Ethics for Thurs

8/12/2019 Ethics for Thurs

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ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH

SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,

Complainant,

- versus-

ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 6010

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, andVELASCO, JR.,JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High

School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly

committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office ofBaguio City; a pending

administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU

for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the

pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal

deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:


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In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet,

before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one

Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was

subsequently annulled for being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarizedcertain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of

respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1]

dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the

Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for

commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts

of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Ownership[2]

dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta,

subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2. Affidavit

[3]

dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribedand sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3. Affidavit[4]

dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos,


4. Affidavit[5]

dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed

and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5. Absolute Date of Sale[6]

dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in

favor of Senecio C.Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7]

dated 5 March 1994, executed by

Evelyn C. Canullas andPastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7. Sworn Statement[8]

dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin,


8. Deed of Sale[9]

dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of

Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10]

dated 1 June 1994, executed

by Ponciano V. Abalos andArsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11]

dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in

favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12]

dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in

favor of Mario R.Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13]

dated 17 April 1996, executed

by Villiam C. Ambongand Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14]

dated 27 February 1997, executed by

Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
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14. Memorandum of Agreement[15]

dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO

represented by Mr. JohnnyTeope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham,

notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary

and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second

marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16]

the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for

investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in

their complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and

the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period

when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good

faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent beadministratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal

steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of

law for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the

expiration of his notarialcommission, he be suspended from the practice of law for

another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.[17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of

Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of

this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second

marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando

C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal

documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando

C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2)years Suspension from the practice of law.

[18]
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This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty

contained therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the

State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such

privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to

practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by

judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutionalprivilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct

rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be

understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a

person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an

office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to

punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19]

that the Bar should maintain a

high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal

profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the

legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed

by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be

disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include

statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover

practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its

members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity

or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a

mere citizen at another.[20]

Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may

reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the

subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral

character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must

be continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral

conduct.[22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May

1982before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable

differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact,

respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with

her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member

of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of BaguioCity, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second

marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having

been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage

to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989,

having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a

second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the

appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9,

or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second

marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came
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after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case

is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the

conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative

case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the

judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually

committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against

members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.[23]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis,grossly

immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral

indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the communityandwhat is grossly

immoral,that is,it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be

reprehensible to a high degree.[24]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his

disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the

Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His

act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice,

decency and morality.[25]

However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly

immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board

of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the

high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost

seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife,

whom he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his

wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother

and child went toAustralia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27]

respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as

shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was

null and void ab initioand that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had

contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some

assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant

pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his

own child safely to a hospital.
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In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28]

respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such

as:first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying

him;third, he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he

availed himself of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the

latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure

complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and

declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and

declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The

power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that

seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be

decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[29]

In line with this philosophy, we find that a

penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the

IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his

commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite

his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in

notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the

contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act

as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible

in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon

its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the

performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance

would be undermined.[30]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual

formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to

do so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public

documents.[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the

Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to

disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawy ers oath to

obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned

when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath

similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7

of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five

documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit,

supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find
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that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of

fourteen (14) documents[33]

without the requisite notarial commission.

Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse

allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office ofBaguio City; the

pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created

by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on

alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the properforums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and

another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years

of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as

the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Claridades

PUP College of Law

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Home About Atty. Alvin T. ClaridadesLee v. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008; 544 SCRA 393 (2008)

Posted onJune 20, 2012byalbinoski2005

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FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008]
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MANUEL L. LEE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago

with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and

testament.

In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested

will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the

purported witnesses to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of

land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.[1]

Complainant, however,

pointed out that the residence certificate[2]

of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated

January 5, 1962.[3]

Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of

donation[4]

(containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased

father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one

another in all angle*s+.[5]

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses

Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective

voters affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records

Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the

certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June

30, 1965 and is available in this Office*s+ files.[6]

Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations:

(1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and

spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament

was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit[7]

of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of

Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit[8]of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and

Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.[9]

Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by

complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.

Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of

the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.

Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not

first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation.[10]


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In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old

Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics,

particularly Canon 1[11]

and Rule 1.01[12]

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13]

Thus, the investigating

commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of

three months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:

[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution

as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws

and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary

public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial

commission is Revoked and Disqualifiedfrom reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.[14]

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree

the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.[15]

A will may either be notarial or holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities

surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and

testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.[16]

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the

testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the

presence of the testator and of one another.[17]

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must

be considered void.[18]

This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or

prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the

witnesses.[19]

The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other

requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.[20]

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and

declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the

notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.[21]

The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-

fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is

administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was

neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the

residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of

the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions

by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a

will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the

party to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption

from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.


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These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary

weight attached to notarized documents.[23]

A notary public, especially a lawyer,[24]

is bound to strictly observe these

elementary requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document

or instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax.Every contract, deed, or otherdocument acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented

their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered

by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence

certificate as aforesaid.[25]

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act[26]

which stated:

When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it

shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of

the residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to

whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to

exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial

Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence

certificates of Noynay and Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the

archives division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public

shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis

supplied)

Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not

a cause for disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in

his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in

chronological order:

1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;6. give each entry a consecutive number; and7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.[27]In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had

crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his

notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification[28]

stating that the archives

division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.


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A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The

proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,[29]

otherwise, the evidence

presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as

evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the

admissibility of secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 1999[30]

must fail. Not

only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;

[31]

its contents did not squarelyprove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32]

and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of

their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.[33]

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness

cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the

witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.[34]

Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as

a consequence of his breach of duty.[35]

In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in

the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in

the manner required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.[36]

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted

transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[37]

and Canon 1[38]

and Rule 1.01[39]

of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the

Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40]

For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to

which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[41]

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer

assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer

should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.[42]

Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in

the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.[43]

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[44]

A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary

action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment

that he has engaged in professional misconduct.[45]

These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment,

suspension and reprimand.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.[46]

We have held in a number of cases that the power to

disbar must be exercised with great caution[47]

and should not be decreed if any punishment less severesuch as

reprimand, suspension, or finewill accomplish the end desired.[48]The rule then is that disbarment is meted out

only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the

court.[49]


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Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to

his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of

existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, wefind that he

acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of

suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission[50]

and his

perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.[51]

WHEREFORE,respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1)the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one year and his notarial

commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as

an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIEDfrom reappointment as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the

Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as ma

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO,J.,

Chairman,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.

ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,

Respondent, Promulgated:

October 25, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA,J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar

decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1]with supporting documents[2]against respondent Atty. Virgil R.

Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.[3]

The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
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Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May

2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784,

entitledSps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin,had already been remanded to the

court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not

the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copyof the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records

to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the

Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this

outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could showus the copy sent to the party you claim to be

representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two

weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant

replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.

Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?

Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty tonotify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court

of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano,Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon?

Kasdiay?(You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office,

banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people

at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.[4]

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and

shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you

are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents

words but still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by

complainants window, he again shouted,Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and

still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting

doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.[6]

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident,was supported by anAffidavit[7]signed by employees

of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. TheAffidavitnarrated the same incident as witnessed

by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidencewas filed by complainant on 25

September 2003.[8]

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9]requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint.

Respondent submitted his Compliance[10]

dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the

plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the

RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30.He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the

complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured

him of the same.
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14/23

Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.

However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve

days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records

were returned to the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the

Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter alsomoved that the case be submitted for resolution.

[11]Respondent later on filed a Manifestationstating that the reason

for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit

to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his

public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of

respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she

accepted.[13]

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other

complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.[14]

The IBP submitted to this Court a

Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he

been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of

the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the

Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its

decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to

the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties

to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professionalemployment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give

proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent

deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether

he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudelytowards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of

invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in

front of her subordinates.
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As held inAlcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16]

respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior

can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.[17]

These acts violate

Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to

practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the

discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his

professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,

offensive or otherwise improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves

with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of thelegal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves

without reproach at all times.[18]

As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges

in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5

May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavitthat respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an

isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the

latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court.

[19]

We, however, cannot acknowledge suchallegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by

either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had

apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent

should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do

even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be

taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be

purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite

conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of

professional duty.[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)

PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decisionbe

furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CO-NAZARIO,J.:
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This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe,

both as a member of the bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for

dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the latters actuations in the handling of Civil Case No.

1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda

MarquezRoque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to the records of Civil Case No.

1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him

in his quest to win the case.

Invoking the principle ofres ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was

raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-

BG. Another reason for his objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-BG

were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was prepared by respondent Judge in his

capacity as then lawyer of herein complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing constitute

misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that

respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff was his former client and which complaint

was copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of his intention as to the disposition of the

case.

Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the respondent lawyer to copy thecomplaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it to court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon

1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,

integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in placing his signature in the complaint not written by

him, respondent lawyer committed deceit, which serves as a ground for his disbarment.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court referred the instant

administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation

within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.

Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005, and directed the

complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents

relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after the marking and offering of

their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon

their motion, they were given a period of thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after

which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.


17/23

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other hand, filed

his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:

In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez)mortgaged six (6) parcels of land to

the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of land with an area of Twenty Two

Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya,

Bauang, La Union covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent

granted on 5 July 1989.

Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August 1993, the

mortgaged properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of which was the

petitioner. Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate

of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the petitioner.

In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O.

Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank and Trust Company.

Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of the mortgaged

properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter, filed a complaint docketed as

Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts with Damages

against said petitioner, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust

Company. Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque as her counsel of

record in said case and was the one who drafted said complaint.

On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge Jose G. Pineda, issued

an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was not a real party in interest since her right

of action has still to ripen upon the death of her mother.

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge of RTC Branch

67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all his professional relationships with his

clients, including Roque, and turned over or relinquished all case records of his office to said clients.

Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now acquired by way of

succession her mothers right of action to pursue the annulment of contracts executed over theproperty formerly covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged the legal services of respondent lawyer.


18/23

Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a complaint for

Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and Damages against petitioner, his

attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and

Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc., now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before

the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.

On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was raffled to the

respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordoo, its Branch

Clerk of Court, issued summons to the defendants. The summons and copy of the complaint was

duly served upon the petitioner on 20 January 2004.

Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his court, respondent

judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that the plaintiff therein was Roque, his

former client. Immediately, without going over the allegations of the complaint, the respondent

judge issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the

record of said case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC

Branch 33).

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67 transmitted the entire

record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33 through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T.

Domingo, which was duly received by the latter.

On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67, an Objection to

Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records thereof were already transmitted

to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch Clerk of Court had said pleadings forwarded

thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch

33.

In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their Answers and the issues

having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial conference and ordered the submission of the parties respective pre-trial briefs.

On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended Answer together with

the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to

appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial Brief.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Courtreferred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for investigation, report and

recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. A copy of the said Resolution was

received by the undersigned on 18 November 2005.


19/23

Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the undersigned set the

case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the petitioner and the respondents, and their

witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge, after the marking

and offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they will not be adducing

any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period thirty (30) days within which to

simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the

other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his

Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondents, and that

complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous complaint.

A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present administrative case is

unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioners

allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for what they

really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be

stressed that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents committed

the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be dismissed.

First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent lawyer, through

the intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free access to the court records Civil

Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support. Without more, petitioner deduced that the court

records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG were made available to the respondent lawyer at the instance ofthe respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the complaint filed by the

latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said

allegation deserves scant consideration.

Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and substantial

portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or

unethical practice on his part.

For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access to the case record

of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge had already turned


20/23

over and relinquished his case records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after his appointment to

the bench on 8 November 2001. Since she intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is

expected, if not necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously dismissed complaint to

her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the right of Roque and the respondent

lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request access to the court records for their reproduction or

certification.

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by the respondent

judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioners claim that the latter merely copied, verbatim or

otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations contained therein were substantially

retained by respondent lawyer. However, these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of

action of Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number of ways to

construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that respondent lawyer is legally restrained

from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent judge.

More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the respondent

lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is unfounded. Aside from the petitioners

mere say so, there is not even an iota of evidence to support this assertion. It is all too obvious that

there is a dearth of evidence that would in any way prove petitioners accusation against the

respondents.

In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent judge intended to try Civil Case No.

1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute this. Reading his petition, it isevident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead this court to believe that respondent judge is

still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself

therefrom. His intent to deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the respondents is

undeniable.

As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this regard. He is

well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting

himself from the case and ordering the transmission of the record of said case to the RTC Branch

33. In fact, petitioner has been actively participating in the proceedings of said case before the RTC

Branch 33 prior to the institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed several

pleadings therewith.

If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously written to deliberately

and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the respondent judge had already inhibited

himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG and that the records thereof had in fact

been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself is frivolous,

calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the integrity and reputation of


21/23

both the respondents. The only piece of evidence that the petitioner has offered in support of his

claim is his bare assertions, which certainly deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized

that a mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with

guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. This brings to the fore the

application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations.

Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner

Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents, there is merit in

the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the petitioner administratively liable for

filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.

As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint against the

respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure speculation and

conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to mislead the Court and cast a doubt

on the integrity and dignity of the respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as a

vehicle to unduly harass or otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his

own desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary and the bar.

For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the Supreme Court had

pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-Hormachuelos. Said the Court:

Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the

Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate

the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary,

neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that

only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem ofthe Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:

By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really,

there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section

20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty:

To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial

officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the

duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude, not for thesake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its

supreme importance. That same canon, as corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent

upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more,


22/23

the attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good

fidelityto the courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the

courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any

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