: Explaining dominance
The analysis revealed that there are three competing discourses on the Amazon fires in the Dutch and British media,with Discourse 2 appearing to be the more powerful, or hegemonic, one. However, the thesis has not yet explored whythis is the case and how this discourse became powerful. The following section will discuss possible explanationsfor this outcome, beginning with power and the politics of knowledge, followed by the concepts of legitimacy, crisisnarratives and divisive rhetoric.
7.2.1 Power and the politics of knowledge
The dynamics between discourses, truth creation and knowledge allows for a distribution of power, influencing actorsand the collective narrative of what is considered to be ‘true’ [36]: “discourses both create and are created by powerand knowledge” [35, p.644]. Moreover, hegemonic discourses tend to lead the representation of a specific topic incertain way, attracting and privileging certain groups of actors [39, 42]. How an environmental issue such as theAmazon fires is understood and portrayed by (dominant) discourses can partially be explained by through the politics ofknowledge. Simply put, the politics of environmental knowledge is the “specific and selective representations of theenvironment” that are produced through knowledge, ultimately playing a role the way the environment is conceptualisedand understood as well as how this comes forth policy and (environmental) management [39, p.363]. In this ’truth’creation, not all ways of thinking and understanding are included or valued equally. Turnhout [39], for instance, arguesthat “in practice science tends to end up in a dominant position, in charge of the facts and of the problem definition,with non-scientific actors in the position of receivers of knowledge and co-creators of solutions or options” (p.367).This idea of the scientific elite and their knowledge production being given priority can be seen as an injustice [39].However, the politics of knowledge extends beyond this to include the foregrounding of knowledge that is produced incertain geographical and historical context-dependent settings, which has brought out questions over the legitimacy ofknowledge as well [130].
In the Dutch and British media, the ’meaning’ of the Amazon storylines and knowledge on the situation is predominantlycreated by the political, economic and scientific elites, regardless of the discourse-coalition they form a part of. Thepower of the political and economic elite in Brazil dates back from the dictatorship period and the subsequent decades,where the produtores claimed they represented ’the people’ and that supporting them would be integral to Brazil’seconomy [4, 14]. In Discourse 2, the scientific and political elite are the main privileged actors who support claimslargely based on scientific representations of nature where interventions are legitimised through the use of scientificprojections and calculations (e.g. deforestation data; potential ‘tipping points’). Science in itself is often regarded as adominant discourse controlled by the scientific elite [30, 39], so its prominent presence and referral in this discourse isnot surprising. As with other forms of truth creation and knowledge production, science is intentionally and purposefullyselective in the way it represents the environment, thereby reflecting certain values, preferences and priorities whilstoccluding others [39]. In other words, having the power of science behind this discourse helps produce credibleknowledge claims whilst intentionally foregrounding and backgrounding other pieces of information. The scientificelites determine what should be addressed and how, and who can participate in decision-making, thus aiding in makingDiscourse 2 more powerful. However, some would argue that giving priority to the powerful actors and their knowledgeproduction can be seen as a form of injustice in itself [39]. Contrary to Discourses 1 and 2, Discourse 3 appears to belacking such privileged and powerful discourse-coalitions, which partially explains why it is such a ‘weak’ discourse inthe media.
7.2.2 Legitimacy
A second factor that appears to help establish powerful or dominant discourse is the concept of legitimacy. Beetham[131] argues that three main components need to be addressed when talking of legitimacy, namely legality, normativejustifiability and express consent (p.43). In Discourse 2, these three dimensions are addressed and visible. In termsof legality, for instance, there are ample concerns over the illegal encroachment and land-grabbing of the Amazon byactors, as well as illegal economic activities such as goldcat mining and logging. Macron uses normative justification
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for his openly shared concern on social media and by making the fires a top priority for the G7 summit. Consent canbe viewed in terms of “the social processes by which agreement to a practice or decision is given” [132, p.86]. Theunilateral decision of Brazil in closing the Amazon Fund’s steering committee, a decision which did not receive consentfrom the Fund’s largest donors, led to Norway and Germany withholding their funds. Overall, legitimacy for Discourse2 includes conserving the Amazon as it is a global issue and many activities that take place and are encouraged byBolsonaro’s administration, are illegal. This perspective on legitimacy is challenged by Discourse 1, for instance,which consists of a storyline that emphasises Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon based on international standards,thereby dismissing global concerns to the Amazon fires. Furthermore, the discourse undermines Discourse 2 by makingreferences to neo-colonialism and sensationalism. In Discourse 3, consent, viewed in terms of access to information,plays an important role. The discourse suggests that media outlets do not adequately present the underlying driversof deforestation and the fires, such as the over-consumption of beef, which prevents consumers from demanding ZDcommodities and withholding consent. As environmental philosophers have noted, such misinformation (or lack ofinformation being present) misinforms preferences regarding longer term environmental consequences [59]. Overall,however, the different members of the discourse-coalitions present their discourses (largely based on the distribution ofcosts and responsibility) as if it is for ’the greater good’ [36, p.456], thus justifying and legitimising a ‘truth’ created bythe political, economic and/ or scientific elites.
7.2.3 Crisis narratives
The storyline ‘the Amazon fires as a crisis’, promoted by Discourse 2, is a powerful storyline based on a combinationof novelty and credibility. The novelty of the situation referred to the ‘record-breaking’ and ‘unprecedented’ numberof fires and increased rate of deforestation, a disruption to the longer-term trend of decreasing deforestation rates.Credibility is derived from the actors of the discourse-coalition: authoritative figures such as Macron, scientists andreputable organisations. Meanwhile, invoking a crisis narrative can lead to a process, such as achieving a state ofexception, that “normalises the pursuit of certain goals and, in doing so, marginalizes competing perspectives” [38,p.201]. The crisis and emergency that is used to describe the Amazon in Discourse 2 is coupled with the vilification ofthe ‘enemy’, i.e. Bolsonaro and his allies, members of discourse-coalition 1. This is achieved through the use of violentdiscursive imagery and adjectives, as well as the apocalyptic framing of the fires themselves.
7.2.4 Divisive rhetoric
The apocalyptic and divisive rhetoric of the fires in Discourse 2 not only used violent imagery, adjectives and metaphors(e.g. Bolsonaro’s ‘inferno’), but it also emphasised the threat of reaching a ‘tipping point’, thereby adding a notion ofurgency. As the results illustrated, Discourse 2 was largely portrayed through an apocalyptic frame. Foust and Murphy[48] illustrate that portraying environmental issues through tragic apocalyptic framing decreases the collective feelingof responsibility and agency whilst encouraging polarisation. This also appears to be the case here: Discourse 2 appearsto alleviate people of a perceived sense of responsibility of their (in)direct contribution to the fires and deforestation, aswell as decreasing the sense of responsibility towards combating the issue. We can see that instead of recognising the‘West’s’ responsibility by addressing the issues of the overconsumption of meat and soy, for example, that the Villaingets blamed for having an anti-environmental rhetoric whilst the underlying drivers are ignored. Consequently, humanand collective responsibility and agency (particularly in ’Western’ countries) is considered to be limited.
Furthermore, the discourse appears to create opposition and stimulate polarisation. It was with ease that the Villain (i.e.Bolsonaro) was identified, as was the blame that was attributed to him in response to the violence and destruction againstthe Amazon rainforest and its people. The discourse removed the feeling of individual and collective responsibilityand action by portraying the enemy as having created a crisis with which the world responded to with shock, concern,and critique. Consequently, it has become evident that language in the media, including vilification, forms part ofbroader discursive strategies that create or (re)enforce opposition [48, 49]. As Heinz [49] notes, framing environmentalissues, such as the fires in the Amazon, as a violent crime “helps set up symbolic oppositions between the minorityand dominant groups, thus justifying the affected group’s need for forceful reactions” (p.52). The perceived injusticesoccurring in the Amazon were indeed described as violent crimes: it was the ’Holocaust’ of the Amazon and a ’genocide’
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of the Indigenous population. Hence, the situation was criminalized and the injustices prompted the need for politicalaction. Heinz [49] further argues that the “clear-cut us-versus-them oppositions perform two important functions inmotivating readers to join the cause of environmental justice”: 1) the symbolic oppositions help create perpetrator andvictim categories, thus making the conflict situation worthy of (media) attention; and 2) communities are presented ashomogeneous group that are “united against a common enemy” (p.52) (i.e. Bolsonaro and his allies).
There is much to gain from having a dominant discourse or creating opposition. Indeed, “inside and outside actors havea strong interest in having their view or interpretation accepted as ‘true’” [133, p.42]. It is in those different regimesof representation where the ’truth’ is claimed that different actions, policies, plans and distribution of resources arelegitimised [35], most often determined by privileged actors such as the political, scientific and economic elite. Here,their policies, plans, actions and the distribution of resources are legitimised. Although this section has illustratedthat there are multiple factors that influence the power, or hegemony, of a discourse, using justice components doesnot appear to be a critical element. What the added value of environmental justice is in the discourses, then, will bediscussed below.
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7.3 Part 3: Environmental justice in discourses
The different ways in which environmental justice is articulated in the discourses appears to support the general claimmade by many scholars that there is no consensus on what the concept actually entails (Martin et al., 2014). As such,the way in which EJ is used and by whom already sheds light on the power dynamics that underly the discourse creation(found in the media) in the first place. The prioritisation of distributive justice, as compared to justice as recognition,procedural justice, or CEJ, for instance, illustrates that matters of equity or equality play an important role, as does anunderlying market-based rhetoric. Moreover, it is intriguing that the Discourse 3, which articulates justice in multipleforms (e.g. ‘shared but differentiated’ responsibility), appears to be less visible and finds little support in Dutch andBritish media. What role, then, do these interpretations of justice play in the discourses outlined in this thesis?
Primarily, the way in which discourses articulate EJ has given insights into the different value systems and theprioritisation of certain worldviews and ideologies over others. Beliefs about the value of nature differs depending onsocietal norms [132], consequently leading to different interpretations of what is considered to be ‘good’ or ‘just’. Thesevalue systems not only help to justify a particular discourse, but also help illustrate the differences in the Amazon’sperceived worth which “reflect, in part, differences in utility functions and which preferences ought to be maximised”[59, p.84]. This perspective is based on justice as utilitarianism and changes depending on who is asked, at what pointin time and what is defined as ‘utility’. Actors from discourse-coalition 1, for instance, mainly value the Amazon from amonetary perspective, emphasising the wealth that is to gain from resource extraction. Actors from discourse-coalition2 mainly view the Amazon from an instrumental perspective, highlighting the importance of the ecosystem services itprovides. Discourse 3 tentatively argues for alternative value systems, such as intrinsic valuation and acknowledgingdifferent worldviews, though the Amazon’s instrumental value is also addressed. Including intrinsic valuation becomesproblematic in environmental management and decision-making, however, as “there are no standard metrics or methodsfor describing the intrinsic value of ecosystems” which may be due “to our reliance on valuation approaches that aresimply not capable of representing their economic worth” [134, p.953]. Moreover, the neoliberalisation of nature andneoliberalised forms of environmental governance are deemed problematic by some [135, 136] as “even more elementsof nature are turned into commodities” [39, p.365]. Ultimately, however, decision-making on the use, and the value, ofthe Amazon is often centered around arguments based on ‘the greater good’.
The focus on distributive justice, which justice as utilitarianism falls under, is not surprising given the elaborate attentionthat economic and market-based issues, trends and solutions, have received in all three discourses. The importanceof economic development and Brazil as a top agricultural producer is highlighted in Discourse 1, partly reproducingviews on anti-internationalisation and conspiracy that have been present in Brazil over the last few decades [10]. Theescalation of the Amazon fires and deforestation have concerned some of Bolsonaro’s allies, however, such as politicianand President of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil, Rodrigo Maia, over its possible implications on Brazil’s exportin (agricultural) commodities. Discourse 2 uses market-based threats as a way to pressure Brazil and Bolsonaro intochanging their course of action, for example by threatening to block the EU-Merscosur deal. Discourse 3 challenges theneoliberal discourse (although somewhat mildly) and pleads for more sustainable commodities and supply-chains whilstrecognising underlying drivers. Consequently, Discourse 3 begins to illustrate that a focus on distribution contributesto obscuring other processes and injustices from the debate, such as “the social, cultural, symbolic, and institutionalconditions underlying poor distributions in the first place” [75]. The above examples thus illustrate that dominantthemes in all three discourses resonate with neoliberalism and market-led development.
This prioritisation of distributive justice imbued with an economic logic provides a rather simplistic perspective onthe Amazon fires, all the while obscuring (or at the most, skimming over) other approaches to justice, such as justiceas recognition, procedural justice and CEJ. Not only are these topics largely omitted in the discourses, they are alsorelatively underrepresented in (academic) literature [69]. Moreover, when marginalised groups are discussed in thediscourses, they appear to be largely romanticised and presented as a vulnerable and homogeneous population. Thus, thelack of justice as recognition illustrates one of the implications of the power-knowledge-truth paradigm where powerfulactors dictate discourses (including the problem definition, participation in decision-making, and solutions/ practices).
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These dominant discourses thus conceal and occlude different types of knowledge, truth-creation and worldviews(including ontologies), thereby limiting potential ’solutions’ to the problem [36].
As such, this thesis supports the use of a multidimensional, plural and critical conception of justice as the differentconceptions are inextricably interlinked [33, 69, 73, 77]. Moreover, the results of this discourse analysis have illustratedthat although there may be dominant conceptions of EJ in the literature or in political discourses, it is not beneficialto give primacy to a single justice approach. The ambiguity of EJ and the lack of a common definition is also whatgives it strength, however, as different actors can strive for different justice elements whilst recognising, respecting,and including alternative perspectives: “The acknowledgement of plurality enables us to identify differences in justiceconceptions between different groups of actors, not with a view to judge, but rather to consider the potential significanceof those differences, with implications for how we might practically engage with them in the pursuit of long-termconservation and social development goals” [33, p.169].
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7.4 Part 4: Moving Forward and Recommendations for Action
Whittaker and Mercy [30] point out that researchers conducting discourse analyses should be transparent when it comesit their position in relation to the discourses that are being researched. Acknowledging this need for transparency, Iargue that if environmental justice is the aim, it is imperative that alternative discourses, including alternative ontologies,are taken into account. Although my analysis and perception of the discourses in Dutch and British media is influencedand limited by my own knowledge and understanding, it nevertheless appears that out of the three discourses identified,Discourse 3 is more likely to promote action and justice. The discourse’s storylines are based strongly on the notionof ‘responsibility’ and give way to alternative ways of understanding the world. According to Fast [137], “successfulenvironmental discourses provide storylines that create meaning, validate action, mobilise action and define alternatives”(p.85). Agreeing with this notion, I argue that there is a need for looking beyond the current dominant discoursesto encourage action and practical justice. As such, I identified three possible courses of action that could makecounter-discourses, such as Discourse 3, more powerful and promote EJ (despite its wide interpretation of the term).These recommendations include a shift towards comic apocalyptic framing, using a multidimensional understanding ofjustice and encouraging active reflection.
7.4.1 Comic apocalyptic framing
Instead of presenting the environmental issue, such as the Amazon fires, using a tragic apocalyptic frame (as wasdone in Discourse 2), a shift towards a comic apocalyptic scenario could mobilise action. An apocalyptic comedyframe presents humanity as being mistaken instead of evil, and as such makes room for the promotion of humanagency. It provides the discourse with “some space for bringing ideologically disparate communities together”, therebyminimising polarisation, unifying communities, and promoting possibilities [48, p.163]. A discourse where humanityhas agency to make different choices allows for the possibility of human intervention, potentially leading to differentoutcomes. Concretely, this could mean that discourse-coalitions could rearticulate the current issue not as a crisis,as is done in Discourse 2, but as an opportunity to avoid potential disaster to the environment, communities and theindividuals’ families. By linking deforestation and the fires to the underlying drivers (i.e. human activities) instead ofidentifying and blaming the villain or the ’other’, (collective) agency becomes a core part of the narrative. This canprovide a steppingstone for action and working towards EJ (in whichever way it is interpreted). However, althoughcomic framing can mobilise collective agency and perceived responsibility, this type of framing does not fundamentallychallenge hegemonic values, such as neoliberal logic, which appears to be an underlying assumption of many storylinesand helps favour distributive justice whilst justifying the “exploitation of the earth” [48, p.163]. The results section dohighlight, however, that Discourse 3 does try to counter the hegemonic discourses and values to some extent. It asks fora critical view on deforestation drivers, the current neoliberal ideology we follow, and encourages action that promotesEJ by taking social, environmental and economic perspectives into account. Not only does this discourse recognise andencourage human agency, it also avoids polarisation between the readers by preventing them from having to choosebetween ideologies or the Hero/ Villain archetypes.
7.4.2 A multidimensional understanding and inclusion of justice
As multiple scholars have advocated, a trivalent or multidimensional conception of justice helps provide a more holisticunderstanding of the term without necessarily giving primacy to one approach or interpretation. Similar to thesescholars, I argue that if one wants to strive towards EJ, one should look at the three dominant justice approaches at thevery minimum. Going beyond that, CEJ helps challenge one-sided discourses by creating multi-actor alliances thatwork on multi-scalar levels, for instance, while simultaneously reflecting on the type of information that is disseminated,by whom and how. It is crucial that there are alternative and competing discourses to challenge the dominant ‘truths’,usually determined by powerful actors (e.g the political, economic, and/ or scientific elite), in order to strive for justice.Not only recognising alternative knowledge production systems, but also actively respecting and including them, canhelp give less powerful populations groups a voice [33, 74]. Justice as recognition also calls for the avoidance of
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domination and oppression [33]. In this perspective, reflecting on whose culture (and therefore, knowledge) is privilegedand respected is integral to achieving justice [73].
As a result, translating discourses to action where one can speak of EJ includes the active recruitment and participationof marginalised, or less powerful, actors in decision-making, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, sex etc. Recognising andsupporting alternative knowledge production, including alternative ontologies, can lead to practical benefits in terms ofconservation. In the Brazilian Amazon, for instance, multiple scholars have illustrated that those areas that fall underIndigenous reserves and Protected Areas have significantly less deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions, as wellas better maintenance of ecological integrity, than other parts of the rainforest [127, 138, 139]. Although Indigenousterritories are “intended to safeguard the rights of Indigenous peoples to their land and livelihoods for social, cultural,and equity reasons”, they also tend to be cheaper and more effective conservation efforts compared to conventional state-sponsored interventions [138, p.3016]. Moreover, local and Indigenous knowledge has been illustrated to complementscientific knowledge production in a variety of ways [39, 140]. Burow et al. [141] illustrate that when “operating onmultiple ontological registers rather than the occlusion of one mode by another, some Indigenous states are successfullyreacquiring lands and revitalizing land-based practices” (p. 68).
Although some scholars and media sources have recognised Indigenous peoples and their position in the Amazonconservation, other ‘traditional’ communities, such the Riverine and Afro-Caribbean communities, have received littleattention. As such, when combating injustices, the different justice approaches should go beyond Indigenous people toinclude other (marginalised) groups. For this to come into effect, however, it is necessary for discourses to addressthese issues, injustices, and alternative knowledge systems. As Berkes [140] notes, the “differences in perspectives andknowledge are inputs for the process of deliberation”, ultimately working towards “reconciling these differences andbalancing the moral imperative of conserving global biodiversity with the moral imperative of protecting human rightsand entitlements” (p.15190). Consequently, using a multi-dimensional justice approach in discourses on environmentalissues would likely generate some form of action, reflection, and change.
7.4.3 Active reflection
Active reflection on how discourses are created, by whom, and what storylines they consist of, is necessary to gaininsight on the power dynamics and the intricacies of discourse creation, knowledge production and truth-creation.When striving for practical environmental justice, reflection can occur on several bases. Primarily, reflection “on theassumptions and values that frame their [the actor’s] own and others role in conservation initiatives” [142, p.245] shouldbe encouraged. This includes the recognition of cultural differences and then “being reflexive regarding whose cultureis privileged and respected” [73, p.124] [16]. Secondly, the different types of knowledge (including going beyondscientific knowledge) should be assessed and reflected on in order to gain a better understanding of the (conservation)context and problem definition. Thirdly, “the holders of that knowledge” should be identified, and different knowledgesources should be integrated in order to gain a joint understanding of the problem and complexity [142, p.250]. Fourthly,reflection on the participation of the specific actors in the discourse-coalitions should take place. Lastly, looking intothe concept of ‘shared well-being’, and idea that “places humans and nature on the same playing field and leads to adecision-making framework that explicitly considers both ecocentric and anthropocentric perspectives” [134, p.354] isimportant. This could encourage a paradigm shift where humans and nature are not viewed in isolation, but insteadrecognise that humans (as a species) from part of the environment.
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7.5 Part 5: Limitations
While carrying out this research certain limitations were found. Primarily, the selection of newspaper articles used werefrom the UK and the Netherlands, therefore making it difficult to draw generalised conclusions on the discourses inand outside the two countries. Secondly, the discourses identified in this thesis refer to the discourses as presented inthe media, which could represent different findings compared to an empirical study based on fieldwork, for instance.Thirdly, the members of the different discourse-coalitions were largely presented as homogeneous groups. I want toemphasise, however, that naturally within these groups we find that the discourse-coalitions are heterogeneous: theactors are likely to possess different characteristics, attributes, interests etc., but for the sake of the analysis thesenuances were omitted. Fourthly, in a more extended research setting, the extent of using CEJ as a justice approach couldbe looked into with greater detail. Due to time and resource constraints, however, properly analysing the use of such acritical approach to EJ studies proved to be unfeasible as, according to Pellow, the approach does not make sense whenone of the pillars is omitted [78]. CEJ draws on methodological and theoretical ideas from a plethora of disciplines, andas such would present an interesting research opportunity by using it as a sole theory in the context of the Amazon fires.This could allow for a more intricate, detailed and critical view on how EJ is articulated by the discourses.
On a more personal level, I encountered some further limitations. Primarily, although document selection was conductedusing different criteria, there was still an element of bias and subjectivity. For example, during the query phase, wheredifferent criteria was used, the search generated more than ten articles per newspaper. As such, the following selectioncriteria was based on: a) being a ’news item’, b) relevance; c) novelty; d) diversity in topics addressed. This leadsme to believe that the methodology has points of improvements to include more rigid and elaborate selection criteria.Secondly, Phillips and Jørgensen (in [30]) point out a valuable question: “How can researchers investigate how somestatements are accepted as ’true’ or ’naturalised’ when the common-sense understandings under investigation are theirown?” (p.272). Their argument is that discourse analysts should be transparent when it comes to their position “inrelation to the discourses under investigation and consider the potential implications of their own contributions to thediscursive production of our world” [30, p.272]. When it comes to (environmental) conservation I, myself, have anormative perspective and share many similar concerns and beliefs as the ’environmentalists.’ These concerns arecoupled with those of social and environmental justice. As such, the research is inherently biased and tainted by myown worldviews, knowledge, and beliefs on what is deemed ‘just’.
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8 Conclusion
The results of this thesis illustrate that the Amazon fires and deforestation that occurred during the summer months of2019 are not only an environmental issue, but are situated in a social, political and economic context. This was observedthrough the three dominant discourses that were identified in Dutch and British media, created and (re)enforced bydiscourse-coalitions largely made up of the economic, political and scientific elite and dominant storylines. Twodiscourses were particularly dominant in the media: 1) Bolsonaro as the Hero, a popular discourse in Brazil wherebyBolsonaro is portrayed as someone who defends national pride and sovereignty, market-based development, and thelivelihoods of many; 2) Bolsonaro as the Villain, where Bolsonaro is regarded as the enemy of people and planet, andconservation of the Amazon is prioritized as a global issue, vital for the planet. The first largely finds support in Brazil,whereas the second discourse is particularly hegemonic internationally, not least because the Dutch and British mediaappeared to support the discourse. The last discourse, where the problem is considered to be bigger than Bolsonaro,was not identified as a powerful discourse due to its low frequency in use and lack of support from powerful actors.The competing discourses illustrate that there is not one objective ‘truth’: actors (both individually and collectively)have different priorities and interests and should be viewed in a broader context to understand the intricate workingsof power, knowledge and truth creation. Moreover, the presence of a hegemonic discourse does not mean that otherdiscourses are not important: especially in international environmental politics, counter-discourses should be valued andnourished. As the dominant discourses are largely supported by powerful actors, encouraging counter-discourses canhelp disrupt these power dynamics and facilitate resistance against dominant conceptions of justice, the environmentand the way in which nature is understood and valued.
The results highlight that the discourses draw on certain elements that are entrenched in the way we think. Forexample, there is still a tendency in the discourses to emphasise an economic perspective, highlighting the importanceof market-based development, livelihoods, trade and so forth. These claims largely override other claims founded ondifferent perspective such as conservation, cultural preservation, and participation. While market-based mechanismssuch as those advocated in the discourses might benefit powerful players, their contribution in terms protection ofthe Amazon and its peoples remains dubious. The tendency to focus on market-based approaches – and especiallythe focus on neoliberal ideologies – is further supported by the emphasis of using distributive justice when talkingabout responsibility, distribution, and fairness. Although the importance of respect and recognition – and therefore alsoequal participation - is acknowledged in literature, this does not appear to have translated itself into media and politicaldiscourse.
It is striking that, despite the magnitude of the Amazon fires as a transnational (some would even argue, global,)socio-environmental conflict, the drivers of such a conflict (such as the expansion of extractive activities to supportunsustainable consumerism on a global scale) are barely addressed. Instead, the issue of sovereignty and competingclaims of development versus conservation are put forward, supported by the characterisation and creation of aVillain and a Hero. Thus, the political discourses appear to be centered on division and polarisation in many regards(environmentalists versus the produtores, Brazil versus the ‘West’, Bolsonaro versus Macron, livelihoods versus Amazonprotection), and often use crisis narratives to support this polarisation. I thus find that ‘successful’ political discourses,including those centered on environmental issues, are based on divisive strategies where the us-versus-them rhetoricplays a prominent role. This illustrates that we need to move beyond an economic rationality and divisive strategies ifwe are to tackle environmental issues holistically.
To conclude, I call for greater recognition and participation of less powerful actors in decision-making concerning naturalresource management. Proper environmental management, in my view, must recognise that social and environmentalmanagement are intrinsically interlinked. For this case specifically, this would include Brazil’s Indigenous peoples,the Afro-Caribbean and Riverine communities, as well as other local communities. However, to challenge dominantdiscourses, active efforts need to be made to include alternative and marginalised knowledge (e.g. lay, citizen, localknowledge) and ontologies in order to support counter-discourses, for example by building environmental knowledgecollectives. A more critical, reflexive and ultimately, inclusive, EJ approach would likely benefit forest protection,’sustainable development’ and a great number of people (whilst perhaps generating a counter-movement to powerful
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players). Overall, the Amazon fires illustrate that the (international) media and the different discourse-coalitions are notexempt from moral dilemmas; such a complex issue requires a fundamental shift in our way of thinking. As mediaplays an important role in political discourse by disseminating information and influencing ’truth creation’, it also playsan integral role in facilitating such a shift to include, and reflect on, elemental ethical questions regarding environmentalgovernance and politics, our value systems and our way of life.
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9 Appendix A: Newspaper articles used for the analysis
Table 2: Newspaper articles from the Guardian that were used for the analysisDate Author Title19 July 2019 D. Phillips Bolsonaro declares ’the Amazon is ours’ and calls
deforestation data ’lies’26 July 2019 J. Watts ’He wants to destroy us’: Bolsonaro poses gravest
threat in decades, Amazon tribes say16 August 2019 D. Boffey Norway halts Amazon fund donation in dispute
with Brazil23 August 2019 J. Watts Amazon fires: what is happening and is there any-
thing we can do?25 August 2019 T. Phillips Ex-minister: Bolsonaro ’most detested’ leader as
he neglects the Amazon26 August 2019 L. O’Neill Leonardo DiCaprio pledges $5m to help save the
Amazon27 August 2019 J. Watts Amazon rainforest fires: Brazil to reject $20m
pledged by G729 August 2019 L. Siegle Burning issue: how fashion’s love of leather is
fuelling the fires in the Amazon9 September 2019 T. Phillips Chaos, chaos, chaos’: a journey through Bol-
sonaro’s Amazon inferno4 September 2019 T. Phillips Jair Bolsonaro says ’deceitful’ media hyping Ama-
zon wildfires
Table 3: Newspaper articles from the Telegraph that were used for the analysisDate Author Title23 July 2019 Our foreign staff Rare footage of Brazil tribe ’is evidence’ of new
threat from logging3 August 2019 Our foreign staff Brazil space research chief to leave job after Bol-
sonaro rejects data showing huge jump in Amazondeforestation
21 August 2019 A. Quinn Record 84 per cent yearly increase in Amazon firesblamed on deforestation in Brazil
22 August 2019 H. Samuel Amazon fires: Brazilian president sends army totackle blaze after Emmanuel Macron moves toblock EU-South America trade deal
24 August 2019 J. Shute Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro blamed for turn-ing a blind eye to Amazon degradation in the nameof ’progress’
24 August 2019 S. Newy Why is the Amazon burning and how bad are thefires?
25 August 2019 J. Eliasch The amazon may be burning, but it needs moretourists than ever
25 August 2019 D. Chazam Pope Francis calls for international action on Ama-zon wildfires
26 August 2019 D. Chazam Environmental campaigners dismiss G7 pledge of£16 million for Amazon fires as ‘inadequate’
4 September 2019 C. Moss The Amazon may be burning, but it needs moretourists than ever
60
MSC THESIS - JULY 17, 2020
Table 4: Newspaper articles from de Telegraaf that were used for the analysisDate Author Title22 August 2019 Onze Redactie
BuitenlandRookgordijn rond vuurzee in Amazone
23 August 2019 Onze Verslaggevers NASA: Aantal branden Amazone lager dan nor-maal
23 August 2019 J. Wiering ‘Amazone brandt voor Chinese varkens’23 August 2019 Unknown Author Ierland dreigt met blokkade akkoord om Amazone23 August 2019 Onze Parlementaire
RedactieRutte bezorgd om branden Amazonegebied
23 August 2019 Unknown Author Bolsonaro stuurt leger naar Amazonegebied23 August 2019 S. Korstjens De ’longen van de wereld’ staan in brand24 August 2019 Unknown Author Ophef om ’fake foto’s’ bij oproep branden Ama-
zone26 August 2019 Unknown Author G7-landen trekken 20 miljoen uit voor Amazone27 August 2019 Unknown Author Bolsonaro stelt voorwaarden voor G7-hulpaanbod
Table 5: Newspaper articles from de Volkskrant that were used for the analysisDate Author Title16 August 2019 Redactie Na Duitsland stopt ook Noorwegen met financiële
steun aan bescherming van Amazonegebied22 August 2019 C. Speksnijder Recordaantal bosbranden in Braziliaanse Amazone23 August 2019 M. van de Water Amazonevuur verenigt Brazilië24 August 2019 Redactie Bolsonaro belooft ‘zero tolerance’ in Amazone en
zet leger in bij bestrijding branden27 August 2019 G. van Hal Staan de longen van de aarde in brand? En is het
echt zo uitzonderlijk dit jaar?28 August 2019 M. van de Water ‘Buitenlanders willen onze Amazone plunderen’28 August 2019 A. Elshout Bolsonaro is terecht in zijn wiek geschoten30 August 2019 C. van Dillen Correspondent Marjolein van de Water is diep in
de Amazone: ‘Mensen konden hier amper ademenafgelopen week’
31 August 2019 P. Smit Brandt de Amazone voor Nederland?7 September 2019 M. van de Water De machteloze hoeders van het woud.
61
MSC THESIS - JULY 17, 2020
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