Epie Villanueva CONSTI

7/23/2019 Epie Villanueva CONSTI

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MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI vs. THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.

55684.

The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:

In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and

Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of

Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and

mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY

FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-

Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.

When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National

Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok,

Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.

SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly established a

checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.

At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it

did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.

The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc and chili.

When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his companions admitted they have

no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi,

and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, f iled a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution" on

the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.

In a Resolution dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 27, 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684

assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.

On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that respondent judge did not

commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the search conducted without warrant by the police

officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution5 dated April 11, 2001.

Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle

was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.


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In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to privacy against unreasonable

intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for anypurpose in any proceeding.

Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure

constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.6

The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap, we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be

conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of

customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable

searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is

the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,

discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are

in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on

reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule orfixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.

Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace officers.

The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure.

We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney

with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted

vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day,

the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad.

A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut

and transport the same.

In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down

by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to

justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the

vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of

Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

when she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs

against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS

For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, "People of the

Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas," affirming the Decision2 dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo

City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

The Information filed against appellant alleged:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A.

6425, as amended, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously have in his possession, custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams,

95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white crystalline


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substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine

hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4

Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.5

The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the

morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car

bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip,

Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the

team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to astop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City

Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about

the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm.

This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3

Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was

thereafter immediately brought to the police station.

In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they discovered "2 big

plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with one loaded

magazine with eleven ammunition."7

The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in

Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over to the crime laboratory yielded thefollowing:

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine

Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:

Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.8

Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as

a caretaker of "Curacha," a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain

Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him.One of these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so

he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green

colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified

men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men allegedly asked him

regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was

then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he

was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said

vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and

Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct

examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was

driving the Gemini car.

The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant thepenalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant, the records of the case having been forwarded to

this Court by the RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their respective briefs.

In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he questioned the validity of his arrest and the

admissibility of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within

Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which could have justified his

apprehension. He goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the

matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police.

Appellant claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the


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authorities were already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance and

then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence.

On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals conformably with our decision in People v. Mateo,

which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court of cases where

the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision

states:

WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is

hereby AFFIRMED.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be "clear and unequivocal"14 and should therefore

prevail over appellants defense of denial.15 The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he was a victim of

frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from

violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.16 It also took note of appellants failure to give any credible reason why the police singled him

out considering that they were strangers to one another prior to the date of the incident.

Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone assignment of error

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE

III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.

Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade

school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest. He also maintains that he was an easy

target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who

frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for

conviction and that the trial court should not have applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the

police officers.

Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes

that the court a quos evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs and was utterly lacking in substantial

discussion, in contravention of this Courts edict that the decisions must distinctly and clearly express their factual and legal bases.

On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant

filed a Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters for his defense were alreadydiscussed in his previous pleadings.22 The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a

supplemental brief.

The appeal must fail.

In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue

about a witnesss credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb factual findings of the trial

court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed

their deportment and manner of testifying.24 Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or

circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal.25 Our careful review of the records of this

case reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno recounted their

encounter with appellant as follows:

PROS. LUNA: Thank you, your honor.

Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the month of March 1999?

WITNESS:

A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.

Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?

A: Yes, sir.


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Q: How did you come to know him?

A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.

Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please point him out?

A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.

LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:

The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.

PROS. LUNA:

Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7, 1999?

WITNESS:

A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.

Q: What were you doing then at that time?

A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.

Q: Who were your companions at that time?

A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.

Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident at that time?

A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.

Q: About what?

A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.

Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to deliver an undetermined amount of "shabu"?

A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC

411 who will deliver at said place.

Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?

A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?

A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.

Q: What did you do next?

A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.

Q: Where is this located?

A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.

Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?

A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir.

Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify it?

A: Yes, sir.


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Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2. What relation has this to the one you mentioned?

A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.

Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?

A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.

Q: Specifically, what did you do?

A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.

Q: What happened after flagging down the car?

A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?

A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.

Q: What was the reaction of the driver?

A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.

Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?

A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.

COURT:

Q: Did you know what Padlan did?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he do?

A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.

Q: What do you mean "he was asked"? Who was asked?

A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.

PROS. LUNA:

Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?

WITNESS:

A: He said that the gun is not his.

Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did you do as police officer?

A: I ordered him to get down from the car.

COURT:

Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?

WITNESS:

A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.


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Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?

A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.

Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?

A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.

Q: What did you do with the "shabu"?

A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.

Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?

A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir.26

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellants

culpability. His testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 from the moment their office

received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they accosted appellant deserved to be given significance as it came from

the mouth of a law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are

presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the

contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.

Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. It is well-settled that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.28 A defense of denial which is

unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and

cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters.29 Denial is

an inherently weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.

We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the physical evidence presented against him. No less

than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures

of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as

follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by

prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)

customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,32 this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of searches of

moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:

[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of thesearch on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be

searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of

smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add

that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle

can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities

unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional

stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the

policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police


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authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order

to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,34 the term "probable cause" was explained to mean

[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that

the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead

a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in

connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause

that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case.

When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as

the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the

instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A

confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo

City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct

as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun

tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more

strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing

white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of

the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.

In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained

through a warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the

evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.

Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any

court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Again, we disagree.

Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital component of due process and fair play. The rule takes an

even more important significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost so that he may appeal to a higher court, if

permitted, should he believe that the decision needs to be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and

the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who

is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The

decision contained a summary of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise contained an

explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed

appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense of bare denial in

favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties enjoyed by police officers.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding

appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BELEN MARIACOS

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the

decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant

Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:


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Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic

Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver

7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or

office. CONTRARY TO LAW."

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to

the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of

marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena

Carino."

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police

station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The

group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the

checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to

conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network

who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The

agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2

Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black

backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He

then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice

who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,

including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself

as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police

station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor

arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round

bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The

laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney

bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her

neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she


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was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed

accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2

Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police

station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags

which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained

in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of lifeimprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in

the presence of the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite

its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc

when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that

PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched

earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending police

officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990,

which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The

said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after

seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative,

who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt

on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items

allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and

the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had

reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from

their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued

that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon

arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of

marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that

physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was

practicable.

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.12 It held that the

prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the

police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that

contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks

of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was

already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant

carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc

looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no

one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal

drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network,

PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.


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Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the

ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant

must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents

of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the

motor vehicle had already left the locality.

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years,

this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are properand which are not.

Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She claims that her

constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of

appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by

prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy

especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the

occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to

justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or

seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.

In People v. Bagista, the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to

a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.


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With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible

for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of

probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid

only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the

instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary

that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite ofprobable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the

articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce

a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and

circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items,

articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to

be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on

probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the

search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be

searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where

moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or

other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in

other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or

prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him

to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching

officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the police received information that marijuana was

to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of

October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of

marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the

packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the

Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may

have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, theRules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final

judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.


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In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest

police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has

probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled

Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos

(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,

trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any

and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred

thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless

authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any

controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to

carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.

Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting

circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug,

without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly

regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn

behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." There is no definitive moment when an accused

"transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportationitself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support

a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.

Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption that she is the owner

of the packages and their contents. Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she

had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry

some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant

said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him

the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged that theapprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,

apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The

dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.

Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs

Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take

charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as


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well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the

following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically

inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or

seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected

public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous

Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall

take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals

as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in

the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,

physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated

and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any

elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical

inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the

nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-

compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items areproperly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police station. At the station, the police

requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of

appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag

yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley

Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no

representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with

Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost

importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station where she stayed

while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and

sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of

custody from the time of appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not

necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain

unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.38 Even assuming

that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have

moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on

the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they

are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC

No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.

32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,

substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the

direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to

flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said

motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost

in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal

ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told

the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and

slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in

size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the

accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon

his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two

(2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous

drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.


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During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner

testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs committed on 10 March 2003.

It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid

search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of

frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of

violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonmentranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and

destruction in accordance with law. SO ORDERED.

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a

Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed

its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED

UPON IN THIS CASE.

(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there

was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even

assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for

violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the

City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time

when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the

part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their

presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the

said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire

case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse

the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and

solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is

effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making

the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is

required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the

part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest

of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:


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SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director

shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and

regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and

issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours

from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid

thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension

and/or revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during

the conduct of checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in

hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable:

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in

prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There

was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the

ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the

trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged

down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention

to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist

detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not

fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of

the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if

any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once

having stopped, to drive away without permission.

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the

doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that

powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that

sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not

otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively

temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a

policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while

the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to

continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation,

which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators

the answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.

To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in

deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of

the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),

than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any

suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic

stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by

Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California

v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is


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subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections

prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of

the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and

neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner

here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while

riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information orcharge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made

for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police

officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In

this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same

violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation

and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for

the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remainsilent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these

constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of

dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into

confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the

individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after

the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons

suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his

ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the

drugsas he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of

evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk"

search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to ap

lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually

concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincingevidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,

intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction

of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was

merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.

Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is

given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant

objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police

procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the

environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the


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State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and

voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning,

accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes

suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited

protective search of outer clothing for weapons.

In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a

citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court thereinheld that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only

conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the

suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these

underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from

issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial

arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and

transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized

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