ethics full text

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B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992EUFROSINA Y. TAN vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL.SABANDAL, respondent. Nelbert T. Paculan forrespondent.Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge ofunauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandaland accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to takethe oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll ofAttorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration ofthe aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or

"Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, hiswillingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting tohis good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsideredits earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer'soath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shallstrictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit

of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legalprofession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separatemotions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616,and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed aMotion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowingrespondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent haddeliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that inhis Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed saidcases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that

Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and ComplainantCornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that theyare in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowingrespondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBPZamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986,certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and hasbeen careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signedonly by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte


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Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from theBoard of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles wasrespondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent'sparents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached toComplainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification,dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga delNorte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that

"the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as Presidenthad not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moralcharacter and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to byComplainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBPZamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O.Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any

certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Boardof Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best torequire the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga delNorte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to givea testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character asto entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reasontherefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court ofZamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a

COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member ofthe Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days fromnotice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica,Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga delNorte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with therespondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as woulddisqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant tomention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitledRepublic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director ofLands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds ofZamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga

del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversionpending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaintfiled by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to havesecured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel ofland which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swamplandand not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, andwhich he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc.The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at publicauction and respondent has not redeemed the land until thepresent. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted aCertification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its SecretaryPeter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by theOffice of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City ofDipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and theOffice of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E.Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any

pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on theabove findings, the Board does not find any acts committed bythe petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the PhilippineBar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBPCertification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica'scomment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement

objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4


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August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Courtinvolving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFERthe setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandaland required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcomeof the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747),pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received anotherComment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpinin SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking ofrespondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in CivilCase 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This commentwas Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court thather relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as

he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her andthat she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him.Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reasonto oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincererepentance and reformation which she believes make himmorally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view ofthis development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend himfor admission to the legal profession and request this HonorableCourt to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient."This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990,

which also required a comment on Tan's letter fromcomplainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in theircomment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a privatepersonal disposition which raises the question whether personalforgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate thesecases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and

finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in thesecases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction anddiscretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutionswhich are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of theforegoing final and executory resolutions, these cases thereforeshould not in the least be considered as anything which issubject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions

of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could notimprove his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, JudgePacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8,Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge PelagioLachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30

June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, acopy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandalet al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which,according to him, was already considered closed andterminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties,approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel

for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the OriginalCertificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name andthe latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan;provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to theRegister of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass ofpublic domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of'Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts ofpossession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant

Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of


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P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinanto waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentionedJudgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991.In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpinwere required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC ofZamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pendingcase with his Court and that he has no cause to object to hisadmission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in theResolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to takethe lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our

Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on theaforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants withthe Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to commenton the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the saidResolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991,stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof ofSabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance withrestitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that

"there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar."This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterateshis plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed totake the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he

took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after carefulconsideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform.

Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attestingto his good moral character and civic consciousness. At thattime, we had not received the objections from complainant Tanto Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravityof the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the

Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by theGovernment in 1985 and was brought about because ofrespondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over aparcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use assecurity for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time,Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did notsubmit any defense and was declared it default by order of theRTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventuallysettled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering thebogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the

mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses oflitigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil CaseNo. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed noobjection to the approval of the said amicable settlement andprayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "asthe amicable settlement may amount to a confession by thedefendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985,at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to takethe lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for

reconsideration alleging his good moral character without,however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case againsthim.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstancesattending its termination, the Court now entertains secondthoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of theBar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator

at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated hisprocurement of the free patent title over property which he could


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not but have known was public land. This was manipulative onhis part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is amanifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service,which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed bythe Republic against him where no determination of his guilt orinnocence was made because the suit had been compromised.Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable

settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What ismore, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity ofhis title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosureof the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he didnot lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filedagainst him was eventually compromised. This is a sadreflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure toreveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversionfiled against him during the period that he was submitting

several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal hislack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character,yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of thependency of any criminal case against him and were obviouslymade without awareness of the facts and circumstancessurrounding the case instituted by the Government against him.Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother hisacts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted anyopposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. Theyhave already expressed their objections in their earliercomments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objectionto his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, thebasis of her complaint treating as it does of another subjectmatter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not amatter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who

are not only learned in the law but who are also known topossess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried tomaintain a high standard for the legal profession, both inacademic preparation and legal training as well as in honestyand fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves

are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one ofthe ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of thisnoble profession only those persons who are known to behonest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo,82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broaddimensions, it has been defined as "including at least commonhonesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It

has also been held that no moral qualification for barmembership is more important than truthfulness or candor(Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit tobecome a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed totake the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romeroand Nocon, JJ., concur.


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EN BANC[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainantRemedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of herhusband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuinggrossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena(Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively

charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of thecourt. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11,1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, wasmeted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2]while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission onBar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent weremarried on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart RomanCatholic Church in Quezon City. They established theirresidence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven childrenwere born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family toDadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his lastthree children were born and where he practiced his profession

until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea,in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elenagave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed

an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality.After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for aperiod of six months without pay was meted by this Court uponrespondent.[5]

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit withElena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and otheradministrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer ofthe court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases wereconsolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his

dismissal and separation from the service.[6]

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mendhis ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in thebirth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named LaellaPea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandonedcomplainant and his children by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back toAntipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And

on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elenain a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court JudgeIsagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while therespondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing onrecord shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United Statesof America upon her retirement from the government service in1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kepther posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their

fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against them.Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which


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she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the presentpetition for disbarment under the compulsion of the materialimpulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic andcruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured theassistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report andrecommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, theCommission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandezrecommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name bestricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised onthe ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposedupon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondentcontinued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead ofcontradicting the charges against him, respondent displayedarrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court,as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for twomonths without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girlMs. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being orderedseparated in later administrative case constitute double

jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea willconstitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the IntegratedBar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolutionadopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97Adm. Case No. 4148Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is herebyADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendationof the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case,herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by theevidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and

that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of CommissionerFernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board ofGovernors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support theforegoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendationto this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b),of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondentsactuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only acondition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but itmust also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standingin that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps noprofession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-tonedmorality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code ofProfessional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adverselyreflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether inpublic or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to thediscredit of the legal profession.*

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must liveup to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession,by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code ofProfessional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a

high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality includinghonesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times


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subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and communityapprobation. Needless to state, those whose conduct bothpublic and private fails this scrutiny would have to bedisciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalizedaccordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once

a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates thisprofessional infractions. For having occupied that place ofhonor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to befree from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is thevisible representation of the law, more importantly, of justice.Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength thatfortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge shouldavoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations,lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely,respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial

Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity andethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested withpublic trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration ofjustice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensurethe faith and confidence of the public that justice is administeredwith dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity isexpected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. Hemust maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly

society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity anddignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his dutiesto society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16]Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged withthe responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what isright, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness andresponsibility that have been compendiously described asmoral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to

strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his

profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for theBar but also the administration of justice.

On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend alawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or privatecapacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, inhonesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to

continue as an officer of the court.[17]

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with greatcaution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriouslyaffects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer ofthe Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarmentproceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto fullopportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action istaken, to assure the general public that those who are taskedwith the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable,

trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clientsmay repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint fordisbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and theirson; and that he had adulterous relations with a married butseparated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome theevidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grosslyimmoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred

when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with anotherwoman who had borne him a child. The Court held thatrespondent failed to maintain the highest degree of moralityexpected and required of a member of a bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previoussanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued hisillicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. Thereport of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughlythe complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the

contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in theface of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,


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tasked to determine whether he still merited the privilegesextended to a member of the legal profession, resolved thematter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoralconduct abounds against him and could not be explained away.Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a priorone still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreatingcomplainant and their children, show his disregard of family

obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyersoath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearlyshows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moralindifference to scandal in the community, and his outrightdefiance of established norms. All these could not but put thelegal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of theadministration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict butappropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is

hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike outhis name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno,Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, andQuisumbing, JJ., concur.Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.Purisima, J., no part.


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SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001]

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTELBUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. DOLORES S.ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of theRegional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decisiondated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming thedecision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty indirect contempt of court.

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearingheld on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitledRoyal Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran andBeatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates ofTitle, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer forPreliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order inthe sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the RegionalTrial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of RoyalBechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order onFebruary 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of theProvince of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificatesof title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds ofthe Province of Cavite could comply with said order, thedefendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion tocancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newlyappointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed anopposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16,

1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by thecourt. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitionerfiled an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996,filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt ofCourt.[3]

During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held onDecember 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:

ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, yourHonor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready withrespect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, yourHonor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds isproperly notified for todays hearing.

COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here,your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.

COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection withthe order of this Court which directed your office to register lis

pendens of the complaint in connection with this case of RoyalBecthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and BeatrizAlvaran, et al.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received thismorning at ten o clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that as early asNovember 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds wasfurnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the

record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer,opposition or pleadings with respect to this motion.


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ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask forthe assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence ofa Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not

a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will considerthat you should be amply represented.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyerhere, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing

ATTY. BARZAGA[4]: Yes, your Honor, I will just review therecords.

ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yetpresent my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibitswhich are part of the record of the case and thereafter yourHonor please.

COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is apreparation being done by newly appointed counsel of therespondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hiredcounsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this

contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go overthe record of this case so that we can call the other case in themeanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor,after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed thatthe motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, therecord of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, theRegister as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcionof the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,

did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996,March 29, 1996, respectively. However, your Honor, Atty.Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming fromAtty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed tothe Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining toTCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request,your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly showsthat it has been already entered in the book of primary entry.We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court thatthe Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6,

1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was madeby the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, yourHonor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 anOrder has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading asfollows, Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of thedefendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of theProvince of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice oflis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos.519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed yourHonor, will first mark our documentary evidence.

COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what youwant to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, hehas not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finishedand then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to havean orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues

appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering thatthe order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has


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already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we justrequest that we be given a period of ten days from today yourHonor, within which to submit our formal written opposition yourHonor.

COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to themanifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the

refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendensbecause of certain reasons. According to the manifestation ofAtty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the recordof this case, the reason for that is because there was a pendingsubdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,1996. May I have the record please.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with

respect to that matter.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Well, according to Atty. DiosdadoConcepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of themanifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly.Because this Court believes that the root of the matter startedfrom that. After the submission of the . what are you supposeto submit?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Comment your Honor, on themotion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.

COURT: After the submission of the Comment andfurnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff,this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equaltime within which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this

representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first

our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing fortoday, your Honor please.

COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they donot have their comment yet what are we going to receive asevidence.

ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please

COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whateveryou have to do after the submission of the comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but therecord will show that the motion for contempt was copyfurnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.

COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what

the Court would want to do. This should be an orderlyproceedings and considering that this is a Court of record thecomment has to be in first then in your reply you can submityour evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put upby the respondent and so we will be able to hear the casesmoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is thatthe respondent had been long time furnished of this contemptproceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it

in due time in accordance with the rules and because it isscheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence andpresent to this Court, your Honor.

COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.

COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Courtyour Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor,


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please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, yourHonor.

COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow theprocedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could

feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representationever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on recordthat I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort ofjustice in town.

COURT: Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness andwe are deprive to present our witness.

COURT: You have presented a witness and it was anadverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.

COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is

for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point intime I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my rightto inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.

COURT: You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogativeyour Honor.

COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going tofollow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT: Yes, you know your rules thats why you areputting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged bythis Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic)aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certioraricases, your Honor.

COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite youfor contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the policeand I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to theSheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favorof my client your Honor please.

COURT: You have been given enough time and you havebeen abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is theappreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting myclient, your Honor.

COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is anabuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff)Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaolcited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:

During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel werepresent together with one (1) operating a video camera who

was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case whilecounsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation


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to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentaryevidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) theDeputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.

The Court called the attention of said counsel who explainedthat he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to takepictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function,

and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in towwith him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsyexplanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after theCourt took exception to the fact that although the proceedingsare open to the public and that it being a court of record, andsince its permission was not sought, such situation was anabuse of discretion of the Court.

When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcionmanifested that he needed the services of counsel and right

then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him,the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark andpresent his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty.Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit awritten pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has somany ramifications and the issues are complicated.

At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed tomark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in

fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty.Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty.Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Courtdirected him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for anorderly proceeding.

While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytimehe felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order,at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered wordsinsulting the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter

as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts,that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to

move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly beingantagonistic to his client, and other invectives were hurled tothe discredit of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in directcontempt and order the Courts sheriff to arres t and place himunder detention.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty.Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, evenchallenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, andcontumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt ofCourt and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment andpayment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commenceimmediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.[5]

Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day

sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine ofP3,000.00.[6]

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5,1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orderciting him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolutionof his motion for reconsideration. Both motions were neverresolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.[7]

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public,petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying forthe annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing himin direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine ofP3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S.Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in directcontempt of court, and that said Order was null and void forbeing in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent lawsand jurisprudence.[8]

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of thetranscript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on


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December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeedarrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extentof being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards thecourt.[9] It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, butfound that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit ofP2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court,[10] and ordered theexcess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it

rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack ofmerit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued bythe trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that theexcess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to thepetitioner.

Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this loneerror:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLEERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THETRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONERS SUBMISSIONSSMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITSQUESTIONED DECISION.[11]

Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript ofstenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that

the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factualand legal basis. It would also show that he was polite andrespectful towards the court as he always addressed the courtwith the phrase your honor please.

We disagree.

Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended byAdministrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:

Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty ofmisbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to

obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, includingdisrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalitiestoward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully requiredto do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such courtor judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousandpesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it

be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine notexceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceedingone (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.

We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals thatpetitioners alleged deference to the trial court in consistentlyaddressing the respondent judge as your Honor pleasethroughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:

1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial

court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) iscontrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain fromscandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior beforethe Courts.

2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judgewas partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers

from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the recordor have no materiality to the case.

3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts order tomaintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5,1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of theCanons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty tomaintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order tomaintain its importance in the administration of justice, andCanon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to


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the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similarconduct by others.

4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellowcounsel who at the time he was making representations inbehalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitionerand was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13,

tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 ofthe Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer toconduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward hisprofessional colleagues, and

5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds ofthe Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right tobe heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the

Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer toalways treat an adverse witness with fairness and dueconsideration, and Canon 12 of Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effortand consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficientadministration of justice.

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in thepetitioners use of the phrase your honor please. For, afterusing said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in

his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officerof the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if properdecorum is to be observed and maintained during courtproceedings.[12]

Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have hisdocumentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting theopposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to saidcounsel and the court, was defiant of the courts system for anorderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and isessential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and

to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of thecourt, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.[13]Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near acourt or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punishedsummarily without hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot claimthat there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge inissuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving

the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make animmediate reconsideration. The records show that petitionerwas cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala ofrespondent judge, and he even filed a motion forreconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.[15]

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carriedby his emotions in espousing the case of his client - bypersisting to have his documentary evidence marked despitethe respondent judges contrary order - he did so in the honest

belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client tothe best of his ability and with utmost diligence.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing hisclients cause (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656).He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound toexert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedyand efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12,

Canons of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. PresidingJudge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). Heshould not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeatthe ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons ofProfessional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede theexecution of a judgment or misuse court processes, inaccordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons(Ibid).

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist

the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which


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tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justicecontravenes such lawyers duty.[16]

Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner indirect contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in theamount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which

took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established thatthe fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thusproperly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Asidefrom the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out topetitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed inSection 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appealsdid not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 ofthe Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional TrialCourt of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return tothe petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00out of the original fine of P3,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ.,concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H.LIM, respondent. Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty.Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's disbarment for allegedmalpractice and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint areas follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan ofP92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainantexecuted a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed ofassignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which sheregularly receives from the United States government as awidow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of

assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until theloan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a specialpower of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect andreceive her pension checks from the post office at TagbilaranCity. The above documents were apparently prepared andnotarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.

On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after theexecution of the aforementioned special power of attorney,complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she

was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages

against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appearedas counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B.Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting herpension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later

filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contemptof court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunctionby changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap,the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expandingthe scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post officesin the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion toallow the latter to withdraw the pension checks. This motiondoes not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record

but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondentAttorney Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into acompromise agreement again without the participation of theformer's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was statedthat complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yapof P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that complainantand Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthlyinstallments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40%

per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromiseagreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the presentcomplaint for disbarment, based on the following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented fromseeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2)lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or atleast to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be

furnished copies of the same;


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8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it wasnot necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretensethat: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she wouldonly be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a newlawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she hadnothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign;(e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her

time; and in any event respondent already took care ofeverything;

9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully hercase by means of fraud, deception and some other form ofmendacity practiced on her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authorityassumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat; .. . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel forcomplainant,Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim furtherstated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did notactively participate in the case and it was upon the request ofcomplainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he(respondent) made the compromise agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify

her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandonedher since she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandonedby her lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent neverfurnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreementand a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited byYap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise

agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L.Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 withinone (1) year from 4 October 1984. There is no provision in thepromissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to bepaid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect basedon the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney'sfees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2August 1985, complainant's debt to Yap was increased toP150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10)months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-fivepercent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromiseagreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would bepayable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest offorty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount ofmathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the

compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant'scounsel of the compromise agreement, it is of record thatcomplainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Intingand Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent preventedher from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasonsenumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform

opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither isthere any showing that respondent informed the trial court of thealleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.

Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandonedby her counsel, respondent saw an opportunity to takeadvantage of the situation, and the result was the execution ofthe compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, isgrossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial tocomplainant.


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Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member ofthe legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subjectof controversy with a party represented by counsel; much lessshould he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter withhim, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent uponthe lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend tomislead a party not represented by counsel and he should notundertake to advise him as to the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroachupon the professional employment of another lawyer; however,it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give properadvice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithfulor neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all concerned given after afull disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professionalconduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim, warrants theimposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court.Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannotbe left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence andtrust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice frombeing attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is herebyimposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of lawfor a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon hisreceipt of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personalrecord as attorney and member of the Bar, and furnished the

Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and theCourt Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


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THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUISMEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES,CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS

of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES,respondents.

D E C I S IO N

VITUG, J.: JVITUG

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code ofProfessional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:

"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subjectof controversy with a party represented by counsel, much lessshould he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter withhim, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent uponthe lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend tomislead a party not represented by counsel and he should notundertake to advise him as to law." barth

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyerscomprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices,

namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D.Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos.Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students fromthe AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for theIssuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and forDamages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged thatrespondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured andeffected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with

four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, ineffect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might

have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and toterminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filedagainst it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondentswas unbecoming of any member of the legal professionwarranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice oflaw.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that notone of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation,discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, nolonger connected at the time with the Pangulayan andAssociates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, heclaimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effectingthe settlement of an administrative case involving nine studentsof AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the

recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. Thestudents, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, NeilJason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon,Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, andCleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board ofDATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published someobjectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-memberStudent Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, andafter a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the useof indecent language and unauthorized use of the student

publication funds. The body recommended the penalty ofexpulsion against the erring students. Jksm

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R.Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencementof Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before theRegional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civilcase was still pending, letters of apology and Re-AdmissionAgreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf ofsome of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated

27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother,and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC


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President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs.Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon andRe-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACCPresident; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven,assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission

Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; andletter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito,assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23January 1997 with the AMACC President.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997,was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending byAttorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and AssociatesLaw Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation

was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Courtthereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Barof the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163,thus:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is herebyADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation

of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and,finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence onrecord and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendmentAtty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice oflaw for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty andDISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for theydid not take part in the negotiation of the case." Chief

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and

Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant wasby then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the

civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of thisfact. Although aware that the students were represented bycounsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, tonegotiate with them and their parents without at the very leastcommunicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant,who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. Thisfailure of respondent, whether by design or because of

oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons ofprofessional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to acolleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of himas a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreementscenters only on the administrative aspect of the controversy isbelied by the Manifestation[1] which, among other things,explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:

"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4)of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed aRe-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R.AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMACOMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARYACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil,criminal and administrative proceedings which they may haveagainst the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm

"x x x......x x x......x x x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion toWithdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them."

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP InvestigatingCommission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings;nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension wouldappear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given thecircumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayanis ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of


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THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt ofthis decision. The case against the other respondents isDISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record ofrespondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, andfurnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to allcourts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,JJ., concur


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something more can be done toward overturning a final judicialmandate.

In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remissand inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into thevortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable carewhich every member of the Bar must needs exercise before

rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or underlitigation.

Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyeris enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom hewould substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, atthe very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplatedsubstitution. 2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the presentcase as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effectsought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of

the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of thepresent incident he averred that he exerted efforts tocommunicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from beingconvinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his writtenmanifestations to this Court did he make mention of such effortson his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainlymere after thoughts.

Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty.Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity

Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who wascounsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969,certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope ofour decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the VarsityHills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted thetwo cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case,he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as isthe befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with anotherin a pending cause. 3 He did not bother either to comprehendthe substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the saidcase, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Hadhe been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely

detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case.Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at thehearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him abouthaving been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then thatcircumstance of itself should have indicated to him theimperative need for verification of the true status of the presentcase. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of

Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident,categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano shouldhave done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted ofmembers of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visitto the records section of this Court, which is easily and quicklyaccessible by car or public conveyance from his office (MayBuilding, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in theprovince and he did not have the time to come to the SupremeCourt building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query

to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.

We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence inthe performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer ofthis Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less thanhis suspension from the practice of the law profession, were itnot for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning hismistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the senseof this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severelycensured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any

future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.

Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwithwithdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counselof record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal recordof Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of thisCourt.


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EN BANC

G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUANGARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.

Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.C.W. Ney for defendants.

TRACEY, J.:

This proceeding is to punish the defendants forcontempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia

Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in thePhilippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change ofsovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and assuch was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was enteredaccordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendantNey, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together,

sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that theyhad established an office for the general practice of law in all thecourts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himselfespecially to consultation and office work relating to Spanishlaw. The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney & Bosque. JuanG. Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol - C.W. Ney, abogadoamericano."chanrobles virtual law library

Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personallyappeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuringthrough an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed notwith the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as

attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney,abogado."chanrobles virtual law library

On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other onSeptember 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions sosinged with the names of the defendants and the practice beingrepeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers

sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon,and he thereupon instituted thisproceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defendtheir acts as being within the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every

pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, doesnot permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of thenames of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise;therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a partynor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor wasit aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of theindividual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in thisinstance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents sonamed was a person residing in these Islands to whom thiscourt had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in

question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuseto recognize as a practice any signature of names appended topleadings or other papers in an action other than those specifiedin the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing bynon-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originallyone of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not,however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firmdesignation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted topractice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is to be noted that we are not now considering an applicationfor the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his


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office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an off icer ofthe court, could not be proceeded against in that way, andprobably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted thisform of proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

Should either of these defendants be thus punished for

contempt?chanrobles virtual law library

Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contemptas follows:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction grantedby a court or judge;chanrobles virtual law library

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance

of his official duties or in his official transactions.

Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts isrestricted to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parteRobinson, 86 U.S., 505.)chanrobles virtual law library

As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order orcommand of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by thedefendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque canhave disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law.

This order, however, was directly binding upon him,notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hopeon his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for itsviolation. Even had he been entitled under the statute topractice law without any license from the court and without anapplication to it, yet its order made on his own petition. Amandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. Theirregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate,had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt toengage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth theestablishment of an office for the general practice of law in allthe courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right

and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that hewould devote himself to consultation and office work relating toSpanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in theequipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on adifferent footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regardto which a skilled person might as a calling, advise withoutpracticing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a

Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of hisprofessional character in the Islands. Independent of statutoryprovisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualifiedfrom practicing law. One of the most eminent Americanadvocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after acontest in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas AddisEmmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of thedefendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made ina proceeding to which he was a party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque isobviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer ofthe court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, thedefendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conductamounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. Inthe offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a generalpractitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature ofthe pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It isimpossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the

law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it.Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregardof the rulings of the court has not commended him to ourindulgence, while the offensive character of certain papersrecently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope ofhis voluntarily conforming to the customary standard ofmembers of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is finedin the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of


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this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. Soordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.


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THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,respondent.

D E C I S I O NNARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a salesrepresentative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. AshariM. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4thJudicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executedfor the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housingunits belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simplyVillarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loanwas also granted to Alauya by the National Home MortgageFinance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.

advising of the termination of his contract with the company. Hewrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifyingyou of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement enteredinto between me and your company, as represented by yourSales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company'sbranch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds thatmy consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaidsales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said salesagent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and

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