Epistemology

Tihamér Margitay, Péter Hartl

5. Coherentism

Justification

We think that there are beliefs which are justified, and which are not justified.

We have good reasons to accept some beliefs, but of course there are beliefs which we don't accept.

Question: What is justified belief?

What are the conditions (requirements) of justification?

Presupposition: An overall and comprehensive definition of 'justification' can be formulated.

Problem of regress

The theories of justification attempt to response to the regress argument.

Given some statement P, it appears reasonable to ask for a justification for P. If that justification takes the form of another statement, Q, one can again reasonably ask for a justification for Q, and so forth.

There are four possible outcomes to this process:

1. the series is infinitely long, with every statement justified by some other statement

2. the series forms a circle (loop), so that each statement is ultimately involved in its own justification

3. the series ends with unjustified beliefs

4. the series terminates with certain statements having to be self justifying

The regress argument

P1: There are beliefs which can be justified only if there are other justified beliefs.

P2: The justification of the belief leads to the infinite or ends at an unjustified belief or runs in a circle or there are self-justified beliefs.

P3: The infinite reasoning cannot be a proper justification of our beliefs.

P4: The circular reasoning cannot be a proper justification of our beliefs.

P5: Appealing to unjusified belief cannot be proper justification.

P6: There are no self-justified beliefs.

C: None of our beliefs are justified.

Foundationalist's answer

Foundationalist rejects P6.

She maintains that there must be some beliefs that, for some reason, do not need justification. (self-justified, fundamental beliefs)

Classical form:

1. The basic beliefs are about my present state sensory experience. („Now it seems to me a red circle”.)

2. These beliefs are considered infallible, unquestionable, incorrible.

3. Other beliefs can be derived from the basic beliefs.

Coherentism

Coherentist denies that there are fundamental beliefs.

Coherentism insists that it is always reasonable to ask for a justification for any statement.

Coherentist argues that foundationalism provides an arbitrary spot to stop asking for justification.

But it does not provide reasons to think that certain beliefs do not need justification.

Coherentist response to the regress argument

1. Coherentist denies P4 (circular reasoning cannot be a proper justification of our beliefs).

Of course coherentist accept that there are some circular arguments which are fallacious.

(Obvious examples of circularity)

But not all circular reasonings are fallacious.

The „great” circles are not necessary fallacious.

Coherentist response to regress argument

2. The regress argument makes the assumption that the justification for a proposition takes the form of another proposition: P" justifies P', which in turn justifies P.

Denies that justification has a linear, „tree-like” structure.

For coherentism, justification is not a linear, but a holistic process.

Example

1. You received a package. The only one you can think of who send you gifts at this time of year lives in Szeged and virtually never leaves the city.

But the package is from Debrecen. This fact doesn't cohere with with your „hypothesis” that it was sent by your good friend, who lives in Szeged.

You open the package, and discover that there is a frozen steak in it. It is not the sort of gift you would expect from your friend (or from anyone either).

You find this puzzling...

Example

2. But a moment later you recall that you recently sent to your friend cheese. You suppose that your friend is probably sending something in response.

Suddenly you remember that she once asked if you had ever tried frozen gourmet steaks, and when you said you had not she replied that she would have to give you some one of these days.

Justification by coherence

You now have a coherent pattern of beliefs and might be justified in believing that it was your friend who sent the package.

If you come to believe this on the basis of the pattern, you (have a justified belief).

When you at last find your friend's greeting card at the bottom of the box, then (normally) you would know that your friend sent the package.

Justification by coherence

A kind of incoherence with our beliefs prevents you justifiedly believing your first hypothesis (that the box came from your friend).

You have several options in order to make your belief system coherent.

But later, as relevant pieces of the pattern developed, you became justified in believing this, and (presumably) came to know, that your friend sent the package.

Holistic justification:

A justified belief is more like answering a question in the light of a whole set of relevant information than like deducing a theorem by successive inferential steps from a set of axioms (basic beliefs).

Coherentist's account of justification

The justification of a belief is not a (entirely) linear process.

The end of justification process: we make certain that belief p is (logically) connected with our system of previous beliefs.

If our system of beliefs (B) is justified and p is coherent with B, then p is justified.

And a belief (q) which is item of set B, is justified, if q is coherent with another beliefs of set of B., etc.

Coherentism

The central idea of coherentism is that the justification (justifiedness) of a belief depends on its coherence with other beliefs.

Belief p is justified if belongs to coherent system of beliefs.

Unlike foundationalism, there are no basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs (none of our beliefs have special, epistemic role).

Question: How can define 'coherence'?

Strong and weak formulations of coherentism: coherence can be a sufficient, or necessary condition.

Coherence and consistency

Coherent set of belief: logically consistent.

Contradiction (example): 'A and not-A'.

A set of belief contents, p1, …. pn, is coherent only if p1, …. pn neither includes, nor logically entails, a contradiction.

Objections to this kind of theory of coherence:

1. But what about fairy tales?

Statements in a fairy tale can consitute a logical consistent set. But of course it would irrational to believe in a fairy tale.

Another objections

2. There can be several coherent (consistent) systems of beliefs which are inconsistent with each other.

But B and B' systems (which are inconsistent with each other) cannot be equally true.

Possible response: The coherent system of beliefs must be comprehensive and large enough.

3. But a paranoid can have a consistent and comprehensive set of beliefs (but of course his beliefs are not justified or rational.)

Conclusion: logical consistency is not sufficient for coherence (and justification).

Argument against coherentism

Logical consistency is not necessary for justification

We have a lot of justified beliefs. If justification requires coherence, each of us has coherent system of beliefs. But is it a psychologically realistic picture?

And we have a plenty of beliefs, how can we check that there is no logical inconsistencies among them?

The logical connections between our beliefs are not entirely transparent to us.

The demonstration of consistency would be an extermely complex and long process (if it is possible).

Incoherent and justified beliefs?

„The Preface Paradox”

Imagine an historian who has just completed her lifelong book project.

She has double and triple checked each claim that she makes in the book, and each has checked out.

For each of the claims she makes, c1, ….. cn, she has a justified belief that it is true:

She has the justified belief that c1 is true, the justified belief that c2 is true, … , and the justified belief that cn is true.

Incoherent and justified beliefs?

At the same time, the historian is fully aware of the fact that historians make mistakes. Likely, her book contains at least one mistake.

For this reason, she believes that at least one of the claims that she makes in her book is false. (it can be considered a justified belief, because we have reasons to think that every book contains at least one mistake.)

She believes that c1 is true, the belief that c2 is true, … , the belief that cn is true, and she has a belief that at least one of c1 through cn is false.

But this yields a set of beliefs that is not logically consistent

Therefore her set of beliefs are not justified. (it is paradox)

Additional requirements

Explanatory relations:

The beliefs are being explained by means of each other.

Coherent set of beliefs needs explanatory richness.

The toxic is steaming in the room is explained by the fact that the cap is off the bottle of toxic liquid.

Toxic is steaming in the room explains the fact that I am feeling sick.

And: I am feeling sick → There must be toxic in the air → The cap must be off the bottle. „The toxic is steaming” serves to both an explanation why I am sick and serves as the explanatory basis for the cap being off the bottle.

An 'explanandum' is something that needs to be explained and its 'explanans' is the explanation of that phenomenon.

Additional requirements

Occam's razor:

Selecting the competing hypothesis that makes the fewest new assumptions, when the hypotheses are equal in other respects.

The „simpliest” (in this sense) explanation is the best explanation.

Empiricism

The beliefs (or the most of the beliefs) must be empirical or be connected with the experience.

Theories about truth

Theory about justification: What is justified belief?

Theory about truth? What is truth?

There is another theory of coherentism: the coherentist theory about truth.

The coherentis, about justification and coherentist theory about truth are not the same! (but it is possible to hold them together).

Is it true that there is extraterrestrial life?

The philosophical problem is: What does it mean to say that it is true that there is extraterrestrial life?

Astrobiologists study the former problem; philosophers, the latter.

Correspondence theory about truth

„It is true that there is extraterrestrial life.”

Traditional answer: A proposition p is true if p corresponds to a fact (which is expressed by the proposition).

Truth is a certain relationship between a proposition and its corresponding fact. (whole proposition and the fact)

But what about universal claims? (All ravens are black. - is it a fact?)

But what about negative claims? „There are no unicorns.” Is this a fact of the world?

Coherentist theory of truth

The truth of a proposition is a relationship between the proposition and other propositions.

Example: A drunk driver says: “There are pink elephants dancing on the highway in front of us.”

Is it true? We examine what other beliefs we have already accepted as true, and if this believe is coherent with them, we accept this claim as true, otherwise it is false.

Coherentist theory of truth

We accept these propositions:

Elephants are gray.

This location is not the habitat of elephants.

There is neither a zoo nor a circus anywhere nearby.

Intoxicated persons usually have hallucinations.

Everyone else in the area claims not to see any pink elephants.

Build on these accepted propositions, we reject that: “There are pink elephants dancing on the highway in front of us.”

Coherentist theory of truth

The coherence theory of truth claims that a proposition is true if and only if it coheres with a certain set of propostions.

Which propositons?

1. My own beliefs. (one's own beliefs)

2. The beliefs of the majority of persons in one’s society.

3. The beliefs of the intellectuals in one’s society.

4. It is consistent with all other true propositions, entails (or logically implies) all other true propositions.

Objections to coherentist theory of truth

Similar objections can be formulated:

1. There are different set of consistent propositions, which inconsistent with each other, therefore they cannot be both true.

2. Truth is not relative. p is coherence with my beliefs, but it doesn't coherent with your beleifs.

3. The conspirancy theory is a consistent, but it doesn't mean that it is true.

4. Our beliefs are usually considered as representing the mind-independent world. But there can be consistent sets of propositions which don't have any connections with the reality.