Equal protection cases Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado 227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993 Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957] Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests , Political Law Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Transcript
Equal protection casesPhilippine Judges Association Vs. Prado 227 SCRA 703G.R. No. 105371November 11, 1993
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
Case Digest on De Guzman v. Comelec G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)November 10, 2010
FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the law violated their security of tenure.
HELD: What the guarantee of security of tenure seeks to prevent is the capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. Where it is the legislature which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purpose of the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. 23794 February 17, 1968]Post under case digests, Taxation at Thursday, March 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.
Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes”
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
Case Digest on People v. Jalosjos
November 10, 2010
324 SCRA 689
FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused,
a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was
reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the
legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was
depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress.
HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the
common restraints of general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the
Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if
offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement
of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years
has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional
sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was
elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of
action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members
being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY MIJANO y TAMORA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Because a man is poor, uneducated and jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction, should he be exempted from the imposition of the
death penalty after it is proved beyond moral certainty that he indeed had sexually abused a five-year old girl?
The Court is burdened, once again, with the heavy task of passing upon, by way of automatic review, a judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty for statutory rape, in this case, alleged to have been perpetrated by accused-appellant Jimmy T. Mijano.
Accused-appellant’s conviction for said crime arose from an Information reading as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of May, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one HAZEL RAMIREZ Y ABING, who is a child below seven (7) years old, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and stood trial, resulting in a judgment of conviction, accordingly disposing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused, Jimmy Mijano y Tamora GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of raping Hazel Ramirez y Abing, a child below 7 years of age, which is punished under Art,. 335 (No. 4) of the Revised penal Code, as amended, with death, and in view of Article 63 of the same Code, accused Jimmy Mijano y Tamora is sentenced to die and such accused be put to death by the method or means prescribed by law; to indemnify the victim, Hazel Ramirez, the sum of P100,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 65, Rollo.)
The prosecution’s version of the events is based principally on the testimony of victim Hazel Ramirez, her mother Dina Ramirez, and a neighbor by the name of Arnulfo Valiente. The Office of the Solicitor General adopted the summarization by the trial court of its findings, to wit:
Dina Ramirez is the mother of five-year old Hazel Ramirez who was born on 02 April 1991. In the morning of 10 May 1996, she washed clothes while one of her neighbors, Jimmy Mijano, was having a drinking session with some friends. Hazel was then playing together with other children. The children were later brought by the accused to their house at Helen Catral Street. Dina later in the afternoon became suspicious and started looking for Hazel and asked the playmates of Hazel where she was. She was told that the accused was playing with her. She went out to the street but was not able to find her daughter. Instead, she saw one Arnulfo Valiente who informed her that he saw Hazel together with Jimmy at Helen Catral Street. Arnulfo Valiente and Dina proceeded to the said place which was a grassy area beside a river and near Bacoor, Cavite. They reached the said place at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon. It was Arnulfo who first saw Hazel already pale and her vagina was profusely bleeding. She was wearing a dress but her panty and skirt were gone. Hazel also had an abrasion on her right hip. Dina first brought Hazel to the Las Piñas Police Station to report the incident but the police suggested that Hazel be brought to the NBI. The Medico Legal Officer advised them to bring Hazel to the PGH because they cannot examine her vagina which was bleeding profusely. Accused has a reputation for molesting women and even raping them whenever he is drunk. Dina identified the accused in open court. (TSN, July 22, 1996, pp. 2-5).
Arnulfo Valiente corroborated the testimony of Dina Ramirez.
The third witness for the prosecution was the victim herself. Five-year old Hazel Ramirez herself confirmed that the penis of Jimmy Mijano was inserted into her vagina. Hazel identified the accused in open court. (TSN, July 29, 1996, pp. 2-4).
(p. 64; pp. 79-81, Rollo.)
The defense is based on the testimony of its sole witness, accused-appellant. He denied the charges and testified that on May 10, 1996 at around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at home quaffing alcoholic drinks with his friends. However, he could not recall how many they were and neither could he give their names. According to him, while they were having a drinking spree, he was suddenly arrested, for what reason he was not aware. Likewise, he could not remember who arrested him and what time he was brought to jail because he was too drunk, and he failed to inquire from the arresting officer why he was jailed (tsn, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-3).
The trial court did not accord credence to the testimony of accused-appellant, pointing out in its decision that the defense of denial and accused-appellant’s alibi that he was at home having a drinking spree with alleged friends he could not identify, deserve no serious preoccupation of the mind. Nor yet can his claim that he was too drunk to know what transpired at the time when the rape was committed, be given weight to disprove the charge against him.
Hence, the instant review and appeal, anchored on a single encompassing and catch-all argument that the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not, however, demanded by law for a conviction. It is sufficient that moral certainty as to the presence of the elements constituting the offense, as well as of the identity of the offender be established (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]).
In the instant case, it does appear that the main issue raised by accused-appellant is the credibility of victim Hazel Ramirez. Accused-appellant claims that the child-witness was too young to know the significance of an oath because she could not answer questions. She should have known that she was supposed to answer all questions and not only those to which answers had been rehearsed, hence, her entire testimony should be stricken off the record for lack of proper answers during cross-examination.
We do not agree.
Many times has this Court said that in reviewing rape cases, it will be guided by the settled realities that an accusation for rape can be made with facility. While the commission of the crime may not be easy to prove, it becomes even more difficult, however, for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove that he did not commit the crime. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons normally are involved, the testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution, and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663 [1996]; People vs. Casinillo, supra).
In the instant appeal, as invariably in almost all rape cases, the issue boils down to the credibility and story of the victim. Just as often, the Court is now constrained to rely on the observations of the trial court in the appreciation of testimony, said court being given the opportunity not equally enjoyed by the appellate courts. It has thus since become doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of testimonial evidence is accorded great respect because it has the direct chance to observe first hand the demeanor of the witness on the stand (People vs. De la Cruz, 754 SCRA 229 [1994]) and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and conclusion (People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493 [1996]).
The Court has meticulously gone over the testimony of the victim and ultimately reaches the dispiriting conclusion that the act complained of did occur. Hazel’s testimony on the rape perpetrated against her is clear and could have only been narrated by a victim subjected to that sexual assault. Thus:
Q: Do you know this person who is the accused in this case by the name of Jimmy Mijano?
A: (Witness nodding her head.)
Q: What do you mean by nodding your head, Hazel?
A: No answer.
Q: Now, Hazel, if I say that you know Jimmy Mijano and he is inside the courtroom, please stand up and point to him?
A: That person, sir. (Witness crying as she points to a person inside the courtroom who, when asked by the interpreter, answered by the name of Jimmy Mijano)
Q: Why are you crying? Are you angry to Jimmy Mijano?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said you saw the titi of Kuya Jimmy Mijano, what did he do with his titi to you?
A: Ipinasok niya sa pekpek ko.
Q: What happened to your pekpek when Kuya Jimmy Mijano inserted his penis to your vagina?
A: It was bleeding.
Q: When Jimmy Mijano inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel?
A: I felt very painful, napakasakit po.
Q: Will you please elucidate before this Court, I withdraw. Will you please illustrate how Jimmy Mijano inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: (No answer. Instead, witness cries aloud.)
(tsn, pp. 2-4, July 29, 1996))
Accused-appellant attempts to discredit the victim’s testimony by assailing her attitude and behavior during cross-examination. However, it must be borne in mind that the victim is an innocent, wholesome, and naïve 5-year old girl that this Court, or anyone for that matter, can not expect to articulate and verbalize answers to all the questions thrown at her. Being a child and a victim of rape, her testimony should be expected to be accompanied by emotional overtures. Verily, it is not right to judge the actions of a child who has undergone a traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from normal and mature people (People vs. Tadulan, 271 SCRA 233 [1997]). In fact, when victim Hazel was asked to illustrate how accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, she could no longer give an answer and instead cried
aloud. She was then forthwith cross-examined by the defense, and Hazel was just too dazed and shaken up, due probably to having to recall her traumatic experience, to answer the questions. She just continued to cry. Such scenario evidently strengthens the claim of the victim that she was sexually abused by accused-appellant, and not otherwise. Hazel cannot be expected to remember every ugly detail of the appalling outrage, especially so since she might in fact have been trying not to remember them and to erase them from her mind (People vs. Butron, 272 SCRA 352 [1997]). She cannot be expected to mechanically keep and narrate an accurate account of the horrifying experience she had undergone (People vs. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142 [1997]). When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed (People vs. Cabayron, 278 SCRA 78 [1997]). Thus, Hazel’s testimony is given full weight and credit.
Moreover, no rule in criminal jurisprudence is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime (People vs. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997]).
In the case at bar, accused-appellant’s alibi that at the time Hazel was being raped he was at home getting drunk with his friends, cannot possibly be given more probative weight than the clear and positive identification provided by no less than three credible eyewitnesses in the persons of Hazel Ramirez, her mother Dina Ramirez, and their neighbor Arnulfo Valiente.
The testimony of Valiente pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is clear and positive, thusly:
q And who was the companion if any of Hazel in that area?
a She was with other children and Jimmy Mijano.
q What else did you see?
a Hazel was embraced, sir.
q By whom?
a Jimmy, sir.
q Could you please stand up and demonstrate before this Honorable Court how Jimmy Mijano embraced Hazel? May we ask the mother supposed she is Hazel?
a Jimmy Mijano embraced the child while the child was facing her back towards the accused and the hands of Jimmy Mijano was pressed at the nipple of Hazel Ramirez.
x x x x x x x x x
q Where did you find the second time Jimmy Mijano the accused in this case?
a At the grassy area, sir.
q And tell this Honorable Court what was Jimmy doing in that grassy portion of Helen Catral?
a He as on top of the child and has no pants.
q You are telling us that Jimmy Mijano was also naked?
a Yes, sir.
q And you saw him with your two eyes on top, with naked buttocks?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you see if the body of Jimmy Mijano was moving sidewards or up and down?
a I did not notice I saw only he was on top of the child.
(tsn, pp. 10-11, July 22, 1996)
Valiente’s account of the incident finds support in Dina Ramirez’ story recounting her daughter’s horrifying experience –
q If this Jimmy Mijano y Tamora is inside the court room, please point at him?
a There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person in yellow T-shirt who stood up and answered to the name of Jimmy Mijano, the accused in this case).
q You stated a while ago accused is your neighbor will you please tell us what place are you a neighbor of Jimmy Mijano?
a Inside the Carnival Park – Looban we are neighbors, sir.
q Let me take you back on May 10, 1996, in the afternoon, Madam Witness?
a Yes, sir.
q In the afternoon, could you tell this Honorable Court what were you doing?
a In the morning of May 10, 1996 I was then washing clothes while accused Jimmy Mijano together with his friends was having a drinking session under our house. My child was then playing and then my child together with her children was brought by Jimmy away from our house called the Helen Castral St.
q Then what happened when you came to know your daughter Hazel was with other children with the accused at Helen Catral?
a It was like this in the afternoon it was drizzling. I asked my child’s playmates the whereabout of Hazel who told me that Jimmy was playing with them and then I became suspicious and started looking for my child. I went out of the street but I was unable to see my child and saw one Arnulfo Valiente standing on the street and asked him if he saw my child and answered “Yes I saw her together with Jimmy at Helen Catral St.”
q Did you go to the place where you described as Helen Catral?
a Yes, sir.
q Who was your companion in going to Helen Catral?
a Arnulfo Valiente, sir.
q When you reached Helen Catral what did you observe if any?
a The place is a grassy area and near Bacoor and there is a river.
q When you went to the said Helen Catral where you able to see your daughter Hazel?
a I was not able to see her but it was Arnulfo Valiente who first saw her.
q And when was the time you saw your daughter?
a At around 5 o’clock in the afternoon.
q In what place did you see Hazel?
a At Helen Catral St., sir.
q Will you tell this Honorable Court. Let me clarify Madam witness when you went there after a few minutes also in the place of Helen Catral?
a Yes, sir.
q Will you please tell this Honorable Court what was the condition of your daughter when you saw her?
a When I saw my daughter she was pale and when Arnulfo Valiente lifted her we saw her vagina was bleeding.
q What else did you see, if any?
a She was bleeding profusely and her vagina was injured.
q How about her clothing?
a We were not able to see her clothes except her blouse which she was wearing and she has no panty and skirt.
q How about the other part of the body did you observe any injury or contusion?
a She has abrasion on the right hip, sir.
q You stated a while you brought your daughter to the police station hereafter you brought your daughter to this police station of Las Pinas, what happened next?
a The police suggested that my daughter be brought to the hospital because of the profuse bleeding and we went directly to the NBI.
q What happened at the NBI Madam Witness?
a We were advised to bring the child to the PGH. They cannot examine the vagina because of the profuse bleeding.
(TSN, pp. 3-4, July 22, 1996)
Prosecution witness Dr. Stella Guerrero Manalo confirmed the claim of victim Hazel Ramirez that she was raped, to wit:
Q On your own medical and professional opinion, based on the physical examination you conducted on the person of the victim, what would have caused this laceration? Would it have been caused by a penis?
A It is highly probable with the history given. And on the basis of the history that I gathered from the child, I would say that it was a case for rape.
(TSN, p. 5, Sept. 2, 1996)
Furthermore, the examination of the victim’s underwear gave positive result for seminal stains.
Accused-appellant’s alibi that he was drunk with his friends when the rape was committed, it is to be noted, remained but a stark, unsupported averment, as verily, the defense neither identified nor presented any of the alleged drinking partners of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Court fails to find any serious flaw in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses nor in the conclusions of the trial court which, to the contrary, appear to be properly founded on the direct, positive, and categorical statements made by Hazel and her witnesses in most material points.
Finally, accused-appellant in his reply brief contends that the death penalty law is violative of the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him, the poor, the uneducated, and the jobless.
The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what
he is or what he possesses (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., p. 6).
Republic Act No. 7659 specifically provides:
x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
x x x
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
x x x
Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons – rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed.
We have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death penalty where the law itself provides such punishment for specific and well-defined criminal acts (People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 [1997]). Further, compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege (Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819 [1997]). The evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is overwhelming. The law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven years of age. Thus, to answer the query, the perpetration of rape against a 5-year old girl does not absolve or exempt accused-appellant from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction. To hold otherwise will not eliminate but promote inequalities.
Although four justices of the Court continue to maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray (supra) that Republic Act no. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nonetheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that death penalty should herein accordingly be imposed.
Applying the new policy laid down in the case of People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party is and should be P75,000.00. In addition, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are likewise awarded without need for proof of the basis thereof. Lastly, accused-appellant is liable to pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158 [1997]).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Jimmy T. Mijano guilty of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the severest penalty of death is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications above-stated.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [n. 1] For reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge
suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation statutes and, after modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions. The Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.
The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the Virginia Code:
"Leaving State to evade law. -- If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to
and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage."
Section 20-59, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:
"Punishment for marriage. -- If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years."
Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between "a white person and a colored person" without any judicial proceeding, [n. 3] and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, respectively, define "white persons" and "colored persons and Indians" for purposes of the statutory prohibitions. [n. 4] The Lovings have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a "colored person" or that Mr. Loving is a "white person" within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.
3 Section 20-57 of the Virginia Code provides: "Marriages void without decree. -- All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process." Va. Code Ann. § 20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
4 Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code provides: "Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white persons.' -- It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall
apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter." Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
The exception for persons with less than one-sixteenth "of the blood of the American Indian" is apparently accounted for, in the words of a tract issued by the Registrar of the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, by "the desire of all to recognize as an integral and honored part of the white race the descendants of John Rolfe and Pocahontas . . . ." Plecker, The New Family and Race Improvement, 17 Va. Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at 25-26 (New Family Series No. 5, 1925), cited in Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189, 1202, n. 93 (1966).
Section 1-14 of the Virginia Code provides: "Colored persons and Indians defined. -- Every person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing in this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians." Va. Code Ann. § 1-14 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications. [n. 5] Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period. The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a "white person" marrying other than another "white person," [n. 7] a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that the applicants' statements as to their race are correct, [n. 8] certificates of "racial composition" to be kept by both local and state registrars, [n. 9] and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage. [n. 10]
5 After the initiation of this litigation, Maryland repealed its prohibitions against interracial marriage, Md. Laws 1967, c. 6, leaving Virginia and 15 other States with statutes outlawing interracial marriage: Alabama, Ala. Const., Art. 4, § 102, Ala. Code, Tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Florida, Fla. Const., Art. 16, § 24, Fla. Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. § 14:79 (1950); Mississippi, Miss. Const., Art. 14, § 263, Miss. Code Ann. § 459 (1956); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North Carolina, N. C. Const., Art. XIV, § 8, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat., Tit. 43, § 12 (Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S. C. Const., Art. 3, § 33, S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Const., Art. 11, § 14, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Texas, Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 492 (1952); West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961). Over the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. The first state court to recognize that miscegenation statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause was the Supreme Court of California. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
7 Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
8 Va. Code Ann. § 20-53 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
9 Va. Code Ann. § 20-50 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
I.
In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its 1955 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S. E. 2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the
State's legitimate purposes were "to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the obliteration of racial pride," obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Id., at 90, 87 S. E. 2d, at 756. The court also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment. While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.
Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does not
mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), or an exemption in Ohio's ad valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race. The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that although these historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; "[at] best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on
racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The State finds support for its "equal application" theory in the decision of the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). In that case, the Court upheld a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct by members of the same race. The Court reasoned that the statute could not be said to discriminate against Negroes because the punishment for each participant in the offense was the same. However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning of that case, we stated "Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 188. As we there demonstrated, the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-345 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already stated that they "cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the
color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 198 (STEWART, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J., concurring). There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. [n. 11] We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
11 Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes, as expressed in the words of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity," extends only to the integrity of the white race. While Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the exception for the descendants of Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend that this distinction renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes arbitrary and unreasonable even assuming the constitutional validity of an official purpose to preserve "racial integrity." We need not reach this contention because we find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the "integrity" of all races.
II.
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied
in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
These convictions must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
I have previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that belief, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
